Event Desc|En No|Site Name|Licensee Name|Region No|City Name|State Cd|County Name|License No|Agreement State Ind|Docket No|Unit Ind1|Unit Ind2|Unit Ind3|Reactor Type|Nrc Notified By|Ops Officer|Notification Dt|Notification Time|Event Dt|Event Time|Time Zone|Last Updated Dt|Emergency Class|Cfr Cd1|Cfr Descr1|Cfr Cd2|Cfr Descr2|Cfr Cd3|Cfr Descr3|Cfr Cd4|Cfr Descr4|Staff Name1|Org Abbrev1|Staff Name2|Org Abbrev2|Staff Name3|Org Abbrev3|Staff Name4|Org Abbrev4|Staff Name5|Org Abbrev5|Staff Name6|Org Abbrev6|Staff Name7|Org Abbrev7|Staff Name8|Org Abbrev8|Staff Name9|Org Abbrev9|Staff Name10|Org Abbrev10|Scram Code 1|RX CRIT 1|Initial PWR 1|Initial RX Mode1|Current PWR 1|Current RX Mode 1|Scram Code 2|RX CRIT 2|Initial PWR 2|Initial RX Mode 2|Current PWR 2|Current RX Mode 2|Scram Code 3|RX CRIT 3|Initial PWR 3|Initial RX Mode 3|Current PWR 3|Current RX Mode 3|Event Text|
Part 21|47975|ABB INC|ABB INC|1|CORAL SPRINGS|FL|||Y||||||DENNIS BATOVSKY|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|05/29/2012 00:00:00|17:07|03/29/2012 00:00:00||EDT|04/01/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||HIRONORI PETERSON|R3DO|PART 21 GROUP||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 NOTIFICATION - PROTECTIVE RELAYS MAY NOT BE QUALIFIED FOR HARSH ENVIRONMENTS  The following report was received via fax:  "During the commercial grade dedication process for a unit that was returned for repair, the unit was found to be in nonconformance with ABB specifications.  The ABB specifications require that two (2) particular components, integrated circuits (ICs) of plastic construction, are replaced with 2 ICs of ceramic construction during the assembly process.  The chips found on the harmonic filter circuit board (HF Board) of the relays were of plastic construction.  While plastic ICs are approved for use in commercial relays, they have not been qualified for safety-related applications.  Relays in this condition will function normally in mild environments, but have not been qualified for harsh environments, or for elevated radiation environments."  The affected solid state relays are 27N and 59G shipped between August 1, 2010 and October 15, 2010.    "Eighteen (18) Relays (Material number: 211T4175-HF-1E) were sold to ABB Florence who in turn shipped the same to Detroit Edison's Fermi 2 Power Plant."   * * * UPDATE FROM TAUZER TO SNYDER AT 1730 EDT ON 4/1/13 * * *   The supplier has concluded that the solid state relays with the plastic encapsulate are qualified for Class 1E applications.  "ABB Coral Springs is providing this letter to close the interim report and notice of deviation from specification requirements associated with Solid State Relays 27N and 59G dated May 29, 2012 (Event ML12153A030).  "As stated in the interim report, one of the actions to be completed was the qualification and testing of representative plastic ICs to confirm acceptability and use in safety-related applications.  "This letter is a follow-up notification that the plastic IC qualification and testing is complete, and based upon the results, we have concluded that the ICs with the plastic encapsulate are qualified for Class 1E applications specific to the subject relays.  "Affected customers have been notified."  Notified R3DO (Daley) and Part 21 Reactors (Email).|
Part 21|48223|WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY|WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY|1|CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP|PA|||Y||||||JAMES GRESHAM|DONG HWA PARK|08/23/2012 00:00:00|09:21|08/22/2012 00:00:00||EDT|04/08/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||MICHAEL HAY|R4DO|PART 21 GROUP|Emai|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 - DEFECT DUE TO CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING PROCESS CAUSING RELAY FAILURE IN SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS  The following is summary of the information received from the licensee:  "The basic component is an Eaton-Cutler Hammer Type ARD660UR DC relay that is commercially dedicated by Westinghouse for use in safety related systems at Palo Verde Units 1, 2 and 3. Except for the Palo Verde plants, Westinghouse is not aware of any other plant that uses this relay as a safety-related component in normally energized applications.  "The relay contacts failed to change state when required to do so during postulated events and/or surveillance testing. Westinghouse has identified the kick-out spring as a possible contributing factor for the relay failure due to stress corrosion cracking. Other anomalies such as relay core barrel tolerance and potential material deficiencies are currently under review. Based upon testing at APS, the relay failure rate is low and non-reproducible. This indicates that a combination of factors could be resulting in the failures with different causes for each failure. Results of testing do not identify a common cause for the failures. For ARD660UR relays used in normally de-energized applications, the kick-out spring will be compressed for only a short period of time and exposure to additional heat generated by intermittent coil energization will be minimal. For relays in normally de-energized applications, it is not expected that the force provided by the kick-out spring will decrease significantly over time and the contacts will change position when the relay coil is de-energized. Westinghouse has not received any reports to date of relay contacts failing to properly change position when the relay goes from a de-energized to an energized state. Because of the kick-out spring's limited exposure to compression and heat generated by the relay coil, it is expected that the springs will perform as intended in normally de-energized applications for the qualified life of the relay.   "Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contain a defect.  "Westinghouse Electric Company "1000 Westinghouse Drive "Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066"  * * * UPDATE AT 1445 EDT ON 04/08/13 FROM JAMES A. GRESHAM TO S. SANDIN * * *  The following update was received via fax and is summarized below:  "During the investigation into the cause of the ARD660UR relay sticking, many physical and performance aspects and components of the relay were analyzed, as well as the entire manufacturing process. This investigation uncovered several issues that contributed, or could contribute, to the failure of the relay to release when de-energized.  "Based on analysis by Westinghouse, with support from Eaton Corporation, it was determined that the primary cause of the relay failure was a change in the manufacturing process in the plastics molding operation of this relay. This manufacturing change caused the moving cores to adhere to the inner diameter of the relay coil spool when a relay was continuously energized during testing by Westinghouse for longer than 21 days. This change in the manufacturing process began in May 2008 and continued until it was terminated in December 2012. Relay coils manufactured during this time may develop an adhesive like residue in the relay coil spools when energized for an extended period of time. This residue was found on the moving cores of relays which stuck during testing at a Westinghouse facility and relays returned from the customer. This residue was determined to be the primary cause of the relay issue.   "Westinghouse shipped Palo Verde a total of 374 potentially affected Eaton-Cutler Hammer Type ARD660UR DC relays.  "As a result of the investigation, Westinghouse recommended several manufacturing process improvements that are designed to prevent the reoccurrence of the issue. Eaton has agreed to implement these improvements prior to restarting the manufacture of these relays. Westinghouse is revising its commercial grade dedication process for these relays. This action ensures that the commercial grade dedication criteria include replacing the relay kick-out spring in each relay and verifies other relay enhancements have been implemented before future relays are shipped to the customer as safety related components.  "Westinghouse recommends that each plant review the application requirements of each affected relay. If an ARD660UR relay is used in a normally energized application or is required to change state after being energized for at least 21 consecutive days and was manufactured between May 1, 2008 and December 31, 2012, Westinghouse recommends replacing the relay at the next convenient opportunity.  "If an ARD relay manufactured during the May 1, 2008 and December 31, 2012 time frame is successfully, periodically cycle tested, this relay may be less susceptible to sticking."  Notified R4DO (Deese) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.|
Agreement State|48261|NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH|UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA|4|LAS VEGAS|NV||03-13-0305-01|Y||||||SNEHA RAVIKUMAR|STEVE SANDIN|08/31/2012 00:00:00|15:48|10/01/2011 00:00:00||PDT|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||DAVID PROULX|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUDENT RECEIVED POTENTIAL INHALATION OVEREXPOSURE  The following information was received from the State of Nevada via email:  "A graduate student inhaled a mixture of U-233 and U-238 while working in the lab grinding a compound of Uranium Octoxide. [The graduate student] used a glove box instead of the hood with the HEPA filter, contrary to UNLV [University of Nevada Las Vegas] approved procedure.   "This happened twice and could have been between October 1, 2011 and April 1, 2012.   "The first bioassay, based on an inhalation date of October 1, 2011, showed 17.72 rem total. When the inhalation date was assumed to be April 1, 2012, the result was 5.52 rem.   "[U-233]*1.6 = [U-238] contribution.   "The student will be getting a third bioassay on September 5, 2012 at the Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL). This will involve a low-energy chest count to detect Th-234 and an organ count, looking at the kidneys for Uranium.   "The student has been restricted from all lab work since April.   "The bioassay was done at Test America."  * * * UPDATE AT 1553 EDT ON 10/24/12 FROM SNEHA RAVIKUMAR TO S. SANDIN * * *  The following update was received from the State of Nevada via email:  "NMED Item No.:  NV120022  "Preliminary results:  "1.  September 5, 2012:           Low-energy lung count, kidney count and hand count were performed at LLNL.         The lung count was less than MDA for U-233, Th-234, U-234 & U-2235.         The detect/non-detect kidney & hand counts were both non-detect.  "2. September 12, 2012:          Third Bioassay results received.         U-238 - 0.66 dpm/sample         U-235 - less than CRDL         U-233/234 - 1.25 dpm/sample"  Notified R4DO (Hagar) and FSME Events Resource via email.  * * * UPDATE AT 1540 EDT ON 11/15/12 FROM RAVIKUMAR TO HUFFMAN * * *  The following update was received from the State of Nevada via email:  "All personnel having access to the UNLV lab where the original uptake occurred had bioassay samples taken. UNLV determined that 46 persons should be in this group, including the RSO and ARSO. From the data submitted thus far, an additional graduate student appears to have received an uptake. This student has been restricted from further RAM work and a dose assessment undertaken. The actual dose will be dependent on the time and source of the uptake. If the timeframe and source are the same as that of the original graduate student, the magnitude will be the same. Thirteen remaining bioassays remain to be analyzed. Three of the thirteen are yet to be collected. The RSO attributed his elevated uptake to previous DOD work. The latest ten bioassays were collected within the last three weeks and with expedited processing results, should be available by mid-December."  Notified the R4DO (Drake) and FSME Events Resource via e-mail.  * * * UPDATE AT 1411 EST ON 02/12/13 FROM RAVIKUMAR TO SNYDER * * *  The following update was received from the State of Nevada via email:  "Dependent on the particle size of the uptake the grad student's exposure could be either 6760 mrem for size M (medium) particles versus 154 mrem for size S (small) particles.  UNLV has indicated a delay till March, 2013, for this analysis.  It appears only the one Grad Student had an uptake.  "What corrective action(s) were taken to prevent a recurrence?  "Existing procedures were reviewed & rewritten, and additional new monitoring, controls, training and procedures are now in place to prevent a recurrence."  Notified the R4DO (Hagar) and FSME Events Resource via e-mail.  * * * UPDATE AT 1152 EDT ON 04/24/13 FROM SNEHA RAVIKUMAR TO CHARLES TEAL * * *  The following is excerpted from an email received from the State of Nevada:  "All of the activity ratios (especially the one from the ICP-MS [Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry], which has the lowest uncertainty) are consistent with that of natural uranium. This supports the conclusion that the student's observed bioassay results are the result of an intake of natural uranium form non-occupational sources and not a result of material she was handling at UNLV."  Notified R4DO (Whitten) and FSME Event Resource via email.|
Power Reactor|48481|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|DON SHEEHAN|BILL HUFFMAN|11/06/2012 00:00:00|03:56|11/06/2012 00:00:00|00:06|EST|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||||GLENN DENTEL|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL  "On Tuesday, November 06, 2012, at 00:06 EST, during the application of a tag-out associated with feedwater level control, the 12 feedwater flow control valve (FCV-29-137) unexpectedly partially opened. As a result, reactor vessel water level rose to the high level turbine trip set point causing the main turbine to trip. The turbine trip signal then resulted in the initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) channels 11 and 12 logic. No actual system component starts or actuations occurred as a result of the logic initiation and no actual HPCI injection occurred due to the system configuration, nor was injection required.  "Actions were taken to manually isolate the 12 feedwater flow control valve and reactor vessel water level was restored to normal.  "This meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION FROM JERRY HELKER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 12/17/12 AT 1543 EST * * *  "This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN) #48481, which reported an automatic actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation logic.  "The HPCI system is automatically initiated based on conditions representing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The initiation signals are:  - Low reactor water level - This is a direct indication of a potential loss of adequate core cooling. - Turbine trip - During a LOCA within the drywell, high drywell pressure due to the line break will cause a reactor scram, which causes a turbine trip, which then by design initiates the HPCI system.  "The event occurred with the reactor in the cold shutdown condition, with the main turbine and main turbine shaft-driven feedwater pump (#13) out of service. In the cold shutdown condition, the probability of a LOCA is low and the HPCI system is not required by the Technical Specifications to be operable. Neither of the conditions requiring actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system (high drywell pressure or low reactor water level) was present.  Although the turbine trip signal was in response to an actual sensed high reactor water level condition, high reactor water level is not a plant condition satisfying the requirement for actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system. With reactor vessel water level high, the safety function of the HPCI system (i.e. to provide adequate core cooling) was already completed. Thus, the HPCI initiation signal was invalid, and the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."  The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R1DO (Hunegs).  * * * UPDATE FROM JOHN APRIL TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/24/13 AT 0158 EDT * * *   "Upon further review, it has been determined the event did constitute a valid actuation of the HPCI system and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(4)(A)."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R1DO (Joustra).|
Power Reactor|48556|CRYSTAL RIVER|FLORIDA POWER CORP.|2|CRYSTAL RIVER|FL|CITRUS||Y|05000302|3|||[3] B&W-L-LP|MARK BROUSSARD|STEVE SANDIN|12/04/2012 00:00:00|15:48|12/04/2012 00:00:00|12:00|EST|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||ALAN BLAMEY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TEMPORARY EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY ESTABLISHED FOR PLANNED OUTAGE  "In support of the planned upgrades to Crystal River Unit 3's Emergency Operations Facility's (EOF) heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system, on Dec. 4, 2012, at 1200 hours Eastern Standard Time a temporary EOF has been established and declared operational. The temporary EOF is located adjacent to the primary EOF and remains outside the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. The temporary EOF meets the functional requirements of the primary EOF. During the establishment of the temporary EOF, there was no loss in the functionality of the EOF. If an emergency requiring EOF activation occurs, the temporary EOF will be staffed and activated using emergency planning procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been briefed on the use of the temporary EOF. Readiness of the temporary EOF has been confirmed by a facility walkdown using existing procedures. This condition has no adverse affect on the public's or employees' health and safety. The EOF HVAC system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately four months.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * UPDATE ON 4/24/13 AT 1757 EDT FROM WARREN DEAGLE TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *  "Primary Emergency Operating Facility Outage completed.  "This is a courtesy notification and provides an update to the information provided in Event Notification Number 48556 on December 4, 2012, Eastern Standard Time (EDT).  "The primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at the Crystal River Nuclear Plant has been restored on April 24, 2013, with the completion of the planned maintenance activity on the EOF heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system that commenced on December 4, 2012, EDT. The temporary EOF established to support this planned upgrade, previously identified in Event Notification Number 48556, is no longer in use. The primary EOF is currently operational and experienced no loss in functionality during the restoration activities. The Emergency Response Organization has been briefed on the restoration of the primary EOF. This condition has no adverse affect on the public's or employees' health and safety.  "NRC Region II has been notified."  The Licensee has also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Part 21|48569|EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT|FISHER DIVISION|3|MARSHALLTOWN|IA|||Y||||||TRISH CROSSER|BILL HUFFMAN|12/07/2012 00:00:00|09:53|11/09/2012 00:00:00||CST|04/30/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(a)(2)|INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION|||||||PATTY PELKE|R3DO|JAMES DRAKE|R4DO|PART 21 GROUP|E-MA|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 - BRACKETS USED  PROXIMITY SWITCHES INSTALLED UPSIDE DOWN  "Equipment Affected By This Fisher Information Notice:  "This Fisher Information Notice (FIN) applies to equipment provided to Arizona Public Service Company-Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station per Fisher Order Number 019-F10051845, Items 0001, 0002, 0004, and 0005 (Arizona Public Service PO# 500559374).  "The affected equipment Is: "4 [inch] CL900 Fisher HPD valve assemblies with TopWorx C8-24521-E3 proximity switches.  "The equipment is identified by Fisher serial numbers 20417605, 20428975, 20428977, and 20428978 respectively and Arizona Public Service Company tag numbers 1JSGEUV0169, 2JSGEUV0169, 1JSGEUV0183, and 2JSGEUV0183.  "Purpose:  "The purpose of this FIN is to alert Arizona Public Service Company that as of 9 November, 2012, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of a situation which may potentially affect the safety-related performance of the aforementioned equipment.  "Fisher is informing you of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10 CFR 21.  "Applicability:  "This FIN applies only to the aforementioned equipment supplied by Fisher to Arizona Public Service Company- Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.  "Discussion:  "Arizona Public Service Company has determined that the brackets used to install the TopWorx switches were installed improperly by Fisher.  "Specifically, the mounting brackets for the switches were installed upside down. This orientation makes it impossible for the switches to operate properly and to perform their safety-related function.  "While the design used for these brackets was unique and constituted a first-time installation by Fisher, Fisher is in the process of performing a root cause analysis as well as investigating why the error was not detected prior to shipment. Fisher will implement a corrective action to prevent problems like this from reoccurring in the future.  "Additionally specific arrangements are being made with Arizona Public Service Company to correct the problem on the subject serial numbers, at Fisher's cost.  "Action Required:  "Fisher is currently working with Arizona Public Service Company to resolve the situation, including, the implementation of a bracket redesign and testing program to demonstrate the problem has been satisfactorily corrected.  "10 CFR 21 Implications:  "Fisher requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21.  "If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: "George Baitinger; Manager, Quality; Fisher Controls International LLC; 205 South Center Street Marshalltown, IA 50158; Fax: (641) 754-2854, Phone: (641) 745-2026."  * * * UPDATE AT 1634 EDT ON 4/30/2013 FROM CHAD ENGLE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  The following information was received via fax:  "After the switches were properly reinstalled it was discovered that due to potential rotation of the valve stem connector when operating the hand wheel, the target magnets could, in some cases, rotate beyond the gap required for switch functionality. This additional discovery is the reason for the issue of this supplemental FIN.  "Fisher is currently working with TopWorx and APS/PVNGS [Arizona Public Service / Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station] to develop a bracket redesign with adequate guiding which will constrain the magnet/switch gap to within acceptable criteria."  Notified the R4DO (Haire), R3DO (Duncan) and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).|
Power Reactor|48628|FORT CALHOUN|OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT|4|FORT CALHOUN|NE|WASHINGTON||Y|05000285|1|||(1) CE|MICHAEL PEAK|PETE SNYDER|12/27/2012 00:00:00|15:46|12/27/2012 00:00:00|14:45|CST|04/12/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||HEATHER GEPFORD|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SCHEDULED OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC) OUTAGE FOR EQUIPMENT UPGRADE  "Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) will be implementing a scheduled modification to renovate and upgrade the interior configuration of the site's Operational Support Center (OSC).  The OSC is located within the Technical Support Center (TSC). The TSC will remain fully operable. Due to the construction, beginning on December 27, 2012 with a planned completion date of February 27, 2013, the OSC will be inoperable.  An alternate OSC has been established on-site and is fully operable."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE AT 0900 EST ON 03/08/13 FROM MICHAEL PEAK TO S. SANDIN * * *  "This is an update to Event Notification 48628, dated December 27, 2012.  "On March 8th, 2013, Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) will be entering a new phase of scheduled modifications to renovate and alter the interior configuration of its Technical Support Center (TSC). The TSC ventilation system will not be functional during this phase of modification.  Combined with renovations, the primary TSC and OSC will be inoperable. An alternate OSC and TSC have been established.  If the Emergency Response Organization is activated the alternate emergency facilities will be available for emergency responders per existing Emergency Plan procedures.   "The project is scheduled to be completed April 12, 2013.  An update to this report will be provided when the TSC renovation is complete."  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Werner).  * * * UPDATE AT 1020 EDT ON 04/12/13 FROM DAVID ORTIZ TO P. SNYDER * * *   "This is an update to Event Notification 48628, dated December 27, 2012.   "As of April 12th, 2013 Fort Calhoun Station has completed modifications to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC).  The TSC ventilation system has been proved functional through required testing.  The primary TSC/OSC is now fully operational."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Deese).|
Power Reactor|48802|WOLF CREEK|WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.|4|BURLINGTON|KS|COFFEY||Y|05000482|1|||[1] W-4-LP|ERIC MARTINSON|JOHN SHOEMAKER|03/02/2013 00:00:00|00:25|03/01/2013 00:00:00|22:42|CST|04/18/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|||||||DON ALLEN|R4DO|ELMO COLLINS|R4RA|ERIC LEEDS|NRR|JASON KOZAL|IRD|JANE MARSHALL|IRD|||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS  On 3/1/2013 at 2242 CST, Wolf Creek Unit 1 declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) being unavailable:  With the 'A' EDG out of service for planned maintenance, the 'B' EDG was discovered to have high governor oil level and was declared inoperable at 2235 CST.    The governor oil level was adjusted and the 'B' EDG was declared operable at 2307 CST.  The NOUE was terminated on 3/21/2013 at 2321 CST.  Normal offsite power was maintained to the plant and no offsite assistance was requested.  The licensee notified state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).  * * * RETRACTION FROM JIM KURAS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/13 AT 1322 EDT * * *   "Further evaluation by the Engineering department determined that the 'B' EDG was available with the high governor oil level.  Testing was performed at an offsite facility, which confirmed that the 'B' EDG was capable of performing its specified safety function with the as-found oil level.  As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i)."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Drake), NRR EO (Skeen) and IRD MOC (Grant).|
Power Reactor|48809|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|JACK EARSLEY|VINCE KLCO|03/06/2013 00:00:00|12:52|03/06/2013 00:00:00|04:01|CST|04/11/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)|POT RHR INOP|||||||NICK VALOS|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MOMENTARY LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING  "At 0401 CST on 3/6/2013, while in RHR-High [Residual Heat Removal-High] water level the plant experienced a momentary Loss of Shutdown Cooling which resulted in a loss of safety function for Residual Heat Capability.  Division 2 RHR shutdown cooling was restored within approximately 90 seconds without issue.  No changes were experienced in refuel volume temperature or level during the loss of RHR shutdown cooling.  This occurred shortly after a flow adjustment on the system was made utilizing the outboard valve. The inboard valve was reopened and an investigation is in progress.  At the time of the valve closure, decay heat removal continued from Reactor Water Cleanup in heat reject mode and fuel pool cooling (with the fuel pool gates removed) is in service.  Division 1 RHR (Shutdown Cooling) was available (not Operable) at the time of the loss.  It is not currently understood why the injection valve closed. All systems functioned as required except for the spurious closing of MO-2015 (the Div 2 RHR inboard injection valve). The following make-up sources are available: Divisions 1 and 2 RHR, Divisions 1 and 2 Core Spray, CRD [Control Rod Drive], CST [Condensate Storage Tank] via a Core Spray with pressurizing station bypassed."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION AT 1419 EDT ON 4/11/2013 FROM RYAN RICHARDS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "On March 6, 2013 (Notification No. 48809) NSPM [Northern States Power Monticello] reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B), a momentary closure of valve MO-2015 in the operating Residual Heat Removal (RHR) subsystem as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.  Following the event, the RHR SDC [shut down cooling] subsystem was removed from operation for equipment forensics and troubleshooting.  Results validated that valve MO-2015 was operable and no issues were identified with the associated electrical circuitry, or the RHR SDC subsystem.  The decay heat removal requirements of LCO 3.9.7, RHR - High Water Level, were met and there was not a loss of safety function.  Therefore, NSPM retracts the March 6, 2013 notification for this event."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state and local authorities, and may make a press release.  Notified the R3DO (Passehl).|
