Event Desc|En No|Site Name|Licensee Name|Region No|City Name|State Cd|County Name|License No|Agreement State Ind|Docket No|Unit Ind1|Unit Ind2|Unit Ind3|Reactor Type|Nrc Notified By|Ops Officer|Notification Dt|Notification Time|Event Dt|Event Time|Time Zone|Last Updated Dt|Emergency Class|Cfr Cd1|Cfr Descr1|Cfr Cd2|Cfr Descr2|Cfr Cd3|Cfr Descr3|Cfr Cd4|Cfr Descr4|Staff Name1|Org Abbrev1|Staff Name2|Org Abbrev2|Staff Name3|Org Abbrev3|Staff Name4|Org Abbrev4|Staff Name5|Org Abbrev5|Staff Name6|Org Abbrev6|Staff Name7|Org Abbrev7|Staff Name8|Org Abbrev8|Staff Name9|Org Abbrev9|Staff Name10|Org Abbrev10|Scram Code 1|RX CRIT 1|Initial PWR 1|Initial RX Mode1|Current PWR 1|Current RX Mode 1|Scram Code 2|RX CRIT 2|Initial PWR 2|Initial RX Mode 2|Current PWR 2|Current RX Mode 2|Scram Code 3|RX CRIT 3|Initial PWR 3|Initial RX Mode 3|Current PWR 3|Current RX Mode 3|Event Text|
Agreement State|48242|ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|ANDERSON ENGINEERING|4|Little Rock|AR||ARK-0519-0312|Y||||||STEVE MACK|BILL HUFFMAN|8/28/2012 00:00:00|17:27|8/28/2012 00:00:00||CDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT -  DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE  The following report was obtained from the Arkansas Radioactive Materials Program via e-mail:  "On August 27, 2012, the Radiation Control Program of Arkansas received notification from the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management that a tractor trailer had run over a nuclear gauge at the 192 mile marker on Interstate 40 near Hazen, Arkansas.  "The driver of a Motorists Assist Truck familiar with moisture density gauges identified the gauge parts on the side of the highway.  The gauge had been struck by a vehicle and broken up.  The driver reported the presence of the gauge parts to his construction company Project Manager who in turn notified Highway Police.  At 1914 the west bound lane of Interstate 40 was closed and remained closed until 2155.  The Highway Police asked for assistance from the Radiation Safety Officer of the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department (AHTD) who drove to the scene.  "The 44 millicurie, Americium-241:Beryllium source was still contained within the original threaded cavity with the  Caution-Radioactive Material  label covering it.  The base of the gauge was broken to the point that only the threaded cavity and surrounding lead remained.  "The 9 millicurie, Cesium-137 source remained attached to the source rod and inside the original shielding.  The shielding was sheared off just above the tungsten sliding block (shutter).    "The AHTD Radiation Safety Officer, upon arrival, secured the Americium-241:Beryllium  source in a polyethylene box brought to the scene.  The Cesium-137 source was removed from the gauge shielding by the AHTD RSO and this source was placed in a lead shield brought to the scene.  "Two Health Physicists from the Arkansas Radiation Control Program were also dispatched and upon arrival took wipes of both sources.  These smears were field counted utilizing a Ludlum-2241 and Ludlum 44-9 pancake  probe.  No loose contamination was found.  "All potential serial numbers were recorded and the sources were transferred to the Radiation Control Program by the AHTD RSO.  The Health Physicists transported the sources to a secure storage area at the State Health Department.  "On Tuesday morning, Troxler identified the owner of the gauge by the serial number.  The gauge is a Model 3430, Serial Number 21024.  The gauge is owned by Anderson Engineering of Little Rock, Arkansas.  Arkansas Radioactive Material License Number ARK-0519-03121.  "It appears that an Anderson Engineering technician had been working at a construction job site in De Valls Bluff, Arkansas.  On Monday evening, he left this job site and returned to the Anderson Engineering Little Rock Office.  The gauge was left unsecured in the back of the pickup.  On Interstate 40 West at mile marker 192, the gauge fell out of the pickup bed, where it was struck by at least one vehicle.  Upon arrival at the Anderson Engineering offices, the technician removed the Troxler Gauge Storage Box from the pickup bed and noted that it was empty.  The technician believed that he had left the gauge at the job site.  On the morning of August 28, 2012, he returned to the jobsite to search for the gauge.  "On Tuesday, August 28, 2012, the Radiation Safety Officer was contacted and retrieved the two sources from the Arkansas Department of Health and secured these in the Anderson Engineering permanent storage area.  "The Arkansas Radiation Control Program has assigned Incident Number AR-2012-006 and is continuing to investigate."  * * * UPDATE FROM STEVE MACK TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/3/13 AT 1012 EDT * * *  The following was received from the State of Arkansas via email:  "The sources were disposed of through the manufacturer on 2/22/2013. The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] considers this event to be closed."  Notified R4DO (Haire) and FSME Event Resource via email.|
Agreement State|48330|ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|CLEARWATER PAPER CORPORATION|4|MCGEHEE|AR||ARK-0530-0312|Y||||||STEVE MACK|JOHN KNOKE|9/21/2012 00:00:00|16:46|9/19/2012 00:00:00||CDT|5/6/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GEOFFREY MILLER|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON DENSITY GAUGE  The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email:  "During an on-site inspection on September 19, 2012, the licensee stated that a Berthold Model 7440, density gauge was in storage and that the shutter was not operating (stuck open).  The gauge is serial number 2718 and contains 50 millicuries of Cesium-137.  "On or about March 30, 2009 the licensee was preparing to replace this gauge.  While preparing to remove the gauge from service, it was determined that the shutter would not close.  The gauge was removed from service, under the direction of the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), and placed in a secure storage location by the RSO.  The gauge is contained in a metal storage locker, facing down toward a concrete slab.  "In accordance with RH-1502.f.2 (10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) the stuck shutter should have been reported to the State of Arkansas within 24 hours.   "With the manufacturer no longer being in business, the RSO contacted another gauge service company for assistance.  The service company indicated they could supply a shielded container to ship the gauge to their facility.  At this time, the gauge is still in storage at the licensee's facility.  "The State of Arkansas is awaiting a written report from the licensee and final disposition information for the gauge. The State's event number is AR-2012-010. "   * * * UPDATE FROM STEVE MACK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1216 EDT ON 5/6/13 VIA EMAIL ***  "The following updates and closes Event 48330.  "The licensee provided a letter dated May 6, 2013 stating that the cause of the shutter malfunction was determined to be the harsh environmental conditions the gauge had been subjected to.  This letter also documented the receipt/disposal of the gauge [by Thermo MeasureTech].  The Department [Arkansas Department of Health] considers this event to be closed."  Notified R4DO (Vasquez) and FSME Events Resource.|
Agreement State|48577|TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH|ENERGY SOLUTIONS|1|OAK RIDGE|TN||R-73006|Y||||||LAURA TURNER|HOWIE CROUCH|12/11/2012 00:00:00|09:05|12/7/2012 00:00:00||EST|5/7/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DANIEL HOLODY|R1DO|FSME RESOURCES|EMAI|MERAJ RAHIMI|NMSS|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION EVENT  The following information was obtained from the State of Tennessee via email:  "On 12/10/12 at 4:30 pm EST, [the] RSO [at] Energy Solutions-Bear Creek called [the State of Tennessee] to report that last Friday, 12/7/12, a drum of DU shavings had been placed in Area 9 of the old ATG building and covered w/mineral oil. When [workers] came to work on 12/10/12, they noticed that the poly drum was completely gone, the shavings were on the floor, oil was on the floor and some of the shavings looked like ash. The poly drum had burned up and the drum/shavings and oil/ash/shavings were now on the concrete floor. There was no stack release. The stack samples were pulled and indicated less than MDA: < E-14 for U-238 and <E-15 for U- 235. Workers were not allowed to enter the area/bldg. A Hi-Volume sample was pulled with no detectable findings. Smear samples were taken with a maximum reading of 11,000 dpm. The pre-filter will be removed and counted. [Workers] are in the process of checking the temperature from a distance using a remote thermometer in order to determine if they can transfer the shavings from the floor into another oil filled container. There was no release into any drains, there was no release into the air, and there were no personnel involved/no personnel contamination. A written report is being prepared and will be sent to the Division [Tennessee Division of Radiological Health]."  Tennessee Report No.: TN-12-305   * * * UPDATE FROM LAURA TURNER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1153 EDT ON 5/7/2013 * * *  The following report was received via e-mail:  This is a request for event notification (EN #48577) to be retracted.     "The State of Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (DRH) investigation has determined, based on the information Energy Solutions (ES) supplied and the amount of DU [Depleted Uranium] lost, incident TN-12-305 did not meet the reporting requirements for the greater than five times ALI criteria. Therefore, Event Notification Report #48577 is being retracted.   "It was concluded that 126 grams of DU, or less than 37 MBq (1 mCi) of activity, is unaccounted for as a result of the oxidation incident. Energy Solutions stated that the work area sample results were 0.46 uBq/ml (1.25E-11 uCi/ml) alpha and 1.85 uBq/ml (5E-11 uCi/ml) beta with field instrument checks. Results were also less than MDA alpha and 0.2 (5.46E-12) beta with laboratory equipment checks (gamma spec). Correspondingly, the field check revealed 1.79 DAC based on 0.26 uBq/ml (7E-12 uCi/ml) DAC for Pu-239. Energy Solutions concluded that an inappropriate storage vessel was used. Corrective actions included operator training, procedural revisions, and external review by proper ES personnel."  Notified R1DO (Dwyer) and FSME Events Resource.|
Power Reactor|48811|SUSQUEHANNA|PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC|1|ALLENTOWN|PA|LUZERNE||N|||2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|DAVE BORGER|BILL HUFFMAN|3/7/2013 00:00:00|03:36|3/7/2013 00:00:00|01:35|EST|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||BLAKE WELLING|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|99|Power Operation|99|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE  "At 0135 EST, Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable, and LCO 3.5.1 entered, due to its turbine steam exhaust valve failing in the closed position during the quarterly valve exercising surveillance. The supply breaker tripped when the opening stroke was attempted. The valve was verified to have remained fully closed via the manual operator. HPCI will not automatically start with this valve closed.  "HPCI is a single train Emergency Core Cooling Safety [ECCS] system. This event results in the loss of an entire safety function which requires an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and the guidance provided under NUREG-1022, rev. 2.  "There are no other ECCS systems presently out of service."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.   * * * RETRACTION FROM TODD CREASY TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/3/13 AT 1401 EDT * * *   "The reported condition, described above, was further evaluated by PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL).  The following is additional information concerning the condition:  "The HPCI Turbine Exhaust valve (HV255F066): 1) is a DC motor operated valve with no design features which cause automatic valve actuation, 2) is manipulated by remote Operator action to open or close the valve, 3) is designed as a normally open valve to support the HPCI function, and 4) is manually closed for long-term containment isolation.    "When the HPCI turbine exhaust valve was stroked, the valve successfully closed; however, position indication was lost when attempting to re-open the valve.  Troubleshooting identified a faulty relay contact that in conjunction with the operator repositioning the key lock switch from CLOSE to OPEN caused a direct short in the circuit.   "NUREG-1022, Revision 2, Section 3.2.7, provides the following example of a condition that is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v): Removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function).    "When the failure of the HV255F066 occurred, HPCI was properly removed from service for planned quarterly valve exercising in accordance with an approved surveillance procedure and LCO 3.5.1.   "Since HV255F066 is a normally open valve, a failure to open does not impact the safety function to provide a flow path for HPCI exhaust since routine valve stroking or maintenance that might close the valve would not be conducted in an accident scenario where HPCI would be required to start and closure associated with long-term containment isolation would only occur after the HPCI function is complete (i.e., the failure to open was introduced by the testing activity and would not occur in a scenario in which the valve is required to perform its safety function to open).  With regard to the long-term containment isolation function, the faulty relay contact failed in a manner that prevented the valve from opening but did not prevent the valve from closing.  Based on closure of the valve during the test, there was no pre-existing operability issue associated with its safety function to close.  Furthermore, even without credit for HV255F066, the containment isolation safety function would be maintained by Check Valve 255F049 and Drain Isolation Valve 255F013.  "Based on the above additional information, PPL is retracting this report.  Susquehanna was in a planned evolution and did not discover a condition that could have prevented performing a safety function."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Hunegs).|
Power Reactor|48845|DRESDEN|EXELON NUCLEAR COMPANY, LLC|3|MORRIS|IL|GRUNDY||Y||||3|[1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3|PATRICK HAARHOFF|PETE SNYDER|3/22/2013 00:00:00|19:58|11/19/2012 00:00:00|19:00|CDT|5/20/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|CONTROL ROD DRIVE CHECK VALVE IN SERVICE LEAK TEST FAILURE  "Control Rod Drive (CRD) Check valves 3-0399-593 and 3-0399-594 are installed on the CRD supply header inside the reactor building to prevent unfiltered radiological release from primary containment past secondary containment through the CRD supply header. The [Design Basis Accident] DBA [Loss of Coolant Accident] LOCA dose analysis does not postulate the CRD supply piping as a release path. These valves were added in response to NRC IN 90-78. Their function is described in the Dresden UFSAR section 4.6.4.6.  "CRD check valves 3-0399-593 and 3-0399-594 failed their as found In Service Testing (IST) seat leakage test during refuel outage D3R22.   "Based on the condition of as-found failed seat leakage tests, Engineering determined that CRD check valves 3-0399-593 and 3-0399-594 would not have been able to perform their design functions as described in the UFSAR to maintain the offsite dose and control room dose within regulatory limits.  "The valves were repaired in D3R22 and successfully retested."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION FROM RILEY RUFFIN TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 5/20/13 AT 1140 EDT * * *  "Based on an evaluation of the current plant design and the overly conservative assumptions made in the 1996 dose estimate, the dose that would be experienced as a result of a DBA LOCA with LOOP [Loss of Offsite Power] due to back leakage through the control rod drive system to the condensate storage tanks [CST] has been reassessed. The initial estimations of dose did not consider the as-built piping configuration of the CRD system. The backflow would be greatly reduced due to the lower differential pressure between the Drywell and CSTs that would exist following a DBA-LOOP. This differential pressure experienced following a DBA-LOOP would not result in a significant backflow due to excess flow check valves and restricting orifices in the current CRD piping configuration. Additionally, in the event that any backflow did occur, the volume of water in the CST would provide a high decontamination factor and dilution. Therefore backflows that could be experienced following a DBA-LOOP would not produce doses that would exceed current limits.   "Based on this assessment, the unanalyzed condition that was reported on March 22 (EN 48845) is being retracted."  The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R3DO (Kozak).|
Agreement State|48864|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|ROSA OF NORTH DALLAS LLC|4|DALLAS|TX||06186|Y||||||ART TUCKER|STEVE SANDIN|3/28/2013 00:00:00|17:58|3/27/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GREG PICK|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDER DOSE IN BRACHYTHERAPY TREATMENT DUE TO USE OF WRONG LENGTH GUIDE WIRE  The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:  "On March 28, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that a medical event occurred on March 27, 2013. The licensee stated that the wrong length guide wire was used during 3 of 4 HDR [High-Dose Rate Brachytherapy] treatments. The error was discovered after the third treatment. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stated the desired area of treatment was under dosed by more than 50 percent. The treatment plan prescribed 2400 cGy over 4 treatments. He stated that the patient and their physician were notified as soon as the error was discovered. The RSO is not at the facility and is trying to gather the information on the event over his phone. The licensee has suspended all HDR treatments until their process and procedures have been reviewed. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300.  "Texas Incident #:  I-9059"  * * * UPDATE ON 4/11/13 AT 2126 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK * * *  The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:  "On April, 9, 2013, the licensee provided the following information: The Physicist of record retrieved tube connectors from the HDR supplies on shelves in the dosimetry area.  The tube/connectors were stored, coiled in Ziploc bags.  The Physicist selected green tubes when he saw the black tubes used previously were not on the shelf.  He was unaware that there were two sets, each a different length when he selected the green set.  The black tubes measure 120cm in length and the green tubes measure 132cm.  The Senior Physicist, who was on vacation during the first two out of the four treatments, stored the black tube set in a drawer across the room.  Physicist selected tubes which attached to the patient's treatment device.  The Physicist planned the patient's treatment with the treatment lengths (119.9 cm) stated in our facility's HDR tandem and ring treatment planning procedure and forms but used the 132cm tube for the treatment delivery for three out of four fractions.  Only the black tubes were used historically in tandem and ring HDR procedures and since their given length were known, they were not measured at the time of treatment delivery.  The green tubes were also not measured prior to treatment delivery.  The Physician of record saw the green tubes and believed their use was intentional.  This medical event meant the patient's tissue to be treated (cervix) received less total radiation dose than that prescribed: 1,390 cGy (mean dose delivered) vs. the 5,139 cGy the cervix would have received over the four treatments.  This is more than a 50 cGy (50 rem) effective dose equivalent difference to the cervix. In addition, the mean total dose delivered to the cervix over the four treatments differed from the prescribed dose by more than 20% (42.1% is the actual variance) and the delivered dose for at least one of the fractions differed by more than 50% from the prescribed dose (fraction #1 cervix mean dose delivered was 42.5 cGy vs. the 1,192.4 cGy expected) (fraction #2 cervix mean dose delivered was 34.6 cGy vs. the 1,416.3 cGy expected) and (fraction #3 cervix mean dose delivered was 45.2 cGy vs. the 1,262.2 cGy expected).  The patient's urethra received a mean dose of 1,607 cGy for the four fractions.  The maximum dose to 1 cc of the urethra for the four fractions was 1,849 cGy.  The patient's anterior vagina received a mean dose from the four fractions of 1,549 cGy.  The maximum dose to 1 cc of the anterior vagina for the four fractions was 3,049 cGy. The Agency [Texas Department of Health] has requested additional information from the licensee.  Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA 300."  Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME Events Resource via email.   * * * UPDATE AT 1107 EDT ON 5/17/2013 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  The reference to a guide "wire" in the initial report was incorrect.  An incorrect guide "tube" was used.  Additionally, the title should have stated "GUIDE TUBE."  Notified the R4DO (Walker).  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Power Reactor|48865|COOPER|NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|BROWNSVILLE|NE|NEMAHA||Y|05000298|1|||[1] GE-4|BRAD BARE|HOWIE CROUCH|3/28/2013 00:00:00|18:39|3/13/2013 00:00:00|17:26|CDT|5/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||GREG PICK|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF OPERABILITY FOR STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL TANK  "Information Notice IN 2012-01 on seismic qualification of Standby Liquid Control (SLC) tanks was evaluated in 2012 to assess immediate operability of the SLC system based on SLC Test Tank and Mixing Tank not being qualified to Seismic Class 1S. Based on calculation NEDC 12-015 in response to IN 2012-01, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS concluded that SLC was still operable with the test tank full. Long-term actions from the 2012 condition were completed by issuance of calculation NEDC 13-010 and evaluation EE 13-009. NEDC 13-010 concludes that the SLC storage tank is qualified when full and the test tank and mixing tank are qualified when empty.  "No procedure step existed in the SLC surveillances to ensure the test tank is drained prior to restoration of SLC to an operable status to ensure it remained fully qualified to its NEDC 13-010 design. Further, no Caution Order or Standing Order existed to ensure short-term control until a procedure change could be implemented. So, as a short-term action, CNS implemented a Standing Order to establish positive control of the test tank. The Standing Order directs that SLC be declared INOPERABLE if the Test Tank is filled.  "Initially, this was thought to be a conservative measure only, because CNS judged that reasonable assurance of OPERABILITY remained due to conservative assumptions in NEDC 13-010. However, on 3/19/13 at 2146 CDT, the Prompt Operability Determination was changed to credit the Standing Order as a compensatory measure needed to maintain or enhance OPERABILITY of SLC. Therefore, CNS had lost reasonable assurance of OPERABILITY as of 03/13/2013 at 1726 CDT when the Control Room was notified that NEDC 13-010 concluded the test tank and mixing tank had to be empty to preserve the required seismic qualification, and an 8-hour report should have been made prior to 0126 CDT on 03/14/2013.  "Currently the SLC Test Tank is drained and SLC is OPERABLE."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID MADSEN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 5/10/2013 AT 1436 EDT * * *  "This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN #48865 which was reported on March 28, 2013 for an event occurring on March 13, 2013. This EN identified Cooper Nuclear Station had lost reasonable assurance of OPERABILITY of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) system based on a CNS design calculation which supported that the SLC test tank was not seismically qualified when full of water.  "Subsequently, this calculation was re-evaluated specifically in support of determining OPERABILITY. This re-evaluation determined the SLC system remained OPERABLE when the consideration of nozzle loads is removed. The ability of Class IIS [ASME American Society Mechanical Engineering] seismic components to meet Class II/I [ASME] does not require the consideration of nozzle loads. The SLC test tank, which is a Class IIS [ASME] component, does not fail when filled if no nozzle loads are considered. As such, there was no loss of safety function for SLC."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Drake).|
Power Reactor|48870|PRAIRIE ISLAND|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|WELCH|MN|GOODHUE||N|05000282|1|2||[1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP|WAYNE EPPEN|HOWIE CROUCH|3/31/2013 00:00:00|15:07|3/30/2013 00:00:00|23:44|CDT|5/13/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||JULIO LARA|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL VENTILATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE  "During testing of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System it was discovered that the outlet damper of one of the normal make-up fans did not close. This created a non-closable opening in the Auxiliary Bldg Special Vent System (ABSVS) boundary of greater than 10 square feet and required entry into TS [Technical Specification] 3.7.12, Condition B, for two ABSVS trains inoperable due to inoperable ABSVS boundary. This is considered a potential loss of safety function to control the release of material."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.   * * * RETRACTION FROM MARK LOOSBROCK TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/13/13 AT 1639 EDT * * *   "This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN) #48870, which reported a non-closeable opening in the Auxiliary Building Special Vent System (ABSVS) boundary of greater than 10 square feet. This required entry into TS 3.7.12 Condition B for two ABSVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable ABSVS boundary. This was considered a potential loss of safety function to control the release of radioactive material.  "Engineering evaluation and analysis identified that there was not a loss of safety function because the ABSVS started on demand during the performance of SP 1172 and that the ABSVS Boundary never exceeded the Tech Spec value of 10 square feet per TS 3.7.12. Review of the work order for CD-34042 validated that the system would have performed its safety function during the failure of CD-34042. In the event of a Design Basis Accident the ABSVS would have received a signal to actuate, the system would have performed as designed and drawn a negative differential pressure in the Aux Bldg within 6 minutes with the identified opening of 9.62 square feet that was observed during the failure of CD-34042."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer).|
Power Reactor|48886|FERMI|DETROIT EDISON CO.|3|NEWPORT|MI|MONROE||N|05000341|2|||[2] GE-4|KELLEY BELENKY|PETE SNYDER|4/3/2013 00:00:00|16:51|4/3/2013 00:00:00|10:53|EDT|5/28/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|65|Power Operation|65|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||COOLING WATER MAKEUP PUMP FAILED TO START DURING A SURVEILLANCE TEST  "At 1053 [EDT] on April 3, 2013, during the performance of a surveillance test on the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system the EECW system was declared inoperable due to the Division 2 EECW makeup pump failing to start during the surveillance.  The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler.   "A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via [Technical Specification] LCO 3.5.1. Investigation into why the makeup pump did not start is currently in progress.   "This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * UPDATE FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/28/13 AT 1613 EDT * * *   "An evaluation of Event 48886 has determined that the Division 2 Emergency Cooling Water (EECW) system was capable of supporting HPCI Room Cooler and HPCI operation for a period of time in excess of that required to perform the required safety functions as assumed in the accident analysis. Therefore, this event is retracted."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R3DO (Orth).|
Agreement State|48959|ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL|BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER-PRINCETON|1|BIRMINGHAM|AL||NOT PROVIDED|Y||||||MYRON RILEY|HOWIE CROUCH|4/23/2013 00:00:00|13:50|3/26/2013 00:00:00||CDT|4/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FETUS/EMBRYO DOSE EXCEEDED 500 MILLIREM  The following information was obtained from the State of Alabama via facsimile:  "On April 9, 2013, [the Certified Nuclear Medicine Technician] for Baptist Medical Center-Princeton, Birmingham, Alabama, notified the Alabama Office of Radiation Control of a fetal/embryo dose that could be over 500 milliRem.  "On March 1, 2013, a 36 year old female had a thyroidectomy due to thyroid cancer. Following surgery on March 6, the patient had general lab work which included a negative pregnancy test. On March 26, the patient returned for a 50 millicurie I-131 treatment on the remaining thyroid tissue. The technologist administering the test did not confirm, nor was told, that the patient had another pregnancy test prior to the dosing. The pregnancy test conducted on March 26, 2013 was positive. It was confirmed that the embryo exposure was greater than 500 millirem threshold.  "The patient was immediately notified of the positive pregnancy results and was consulted by a OB/GYN physician. The patient received an ultrasound which confirmed the pregnancy at 4 to 5 weeks.  "The information is complete as of 12:45 pm CDT, April 23, 2013."  Alabama Incident 13-15|
Agreement State|48967|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|METCO|4|HOUSTON|TX||03018|Y||||||ART TUCKER|DONALD NORWOOD|4/25/2013 00:00:00|14:52|4/23/2013 00:00:00||CDT|4/25/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|E-MA|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE TO FULLY RETRACT  The following information was received from the State of Texas via E-mail:  "On April 24, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that they were unable to fully retract an Iridium-192 source into a QSA model 660 radiography device.  The radiographers attempted to retract the source several times, but were unable to get the device to lock the source in the fully shielded position.  The radiographers contacted the Radiation Safety Officer who responded to the location along with the licensee's Source Retrieval Supervisor.  The supervisor attempted to retract the source and on the second attempt, dose rates indicated that the source was fully shielded, but the device's locking device had not tripped.  The supervisor inserted the source shipping plug into the device to secure the source in place.  The source crankout device was dismantled and they discovered the connector on the end of the drive cable had separated from the drive cable.  The crankout device has been shipped to the manufacturer for inspection and repair.  The crankout device was placed in service by the licensee on April 11, 2013.  The exposure device was inspected by the licensee and found to operate normally.  No significant exposure was received by any individual involved in this event.  Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."  Texas Incident #:  I-9074|
Non-Agreement State|48971|PREFIX CORPORATION|NRD LLC|3|ROCHESTER HILLS|MI||GENERAL|N||||||JOHN STEMPOWSKI|BILL HUFFMAN|4/26/2013 00:00:00|12:00|4/18/2013 00:00:00||EDT|4/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|20.2201(a)(1)(ii)|LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|E-MA|DENNIS ALLSTON|ILTA|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOST POLONIUM-210 STATIC ELIMINATOR SOURCE  Prefix Corporation uses static control ionizers for applying coatings in some of its product processes.  These static control ionizers are leased from NRD LLC and contain less than 0.1 millicuries of Polonium-210.  In early April, 2013, Prefix was preparing to return one of its leased Nuclecel Ionizers to NRD and discovered it was missing.  The source was last used in November of 2012.  A search was conducted for the source without success and Prefix considers the source to be lost.  The source is small and cylindrical and could have rolled off its storage location onto the floor and been swept-up as trash.  Prefix sent a written notification to NRC Region 3 on April 18, 2013, but had not previously reported the event to the NRC Operations Center.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Non-Agreement State|48975|BEAUMONT HEALTH SYSTEMS|BEAUMONT HEALTH SYSTEMS|3|ROYAL OAK|MI||21-01333-01|N||||||CHERYL SCHULTZ|BILL HUFFMAN|4/26/2013 00:00:00|13:45|2/21/2013 00:00:00||EDT|4/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|20.1906(d)(1)|SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|E-MA|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SURFACE CONTAMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT EXCEEDED LIMITS  During an audit of a satellite facility associated with Beaumont Health Systems, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) determined that a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than NRC reporting limits had been received but not reported to the NRC as required per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).  The package was received on February 21, 2013 and wipe tests performed on the external surface of the package.  Removable contamination levels were found on the package of 19,070 dpm/300 cm2.  This level exceeds the reportable limits specified in 10 CFR 71.87(i).  The package contained Technetium-99m that had been shipped and delivered by Beaumont's Troy Hospital facility. The receiving facility did not find any damage or contamination on the Tech-99m vial or inside the ammo case used to transport the vial. The audited receipt inspection report revealed the external package contamination event was documented but not reported to the company's RSO.  Troy Hospital was notified at the time of the event and contamination surveys were performed at the packaging location, on the transport vehicle, and on the driver. The only contamination found was a wipe used to wipe the area where the package had been stored in the truck (wipe-down of radioactive material lay-down area is routine protocol for the licensee).  The RSO stated that corrective actions are being taken related to improving contamination controls while packaging these shipments.  In addition, improvements in the process related to reporting events to the RSO and the NRC are being explored.  * * * RETRACTION AT 1415 EDT ON 4/29/2013 FROM CHERYL SCHULTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  The removable contamination of 19070 dpm/300cm2 equates to 63 dpm/cm2 which is below the reportable limit of 220 dpm/cm2.  Therefore, this event is retracted.  Notified the R3DO (Duncan) and FSME Resources (via e-mail).|
Power Reactor|48980|COOK|INDIANA/MICHIGAN POWER CO.|3|BRIDGMAN|MI|BERRIEN||N|05000315|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|RANDY ROSE|JOHN SHOEMAKER|4/29/2013 00:00:00|08:41|4/29/2013 00:00:00|09:00|EDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE  "At 0900 EDT on Monday, April 29, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.  "Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room, if necessary.  "TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1200 EDT on Thursday, May 2, 2013.   "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."  * * * UPDATE FROM GREG KANDA TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 5/2/13 AT 1448 EDT * * *   "Due to scheduling issues, the restoration of the Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems has been delayed. The TSC ventilation systems are expected to be returned to service by 0000 EDT on Friday, May 3, 2013.   "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."  Notified R3DO (Duncan).  * * * UPDATE FROM DEAN BRUCK TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/3/13 AT 0515 EDT * * *  "The restoration of the Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems has been delayed but is in progress. The TSC ventilation systems are expected to be returned to service by 0600 EDT on Friday, May 3 2013.   "The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector."  Notified R3DO (Duncan).  * * * UPDATE FROM GREG KANDA TO VINCE KLCO AT 0822 EDT ON MAY 3, 2013 * * *   "The Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems were restored at 0818 EDT. The TSC is fully functional.   "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "  Notified the R3DO (Duncan).|
Agreement State|48987|LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV|EXXON MOBILE CHEMICAL|4|BATON ROUGE|LA||LA-2349-L01|Y||||||MELANIE BAUDER|CHARLES TEAL|5/1/2013 00:00:00|09:43|4/22/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/1/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MARK HAIRE|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTERS FOUND THAT WERE DIFFICULT TO OPERATE ON TWO PROCESS GAUGES  The following was received from the State of Louisiana via facsimile:  "On 4/22/2013, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for ExxonMobile Chemical was performing his annual inventory and operational checks on the level gauges at the Baton Rouge facility. During the checks, two level gauges were found with shutters that were difficult to operate.  "The gauges detected were Ronan Engineering Gauges, devices involved, Model Number SAF-F37. One gauge is S/N 0781GK loaded with 100 mCi of Cs-137 and S/N 4585GH loaded with 25 mCi of Cs-137. Ronan Engineering has been contacted to fix the problem or repair the gauge. These gauges are installed on process and pose no safety threat to the general public or the employees. This is not considered a safety equipment failure, just being installed on a process in a very harsh corrosive environment.  "This is a two shutter malfunction on level gauges installed on processes. These devices do not pose a radiation exposure threat to the general public. They will remain in operation on the process until and after repair.  "The department considers this event closed."  Event Report ID No.: LA-120016, T146449|
Power Reactor|48988|VOGTLE|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|WAYNESBORO|GA|BURKE||Y|05000424|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|NAVEEN KOTEEL|CHARLES TEAL|5/1/2013 00:00:00|10:41|5/1/2013 00:00:00|05:00|EDT|5/2/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "A condition is being reported per TRM 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2 The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "  The licensee anticipates the maintenance will be complete at 1630 EDT on 5/1/13.   * * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1702 EDT ON 5/1/13 * * *   The TSC was returned to service at 1607 EDT on 5/1/13.  Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).  * * * UPDATE FROM ASHTON PARKER TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1123 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * *  The TSC has been taken out of service to perform planned maintenance.  The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.  Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).   * * * UPDATE FROM PARKER TO SNYDER AT 1747 EDT ON 5/2/13 * * *   The TSC was returned to service at 1733 EDT on 5/2/13.  Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).|
Agreement State|48989|LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV|IRIS NDT MATRIX|4|GARYVILLE|LA||LA-12236-L01|Y||||||JOE NOBLE|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/1/2013 00:00:00|13:28|4/26/2013 00:00:00|14:57|CDT|5/1/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MARK HAIRE|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCES||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILS TO RETRACT  The following information was received via fax:  "On 04/26/2013, the RSO for IRIS, was notified by one of his radiography crews working at the Marathon Refinery that a source was not retracting into the shielded area of the camera.  "This incident involved a QSA Global Exposure Device, Model Delta 880, S/N D6458, loaded with an Ir-192 source. Associated equipment was used with the exposure device. The problem occurred when the crew used a magnetic source tube stand as opposed to a non-magnetic support stand.  "Source retrieval was accomplished by the RSO around 2:53 pm.  Using safety equipment, maintaining a 2 mR boundary, and time, the highest exposure received was by the RSO which was 75 mR.  The other exposures recorded were from normal work activities.  The Department [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] was notified after source retrieval was completed."|
Fuel Cycle Facility|48990|PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT|UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION (USEC)|2|PADUCAH|KY|McCRACKEN|GDP-1|Y|0707001||||URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY|DEREK WARFORD|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/1/2013 00:00:00|14:16|4/30/2013 00:00:00|13:20|CDT|5/1/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|76.120(c)(1)|UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION|||||||MICHELE SAMPSON|NMSS|KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AREA ACCESS RESTRICTED FOR MORE THAN 24 HOURS DUE TO INCREASED RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS  "On 04/30/13, while changing the feed from Position 3 East to Position 3 West autoclaves, Operators noticed a pressure spike on the 3 East cylinder to approximately 47 psia.  After disconnecting the cylinder in Position 3 East with Health Physics (HP) assistance, HP found a contamination spread on the cylinder, on the grating within the autoclave, and on the autoclave locking ring.  Due to the contamination spread, access requirements to the area will be increased for more than 24 hours.  Decontamination efforts are underway but will not be completed within 24 hours from the time that radiological controls were increased.  "This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i) 'An unplanned contamination event that: Requires access to the contaminated area, by workers or the public, to be restricted for more than 24 hours by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area.'  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."|
Power Reactor|48991|SUMMER|SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.|2|JENKINSVILLE|SC|FAIRFIELD||Y|||2|3|[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000|APRIL RICE|CHARLES TEAL|5/2/2013 00:00:00|11:27|5/2/2013 00:00:00|07:48|EDT|5/2/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Under Construction|0|Under Construction|N|N|0|Under Construction|0|Under Construction|VIOLATION OF THE FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM  On May 2, 2013, a non-licensed employee supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a random fitness for duty test. The individuals site access has been terminated.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.|
