Bulletin 75-04: Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station
BL75004 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 March 24, 1975 J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region I N. C. Moseley, Director, Region II J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III E. M. Howard, Director, Region IV R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V IE BULLETIN NO. - 75-04 - CABLE FIRE AT BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION The subject Bulletin should be dispatched for action to the following facilities by close of business on March 24, 1975. Arkansas 1 Brunswick 2 Calvert Cliffs 1 Cook 1 Hatch 1 Indian Point 2 Millstone 1 San Onofre 1 Three Mile Island 1 The Bulletin should also be dispatched for information to all other power reactor facilities with operating license or construction permit no later than close of business on March 26, 1975. The text of the Bulletin and draft letter to licensees are enclosed for this purpose. John G. Davis Deputy Director for Field Operations Office of Inspection and Enforcement Enclosures: As stated . -2- Distribution: D. F. Knuth, IE J. G. Davis, DDFO:IE L. I. Cobb, A/D, IE (3) H. H. Brown, D, ISP D. Thompson, AD, IP, OOE:IE B. H. Grier, AD, CO:IE C. W. Kuhlman, AD, REMP:IE Director NRR Director, RL Director, TR Assistant Directors, RL (6) Assistant Directors, TR (4) H. D. Thornburg, Chief, FSEB:IE J. L. Crews, FSEB:IE FADreher; GCGower; SEBryan; GHSmith; FSEB:IE M. Meadows, Secretary, DDFO:IE D. Hodges, Secretary, FSEB:IE (Original) Central Files EDO Reading Files IE Files IE Reading Files DDFO:IE Reading Files . IE Bulletin No. 75-04 Date: 3/24/75 CABLE FIRE AT BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES: Preliminary information from Tennessee Valley Authority regarding a fire which occurred on March 22, 1975, at their Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama, indicates that the fire was started as a result of construction activities. The fire resulted in the shutdown of two operating nuclear plants and made several safety systems inoperative, including systems normally used for decay heat removal during shutdown. The workmen were engaged in construction activities on a third unit not yet licensed for operation by NRC. Initial information indicates that during the installation and testing of cable through-wall penetrations an open flame ignited a flammable material used in the penetration seals. ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES: The following actions are requested of selected Licensees with operating power reactor facilities and major construction activities at a common site: 1. Review your overall procedures and system for controlling construction activities that interface with reactor operating activities, with particular attention to the installation and testing of seals for electrical cables between compartments of the reactor building, e.g., control room to cable spreading room. 2. Review the design of floor and wall penetration seals, with particular attention to the flammability of materials. 3. Evaluate your procedures for the control of ignition sources which may be used for leak testing or other purposes in areas containing flammable materials. 4. Report to this office, in writing within 20 days of the date of this Bulletin, the results of your reviews or evaluations regarding items 1 through 3 above. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES MAY BE REVISED: The actions requested of Licensees above may be revised as additional details of the Browns Ferry occurrence are available and evaluated by the NRC.
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