Agreement State|48848|ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL|IIG, MINWOOL, LLC|1|PHENIX CITY|AL||986|Y||||||DAVID WALTER|DONALD NORWOOD|03/25/2013 00:00:00|12:05|03/25/2013 00:00:00|08:20|CDT|03/25/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||PAUL KROHN|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCES|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INTERNAL LEAD SHIELDING OF GAUGE SOURCE HOLDERS MELTED  The following information was received via facsimile:  "The Alabama Office of Radiation Control received a call at 0820 CDT on 3/25/13 from Dr. Michael Hensley of RSO Services (AL license No. 1482), a gauge service company.  He had been contacted by IIG, MinWool, LLC in Phenix City, AL (AL license No. 986) to assist them with an issue.  The licensee melts rock in a cupola to make insulation.  The cupola has two Ohmart Model SR-A devices, one at the top and one at the bottom of the cupola, each containing a 100 mCi Cesium-137 source.  The cupola was superheated to about 3,500 degrees Fahrenheit above the operating limits for the Model SR-A devices.  It is believed the lead shielding in the devices liquefied, but because the source holders are sealed, the lead was contained inside the devices and did not leak out.  "Dr. Hensley surveyed the devices and found a maximum reading of 2.5 mR/hr at 12 inches from the back of the device which was located at the top of the cupola.  This is lower than the design maximum exposure of 4.8 mR/hr with a 100 mCi source per the SSDR.  The shutters on both devices were still operable, and were closed and locked.  Dr. Hensley will remove the devices and prepare them for shipment to Ohmart."  Alabama Incident No.: 13-09|
Agreement State|48856|TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH|VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY|1|NASHVILLE|TN||R-19021-I15|Y||||||SASI KRISHNASARMA|JOHN SHOEMAKER|03/26/2013 00:00:00|15:23|01/29/2013 00:00:00||EDT|03/27/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||PAUL KROHN|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCES|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CATHETER LEAKAGE DURING TREATMENT  "The Division of Radiological Health was notified on Tuesday March 26, 2013, by a representative from Vanderbilt [University], of a misadministration.  A patient was treated January 29, 2013, with Iodine 131-MIBG [metaiodobenzylguanidine]. The patient stayed in the hospital for 4 days until February 2, 2013.  Foley catheter leakage occurred during this interval, but not recognized as a misadministration because there was no visible effect.   "The patient returned for a second treatment on March 19, 2013, at that time a rash was noted and attributed to the catheter leakage during the initial treatment in January.    "Inspectors from the Nashville Field Office will [request additional information and] follow-up and keep NRC informed of the status of our investigation."  Tennessee Division of Radiological Health Report Number: TN-13-044  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Agreement State|48857|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|PETROCHEM INSPECTION SERVICES|4|PORT ARTHUR|TX||L-04460|Y||||||GENTRY HEARN|HOWIE CROUCH|03/27/2013 00:00:00|11:47|03/26/2013 00:00:00||CDT|03/27/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GREG PICK|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DUE TO DAMAGED GUIDE TUBE  The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:  "On March 27, 2013, the Agency [Texas Bureau of Radiation Health] was notified by the licensee that a radiography [camera] guide tube at a temporary field site had suffered damage, causing the source to become unretractable. The source was recovered by the licensee according to the terms of the license. The source was part of a GRP model 880D Sentinel radiography camera, S/N 9185. The source was a 51 Ci Ir-192 sealed source, S/N 91313B. Initial dose estimates show 1.4R exposure to whole body and 2R exposure to the hand by the retrieval worker. The work site was closed so no dose was received by members of the public. More information will be provided as needed per SA300."  Texas Incident # I-9060|
Non-Agreement State|48858|DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS|DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS|4|SAN ANTONIO|TX||03-23853-01VA|Y||||||THOMAS HUSTON|HOWIE CROUCH|03/27/2013 00:00:00|16:06|03/27/2013 00:00:00|12:48|CDT|03/27/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|20.1906(d)(1)|SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS|||||||JULIO LARA|R3DO|GREG PICK|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SURFACE CONTAMINATION ON OUTSIDE OF PACKAGE EXCEEDING NRC REPORTING LIMITS  "Per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1), [the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is] reporting receipt of a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than NRC reporting limits.  "The package was received today (March 27, 2013) around 12:48 PM CDT by South Texas Veterans Health Care System, San Antonio, Texas.  This medical center holds permit number 42-15881-01 under the VHA master materials license.  "Wipe tests performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of 993 dpm/cm2 as compared to the regulatory limit of 220 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters.  "The package contained one 30-millicurie dosage of Technetium-99m and was shipped and delivered by Cardinal Health in San Antonio, Texas. The inner packaging materials were slightly contaminated but the dosage itself was not impacted and was able to be used.  "The VA facility Nuclear Medicine Technologist immediately notified, by telephone, the Radiation Safety Officer at Cardinal Health about the contaminated package.  "As corrective actions: the packaging materials were bagged and set aside in a restricted area at the medical center for decay; staff with access to the area were notified about the contaminated packaging materials; and surveys were performed in the package receipt area to ensure that contamination was not spread beyond the area.  "[Veterans Health Administration] notified NRC Region III (K. Null) by telephone of this event."|
Agreement State|48859|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY|1|WORCHESTER|MA||N/A|Y||||||TONY CARPENTINO|HOWIE CROUCH|03/27/2013 00:00:00|17:02|01/16/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||PAUL KROHN|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||DISCOVERY OF TWO RADIOACTIVE GAUGES IN LOCKED STORAGE  The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:  "[On approximately] 1/16/13, two surface gauges [manufactured in 1961 were] found in locked storage within [a] remote airfield facilities building at Worcester Regional Airport, Worcester, MA.  Third-party waste brokers [were] contacted to bid on proper removal.  Wipe tests by a third-party waste broker indicate no leakage of radioactive contamination from [the] gauge sources.  [The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (the Agency) received the information via email] on 3/19/13. The Agency conducted a site visit to confirm device identifications on 3/26/13.  A waste brokers' bid [was] accepted [and] packaging and removal [is] scheduled for 4/17/13.  Gauges [are being] held in locked storage until removal by [the] waste broker.  "[The] items [are] described as one Nuclear-Chicago Corporation Model P21 Surface Moisture Probe, SN 136, containing 5 mCi Ra-Be, date stamped 5/2/61; and one Nuclear-Chicago Corporation Model P22A Surface Density Probe, SN 139, containing 3 mCi Cs-137, date stamped 5/23/61.  "The Agency considers this matter to be open until [the] items [are] confirmed removed on 4/17/13."  * * * UPDATE FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1132 EDT * * *   "4/19/13 UPDATE - The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] considers this matter to be OPEN until items confirmed removed for disposal.  "Agency  [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] regulation 105 CMR 120.281 (A)(1) and USNRC regulation 20.2201 (a)(1)(i) requires 'immediate' telephone reporting of stolen, lost or missing licensed radioactive material in specified quantities under circumstances that it appears an exposure could result to individuals in unrestricted areas.  The situation in this case involved 'found' radioactive material, devices already wipe tested to confirm no leakage of radioactive contamination and stored in a 'secure' location to prevent exposure to individuals until such time that scheduled packaging and removal by a waste broker is completed, and therefore, did not warrant immediate notification.  This case was determined to be included in the 30-day notification category.  The written report to NMED was issued one day after the Agency  [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] confirmatory site visit of 3/26/13."  NMED Report #: 130149  Notified R1DO (Cook) and FSME Event Resource via email.  * * * UPDATE ON 4/29/2013 AT 1142 EDT FROM TONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "The gauges were removed and shipped for disposal on 4/24/13.  The Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) considers this matter to be closed."  Notified the R1DO (Hunegs) and FSME Event Resource via email.   THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|48860|SURRY|DOMINION GENERATION|2|SURRY|VA|SURRY||N|05000280|1|2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|JON FORD|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|03/28/2013 00:00:00|00:43|03/27/2013 00:00:00|22:45|EDT|04/02/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||DEBORAH SEYMOUR|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||ONE EMERGENCY WARNING SIREN ENERGIZED FOR A SHORT TIME  "At 2245 [EDT] on 3/27/2013, Surry Power Station (SPS) Operations Department received a report from Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (VEOC) that a concerned citizen had called James City County (JCC) law enforcement to report that an Early Warning System (EWS) siren, #62 in James City County NW side of Route 682, was sounding.  VEOC reported JCC police received call at 2240 [EDT] from a concerned citizen that an EWS siren was sounding.  SPS Security contacted JCC police and subsequently reported that JCC police responded approximately 10 minutes later to the site of the siren, but the siren was no longer sounding.  Maintenance will investigate in the morning.  All plant conditions/parameters are normal and no releases to the environment have occurred.  "The site NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.  "This notification is being transmitted due to notification of other Government Agencies in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."  The licensee also notified the state and local governments.  * * * UPDATE FROM JASON SWEATMAN TO STEVE SANDIN ON 4/2/2013 AT 1710 HOURS * * *  "This report is being retracted based upon the following:  "On 3/28/13, an activation verification test was performed.  The results of the test indicated EWS siren #62 did not activate.  In addition, when a siren activates, the battery voltage decreases.  A review of the battery voltage trend for siren #62 found no such decrease, verifying no activation occurred.  Maintenance staff reported to the siren location and confirmed the siren did not activate.  They also found no indication of tampering or intrusion.  Three local homeowners were interviewed and stated they did not hear any siren activation.  "By all available indications, EWS siren #62 was functional and did not activate on 03/27/13.  "NRC Site Resident Inspectors have been notified of the retraction."   Notified R2DO (McCoy).|
Part 21|48863|INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC.|INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.)|4|NEBRASKA CITY|NE|||Y||||||JOHN F. BROSEMER|HOWIE CROUCH|03/28/2013 00:00:00|15:53|03/27/2013 00:00:00|15:30|CDT|04/01/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||GREG PICK|R4DO|PAUL KROHN|R1DO|PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|DEBORAH SEYMOUR|R2DO|JULIO LARA|R3DO|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 REPORT - FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS  Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies. When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements. As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure.  This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components. In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.  The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry. At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment. Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.  Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types.   * * * UPDATE FROM BROSEMER TO SNYDER AT 1530 EDT ON 4/1/13 * * *   "Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI [Integrated Resources, Inc.] opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the tie wrap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.  "Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.  "IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:  "Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant; Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; Eletronnuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One; Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center; Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant; Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; NextEra Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant; Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant; Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.  "IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.  Corrective action taken: "IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed tie wrap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps."  Contact Information: John F. Brosemer; President Integrated Resources, Inc. 113 South 9th Street Nebraska City, NE 68410  Notified R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Reactors (Email).|
Agreement State|48864|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|ROSA OF NORTH DALLAS LLC|4|DALLAS|TX||06186|Y||||||ART TUCKER|STEVE SANDIN|03/28/2013 00:00:00|17:58|03/27/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/11/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GREG PICK|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDER DOSE IN BRACHYTHERAPY TREATMENT DUE TO USE OF WRONG LENGTH GUIDE WIRE  The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:  "On March 28, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that a medical event occurred on March 27, 2013. The licensee stated that the wrong length guide wire was used during 3 of 4 HDR [High-Dose Rate Brachytherapy] treatments. The error was discovered after the third treatment. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stated the desired area of treatment was under dosed by more than 50 percent. The treatment plan prescribed 2400 cGy over 4 treatments. He stated that the patient and their physician were notified as soon as the error was discovered. The RSO is not at the facility and is trying to gather the information on the event over his phone. The licensee has suspended all HDR treatments until their process and procedures have been reviewed. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300.  "Texas Incident #:  I-9059"  * * * UPDATE ON 4/11/13 AT 2126 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK * * *  The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:  "On April, 9, 2013, the licensee provided the following information: The Physicist of record retrieved tube connectors from the HDR supplies on shelves in the dosimetry area.  The tube/connectors were stored, coiled in Ziploc bags.  The Physicist selected green tubes when he saw the black tubes used previously were not on the shelf.  He was unaware that there were two sets, each a different length when he selected the green set.  The black tubes measure 120cm in length and the green tubes measure 132cm.  The Senior Physicist, who was on vacation during the first two out of the four treatments, stored the black tube set in a drawer across the room.  Physicist selected tubes which attached to the patient's treatment device.  The Physicist planned the patient's treatment with the treatment lengths (119.9 cm) stated in our facility's HDR tandem and ring treatment planning procedure and forms but used the 132cm tube for the treatment delivery for three out of four fractions.  Only the black tubes were used historically in tandem and ring HDR procedures and since their given length were known, they were not measured at the time of treatment delivery.  The green tubes were also not measured prior to treatment delivery.  The Physician of record saw the green tubes and believed their use was intentional.  This medical event meant the patient's tissue to be treated (cervix) received less total radiation dose than that prescribed: 1,390 cGy (mean dose delivered) vs. the 5,139 cGy the cervix would have received over the four treatments.  This is more than a 50 cGy (50 rem) effective dose equivalent difference to the cervix. In addition, the mean total dose delivered to the cervix over the four treatments differed from the prescribed dose by more than 20% (42.1% is the actual variance) and the delivered dose for at least one of the fractions differed by more than 50% from the prescribed dose (fraction #1 cervix mean dose delivered was 42.5 cGy vs. the 1,192.4 cGy expected) (fraction #2 cervix mean dose delivered was 34.6 cGy vs. the 1,416.3 cGy expected) and (fraction #3 cervix mean dose delivered was 45.2 cGy vs. the 1,262.2 cGy expected).  The patient's urethra received a mean dose of 1,607 cGy for the four fractions.  The maximum dose to 1 cc of the urethra for the four fractions was 1,849 cGy.  The patient's anterior vagina received a mean dose from the four fractions of 1,549 cGy.  The maximum dose to 1 cc of the anterior vagina for the four fractions was 3,049 cGy. The Agency [Texas Department of Health] has requested additional information from the licensee.  Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA 300."  Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME Events Resource via email.   A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Agreement State|48866|MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM|FELINE HEALTH, INC.|1|WESTFIELD|MA||48-0316|Y||||||MIKE WHALEN|DONALD NORWOOD|03/29/2013 00:00:00|13:46|03/29/2013 00:00:00||EDT|03/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||PAUL KROHN|R1DO|ANGELA MCINTOSH|FSME|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - VETERINARY TECHNICIAN POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE  The following information was received via facsimile:  "The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) called to report that the quarterly whole body dosimeter for her technician recorded 993 mrem deep, 21,900 mrem to the lens, and 58,000 mrem shallow dose.  The technician's finger ring dose was negligible.  "The technician & RSO have worked for years injecting three to ten cats with I-131 on a monthly basis (approximately 3 mCi per cat) and neither have ever approached such high radiation doses.  "It is suspected that the dosimeter has malfunctioned or was inadvertently contaminated with I-131.  The licensee has requested that the dosimeter manufacturer re-analyze the dosimeter.  "The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program is investigating."|
Agreement State|48867|NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH|AMERICAN SOIL TESTING|4|SPARKS|NV|||Y||||||ERIC MATUS|DONALD NORWOOD|03/29/2013 00:00:00|17:22|03/29/2013 00:00:00|08:30|PDT|04/08/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||GREG PICK|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE FOUND  An auction lot of industrial equipment was purchased by West Tech, Inc., an electronics recycling company, at an auction in Milpitas, California.  The auction lot was subsequently delivered to West Tech, Inc. in Sparks, Nevada.  A CPN density gauge, s/n M17031878, manufactured 1/1/1976, originally containing 50 mCi Americium-241/Be and 10 mCi Cs-137, was found in the auction lot.  After discovering the gauge, West Tech, Inc. notified InstroTek, Inc. (parent company of CPN) which notified the State of Nevada Radiation Control Program.  The State of Nevada Radiation Control Program dispatched inspectors.  The gauge was found to be in its shipping container.  The gauge appeared to be undamaged and intact.  Swipes were taken and no contamination was found.  The State of Nevada Radiation Control Program has impounded the gauge.    The State of Nevada will provide more information as it becomes available.   * * * UPDATE AT 1601 EDT ON 04/08/13 FROM GENE FORRER (STATE OF CALIFORNIA) TO S. SANDIN * * *  The State of Nevada informed the State of California that after checking with the manufacturer, the recovered CPN Moisture Density gauge, S/N M17031878 was registered to American Soil Testing, Licensee # CA5059-43.  The gauge will be returned to the manufacturer for disposal.  HOO Note:  See EN #48895 for report of stolen gauges.  Notified R4DO (Deese), FSME Events Resource via email and Mexico via fax.|
Power Reactor|48869|ARKANSAS NUCLEAR|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|RUSSELVILLE|AR|POPE||N|05000313|1|2||[1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE|PHILLIP FORE|HOWIE CROUCH|03/31/2013 00:00:00|11:57|03/31/2013 00:00:00|10:33|CDT|04/02/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|GREG PICK|R4DO|ART HOWELL|R4RA|JENNIFER UHLE|NRR|ALLEN HOWE|NRR|WILLIAM GOTT|IRD|||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A BREAKER EXPLOSION IN THE PROTECTED AREA  "At 0750 [CDT] on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator Stator (~500 tons), the Unit 1 turbine temporary lift device failed. This caused a loss of all off-site power on Unit 1. The ANO Unit 1 #1 and #2 EDG [Emergency Diesel Generator] have started and are supplying A-3 4160V switchgear and A-4 4160V switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit 1 has entered [procedures]  1202.007 -  Degraded Power, 1203.028 - Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 - Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit 1 is in MODE 6.  "ANO-1 entered TS 3.8.2 A, 'One Required Offsite Circuit Inoperable'. All required actions are complete. The event caused a loss of decay heat removal on ANO Unit 1 which was restored in 3 minutes and 50 seconds.  "Unit 2 tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water was initiated on Unit 2 and Unit 2 was in [Technical Specification] 3.0.3 from 0817 [CDT] to 0848 [CDT] due to Emergency Feedwater. Unit 2 is being powered by off-site. Unit 2 Startup 3 [transformer] lock out at 0921 [CDT]. [Bus] 2A1 is on Start up 2 [transformer] and [bus] 2A3 is on #2 EDG.  "10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) - 4-hr. notification due to the ES [Engineered Safeguard Feature] actuation on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. 10CFR50 72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) - 4-hr. notification due to RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuation on Unit 2. 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(xi) -  4-hr. notification due to Government Notification. 29CFR1904.39a -  [OSHA] 8-hr. notification due to death on site.  "At 1033 [CDT] on 3/31/2013, Unit 2 entered a Notification of Unusual Event based on EAL HU4 due to damage in 2A1 switchgear. Notification of the NUE will be made lAW Emergency Plan requirements. Follow-up notifications will be made as appropriate."  At this time, the full extent of structural damage on Unit 1 is not known.  There was one known fatality and 4 known serious injuries to workers. The local coroner is on site for the fatality and the injured personnel have been transported offsite to local hospitals. Investigation into the cause of the failure and extent of damage is ongoing.   On Unit 2, all rods inserted during the trip. The core is being cooled via natural circulation. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to atmosphere. There is no known primary to secondary leakage.  The licensee has notified the State of Arkansas, local authorities, OSHA and the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA and Nuclear NSSA (via email).   * * * UPDATE FROM DAVID THOMPSON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1934 EDT ON 3/31/13 * * *  The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1821 CDT. The basis for termination was that the affected bus (2A2) is de-energized and no other equipment on Unit 2 was damaged.  The licensee has notified the state and local authorities and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Pick), NRR EO (Howe), IRD (Gott), DHS SWO, DHS NICC, FEMA and Nuclear SSA (via email).   * * * UPDATE FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1054 EDT ON 4/2/13 * * *  The licensee made the following edits to the third paragraph of their original report (edits in quotes):  Unit 2 tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water initiated on Unit 2. Unit 2 was in [Technical Specification] 3.0.3 from 0817 [CDT] to 0848 [CDT] due to Emergency Feedwater "being procedurally overridden." Unit 2 "was initially" being powered by off-site. Unit 2 Startup 3 Lock out occurred at 0921. 2A1 is now on Startup 2, and "2A4" is on #2 EDG.  Notified R4DO (Kellar) via email.|
Power Reactor|48871|WATTS BAR|TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY|2|SPRING CITY|TN|RHEA||Y|||2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|GORDON ARENT|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/01/2013 00:00:00|09:52|02/11/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/01/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.55(e)|CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY|||||||DEBORAH SEYMOUR|R2DO|NRR 50.55 COORD|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Under Construction|0|Under Construction|N|N|0||0||INSTRUMENTATION LINES NOT INSPECTED COMPLETELY FOR PROPER SLOPE  "WBN [Watts Bar Nuclear] Unit 2 (under construction) determined that a portion of a number of instrumentation lines within multiple systems may have not been inspected completely for proper slope. This condition may have resulted in sense lines being installed with less than the 1/4" per foot minimum slope. No confirmed examples have been identified that would have created a substantial safety hazard at this time. However, walkdowns and evaluations are still underway to confirm that no substantial safety hazards exist. If any examples are found, they will be corrected prior to system turnover to Plant Operations. Therefore, at this time, the safety significance remains indeterminate. This issue has been documented in TVA's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report 680826 and is being conservatively reported as a programmatic breakdown by WBN Unit 2 under 10 CFR 50.55(e)."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Part 21|48872|ABB INC.|ABB INC.|1|CORAL SPRINGS|FL|||Y||||||DENNIS BATOVSKY|PETE SNYDER|04/01/2013 00:00:00|17:29|02/04/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/01/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|DEBORAH SEYMOUR|R2DO|ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|RAY KELLAR|R4DO|PART 21 REACTORS|EMAI|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||POTENTIAL ISSUE CONCERNING THE ZPA RATING FOR 3 PHASE RELAY TYPE SSC-T  "This letter is to notify you of a potential issue concerning the ZPA [Zero Point Acceleration] rating for our three phase relay type SSC-T.  "During a Customer Audit (week of February 4, 2013 by ABB Inc., Florence, S.C.), we discovered that our Class 1E Certification database showed the ZPA rating of our three phase SSV -T and SSC-T relays was 5.6g, while our most recent qualification (dated June 14, 2012) determined that the ZPA rating was 4.79g.  "A review of our Purchaser records for the last ten years indicates that one (1) affected relay was sold to WESCO:  "SSC-T relay completed 10/5/2007, order number 3365-960825 and serial number 11835.   "ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchaser of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(a).  "ABB recommends that the affected licensee evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the licensee should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action.   "If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact ABB Technical Support at 954-752-6700."|