Agreement State|48992|NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH|UNSPECIFIED|1||NY||UNSPECIFIED|Y||||||ROBERT SNYDER|PETE SNYDER|5/2/2013 00:00:00|13:31|4/24/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/2/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROSTATE SEED IMPLANT EARLY TERMINATION  "A prostate seed implant procedure was terminated after the insertion of 2 needles. Only 5 of 106 intended seeds were implanted (1.55mCi of 32.86mCi). The patient's anatomy (pubic arch) presented interference to the placement of needles/seeds for proper dose distribution. The patient will now be treated with external beam IMRT [intensity modulated radiation therapy] once post implant CT and dose assessment have been performed in approximately 3 weeks. The patient and referring physician have been notified. The facility notified NYS DOH [New York State Department of Health] same day, written report with corrective actions has been received. To prevent recurrence the urologist will verify during planning volume study that there are no anatomical obstructions to needle placement."  Report No. NY-13-02  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Power Reactor|48993|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N||||3|[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|WALTER ORF|CHARLES TEAL|5/2/2013 00:00:00|23:56|5/2/2013 00:00:00|22:07|EDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|RADIATION MONITORS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED RADIOGRAPHY  Main Steam Line radiation monitors, MSS-RE75, RE76, RE77, RE78 and Terry Turbine Radiation monitor MSS-RE79 have been taken out of service for pre-planned radiography and plant conditions. This results in a loss of assessment capability since the radiation monitors are used for EAL classification.  The radiation monitors will be restored prior to entering Mode 4.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48994|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|SCOTT MOECK|CHARLES TEAL|5/3/2013 00:00:00|06:20|5/3/2013 00:00:00|05:20|CDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARK HAIRE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OUTAGE OF FT. CALHOUN STATION SIRENS FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "A planned outage of all FCS [Ft. Calhoun Station] sirens will occur today at 0530 CDT to transfer in-service zone controllers.  During the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are nonfunctional.  Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement have been completed with compensatory measures established to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Washington, Harrison, and Pottawattamie counties.  * * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MOECK TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/3/13 AT 0641 EDT * * *  "The maintenance has been completed and the EPZ sirens have been returned to service.  Local Law Enforcement has been notified that the scheduled maintenance is complete and the primary method of alerting the public with sirens is restored."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Haire).|
Power Reactor|48995|WATTS BAR|TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY|2|SPRING CITY|TN|RHEA||Y|05000390|1|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|BRIAN MCILNAY|CHARLES TEAL|5/3/2013 00:00:00|07:54|5/3/2013 00:00:00|01:11|EDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TEMPORARY LOSS OF BOTH TRAINS OF EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM  "On May 3, 2013, at 0111 [EDT], Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (TS LCO) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of both trains of Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS). The Train B EGTS had been removed from service for scheduled maintenance and at 0111 the Train A auxiliary air dryer stopped functioning. On May 3, 2013, at 0155, Train B EGTS was restored to service and declared Operable, and TS LCO 3.0.3 was exited.   "The auxiliary air system is required to support multiple safety related systems.  The auxiliary air system is the safety grade air supply for EGTS.  As Train A auxiliary air was no longer Operable, and the B train EGTS system was inoperable, the safety function supported by EGTS was not available.  The EGTS establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building and the steel containment vessel. Filters in the system then control the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment.    "Watts Bar Unit 1 remained in Mode 1 at 100% power.  No reactivity was added to the plant.  "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Part 21|48996|CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.|CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.|1|EAST FARMINGTON|NY|||Y||||||JOHN DEBONIS|CHARLES TEAL|5/3/2013 00:00:00|09:25|5/3/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||INTERIM PART 21 REPORT OF POTENTIAL DEFECT IN A RELIEF VALVE BELLOWS  The following was excerpted from a fax:  (ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect.  Target Rock P/N: 303480-1, Bellows, Manufactured by Target Rock.  (iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.  Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation 1966E Broadhollow Road East Farmingdale, NY 11735  (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.  During as-found steam testing on March 5, 2013 of a Pilgrim Main Steam Safety Relief Valve (MS-SRV) (TR Model 09J-001, valve assembly S/N 5, pilot assembly S/N 23, bellows PIN 303480-1 S/N 607) a loud pop was heard and as-found testing was secured. Subsequently, the pilot assembly was removed from the valve assembly and subjected to a leak test and would not hold pressure. The pilot assembly was disassembled and a visual inspection of the P/N 303480-1 bellows convolutions revealed a through wall failure in one of the convolutions. It is noted the steam testing was performed at an offsite test facility and the valve did not fail installed in the plant.  The bellows acts as a pressure sensor responsible for initiating the opening of the MS-SRV at set pressure. Failure of the bellows does not directly impact the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, which is maintained by the bonnet assembly that surrounds it, but does impair the ability of the MS-SRV to provide over-pressure protection of the RCS. This technology has an extensive history of reliability in nuclear power systems and has been used in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) since the 1970s. This is the first reported incident regarding a thru wall bellows failure.  Target Rock initiated a comprehensive root cause evaluation pursuing several areas of investigation. In parallel, Entergy is conducting an independent investigation and we are cooperating with them. A complete review of our paperwork confirms all manufacturing procedures and processes were performed in accordance with all specified requirements. This includes:   - Raw material analysis  - Dimensional inspections  - Cleaning  - Heat Treatment  - Manufacturing processes  - Testing  - Review of design stresses  Preliminary metallurgical analysis of the failed bellows indicates cracks forming in an inter-granular manner as would be expected from Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracks (IGSCC) originating at pit like location on the interior pressurized surface. The source of this cracking is the focus of on going investigations. Target Rock has also visually inspected two other bellows of the same part number, one manufactured from the same material lot and another manufactured from an earlier material lot. Both of these bellows were installed in valves steam tested at Target Rock. One of these valves bellows was also full flow tested at Wyle Labs. Neither of these additional bellows contained pit-like locations and may indicate this potential failure mechanism is an isolated incident. However, to date, neither Target Rock nor Pilgrim can draw final conclusions with the information collected and analyzed.  The mode of failure has not been determined; however, in order to address the potential for a common mode failure, Target Rock is continuing metallurgical testing of the failed bellows and the two other bellows with the same part number. Based on these results, it is likely we will need to evaluate bellows that have been installed in other NPP as they become available.  (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.  The as-found steam test and identification of the potential defect occurred on March 5, 2013.  (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.  The following plants are running with bellows P/N 303480-1 installed: Limerick 1 & 2, Pilgrim, and J.A. Fitzpatrick.  (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.  The root cause of the potential defect is not yet known as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Corrective Action Request CAR 13-013 will document the corrective actions when they are determined. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days.  (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.  Target Rock will recommend that the end user perform a detailed visual inspection of the interior convolutions of installed bellows P/N 303480-1 at the next opportunity to determine if any areas of pitting or cracking exist on the interior walls of the bellows. This is a difficult inspection to perform due to the following: internal geometry of the convolutions, a trained inspector is required and specific inspection technology is needed to yield reliable results.|
Power Reactor|48997|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|JOHN OHRENBERGER|CHARLES TEAL|5/3/2013 00:00:00|10:39|5/3/2013 00:00:00|05:42|EDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS DURING PLANNED SPDS MAINTENANCE  "On May 3, 2013 at 0542 [EDT] hours with the reactor in Cold Shutdown and Reactor Mode Switch in Refuel, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was removed from service as part of a preplanned activity in order to repair the associated 120VAC instrument power supply transfer switching scheme. The reactor cavity is flooded the fuel pool gates are removed and refueling activities are in progress. Station risk is green and all key safety functions are green as well. It is anticipated the repair will be completed in approximately ten hours.  "Following the planned de-energization, it was determined that an apparent equipment failure resulted in the loss of main control room annunciator system. The appropriate abnormal procedure was entered and compensatory actions including periodic monitoring of bus voltages and field annunciator panels implemented for systems in service at the time of the loss. The annunciator system was restored on May 3, 2013 at 0640 hours.  "This USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.  "This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public."  The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.|
Part 21|48998|CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.|WOLLASTON ALLOYS, INC.|1|CHESWICK|PA|||Y||||||JAMES DRAKE|PETE SNYDER|5/3/2013 00:00:00|10:50|5/3/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/17/2013 00:00:00||21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|MARK HAIRE|R4DO|PART 21 REACTORS|EMAI|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 REPORT - INSUFFICIENT PROCESS CONTROL ON PUMP IMPELLER  The following is a summary of information received via fax:  "In January 2013, Curtiss-Wright Electro Mechanical Corporation completed final testing on AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Serial Number 9, part number 6D70795G05, Revision 8, which contained a sand cast impeller (S/N 3021) cat by Wollaston Alloys of Braintree, MA. When it was disassembled for inspection it was discovered that a piece of an impeller blade approximately 3 inches by 2 1/2 inches had separated from the main impeller casting. The separated piece was the leading edge of one blade, and it was subsequently recovered intact from the pump test loop.  "This incident was investigated as a significant condition adverse to quality with the potential to create a substantial safety hazard; but, was deemed not a reportable incident since all cast impellers were either: 1) in CW-EMD control, or 2) exported to customers in the Peoples Republic of China.  "Our customers (Westinghouse Electric Company and the Chinese customers and regulatory authorities) were kept informed as the investigation progressed and root cause was identified.  "The physical cause of the failure is most likely due to a flaw present in both the cast material and weld overlay applied to the impeller blade. The original flaw was most likely a consequence of tensile overload failure due to cooling stresses introduced by the welding process. Subsequent weld repairs were insufficient in remediating the original flaw, which went undetected by NDT methods. Ultimately, AP1000 RCP Serial Number 3021 failed by high cycle fatigue followed by ductile failure.  "As a result of the above investigation, CW-EMD is concerned that the identified lack of process control at Wollaston Alloys, Inc., could result in other significant conditions adverse to quality with the potential to create a substantial safety hazard.   "Because of the nature of the issue, CW-EMD is unable to complete a full extent of condition investigation, and is reporting this issue to the Commission to ensure full awareness within the industry.  "Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission  James A. Drake, General Manager Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation 1000 Wright Way Cheswick, Pa 15024"  * * * UPDATE FROM STEVE GRIEF TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 5/17/13 AT 1549 EDT * * *  Subject; Report of Potential Substantial Safety Hazard in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21.  Wollaston Alloys is submitting this interim report as a result of product concerns discovered by Curtiss Wright EMD during the investigation of an impeller blade failure occurring during testing as noted in Curtiss Wright EMD's notification to the NRC dated May 3, 2013. Wollaston is requesting an additional 30 days to identify any current or previous orders where 10 CFR 21 is invoked and to determine if there is evidence that a condition exists that could create a substantial safety hazard.  Notified R1DO (Schroeder), R2DO (Bartley), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Walker), and PART 21 REACTORS via email.|
Agreement State|48999|CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM|RADIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATES OF SACRAMENTO|4|SACRAMENTO|CA||1065-34|Y||||||KENT PRENDERGAST|HOWIE CROUCH|5/3/2013 00:00:00|13:54|2/20/2013 00:00:00||PDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MARK HAIRE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|ANGELA MCINTOSH|FSME|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FETAL EXPOSURE TO IODINE-131  The following information was obtained from the State of California via email:  "A female patient was treated with 176.9 mCi of Iodine 131 on 2/20/13.  A serum pregnancy test conducted on 2/18/13 came back negative.  On 4/22/13, Radiological Associates received a phone call from the patient's endocrinologist informing them that the patient was pregnant.  An ultrasound evaluation of the patient performed on 3/18/13 determined that the fetus would have been approximately two weeks old at the time of the Iodine 131 dose administration.  The dose to the fetus was determined to be 47 rad, which may meet the requirement for an abnormal occurrence."  "The [California Radiologic Health Branch] will be reviewing this event."  California Event: 5010-050313|
Non-Agreement State|49000|VALLEY QUARRIES, INC.|VALLEY QUARRIES, INC.|1|CHAMBERSBURG|PA||PA-1222|Y||||||JOHN ENGLERTH|HOWIE CROUCH|5/3/2013 00:00:00|17:03|5/3/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|20.2201(a)(1)(i)|LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|ILTAB|EMAI|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOST TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE  The licensee from Chambersburg, PA, was doing work in West Virginia under a reciprocity agreement. The authorized user was conducting a reading when he was asked by his supervisor to pick-up a fellow employee at the construction yard approximately 1.5 miles from the reading site. After the reading was done, the user placed the gauge in the back of his pickup truck and proceeded to the construction yard. Once he arrived at the yard, he saw that his truck tailgate was down and the gauge was missing.  The gauge was not in its shipping container. The user and his co-worker doubled back in search of the gauge but did not find it. When the RSO arrived, another employee told him that he saw someone stopping along the highway to pick up what appeared to be the gauge and then driving off. At that time, the employee was unaware a gauge was missing so he didn't pay much attention to the vehicle.   The gauge is identified as a Troxler Electronics Laboratories Model # 3430, Serial # 32506. It contains 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.  The RSO notified the West Virginia State Police, the local newspaper and the regional television station. The licensee is considering offering a reward for the return of the gauge.    * * * UPDATE AT 2244 EDT ON 5/15/13 FROM THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO SNYDER * * *  The gauge has been recovered and is now in the possession of the licensee.  Notified R1DO (Schroeder), ILTAB (Hahn), and FSME Events Resource (E-Mail).    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Part 21|49001|ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC|ELECTRO-MOTIVE DIESEL|1|ROCKY MOUNT|NC|||Y||||||TOM HORNER|PETE SNYDER|5/3/2013 00:00:00|16:49|5/3/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/3/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|MARK HAIRE|R4DO|PART 21 REACTORS|EMAI|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 REPORT - FUEL INJECTORS FAILED PRESSURE TEST  The following is a summary of information received via fax:  "Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 02/19/13 upon pressure leakage testing of three (3) fuel injectors, part number 40084720 (s/n 11K23136, 12K20318 & 12K20385), that were returned by TVA-Browns Ferry because they failed a pressure test at the site prior to installation in the engine. Another fuel injector was later returned by TVA (s/n 12K20330) for the same reason. On 3/11/13, ESI received a fuel injector (s/n 12H23003) from First Energy-Davis Besse because the injector failed their on-site pressure leakage test. The pressure test specifies applying 2000 psi to the fuel injector and verifying the pressure does not fall below 1500 psi after 30 seconds.  "TVA has been working with ESI to evaluate the reported deviation. ESI has also been working with EMD and EMD's fuel injector supplier to determine the cause of the injector leakage. All parties involved were not able to complete the deviation evaluation within the 60 day time period specified in 10CFR Part 21; therefore, TVA issued an interim report to the NRC about this issue on March 22, 2013 [NRC EN No. 48844]. This report is a follow-up to TVA's interim report.  "This evaluation was concluded on 05/02/13 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. The fuel injector pressure leakage has been attributed to debris that entered the injectors during assembly of the filter elements into the injector body at the manufacturer. A leaking or otherwise improperly functioning fuel injector could affect the load carrying capability of the diesel engine. Fuel dilution of the engine lubricating oil could also occur as a result of a leaking fuel injector. Either of these conditions could impact the operability of the diesel engine and thereby prevent the diesel generator from performing its safety related function."  The following licensees may potentially be affected: FP&L-St. Lucie, Energy Northwest-Columbia, Nextera-Point Beach, Exelon-Dresden, TVA-Browns Ferry, First Energy-Davis Besse, Dominion Va. Power-Surry, Entergy-ANO, and First Energy-Beaver Valley.|
Power Reactor|49002|PALISADES|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|COVERT|MI|VANBUREN||N|05000255|1|||[1] CE|TODD MULFORD|BILL HUFFMAN|5/5/2013 00:00:00|01:45|5/5/2013 00:00:00|01:12|EDT|5/5/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(i)|PLANT S/D REQD BY TS|||||||ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|88|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN - SAFETY INJECTION REFUELING WATER TANK DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LEAK  "At 0112 EDT on May 5, 2013, the plant commenced a shutdown due to water leakage from the SIRW (Safety Injection Refueling Water) Tank exceeding the operational decision-making issue  process trigger point of 34 gallons per day, causing it [the SIRW] to be declared inoperable and requiring entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 Condition B.  LCO 3.5.4 Condition B requires the SIRW Tank to be returned to Operable status within one hour or entry into Condition C which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours.  "This event had no impact on the health and / or safety of the public.   "The NRC Resident has been notified.  "The exact location of the leakage has not been determined at this time. The Plant will be taken to Mode 5."  The licensee has been operating with SIRW leakage at a rate of less than 34 gallons per day.  The leakage has increased for unknown reasons to a calculated value of approximately 90 gallons per day.    See EN #48018 dated 06/12/12 for similar report on a technical specification shutdown for the SIRW tank leakage.|
Power Reactor|49004|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|RAYMOND MOORE|PETE SNYDER|5/6/2013 00:00:00|13:34|5/6/2013 00:00:00|10:16|EDT|5/6/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE||OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT|||||KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||ONE OF TWO NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE TONE ALERT RADIOS OUT OF SERVICE  "At 10:16 AM EDT on May 6, 2013, the National Weather Service (NWS-NOAA) reported a loss of the [NWS-NOAA] Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, which serves the Northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHZ. The NWS-NOAA does not have an expected return to service time. The NWS-NOAA Tone Alert Radio Transmitters are in place to provide a redundant means to alert residents within five miles to an emergency at the plant. Eighty-three Alert and Notification System (ANS) sirens are located throughout the ten mile radius of the plant. The ANS sirens have the same function as the Tone Alert Radios, but extend out to ten miles.  "All ANS sirens are currently in service and fully functional. Therefore, there is a means to alert the public within the 10 mile radius of the plant if an actual emergency were to occur. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."   This report was also made per a requirement of licensee procedure PLP-201.|
