United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Bulletin 81-02: Supplement 1, Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure

                                                       SSIN No. 6820 
                                                       Accession No.: 
                                                       8011040283 
                                                       IEB 81-02, Supp. 1 

                               UNITED STATES 
                       NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                           WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 
                                     
                              August 18, 1981 

IE BULLETIN NO. 81-02 SUPPLEMENT 1:     FAILURE OF GATE TYPE VALVES TO CLOSE
                                        AGAINST  DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE 

Description of Circumstances: 

IE Bulletin No. 81-02, "Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against 
Differential Pressure," identified several gate type valves that had been 
shown by tests and/or analyses by Westinghouse to have a potential for not 
closing against differential pressure. 

As a part of its ongoing analysis program, Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical 
Division (W-EMD) has applied the analytical methods developed for valves 
discussed in IE Bulletin 81-02 to the remaining motor operated gate valves 
that they manufacture. These analyses predict that closure problems could 
also be anticipated with 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18-inch nominal size 
valves in addition to 3- and 4-inch low-pressure valves. Thus, the entire 
line of W-EMD manufactured motor-operated gate valves has the potential for 
not closing against differential pressure. 

Westinghouse has indicated to NRC that they have notified all of their 
domestic nuclear customers of this problem. When the valves were provided as
original scope of supply, they also identified the recommended corrective 
action necessary to assure valve closure under the system service conditions
that their records show the valves will experience. Where the valves were 
provided as spares or replacements, they indicated the threshold 
differential pressure across the valves above which closure could not be 
assured under the utility order equipment specification conditions. 

A list of power reactor facilities that Westinghouse believes to have the 
potentially affected valves is given in Table 1. However, this list, as well
as Westinghouse's notifications, does not take into consideration the fact 
that the valves may have been transferred between facilities. In addition, 
the Westinghouse determinations of operability and corrective action do not 
take into consideration the fact that the valves may have been transferred 
between systems or that the system service conditions may have changed 
through design evolution. 

It is therefore essential that all facilities verify the presence or absence
of W-EMD manufactured motor-operated gate valves and also verify their 
ability to close under the current and/or intended service conditions. 

Actions To Be Taken by Licensees: 

1.   Within 30 days of the issuance date of this bulletin supplement, 
     ascertain whether any W-EMD manufactured motor-operated gate valves 
     have been 
.

                                                      IEB 81-02. Supp. 1 
                                                      August 18, 1981 
                                                      Page 2 of 3 

     installed, or are maintained as spares for installation, in 
     safety-related systems where they are required to close against a 
     differential pressure. 

2.   If no valves, other than those reported in response to IE Bulletin 
     81-02, are identified, report this to be the case. No further action is
     required. 

3.   If any valves are identified as being installed, verify that they are 
     capable of closing under their current limiting normal and post 
     accident service conditions. If such cannot be shown, take corrective 
     action on these affected valves and evaluate the effect that failure to 
     close under any condition requiring closure would have on system(s) 
     operability pursuant to the facility technical specifications for 
     continued operation. 

4.   If any valves are identified as spares, verify that they are capable of
     closing under their intended limiting normal and post accident service 
     conditions. If such cannot be shown, either modify the affected valves 
     so that they are qualified for the intended service or obtain qualified
     replacements prior to installation. 

5.   Within 45 days of the issuance date of this bulletin supplement, submit
     a report to NRC listing the affected valves identified in 
     safety-related systems, their service or planned service, and the 
     maximum differential pressure at which they would be required to close, 
     the safety consequences of the valves failing to close, the corrective 
     action taken or planned, and the schedule for completing the corrective 
     action. 

Actions To Be Taken by Construction Permit Holders: 

1.   Ascertain whether any W-EMD manufactured motor-operated gates valves 
     are or will be installed, or maintained as spares for installation, in 
     safety-related systems where they are required to close against a 
     differential pressure. 

2.   If no valves, other than those reported in response to IE Bulletin 
     81-02, are identified, report this to be the case. No further action is
     required. 

3.   If any valves are identified, verify that they are capable of closing 
     under their intended limiting normal and post accident service 
     conditions. If such cannot be shown, either modify the affected valves 
     so that they are qualified for the intended service or obtain qualified
     replacements prior to startup. 

4.   Within 90 days of the issuance date of this bulletin supplement, submit
     a report to NRC listing the affected valves identified for use in 
     safety-related systems, their planned service, the maximum differential
     pressure at, which they would be required to close, the safety 
     consequences of the valves failing to close, the corrective action 
     taken or planned, and the schedule for completing the corrective 
     action. 

For those cases in which reports have already been submitted in accordance 
with the Technical Specification, 10 CFR Parts 21 and/or 50.55(e), this 
information need not be resubmitted. Rather, licensees or construction 
permit holders should reference this earlier report and submit only the 
additional information requested above. 
.

                                                      IEB 81-02, Supp. 1 
                                                      August 18, 1981  
                                                      Page 3 of 3 

Reports, signed under oath or affirmation under the provisions of Section 
182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, shall be submitted to the Director of
the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the 
Director of the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. 
20555. 

If you need additional information regarding this matter, please contact the
appropriate NRC Regional Office. This request for information was approved 
by OMB under blanket clearance number 3150-0012 that expires December 31, 
1981. Comments on burden and duplication should be directed to the Office of
Management and Budget, Reports Management Room 3208, New Executive Office 
Building, Washington, D.C. 20503. 

Attachments: 
1.   Table 1, Partial List of Plants With 
       Valves Manufactured by W-EMD
2.   Recently issued IE Bulletins
.

                                                      Attachment 1 
                                                      IEB 81-02, Supp. 1 
                                                      August 18, 1981 

                    TABLE I. PARTIAL LIST OF PLANTS WITH
                        VALVES MANUFACTURED BY W-EMD

Valves Supplied as                                Valves Supplied as
Spares or Replacements                            Original Scope of Supply

Arkansas Nuclear One 1                            Beaver Valley 2 
Beaver Valley 1                                   Braidwood 1, 2 
Callaway 1, 2                                     Byron 1, 2 
Catawba 1, 2                                      Callaway 1, 2 
Diablo Canyon                                     Comanche Peak 1, 2 
Farley                                            Shearon Harris 1, 2, 3
Indian Point 2                                    Marble Hill 1, 2 
Midland 1, 2                                      Seabrook 1, 2 
Oyster Creek                                      South Texas 1, 2 
Prairie Island 1, 2                               Summer 1 
St. Lucie 2                                       Vogtle 1, 2 
San Onofre 1, 2, 3                                Watts Bar 1, 2 
Summer 1                                          Wolf Creek 1 
Surry 2 
Wolf Creek 1 
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