Agreement State|48874|COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH|TERRACON, INC.|4|COLORADO SPRINGS|CO||664-02|Y||||||MARK DATER|DONG HWA PARK|04/02/2013 00:00:00|10:55|03/29/2013 00:00:00|10:06|MDT|04/02/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RAY KELLAR|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE  The following information was received from the State of Colorado via email:  "At 10:06 am on Friday, March 29, 2013 the Emergency Response Duty Officer was notified that there was an incident involving a portable moisture density gauge that had been run over by a piece of heavy construction equipment. The [Colorado] Department [of Public Health and Environment] responded by phone and contacted the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] for Terracon, Inc., who was on site supervising the incident. The RSO reported that the gauge had been backed over by a Bobcat loader. The Bobcat loader had a counter balance weight on the rear of the equipment and this contacted the gauge damaging the outer casing. The RSO reported that the source had been fully retracted and was in the safe (shielded position). The RSO conducted a survey and the reading was 0.2 mr/hr at 1 foot. The gauge was loaded into the transport box and readied for transport back to storage at the Tarracon facility. The transport index on the box was 0.1 mr/hr and the RSO was given permission to transport gauge back to storage and perform a leak test before sending off for repair. The leak tests proved negative and the gauge was [shipped] for repair. This licensee will be issued a Notice of Violation of Part 4.26.1: 'The licensee shall control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed or registered radioactive material that is in an unrestricted area and that is not in storage or in a patient.'  "Licensee causing incident: Terracon, Inc., Colo. License number 664-02 "Density gauge model and serial number: Troxler model 3430 s/n 28184 "Isotopes in gauge: Cs-137 (9mCi); Am-241 (40mCi) "Survey meter used by RSO: Radiation Alert Monitor 4, s/n 42585, Cal. Date: August 7, 2012"  Incident number: I13-03|
Agreement State|48875|NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION|GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY|1|FAYETTEVILLE|NC||026-0352-0G|Y||||||WILLIAM JOHNSON|PETE SNYDER|04/02/2013 00:00:00|13:24|03/30/2013 00:00:00|17:08|EDT|04/02/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IN PLANT MAY HAVE DAMAGED TWO PROCESS GAUGES  The following information was received via facsimile:  Two process gauges containing Sr-90 (approximately 50 mCi ea.) at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company facility in Fayetteville, NC may have sustained damage as a result of a fire. No leakage is reported. The gauges were mounted in a "LOW - Minimal or Low risk area."   The State of North Carolina will be investigating.   NC Incident No. 13-06.|
Non-Agreement State|48876|RAPID CITY REGIONAL HOSPITAL|RAPID CITY REGIONAL HOSPITAL|4|RAPID CITY|SD||40-00238-04|N||||||JAMES McKEE|STEVE SANDIN|04/02/2013 00:00:00|14:50|02/26/2013 00:00:00||MDT|04/02/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|35.3045(a)(1)|DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE|||||||RAY KELLAR|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING DELIVERED DOSE EXCEEDING PRESCRIBED DOSE >20%  During a review of post implant dosimetry for prostate cancer treatment at 0800 hours [MDT] on 4/02/13, it was discovered that a patient received 145 gray vice 110 gray prescribed as a "boost" treatment.  The prescribing physician will inform the patient and consult with the urologist.  The error occurred due to not taking into account that the prescribed dose was a "boost" to the previously delivered 45 gray on 2/14/13, and used the default value of 145 gray for initial treatment.  The physician is evaluating any potential adverse consequences for the patient.   A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Power Reactor|48877|BRAIDWOOD|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|BRACEVILLE|IL|WILL||Y|05000456|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|BRIAN FINLAY|STEVE SANDIN|04/02/2013 00:00:00|15:52|04/02/2013 00:00:00|13:45|CDT|04/02/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF AN ALCOHOL CONTAINER  INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA  During remodeling of a bathroom on the third floor of the Administrative Building which is located inside the Protective Area, workers discovered a very old container of gin after removing the ceiling tiles.  This item will be entered into the licensee corrective actions program for follow up.  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48878|CATAWBA|DUKE ENERGY NUCLEAR LLC|2|YORK|SC|YORK||Y|05000413|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|THOMAS GARRISON|PETE SNYDER|04/02/2013 00:00:00|16:25|04/02/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/02/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||GERALD MCCOY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "This is a non emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.  "Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 4/3/13 to be Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes removal of a pressurizing ventilation fan and opening ventilation system ductwork. The planned work activity duration is approximately 48 hours.   "If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.  The State of North Carolina will be notified."|
Power Reactor|48879|CALLAWAY|AMEREN UE|4|FULTON|MO|CALLAWAY||N|05000483|1|||[1] W-4-LP|TIM HOLLAND|PETE SNYDER|04/02/2013 00:00:00|20:30|04/02/2013 00:00:00|17:07|CDT|04/04/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||RAY KELLAR|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|88|Power Operation|88|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELECTRICAL FAULT IN SWITCHYARD RESULTING IN PERSONNEL INJURIES  "At 1707 CDT on 4/2/13 an arc flash occurred at the 'B' safeguards transformer (XMDV24) in the plant switchyard at Callaway. At the time of the flash, ground straps were being placed on the 'B' safeguards transformer which had been removed from service for maintenance. The event resulted in a loss of power to areas/buildings outside the power block. There was no impact to equipment and systems in the plant.  "Four workers were injured or affected by the flash. The extent of the electrical-related injuries has not been determined. However, based on reports from the scene, all of the workers were conscious and walked away from the scene. One person was transported by helicopter and two by ambulance to a local hospital. The fourth person experienced only a minor injury.  "The hazard has been isolated and investigation of the cause is in progress.  "Notifications of this event are planned to be made to OSHA and the Missouri Public Service Commission."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE FROM ROB STOUGH TO VINCE KLCO AT 1955 EDT ON 4/4/2013 * * *   "Ameren Missouri issued a press release about the event described above at approximately 1507 CDT on April 4, 2013.     "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."  Notified the R4DO (Kellar).|
Power Reactor|48880|VOGTLE|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|WAYNESBORO|GA|BURKE||Y|05000424|1|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|MICHAEL ASHTON PARKER|DONG HWA PARK|04/03/2013 00:00:00|07:32|04/03/2013 00:00:00|06:47|EDT|04/03/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|||||||GERALD MCCOY|R2DO|BILL GOTT|IRD|HAROLD CHERNOFF|NRR|VICTOR MCCREE|R2 R|DAN DORMAN|NRR|||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT BASED ON A FIRE IN THE PROTECTED AREA LASTING GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES  "Vogtle Unit 1 has declared an NOUE based on a fire within the protected area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection.  "At 0632 [EDT] Unit 1 received a fire alarm in the Unit 1 control building.  A systems operator was dispatched to investigate and reported back that a small flame was visible inside 1ND3I1, computer inverter. Fire brigade was dispatched in accordance with fire response procedures. No other systems or parameters affected.  "At 0651 [EDT] fire brigade captain reported that the fire had been extinguished."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the state and local authorities.  Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA.  * * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL PARKER TO DONG PARK AT 0811 EDT ON 3/31/13 * * *  The licensee terminated the NOUE at 0745 EDT based on the fire being extinguished.   The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  R2DO (McCoy), NRR EO (Chernoff), and IRD (Harris) notified. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).|
Power Reactor|48881|KEWAUNEE|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|KEWAUNEE|WI|KEWAUNEE||Y|05000305|1|||[1] W-2-LP|KARL KIUPELIS|DONALD NORWOOD|04/03/2013 00:00:00|11:07|04/03/2013 00:00:00|08:00|CDT|04/03/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL PARTICULATE IODINE NOBLE GAS MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE  "On April 3, 2013, at 0800 CDT, the Kewaunee Power Station discovered that the Auxiliary Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Monitor (Mid and hi Range) was Non-Functional due to an external failure.  The SPING is used to aid in assessing Emergency Action Levels.  The expected out of service time is unknown at this time.  Trouble shooting is currently in progress.  Work will be performed with high priority.  "Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for Offsite Radiation conditions).  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * UPDATE AT 1448 EDT ON 4/03/13 FROM STODOLA TO HUFFMAN * * *   The Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Monitor was recalibrated and returned to service at 1257 CDT on 4/03/13.   The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  R3DO (Daley) notified.|
Power Reactor|48882|SAINT LUCIE|FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|FT. PIERCE|FL|ST LUCIE||Y|05000335|1|2||[1] CE,[2] CE|REESE KILIAN|PETE SNYDER|04/03/2013 00:00:00|14:13|04/02/2013 00:00:00|16:45|EDT|04/03/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||GERALD MCCOY|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED EMPLOYEE ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE  A licensed employee was arrested for possession of a controlled substance while off-duty.  The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48883|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|JERRY HELKER|PETE SNYDER|04/03/2013 00:00:00|15:45|04/03/2013 00:00:00|07:39|EDT|04/03/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||JAMES DWYER|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL  A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test.  The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated.  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|48884|LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV|NONDESTRUCTIVE & VISUAL INSPECTION|4|GRAY|LA||LA-5601-L01|Y||||||JOE NOBLE|PETE SNYDER|04/03/2013 00:00:00|16:20|04/01/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/03/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RAY KELLAR|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE OF RADIATION WORKER  The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email:  "On 04/01/2013 [the] RSO for NVI [Nondestructive & Visual Inspection], notified the Department [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] that his personnel monitoring processing company, Landauer, notified him that one of his monitors was processed with a result of 108 R exposure.  The monitor was assigned to an individual who had been terminated at the beginning of February 2013 for chemical dependency.  The individual could not be directly contacted and the monitor was missing for the month of February.  The monitor appeared in the cab of a rig truck for radiography.  The employee had not been employed or working in a radiation environment for NVI about 2-3 weeks when the monitor surfaced.  Attempts were made to make contact with the individual, but [there was] no response.  "[The RSO] stated that he was trying to reach the individual to provide him with medical assistance. At a minimum, he wanted to do blood work Cytogenetics/Biodosimetry on the individual.  This is a possible but, not probable excessive exposure to this individual.   "At 8:00 AM on 04/02/2013 [the RSO] called to update the Department and stated that the individual returned his call at [11:00 PM] on 04/01/2013 and consented to accept the medical assistance.  The employee has not been sick or had any visible signs of radiation sickness.  The trip to a physician office and a call to REACTS in Oak Ridge, TN set up the process for Monday April 8, 2013.  The process needs fresh blood within 24 hours for the test.  At this time, the Department considers this incident pending the outcome of the test."  LA Event Report ID: LA-120014|
Power Reactor|48885|BRAIDWOOD|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|BRACEVILLE|IL|WILL||Y|05000456|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|BRIAN FINLAY|VINCE KLCO|04/03/2013 00:00:00|16:40|04/03/2013 00:00:00|12:50|CDT|04/03/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF AN ALCOHOL CONTAINER INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA  During remodeling of a bathroom on the third floor of the Administrative Building which is located inside the Protective Area, workers discovered two very old containers of blackberry brandy after removing the ceiling tiles.  This item will be entered into the licensee corrective actions program for follow up.  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  HOO Note:  A similar report [EN #48877] was received on 4/2/2013.|
Power Reactor|48886|FERMI|DETROIT EDISON CO.|3|NEWPORT|MI|MONROE||N|05000341|2|||[2] GE-4|KELLEY BELENKY|PETE SNYDER|04/03/2013 00:00:00|16:51|04/03/2013 00:00:00|10:53|EDT|04/03/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|65|Power Operation|65|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||COOLING WATER MAKEUP PUMP FAILED TO START DURING A SURVEILLANCE TEST  "At 1053 [EDT] on April 3, 2013, during the performance of a surveillance test on the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system the EECW system was declared inoperable due to the Division 2 EECW makeup pump failing to start during the surveillance.  The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler.   "A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via [Technical Specification] LCO 3.5.1. Investigation into why the makeup pump did not start is currently in progress.   "This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48887|FERMI|DETROIT EDISON CO.|3|NEWPORT|MI|MONROE||N|05000341|2|||[2] GE-4|KELLEY BELENKY|DONG HWA PARK|04/04/2013 00:00:00|08:35|04/04/2013 00:00:00|04:06|EDT|04/05/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|65|Power Operation|65|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FAILURE OF THE INTEGRATED PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM  "At 0406 [EDT] on April 4, 2013, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS).  "While IPCS and SPDS are not fully functional, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented if a plant emergency does occur, as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means.  "Investigation is in progress. A follow up message will be made when IPCS and SPDS are restored to fully functional status.  "This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE FROM GREG MILLER TO VINCE KLCO AT 1636 EDT ON 4/5/2013 * * *  "At 1627 [EDT] on April 4, 2013, plant personnel were able to restore full functionality of IPCS and SPDS.  This restored full assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response faculties."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R3DO (Daley).|
Agreement State|48888|WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION|PEKINS ELMER|4|RICHLAND|WA|||Y||||||KRISTEN SCHWAB|VINCE KLCO|04/04/2013 00:00:00|16:08|03/18/2013 00:00:00||PDT|04/04/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RAY KELLAR|R4DO|FSME RESOURCES|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHIPMENT EXCEEDED SURFACE CONTAMINATION LIMITS  The following information was received from the Washington State Division of Radiation Protection by email:  "PermaFix Northwest received a shipment from Perkin Elmer, Inc. that consisted of 32 packages, 4 plastic drums and 28 metal drums, and was shipped as an exclusive use shipment.  Upon receipt, the drums were surveyed and 2 plastic drums were found to exceed the 49 CFR 173.443 non-removable contamination limit of 2,200 dpm/cm2 for an exclusive use shipment.  The drum survey results were reported as 44,391 dpm/100 cm2 H-3 and 18,080 dpm/100 cm2 C-14; 20,127 dpm/100 cm2 H-3 and 18,508 dpm/100 cm2 C-14, and 13,323 dpm/100 cm2 H-3 and 10,019 dpm/100 cm2 C-14. This most contaminated drum was manifested with only H-3 and C-14, the other 2 drums were manifested with only C-14."  Washington Incident Number: WA-13-021|
Agreement State|48889|CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM|JACOBSEN CONSULTING|4|MODESTO|CA||6370-39|Y||||||KAMANI HEWADIKARAM|VINCE KLCO|04/04/2013 00:00:00|17:43|04/03/2013 00:00:00||PDT|04/04/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RAY KELLAR|R4DO|FSME RESOURCES|EMAI|MEXICO|EMAI|ILTAB|EMAI|||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE GAUGE  The following information was from the State of California via email:  "On 04/04/13, [the licensee] RSO, called RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] to report a lost gauge.  The gauge is a Model 503 DR CPN moisture gauge (S/N H33064926) containing 50 mCi (max) of Americium 241:Be.  [The RSO] stated that he placed the gauge in the back of his truck next to the tailgate, then got distracted by a telephone call and started driving from 4181 Brew Master Dr, Suite 4, Ceres, CA, on Crows Landing, Hwy N 99 and then onto Hwy 88 without securing the gauge.  He discovered the gauge missing [at 1600 PDT] on 04/03/13, upon arrival at a jobsite.  The Ceres Police Department was notified of the lost gauge (case # 213-001653).  Licensee was advised to place an advertisement in a local paper/craigslist offering a reward of $4000.00 for the safe return of the gauge.  RHB will be investigating the incident and licensee will be cited for the items of non compliance associated with this incident."  California Report: #040413  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|48890|BRUNSWICK|CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO.|2|SOUTHPORT|NC|BRUNSWICK||Y|05000325|1|2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|JEFF EMBRY|DONG HWA PARK|04/05/2013 00:00:00|07:02|04/05/2013 00:00:00|06:24|EDT|04/05/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|||||||DANIEL RICH|R2DO|SAMSON LEE|NRR|PAUL HARRIS|IRD|ERIC LEEDS|NRR|LEN WERT|R2|||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE ALARM IN THE STACK FILTER HOUSE  "At 0624 [EDT], the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) declared an Unusual Event due to a fire alarm in the Stack Filter House. The classification of the Unusual Event is based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) HU2.1, 'Fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm.'  Verification of fire could not be made within 15 minutes of fire alarm due to confined space conditions. Actual fire conditions did not exist; alarm was caused by environmental conditions.  "There is no impact on the health and safety of the public."  The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0650 EDT.  Personnel injuries and equipment damage did not occur.  Offsite assistance was not required.     The licensee has notified the state and local authorities. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA.  * * * RETRACTION FROM WILLIAM MURRAY TO VINCE KLCO AT 1644 EDT ON 4/5/2013 * * *   "This event is being retracted based upon the following:  "As stated in the original event notification, an actual fire condition did not exist and the control room fire alarm was caused by environmental conditions.  Because an actual fire did not exist and the fire detection system alarm was not valid, the condition described in the Emergency Action Level (EAL) HU2.1, 'Fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room fire alarm,' also did not exist. The Unusual Event was terminated at 0650 [EDT].  The Unusual Event classification was appropriately made, in accordance with the EAL basis which requires the control room alarm be validated by other indications or alarms or by an actual field report, or the classification must be made.  Based on the preceding information, Event Notification 48890 is retracted."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R2DO (Rich) and the NRR EO (Lee).|
Power Reactor|48891|KEWAUNEE|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|KEWAUNEE|WI|KEWAUNEE||Y|05000305|1|||[1] W-2-LP|STEVEN SNYDER|HOWIE CROUCH|04/05/2013 00:00:00|08:20|04/05/2013 00:00:00|07:30|CDT|04/05/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "On April 5, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours [CDT], the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Reactor Building Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (SPING) (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of this Reactor Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance.  "The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours.   "Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently indentify the upper two emergency action levels for Offsite Radiation conditions).  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Part 21|48893|FLOWSERVE CONTROL - LIMITORQUE|FLOWSERVE CONTROL - LIMITORQUE|1|LYNCHBURG|VA|||Y||||||JEFF McCONKEY|BILL HUFFMAN|04/05/2013 00:00:00|14:36|04/04/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/05/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||DANIEL RICH|R2DO|RAY KELLAR|R4DO|PART 21 REPORTS|E-MA|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 REPORT OF LIMITORQUE VALVES WITH INCORRECT MOTOR NAMEPLATES INSTALLED  The following information is a synopsis of a report received from Flowserve - Limitorque via facsimile:  "During routine Motor Operated Valve testing of a Limitorque SMB-000 actuator prior to being placed into operation, Duke Energy, Catawba Nuclear Station measured motor current readings higher than expected. This actuator was equipped with a 2 ft-lb motor. This motor was returned to Limitorque and subsequently to the motor Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). Investigation revealed that this motor was a 5 ft-lb motor mislabeled with the nameplate from a 2 ft-lb motor which explains the measured current draw.  "This notification is limited to a quantity of two motors for Limitorque SMB-000 actuators. Both affected licensees have been notified of this occurrence and both motors have been returned to Flowserve - Limitorque for replacement.  [Catawba and Arkansas Nuclear One]  "The defect which occurred is that the 2 ft - lb motor was identified on the nameplate as a 5 ft - lb motor.  Similarly the 5 ft - lb motor was identified on the nameplate as a 2 ft - lb motor.  Had these motors been placed into service, this defect has the potential to affect safety related operation due to a possible reduction of MOV capability.  "The cause of the defect was due to two motor nameplates being inadvertently interchanged by Flowserve personnel during the painting process prior to shipment. The two motors which are both 48 frame, SMB-000 flanged, Baldor Reliance AC motors were being painted in the same timeframe. The painting process requires the OEM supplied nameplate to be temporarily separated from the motor. Upon the completion of the painting process, Flowserve personnel inadvertently interchanged the nameplates resulting in the 2 ft-lb motor being incorrectly identified as a 5 ft-lb motor. Similarly the 5 ft-lb motor was incorrectly identified on the nameplate as a 2 ft-lb motor. Inspections of the returned motors by Flowserve and the motor OEM confirmed the problem.  "To prevent recurrence of this issue, Flowserve has reviewed and strengthened the relevant procedures regarding verification of motor identification during the installation of the OEM supplied motor nameplate. All personnel associated with this process have been trained by Flowserve QA to the latest revision of the procedures."|
Power Reactor|48894|PERRY|FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|3|PERRY|OH|LAKE||Y|05000440|1|||[1] GE-6|THOMAS MORSE|VINCE KLCO|04/07/2013 00:00:00|17:47|11/17/2010 00:00:00||EDT|04/07/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT|||||||ROBERT DALEY|R3DO|SAMSON LEE|NRR|PAUL HARRIS|IRD|||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AFTER THE FACT DISCOVERY OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT ENTRY CONDITION  "During an extent of condition review of past radiological events, it was identified that an event on November 17, 2010 met the E-Plan entry criteria for GU1, 'Unexpected Increase In Plant Radiation Levels'. Due to an equipment deficiency, dose rates in one section of the Radwaste building rose from 0.08 mrem/hr to 80 mrem/hr. This satisfied the E-Plan criteria of a 1000 times change over normal radiation levels. This was initially identified in [Perry] Condition Report 2010-85937."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify State and local authorities.|
Agreement State|48895|CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM|AMERICAN SOIL TESTING|4|SAN JOSE|CA||5059|Y||||||GENE FORRER|STEVE SANDIN|04/08/2013 00:00:00|14:00|12/02/2012 00:00:00||PDT|04/08/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RICK DEESE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|MEXICO|FAX|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES  The State of California provided the following information via email:  "On December 5, 2012, . . .  American Soil Testing notified RHB [California Radiologic Health Branch] that his storage facility had been broken into and two CPN Moisture Density gauges (Serial numbers MD00405615 & M17031878) had been stolen.  The licensee was advised to post a notice and reward in the local newspapers and on Craigslist and to notify local law enforcement.  "Note: Miscommunication resulted in the NRC not being notified until 4/8/13."  CA 5010 Number:  120512  These CPN Moisture Density gauges contain two (2) sources each, i.e., 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am-241/Be.  HOO Note:  See EN #48867 - Report from Nevada concerning recovery of M17031878 gauge.  THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to  http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
Power Reactor|48896|SALEM|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|05000272|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|GARY MEEKINS|VINCE KLCO|04/08/2013 00:00:00|15:58|04/08/2013 00:00:00|12:40|EDT|04/08/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||HAROLD GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||CONTROL ROOM ENS PHONE OUT OF SERVICE FOR GREATER THAN ONE HOUR  "The Salem Generating Unit 1 and 2 control room ENS phone system was down for greater than one hour from 1140EDT to 1240EDT."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48897|HOPE CREEK|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|05000354|1|||[1] GE-4|KENNETH P. BRESLIN|STEVE SANDIN|04/08/2013 00:00:00|16:09|04/08/2013 00:00:00|11:15|EDT|04/08/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||HAROLD GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING  "On April 8, 2013 at 0908 [EDT], the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable as part of planned Controls Functional Testing. At 1115 [EDT], during the performance of scheduled testing, an initiation signal for the HPCI system was provided and the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump failed to start as expected. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump provides the motive force to open the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves during system startup. The inability of the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves to open prevents the HPCI system from fulfilling its design safety function. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the cause of the failure has been corrected.  "All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable.  "The unit remains at 100% power.  "The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure.  "No personnel injuries resulted from the event.  "The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified."|
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation|48898|MAINE YANKEE|MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.|1|WISCASSET|ME|LINCOLN|GL|Y|72-30||||ISFSI|JOSH MILLER|STEVE SANDIN|04/08/2013 00:00:00|16:56|04/08/2013 00:00:00|14:35|EST|04/08/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|72.75(b)(2)|PRESS RELEASE/OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||HAROLD GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE MAINE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  "A sewage line has been found broken and leaking.  The area of the leak is on Maine Yankee property but outside the licensed area.  Repairs are scheduled for 04/09/13."  No radioactive material is involved.|
Agreement State|48899|LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV|ALPHA-OMEGA SERVICES, INC.|4|BELLFLOWER|CA||LA-10025-L01|Y||||||JOE NOBLE|STEVE SANDIN|04/08/2013 00:00:00|16:50|04/02/2013 00:00:00||PDT|04/08/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RICK DEESE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|PATTI SILVA|NMSS|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A MIS-DELIVERED SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL  The following information was provided by the State of Louisiana via email:  "Event date and Time: On 04/02/2013  [the] RSO for A & O [Alpha-Omega Services, Inc.] called in a mis-delivery of an Ir-192 source intended for Radiation Oncology Center of Nevada (ROCN). ROCN is a client/customer of A & O, but [the common carrier] delivered the source to Cardinal Health (CH). ROCN and CH are both radioactive material licensees and both have facilities in Las Vegas, NV.   "Event Location: Around the Las Vegas, NV area. The source was intended for ROCN in Las Vegas, NV, but was delivered to Cardinal Health, [also in] Las Vegas, NV.  The source delivery occurred in the morning to CH. CH notified ROCN that their source was delivered to CH by [the common carrier].  [The common carrier] was notified  and picked up the source at 1300 [PDT] and delivered it to ROCN.  "Event type: Delivery of a radioactive source by the [common] carrier to the wrong licensee. Except during transport, the source was in possession of someone who was a licensee and well trained in radiation safety practices.  "Notifications: A notification was made to LA DEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] Radiation Assessment after the incident was basically over and entirely under control. The notification was made to [a Louisiana representative] located in [the Louisiana] Southwest Regional office. A & O was involved in the recovery of the source by phone after learning of the mis-delivery.  The source was delivered to the wrong licensee.  CH, the licensee where the source was delivered, was licensed for radioactive material and well trained in the handling of radioactive material.       "Event description: [An] Ir-192 source was delivered to the wrong licensee by [the common carrier].  When the error was discovered by CH, CH notified ROCN that they were in possession of licensed radioactive material that belonged to ROCN.  [The common carrier] was called and they picked up the source and delivered it to ROCN around 1300 [PDT].  The source shielding and shipping container was intact during the entire incident.  It was not damaged nor was the container opened.   "Transport vehicle description: [The common carrier] picked up the source from the A & O facility [in] Venton, LA which was being shipped to a client, ROCN [in] Las Vegas, NV.  [The common carrier] delivered the Ir-192 source to the wrong address.  The source was delivered to Cardinal Health (CH), [also in] Las Vegas, NV."  Event Report ID No.:  LA-120015|
Power Reactor|48900|KEWAUNEE|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|KEWAUNEE|WI|KEWAUNEE||Y|05000305|1|||[1] W-2-LP|JOHN PULS|HOWIE CROUCH|04/09/2013 00:00:00|09:05|04/09/2013 00:00:00|07:30|CDT|04/09/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AUXILIARY BUILDING VENT MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "On April 9, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours [CDT], the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Auxiliary Building Vent Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Radiation Monitor (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance.  "The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours.  "Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for offsite radiation conditions).  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  See similar EN #48881 and 48891.  * * * UPDATE FROM GARY AHRENS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1018 EDT ON 4/9/13 * * *  SPING was returned to service at 0819 CDT.  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R3DO (Passehl).|
Power Reactor|48901|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|2||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|MATTHEW BUSCH|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/09/2013 00:00:00|09:42|04/09/2013 00:00:00|02:35|EDT|04/09/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||HAROLD GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|98|Power Operation|98|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||POWER LOST TO METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION  "At 0235 EDT on 4-9-13, due to an offsite power transformer fault, power was lost to site support buildings and all meteorological instrumentation.  This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3), major loss of emergency assessment capabilities.   "At 0455 EDT, power was restored to meteorological instrumentation in the control room.  During the power outage, limited meteorological data remained available via telephone from the National Weather Service and the Fitzpatrick site met tower.  Plant operations at both units 1 and 2 were not affected.  Both units remain at full power."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|48902|KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT|FRONTIER EL DORADO REFINING, LLC|4|EL DORADO|KS||22-B145-01|Y||||||DAVID J. WHITFILL|STEVE SANDIN|04/09/2013 00:00:00|11:52|04/03/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/09/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||RICK DEESE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING DIFFICULTY IN RETRACTING A FIXED GAUGE SOURCE  The following information was provided by the State of Kansas via fax:  "This letter is to inform [the Kansas Department of Health & Environment] that yesterday afternoon [on 4/3/13, the RSO] had attempted to move a source from its drywell into its source holder to prepare for maintenance activities in the vessel. The source seemed to be stuck in the drywell. Because the cable restraining the source does not allow the shutter to close until it completely retracted, the shutter would not close. Later last night, after consulting with VEGA Americas and [the company] on-site engineers, [the RSO] attempted again to remove the source and it was free. The source has been safely stored in its holder. There were no reportable personnel exposures. Because of the position of this source 8 feet inside a large vessel with 5 [inch] steel walls, it is shielded at least as well as inside its holder.  "The shutter in question is on an Ohmart/VEGA model SHLM-CR3 source holder S/N 19077664, containing 2 Ci of Cs-137 in a model A2102 sealed source S/N 0587CO.  "The source is located at [the company facility] in EI Dorado, KS . . .. It is approximately 140 feet above the ground. Operations and maintenance personnel were notified of the issue. A wipe sample was collected to check for gross leakage. None was indicated.  "What [the RSO] believe[s] caused this situation was the combination of two (2) things. The reactor was being cooled with nitrogen over the past few days. It has also been raining and snowing. [The RSO] believe[s] water was drawn into the well during cooling and the nitrogen cooled that area of the reactor enough to freeze the water in the well. Ice was present on the cable as it was pulled out. Because the reactor was sufficiently cooled, the nitrogen purge was reduced, thus allowing the reactor to warm slightly by 8 PM when [the RSO] tried again.  "[The RSO] feel[s] that this was not, in fact, a shutter issue, but an operational issue which [the RSO] will be cognizant of in the future. [The RSO] will simply make sure the internal temperature of this vessel is above 40 degrees F before attempting to remove the top source. Normally it is over 500 Degrees, so water intrusion is not an issue. Again, the source was always in a safe position. At no time were personnel exposed to any reportable levels of radiation."  Kansas Item Number:  KS130003|
Non-Agreement State|48903|SAGINAW RADIATION ONCOLOGY CENTER|MID MICHIGAN MEDICAL CENTER|3|SAGINAW|MI||21-01549-02|N||||||IAN REINECK|STEVE SANDIN|04/09/2013 00:00:00|14:56|04/08/2013 00:00:00|10:30|EDT|04/09/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|35.3045(a)(3)|DOSE TO OTHER SITE > SPECIFIED LIMITS|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING A MIS-POSITIONED BRACHYTHERAPY SOURCE  On 04/08/13 at approximately 1030 EDT a female patient undergoing brachytherapy treatment for cervical/vaginal cancer received the first of three fractions.  The prescribed dose for the first fraction was 400 cGy, however, the wrong length catheter was used.  This placed the source 5 cm inferior to the intended treatment site.  The actual dose received has not been determined at this time.  This error was discovered on 04/09/13 during a review by the Medical Physicist.  Both the prescribing physician and patient have been informed.  There are no adverse health consequences anticipated due to this error in treatment.    A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Power Reactor|48904|BROWNS FERRY|TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY|2|DECATUR|AL|LIMESTONE||Y||||3|[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4|TODD CHRISTENSEN|VINCE KLCO|04/09/2013 00:00:00|17:07|02/11/2013 00:00:00|06:13|CDT|04/09/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||||MALCOLM WIDMANN|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Shutdown|MANUAL INITIATION OF REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM  "On February 11, 2013, at 0613 hours [CDT], the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was manually started during a planned Unit 3 reactor shutdown.  A Reactor Feedwater recirculation piping separation resulted in the loss of condenser vacuum and subsequent unavailability of the Main Turbine Bypass Valves.  The RCIC system was manually started at 9.2" of condenser vacuum in order to control reactor water level in anticipation of loss of Reactor Feedwater Pumps (RFPs) which occurs at 7" of condenser vacuum.  Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) were manually operated to maintain reactor pressure.  The reactor water level was controlled in the normal band by RCIC, and Reactor Pressure was controlled with a combination of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system and SRV manual operation.  All systems operated as designed and Reactor water level was maintained in the prescribed band.  No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached.  RCIC operation was secured at 1449 [CDT] on 2/11/2013.    "This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).  During a review of operating logs it was identified that this event met reporting requirements and had not been reported.  Therefore, this report does not comply with the 8 hour requirement.  This condition has been entered into the corrective action program.  Additionally, an LER is required within 60 days per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48905|HOPE CREEK|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|05000354|1|||[1] GE-4|KENNETH P. BRESLIN|STEVE SANDIN|04/09/2013 00:00:00|17:08|04/09/2013 00:00:00|13:15|EDT|04/09/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JAMES TRAPP|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM TELEPHONE  "On April 9, 2013 at 1315 [EDT] Hope Creek Operations personnel identified that the NRC ENS phone line was unavailable for Hope Creek Generating Station. The loss of the NRC ENS line was verified by the Hope Creek Shift Manager via backup land line communication to the NRC Operation Center at 1355 [EDT]. At that time, the NRC Operations Center submitted a repair ticket to the phone service provider. NRC ENS phone availability was verified restored to service at 1618 [EDT] with the NRC Operations Center.  "The loss of the phone line had no effect on plant operations and the unit remains at 100% power.  "Additionally, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was verified to remain intact during this time period and was available to transmit data.  "No personnel injuries resulted from the event.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48906|VOGTLE|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|WAYNESBORO|GA|BURKE||Y|52-011|3|4||[3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000|HOWARD MAHAN|HOWIE CROUCH|04/10/2013 00:00:00|09:47|12/06/2012 00:00:00|08:00|EDT|04/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.55(e)|CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY|||||||MALCOLM WIDMANN|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Under Construction|0|Under Construction|N|N|0|Under Construction|0|Under Construction|N|N|0||0||FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMIT  "50.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear).  "This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of Southern Company for Vogtle 3&4, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by Southern Company.  "This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C)."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48907|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|DAVE RICHARDSON|PETE SNYDER|04/10/2013 00:00:00|11:06|04/10/2013 00:00:00|11:30|EDT|04/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JAMES TRAPP|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANNED TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUTAGE  "A planned work package (52343687-01) at the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant will be performed for DOP/Freon Testing TSCVASS as required per TS 5.5.8 Ventilation Filter Testing Program. The testing requires breaking the boundary into the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system to obtain a charcoal sample. Therefore, the TSC ventilation system will be rendered nonfunctional during the duration of this work activity. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately 6 hours.  "If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the station Emergency Plant Manager will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location In accordance with applicable site procedures giving first consideration to the Control Room. TSC facility leads have been made aware of this contingency.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * UPDATE ON 4/10/13 AT 1717 EDT FROM DAVE RICHARDSON TO DONG PARK * * *  "This is an update from EN #48907.  Planned maintenance has been completed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system.  The TSC filtered ventilation system has been restored to normal standby lineup.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."|
Power Reactor|48908|HOPE CREEK|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|05000354|1|||[1] GE-4|JOHN PANAGOTOPULOS|STEVE SANDIN|04/10/2013 00:00:00|13:13|04/10/2013 00:00:00|09:30|EDT|04/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JAMES TRAPP|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM TELEPHONE  "On April 10, 2013 at 0930 [EDT] Hope Creek Operations personnel identified that the NRC ENS phone line was unavailable for Hope Creek Generating Station. The loss of the NRC ENS line was verified by the Hope Creek Shift Manager via backup land line communication to the NRC. The NRC Operations Center has an open repair ticket with the phone service provider.  "The loss of the phone line had no effect on plant operation and the unit remains at 100% power.  "Additionally, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was verified to remain intact and is available to transmit data.  "No personnel injuries resulted from the event.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."|
Power Reactor|48909|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|JOHN OHRENBERGER|DONG HWA PARK|04/10/2013 00:00:00|16:19|04/10/2013 00:00:00|13:14|EDT|04/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||JAMES TRAPP|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|86|Power Operation|86|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MASSACHUSETTS AGENCIES NOTIFIED REGARDING NEUTRALIZING SUMP DISCHARGE LINE INSPECTION  "At 1314 hours on Wednesday, April 10, 2013 during a boroscopic inspection of the sub-surface portions of the Neutralizing Sump Discharge Line, Pilgrim Station discovered indications of a separation in the line. The line is currently isolated and no discharges were in progress during the planned inspection. This line is used infrequently to discharge permitted liquids that have the potential to contain radiological contamination. This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with Pilgrim site procedures with direct voluntary communications with offsite agencies.  "There is no impact on the safe operation of the plant and personnel are investigating the cause.  "The [NRC] Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this notification.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).   "The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and other state agencies."|
Power Reactor|48910|SUMMER|SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.|2|JENKINSVILLE|SC|FAIRFIELD||Y|||2|3|[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000|J. FINDLAY SALTER|DONG HWA PARK|04/10/2013 00:00:00|16:44|12/06/2012 00:00:00|08:00|EDT|04/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.55(e)|CONSTRUCT DEFICIENCY|||||||MALCOLM WIDMANN|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Under Construction|0|Under Construction|N|N|0|Under Construction|0|Under Construction|FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMIT  "50.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear).  "This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) for Virgil C. Summer 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by SCE&G.  "This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C)."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Part 21|48911|CRANE NUCLEAR|CRANE NUCLEAR|3|BOLINGBROOK|IL|||Y||||||ROSALIE NAVA|STEVE SANDIN|04/10/2013 00:00:00|20:29|03/25/2010 00:00:00||CDT|04/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|MALCOLM WIDMANN|R2DO|RICK DEESE|R4DO|NRR PART 21 GROUP|EMAI|||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 INVOLVING A POTENTIAL WELD DEFECT  The following information was received via fax as a supplement to a report originally submitted to the NRC Document Control Desk:   "This is a supplement to the above subject Part 21 letter issued by Crane Nuclear, Inc. on March 25, 2010 and NRC ref. ML100920093.  "In the referenced letter, Crane Nuclear Inc., located at [860 Remington Boulevard, Bolingbrook, Illinois  60440], filed a 10CFR21 Notification of a Potential Weld Defect to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and also the affected customers. Copies of these letters were provided to the NRC.  "This letter is intended to supplement that initial notification letter by providing further details on when Crane Nuclear became aware of the issue and the potential safety hazard associated with the issue.  "During the NUPIC [Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee] Audit of Crane Nuclear the week of February 2, 2010 an audit finding was issued to Crane Nuclear for not effectively reviewing a customer complaint. The complaint was relative to a potentially undersized fillet weld and the audit finding documented that Crane Nuclear did not review the issue through to completion, or with regard to potentially affecting other customers. In response to the NUPIC Audit Finding, Crane Nuclear generated a Corrective Action Report (CAR) CAR 10-22 on 03/01/10. This CAR identified two required actions and they were: 1) Create a formal procedure that ensures all customer complaints are thoroughly investigated until they are complete and that Part 21 applicability is considered for the initial complaint and the potential it affects other customers; and, 2) Evaluate the complaint on the potentially undersized fillet weld to determine if Part 21 reporting is required.  "During that NUPIC Audit, Crane was asked to provide a statement relative to the potential defect or failure and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by a potentially undersized weld and the following statement was provided to the NUPIC Audit team and as of today this statement has been provided to the customers that received the initial notification - the following is the Statement that was provided to NUPIC and the notified customers:  "Assessment of Undersized Weld on Valve Safety Function  "Auxiliary connections on valve bodies, bonnets and covers are used for drains, vents or leak-off. The welds used to attach these connections are tested as part of the pressure boundary and subjected to ASME/ANSI hydrostatic test pressure (1.5 X cold working pressure). Because the pipe nipples used are short and fairly rigid, if the lines remained capped and not connected to a piping system it is unlikely that the combined stresses due to pressure and bending at the weld due to seismic accelerations would exceed the stress due to the pressure load applied during the hydrostatic test. However, a complete and instantaneous failure of the weld could result in a capped line becoming a missile and pressure boundary violation. If a line was connected to a piping system, if properly supported it is also unlikely the welded joint would see loads that would over stress the weld. However, if loads were generated at the welded connection that exceeded the strength of the weld a crack could be initiated and the pressure boundary violated.  "In response to the first required corrective action, Crane Nuclear created and released a robust customer complaint procedure CCP-1 titled, 'Customer Complaint Procedure.' This procedure requires a documented management review by the Customer Service Manager, Engineering Manager, Site Leader and Quality Director, for each and every customer complaint. The complaint form requires completion of a 'yes or no' check box that needs to be completed with respect to 10CFR21 applicability and it also has a 'yes or no' check box to document whether other customers are affected.  "In response to the second required action on the CAR, all Crane Nuclear designs with any kind of bleed off or other venting/leak type designs using fillet welds were isolated and each inspection 'as-built' record for each design and order were reviewed. The review of the 'as-built' inspection records confirmed that the fillet welds were in compliance with the drawing except for potentially those that were identified in the Part 21 notification referenced above. The review of all inspection documentation was completed on Friday March 19th and in accordance with our procedure the President was notified at 8:48PM that evening and the notification was completed on March 2, 2010. CAR 12-26 was later generated on 07/27/12 and closed on 08/21/12 for filing the report on the 6th day. If you have any further questions please contact [Rosalie Nava] at one of the following, phone 630-226-4940, email rnava@cranevs.com., or by fax 630-226-4646."  Affected licensees include Dominion, Duke Energy, Omaha Public Power District and TVA Nuclear.|
Power Reactor|48912|COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION|ENERGY NORTHWEST|4|RICHLAND|WA|BENTON||Y|05000397|2|||[2] GE-5|MARK MITCHELL|DONG HWA PARK|04/10/2013 00:00:00|20:40|04/10/2013 00:00:00|09:52|PDT|04/10/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||RICK DEESE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||REACTOR BUILDING STACK ACCESS DOOR NOT FULLY CLOSED   "On April 10, 2013, at 0952 [PDT] it was discovered that an access door to the reactor building stack was not fully closed. The door was subsequently closed by operations. On March 16, 2013, the reactor building exhaust flow rate took a step change decrease. Initially the reduction in flow was thought to be a reactor building ventilation damper issue.  On April 3, 2013, after walkdown of the reactor building dampers and verification of proper system lineup, the reactor building exhaust flow rate monitor was declared inoperable and a substitute value was used for the exhaust flow rate in accordance with station procedures.  "Had an actual event involving an offsite release occurred during the time period from March 16, 2013, to April 3, 2013, an inaccurate reactor building exhaust flow rate might have been used to calculate offsite dose. This would only impact dose calculations at lower doses and potentially delay declaration of an Unusual Event. This is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability. At higher dose rates, the reactor building ventilation isolates and Standby Gas Treatment is operated. Standby Gas Treatment flow rate measurement would be unaffected. The intermediate and high range radiation monitors for the reactor building effluent remained fully functional and would have provided an accurate measure of activity concentration.  "Upon closure of the reactor building stack door, the reactor building exhaust flow rate returned to normal and emergency preparedness assessment capability was restored."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48913|SAN ONOFRE|SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON  COMPANY|4|SAN CLEMENTE|CA|SAN DIEGO||Y|||2|3|[1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE|ADAM MANELLA|PETE SNYDER|04/11/2013 00:00:00|04:29|04/10/2013 00:00:00|23:26|PDT|04/11/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||RICK DEESE|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|FBI NOTIFIED DUE TO DEGRADED SECURITY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS  "At 2253 PDT on 4/10/13, SONGS experienced degraded on-site radio communications during planned maintenance on radio systems. Radio communications were restored at 2315 PDT."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48914|WOLF CREEK|WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.|4|BURLINGTON|KS|COFFEY||Y|05000482|1|||[1] W-4-LP|JAMES KURAS|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/11/2013 00:00:00|16:47|04/11/2013 00:00:00|15:10|CDT|04/12/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|||||||RICK DEESE|R4DO|JANE MARSHALL|IRD|ART HOWELL|RA|DAN DORMAN|NRR|JOHN MONNINGER|NRR|||||||||||N|N|0|Hot Standby|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNUSUAL EVENT FOR A FIRE LASTING GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES  "The fire started at 1455 CDT in the turbine building southeast stairwell and on the auxiliary boiler room roof.  Fire fighting efforts continue as fire exists inside the wall between the turbine building and the auxiliary boiler room.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local governments.    Notified DHS, FEMA, and the NICC.   * * * UPDATE FROM WARREN BRANDT TO PETE SNYDER AT 0100 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * *   "Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 [CDT] in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof.  The fire was extinguished at 15:19 [CDT], and cool to the touch at 16:48 [CDT]. No offsite fire response support was required.  The fire did not impact any safety related equipment.  "The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13.  The cause of the fire is under investigation."  Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall), DHS, FEMA and NICC (via email).  * * * UPDATE FROM PIERCE MOORE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1400 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * *  "Update to Termination of NOUE due to Fire on roof of Auxiliary Boiler.  "Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 [CDT] in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof.  The fire was extinguished at 15:19 [CDT], and cool to the touch at 16:48 [CDT].  The Offsite Fire Department was called and responded but their support in fire suppression was not required, they did assist in clean up and fire investigation efforts.  The fire did not impact any safety related equipment.  "The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13.  The cause of the fire is under investigation."  Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall) via email.|