Agreement State|49005|OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION||3|GALENA|OH|||Y||||||DAVID LIPP|DONALD NORWOOD|5/6/2013 00:00:00|14:37|4/19/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/6/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||HIRONORI PETERSON|R3DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND ORPHAN RADIUM SOURCES  The following information was received via E-mail:  "On 4/19/13 the [Ohio] Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) received a call from the RSO of broad-scope licensee Ohio State University (OSU). The RSO stated that he had received a call from a woman who had been helping an elderly neighbor clean out a garage after her husband's death. The husband had been a college professor. The woman and widow had discovered a large, five-gallon can filled with what appeared to be lead. The widow indicated that she believed it contained radium needles.  "On 4/21/13 the woman contacted BRP to arrange pickup of the device and deliver it to OSU. OSU has volunteered to store the device pending disposal. On 4/22/13, three BRP inspectors went to the home to perform radiological surveys of the container. Wipes were taken of the outside and a field scan of the wipes identified no removable contamination. The maximum dose rate reading at contact was 1.7 mrem/hr. The inspectors were unable to verify that the material was radium. The device was loaded into the BRP truck and transferred to the OSU Radiation Safety Office and placed in a secure radioactive material storage area.  "On 4/23/13, BRP contacted the US-EPA to request assistance in identification and disposal of the container and material, assuming it to contain one or more radium needle orphan source(s). BRP is also contacting the CRCPD [Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors] for assistance in disposal.  "On 5/2/13 BRP inspectors visited the widow's home, at her request, to ensure there were no other similar containers or materials present. The inspectors discovered a second container that was identified as containing radium. This container was also taken to OSU and placed in a secure radioactive material storage area. US-EPA was contacted about this second device for inclusion in their investigation.  "BRP is currently working to obtain more information on the origin of the radioactive materials. No further information is available as of this date (5/6/13)."  BRP indicated that the 'containers' appear to be homemade lead pigs. The second container has a maximum dose rate reading of 2.5 mrem/hr at contact. Gamma spectroscopy analysis of the second container, along with a partial label found, indicate that the contents may be Radium-226.  Ohio Item Number: OH130013|
Agreement State|49006|GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM|PROFESSIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES, INC|1|KENNESAW|GA||GA 629-1|Y||||||ERIC JAMESON|DONALD NORWOOD|5/6/2013 00:00:00|16:12|5/3/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/8/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER GAUGE  The following information was received via E-mail:  "After conducting a recent inventory, the licensee called in to report that one of their portable radiation gauges was missing and/or stolen. Specifically, a Troxler gauge, model 3430, serial number 27283 cannot be currently accounted for."  The Georgia Radioactive Materials Program will update this event when more information is available.  Georgia Incident Summary: GA-CTS-07990   * * * UPDATE FROM ERIC JAMESON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1532 ON 5/7/2013 * * *  The following report was received via e-mail:  "The licensee reports that the gauge's last recorded use was on 4/24/2013. The licensee made the report of the lost or stolen gauge to both the Department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] and local law enforcement on 5/2/2013. The licensee also stated the gauge has a sticker on it indicating a reward if found and returned."  Notified R1DO (Dwyer) and FSME Events Resource.    THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Agreement State|49007|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|QSA GLOBAL|1|BURLINGTON|MA|||Y||||||BRUCE PACKARD|PETE SNYDER|5/6/2013 00:00:00|18:07|5/6/2013 00:00:00|08:00|EDT|5/6/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|BRIAN MCDERMOTT|FSME|JIM WHITNEY|ILTA|PAUL HARRIS|IRD|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE SHIPMENT DID NOT ARRIVE AS EXPECTED  "QSA Global reported a lost source. The location of the source is not known. The shipment contains Ir-192."  QSA expected this source to arrive at their Baton Rouge, LA location at about 0800 CDT on 5/6/13. QSA contacted the common carrier to locate the item at some time after that. The last known location was Memphis, TN.    * * * UPDATE FROM MIKE FULLER (QSA) TO PETE SNYDER AT 1915 ON 5/6/13 * * *   At about 1915 EDT, QSA personnel learned from the common carrier that the item had been located at the Memphis, TN shipping location.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours).  It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days.  These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|49008|WOLF CREEK|WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.|4|BURLINGTON|KS|COFFEY||Y|05000482|1|||[1] W-4-LP|PIERCE MOORE|DONALD NORWOOD|5/6/2013 00:00:00|20:16|5/6/2013 00:00:00|17:33|CDT|5/6/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(i)|PLANT S/D REQD BY TS|||||||MICHAEL VASQUEZ|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|70|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN REQUIRED DUE TO NON-FUNCTIONAL CLASS 1E AIR CONDITIONING UNIT  "Class 1E Air Conditioning Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical Train 'A' and was declared non-functional at 1733 hours.  As a result, the following safety related electrical equipment was declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01; 480 volt buses NG01 and NG03; 120 volt Instrument AC inverters and buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03; 125 VDC chargers and buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03.  T/S 3.0.3 was entered at 1733 from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable.  Plant shutdown to Mode 5 commenced at 1801 hours.    "All electrical systems listed above remain functional but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability."  The licensee plans on performing a controlled plant shutdown using normal rod insertion following approved plant procedures.  Per the licensee, Mode 3 conditions must be met by 0033 CDT 5/7/2013 and Mode 5 conditions must be met by 0033 CDT 5/8/2013.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|49009|MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH|MISTRAS GROUP, INC.|4|PASCAGOULA|MS||MS-995-01|Y||||||JAYSON MOAK|DONALD NORWOOD|5/7/2013 00:00:00|15:05|5/6/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MICHAEL VASQUEZ|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE  The following information was received via E-mail:  "Licensee reported a stuck radiography source that occurred at approximately 2315 CDT on May 6, 2013.  Licensee's RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] responded to incident site, increased barricades, maintained perimeter, and notified Chevron RSO.  Licensee's source was fully retracted into the shielded position at 0100 CDT [on May 7, 2013].  The Licensee's RSO received 20 mR conducting the source retrieval."  The incident occurred while performing work at the Chevron Pascagoula Refinery.  Mississippi Report Number: MS-13002  * * * UPDATE RECEIVED FROM JAYSON MOAK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 5/17/13 AT 1250 EDT * * *   The following report was received via e-mail:  "On 5/6/2013, the Licensee had a two man crew performing industrial radiography at the Chevron Plant.  The radiographer was unable to crank the source back into the camera after his third exposure.  The source was then cranked back into the collimator.  The radiographer repositioned the cranks and tried to retract the source again without success.  The radiographer and assistant radiographer extended the restricted area boundary and called the Licensee's night safety officer on site.  The Licensee's RSO then notified Mistras Group's CRSO [Corporate Radiation Safety Officer] and plant personnel of the incident.  "The Licensee's RSO, once on site, discovered from conversation with the radiographer that the drive cable was hitting a melted area of the conduit and not letting the drive cable pass through. The melting of the (black) return conduit of the cranks occurred because it was placed over a non-insulated pipe from the plant's furnace.  The Licensee's RSO made the decision to cut the conduit at the melted area of the cranks to save time and reduce exposure while trying to retract the source.  This provided clearance for the drive cable to pass through and allowed the source to retract back into the fully shielded position inside the camera.  The camera, guide tube, and cranks were surveyed by the RSO upon source retraction."  The State (Mississippi) has closed this case.  Notified the R4DO (Walker) and FSME Events Resources via email.|
Power Reactor|49010|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|ANGEL BRAY|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/8/2013 00:00:00|09:41|5/8/2013 00:00:00|06:23|CDT|5/8/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||HIRONORI PETERSON|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||EMERGENCY SIREN SPURIOUS ACTUATION  "On 5/8/2013 at 0623 (CDT) MNGP was informed by Wright County Sheriffs Department of a spurious actuation of one emergency response siren in Wright County (for about 2 seconds).  This activation was confirmed by vendor system monitoring.  The source of the activation has not been determined.  At this time all aspects of the public notification system are functional."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the state and local governments.|
Agreement State|49011|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|QSA GLOBAL|1|BURLINGTON|MA|||Y||||||BRUCE PACKARD|DONALD NORWOOD|5/8/2013 00:00:00|17:03|5/8/2013 00:00:00|10:00|EDT|5/9/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|BRIAN MCDERMOTT||JANE MARSHALL|IRD|JIM WHITNEY|ILTA|DAVID AYRES|R2DO|HIRONORI PETERSON|R3DO|MICHAEL VASQUEZ|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY LOST RADIOACTIVE SOURCE SHIPMENT  Two, Category 2, IR-192 industrial radiography sources, loaded in a QSA Global model 650L source changer, left Wilmington, MA at 1416 EDT, 5/6/13 headed for Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, VA.  The source changer was expected to be delivered early the morning of 5/8/13.  Norfolk Naval Shipyards notified QSA Global when the source changer did not arrive as scheduled.  The transportation company was then notified.  The transportation company began searches of its facilities in Newark, NJ and Boston, MA for the source changer.  The last known shipping scan of the source changer was at 2342 EDT, 5/6/13 in Newark, NJ.  The source changer is a metal container measuring 8 1/4 inches x 10 inches x 13 inches that weighs approximately weighs 90 lbs. The transportation company is continuing to search for the source changer.  * * * UPDATE FROM CHARLES ELLARS (QSA Global) TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/9/13 AT 0902 EDT * * *  The sources were found in the Newark, NJ facility and the shipment is expected to arrive at Norfolk Naval Shipyard on 5/10/13.  Notified R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Ayers), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Vasquez), IRD (Marshall), ILTAB (Whitney), FSME (McDermott), FSME Event Resources via email, DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA and Nuclear SSA via email.  * * * UPDATE FROM KENATH TRAEGDE (MA STATE) TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 5/9/13 AT 1444 EDT * * *  The state was notified, by QSA Global, at 0825 EDT on 5/9/13 that the source was found at 0450 EDT on 5/9/13.  The state will submit a follow-up report.   THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours).  It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days.  These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|49012|CALVERT CLIFFS|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|LUSBY|MD|CALVERT||Y|||2||[1] CE,[2] CE|CHARLES MORGAN|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/9/2013 00:00:00|00:09|5/8/2013 00:00:00|21:47|EDT|5/9/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP  The reactor automatically tripped at 2147 EDT.  All control rods fully inserted on the trip and all systems responded as expected.  Decay heat removal is to the main condenser.  The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.  The licensee is investigating the cause of the reactor trip.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49013|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|JOHN WHALLEY|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/9/2013 00:00:00|00:51|5/8/2013 00:00:00|17:00|EDT|5/9/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MAIN ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE   "On May 8, 2013 at 1700 hours with the reactor in a Cold Shutdown condition and the Reactor Mode Select Switch in Refuel, the main control room annunciator system became inoperable during a preplanned activity to repair the associated 120VAC/125 VDC instrument power supply transfer switching scheme.  The reactor cavity is flooded, the fuel pool gates are removed, shutdown cooling is in service and reactor vessel reassembly activities are in progress.  The appropriate abnormal procedure was entered and compensatory actions including periodic monitoring of bus voltages and field annunciator panels were implemented for systems in service at the time of the loss.  Station risk is green and all key safety functions are green. Troubleshooting is in progress however, return to service time has not been determined.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  The USNRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public."|
Power Reactor|49014|CALLAWAY|AMEREN UE|4|FULTON|MO|CALLAWAY||N|05000483|1|||[1] W-4-LP|GERRY RAUCH|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/9/2013 00:00:00|07:18|5/9/2013 00:00:00|05:09|CDT|5/9/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|||||||MICHAEL VASQUEZ|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE  "During Callaway refueling outage 19 on 5/8/13 at approximately 1900 hour CDT, water was observed dripping from piping insulation in the overhead by RCS loop 4.  Further investigation determined it was near Safety Injection (EP) vent valve EPV0109.  A scaffold was built and insulation was removed to perform an inspection.  At approximately 0509 hours CDT on 5/9/13, engineering inspected the piping and determined there was a crack in the socket weld where 3/4 inch vent valve EPV0109 is connected to the 'B' train injection piping to RCS loop 4 Cold Leg.  The estimated leakage rate through the crack is 6 (six) drops per minute. The configuration of this vent valve is a 3/8 inch flow restrictor socket welded to the six inch piping and a 3/4 inch vent valve socket welded to the flow restrictor.  The crack is in the socket weld between the ASME code class 1 flow restrictor socket and the ASME code class 2 vent piping.  "Callaway plant was in mode 6 with refueling pool level greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange at the time of the discovery.  The 'A' RHR train which discharges to RCS loops 1 and 3 Cold Legs is the currently operable RHR train.  'B' RHR train was declared inoperable when the weld crack was identified.  Only one RHR train is required to be operable at the present plant Mode of applicability.  Repair plans are being developed.  "Basis for Reportability: This condition constitutes abnormal degradation of a principle safety barrier due to unacceptable welding defects within the primary coolant system."  There is a check valve between this leak and the reactor coolant system.  Therefore, this is considered unisolable and pressure boundary leakage.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Fuel Cycle Facility|49015|HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.|HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.|2|METROPOLIS|IL|MASSAC|SUB-526|Y|04003392||||URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION|ROSS LINDBERG|CHARLES TEAL|5/9/2013 00:00:00|09:36|5/8/2013 00:00:00|15:40|CDT|5/9/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|40.60(b)(3)|MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM|||||||DAVID AYRES|R2DO|TIM MCCARTIN|NMSS|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL  "An employee reported to the dispensary yesterday afternoon with a potential knee injury at approximately 1540 CDT. The plant nurse administered first aid and decided to send the employee home. A whole body survey of the employee in his plant clothing was performed; the maximum amount of contamination was present on his right boot, 17,936 dpm/100 cm2. Prior to leaving the Restricted Area, the employee removed all plant clothing, changed into his personal clothing, and was re-surveyed. The employee was free of contamination upon release."  The licensee notified NRC R2 (Richard Gibson).|
Agreement State|49016|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|MATERON PRECISION OPTICS|1|TYNGSBOROUGH|MA||G0272|Y||||||TONY CARPENITO|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/9/2013 00:00:00|14:18|5/9/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/30/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST IONIZING STATIC DISSIPATER  The licensee reported to the state that a ionizing static dissipater, licensed under a General License [GL] and used on lines for clearing small parts of dust, was lost.  The device is Model: NRD P-2021-8101 with Serial Number: A2HN439 and contained a Po-210 with an up to a 10 mCi source, on 1/18/12, which has decayed to approximately 0.9 mCi as of 5/9/13.  The licensee has properly returned all other devices for destruction from the facility.  The State has initiated an investigation and will assign an event number as new information is obtained.   * * * UPDATE ON 5/30/2013 AT 1430 EDT FROM TONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  The following update was received via e-mail:  "The agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] conducted a site visit on 5/29/13.  The general licensee implemented a search through facilities and determined the missing device may have been inadvertently dispositioned during recent building renovations and subsequent departmental reorganizations and relocations.  The missing device was last used in 2012.  The general licensee is seeking to terminate GL registration due to GL devices having been phased out and replaced with non-RAM [radioactive material] equipment.  All other GL devices were accounted for and have already been dispositioned.  The missing device component is a small metallic cylindrical object 0.5 inches in diameter and 2.7 inches in length.  "The agency considers this event to be CLOSED."  Massachusetts Event Docket #17-0766 NMED Item #130233  Notified the R1DO (Holody) and FSME Event Resources (via e-mail).   THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|49017|TURKEY POINT|FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|MIAMI|FL|DADE||Y|05000250|3|||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|PAUL CZAYA|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/9/2013 00:00:00|16:10|3/11/2013 00:00:00|00:43|EDT|5/9/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.73(a)(1)|INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION|||||||DAVID AYRES|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|3|Startup|3|Startup|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||INVALID ACTUATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM  "This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of the Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).  "On March 11,2013 at approximately 0043 [EDT], while starting the 3B Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) for a one minute run, both trains of AFW started. Operators then manually closed the AFW flow control valves. AFW Trains 2 and 1 were restored to operable standby status at approximately 0112 [EDT] and 0117 [EDT], respectively.  "AFW actuation occurred because of a misunderstood procedure step and unnecessarily placed jumpers in AFW actuation logic in preparation for start of the 3B SGFP, which resulted in the invalid signal. At the time, the level in the steam generators was being maintained by the 3A Standby Steam Generator Feed Pump (SBSGFP).  "Because no actual loss of normal feedwater condition existed (with the 3A SBSGFP in service) which required AFW to start, and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for actuation, this event is an invalid actuation."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|49018|COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH|VARIOUS|4|DENVER|CO||VARIOUS|Y||||||JENNIFER OPILA|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/9/2013 00:00:00|17:29|5/9/2013 00:00:00||MDT|5/13/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MICHAEL VASQUEZ|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCES|EMAI|ILTAB|EMAI|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - REPORT OF MISSING GENERAL DEVICES  The following is a list of missing general devices reported by the State of Colorado, missing between 1998-2011, via email.  The following table details the type and number of devices that the State previously neglected to report:  Type of Device                        Number Reported as Missing 1998-2011 - Exit Signs                               1096 - Calibration                                    7 - Dust Monitor                                1 - Electron Capture Detector         13 - Gas Chromatograph                    6 - Standard Reference Materials     1 - Gauge                                          2 - Static Eliminator                         44 - Unknown                                     1 - X-Ray Florescence                    14  The State does not believe these devices represent a risk to human health or the environment and has taken steps to improve the general licensing registration program to ensure accurate reporting in the future.  