Event Notification Report for October 31, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/30/2012 - 10/31/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
484634846448466484614846748484
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48463
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL STAKES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL STAKES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 06:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2012
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 06:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
SEQUENCER FAULT RESULTING IN SYSTEM ACTUATIONS
"On October 31, 2012 at 0615 hours CDT, Unit 1 Train 'B' Safety Injection/Blackout Sequencer faulted resulting in a start of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (TDAFW) Pump and Train 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Reactor power was reduced to 97% rated thermal power (RTP) by an immediate load reduction of 50 MWe due to the resulting cooler Auxiliary Feed Water being injected into the Steam Generators; reactor power did not exceed 100% RTP. Train 'A' equipment was not affected by the event.
"The TDAFW Pump was secured at 0628 hours by closing the Train 'B' steam supply valve from the main control board and the steam supply valve was declared operable at 0916 hours when the hand switch was returned to 'Auto' and the control switch lineup surveillance was completed. The Train 'B' EDG was loaded to 100% capacity in accordance with the operating procedure and secured at 1032 hours. The EDG is available but remains inoperable until the Sequencer is declared operable.
"Efforts continue to restore the Sequencer at this time. A faulted 15 Volt power supply was identified and further investigation/calibration will determine if other conditions contributed to the fault. A final surveillance test will determine Sequencer operability. The most limiting Shutdown Technical Specification action statement is 24 hours in accordance with Safety Injection Sequencer TS 3.8.1 F. Current projections for Sequencer operability, and thus Train 'B' EDG operability, are 1800 hours.
"This action appears to be an invalid actuation. However, this will be confirmed after a cause analysis and an update to this event will be provided at that time."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT CLARK TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/20/12 AT 1130 EST * * *
"This is an update to Event Notification #48463. This event was initially reported on October 31, 2012 as a valid actuation per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). However, further evaluation of this event has confirmed that the cause was isolated to a failed 15VDC power supply and the ESF bus voltage sensed by the Blackout Sequencer did not dip. Therefore, a valid blackout condition did not occur and the starts of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP) and the Unit 1 Train B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) were both determined to be invalid.
"For the EDG start, the associated electrical bus was never de-energized and the EDG output breaker did not close. Therefore, the EDG start is not reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it was an invalid actuation and the safety function (i.e. provide power to the safety related electrical bus) had already been completed at the time of the EDG actuation.
"For the TDAFWP start, the AFW system safety function had not already been completed. Therefore, the TDAFWP start is reportable as an invalid actuation per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) with the option to provide a telephone notification within 60 days instead of an LER per 10CFR50.73(a)(1). The following required information is being submitted per NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 for the TDAFWP start:
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated - Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial - The train actuation was complete.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully - The system started and functioned successfully.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
"On October 31, 2012 at 0615 hours CDT, Unit 1 Train 'B' Safety Injection/Blackout Sequencer faulted resulting in a start of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (TDAFW) Pump and Train 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Reactor power was reduced to 97% rated thermal power (RTP) by an immediate load reduction of 50 MWe due to the resulting cooler Auxiliary Feed Water being injected into the Steam Generators; reactor power did not exceed 100% RTP. Train 'A' equipment was not affected by the event.
"The TDAFW Pump was secured at 0628 hours by closing the Train 'B' steam supply valve from the main control board and the steam supply valve was declared operable at 0916 hours when the hand switch was returned to 'Auto' and the control switch lineup surveillance was completed. The Train 'B' EDG was loaded to 100% capacity in accordance with the operating procedure and secured at 1032 hours. The EDG is available but remains inoperable until the Sequencer is declared operable.
"Efforts continue to restore the Sequencer at this time. A faulted 15 Volt power supply was identified and further investigation/calibration will determine if other conditions contributed to the fault. A final surveillance test will determine Sequencer operability. The most limiting Shutdown Technical Specification action statement is 24 hours in accordance with Safety Injection Sequencer TS 3.8.1 F. Current projections for Sequencer operability, and thus Train 'B' EDG operability, are 1800 hours.