Power Reactor|48915|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|LEWIS ROGERS|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/11/2013 00:00:00|18:19|04/11/2013 00:00:00|15:41|EDT|04/11/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MALCOLM WIDMANN|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER COOLERS OUT OF SERVICE  "This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on 'Loss of Assessment' capability.  "This is a non-emergency notification.  This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility.  At approximately 15:41 EDT on 4/11/2013, AH-11 and AH-17, Technical Support Center (TSC) Air Handling Units' coolers were not working.  The cause of the condition has not been identified.  However, troubleshooting efforts are being planned and will be worked immediately.  "TSC functionality requires all areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F.  Actual TSC area temperatures have reached 77 degrees F.  If the facility were activated with a full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degree F limit.  Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240.  This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, SEC-MCR, and Radiological Control Manager.  The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability.  The Technical Support Center-Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48916|QUAD CITIES|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|CORDOVA|IL|ROCK ISLAND||Y|05000254|1|||[1] GE-3,[2] GE-3|KEVIN HOLLE|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/11/2013 00:00:00|21:10|04/11/2013 00:00:00|13:00|CDT|04/11/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||DEGRADED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS  "On April 11, 2013, at 1300 hours, during the performance of On-Line Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Blowdown Logic Testing, two poor wiring connections were identified (the electrical leads were not properly compressed at their termination point).  The electrical leads are associated with the B and C ADS valves.  Quad Cities has five ADS valves which can be used to depressurize the Reactor Pressure Vessel under accident conditions.  While the solenoids of these valves were actuated successfully during the recent Unit 1 refueling outage (which ended on April 8, 2013), the less than optimum configuration could have prevented the valves from actuating under design basis conditions.  The degraded wiring for both valves was restored at 1741 hours [CDT].  "Given the potential impact on the ADS depressurization function, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Non-Agreement State|48917|U.S. ARMY|U.S. ARMY|1|CAMP LEJEUNE|NC||21-32838-01|Y||||||THOMAS GIZICKI|DONG HWA PARK|04/12/2013 00:00:00|11:46|04/11/2013 00:00:00|13:00|EDT|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|30.50(b)(1)|UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE||JAMES TRAPP|R1DO|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TRITIUM LAMP BROKEN DURING MAINTENANCE OF A MORTAR SIGHT  On 4/11/13 at 1300 EDT, a 1 Ci tritium lamp was broken during routine maintenance on a M64 mortar sight unit.  The sealed source tritium lamp broke when a wrench hit the tritium module.  Surveys were conducted, but the results will not be available until next week.  Bioassays are being perform on 4 individuals and based on historic records, the RSO expects minimal intake of less than 5 mrem.  The device was bagged, tagged and placed in a secure storage area for future disposal.   The licensee attempted to notify R3 (McCraw).  * * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/24/13 AT 1004 EDT * * *   The US ARMY is retracting this event due to a miniscule bio-assay indicated dose rate to the four workers (maximum dose of 0.9 mRem to an individual) and survey results of the maintenance shop indicating no contamination.  The device has been secured and properly stored for future disposal.  The licensee notified R3 (McCraw).  Notified the R1DO (Joustra), R3DO (Hills) and FSME Events Resource via email.|
Power Reactor|48918|GINNA|ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.|1|ONTARIO|NY|WAYNE||Y|05000244|1|||[1] W-2-LP|DALE BISAILLON|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/12/2013 00:00:00|14:45|04/12/2013 00:00:00|10:10|EDT|04/12/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||HAROLD GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNANALYZED CONDITION - MISSING BACKFLOW PREVENTER  "On 4/12/2013 at 1010 EDT, it was determined that a floor drain line between the Turbine Building and Intermediate Building did not have a backflow preventer as expected.  Backflow protection is provided to prevent the possible spread of a fire via the drain system.  The Turbine Building and the Intermediate Building are considered two different fire areas within the scope of the fire protection program.  The discovery of this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).  "In accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual, an hourly fire watch inspection and fire detector operability verification have been established until an equivalent level of protection is provided or until permanent corrective actions can be implemented.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48919|MONTICELLO|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|MONTICELLO|MN|WRIGHT||N|05000263|1|||[1] GE-3|MATTHEW QUICK|BILL HUFFMAN|04/13/2013 00:00:00|03:18|04/12/2013 00:00:00|22:00|CDT|04/13/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO ISOLATED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH ON SAFETY RELIEF VALVE TAILPIPE  "On April 12th, 2013 at 2200 CDT, investigation into the inability to complete a Safety/Relief Valve (S/RV) discharge line excess flow check valve test determined that a relief valve discharge monitoring instrument valve had been inappropriately closed since late June, 2011. The closed valve isolated two differential pressure switches that impact the operation of 'E' Low-Low Set (LLS) valve. The LLS logic and instrumentation were affected by the loss of two  'E'  S/RV tailpipe discharge pressure switches which indicate S/RV open status and start two inhibit timers which prevent plant operators or the LLS S/RV logic from immediately re-opening the valve to allow the water leg in the S/RV discharge line to recede. The LLS logic and instrumentation is designed to mitigate the effects of postulated thrust loads on the S/RV discharge lines by preventing subsequent actuations with an elevated water leg in the S/RV discharge line.  It also mitigates the effects of postulated pressure loads on the torus shell or suppression pool by preventing multiple actuations in rapid succession of the S/RVs subsequent to their initial actuation. The valve found closed has been returned to its normal open position. This condition resulted in the 'E' S/RV LLS function being aligned contrary to its design configuration and as such is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48920|KEWAUNEE|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|KEWAUNEE|WI|KEWAUNEE||Y|05000305|1|||[1] W-2-LP|GEORGE LESTER|DONG HWA PARK|04/13/2013 00:00:00|18:21|04/13/2013 00:00:00|11:09|CDT|04/13/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SERVICE WATER SYSTEM EFFLUENT LINE NON-FUNCTIONAL  "At 1109 CDT on 4/13/13, R-20, Service Water System Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) was declared non-functional due to low SW [Service Water] sampling flow. R-20 is used for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for an Unusual Event and an Alert, and is therefore, being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48921|POINT BEACH|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|TWO RIVERS|WI|MANITOWOC||N|05000266|1|||[1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP|KARL COSSEY|DONG HWA PARK|04/14/2013 00:00:00|13:24|04/14/2013 00:00:00|06:20|CDT|04/14/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHEMICAL ADDITION FLOW PATH ISOLATED  "At 0620 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was found to be shut. This valve isolated the flow path for both trains of containment spray chemical addition and resulted in LCO 3.6.7 (Spray Additive System) not being met, which resulted in a condition reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).  "At 0651 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was restored to its required locked open position and TSAC [Technical Specification Action Conditions] 3.6.7.8 was exited."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48922|COOK|INDIANA/MICHIGAN POWER CO.|3|BRIDGMAN|MI|BERRIEN||N|05000315|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|RANDY ROSE|DONG HWA PARK|04/14/2013 00:00:00|13:47|04/14/2013 00:00:00|14:00|EDT|04/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||DAVE PASSEHL|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE  "At 1400 EDT on Sunday, April 14, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.   "Under certain accident conditions, the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary.  "TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1400 EDT on Wednesday, April 17, 2013.  "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."  * * * UPDATE FROM GREGORY KANDA TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1456 EDT ON 4/17/13 * * *  "The Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and filtration systems have been returned to service following maintenance. The TSC is fully functional.   "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "  Notified R3DO (Orth).|
Power Reactor|48923|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|JOHN WHALLEY|BILL HUFFMAN|04/15/2013 00:00:00|02:01|04/14/2013 00:00:00|22:17|EDT|04/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||||HAROLD GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||M/R|N|0|Startup|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS WHILE SHUTTING DOWN  "On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2217 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to reactor pressure lowering beyond established control bands. At the time of the manual reactor scram PNPS was conducting a planned reactor shutdown to commence refueling outage (RFO) -19. All control rods fully inserted and Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. All plant systems responded as designed. Off-site power was unaffected and was supplied by the start-up transformer (normal power supply for refuel and reactor shutdown operations).  "The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) were manually closed to terminate the reactor pressure reduction and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started in the reactor pressure control mode. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) was reset as were the reactor building and reactor water clean-up system isolation signals. Currently, the plant cooldown is continuing with the HPCI system in pressure control and reactor water level being maintained within normal bands with the condensate and feedwater system. The cause of the lowering reactor pressure has not been determined and remains under review.  "This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.  "This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A)."  The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.  The licensee will also be notifying state authorities.|
Power Reactor|48924|PILGRIM|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|PLYMOUTH|MA|PLYMOUTH||Y|05000293|1|||[1] GE-3|MICHAEL McDONNELL|DONALD NORWOOD|04/15/2013 00:00:00|06:04|04/14/2013 00:00:00|22:16|EDT|04/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)|POT UNCNTRL RAD REL|||||||HAROLD GRAY|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK FAILED INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST  "On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2216 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, the PNPS Containment Personnel Air Lock failed integrated air lock testing as required by TS 4.7.A.2.  "10CFR50 Appendix J requires that primary reactor containment meet certain leakage rate testing requirements.  These test requirements ensure that 1) Leakage through the containment or systems and components penetrating the containment do not exceed allowable leakage rates specified in Technical Specifications and 2) The integrity of the containment structure is maintained during its service life.  The test requirements include local leakage rate testing of containment air locks.  The test criteria establishes a limit of less than or equal to 10.525 SLM, actual leakage was 16.7 SLM.  "PNPS was in the process of shutting down for a scheduled Refueling Outage during the scheduled testing.  "This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.  "The USNRC Resident Inspector will be notified.  "This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c).|
Power Reactor|48925|PRAIRIE ISLAND|NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY|3|WELCH|MN|GOODHUE||N|05000282|1|2||[1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP|STEPHEN SEILHYMER|VINCE KLCO|04/15/2013 00:00:00|12:27|04/15/2013 00:00:00|10:18|CDT|04/15/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||STEVE ORTH|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF A SIREN  "At approximately 1018 CDT on April 15, 2013, the licensee was notified that the Pierce County Sheriff Dispatch reported an inadvertent activation of an emergency siren (P-43), in Pierce County, WI.  The cause of the siren activation is unknown. The siren was deactivated at 1022 CDT after sounding for approximately 28 minutes.  The siren vendor (NELCOM) has been contacted to repair the siren.  The siren remains out of service and is the only siren out of service within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).  "NRC Resident has been informed [by the licensee]."|
Power Reactor|48926|FARLEY|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|ASHFORD|AL|HOUSTON||Y|||2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|DARRIN GARD|STEVE SANDIN|04/16/2013 00:00:00|08:55|04/16/2013 00:00:00|00:37|CDT|04/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MALCOLM WIDMANN|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATION DURING LOSS-OF-OFFSITE-POWER TEST  "This is an 8-hour report of a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  "At 0037 CDT on 4/16/13, during the performance of an 'A' train loss-of-offsite-power test per procedure FNP-2-STP-80.14, Farley Unit 2 experienced a complete loss of main control board annunciation.  Emergency Power Board annunciators are unaffected.  No emergency action level criteria have been exceeded as a result of the loss of annunciation, however, annunciators normally relied upon for emergency assessment are not functional.  Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the loss of annunciation is in progress.  No estimate for restoring annunciator power is currently available.  Compensatory measures for critical parameter monitoring have been established and implemented.  Unit 2 plant conditions remain stable in mode 5.  Unit 1 is unaffected by this event.  There has been no release of radioactivity to the environment.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1444 EDT ON 4/16/13 * * *  The Unit 2 main control room annunciators were restored at 0907 EDT on 4/16/13. The cause of the failure was determined to be a relay in the annunciator power supply circuit.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias).|
Power Reactor|48927|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|THOMAS YURKON|STEVE SANDIN|04/16/2013 00:00:00|10:17|04/16/2013 00:00:00|08:45|EDT|04/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION DURING WEEKLY TESTING DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR   "The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) to notify the NRC of the inadvertent actuation of the Oswego County emergency notification sirens at approximately 0845 [EDT] on 4/16/13.  Oswego County was performing routine weekly testing and siren #17 was inadvertently actuated for approximately 2 minutes.    "The Oswego County Emergency Management Office issued a News Release identifying the inadvertent actuation of the emergency siren.    "The NRC  Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48928|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|MARK LEE|STEVE SANDIN|04/16/2013 00:00:00|11:20|04/16/2013 00:00:00|04:14|EDT|04/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE  "This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on LOSS of ASSESSMENT capability. This is a non-emergency notification. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At approximately 0414 [EDT] on April 16, 2013, preplanned maintenance will be performed that will affect the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean all Air Handler Units, Fans, and Outside Air Condensing Units that support TSC Ventilation. This maintenance is scheduled to be performed and completed within approximately 50 hours.  "TSC functionality requires all occupied areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC area temperatures have been verified to be less than 78 degrees F. If an emergency condition should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. If the facility were activated with full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degrees F limit. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, Main Control Room - Site Emergency Coordinator, and Radiological Control Manager. The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center - Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified.   "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|
Power Reactor|48929|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|||2||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|JASON SAWYER|BILL HUFFMAN|04/16/2013 00:00:00|11:32|04/16/2013 00:00:00|09:14|EDT|04/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR   "On Tuesday April 16, 2013 at approximately 0914 EDT, the Oswego County Emergency Management Office notified Nine Mile Point via the Radiological Emergency Communications System RECS line of an inadvertent activation of Siren 17. The activation occurred during a normally scheduled Oswego County bi weekly test and was due to a human performance error. Activation occurred at approximately 0845 EDT and lasted for approximately 2 minutes.  "This notification is applicable to both NMP Unit 1 and 2 as well as the James A Fitzpatrick station, a separate notification will be communicated from JAF station. The Oswego County Emergency Management Office has issued a press release and the NRC resident inspector has been notified."  The licensee will also notify the State.  See related EN #48927.|
Agreement State|48930|NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH|UNSPECIFIED|1||NY||UNSPECIFIED|Y||||||ROBERT SNYDER|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/16/2013 00:00:00|13:32|03/25/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SEED MIGRATED DEEPER INTO TISSUE AND WAS NOT REMOVED  The following information was received by facsimile:  "A patient for axillary node dissection with radioactive seed localization had an 8.33MBq 123 I [Iodine] seed placed at tumor site under ultrasound guidance by radiologist. The surgeon successfully removed the tumor and lymph node, however the seed had migrated deeper into tissue and was not removed. The surgeon determined that the new seed location prevented safe extraction due to scarring from previous node removal, mastectomy and reconstructive, surgery. NYS DOH [The New York State Department of Health] received verbal notice within 24 hours and written notice within 15 days. The patient, referring physician, medical oncologist, and radiologist have all been notified. A localized dose at 0.5 cm from the seed of 22.9Gy was calculated, negligible dose at 6 cm. As a corrective action the facility will no longer use radioactive seed localization for axillary node lesions. [Licensee] Policy updates and staff notifications are to be evaluated during the next routine inspection."  Event Report Identification Number: NY-13-01  A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials.  It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
Agreement State|48931|TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH|CUDD PUMPING SERVICES|4|CRYSTAL CITY|TX||G02133|Y||||||KAREN BLANCHARD|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/16/2013 00:00:00|16:05|04/16/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/18/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DRAKE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|ERIC BENNER|NMSS|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRUCK ACCIDENT INVOLVING A FIXED DENSITY GAUGE   The following information was provided by facsimile:  "On April 16, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified that one of the licensee's trucks had had a blowout on one of its tires which caused the vehicle to roll. The driver was killed in the accident. On the truck is a densitometer which includes a Thermo-Fisher Scientific Model 5192 fixed gauge that contains 200 millicuries of Cesium-137 (original activity). These devices are a USA DOT 7A Type A container. The licensee reported that the gauge is still [within] of the truck--there is no indication of radiation leakage or exposures to any individual. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer is enroute and will make necessary radiation surveys and conduct an investigation. Local law enforcement responded to the accident. More information will be provided as it is obtained, per SA-300."  Texas State Report # I-9067  * * * RETRACTION FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/13 AT 1708 EDT * * *  The following retraction was received via email:  "This event does not meet the reporting criteria referenced in SA-300, specifically 49 CFR171.15 (b)(1) and (2), in that the individual's death in this incident was not the 'direct result of hazardous materials' as stated in the 171.15(b)(1)."  Notified R4DO (Drake), NMSS (Benner), and FSME EVENTS Resources via email only.|
Power Reactor|48932|HARRIS|CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|RALEIGH|NC|WAKE & CHATHAM||Y|05000400|1|||[1] W-3-LP|MARK LEE|CHARLES TEAL|04/16/2013 00:00:00|17:15|04/16/2013 00:00:00|16:25|EDT|04/16/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)|UNANALYZED CONDITION|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||POTENTIAL CABLE SIZE AND BREAKER MISMATCH  "During investigation of a documentation discrepancy, a potential cable size and breaker mismatch was identified to exist in a non-safety related DC panel. Initial evaluation has shown that the cable may heat and be potentially damaged if exposed to a 'smart' high impedance fault for an extended period. This discovered condition has not been previously analyzed for NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 805 common enclosure circuit coordination.  "Fire watches were established as a compensatory measure immediately following identification of the issue on April 8, 2013. An initial review of fire protection analysis was completed on April 16, 2013.  Fire watches remain in place until a modification which will restore coordination is complete.  "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."|
Agreement State|48933|OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT|HI-TECH TESTING SERVICE|4|SEILING|OK||OK-32150-01|Y||||||MIKE BRODERICK|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/16/2013 00:00:00|17:45|04/15/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/19/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DRAKE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|BRIAN MCDERMOTT|FSME|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA  The State of Oklahoma received a report from the licensee, that a new SPEC-150 Radiographer camera was giving an unexpected high radiation reading of 20 mrem. The State responded to the licensee's location to investigate. Contamination was detected on the exterior of the camera, guide tube, and cable. Contamination was also detected on the truck used to transport the camera. The camera had been used at a natural gas plant in Wheeling, Texas. There was no apparent damage to the camera and efforts to decontaminate the camera were unsuccessful. The licensee has placed the camera in a container and stored it in a secure location. It is believed the camera may have a manufacturer defect. The manufacturer has been notified. The truck has been decontaminated.  The State of Texas has been notified and they will determine if any contamination is present at the natural gas plant in Wheeling, Texas. The radiographer and his assistant were checked for contamination and none was found and no internal exposure is expected. The radiographer's dosimeter indicated 10 mrem and the assistant's dosimeter indicated 0 mrem. Both radiographer's film badges have been sent out for processing.  The States of Oklahoma and Texas will continue their investigations and provide additional information when it is available.  * * * UPDATE AT 1557 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM KEVIN SAMPSON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER VIA EMAIL * * *  The following update was received from the State of Oklahoma by email:  "On Monday afternoon, April 15, 2013, radiographers of Hi-Tech Testing Service, (Oklahoma license OK-32150-01 located in Seiling, OK) were working at a natural gas plant near Wheeler, Texas. After doing their survey following retracting the source, they noted high levels of radiation coming from the right rear truck bed. The camera was not nearby, and there was no obvious source for the radiation. They contacted their RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and after ensuring that the source was properly retracted and in the camera, and all known sources of radiation were accounted for, they still had the anomalous high reading. The RSO instructed them to return to the office. After some work, the RSO was able to remove the contamination with duct tape. He reported that using an ND-2000 radiation meter in near contact, the duct tape registered approximately 1 R/hour [Rem] (1000 mrem/hour). He reported that the bed was now showing no radiation, and that the radiography camera and associated equipment were showing no radiation. He secured the contaminated tape in his vault, and advised Oklahoma DEQ [Department of Environmental Quality] of this on Monday evening. On Tuesday [4/16/13] morning, DEQ inspectors arrived at the facility to investigate. As a courtesy, we [Oklahoma DEQ] had advised Texas DSHS [Department of State Health Services] radiation control of the report, and possible contamination concerns at the work site in Texas.  "[Oklahoma] DEQ inspectors checked the area and equipment, including the radiography camera and associated equipment, the radiography truck used during the event, and the shop area where the camera and equipment had been worked on by the RSO.  Contamination was found on the bed of the truck in a location where radiographers reportedly assemble and disassemble the camera and associated equipment. Removable contamination was found on the collimator that had been used during the exposures. Radiation was measured from the guide tube and from the crank cable. The radiation in the crank cable extended for several feet from the end of the cable that attaches to the radiography camera, consistent with contamination of the cable from contact with the (presumably contaminated) interior of the guide tube. Other than the bed of the truck, no contamination of the truck was found in this survey. The exterior of the camera was wiped, but no removable contamination was found. Analysis with a portable gamma spec showed that all contamination was Ir-192.  Measured radiation levels in near contact on the equipment and truck varied, but were in the hundreds of microR/hour, with the highest being about 800 microR/hour on the collimator. It is important to note that none of this contamination was detectable with the radiography company's instrument, an ND-2000.  "Separately, we [Oklahoma DEQ] verified the licensee RSO's measurements of the contaminated duct tape that he had used to remove the bulk of the contamination from the truck bed. The tape was under lead shielding in an ammo box that had been used as a transport container, and we did not remove the tape from the container, but got readings in the hundreds of milliR/hour, consistent with the one R in contact figure reported by the company RSO.  "The radiographers involved live a long distance from the licensee office and were not available to be surveyed or interviewed in person while we were on site. The licensee reports this was the first time that the camera, guide tube, and crank cable had been used (see dates below). We are told that this equipment had been used only together, and had not been used with other equipment, and that it had only been used at the Wheeler, TX. job site.  "[Oklahoma] DEQ staff worked with the company RSO to remove the remaining contamination from the bed of the pickup truck. Contamination appeared to be in discrete spots on the bed, and removal appeared to be an all or nothing matter Attempts to remove the contamination with duct tape would fail repeatedly, then after another attempt it appeared that all contamination associated with that spot had been removed. Some of the people participating claimed to be able to see a small dark spot on the tape after the successful removal, consistent with a small chip of Ir-192 remaining on the tape. When we concluded our work, all levels we could find on the truck bed were 10 microR/hour or less in near contact.   "The contaminated guide tube, crank cable, collimator, and all wastes associated with the decontamination efforts were placed in plastic bags where possible, placed in a large trash can, and secured in the licensee's vault for removal. The work bay where all surveys had taken place was surveyed and found to be uncontaminated.  "[Oklahoma] DEQ staff and the licensee RSO called SPEC, manufacturer and distributor of the equipment, and advised them of the situation. DEQ requested that SPEC arrange for packaging and shipment of all contaminated material back to SPEC.  SPEC representatives were at the licensee facility on Wednesday, April 17, 2013 and  packaged all contaminated material and equipment for shipment to SPEC. To our knowledge, the actual shipment has not occurred yet. We were advised verbally that the SPEC staff found very low (no further information is available at this time) contamination on the truck, and that they surveyed the two radiographers and the clothes they had worn during the incident, and found low (no further information available at this time) contamination on one radiographer's shirt sleeve. The radiographer estimates he wore the shirt for about 13 hours on the day of the incident, and had not worn it since. SPEC has taken custody of the contaminated shirt. We were told that SPEC personnel surveyed the homes and privately-owned vehicles of the radiographers last night and found no contamination. We are expecting a written report from SPEC.  "The tentative opinion of the [Oklahoma] DEQ inspectors and the licensee RSO is that our findings are consistent with the presence of a limited number of particles of Ir-192 that had been present on the outside of the source.  How the contamination came to be there is unclear. However present, it seems likely that the contamination was deposited inside the guide tube during the initial exposures, and some contamination fell out of the guide tube during assembly and disassembly of the camera. The 'all-or-nothing' removal of contamination from each area suggests that the contamination was in the form of relatively sizable chips, not in the form of a very fine particulate.  "[Oklahoma] DEQ will continue to investigate. We have cooperated with Texas [DSHS] staff as described above, and have informed the state of Louisiana. We were told that Texas staff visited the job site in Texas, and were guided to a single location of use by facility staff, where Texas staff found no contamination. In interviews with the radiographers, Oklahoma DEQ staff were told by the radiographers that radiography had been conducted at several sites in the plant over several days. We informed Texas of this discrepancy and the possibility of additional sites that might need to be checked for contamination. We understand that Texas staff are meeting  at the job site this afternoon with the licensee RSO, one of the radiographers, and SPEC staff to check for contamination at all sites where radiography was performed.  "This is an interim report based on initial investigations and phone conversations with many of the actors, and has not undergone substantial review.  More information will be provided later of further actions, or of any corrections or clarifications needed.  "Camera was used for shooting at the job site from April 8-12, 2013 and on April 15, 2013.  "Areas of interest that appear to [Oklahoma] DEQ at this time include:  "1) The licensee RSO was not able to detect contamination remaining on the truck bed, and had never identified any contamination on the associated equipment. [Oklahoma] DEQ found contamination at levels of definite concern present on both of these. The RSO was using an NDS-2000, a very common industrial radiography survey meter that is optimized for measuring high levels of radiation. Based on this experience, this model (and possibly similar instruments optimized for radiographer use) may not be sensitive enough to reliably detect contamination of this sort.  [Oklahoma] DEQ was readily able to detect the contamination with a MicroR meter, portable gamma spec, and with a pancake probe.  "2) How the source came to be contaminated with Iridium is of interest, especially how the source was shipped with external contamination present, if that was indeed the case."  * * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN SAMPSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1208 EDT * * *  The following update was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:  "On Thursday afternoon, Texas radiation control and SPEC personnel met with the licensee RSO and one of the radiographers involved in the incident at the Wheeler, TX job site. We are told they did surveys of all locations where radiography had been performed, and no contamination was detected."  Notified R4DO (Drake) and FSME Event Resource via email.|
Power Reactor|48934|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N||||3|[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|MICHAEL CICCONE|BILL HUFFMAN|04/16/2013 00:00:00|23:50|04/16/2013 00:00:00|21:30|EDT|04/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED OPERATOR HAD A CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL  A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test.  The employee's plant access has been revoked.  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Connecticut.|
Power Reactor|48935|FARLEY|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|ASHFORD|AL|HOUSTON||Y|||2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|JOSH CARROLL|BILL HUFFMAN|04/17/2013 00:00:00|01:16|04/16/2013 00:00:00|22:47|CDT|04/18/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xii)|OFFSITE MEDICAL|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED TO OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY  "Contract worker suffered a non-occupational medical emergency while working inside the Unit 2 Containment Building (105' elevation). The worker was working in a contaminated area when the event occurred. He was transported to Southeast Alabama Medical Center via ambulance. The worker is potentially contaminated. Health Physics provided escort in the ambulance.  "Farley Nuclear Plant [was] notified by Health Physics on 4/17/13 at 0028 [CDT] that [the] individual was surveyed and no contamination was found."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * RETRACTION FROM JOSH CARROLL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 4/18/13 AT 2243 EDT * * *  Farley Nuclear Plant is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification: Health Physics personnel have completed surveys that determined that the contract worker, ambulance, and hospital are free of contamination.  The initial report was made based on the individual being potentially contaminated due to radioactive surveying being deferred to allow prompt medical attention. Based on the subsequent determination that the individual was not contaminated the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) are not met and this event report is being retracted.  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R2DO (Vias).|
Power Reactor|48936|LIMERICK|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|1|PHILADELPHIA|PA|MONTGOMERY||N|||2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|CHRIS GIAMBRONE|BILL HUFFMAN|04/17/2013 00:00:00|02:11|04/16/2013 00:00:00|21:42|EDT|04/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING TURBINE STOP VALVE LOGIC TESTING WHILE SHUTDOWN  "During outage main turbine stop valve RPS logic surveillance testing, an invalid RPS actuation occurred due to an error in executing main turbine surveillance testing procedures. A Turbine Stop Valve closure RPS signal occurred due to an error in the restoration sequence of restoring the RPS bypass signal and a subsequent manual trip of the main turbine. This resulted in a full scram and a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps.  "The site post-scram response procedure was entered, which required that the mode switch be placed in the locked SHUTDOWN position. This caused an expected but valid RPS actuation.  "No control rod motion occurred due to all control rods were inserted at the time of the invalid RPS actuation and subsequent valid RPS actuation."  The license has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48937|PERRY|FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|3|PERRY|OH|LAKE||Y|05000440|1|||[1] GE-6|GLENDON BURNHAM|BILL HUFFMAN|04/17/2013 00:00:00|05:20|04/16/2013 00:00:00|23:23|EDT|04/20/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||STEVE ORTH|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||DEGRADED FLOW IN EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 'A'  "The Perry Nuclear Power Plant is reporting an event or condition pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).  "On April 16, 2013, at 2323 EDT, it was identified that Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump 'A' was inoperable due to an inability to maintain minimum flow requirements. As a result, ESW 'A' and the supported Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) were declared inoperable. Coincident with this discovery, a test of the Division 2 emergency systems was in progress with the associated ESW 'B' pump and Division 2 EDG inoperable. Division 2 EDG was available to support the Shutdown Defense In-Depth Strategy.  Division 3 EDG was operable and could supply High Pressure Core Spray system injection, if needed.  "Both EDGs were inoperable simultaneously and Technical Specification 3.8.2 'AC Sources-Shutdown' was entered and required actions taken. These actions included immediately suspending core alterations and immediately initiating actions to restore the required EDG. The test of Division 2 emergency systems was suspended and ESW 'B' and the Division 2 EDG were restored to operable status at 0135 EDT on April 17, 2013.  "The failure of ESW 'A' minimum flow is currently under investigation.  "The Resident Inspector has been notified."  * * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN PELCIC TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/13 AT 1355 EDT * * *  "Engineering personnel performed an immediate investigation of the ESW 'A' minimum flow condition.  The investigation results showed that the ESW 'A' pump flow exceeded the minimum flow requirement to protect the ESW 'A' system.  Therefore, continued operation of ESW 'A' was acceptable and the minimum flow condition originally reported did not cause the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator to be inoperable.  "The condition would not have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident.  Reporting is not required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and this notification is retracted.    "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  Notified R3DO (Orth).|
Research Reactor|48938|PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY|PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY|1|UNIVERSITY PARK|PA|CENTRE|R-2|N|05000005||||1000 KW TRIGA MARK III|MARK TRUMP|VINCE KLCO|04/17/2013 00:00:00|15:53|04/16/2013 00:00:00|17:01|EDT|04/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|XIAOSONG YIN|NRR|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TEST REACTOR EXCEEDED LICENSED POWER LIMIT DURING A SCRAM  The following information was excerpted from an email from the licensee:  On April 16, 2013 at 1701 EDT, the research test reactor automatically shutdown from 100% power (1 MW) due to a valid high power condition.  The duty Senior Reactor Operator removed a timed irradiation sample from the core that added positive reactivity.  Both the digital (non-safety system) and the analog safety system acted on the high power condition and initiated the shutdown.  All systems functioned as designed.  The short duration power transient reached a peak power of about 1.3 MW.  There was no increase in radiation levels, personnel radiation exposure, or release of radiation from the facility.  No emergency event entry criteria were met.  The plant was placed in a secured condition and an event review investigation was conducted.  The event is (potentially) reportable in that the Maximum Power Level observed during the short duration (< 1 second) transient exceeded the steady state power limit for non-pulse mode operation as described in Technical Specification(TS) 3.1.1 Non-pulse mode operation sub-section b. The maximum power level shall be no greater than 1.1 MW (thermal).  The reactor was returned to routine service at approximately 1300 EDT on April 17, 2013.|
Power Reactor|48939|LASALLE|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|MARSEILLES|IL|LA SALLE||Y|05000373|1|2||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|DAN SZUMSKI|DONG HWA PARK|04/17/2013 00:00:00|16:59|04/17/2013 00:00:00|15:11|CDT|04/21/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A)|ECCS INJECTION|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|STEVE ORTH|R3DO|JEFFERY GRANT|IRD|DAVID SKEEN|NRR|JENNIFER UHLE|NRR|ANNE BOLAND|R3|||||||||||A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|A/R|Y|100|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FROM A LIGHTNING STRIKE  "LaSalle Unit 1 and LaSalle Unit 2 have both experienced an automatic reactor scram, in conjunction with a loss of offsite power.  This was caused by an apparent lightning strike in the main 345kV/138kV switchyard during a thunderstorm.  138kV line 0112 has been inspected in the field, and heavy damage has been noted on the insulators on two of the three phases on a line lightning arrestor line side.    "The plant systems have all responded as expected.  All five diesel generators started, and have loaded on to their respective buses as designed.  All rods went full in on both units during the respective scrams.  HPCS [High Pressure Core Spray] system was started on each unit and automatically aligned for injection for initial level control."  The MSIVs [Main Steam Isolation Valves] are shut on both units with decay heat being removed via the safety relief valves.  Suppression pool cooling is in progress.    The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the State.    Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.  * * * UPDATE FROM DON PUCKETT TO VINCE KLCO AT 2113 EDT ON 4/17/2013 * * *   "In addition to information [previously provided], LaSalle Unit 2 received a high drywell pressure signal [1.77 psig] due to loss of containment cooling from the loss of power.  At the time of this high drywell pressure signal, high pressure core spray pump and 2B residual heat removal [RHR] pump was already in operation, the low pressure core spray system and 2A residual heat removal system was secured and [placed] in pull to lock.  When the signal was satisfied the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] signal was processed but only the 2C RHR pump would have started.  In this case, the 2C RHR pump tripped when the signal was received.  There is no evidence of reactor coolant leakage.  There was no additional ECCS systems discharging into the RCS [Reactor Coolant System].  As [initially stated], level was controlled using High Pressure Core Spray and level control is now being maintained using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] systems.  The 2C RHR pump trip is under investigation.  "Due to the initial loss of offsite power for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reported at 1511 [CDT], multiple containment isolation valves isolated and closed as expected.  Once initial containment isolations were verified, two Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge valves were opened to vent the Unit 2 containment.  Once Unit Two containment pressure reached 1.77 [psig], these two vent valves isolated as expected.   "Due to the loss of offsite power, the Station Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) and the Standby Gas Treatment Wide Range Gas Monitor (VGWRGM) also lost power.  Manual sampling has been implemented and power is restored to the VGWRGM, however the VGWRGM has not been declared operable yet.  Normal radiation levels have been reported from the manual sampling.  [This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).]"  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois.  Notified the R3 IRC, NRR EO(Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant).  * * * UPDATE AT 0057 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM MIKE LAWRENCE TO S. SANDIN * * *  "After the Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge system isolated on the Unit 2 containment High Pressure signal, Venting of the Unit 1 primary containment was commenced.  At 2005 CDT, Unit 1 primary containment pressure reached the Group 2 primary containment isolation system setpoint (1.77 PSIG) causing the primary containment vent and purge valves being used to vent the Unit 1 containment to isolate.  Unit 1 primary containment venting was being performed through the Standby Gas Treatment system which is a filtered system.   "In addition to the primary containment isolation signal on high drywell pressure, an ECCS initiation on high drywell pressure also occurred.  The ECCS signal resulted in an auto start of the 1C RHR system.  The 1B RHR system was already running in suppression pool cooling mode.  1A RHR and LPCS had been secured to prevent overloading the common diesel generator for division 1.  The common diesel generator supplies both Unit 1 and Unit 2 division 1 ESF busses."  The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified NRR EO (Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant) and R3IRC (Louden).  * * * UPDATE AT 0947 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM JUSTIN FREEMAN TO PETE SNYDER * * *   "LaSalle has terminated the unusual event which was initiated at 1511 on 4/17/13 and reported under EN 48939.  This unusual event has been terminated based on meeting the following established criteria.  This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72.(c)(1)(iii).    "1) Off-site power has been restored to all ESF busses "2) Fuel Pool Cooling has been restored on both units "3) Primary Containment Chillers have been restored on both units "4) Drywell pressure is less than ECCS initiation setpoint "5) ECCS signals cleared to allow diesels to be placed in stand by  "Recovery of remaining plant systems will be managed through the Outage Control Center (OCC)."   The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R3DO (Orth), NRR EO (Chernoff), IRD (Grant), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.  * * * UPDATE AT 1711 EDT ON 4/21/2013 FROM GREG LECHTENBERG TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "In addition to the 10 CFR 50.72 Sections initially identified, the Loss of Offsite Power was also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event is considered a safety system functional failure for both Units 1 and 2."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified the R3DO (Orth).|
Power Reactor|48940|NORTH ANNA|DOMINION GENERATION|2|RICHMOND|VA|LOUISA||N|||2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP|LEE KELLY|VINCE KLCO|04/17/2013 00:00:00|23:19|04/17/2013 00:00:00|16:00|EDT|04/17/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|||||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|N|0||0||DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO SUSPECTED VALVE BODY LEAKAGE  "On April 17, 2013 at 1600 [EDT], while performing a valve inspection/repair of the Unit 2 'A' Reactor Coolant Loop Fill Valve (2- RC-HCV-2556A), the as-found inspection results identified evidence of a suspected flaw causing leakage from the valve body to the threads of a stud housing of the valve. This valve is a 2 [inch] 316 SS [Stainless Steel] cast ASME XI (Class 1) 1500 psi valve body of a globe style design. Due to this design and the installed orientation, the RCS pressure medium fills the upper portion of the valve bonnet where the leak is located during normal plant operations.  Therefore, this leakage would be considered pressure boundary leakage.  2-RC-HCV-2556A is currently isolated from the Reactor Vessel and is at atmospheric pressure.  "This inspection was performed in response to dry discolored boric acid identified during the normal operating pressure boric acid accumulation inspection procedure during the Spring 2013 Unit 2 refueling outage shutdown.  An engineering evaluation of the suspected defect will be performed and corrective actions implemented.  "This event is reportable in accordance to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for, 'Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded'."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local County Commissioners.|
Power Reactor|48941|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|||2||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|GERALD BAKER|HOWIE CROUCH|04/18/2013 00:00:00|13:52|04/18/2013 00:00:00|11:20|EDT|04/18/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO FAILURE OF A RADIATION MONITOR BYPASS PUMP  "System(s) Affected: Site Stack Radiation Monitor, RM-8169  "Causes: Failure of radiation monitor bypass pump.  "Effect of Event on Plant: Loss of assessment capabilities from radiation monitor.  "Actions taken or planned: Repair of radiation monitor.  "Additional information: Radiation monitor inoperable at 2030 [EDT] on 4/16/13.  Further review identified the reportable condition."  The licensee informed the State of Connecticut, Waterford dispatch, and the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|48942|MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH|SABIC|4|BAY ST. LOUIS|MS||MS-689-01|Y||||||BRANDY FRAISER|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/18/2013 00:00:00|17:07|03/16/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/18/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DRAKE|R4DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MALFUNCTIONING GAUGE SHUTTER  The following report was received via email:  "The licensee RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] notified [Mississippi] DRH [Division of Radiological Health] of malfunctioning gauge shutter discovered upon leak testing on 3/16/13.  The gauge is a Kay Ray 7700 J, Source Model Kay Ray 7064 and is mounted on functioning pipe and is currently in use, however, the shutter will not close.  The [licensee] RSO, stated a technician was on-site to deliver an estimate to be received by the following week.  Until then, the licensee stated the gauge would continue to be used as usual.   "Update: On 4/5/13, [the license RSO] called to notify [Mississippi] DRH the gauge is still being used, he has received the quote for the repair, and is waiting for the appointment scheduled by the technician (3 weeks from this date).  "Update: Formal report received by SABIC on 4/17/13 which includes description of the incident, as stated above.  At this time, [the licensee RSO] is still awaiting the appointment for repair or replacement of the gauge."  Mississippi Report #: MS-13001|
Power Reactor|48943|LASALLE|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|MARSEILLES|IL|LA SALLE||Y|||2||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|MICHAEL FITZPATRICK|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/18/2013 00:00:00|21:32|04/18/2013 00:00:00|14:00|CDT|04/18/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||STEVE ORTH|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||PIN HOLES LEAKS IDENTIFIED IN HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM  "This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident', and also 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition'. At 1400 [CDT] on 4/18/13, 3 pin hole leaks were identified in the Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) minimum flow valve flow line, between the minimum flow valve and the Primary Containment Suppression Pool in the Reactor Building Raceway. The leak is approximately ¢ gallon per minute. This could have prevented the Primary Containment, a single train safety system, from performing its design function, and also results in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded. In addition, the Unit 2 HPCS System, a single train system, has been declared inoperable, and has also lost function due to the minimum flow line leak. This is reportable as an 8 hour ENS [Event Notification System] notification.  "At the time the leak was identified, Both LaSalle Unit 1 and 2 are in Hot Shutdown, following a loss of Offsite Power on 4/17/13. Unit 2 will remain shut down until repairs are made to the Unit 2 HPCS minimum flow line leak."  Unit 2 will be placed in Mode 4 and remain in Mode 4 until repairs are complete.    The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Agreement State|48944|IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH|3M HEALTH PHYSICS SERVICES|3|AMES|IA||0271185FG|Y||||||RANDAL S. DAHLIN|STEVE SANDIN|04/19/2013 00:00:00|09:05|04/17/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/19/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||STEVE ORTH|R3DO|FSME EVENTS RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT -  SHUTTER MECHANISM FAILURE ON A FIXED GAUGE  The following information was received from the State of Iowa via fax:  "On April 18, 2013, the licensee (3M Company - Ames) reported to the Iowa Department of Public Health that a shutter mechanism had failed to close on a fixed gauge at their Ames, Iowa facility. The device is a Thermo EGS Gauging, model ASC-185, serial number KA1527 containing a nominal activity (May 25, 2006) of 1250 millicuries Krypton-85. The licensee's RSO and trained maintenance staff proceeded to troubleshoot the cause of the failure to close. They identified that screws holding the shutter mechanism had become stripped and loose causing the source shutter to not operate properly. The gauge was removed and is now stored in a locked cabinet under the RSO's control. The RSO is currently pursuing the purchase of new screws so that the shutter mechanism can be repaired. Additional corrective actions include a more detailed inspection of the shutter screws during six month inspections."  The sealed source (Krypton-85) is manufactured by Isotope Products Lab, S/N NER-588.  IA Item Number: IA130003|
Power Reactor|48945|COOK|INDIANA/MICHIGAN POWER CO.|3|BRIDGMAN|MI|BERRIEN||N|05000315|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|RANDY ROSE|CHARLES TEAL|04/19/2013 00:00:00|12:30|04/18/2013 00:00:00|23:12|EDT|04/19/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||STEVE ORTH|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF AN EMERGENCY SIREN  "On 4/18/13 at 2312 EDT, Emergency Siren 955 inadvertently actuated for approximately 5 minutes. The cause of the actuation is under investigation but believed to be due to rain water intrusion. The siren stopped on its own, and was subsequently disconnected by the siren vendor to prevent further erroneous actuation. The siren remains out service and is the only siren out of service within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). There are a total of 70 sirens.  "The siren is located in a state park not currently inhabited by campers; due to the siren location and time of activation the impact on the surrounding population was minimal. The event was therefore determined to not be reportable.  "A subsequent review of the event, considering communications made between Cook Nuclear Plant and the Berrien County 911 Dispatch Center, as well as recent industry operating experience of similar events, was performed; its conclusion was to conservatively make a report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).  "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."|