See EN #48609 for a list of missing general devices in 2012.  * * * UPDATE FROM J. OPILA TO V. KLCO ON 5/13/2013 AT 1634 EDT * * *   The following information was excerpted from a received facsimile:  The State of Colorado checked with the general licensee and there was a report error.  A Pepsi Bottling Group LLC source (Am-241; 100 mCi) was never missing and still is in the possession of the licensee.  Notified the R4DO (Hay), ILTAB and FSME Resources via email.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|49019|COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION|ENERGY NORTHWEST|4|RICHLAND|WA|BENTON||Y|05000397|2|||[2] GE-5|CHRIS LAWS|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/10/2013 00:00:00|00:19|5/9/2013 00:00:00|18:00|PDT|5/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||MICHAEL VASQUEZ|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||INLET/OUTLET TURBIDITY FLOCCULATOR NOT RECORDING DATA  "The following is a non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the notification requirement to other government agencies that will be made within 48 hours.  "At 1800, May 9, 2013, the Columbia Generating Station main control room received notification that PWC-XR-1 had been found to be not recording data.  A review of the stored data indicated that the data collection had been stopped since 5/2/2013 at 0934.  The screen does show real time data, although that data is not being stored.  Some of the data is recorded manually by chemistry technicians and operators during rounds that may be used for reporting purposes.  "Automatic functions for high turbidity shutdown and low chlorine setpoints remain active when the data is not being stored.  The data collected by PWC-XR-1 includes inlet and outlet flocculator turbidity, water temperature, flow rate and free residual chlorine.  Washington Administrative Code, WAC, 246-290-664 outlines the requirements for monitoring filtered systems.  WAC 246-290-480 section 2.a requires this failure to be reported as a failure to comply with monitoring requirements to the Washington Department of Health within 48 hours.  "PWC-XR-1 data storage has been re-initiated and is working as expected."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49020|NORTH ANNA|DOMINION GENERATION|2|RICHMOND|VA|LOUISA||N|||2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP|PAGE KEMP|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/10/2013 00:00:00|08:20|5/10/2013 00:00:00|06:12|EDT|5/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||DAVID AYRES|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||M/R|Y|60|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH TURBINE BEARING VIBRATION  "On May 10, 2013 at 0612 hours [EDT], Unit 2 was manually tripped from 60% power due to increased vibrations and a report of arcing on bearing #9 of the main turbine.  Unit 2 was in the process of increasing power following a refueling outage when this event occurred. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 2 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure.  All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip.  This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).  The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators.  The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of an ESF system.  The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic.  Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system.  Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup."  The #9 bearing is on the main generator exciter.  There was no effect on Unit 1.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying local government agencies.|
Power Reactor|49021|TURKEY POINT|FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|MIAMI|FL|DADE||Y|05000250|3|||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|PAUL REIMERS|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/10/2013 00:00:00|12:42|5/10/2013 00:00:00|11:08|EDT|5/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|||||||DAVID AYRES|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||M/R|Y|25|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNIT 3 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MALFUNCTION OF TURBINE VALVES  "This is a non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center] in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification).  "On 5/10/13 [at 1108 EDT] Unit 3 was stabilizing at 25% [power] during a controlled shutdown from an initial power level of 38% [power].  Prior to the planned insertion of the trip at 25% [power], a malfunction of the turbine valves (not yet understood) caused a loss of load and a manual reactor trip was performed at 1108 [EDT].  Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 [Hot Standby] and stable. Source Range Nuclear Instrument N-3-32 malfunctioned (loss of detector voltage).  All other plant systems are working as designed."  Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 [Hot Standby] at normal operating temperature and pressure.  All control rods fully inserted.  All other Nuclear Instrumentation is operable.  Decay heat removal is via main feedwater and atmospheric steam dumps however, the condenser steam dumps are available but not preferred for Tave control. There is no known primary to secondary leakage.  Unit 3 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.  The cause of the turbine valves malfunction is not known at this time.  There is no impact on Unit 4.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49022|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|||2||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|VINCE WESSLING|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/10/2013 00:00:00|15:56|5/10/2013 00:00:00|12:09|EDT|5/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO PLANNED TESTING OF RADIATION MONITORS  At 1209 EDT on 5/10/13, Stack Effluent radiation monitors RM8168 and RM8132 and Main Steam Line radiation monitors RM4299 A, B, and C were removed from service for planned testing.  At 1458 EDT on 5/10/13, all radiation monitors were restored to service following completion of testing.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State and Local authorities.|
Power Reactor|49023|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|MICHAEL STIDMON|STEVE SANDIN|5/10/2013 00:00:00|15:56|5/10/2013 00:00:00|09:20|CDT|5/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||HIRONORI PETERSON|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF ALCOHOL CONTAINER INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA  "[The licensee] discovered a small bottle of alcohol within the Protected Area.  The 50ml bottle was approximately 2/3 full.  The seal ring had been broken.  The clear liquid smells of alcohol as the label of the bottle indicates.  The bottle was discovered beneath a deck structure to a temporary trailer that workers were demolishing.  "This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719 Fitness-For-Duty."  The license informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49024|LIMERICK|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|1|PHILADELPHIA|PA|MONTGOMERY||N|05000352|1|2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|PAUL MARVEL|STEVE SANDIN|5/10/2013 00:00:00|18:08|5/10/2013 00:00:00|09:05|EDT|5/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR TESTING POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL  "A Non-licensed, Supervisory employee had a confirmed positive alcohol test during a random fitness-for-duty test.  The employee's access to the Plant has been removed."  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49025|GRAND GULF|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|PORT GIBSON|MS|CLAIBORNE||Y|05000416|1|||[1] GE-6|TJ REYNOLDS|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/12/2013 00:00:00|19:15|5/12/2013 00:00:00|17:43|CDT|5/29/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|||||||JAMES DRAKE|R4DO|ART HOWELL|RA|JANE MARSHALL|IRD|DAN DORMAN|NRR|||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO FIRE ON AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER INSIDE PROTECTED THE AREA  At 1743 CDT on 05/12/13, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station declared an Unusual Event due to a fire lasting greater than 15 minutes in an auxiliary transformer inside the Protected Area (PA).  The transformer was isolated. The plant continues to operate at 100% power.  The license remains in a Unusual Event pending further investigation.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local Authorities.  Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.  * * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT BRINKMAN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2112 EDT ON 5/12/13 * * *  The Licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1921 CDT on 5/12/13 based on electrically isolating the auxiliary transformer and termination of smoke coming from the transformer.  At no time were flames seen during this event.  The transformer is located outside of the turbine building and is used to supply various loads and office space during outages.  There was no other impact on the plant.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local Authorities.  Notified R4DO (Drake), NRR EO (Bahadur), IRD (Marshall), DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.  * * * RETRACTION FROM CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1057 EDT ON 5/29/13 * * *  "EN #49025 documents an emergency declaration of Notification of Unusual Event due to a fire lasting greater than 15 minutes within the protected area. The basis for retraction is that this event did not meet the definition of FIRE in NEI 99-01 Rev 5, 'Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels'.  This document was endorsed by the NRC on February 22, 2008 (see ADAMS ascension # ML080450149) and is part of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's current licensing basis. Per the guidance, a FIRE is defined as:  "Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.   "Grand Gulf performed interviews of operators and personnel responding to the event and subsequently examined photos of the affected auxiliary transformer. According to eyewitness reports from personnel, flames were not observed at any time nor was there any light emanating from the source of smoke. Personnel also reported that at the immediate vicinity of the smoke source, heat was not at a level which would be indicative of a fire. Photos of the affected transformer did not show signs of charring, burns, warping, or deformation as would be expected during a FIRE.  Additionally, the definition of a FIRE specifically excludes overheated electrical equipment."  Notified R4DO (Azua), NRR EO (Chernoff), and IRD (Morris).|
Power Reactor|49026|KEWAUNEE|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|KEWAUNEE|WI|KEWAUNEE||Y|05000305|1|||[1] W-2-LP|LOGAN MILLER|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/12/2013 00:00:00|21:58|5/12/2013 00:00:00|17:55|CDT|5/12/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||HIRONORI PETERSON|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SERVICE WATER EFFLUENT LINES NON FUNCTIONAL  "At 1755 [CDT] on 05/12/13, R-16, Service Water System Effluent Line (Containment Fan Cooling) and R-20, Service Water System Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) were declared NON-FUNCTIONAL due to low SW [Service Water] sampling flow.  R-16 and R-20 are used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability."  The Licensee is investigating to determine an appropriate recovery plan.    The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49027|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|CHUCK TACK|CHARLES TEAL|5/13/2013 00:00:00|11:22|5/13/2013 00:00:00|10:10|CDT|5/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANNED OUTAGE OF SIRENS DUE TO SCHEDULED UPGRADES  "Planned intermittent outages of all FCS sirens will occur the week of 5/13/13-5/17/13 due to scheduled upgrades to the radio system.   Based on the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be nonfunctional for various amounts of time. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement will be completed with compensatory measures established prior to work each day to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance. Updates will be made to the NRC on 5/13/13 when the work starts, and upon completion of the work not to exceed 5/17/13. Work is currently scheduled to be complete 5/17/13.    "Also, contingencies have been established to back out if required in support of the plant or Law Enforcement activities.    "Work is scheduled to commence today, 5/13/13, at 10:10 AM.  "This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.'"  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE AT 0915 EDT ON 5/17/2013 FROM LUKE JENSEN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  The work was completed on 5/16/2013 at 1700 CDT.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R4DO (Walker).|
Power Reactor|49028|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|05000245|1|||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|MARK STROLLO|CHARLES TEAL|5/14/2013 00:00:00|09:31|5/14/2013 00:00:00|09:07|EDT|5/14/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Decommissioned|0|Decommissioned|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  The licensee is taking the spent fuel pool island radiation monitor out of service for pre-planned maintenance to change the air filter. The maintenance is expected to take approximately 5 minutes.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state and local authorities.|
Power Reactor|49029|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|DANIEL COLEMAN|PETE SNYDER|5/14/2013 00:00:00|17:20|5/14/2013 00:00:00|12:15|EDT|5/14/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|3|Startup|3|Startup|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||HIGH STEAM FLOW ISOLATION CAPABILITY IDENTIFIED AS NON-FUNCTIONAL  "Emergency Cooling Loop 11 High Steam Flow Isolation capability not functional due to inadequate water level in differential pressure transmitter reference legs.  "Emergency Cooling Loop 11 High Steam Flow transmitter for channel 11 alarmed due to gross failure at 0840 hours [EDT] on May 14, 2013. At 1154 hours channel 12 Emergency Cooling Loop 11 High Steam Flow transmitter experienced a gross failure. With both transmitters failed, the isolation capability of Emergency Condenser Loop 11 on high steam flow is not available.  "At 1215 hours, a manual isolation of Emergency Cooling Loop 11 was initiated fulfilling the safety function.  "Subsequent troubleshooting has revealed that the reference legs of the differential pressure transmitters for high steam flow were not filled properly.  "This is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition could have prevented the mitigation of the consequences of an accident."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State of New York.|
Power Reactor|49030|GRAND GULF|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|PORT GIBSON|MS|CLAIBORNE||Y|05000416|1|||[1] GE-6|CHRIS ROBINSON|PETE SNYDER|5/14/2013 00:00:00|18:22|5/14/2013 00:00:00|10:44|CDT|5/14/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FAILED FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST  A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49031|COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION|ENERGY NORTHWEST|4|RICHLAND|WA|BENTON||Y|05000397|2|||[2] GE-5|RICK GARCIA|PETE SNYDER|5/14/2013 00:00:00|18:37|5/14/2013 00:00:00|15:02|PDT|5/31/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANNED POWER OUTAGE AT TSC AND OSC  "During Refueling Outage 21, at 1502 PDT on 5/14/13, power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) was removed as part of transferring the facility to temporary power during a bus outage impacting the normal facility power supply. The TSC and OSC will be unavailable for use for several hours until temporary power has been established.   "Established compensatory measures direct ERO members normally responding to either of the two impacted centers to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the bus outage.   "This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The resident inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when temporary power has been established and the facility is available for use."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.   * * * UPDATE FROM SANDRA CHRISTIANSON TO PETE SNYDER AT 1637 EDT ON 5/15/13 * * *   "This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 49031. Temporary power has been established to the TSC and OSC, and both are available for emergency response. Normal power to TSC and OSC is expected to be restored on or about June 2, 2013 at 0600 PDT and will require a similar removal of power to the facility. A separate notification will be made when swapping off of temporary power."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hay).  * * * UPDATE AT 1735 EDT ON 5/31/2013 FROM SANDRA CHRISTIANSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "On 5/31/13, power to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operations Support Center (OSC) was removed as part of transferring the facility from temporary power back to the normal facility power supply. The duration of the power outage will last approximately 90 minutes. The TSC and OSC are unavailable for use during this time for support of emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when normal power has been reestablished and the facility is available for use."  Notified the R4DO (Azua).  * * * UPDATE AT 2050 EDT ON 5/31/2013 FROM LISA WILLIAMS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "At 1700 hours [PDT] on 5/31/13, normal power has been reestablished to the TSC and OSC, and both are available for emergency response. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R4DO (Azua).|
Power Reactor|49032|CATAWBA|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|YORK|SC|YORK||Y|||2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|WALTER HUNNICUTT|DONALD NORWOOD|5/15/2013 00:00:00|02:52|5/14/2013 00:00:00|23:23|EDT|5/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||JONATHAN BARTLEY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LEAK FROM TURBINE BUILDING SUMP CONTAINING TRITIUM  "Sample exceeding the industry groundwater protection initiative related to radioactivity in groundwater for which a news release is planned and notification to other government agencies will be made."  "A leak greater than 100 gallons containing tritium has the potential to reach groundwater.  The source has been identified.  Actions to isolate this source are being initiated."  The licensee has identified a leak in a fiberglass discharge pipe from the turbine building sump.  The licensee estimates that greater than 100 gallons of water has been discharged through the leak at the present time.  The licensee is in the process of installing a temporary sump pump in the turbine building sump in order to isolate the discharge path.  Samples indicate a tritium concentration of 8.964 E-6 uCi/mL.  The licensee will notify state and local government agencies.  A press release is planned.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Research Reactor|49033|TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY|TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY|4|COLLEGE STATION|TX|BRAZOS|R-83|Y|05000128||||1000 KW TRIGA (CONVERSION)|ESTEBAN BOTELLO|HOWIE CROUCH|5/15/2013 00:00:00|11:03|5/14/2013 00:00:00|22:09|CDT|5/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT|||||||MICHAEL HAY-email|R4DO|DUANE HARDESTY|NRR|JESSE QUICHOCHO|NRR|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||RESEARCH REACTOR REPORTABLE EVENT - CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM JAM  "This preliminary event report is in compliance with Technical Specification 6.6.2 Special Reports confirming in writing the initial report made by telephone to the USNRC Operations Center.  "During reactor shutdown after normal steady state operation on May 14, 2013 at 2209 CDT, shim safety 1 jammed at 30% withdrawn (70% inserted). Operators lowered the remaining rods with no other issues and after determining the reactor was shut down at 2250 CDT, operators began investigating the cause of the jam. The shutdown margin in this configuration was determined to be $2.91 [negative reactivity] with shim safety 1 jammed at 30%. The Technical Specification requirement for shutdown margin is $0.25 [negative reactivity] which meant the reactor was well within acceptable limits for shutdown.   "The reactor was determined to be in a safe shutdown state. During inspection a rope that was attached to an experiment was found to be caught inside the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) for shim safety 1 about 10 feet from the surface of the pool. This caused a jam in the drive mechanism not allowing the rod to go below 29% and above 32%.    "A fuel handling team was assembled at 0945 CDT on 5/15/13 in order to remove the control rod assembly for shim safety 1. The rope connecting the experiment to the CRDM was cut in order to allow proper removal of the CRDM. The CRDM was successfully removed and the piece of rope caught inside the drive was removed. After further inspection of the CRDM no other issues were found and it was reinstalled into its normal position.   "Operability and scram time tests were performed and completed satisfactory at 1130 CDT. The fuel handling team was disbanded at 1137 CDT and the reactor was determined to be operational. At no point during this event was there any danger to the general public or Nuclear Science Center personnel."|
Power Reactor|49034|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N||||3|[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|GERALD BAKER|PETE SNYDER|5/15/2013 00:00:00|11:55|5/15/2013 00:00:00|04:00|EDT|5/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Standby|LEAKING CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK EQUALIZING VALVE  "On May 15, 2013, at 0400 EDT, it was discovered that an equalizing valve for the outer containment air lock was leaking by its seat rendering the outer containment air lock inoperable. This condition was discovered by maintenance personnel as they were exiting containment through the inner containment air lock.  "The containment inner door was open for transit, which resulted in the Loss of Containment Integrity.  "With both containment air lock doors open at the time of discovery of the leaking equalizing valve, this condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The inner air lock door was immediately closed and has remained closed since.  "Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment Integrity is applicable in Modes 1,2,3, and 4. Since Primary Containment Integrity was rendered inoperable, Dominion is reporting that this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to control the release of radioactive material.   "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Agreement State|49035|COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH|UNKNOWN|4|GRAND JUNCTION|CO|||Y||||||ED STROUD|PETE SNYDER|5/15/2013 00:00:00|13:49|4/24/2013 00:00:00||MDT|5/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND RADIUM 226 SOURCE  "On April 24, 2013, The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment [Department] received notification from the Mesa County Landfill located in Grand Junction, Colorado, that a load of trash had alarmed the gate monitor. The roll-off in question came from a residential spring clean-up event sponsored by the city of Grand Junction.   "That same day, a member of the Department responded to the alarm and the roll-off was moved to a secure location after an initial radiation survey on the outside of the roll-off had been completed.   "On May 7, 2013, members of the Department examined the contents or the roll-off and a small section of plastic pipe (1 foot length) and a small source bound with tape were identified. It appeared that the source had been taped to the side of the plastic pipe at one time, and the word 'source' was written on the pipe. Using an Identifinder multi-channel analyzer, the isotope was identified as Ra-226.   "Dose rates were measured at greater than 200 millirem per hour on contact with the source (the limit of the inspector's instrument), and 10 millirem per hour at 1 foot. The dimensions of the source appeared to be approximately 3 mm by 2 cm. The source is currently stored in a secured location.  "The Department is conducting an investigation, and a press release is being issued to encourage anyone with information about the source to contact the Department."  * * * UPDATE FROM ED STROUD TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/29/13 AT 1459 EDT * * *   The following information was received by email:  "Following the initial event notification on 5/15/13 regarding a found Ra-226 source in Grand Junction, CO, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment issued a press release that requested anyone with additional information to please contact the DOH.  Several days later a member of the public contacted DOH with a possible lead.  Using that information, inspectors were able to trace the source back to a private residence in Grand Junction.  On 5/24/13, inspectors visited a house in a residential neighborhood and found additional radioactive materials in the attached garage.  However, the inspectors were not permitted to enter the residence.  Radioactive materials found included 2 more Ra-226 sources and a half dozen small jars containing an unknown radioactive powder, which appeared to be uranium mill tailings.  The radioactive materials were removed by the inspectors and taken to a secure storage location where additional measurements/analysis can be conducted.  The elderly female resident at the house told inspectors that her late husband and his business associates manufactured Geiger counters during the uranium boom years.   "Additional information will follow as it is obtained."   Notified R4DO (Azua) and FSME Resources via email.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|49036|CATAWBA|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|YORK|SC|YORK||Y|05000413|1|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|AARON MICHALSKI|VINCE KLCO|5/15/2013 00:00:00|15:00|5/15/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|20.2201(a)(1)(ii)|LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X|||||||JONATHAN BARTLEY|R2DO|FSME RESOURCES|EMAI|HAROLD CHERNOFF|NRR|||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MISSING LICENSED MATERIAL  This is a non-emergency 30 day notification for missing licensed material.  This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR20.2201(a)(1)(ii).  On April 16, 2013, while performing the required semi-annual source leak check and inventory, Radiation Protection personnel could not locate the source label tag or cable for source RMC-0169 on radiation monitor 1EMF44H (This monitor has not been in use since 1995).  The monitor's pre-amplifier box had been removed as well.  1EMH44H was inspected and the source was not found within the housing.  A search was conducted for this missing source, however it could not be located.  During the previous source leak check and inventory on October 4, 2012, the source was in its expected location.  Source RMC-0169 is a 200 milligram depleted uranium source.  The total original activity of the source was 9.998E-02 microCuries (3.03E-02 micro curies; U-234; 1.98E-03 microCuries; U-235, 6.77E-02 microCuries; U-238).  The reportable limit for U-234 (the shortest-lived isotope in the source is U-234 with a half-live of 2.46E+05 years) is 0.01 microCuries per 10CFR20, Appendix C.  Based on the activity of U-234 present in the source of 0.03 microCuries, this 30 day phone notification to the NRC is being provided pursuant to 10CFR22.2201(a)(1)(ii).  The external dose to an individual from this source is negligible due to the small quantity and the type of material involved.  Therefore, this event has no adverse effect upon the health and safety of employees or the public.  The required written report pursuant to 10CFR20.2201(b)(1) will be provided to the NRC within 30 days of the telephone notification.  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  The licensee with notify State and local authorities.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Agreement State|49037|NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH|ST. MARY'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER|4|RENO|NV||16-12-0244-02|Y||||||SNEHA RAVIKUMAR|PETE SNYDER|5/15/2013 00:00:00|16:54|5/14/2013 00:00:00|09:45|PDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WRONG DOSE ADMINISTERED TO PATIENT  The following information was obtained from the State of Nevada via email:  "The patient was to undergo a HIDA [hepatobiliary] scan for abdominal pain (Tc-99m; 5mCi, abdomen), but given syringe for MDP [bone scan] (Tc-99m; 30mCi; bone).  A wrong dose of Tc-99m (600% the prescribed dose) was administered to the patient due to human error.  "Corrective action: Better training in cross-checking and confirming patient identity with prescribed dose information."  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.  Item Number: NV130006  * * * RETRACTION FROM SNEHA RAVIKUMAR VIA E-MAIL ON 5/16/13 AT 1329 EDT * * *   "This is with regard to the wrong dose administration that was reported yesterday.  [The State of Nevada] heard back from the RSO regarding the Effective Dose Equivalent:   "What should have been administered was 5 mCi of HIDA (Mebrofenin) = (3E-02) x 5 rem = 0.15 rem.  "What was administered was 30 mCi of MDP = (2E-02) x 30 rem = 0.60 rem.  "So, this would not be reportable."  Notified R4DO (Walker) and FSME Events Resource via E-mail.|
Power Reactor|49038|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|ARTHUR PAN|PETE SNYDER|5/15/2013 00:00:00|19:55|5/15/2013 00:00:00|06:49|EDT|5/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(i)|PLANT S/D REQD BY TS|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||JONATHAN BARTLEY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO DISCOVERY OF AN UNACCEPTABLE FLAW DURING DATA REVIEW  "On May 13, 2013, during a secondary review of ultrasonic data of the reactor vessel head penetrations performed during Harris Nuclear Plant spring 2012 refueling outage, it was determined that the results for one of the penetrations appeared to not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. Further evaluation completed on May 15, 2013, characterized the flaw as a 0.26 inch flaw on nozzle 49 that overlaps the J-grove weld and exhibits characteristics of primary water stress corrosion cracking. The original examinations were performed per NRC requirements.  "Initial evaluation indicates that the flaw is not through wall and there is no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head during the spring 2012 refueling outage. Operators are shutting down the unit to make the necessary repairs. There is no impact to the health and safety of employees or the public.  "The NRC resident inspector has been informed.  "This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), discovery of a degraded condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), plant shutdown required by technical specifications, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive material."|
Power Reactor|49039|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N||||3|[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|MICHAEL WEISE|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/16/2013 00:00:00|10:20|5/16/2013 00:00:00|02:56|EDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Hot Standby|0|Hot Standby|MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING CONTROL ROD TESTING  "On May 16, 2013, at 0256 EDT, while in Mode 3 (subcritical), operators manually opened the reactor trip breakers as directed by procedure.  During rod drop testing, demand position and digital rod position indication did not agree within procedural limits.  As directed by procedure, operators opened the reactor trip breakers.  The cause of the discrepancy is under investigation.  The plant responded as expected and all rods inserted as required. The plant remains stable in Mode 3.  "This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv).  "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Agreement State|49040|VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM|HONEYWELL RESINS & CHEMICALS LLC|1|CHESTER|VA||041-344-2|Y||||||ASFAW FENTA|DONALD NORWOOD|5/16/2013 00:00:00|10:28|5/15/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|E-MA|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER HARD TO OPEN  The following information was submitted by the Commonwealth of Virginia via fax:  "On May 15, 2013, the licensee reported that the shutter of one of its fixed gauges was not 'functioning per the design.'  The problem was detected during the periodic shutter checks on May 15, 2013.  The shutter could be closed but needed strong force to open it.  The gauge is a Ronan Engineering Company, Model SA1-F37, Serial number M-2232.  The gauge contains 50 mCi of Cs-137 as of the manufacturing date (remaining activity as of the incident date is 34.3 mCi).  "Ronan Engineering Company was contacted and a schedule has been arranged for shutter repair.  "A radiation survey was performed by the licensee and found to be within design parameters and regulatory limits.  There are no public health or safety issues involved.  The Virginia Radioactive Material Program will follow up with the licensee."  Virginia Event Report ID: VA-13-005|
Agreement State|49041|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION CORPORATION|4|LAKE JACKSON|TX||02712|Y||||||KAREN BLANCHARD|HOWIE CROUCH|5/16/2013 00:00:00|12:50|5/15/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||WAYNE WALKER|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA DRIVE CABLE  The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:  "On May 15, 2013, the licensee reported that one of its radiography teams had been unable to retract an iridium-192 source back into a QSA Model 880 radiography camera at a temporary field site in Galena Park, Texas. The licensee's RSO and a supervisor responded to the site.   "The RSO covered the collimator containing the source with lead shot bags then an individual authorized to perform source retrieval responded and secured the source. The pocket dosimeter readings for the three were: RSO received 60 millirem; the supervisor received 50 millirem; and the individual performing source retrieval received 40 millirem.  "The licensee reported that the drive cable had broken right behind the ball. No member of the public received any exposure as a result of this event. The source, camera, and equipment will be taken to the licensee's facility and the licensee will contact the manufacturer.  "Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.  "Radiography camera: QSA Model 880, SN: 2735. Source SN: 91360B"  Texas Incident # I-9078|
Power Reactor|49042|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|||2||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|MICHAEL WEISE|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/16/2013 00:00:00|12:52|5/16/2013 00:00:00|09:25|EDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||STACK RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  At 0925 EDT on 5/16/13, Stack Radiation Monitor RM-8169 was removed from service for pre-planned maintenance.  There are no automatic actuations or initiations associated with this radiation monitor.  The radiation monitor will be restored to service following completion of maintenance.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state and local authorities.|
Power Reactor|49043|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|JERRY HELKER|HOWIE CROUCH|5/16/2013 00:00:00|16:46|5/15/2013 00:00:00|19:34|EDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|23|Power Operation|23|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO DEGRADED SEAL ON INNER DOOR CONCURRENT WITH PERSONNEL PASSING THROUGH THE OUTER DOOR  "At approximately 1934 EDT on May 15, 2013, maintenance personnel entered the primary containment personnel air lock to determine the cause of the inability to attain test pressure during a type B leak rate of the airlock. The inner door seal was found degraded and partially rolled from its required position allowing air from inside the airlock to enter the primary containment. During the limited time the outer airlock door was opened for access into the airlock concurrent with the degraded seal on the inner door, a condition existed that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the structure to control the release of radioactive material.  "The inner door seal was subsequently replaced and the leak rate of the personnel air lock completed with satisfactory results. During the seal replacement activity, the outer airlock door remained closed to provide the barrier against the release of radioactive material should it be required.  "This is a notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for a condition that could have prevented the control of the release of radioactive material. It is recognized that this notification [was] not within eight hours of the event.  "The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program."  The licensee will notify the New York State Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|49044|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|MISTRAS GROUP INC|4|DEER PARK|TX||06369|Y||||||KAREN BLANCHARD|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/16/2013 00:00:00|16:47|5/14/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||WAYNE WALKER|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE INTO RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA  The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via E-mail:  "On May 15, 2013, the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on May 14, 2013, one of its radiography crews had been unable to retract the source back into the QSA Model 880 camera they were using. The radiography crew had dropped and damaged the crank assembly when it was moving the equipment between shots. The crew apparently failed to thoroughly check the crank assembly prior to the next shot. Following the next shot, the source could not be retracted. The RSO was notified and he and another licensee employee, with assistance from the radiographers, performed the source retrieval (the camera and equipment had to be lowered to the ground from 40 feet inside a tank where the radiography was being performed in order to retrieve the source).  The RSO reported that the connector at the end of the cable, which connects the cable to the pigtail, had come off of the cable.  [The connector] was apparently damaged in the crank assembly accident. Readings from the pocket dosimeters were: RSO received 240 mrem; other employee performing source retrieval received 40 mrem; and, the 3 [other] radiography crew members received 300 mrem, 110 mrem, and 80 mrem, respectively. No member of the public received any exposure from this event. Further information will be provided as it is obtained, per SA-300.  "Radiography Camera: QSA Model 880, SN: D11097, Source: SN: 93674B"  Texas Incident #: I-9079|
Agreement State|49046|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|THERMO PROCESS INSTRUMENTS LP|4|SUGAR LAND|TX||03524|Y||||||ART TUCKER|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/16/2013 00:00:00|17:56|5/16/2013 00:00:00|15:25|CDT|5/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||WAYNE WALKER|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION EVENT REQUIRES AREA TO BE RESTRICTED FOR GREATER THAN 24 HOURS  The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via E-mail:  "On May 16, 2013 at 1525 [CDT], the licensee contacted the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] to report a contamination event which required access to an area to be restricted for more than 24 hours due to an unplanned contamination event. The licensee had received a drum containing 18 nuclear gauges from a facility licensed in the State of North Carolina (NC). The Texas licensee was to dismantle the gauges and dispose of the sources. The Texas licensee stated the gauges had been leak tested by the NC licensee and the leak test results were below regulatory levels. The Texas licensee stated they performed a contamination survey of the drum before they began removing the gauges. A licensee's worker removed the first gauge in preparation to remove the source. The gauge was a Berthold model LB 7400 gauge containing a Cs-137 source.  When the worker opened the shutter of the gauge to remove the source, they found a piece of lead inside the gauge cavity between the gauge shutter and the source.  As the worker removed the piece of lead they noted the background radiation readings where increasing. The worker stopped work and notified his supervisor. A contamination survey found that the workers hands, shirt sleeves, the table top, the floor in the immediate work area, and the worker's personal dosimetry were contaminated. The workers contaminated shirt and dosimetry were removed and his hands were decontaminated. The worker's face was surveyed for contamination, none was detected. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stated that worker was decontaminated within 15 minutes of the event occurring. The RSO stated that the individual had not exceeded any exposure limits based on their electronic dosimeter reading. The licensee attempted to decontaminate the table top and the floor in the work area, but some areas remain contaminated. Access to the area remains restricted. The Texas licensee has contacted the NC licensee and notified them of the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."  Texas Incident #: I-9080|
Power Reactor|49047|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N||||3|[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|GERALD BAKER|HOWIE CROUCH|5/17/2013 00:00:00|12:05|5/17/2013 00:00:00|04:39|EDT|5/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Hot Standby|0|Hot Standby|UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE BELOW REQUIRED VALUE  "On May 17, 2013 at 0439 EDT, with the unit in Mode 3, operators identified RCS temperature decreased below 551 deg. F with the reactor trip breakers closed. The condition existed for approximately one hour after which operators identified this was below the procedurally required value identified to support power range nuclear instrumentation trip operability. The condition was then immediately corrected.  "The plant remains stable in Mode 3.  "This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."  The reactor trip breakers were closed to support rod testing at the time this event occurred. RCS temperature was decreasing due to Terry turbine testing which was being performed at the same time. The reactor trip breakers were opened when the operators identified RCS temperature below 551 degrees. The RCS temperature was returned to above 551 degrees. This temperature limit is specified in Millstone 3 FSAR section 15.4.1, "Uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical or low power startup condition".  The licensee notified state and local authorities.   * * * RETRACTION FROM WILLIAM BARTRON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1053 EDT ON 5/23/2013 * * *  "The purpose of this call is to retract the report made on May 17, 2013, Event Number 49047.  "Upon further review, the condition in which Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature decreased below a procedural limit while in Mode 3 did not result in an unanalyzed condition.  Engineers verified that RCS boron concentration was sufficiently high that criticality could not have occurred during any inadvertent control rod withdrawal.  The details of the engineering review have been provided to the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."  Notified R1DO (Gray).|
