| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/23/2016 - 05/24/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51926 | Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: NORTHEAST CMT
Region: 1
City: RIVERSIDE State: NJ
County:
License #: PI #507412
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHERINE BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 05/13/2016
Notification Time: 10:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE DAMAGED
The following information was obtained from the State of New Jersey via fax:
"[The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was informed that in Galloway Township, New Jersey], a Troxler [gauge] Model 3440, S/N 17337, was run over by the company pickup truck. This gauge contained 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241/Be. The gauge was not in its transport container, so the outer housing of the gauge was badly cracked and fell off."
The licensee reported no release of licensed material or contamination and no overexposure.
State Event Report ID No.: NJ #16-05-12-1410-12 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51930 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: QUALITY INSPECTION & TESTING INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County: ORANGE
License #: L06371
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 05/15/2016
Notification Time: 09:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On May 14, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was informed by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a radiography crew had experienced a source disconnect at a temporary field site on May 13, 2016. The RSO stated the crew was working on a pipeline and after 3-4 welds were completed the source could not be retracted into the Spec 150 camera containing a 90.4 Curie iridium-192 source. The RSO, who was authorized to perform source retrieval, responded. He determined that the source cable had parted right next to the ball connector and that the source would not slide out of the source tube since the frayed cable was catching on the inside of the tube. He cut the source tube in order to recover the source. The RSO received 1300 mRem on his pocket dosimeter and is sending in his film badge for emergency processing. No member of the general public received an exposure due to this event. The licensee is conducting an investigation into the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9403 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51933 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: SEADRIFT State: TX
County: CALHOUN
License #: 00051
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 05/16/2016
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/16/2016
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FAILED TO OPERATE
The following information was received via E-mail
"On May 16, 2016 the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Service] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer that the facility was unable to isolate a gauge for maintenance when the shutter failed to operate. The gauge is an Ohmart Vega model SHF2 containing a 200 millicurie cesium - 137 source, serial number 7548GK. The shutter was left in the normal operating, unshielded position. The source does not pose any additional risk of exposure to the workers or members of the general public. The RSO stated they have called TechStar to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I 9404 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51949 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRAD SHORT
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 05/23/2016
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 11:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FFD GRP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR
"A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51950 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN SELLERS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 05/23/2016
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2016
Event Time: 10:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text PLANT HATCH UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE ACTUATION
"On May 23, 2016, at 1009 EDT, while personnel were performing turbine testing with Unit 2 offline for planned maintenance, an event resulted in the actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. In response to this unexpected signal, 2B21F016 (Steam Line Drain Line Inboard Isolation Valve), 2B21F019 (Steam Line Drain Line Outboard Isolation Valve), and 2B31F019 (Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve) went closed, all of which are primary containment isolation valves actuated by Group 1 Isolation. The Group 1 Isolation signal initiated based on low condenser vacuum during the turbine testing procedure, a valid condition that was expected to have been bypassed in the logic during the performance of this procedure. Human performance is believed to be the cause of these systems having actuated in a way that was not part of the planned evolution. Although the Unit was shut down when this signal was received, and primary containment isolation was not required to mitigate the consequences of an event, this Isolation signal has been determined to have been valid due to the initiation in response to actual plant conditions or parameters which satisfy the requirements for initiation of the system.
"The event is reportable as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(2):
(A) Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
(2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam Isolation valves (MSIVs).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51952 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN HARKINS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 05/24/2016
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2016
Event Time: 01:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF INBOARD ISOLATION LOGIC
"On Monday, March 28, 2016, Unit 1 was in OPCON 5 (Refueling) conducting a refueling outage. A modification was being installed for an NSSSS [Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System] Test Box on Division 1A Group 1 NSSSS logic. At 0150 hours, a logic jumper was removed as directed by the work order and a logic fuse failed. The fuse failure caused an unplanned invalid actuation of the inboard isolation logic. The isolations were reset and the valves were restored to initial conditions at 0246 hours. On Sunday, April 3, 2016, at 0134 hours, one additional logic fuse opening event occurred during the testing which also caused an invalid actuation which was reset at 0405 hours. The fuse openings occurred during jumper manipulations as the modification was tested on the Division 1A and 1D logic during the refuel outage. The investigation determined the fuse openings were due to the testing process. The suspected devices that caused the condition are not permanent plant equipment and there is no degradation of the actual circuit. They were part of a temporary configuration that was installed to support modification installation and acceptance testing. The temporary devices have been removed.
"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.
"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuations of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on reactor water cleanup (RWCU), drywell chilled water (DWCW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), drywell sumps and the suppression pool cleanup systems."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |