BL74007 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545 JUN 26 1974 J. P. O'Reilly, Director of Region I N. C. Moseley, Director of Region II J. G. Keppler, Director of Region III E. M. Howard, Director of Region IV R. H. Engelken, Director of Region V DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS, RO BULLETIN #74-7 PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE - IRRADIATOR FACILITY The enclosed RO Bulletin #74-7 should be transmitted to all Irradiator Licensees in your Region, that are listed on the enclosed List A and to those licensees on List B who rely on interlocks, radiation alarms and/or administrative controls to preclude exposure of personnel. These notices should be transmitted by certified mail, return receipt requested. John G. Davis, Deputy Director for Field Operations Directorate of Regulatory Operations Enclosure: DRO Bulletin #74-7 cc: D. F. Knuth, RO P. A. Morris, RO B. H. Grier, RO C. W. Kuhlman, RO G. W. Roy, RO S. H. Smiley, L G. R. Grove, L G. A. Blanc, L . NAME AND ADDRESS Date: 6/26/74 DRO Bulletin #74-7 License No(s). Gentlemen: The enclosed Directorate of Regulatory Operations Bulletin No. 74-7 "Personnel Overexposure - Irradiator Facility" is sent to provide you with information obtained during an investigation. This information may have applicability to your facility(ies). The action to be taken by you is identified in Section B of the enclosed Bulletin. If you have any questions on the contents of this Bulletin, please do not hesitate to contact us. Sincerely, Director Enclosure: DRO Bulletin #74-7 . RO BULLETIN PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE - IRRADIATION FACILITY A recent investigation of a serious overexposure of an employee at an Irradiator Facility revealed safety problems which may exist at other plants where radioactive materials are similarly utilized. A. Description of Circumstances: An experienced operator received a whole body exposure of from 300 to 400 rems when he entered a cell where a 120,000-Curie cobalt 60 source was in the unshielded position. This entry resulted from several significant contributing causes which included: 1. A radiation alarm circuit required by the license had been deactivated. If operating it would have alerted the operator to an unsafe condition. 2. The operator failed to perform a physical radiation survey as he entered the cell. 3. The operator failed to follow approved pre-cell-entry operating procedures, which required visual assurance that the source had been returned to its shielded position. 4. The cell operator was unaware that the radiation alarm circuit had been or could be deactivated. B. Action Requested: In view of the above you should take the following steps: 1. Perform a complete operational test of all interlocks, radiation alarms and other devices which have been installed to prevent radiation exposure of personnel. 2. Review your administrative controls to assure that all regulatory requirements are being met. Such controls, if license conditions permit, must provide conservative criteria under which any protective devices may be bypassed or reduced in effectiveness. 3. Conduct special training of all operating personnel on the proper operation of all protective devices and safety related procedural requirements to assure that these devices are properly operated and procedures are followed. . -2- 4. The above actions along with any necessary repairs, should be completed within ten (10) days of the receipt of this notice. A record detailing the actions taken, findings, and corrective measures if any, shall be retained for review during the next inspection.
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