Power Reactor|49048|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|ANGEL BRAY|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/17/2013 00:00:00|16:34|5/17/2013 00:00:00|15:27|CDT|5/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||KENNETH RIEMER|R3DO|ERDS GROUP|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE AND UPGRADES  "This is a non-emergency 8-hour notification for a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activities affects the functionality of the Plant Process Computer System.  Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant will remove the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) from service on 5/17/13 at 1527 [CDT] to perform system upgrades and planned maintenance. The PPCS system is planned to be non-functional for less than 4 hours.  While the system is out of service, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means and communication of the assessment results using communication equipment.  ERDS will be out of service during this period. Compensatory measures for the loss will be implemented. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Agreement State|49049|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|TUFTS MEDICAL CENTER|1|BOSTON|MA||68-0263|Y||||||MARIE WARD|HOWIE CROUCH|5/17/2013 00:00:00|16:55|5/17/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/20/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MASSACHUSETTS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT CONCERNING GAMMA KNIFE THERAPY  A patient was undergoing a second gamma knife treatment when the treatment was delivered to the wrong side of the brain. The patient and the prescribing physician were informed. The patient received 75 Gy to the brain. No serious effects are expected.  The Commonwealth of Massachusetts will be providing an update to this event.  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.  * * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL WHALEN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1350 EDT ON 5/20/13 * * *  The following report was received via email.  "Event Occurred on 5/17/2013 at approximately 1000 [EDT].  "With a Gamma Knife Manufacturer: Leksell Gamma System Model: Model 24001 Type C  "Sealed Sources information:  Manufacturer: Elekta Model number: 43685  "Prescribed treatment was for one fraction [the daily dose] of 75 Grays to be delivered to the left side of brain. However, the right side of the brain received the treatment."  Notified R1DO (Gray) and FSME EVENTS RESOURCE via email.|
Power Reactor|49050|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|LUKE JENSEN|HOWIE CROUCH|5/17/2013 00:00:00|17:28|5/17/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||WAYNE WALKER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||EMBEDMENT DEPTH FOR SEISMIC ANCHORS INADEQUATE  "It has been determined that some instrument racks in the Containment and Auxiliary buildings do not meet their design basis capacity due to inadequate embedment depth of the seismic anchors.  Assumptions made about embedment depth for a previous event were determined to be incorrect; therefore, the design basis capacity cannot be assured. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed condition'."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Part 21|49051|CRANE NUCLEAR INC|CRANE NUCLEAR INC|3|BOLINGBROOK|IL|||Y||||||ROSALIE NAVA|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/17/2013 00:00:00|20:56|5/17/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|PART 21 REACTORS|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||NOTIFICATION OF VALVE BODY LEAKAGE  Subject: 10CFR21 Notification on Potential Valve Body Leakage - 20 Valve Assemblies.  Crane Nuclear, Inc. has been advised by one customer about leakage on the body of an installed 2" valve assembly. The valve body identified as leaking or weeping was cast from alloy SB 148 UNS 95200.   While it was the customer that identified the valve body leakage to Crane Nuclear, a notification letter with their purchase order history was sent to Dominion / Millstone today in accordance with their purchase order notification requirements.|
Power Reactor|49052|COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION|ENERGY NORTHWEST|4|RICHLAND|WA|BENTON||Y|05000397|2|||[2] GE-5|TONY PACE|BILL HUFFMAN|5/19/2013 00:00:00|18:51|5/19/2013 00:00:00|14:21|PDT|5/19/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||WAYNE WALKER|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANNED OUTAGE OF RADIOLOGICAL AND SEISMIC MONITORING CAPABILITY  "During Refueling Outage 21, at approximately 0700 PDT on May 20, 2013 the following plant's gaseous effluent radiation monitoring systems and seismic monitoring systems will be removed from service due to a planned power outage:  " - Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor: Low Range; Intermediate Range; and High Range Detectors. [NOTE: The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors were removed from service as of 1421 PDT on 19 May 2013 (24 hours before the power outage) to allow for a gradual warming up of the sensors]  " -  Rad Waste Building Vent Exhaust Low Range Radiation [Rate Meter] and Exhaust Air Monitor Radiation Indicating Switch " -  Turbine Building Radiation Indicating Switch and Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch " -  Seismic Instrument Accelerometers " -  Seismic Instrument Accelerographs  "The listed equipment is expected to be re-energized at approximately 1400 PDT on May 22, 2013. The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors is expected be operational approximately 48 hours after they are re-energized to allow for sensor cooling requirements to be established.  "To compensate for the loss of the radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases will be on shift. The additional personnel will be pre-staged in support of the radiation monitoring system outage and will be deployed in accordance with guidance in site procedures and the compensatory measure instructions.  "To compensate for the loss of the seismic monitoring capability, an entry into the abnormal operating procedure 'EARTHQUAKE' will be made when an earthquake is felt in the control room or when information is received from plant personnel that an earthquake has been felt.  Earthquake severity will be estimated in accordance with abnormal operating procedure 'EARTHQUAKE' in lieu of instrumentation being available.  Information from the US Geological Survey (USGS), if available, will supplement the estimation of earthquake severity.  "This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service.  "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."|
Power Reactor|49053|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|DAVE NOYES|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/20/2013 00:00:00|07:54|5/20/2013 00:00:00|03:53|EDT|5/20/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||DAN SCHROEDER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|0|Startup|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OFF-SITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FIRE IN TURBINE BUILDING  "At 0353 hours [EDT] on Monday, May 20, 2013 Pilgrim Station responded to indications of a fire in the Turbine Building (TB) Lubricating Oil Room.  The Pilgrim Fire Brigade responded to the fire and was able to extinguish a small fire associated with the 'A' Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor.  The plant was in start-up at the time of the event with the reactor critical and reactor coolant system temperature approximately 180 degrees F.  "The Plymouth Fire Department was contacted and responded to the site. The event did not require entry into the Emergency Action Levels (EALs).  The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause.  The plant will be restarted after a thorough evaluation and any necessary repairs are completed.    "This informational notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).  The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) .  "The Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this notification."  This was an electrical fire confined to the aux oil pump motor and was extinguished using hand held CO2 and dry chemical extinguishers.|
Power Reactor|49054|CALVERT CLIFFS|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|LUSBY|MD|CALVERT||Y|||2||[1] CE,[2] CE|AMI CORDER|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/21/2013 00:00:00|06:20|5/21/2013 00:00:00|05:33|EDT|5/21/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||MEL GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||M/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AFTER A FEED PUMP TRIP  "Reactor trip.  All safety functions met with normal heat removal.  22 SGFP [Steam Generator Feedpump] exhibited high vibrations and signs of coupling damage.  Further investigation will be performed."  All control rods fully inserted on the trip.  Steam Generator level is being maintained with the remaining feedpump.  Decay heat is being dumped to the main condenser.  Electrical power is in the normal shutdown lineup.  No relief or safety valves lifted during the trip.  There was no effect on Unit 1.    The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49055|HATCH|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|BAXLEY|GA|APPLING||Y|||2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|STEVE BURTON|VINCE KLCO|5/21/2013 00:00:00|16:46|3/24/2013 00:00:00|10:09|EDT|5/21/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.73(a)(1)|INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION|||||||ALAN BLAMEY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|92|Power Operation|92|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||INVALID ACTUATION OF HPCI SUCTION VALVES  "On March 24, 2013, at 1009 EDT, while personnel were entering the torus compartment to perform planned maintenance activities via permanently installed plant ladder, the sensing line to transmitter 2E41-N062D was inadvertently bumped.  [This] was confirmed to be the cause for an invalid torus high water level alarm and a HPCI [High Pressure Core Injection] pump suction swap.  This resulted in the HPCI suction swapping from its normal lineup, condensate storage tank (CST), to the torus as designed.  Once actuated the suction swap occurred as designed.  The cause was attributed to the close proximity between an individual descending/ascending the fixed ladder and the affected sensing line in conjunction with a loose tubing restraint which made the line more sensitive to being bumped.  After confirming that the actuation on high torus level was invalid, HPCI suction was realigned to the CST.  "The HPCI pump suction was subsequently realigned to the CST and the loose tubing restraints were tightened."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49056|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|SCOTT MOECK|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/21/2013 00:00:00|22:15|5/21/2013 00:00:00|12:00|CDT|5/21/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED CONTRACT SUPERVISOR  A non-licensed, contract supervisory employee failed a random fitness-for-duty test.  The employee's access to the plant has been revoked.  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|49057|WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION|MORAVEK BIOCHEMICALS, INC.|4|RICHLAND|WA|||Y||||||MIKE ELSEN|HOWIE CROUCH|5/22/2013 00:00:00|11:13|5/13/2013 00:00:00||PDT|5/22/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SHIPPING DRUM EXCEEDED NON-REMOVABLE CONTAMINATION LIMITS  The following information was obtained from the State of Washington via email:  "Surface contamination levels exceeded limits for package.  PermaFix Northwest received a shipment from Moravek Biochemicals [based in Brea, CA] that consisted of (14) 55 gallon drums, and was shipped as an exclusive use shipment. Upon receipt, the drums were surveyed and 1 drum was found to exceed the 49 CFR 173.443 non-removable contamination limit of 2,200 dpm/cm2 for an exclusive use shipment. The drum survey results were reported as 35,538 dpm/100 cm2 H-3 and 1391 dpm/100 cm2 C-14. Taking into account the 10% wipe efficiency, the contamination levels on this drum exceeded the DOT contamination limits for packages. This drum was manifested with only H-3 and C-14. "  Washington Incident Number: WA-13-028|
Power Reactor|49058|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|TIM ENGLISH|HOWIE CROUCH|5/22/2013 00:00:00|11:06|5/22/2013 00:00:00|05:16|EDT|5/22/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT|||||||ALAN BLAMEY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF REDUNDANT ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY  "Loss of both National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitters.  "At 5:16 AM EDT on May 22, 2013 the National Weather Service reported a loss of the National Weather Service (NOAA) tone alert radio transmitters, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC, serving the northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHZ, and WNG-706 located in Garner, NC, serving the eastern Piedmont and coastal plain on 162.450 MHZ. The National Weather Service expects to return both transmitters to service no earlier than 8:00 AM on May 22, 2013. The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) tone alert radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant emergency sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant emergency sirens are in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur.  "There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.  "The NRC Resident has been notified."  The tone alert radio transmitters were returned to service at 11:30 AM.|
Agreement State|49060|COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH|CHAIR RENTAL|4|SHERIDAN|CO||UNKNOWN|Y||||||LINDA BARTISH|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/22/2013 00:00:00|16:03|5/20/2013 00:00:00||MDT|5/22/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS  The following information was obtained from the State of Colorado via email:  "A representative from Chair Rental, reported receiving the documentation for 2013 Self Certification, Registration, and Inventory report from the [Colorado State] Radioactive Materials Unit's annual General License notifications.  The report requires the company to verify the use and location of the exit signs at the site noted within the reports.    "[The company representative] contacted the [State's] Radioactive Materials Unit - General License section to report two exit signs were not located during the inventory check on May 20, 2013.  The signs are kept in a storage room within a warehouse.  Further details are being investigated.  "During the investigation, Chair Rental was asked to complete a corrective action plan and was made aware of the importance of accounting for exits signs within their business. The following information is provided for compliance.  Maker of sign:    Forever-Lite, Inc.  Model Number:    SLXTU16U10  Serial Number:    228,338 and 228,340  Date of Manufacture:  May, 2010  Date of Loss:     Unsure  Location of Sign:   When Lost: Unsure   "Other Details:   Signs are kept in a storage room for use in larger tents. When letter was received, [the company] went to do an inventory and two [signs] were missing. [The company is] unsure if they are lost in the building or if they are lost on a job site.   "Corrective Action Plan: [The company has] briefed our employees to check certain job sites in the hope that we may recover them. [The company] will also be using a sign out sheet for the signs that will include where they are going to and who is checking them out."  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|49061|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|DAVID NOYES|DONG HWA PARK|5/23/2013 00:00:00|12:42|5/23/2013 00:00:00|04:55|EDT|5/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||MEL GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|2|Startup|2|Startup|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING HPCI TESTING  "At 0455 hours on Thursday, May 23, 2013, with Pilgrim Station in the Startup/Hot Standby Mode and reactor coolant pressure approximately 550 psig, primary containment was declared inoperable due to a leak on the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) turbine exhaust line while performing the HPCI system flow rate test. Power ascension was suspended pending investigation and repair. Repair plans to restore system integrity are in progress.  "The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause. The Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)."  The licensee has entered Technical Specification 3.7.A.2 to be in cold shutdown within 24 hours.|
Power Reactor|49062|COOPER|NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|BROWNSVILLE|NE|NEMAHA||Y|05000298|1|||[1] GE-4|NATHAN L. BEGER|CHARLES TEAL|5/23/2013 00:00:00|15:45|5/23/2013 00:00:00|10:19|CDT|5/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012. Removing AC power was not expected to have an effect since all MET information would continue to be available due to an 8-hour battery backup system installed at the meteorological tower. However, when power was removed, all onsite meteorological data was lost to the control room via the Plant Management Information System (PMIS). PMIS is the only display of local direct meteorological conditions available. Subsequently, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS determined the interface between MET system and PMIS was not powered from the 8 hour MET battery backup system which accounted for the lost MET indication. CNS corrected the condition and restored meteorological data to the control room via the PMIS system at 1219 CDT.  "Site backup assessment capability relies on Meteorological model estimates from the National Weather Service out of Valley, Nebraska or on default values derived from historical local weather patterns. Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions during the period of lost power, CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."  The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.|
Agreement State|49063|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|KXR INSPECTION INC|4|HOUSTON|TX||01074|Y||||||ART TUCKER|CHARLES TEAL|5/23/2013 00:00:00|16:40|5/23/2013 00:00:00||CDT|5/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT  The following was received from the State of Texas via email:  "On May 23, 2013 the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by a licensee that while performing work at a remote site, a radiographer crew was unable to retract a source into a Spec 150 exposure device. The event occurred when a pipe jack fell on the source guide tube and crimped it to where the source connector would not pass through it. The radiographers contacted their Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) who responded to the scene. The source was covered with bags of lead shot to reduce the dose rates in the area. The RSO was able to un-crimp the guide tube using a pair of pliers enough to allow the source to be returned to the exposure device. The RSO received 45 millirem for the entire operation. No exposure limits were exceeded. The RSO stated that they disposed of the guide tube."  Texas Incident #: I-9085|
Power Reactor|49064|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|DAVID NOYES|CHARLES TEAL|5/23/2013 00:00:00|18:07|5/23/2013 00:00:00|10:50|EDT|5/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||MEL GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|2|Startup|2|Startup|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING POST MAINTENANCE TESTING  "At 1050 hours on Thursday, May 23, 2013, with Pilgrim Station in the Startup/Hot Standby Mode and with the reactor coolant pressure at approximately 525 psig, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI system was being operated in accordance with plant procedures to complete post maintenance test requirements. The flow controller could not achieve required system flow rates with the flow controller in the automatic mode. Plans to restore the automatic flow control capability are in progress.  "The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause.  "The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.  "The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)."|
Power Reactor|49065|WOLF CREEK|WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.|4|BURLINGTON|KS|COFFEY||Y|05000482|1|||[1] W-4-LP|MARK JENKINS|DONG HWA PARK|5/23/2013 00:00:00|18:25|5/23/2013 00:00:00|14:16|CDT|5/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR TESTING POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL  A non-licensed, supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49066|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|MARTIN RAJKOWSKI|DONALD NORWOOD|5/24/2013 00:00:00|11:23|5/24/2013 00:00:00|03:34|CDT|5/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||||LAURA KOZAK|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUTOMATIC START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DUE TO BUS UNDERVOLTAGE  "At 0334 (CDT) on 5/24/2013 MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant] experienced a loss of power to Bus 15 (Division 1 4kV Essential Bus) during performance of preoperational testing on the 2R reserve transformer which initiated an Essential Bus Transfer of Bus 15 and automatic start of 12 Emergency Diesel Generator.  "MNGP was in Mode 5 operations with water level >21 feet 11 inches above the top of the RPV flange and all credited safety systems were lined up to Bus 16 (Division 2 4kV Essential Bus) which was unaffected by this event.  "Bus 15 was automatically repowered from the 1AR reserve transformer as designed.  During this evolution all critical safety functions remained green and all systems responded as expected to the Essential Bus transfer.  The cause of the sequence of events that led to the Bus 15 loss of power is being investigated.  "This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv) as an event that results in a valid actuation of 12 Emergency Diesel Generator.  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|49067|WATERFORD|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|KILLONA|LA|ST CHARLES||Y|05000382|3|||[3] CE|MICHAEL SHUMATE|CHARLES TEAL|5/24/2013 00:00:00|13:44|5/24/2013 00:00:00|12:30|CDT|5/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||NEIL OKEEFE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INTAKE BARRIER BEING STRUCK BY OIL TANKER  "At 0835 CDT, the Entergy Transmission Operations Center notified the Waterford 3 control room that a crude oil tanker had struck the dolphins at the cooling water intake structure on the Mississippi River. There were 4 out of 5 dolphins damaged, with 3 of these having substantial damage.  "The dolphins are hard structures anchored around the cooling water intake structure [which provide] protection from river traffic.  "Waterford 3 operations was unaffected by this event and thermal power remains at 100%. The intake structure, including the Circulating Water System, was unaffected by this event.  "Possible near-term effects of the event are a loss of protective barrier between river traffic and the intake structure due to the physical damage to the dolphins and hazards to navigation due to the loss of the dolphin lights.  "At 1230 CDT, the United States Coast Guard was notified of this event in accordance with Waterford 3 procedures. This notification is subsequent to the notification of the United States Coast Guard per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49068|OCONEE|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|SENECA|SC|OCONEE||Y|05000269|1|2|3|[1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP|BOB MEIXELL|CHARLES TEAL|5/24/2013 00:00:00|14:47|5/24/2013 00:00:00|14:00|EDT|5/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)|POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD|50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)|POT RHR INOP|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|ALAN BLAMEY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITION SYSTEM INADEQUATELY ANALYZED FOR HEAT LOAD  "There is no current event in progress at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). This notification is [being made] to complete a required 10 CFR 50.72 report that was not made at the time of discovery.  During a review of the guidance in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, ONS recognized conditions that were reported to the NRC in LER 269/2013-001-00 on April 8, 2013, (ADAMS Accession ML13101A307), which met the 8-hour reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) -- 'Unanalyzed Condition,' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B,C&D) -- 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' but were not previously reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3).   LER 269/2013-001-00 previously documented Duke Energy's conclusion that emergency power equipment could be adversely impacted by a licensee identified, original design issue involving inadequate analysis of electrical equipment heat loads and weaknesses in the Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system design.  Nothing in this notification modifies or supplements the information provided in LER 269/2013-001-00.  This legacy event notification completes the action required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B,C&D).  The need to perform a 10 CFR 50.72 notification was not recognized during the reportability evaluation.  "Initial Safety Significance:  None.  This is a legacy event notification. Oconee's emergency power equipment is currently operable, but nonconforming with Oconee's license.  "Corrective Action(s):  Compensatory measures are in place, and modifications are in progress to address the legacy design issue.  The issue of not reporting as required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) is entered into Duke Energy's corrective action program.  "The Oconee NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|49069|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|2||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|MATT BUSCH|DONG HWA PARK|5/26/2013 00:00:00|21:32|5/26/2013 00:00:00|18:39|EDT|5/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MEL GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TONE ALERT RADIOS OUT OF SERVICE  "At 1839 EDT on May 26, 2013 Oswego County Emergency Management notified Nine Mile Point (NMP) that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 1745 EDT.   "This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF [James A. FitzPatrick] Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iii).  "The County Alert Sirens which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System remain operable.  "The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local Law Enforcement Personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.  "At 2111 EDT on May 26, 2013, NMP was notified by Oswego County Emergency Management that the Tone Alert Radios had been returned to service.  "The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed."|
Power Reactor|49070|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|STEVE DEFILLIPPO|CHARLES TEAL|5/26/2013 00:00:00|21:52|5/26/2013 00:00:00|18:39|EDT|5/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MEL GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|98|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TONE ALERT RADIOS OUT OF SERVICE  "At 1839 EDT on May 26, 2013, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant performing power ascension from 98% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 1745 EDT.  "This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants.  This failure meets NRC 8-hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  "The County Alert Sirens which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System remain operable.  "The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability.  Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed.  This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center.  Local Law Enforcement Personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.  "At 2111 EDT May 26, 2013, JAF was notified by Oswego County Emergency Management that the Tone Alert Radios had been returned to service  "The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed."|
Power Reactor|49072|NORTH ANNA|DOMINION GENERATION|2|RICHMOND|VA|LOUISA||N|05000338|1|2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP|PAGE KEMP|VINCE KLCO|5/27/2013 00:00:00|18:49|5/27/2013 00:00:00|15:45|EDT|5/27/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||ALAN BLAMEY|R2DO|SAMSON LEE|NRR|JASON KOZAL|IRD|||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|96|Power Operation|96|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DROWNING AT LAKE ANNA  "At 1545 hours on 05/27/2013, the North Anna Control Room was notified by local authorities that a potential drowning had taken place at the number 3 Dike in Lake Anna.  This incident has been reported to the FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] Regional Engineer under FERC requirements.  Therefore, this is reportable to the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).  In addition, this incident has received significant media interest.  The identity of the victim is not known at this time."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Louisa County Administrator.|
Power Reactor|49073|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|05000245|1|2||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|STEPHAN LAMBERT|BILL HUFFMAN|5/28/2013 00:00:00|10:32|5/28/2013 00:00:00|10:06|EDT|5/28/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||DANIEL HOLODY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Decommissioned|0|Decommissioned|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||RADIATION MONITORS OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  The Station Stack Radiation Monitor, RM-8169, and the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Island Rad Monitor have been removed from service for preplanned maintenance for filter change out.  During this time period, the licensee will not have normal assessment capability for radiation releases via these pathways.  Compensatory monitoring methods are in place for the duration of the maintenance activity.  The radiation monitors will be restored upon completion of the filter change-out.  The expected completion time is before the end of day shift on 5/28/13.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector along with state and local authorities.|
Power Reactor|49074|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|RAYMOND MOORE|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/28/2013 00:00:00|11:36|5/28/2013 00:00:00|10:52|EDT|5/28/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT|||||||ALAN BLAMEY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF REDUNDANT ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY  "Loss of one of two National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitters.  "This is a non-emergency notification.  "At 10:52 AM EDT on May 28, 2013, the National Weather Service reported that they plan to remove the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC., serving the northeast piedmont on 162.550 MHZ, from service maintenance. The maintenance is expected to last 4 hours. The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens are in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur.  "There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.  "The NRC Resident has been notified."  * * * UPDATE FROM RAYMOND MOORE TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1420 EDT ON 5/28/13 * * *  At 1415 EDT on 5/28/13 the Tone Alert Radio Transmitter WXL-58 was returned to service.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R2DO (Bonser).|
Power Reactor|49075|NORTH ANNA|DOMINION GENERATION|2|RICHMOND|VA|LOUISA||N|||2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP|PAGE KEMP|VINCE KLCO|5/28/2013 00:00:00|18:09|5/28/2013 00:00:00|15:07|EDT|5/28/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||BRIAN BONSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||M/R|Y|98|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A FEEDWATER TRANSIENT  "On May 28, 2013, at 1507 [EDT], Unit 2 was manually tripped from approximately 98 percent power due to decreasing steam generator levels as a result of a main feedwater system transient.  The main feedwater system transient was initiated when the 'C' Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Motor-Operated Valve, 2-FW-MOV-250C, spuriously closed.  The cause of the spurious closure of 2-FW-MOV-250C is unknown at this time.  "The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 2 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure.  All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip.  The reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).  The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators.  The automatic start of the AFW system is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of an ESF system.  The AFW pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic.  Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system.  Unit 2 is in the normal shutdown electrical line-up.  "Unit 1 was not affected by this event."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|49076|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|RAYMOND MOORE|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/29/2013 00:00:00|09:59|5/29/2013 00:00:00|09:34|EDT|5/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT|||||||BRIAN BONSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF REDUNDANT ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY  "Loss of one of two National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitters.  "This is a non-emergency notification.  "At 09:34 AM EDT on May 29, 2013, the National Weather Service reported that they plan to remove the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC., serving the northeast piedmont on 162.550 MHZ, from service for maintenance. The maintenance is expected to last 4 hours. The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens are in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur.  "Compensatory Measure is in place as a back-up route alert to the public within the 5 miles radius (affected counties; Wake, Chatham, Harnett) upon declaration of an event.  "There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.  "The NRC Resident has been notified."  This is the same NOAA Tone Alert Radio Transmitter as reported in NRC Event #49074.  * * * UPDATE FROM RAYMOND MOORE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/29/13 AT 1618 EDT * * *   The NOAA Tone Alert Radio Transmitter was returned to service on 5/29/13 at 1538 EDT.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R2DO (Bonser).|
Power Reactor|49077|BROWNS FERRY|TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY|2|DECATUR|AL|LIMESTONE||Y|||2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4|BRAIN MAZE|BILL HUFFMAN|5/29/2013 00:00:00|11:06|4/9/2013 00:00:00|05:06|CDT|5/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.73(a)(1)|INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION|||||||BRIAN BONSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||60 DAY REPORT OF AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM ISOLATION SIGNAL  "This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.  "On April 9, 2013, at 0506 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), during placement of clearance 2-TO-2013-0003, section 2-099-0001, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2, received Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and isolations of the BFN, Unit 2, Reactor Zone ventilation and BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3, Refuel Zone ventilation. Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, and stopped the clearance placement.  "Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.  "The apparent cause for this condition was the outage tagging personnel did not prepare clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 section 2-099-0001 as a stand alone clearance, detail the effect on PCIS initiation on cover placement instructions, place clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 in the right sequence, and perform a thorough review of clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 section 2-099-0001 to identify the missing detail related to PCIS initiation. Personnel performance issues are being addressed in accordance with the Tennessee Valley Authority policies and processes.  "There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.  "This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 711266.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."|
Power Reactor|49080|LASALLE|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|MARSEILLES|IL|LA SALLE||Y|05000373|1|2||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|RUDY CAPUTO|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/30/2013 00:00:00|10:16|5/30/2013 00:00:00|09:00|CDT|5/30/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||STEVE ORTH|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM MAINTENANCE  "On May 30, 2013, at 0900 [CDT], the Exelon LaSalle Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service for planned TSC ventilation system maintenance.  "The removal of the ventilation system potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.  "The ventilation system is expected to be out of service for approximately 8 hours.  "This telephone notification is provided in accordance with Exelon Reportability Manual SAF 1.10. 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  "The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector of the issue."  * * * UPDATE AT 2040 EDT ON 5/30/2013 FROM MARK SMITH TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "The scheduled TSC ventilation system maintenance is expected to continue for approximately an additional 12 hours.  "The licensee has notified the Senior Resident Inspector of the issue."  The replacement fan belts came off and the cause is being investigated.  Notified the R3DO (Orth).|
Power Reactor|49082|SAINT LUCIE|FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|FT. PIERCE|FL|ST LUCIE||Y|||2||[1] CE,[2] CE|CHARLES PIKE|JOHN SHOEMAKER|5/31/2013 00:00:00|10:26|5/31/2013 00:00:00|07:12|EDT|5/31/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|||||||BRIAN BONSER|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||M/R|Y|40|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO AN ANTICIPATED LOSS OF CONDENSER COOLING  "On May 31, 2013 at 0712 [EDT], Unit 2 [reactor] was manually tripped due to high differential pressure on the debris filter for the 2A1 Condenser Waterbox which required a trip of the 2A1 Circulating Water Pump. The 2A2 Condenser Waterbox and the 2A2 Circulating Water Pump were already removed from service due to a suspected condenser tube leak.  "All CEAs [Control Element Assembly] fully inserted into the core. Decay heat removal is from main feedwater and steam bypass to the main condenser. The cause of the rising differential pressure on the 2A1 debris filter was potentially due to an influx of algae.   "This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip."  The reactor trip response is considered uncomplicated and the unit is stable in Mode 3 at normal temperature and pressure.  Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.  There was no impact on Unit 1.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Part 21|49083|WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY|WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY|1|CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP|PA|||Y||||||JAMES GRESHAM|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/31/2013 00:00:00|12:09|5/31/2013 00:00:00||EDT|5/31/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||BRIAN BONSER|R2DO|PART 21 - REACTORS||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART-21 INTERIM REPORT - INCORRECT PRESSURIZER SUPPORT LOADS FOR AP1000  "The deviation being evaluated is an identified inconsistency between the applied design loads for the AP1000 plant pressurizer support columns and embedments and the calculated actual loads. As a result, certified for construction drawings have been delivered to customers of the AP 1000 plant new build projects with an incorrect pressurizer support column embedment design configuration.  The planned changes to the embedments to correct this deviation for the pressurizer support columns will be reflected on revised certified for construction drawings but do not require changes to the current licensing basis.  The certified for construction drawings have been delivered to U.S. AP1000 plant new build customers, V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3, and A.W. Vogtle Units 3 and 4."|
Power Reactor|49084|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|||2||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|JERRY HELKER|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/31/2013 00:00:00|15:07|4/2/2013 00:00:00|09:46|EDT|5/31/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.73(a)(1)|INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION|||||||DANIEL HOLODY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||6O-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION  "This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.  "On April 2, 2013, Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 reactor building area high ambient temperature isolation signal when lifting a lead for trip unit E31-N638B while performing surveillance N2-IPS-LDS-Q010, Reactor Building General Area Temperature Instrumentation Channel Functional Test. The isolation signal provided a closure signal to two Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) valves, and three Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system containment isolation valves.  "As a result of the isolation signal one of the RCIC containment isolation valves, 2ICS*MOV128 closed. The other four valves were already in their normal closed position. The RHR system valves are associated with the RHR Shutdown Cooling System and second RCIC isolation valve is used to warmup and place the RCIC system in standby following an isolated condition. All affected isolation valves responded as designed. As a result of 2ICS*MOV128 closing the RCIC system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.3, RCIC System, Condition A was entered.  Action A.1 required verifying the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) was operable immediately.  Action A.2 requires restoring RCIC to operable within 14 days.  "After the instrumentation system was restored to normal, the RCIC system was subsequently restored to available later that day at 1205 [EDT] and operable at 1500 [EDT].  "The actuation signal was not valid because it resulted from maintenance activities when leads were lifted, and the trip unit had not been bypassed as required by the procedure. There were no isolation logic signals in response to actual plant conditions or parameters.  "This event was entered into the corrective action system as Condition Report (CR) 2013-002461. There were no actual safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.|
Power Reactor|49085|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|LIEUTENANT CHRISTOS|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|5/31/2013 00:00:00|19:05|5/31/2013 00:00:00|14:00|CDT|5/31/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||STEVE ORTH|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNANALYZED CONDITION CONCERNING FLOODING MITIGATION  "On May 31, 2013, during an aggregate review of issues raised during a focused self assessment of external flooding mitigation, it was concluded that the A.6 Acts of Nature procedure may not adequately protect equipment required to maintain safe shutdown from the external probable maximum flood.  "The plant is currently in Mode 4, Cold Shutdown for refueling. MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant] is addressing the inadequacies.  "This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition."  Compensatory measures are being prepared including procedure changes, additional barriers, and contingency actions.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|