Agreement State|48946|LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV|CORNERSTONE CHEMICAL COMPANY|4|WAGGAMAN|LA||GL-155|Y||||||JAMES PATE|CHARLES TEAL|04/19/2013 00:00:00|14:29|03/13/2013 00:00:00||CDT|04/19/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JAMES DRAKE|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON KAY-RAY DENSITY METER  The following was received by the State of Louisiana via fax:  "Louisiana Dept. of Environmental Quality was notified on April 2, 2013, by a written letter from Cornerstone Chemical Company. A Kay-Ray Cs-137 50 mCi (decay corrected to 31 mCi) density meter, model number 7062BP, serial number S93C1706 was removed in order to service a pipe during a turnaround activity. After the device was removed, the shutter was discovered to be stuck in the half closed position and would not completely close. An employee who carried the density meter was calculated to receive a radiation exposure of 1.8 mR total dose. BBP Sales serviced the shutter, reinstalled the density gauge, performed a leak test, and installation survey. Notification was given to all Cornerstone Chemical maintenance planning personnel and supervision in the acid unit to contact the RSO for any activities concerning radiation sources. All activities are to be conducted by licensed contractors.  "The general license registration is in the stages of being modified to a specific license."  State event report number: LA-13-0015|
Power Reactor|48947|HOPE CREEK|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|05000354|1|||[1] GE-4|JIM BUTLER|HOWIE CROUCH|04/19/2013 00:00:00|15:56|04/19/2013 00:00:00|15:18|EDT|04/19/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|BILL DEAN|R1RA|JENNIFER UHLE|NRR|JEFFERY GRANT|IRD|||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO INABILITY TO CONFIRM A FIRE IN THE PROTECTED AREA WITHIN 15 MINUTES  "Fire within the Protected Area not verified within 15 minutes.  Emergency Action Level HU 2.1 declared at 1518 EDT.  Confirmation of no fire completed at 1526 EDT."  The fire alarm occurred in the Rad Waste Building. Due to the location of the alarm, the licensee was not able to validate alarm within 15 minutes which led to the emergency declaration. Once access to the area was obtained, there was no fire observed.  The cause of the inadvertent fire alarm is under investigation.  The licensee has notified Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, the State of Delaware and the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email.  * * * UPDATE FROM MARTIN FRANKLIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1731 EDT ON 4/19/13 * * *   At 1725 EDT, the licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event. The affected fire alarm was placed out of service and a fire watch has been established.    The licensee has notified Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, the State of Delaware and the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R1DO (Cook), IRD (Grant), NRR EO (Skeen), DHS, FEMA, NICC, and NuclearSSA via email.|
Power Reactor|48948|TURKEY POINT|FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.|2|MIAMI|FL|DADE||Y|||4||[3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP|ROBERT PELL|CHARLES TEAL|04/19/2013 00:00:00|18:08|04/19/2013 00:00:00|17:20|EDT|04/23/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|VICOTR MCCREE|R2RA|JENNIFER UHLE|NRR|JEFFERY GRANT|IRD|DAVID SKEEN|NRR|||||||||||N|N|0||0||A/R|Y|29|Power Operation|0|Hot Standby|N|N|0||0||UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES  "An Unusual Event was declared on Unit 4 at 1730 EDT due to a loss of offsite power for greater than 15 minutes. Emergency buses are being powered from the Emergency Diesel Generators. All rods inserted. The plant is stabilizing on natural circulation in Mode 3. Emergency buses failed to auto-transfer to the startup transformer."  AFW initiated and is supplying water to the steam generators. There was no impact on Unit #3. The failure of the auto-transfer of the startup transformer is under investigation.  Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email. The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT PELL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1911 EDT * * *  "At 1854 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 continues to be in an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. The emergency buses were energized from the start up transformer at 1824 EDT. Two reactor coolant pumps have been started and are running. The plant is stabilizing in Mode 3. In addition, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) notifications are being made for the Reactor Protection Actuation for loss of power and the Emergency Safety Function actuations of the Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliary Feedwater."  The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias), NRR (Skeen), and IRD (Grant).  * * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT PELL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1943 EDT * * *  "All emergency buses are powered from offsite power. Unit 4 is stable in Mode 3. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1915 EDT on 4/19/13."  The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R2DO (Vias), NRR (Skeen), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email  * * * UPDATE FROM KEITH MAESTAS TO BILL HUFFMAN ON 4/23/13 AT 1959 EDT * * *  "In addition to the 10 CFR 50.72 sections initially identified, this event is also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).  "Turkey Point was performing a 3rd Harmonic Relay Power Ascension Test after an Extended Power Upgrade outage. Unit 4 was approximately 173 MW electric with the auxiliary transformer supplying the site safety related 4.16KV busses. The test required maneuvering the Unit 4 main generator voltage downward to place the generator in the lead. As the Unit 4 main generator voltage was lowered, the Load Center degraded voltage relays initiated sequencer operation, 4.16KV bus stripping, starting the EDGs, and loading the 4.16KV buses onto EDGs.    "Offsite power was available at all times."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  R2DO (Sykes) notified.|
Power Reactor|48949|SALEM|PSEG NUCLEAR LLC|1|HANCOCKS BRIDGE|NJ|SALEM||N|||2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|HARRY WIEDMAN|PETE SNYDER|04/20/2013 00:00:00|09:46|04/20/2013 00:00:00|04:22|EDT|04/20/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||WILLIAM COOK|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||ACCIDENT MITIGATION - COMMON CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM  "Salem Unit 2 was placed in a configuration that affected the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident due to an inadvertent actuation of the common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS). CREACS was actuated as a result of an invalid Control Room air intake duct radiation monitor signal initiated on April 20, 2013 at 0422 hours [EDT].   "Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 with core offload in progress. Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 100% power. Unit 2 has two shutdown LCOs in effect. The first is for the CREACS, which is shared between Unit 1 & 2, being aligned for single train operation with the Unit 1 CREACS train out of service per LCO 3.7.6. The second shutdown LCO is for single source of offsite power due to scheduled maintenance.   "With Unit 1 having an invalid radiation monitor signal, the CREACS automatically aligned to accident pressurized mode. This mode of actuation starts the CREACS fans, isolates the Control Room Envelope from the normal control room ventilation system and aligns the two sets of CREACS outside air intake dampers. With a Unit 1 radiation monitor signal the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers close and the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers open. These damper positions are locked in until manually reset. With only one train of CREACS operable, the dose analysis indicates that the requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 can only be met during the worst case design basis accident if the Unit 2 CREACS intake dampers are closed and the Unit 1 CREACS intake dampers [are] open. Therefore, until the CREACS intake dampers were reset and realigned, Salem Unit 2 would not have been able to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).  "The CREACS system actuation was reset after the failed radiation monitor (2R1B ch. II) was removed from service and the dampers were realigned to their pre-actuation alignment at 0457 hours, restoring Salem Unit 2 to within the assumptions of the dose analysis. Total duration in the condition was 35 minutes.   "The only pieces of major equipment out of service on Salem Unit 2 are the 4 Station Power Transformer and 23 Station Power Transformer which are out of service for scheduled maintenance."    The licensee will notifying Lower Alloways Creek township and the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48950|WATTS BAR|TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY|2|SPRING CITY|TN|RHEA||Y|05000390|1|||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|DAMON FEGLEY|PETE SNYDER|04/21/2013 00:00:00|02:29|04/21/2013 00:00:00|02:11|EDT|04/21/2013 00:00:00|UNUSUAL EVENT|50.72(a) (1) (i)|EMERGENCY DECLARED|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||STEVEN VIAS|R2DO|VICTOR MCCREE|R2|JENNIFER UHLE|NRR|DAVID SKEEN|NRR|JEFFERY GRANT|IRD|DARYL JOHNSON|ILTA|JIM WIGGINS|NSIR|||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SHOTS FIRED WITHIN THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA  An unidentified individual fired a shot at a site security vehicle. "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) at 0211 EDT April 21, 2013.  [The licensee notified] Rhea and Meigs County Sheriff departments for on-site support.  "A notification of the event discussed above was made to the State of Tennessee.  A notification of the event discussed above was made [to the] U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability."    The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.   Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, FBI SIOC and Nuclear SSA via email.   * * * UPDATE FROM DAMON FEGLEY TO PETE SNYDER AT 0634 EDT ON 4/21/13 * * *   "This information is being provided to the NRC for a 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification.    "TVA is planning on making a news release to local media affiliates and posting the news release on TVA's website.  This news release is in reference to the Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant recently entered for a security condition."  Notified R2DO (Vias).  * * * TERMINATION AT 1301 EDT ON 4/21/2013  FROM MICHAEL BOTTORFF TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  "[At] 1230 EDT Watts Bar Nuclear plant terminated the Notification of Unusual Event.    "TVA is planning on making an additional news release to local media affiliates and posting the news release on TVA's website.  This news release is in reference to the Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant recently terminated.  "The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."  Notified the R2 IRC, IRD (Grant), NSIR (Wiggins), NRR (Uhle), ILTAB (Johnson), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, FBI SIOC and Nuclear SSA via email.|
Agreement State|48952|KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT|FRONTIER EL DORADO REFINING LLC|4|EL DORADO|KS||22-B145-01|Y||||||DAVID WHITFILL|PETE SNYDER|04/22/2013 00:00:00|10:13|04/21/2013 00:00:00|01:04|CDT|04/22/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||SOURCE JAMS AS IT IS MOVED FROM DRYWELL TO SOURCE HOLDER  The following information was received via facsimile from the State of Kansas:  "We [Frontier El Dorado Refining] attempted to move a source from its drywell, into its source holder. The source seems to be stuck in the drywell. There were no reportable personnel exposures. Because of the position of this source, 2 feet inside a large vessel with 5 [inch] steel walls, it is shielded at least as well as inside its holder.  "The shutter in question is on an Ohmart/VEGA model SHLM-CR3 source holder S/N 19077661, containing 2 Ci of Cs-137 in a model A2102 sealed source S/N 0586CO.  "The source is located at approximately 100 feet above the ground. Operations and maintenance personnel were notified of the issue. A wipe sample was collect to check for gross leakage. None was indicated.  "We [Frontier El Dorado Refining] will contact VEGA Americas (formerly Ohmart/VEGA) to arrange for repairs."  Item Number: KS130004|
Power Reactor|48953|COMANCHE PEAK|TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP|4|GLEN ROSE|TX|SOMERVELL||Y|05000445|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|MIKE NIEMEYER|BILL HUFFMAN|04/22/2013 00:00:00|14:58|04/22/2013 00:00:00|09:00|CDT|04/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|45|Power Operation|45|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY NOT AVAILABLE  "The Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not available due to the loss of HVAC and filtering capabilities resulting from a failed Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation fan. The condition was discovered at 0900 CDT on 4/22/13. Repair parts are expected by the morning of 4/23/13 and the EOF is projected to be available by the end of the day on 4/23/13.  "Compensatory measures are in place to staff and activate the Alternate EOF in the event of a declared emergency.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."  * * * UPDATE FROM MIKE STAKES TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1426 EDT ON 4/23/13 * * *  The Emergency Operations Facility vent fan was returned to service at 1400 EDT on 4/23/13.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Whitten).|
Agreement State|48954|WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION|MISTRAS GROUP, INC|4|KENT|WA||WN-IR011-1|Y||||||JAMES KILLINGBECK|CHARLES TEAL|04/22/2013 00:00:00|19:18|04/20/2013 00:00:00||PDT|04/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||AGREEMENT STATE|||||||JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|FSME EVENT RESOURCE|EMAI|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE STUCK IN GUIDE TUBE  The following was received from the State of Washington via email:  "Mistras Group, Inc. was conducting industrial radiographic operations at Shell Puget Sound Refinery. After a routine exposure, the radiographer attempted to crank the source back into the camera, but the source became stuck. The source could not make it past a crimp in the guide tube, which was caused earlier when the camera fell on it. The radiography crew moved their restricted area boundaries to increase the size of the restricted area and to provide additional protection to anyone in the area. Fortunately, nobody other than the radiography crew were in that portion of the refinery. The radiography crew and assistant radiation safety officer were able to manually pull the source back into the shielded position in the camera. The highest exposure to any person, as read from a pocket dosimeter, was 10 millirem. Note: This is a preliminary report - we [State of Washington] will obtain additional information from the licensee and provide a more complete report in the near future."  Washington Item Number: WA130001  * * * UPDATE ON 4/29/2013 AT 1931 EDT FROM JAMES KILLINGBECK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *  The following information was received via fax:  "An industrial radiography crew retracted the source, checked to verify that the source was fully retracted and locked, and discovered that it was not. The crew made more attempts to retract the source, but were unsuccessful. They attempted to straighten out the crank assembly, then the radiographic exposure device fell about 46 inches from a pipe onto a platform, after which the drive cable would not move using the crank handle. The restricted area was expanded to the 2 mR/hr line and facility management and the licensee's radiation safety personnel were notified and traveled to the site. The guide tube was moved onto the platform and lead shot bags were placed onto the collimator to provide extra shielding. Licensee radiation safety staff found that the drive cable was hung up in the crank assembly conduit but moved freely in the source tube. So, the staff manually pulled on the drive cable and returned the source to the fully retracted and locked position in the radiographic exposure device. It was discovered that there was a crimp in the crank assembly conduit that kept the drive cable from moving. The highest pocket dosimeter reading was 18 millirem. The radiographic exposure device was sent to the manufacturer for evaluation."  Notified the R4DO (Haire) and FSME Event Resources (via e-mail).|
Power Reactor|48955|ARKANSAS NUCLEAR|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|RUSSELVILLE|AR|POPE||N|05000313|1|2||[1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE|ALBERT MARTIN|BILL HUFFMAN|04/22/2013 00:00:00|23:23|04/22/2013 00:00:00|16:23|CDT|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling Shutdown|0|Refueling|N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY NOT AVAILABLE  "On 4-22-13, at 1623 [CDT], the ANO Unit 2 control room was notified of a loss of ventilation capability to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The main control boards associated with the variable speed drives on both air handling units at the EOF have failed. Therefore, there are no means to filter air for the EOF. If the EOF is staffed, the EOF will be required to relocate to the Alternate EOF in the event of a release that causes the EOF evacuation criteria to be exceeded, as directed by approved emergency response procedures.  "The on-site Operations Support Center, on-site Technical Support Center and off-site Alternate EOF remain fully functional to perform emergency assessment activities. Efforts are underway to expedite repairs.  "This notification is required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  * * * UPDATE ON 4/24/13 AT 1003 EDT FROM STEVE COFFMAN TO DONG PARK * * *  At 1637 EDT on 4/23/13, the EOF ventilation has been restored and the EOF has full functionality.   The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R4DO (Whitten).|
Power Reactor|48956|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|||2||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|GERALD BAKER|PETE SNYDER|04/23/2013 00:00:00|09:46|04/23/2013 00:00:00|08:15|EDT|04/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||STACK RADIATION MONITOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "System Affected: Site Stack Radiation Monitor; RM-8169 "Causes: Planned Maintenance "Effect on Plant: Loss of Assessment Capabilities "Actions Taken or Planned: Pre-planned maintenance of the RAD monitor. "Additional Information: RM-8169 will be removed from service at approximately 1100 [EDT] on 4/23/13 for a period of approximately 3 hours."  The licensee notified the state and local government. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48957|NINE MILE POINT|CONSTELLATION NUCLEAR|1|SYRACUSE|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000220|1|2||[1] GE-2,[2] GE-5|JASON SAWYER|PETE SNYDER|04/23/2013 00:00:00|10:39|04/23/2013 00:00:00|03:30|EDT|04/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||STATE NOTIFICATION LINE OUTAGE  "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP1 and NMP2) was notified by NYS Warning Point that the RECS [Radiological Emergency Communication System] line and all land lines to NYS were nonfunctional beginning at approximately 0330 [EDT] on 4/23/13. Due to this condition, NMPNS did not have any communications with the NYS Warning Point available via NORMAL or BACKUP methods per Emergency Plan Procedures.   "At 0734 [EDT], the NMP1 and NMP2 control rooms were provided an alternate means of contacting the NYS Warning Point via cell phone and hence a viable means of BACKUP communications was established. Per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability (offsite notification system between licensee and off site officials - NYS) is reportable via 8-hour report.   "Subsequent to this event at approximately 0930 [EDT], functionality of the RECS line was restored."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48958|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|JOHN A WALKOWIAK|DONG HWA PARK|04/23/2013 00:00:00|11:13|04/23/2013 00:00:00|03:30|EDT|04/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||STATE NOTIFICATION LINE OUTAGE  "James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF NPP) was notified by NYS Warning Point that the RECS [Radiological Emergency Communication System] line and all land lines to NYS were non-functional beginning at approximately 0330 [EDT] on 4/23/13. Due to this condition, JAF NPP did not have any communications with the NYS Warning Point available via NORMAL or BACKUP methods per Emergency Plan Procedures.   "At 0449 [EDT] on 4/23/13, the JAF NPP control room was provided with an alternate means of contacting the NYS Warning Point via cell phone and hence a viable means of BACK-UP communications was established. Per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii), 'any event that results in a major loss of off-site communications capability (off-site notification system between licensee and off-site officials - NYS) is reportable via 8-hour report.'   "Subsequent to this event at approximately 0930 [EDT] 4/23/13, functionality of the RECS was restored and tested satisfactorily."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the State and local governments.|
Part 21|48960|ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC|ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC|1|ROCKY MOUNT|NC|||Y||||||TOM HORNER|HOWIE CROUCH|04/23/2013 00:00:00|16:32|04/19/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PART 21 REPORT - ESI REFURBISHED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CYLINDER HEADS MAY HAVE VALVE KEEPER SEALS MISSING  The following information is a summary of a report faxed to the Operations Center from Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) concerning a condition reportable under 10 CFR 21:  "Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10 CFR 21 evaluation on 02/19/13 following the failure analysis of a cylinder head returned by South Texas Project (STP). The cylinder head had been installed on an emergency diesel generator set at STP and, during routine prestart checks, oil was found leaking from the Kiene valve while barring over the engine. This cylinder head had been previously refurbished in 2004 under ESI's 10 CFR 50 Appendix B program. ESI's investigation revealed that the refurbished cylinder head was returned to the customer without keeper seals installed.  "The evaluation was concluded on 04/19/13 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10 CFR 21. Omission of the keeper seals from the cylinder head of the KSV emergency diesel generator set could allow engine lubricating oil to migrate through the cylinder head and into the combustion chamber during engine standby conditions. Presence of this oil could damage the engine to the point that it is unable to perform its safety related function."  ESI began dedicating refurbished cylinder heads in 2001 but the refurbishment scope did not include valve train components. Refurbishments that included valve train components were first shipped in 2003. Procedure steps were included in 2007 to verify valve keepers were installed.  Therefore, only cylinder heads refurbished between 2003 and 2007 are affected.  A review of purchase orders have determined that the following plants received a total of 26 cylinder heads that may not have valve keeper seals installed:  Byron Station - 3 heads South Texas Project - 21 heads Cooper Nuclear Plant - 2 heads  Affected cylinder head part numbers are 10-KSV-11-3-RR, 12-KSV-11-3-RR AND 13-KSVR-11-6-RR.  ESI will be notifying affected customers.|
Power Reactor|48961|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N||||3|[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|WALTER ORF|HOWIE CROUCH|04/23/2013 00:00:00|22:39|04/23/2013 00:00:00|20:58|EDT|04/23/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES FROM A RADIATION MONITOR USED FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION  Secondary leak collection and release radiation monitor RE19 A/B power supply was removed from service at 2058 EDT on 4/23/13 for planned maintenance activities. This radiation monitor is relied upon for emergency classifications. Expected duration of the maintenance activities is 72 hours.  The licensee notified the State of Connecticut, the town of Waterford, and the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Research Reactor|48962|RHODE ISLAND ATOMIC ENERGY COMM|STATE OF RHODE ISLAND|1|NARRANGANSETT|RI|WASHINGTON|R-95|Y|05000193||||2000 KW POOL|ANDREW KADAK|VINCE KLCO|04/24/2013 00:00:00|10:58|04/24/2013 00:00:00|10:00|EDT|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY||NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|XIAOSONG YIN|NRR|CRAIG BASSETT|NRR|ALEXANDER ADAMS|NRR|||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||UNQUALIFIED RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER AT A NON-POWER REACTOR  Based on a review of qualifications of the current RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) at the Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center, it was determined that the individual did not meet the licensee's Technical Specification 6.2.2 for education or experience requirements.  This review is a follow-up to an NRC inspection report dated March 25, 2013.  This non-compliance is reportable in accordance with licensee Technical Specifications 1.25, item 8, which delineates administrative and procedural requirements.  Immediate actions was to shut down operations until such time that inadequacies can be remedied.|
Power Reactor|48963|LIMERICK|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|1|PHILADELPHIA|PA|MONTGOMERY||N|05000352|1|2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|MARK ARNOSKY|BILL HUFFMAN|04/24/2013 00:00:00|16:50|04/24/2013 00:00:00|16:00|EDT|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL  "A non-licensed, supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been restricted."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48964|COOK|INDIANA/MICHIGAN POWER CO.|3|BRIDGMAN|MI|BERRIEN||N|05000315|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|RANDY ROSE|CHARLES TEAL|04/24/2013 00:00:00|17:15|04/24/2013 00:00:00|14:11|EDT|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)|VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||VALID ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DUE TO A LOSS OF TRAIN A RESERVE FEED TO THE SITE  "On 4/24/13 at 1411 EDT, a fault occurred on the Unit 1 101 CD Reserve Auxiliary Transformer causing the 12 CD 34kV Reserve Feed Breaker to open resulting in a loss of Train A Reserve Feed to Unit 1 and Unit 2. The cause of the fault is still under investigation.   "Unit 2 remains stable in 100% power. Unit 2 entered LCO 3.8.1, AC Source - Operating, Condition A, one required offsite circuit inoperable   Restore Unit 2 reserve feed to operable status within 72 hours.  "Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage and offline. Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started and loaded as expected.  "North Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Train lost power due to a load shed, which resulted in a 2 degree Fahrenheit rise in the Spent Fuel Pool Temperature. The North Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Pump was restarted on 1 CD EDG at 1447 EDT. South Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Train remained in-service the entire time.  "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."|
