| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/22/2014 - 01/23/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 49721 | Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: NOVA ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL, LLC
Region: 1
City: KENNESAW State: GA
County:
License #: GA 1323-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID CROWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/14/2014
Notification Time: 15:59 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Georgia via email:
"On January 13, 2014, NOVA Engineering and Environmental, LLC had a Troxler 3440 gauge stolen out of the bed of the truck. There have been a couple thefts at this site leading up to this incident (2075 Princeton Ave., College Park, Georgia). The truck was parked at an active construction site (new elementary school) and the vehicles are required to park some distance away from the construction. During [the] NOVA gauge operator time at the site he stated he saw the gauge in the bed of the truck and sometime later he left this site to go to another. Upon arrival, he realized the chain had been cut and the gauge box was gone.
"[The] NOVA RSO confirmed that the gauge box was only secured with one chain and that there was a lock on the box. A police report has been filed and will be available to be viewed in three to five days. At this moment, all gauges are locked in storage at the company's office. Gauges are only allowed to be removed if there is an assignment. Prior to this, the gauge stayed in the bed of the truck and went to all job sites even if there wasn't an assignment for it.
"A leak test was done on November 27, 2013 and the result report was created on December 13th 2013 by Atlantic Supply with no areas of concern.
Gauge Information:
Model Number: Troxler 3440
Serial Number: 22661
Isotope: Am-241 and Cs-137
Source serial numbers: 47-18503 (Cs-137) and 75-4417 (Am-241)
Activity: 8mCi Cs-137 and 40mCi Am-241"
GA Complaint ID: 72861
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49754 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KENT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/22/2014
Notification Time: 00:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 21:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text DUAL UNIT TRIP ON THE LOSS OF THE "21" 13KV BUS
"Dual Unit Trip due to loss of '21' 13 KV bus . All safety functions are met for both units. Unit 1 remained with normal heat removal. Unit 2 lost power to its normal heat sink and is stable on Auxiliary Feed water and Atmospheric Dump Valves for temperature control. Both trips were automatic trips. Due to loss of power a Under Voltage actuation occurred on both units ('14' and '24' 4Kv bus). Due to loss of main feed on Unit 2 a Auxiliary Feed water Actuation System [AFW] actuation occurred on Unit 2. Cause is under investigation."
All control rods fully inserted on the loss of power to the Control Rod Drive Mechanisms [CRDMs]. Both Units Reactor Coolant Pumps [RCPs] remained running during the transient. The normal Unit 2 heat sink was unavailable due to the loss of the operating circulating water pumps resulting in a loss of condenser vacuum. The Unit 2 AFW actuation included one of two steam-driven pumps and the motor-driven pump. Both Units Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded and have since been secured. Both Units are stable and will remain in mode 3 (Hot Standby) pending the results of the investigation.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49758 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JOE LIZEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/22/2014
Notification Time: 23:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2014
Event Time: 19:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
"A spurious closure of a Secondary Containment isolation damper caused a trip of the Fuel Building ventilation system and a loss of Secondary Containment differential pressure. Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded -0.25 inches of water vacuum rendering Secondary Containment inoperable between the time of 1956 and 2003 [CST]. The damper re-opened, fuel building ventilation was restarted and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored to normal. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)c.
"The Licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector".
Investigation for the spurious closure of a Secondary Containment isolation damper is in progress. | |