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation|48965|DIABLO CANYON|PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.|4|AVILA BEACH|CA|SAN LUIS OBISPO|SNM-2511|Y|72-26||||ISFSI|DAN STERMER|CHARLES TEAL|04/24/2013 00:00:00|18:15|04/24/2013 00:00:00|09:02|PST|04/24/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|72.75(d)(1)|SFTY EQUIP. DISABLED OR FAILS TO FUNCTION|||||||JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|ALLEN HOWE|NRR|GORDON BJORKMAN|NMSS|SCOTT MORRIS|IRD|||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOADING PROCEDURE FOR ISFSI MULTI-PURPOSE CANISTERS PLACED THEM IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION  "On April 24, 2013, at 09:02 PDT, Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) determined that the loading procedure for the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) multi-purpose canisters (MPCs) placed the MPCs in an unanalyzed condition.  The procedure (approved for use in 2009) contained steps to install vent caps on the MPC vents while the MPC contained an air/water mixture.  This placed the MPC in an isolated condition without any relief path while water was in the MPC (a condition previously not analyzed in the DCPP ISFSI FSAR).  "The MPC vents that prevent MPC over pressurization were disabled while the vent caps were installed with no alternative over pressurization protection provided, therefore the condition is a 24-hour reportable event under 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1).  "This process was used for 23 casks, beginning in 2009.  The amount of time each cask was isolated was approximately 40 - 60 minutes.  DCPP expects that no appreciable MPC pressure increase occurred, since the MPC contains an air void, and the activity is performed expeditiously.  Based on engineering judgment, a conservative evaluation of the potential pressure rise during this period shows an increase of less than 2 psig.  Since the MPC is vented prior to isolation, a 2 psig increase does not challenge the MPC design pressure of 100 psig.  Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the integrity of any of the 23 previously loaded MPCs has been challenged at the DCPP ISFSI.  "This evaluation will be confirmed and documented in a formal calculation as part of issue resolution."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48966|LASALLE|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|MARSEILLES|IL|LA SALLE||Y|05000373|1|||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|MICHAEL FITZPATRICK|DONALD NORWOOD|04/25/2013 00:00:00|12:23|04/18/2013 00:00:00|13:25|CDT|04/25/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)|ACCIDENT MITIGATION|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Hot Shutdown|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE  "On 4/18/2013, while attempting to raise Unit 1 reactor level with the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system, LPCS injection valve 1E21-F005 failed to open as required when the associated control switch was held in the 'OPEN' position.  The Unit Supervisor declared the LPCS system inoperable, and the appropriate Technical Specification time clocks were entered.  Troubleshooting determined that the problem was a faulty control switch.  "The control switch has been replaced and LPCS returned to an operable status.  "Initial review of this event determined that it was not reportable; however, subsequent review caused the event to be re-evaluated and classified as reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.  "The station is continuing to evaluate the reportability of this event."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48968|FARLEY|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|ASHFORD|AL|HOUSTON||Y|||2||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|JOSH CARROLL|BILL HUFFMAN|04/25/2013 00:00:00|20:51|04/25/2013 00:00:00|17:59|CDT|04/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||MARVIN SYKES|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Refueling|0|Refueling|N|N|0||0||VENT STACK RADIATION MONITORS DE-ENERGIZED FOR SHORT DURATION DURING PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE  "This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  "On April 25, 2013 at 1759 CDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support de-energizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors at 1845 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release.  "At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors.  "The NRC Resident inspector has been informed."  * * * UPDATE AT 0400 EDT ON 4/29/13 FROM BRANNON PAYNE TO S. SANDIN * * *  "On 28 April, 2013, power was again interrupted to the Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors to restore the connection to their normal power supply. The radiation monitors were out of service from 2315 until 2340 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were again implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and minimize potential for vent stack release.  "The reported time for the initial loss of vent stack radiation monitoring on April 25, 2013 was incorrect. The correct time was 1759 CDT.  "The NRC Resident has been notified."  Notified R2DO (Sykes).|
Power Reactor|48969|LASALLE|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|MARSEILLES|IL|LA SALLE||Y|||2||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|TODD GRANLUND|BILL HUFFMAN|04/25/2013 00:00:00|22:23|04/25/2013 00:00:00|20:19|CDT|04/25/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||M/R|Y|57|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING TRIP OF CIRC WATER PUMPS  "This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation (scram). At 2019 CDT on April 25, 2013, LaSalle Unit 2 was manually scrammed due to a loss of Condenser Circulating Water. The Unit was manually scrammed after the condenser circulating water pumps tripped due to high level in the turbine building condenser pit. The high level in the condenser pit was caused by a leak on the upper manway of the condenser water box during a maintenance activity. MSIV's were isolated due to loss of heat sink. The safety relief valves were used in pressure control mode. Current plant status: reactor level is stable and reactor pressure is stable. The condenser water box manway leak has been isolated. The plant will remain in hot shutdown pending investigation and repairs."  Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) is being used in the pressure control mode.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48970|COOK|INDIANA/MICHIGAN POWER CO.|3|BRIDGMAN|MI|BERRIEN||N|05000315|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|GREGORY KANDA|HOWIE CROUCH|04/26/2013 00:00:00|08:19|04/26/2013 00:00:00|04:42|EDT|04/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|DENNIS ALLSTON|ILTA|||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||UNATTENDED VEHICLE ADJACENT TO THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA  "On April 26, 2013 at 0442 EDT operations personnel were notified of an unattended vehicle discovered on a public road adjacent to the owner controlled area [OCA]. Investigation revealed evidence of an individual briefly entering the owner controlled area and exiting. The Berrien County Sheriffs department was contacted and participated in a search of the immediate area with DC Cook Security personnel. The search was completed at 0721 EDT and did not identify anything unusual.   "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, as a four (4) hour report.  "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."  The licensee observed the individual via security camera.  The person exited the OCA within 5 minutes.   The licensee notified the State of Michigan and the St. Joe FBI field office.|
Power Reactor|48972|BRUNSWICK|CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO.|2|SOUTHPORT|NC|BRUNSWICK||Y|05000325|1|2||[1] GE-4,[2] GE-4|MARK TURKAL|BILL HUFFMAN|04/26/2013 00:00:00|12:21|03/04/2013 00:00:00|08:04|EST|04/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.73(a)(1)|INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION|||||||MARVIN SYKES|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0|Cold Shutdown|0|Cold Shutdown|N|N|0||0||INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS  "This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Due to the shared configuration of the onsite AC Electrical Distribution System, this event is applicable to both Units 1 and 2.  "On March 4, 2013, at approximately 0804 EST, while performing a planned maintenance activity associated with the Unit 2 Start-Up Auxiliary Transformer (SAT), the SAT lock-out relay was inadvertently energized. This occurred when a Transmission Maintenance electrician closed the fault pressure device oil isolation valve without having previously opened the fault pressure cutoff switch. This action resulted in energizing the SAT lock-out relay and, per design, started all four EDGs.  "All four EDGs started and operated as expected. Because electrical power was never lost to the emergency busses and none of the EDGs loaded to their respective emergency busses, the actuations were considered to be partial.  "The EDGs were returned to their standby line-up by 1023 [EST] hours on March 4, 2013. Since no actual bus under voltage condition existed which required the EDGs to start and the start was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for initiation, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation.  "This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48973|GRAND GULF|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|4|PORT GIBSON|MS|CLAIBORNE||Y|05000416|1|||[1] GE-6|CHRIS ROBINSON|DONALD NORWOOD|04/26/2013 00:00:00|12:25|04/26/2013 00:00:00|10:00|CDT|04/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|26.719|FITNESS FOR DUTY|||||||JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED OPERATOR HAD A CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS  A licensed operator had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test.  The licensed operator's plant access has been terminated.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector|
Power Reactor|48974|CLINTON|AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY|3|CLINTON|IL|DEWITT||Y|05000461|1|||[1] GE-6|KEN LEFFEL|DONALD NORWOOD|04/26/2013 00:00:00|12:55|04/26/2013 00:00:00|08:55|CDT|04/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)|RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL|||||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||M/R|Y|97|Power Operation|0|Hot Shutdown|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO RAPIDLY DECREASING LEVEL IN THE EHC OIL RESERVOIR  "On 4/26/13 at about 0855 CDT while operating at rated electrical power, operators initiated a manual reactor scram due to rapidly decreasing level in the main Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) oil reservoir.  All systems responded as expected with no complications.  The cause of the main EHC decrease in level is under investigation.  The plant is stable in mode 3.  "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."  The licensee reports that bypass valves remain available via a separate EHC system and decay heat is being routed to the condenser.|
Part 21|48976|ITT ENGINEERED VALVES, LLC|ITT ENGINEERED VALVES, LLC|1|LANCASTER|PA|||Y||||||STEPHEN DONONHUE|BILL HUFFMAN|04/26/2013 00:00:00|17:25|04/26/2013 00:00:00|13:54|EDT|04/26/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||JUDY JOUSTRA|R1DO|MARVIN SYKES|R2DO|DAVID HILLS|R3DO|JACK WHITTEN|R4DO|PART 21 GROUP (RX)|E-MA|||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||DIAPHRAGMS MAY NOT BE QUALIFIED FOR SPECIFIC RADIATION DESIGN CONDITIONS  The following report was received from ITT Engineered Valves, LLC via facsimile:  "It is my duty as the Responsible Officer of ITT Engineered Valves, LLC (ITT) to inform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a defect with certain items of our nuclear diaphragm valve product line which may be considered Basic Components. The components are ITT's Nuclear M1 diaphragms, sizes 3 inch and 4 inch that may have been sold to certain customers for specific design conditions. The defect does not affect all 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms that have been sold. It only applies to those that were sold for a particular service condition of Code Case N31 (250?F and 220 psi with 40 year radiation exposure of 1E8 Rad).  "The nature of the defect is best described by 10 CFR Section 21.3 Defect Definition #5, as 'an error, omission or other circumstance in a design certification or standard design approval that... could create a substantial safety hazard.'  In this case, ITT inadvertently qualified the 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms for a design condition that includes the effect of radiation when in fact our recommendation was erroneously based on diaphragm testing that did not include irradiated diaphragm test results for those sizes. The potential safety hazard stems from the fact that if one of these diaphragms sees radiation in this particular service, there is no data to indicate that the diaphragm will perform its function in that service condition. Until such time that we can conduct additional irradiated diaphragm testing to additional sample diaphragms and test for this condition, we need to consider the parts that are in this service as potentially unsafe.  "ITT is in the process of identifying all facilities for which the diaphragms were sent, either as spare parts or diaphragms incorporated into valve assemblies. We are also preparing to do further verification tests of the 3 inch and 4 inch M1 diaphragms in an attempt to ascertain the true performance rating at the noted condition.  "Per 10 CFR 21 policy guidelines, this initial notification will be followed by a written notification by May 27, 2013."|
Power Reactor|48977|LASALLE|EXELON NUCLEAR CO.|3|MARSEILLES|IL|LA SALLE||Y|05000373|1|||[1] GE-5,[2] GE-5|JIM SPIELER|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/28/2013 00:00:00|00:48|04/27/2013 00:00:00|21:24|CDT|04/28/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(i)|PLANT S/D REQD BY TS|50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)|DEGRADED CONDITION|||||DAVID HILLS|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|6|Startup|0|Startup|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED PLANT SHUTDOWN  "This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), Plant Shutdown required by Technical Specifications, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)A, Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition.  "At 2245 CDT on 04/27/13, LaSalle Unit 1 commenced a Technical Specification required plant shutdown, due to identification of pressure boundary leakage.  At 2124 CDT on 04/27/13, a through-wall leak was identified in the body of 1E51-F076, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system steam supply inboard isolation bypass warmup valve. This qualifies as pressure boundary leakage, which requires entry into Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, Required Action C, to be in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, by 0924 [CDT] on 04/28/13, and Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, by 0924 [CDT] on 04/29/13. This leakage is significantly less than 10 gpm and therefore does not meet the threshold for entry into the Emergency Action Plan. At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was in startup mode following a forced outage. A unit shutdown has been initiated. A repair plan is being prepared at this time, and the unit will remain in Cold Shutdown until repairs are complete."  The leak is located inside the primary containment and was visually identified during a containment walk-down.  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48978|FARLEY|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|ASHFORD|AL|HOUSTON||Y|05000348|1|||[1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP|BILL ARENS|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/28/2013 00:00:00|14:47|02/28/2013 00:00:00|15:36|CDT|04/28/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.73(a)(1)|INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION|||||||MARVIN SYKES|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP  "This is a 60-day optional telephonic notification of an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP).  This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).  "On 28 February 2013, at 1534 CST, during restoration of the Unit 1 TDAFWP from steam admission valve maintenance, steam was inadvertently admitted to the TDAFWP turbine, resulting in the TDAFWP delivering auxiliary feed water flow to the steam generators.  "On 28 February 2013, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was removed from service for replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid to the TDAFWP steam admission valve.  The tagout utilized for this maintenance closed the TDAFWP trip-throttle valve to ensure that steam remained isolated from the TDAFWP.  During the replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid, the normally closed steam admission valve failed to the open position.  This went unnoticed by Operations personnel.  When the TDAFWP trip throttle valve was reopened during post-maintenance restoration, the failed-open steam admission valve provided a steam path to the TDAFWP.  The TDAFWP started and supplied approximately 60-70 gpm feed water flow to each steam generator for approximately one minute prior to being secured by the operators.  No main turbine load reduction was required to maintain reactor power within limits.  "This was an invalid actuation of the TDAFWP due to no automatic actuation signals being present and no operator actions being taken with the intent of starting the TDAFWP.  "During a normal TDAFWP start, the steam admission valve is opened in concert with steam supply valves aligned in series with the steam admission valve.  During this event, the steam supply valves remained closed (steam flow bypassed these valves through normally open warm-up valves).  Therefore, this event was a partial actuation of the TDAFWP.  "The TDAFW Pump is a third, independent train of AFW.  No other portions of the auxiliary Feed Water System actuated or received actuation signals during this event.  "The primary cause of this event was determined to be not complying with the tagging checklist when sequencing the tagout restoration steps.  Corrective actions are scheduled to complete on 30 May 2013."  The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Part 21|48979|SHAW AREVA MOX SERVICES, LLC|CB&I LAURENS|1|Aiken|SC|||Y||||||DOUGLAS YATES|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/29/2013 00:00:00|07:59|04/29/2013 00:00:00||EDT|04/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|21.21(d)(3)(i)|DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE|||||||MARVIN SYKES|R2DO|PART 21 MATERIALS|EMAI|ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT  "(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.  "Kelly D. Trice President and Chief Operating Officer Shaw AREVA MOX Services Savannah River Site P.O. Box 7097 Aiken, SC 29804-7097  "(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility which fails to comply or contains a defect.  - The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility is affected by the procurement of Types 304L and 316L SS pipe where some of the delivered pipe contains a defect. An extent of condition was performed based on the initial discovery of a defect in 1/2" (0.109 MW), Type 304L SS pipe. This investigation determined that eight additional heat/size combinations had similar defects including both 304L and 316L pipe as given below.    1/2" (0.109 MW), Type 304L - 5 heats (41789, 44266, 43599, 40900, 41123)   3/4" (0.113 MW), Type 304L - 1 heat (42635)   1-1/2" (0.145 MW), Type 304L - 1 heat (41586)   4" (0.237 MW), Type 304L -1 heat (41880)   3/4" (0.113 MW), Type 316L - 1 heat (44464)  "(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.  - The Type 304L and 316L SS pipe is being supplied to MOX Services as a basic component by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw).  "(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.  - Through independent testing, MOX Services has identified nine heats/sizes of 304L and 316L SS pipe supplied by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) that fail required ASTM A262 testing and cannot be used in their specified application. Test results provided by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) with the pipe indicate that it passes the Practice A test. The pipe was manufactured by Tubacex for CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw), and ASTM A262 Practice A testing was performed by Welding Testing Lab prior to supply of the pipe to MOX services. Both entities have been qualified by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) as approved suppliers.  - Testing of these heat/size combinations of material has been performed by an independent test lab contracted by MOX Services with failing results thus indicating that the pipe is susceptible to intergrannular corrosion if utilized in an environment with electrolytic potential (e.g., nitric acid, oxalic acid). The heats/sizes of SS pipe in question are intended for use where these environments exist for many processes.  - In total, 124 heat/size combinations of Type 304L SS pipe and 64 heat/size combinations of Type 316L supplied by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw) were retested to validate original testing results. Eight heats/sizes of Type 304L SS pipe fail both ASTM A262 practice A and C and the one heat/size of Type 316L SS pipe fails ASTM practice A making this pipe unusable for the MOX Project in certain applications.  "(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.  - The deviation was initially identified in a test report provided by Savannah River National Laboratory on May 14, 2012.  "(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.  - MOX Services does not possess information as to whether other facilities have been supplied a similar basic component by CB&I Laurens (formerly BF Shaw).  "(vii) The corrective action, which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.   - Corrective actions are being addressed via MOX Services' corrective action program. The major activities associated with this issue include, tagging and segregation of impacted pipe spools, retesting samples for the affected pipe, generating/dispositioning non-conformance reports for heats of pipe that fail the re-test, and investigating the test protocol at both Welding Testing Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory. The majority of the samples requiring retest have been retested. Initial nonconformance reports have been generated. Additional nonconformance reports will be generated as retesting is completed and affected heats are mapped to affected pipe spools. Test protocols at both Weld Test Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory have been observed.  "(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.  - The following two excerpts are from ASTM A262 and pertain to the advice offered by MOX services.  5.2 The intent is to test a specimen representing as nearly as possible the surface of the material as it will be used in service. Therefore, the preferred sample is a cross section including the surface to be exposed in service. Only such finishing should be performed as is required to remove foreign material and obtain a standard, uniform finish as described in 5.3. For very heavy sections, specimens should be machined to represent the appropriate surface while maintaining reasonable specimen size for convenient testing. Ordinarily, removal of more material than necessary will have little influence on the test results. However, in the special case of surface carburization (sometimes encountered, for instance, in tubing or castings when lubricants or binders containing carbonaceous materials are employed) it may be possible by heavy grinding or machining to completely remove the carburized surface. Such treatment of test specimens is not permissible, except in tests undertaken to demonstrate such effects.  6.2 The etched cross-sectional areas should be thoroughly examined by complete traverse from inside to outside diameters of rods and tubes, from face to face on plates, and across all zones such as weld metal, weld-affected zones, and base plates on specimens containing welds.  - Based on these excerpts, MOX Services offers the following advice.  - Sample preparation is an area that should be carefully controlled in regards to detection of piping with 10 sensitization. Heavy cleaning or deburring in sections of the sample to be tested is proven to impact test results. Follow up surveillance at both Welding Testing Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory determined that standard protocol is for samples to be taken from newly cut sections without sanding or deburring.    - Procurement specifications should clearly indicate that micrographs should be done perpendicular to the forming direction, and should be representative of the worst case area of the cross section including the pipe 10 when appropriate. In a number of cases represented herein, only the inner portions of the pipe walls were sensitized to the point of ditching in which case a complete traverse of the cross-sectional area is needed to detect the condition. In a follow up survey of both Welding Testing Lab and the MOX Services independent laboratory, ASTM A262 practices were reviewed and it was determined in both cases that testing practices and procedures are in compliance with the ASTM standard including a full traverse of the cross-section.   "(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.  "This is not an early site permit concern."|
Power Reactor|48980|COOK|INDIANA/MICHIGAN POWER CO.|3|BRIDGMAN|MI|BERRIEN||N|05000315|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|RANDY ROSE|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/29/2013 00:00:00|08:41|04/29/2013 00:00:00|09:00|EDT|04/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||ERIC DUNCAN|R3DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE  "At 0900 EDT on Monday, April 29, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.  "Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room, if necessary.  "TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1200 EDT on Thursday, May 2, 2013.   "The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."|
Power Reactor|48981|FITZPATRICK|ENTERGY NUCLEAR|1|LYCOMING|NY|OSWEGO||Y|05000333|1|||[1] GE-4|THOMAS YURKON|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/29/2013 00:00:00|17:50|04/29/2013 00:00:00|14:17|EDT|04/29/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(2)(xi)|OFFSITE NOTIFICATION|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A FREON LEAK  "Offsite notification to the New York DEC [Department of Environmental Conservation] to report a Freon (R-22) release to the air of 8 lbs. 11 ozs.  This release came from the cafeteria kitchen walk-in cooler."  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
Power Reactor|48982|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N||||3|[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|MICHEL CICCONE|JOHN SHOEMAKER|04/30/2013 00:00:00|05:06|04/30/2013 00:00:00|01:20|EDT|04/30/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||N|N|0|Defueled|0|Defueled|PLANNED MAINTENANCE OF RADIATION MONITORS USED FOR EAL CLASSIFICATION  "Systems affected: Main steam line radiation monitors, MSS-RE75, RE77, and Terry Turbine radiation monitor MSS-RE79.  "Actuations & their initiation signals: None.  "Causes: Preplanned electrical maintenance of radiation monitors power supplies.  "Effect of event on plant: Loss of assessment capabilities from radiation monitors used for EAL [Emergency Action Level] classification.  "Actions taken or planned: Maintenance of electrical power supplies to radiation monitors.  "Additional information: Radiation monitors will be removed from service for approximately 48 hours."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable state and local authorities.|
Power Reactor|48984|MILLSTONE|DOMINION GENERATION|1|WATERFORD|CT|NEW LONDON||N|05000245|1|||[1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP|MARK STRELLO|STEVE SANDIN|04/30/2013 00:00:00|10:45|04/30/2013 00:00:00|08:40|EDT|04/30/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||GORDON HUNEGS|R1DO|||||||||||||||||||N|N|0|Decommissioned|0|Decommissioned|N|N|0||0||N|N|0||0||PLANNED MAINTENANCE OF RADIATION MONITORS USED FOR EAL CLASSIFICATION  "Systems affected: Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Island Vent Rad Monitor  "Actuations & their initiation signals: None.  "Causes: Preplanned Chemistry maintenance  "Effect of event on plant: Loss of assessment capabilities from radiation monitors used for EAL [Emergency Action Level] classification.  "Actions taken or planned: Chemistry to perform scheduled maintenance  "Additional information: Radiation monitor will be out of service for approximately 30 minutes."  The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable state and local authorities.|
Power Reactor|48985|VOGTLE|SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY|2|WAYNESBORO|GA|BURKE||Y|05000424|1|2||[1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP|NAVEEN KOTEEL|MARK ABRAMOVITZ|04/30/2013 00:00:00|13:15|04/30/2013 00:00:00|09:45|EDT|04/30/2013 00:00:00|NON EMERGENCY|50.72(b)(3)(xiii)|LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|||||||KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE|R2DO|||||||||||||||||||N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|Y|100|Power Operation|100|Power Operation|N|N|0||0||PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER SUPPORT SYSTEMS  "A condition is being reported per TRM [Technical Requirements Manual] 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2.  The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities performed on TSC support systems.  Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority.  A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity.    At 102 EDT on 4/30/13, the "TSC has been restored to a functional status.  The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."|