"This action appears to be an invalid actuation. However, this will be confirmed after a cause analysis and an update to this event will be provided at that time."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT CLARK TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/20/12 AT 1130 EST * * *
"This is an update to Event Notification #48463. This event was initially reported on October 31, 2012 as a valid actuation per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). However, further evaluation of this event has confirmed that the cause was isolated to a failed 15VDC power supply and the ESF bus voltage sensed by the Blackout Sequencer did not dip. Therefore, a valid blackout condition did not occur and the starts of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP) and the Unit 1 Train B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) were both determined to be invalid.
"For the EDG start, the associated electrical bus was never de-energized and the EDG output breaker did not close. Therefore, the EDG start is not reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it was an invalid actuation and the safety function (i.e. provide power to the safety related electrical bus) had already been completed at the time of the EDG actuation.
"For the TDAFWP start, the AFW system safety function had not already been completed. Therefore, the TDAFWP start is reportable as an invalid actuation per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) with the option to provide a telephone notification within 60 days instead of an LER per 10CFR50.73(a)(1). The following required information is being submitted per NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 for the TDAFWP start:
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated - Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial - The train actuation was complete.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully - The system started and functioned successfully.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48464
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LOOSBROCK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LOOSBROCK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 15:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 14:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 15:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 14:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (DRA)
HO NIEH (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
CYNTHIA PEDERSON (DRA)
HO NIEH (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO SECURITY CONDITION
The licensee declared an Unusual Event based upon a security condition at the site. Compensatory measures are being put in place. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM TERRY BACON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1924 EDT * * *
The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1754 CDT.
Notified NRR EO (Nieh), IRD (Morris), and R3DO (Kozak), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.
The licensee declared an Unusual Event based upon a security condition at the site. Compensatory measures are being put in place. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM TERRY BACON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1924 EDT * * *
The licensee terminated the NOUE at 1754 CDT.
Notified NRR EO (Nieh), IRD (Morris), and R3DO (Kozak), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48466
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID NOYES
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 20:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 14:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 20:12 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 14:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On Wednesday, October 31, 2012 at 1200 hours, with the reactor at approximately 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Train 'B' was removed from service (made inoperable) for surveillance testing.
"At 1441 hours, the control room staff declared the Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'A' inoperable as a result of an engineering analysis that determined that 480 VAC feed, Motor Control Center (MCC) B15, had the potential to exceed its trip set point under worst case bus loading.
"The inoperability of both SBGT System Trains 'A' and 'B' could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions to 'control the release of radioactive material' and 'mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"At 1510 hours, a compensatory measure was taken to preclude the overload condition on MCC B15 and the SBGT System Train 'A' was restored to operable status.
"At the time of submittal of this notification, the SBGT System Train 'B' remains inoperable for replacement of an overload relay. SBGT System Train 'B' is expected to be returned to service this evening.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the Public.
"The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On Wednesday, October 31, 2012 at 1200 hours, with the reactor at approximately 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Train 'B' was removed from service (made inoperable) for surveillance testing.
"At 1441 hours, the control room staff declared the Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'A' inoperable as a result of an engineering analysis that determined that 480 VAC feed, Motor Control Center (MCC) B15, had the potential to exceed its trip set point under worst case bus loading.
"The inoperability of both SBGT System Trains 'A' and 'B' could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions to 'control the release of radioactive material' and 'mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"At 1510 hours, a compensatory measure was taken to preclude the overload condition on MCC B15 and the SBGT System Train 'A' was restored to operable status.
"At the time of submittal of this notification, the SBGT System Train 'B' remains inoperable for replacement of an overload relay. SBGT System Train 'B' is expected to be returned to service this evening.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the Public.
"The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48461
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STUHAAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STUHAAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 09:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 07:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 09:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 07:42 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUTAGE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements ManuaI13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) Evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC TEW TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1452 EDT * * *
TSC maintenance is complete. The TSC has been returned to operable status at 1445 EDT on 10/31/12.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper).
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements ManuaI13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action B.2. The Functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on TSC Support Systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) Evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC TEW TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/31/12 AT 1452 EDT * * *
TSC maintenance is complete. The TSC has been returned to operable status at 1445 EDT on 10/31/12.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48467
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 12:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 12:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIALLY UNABLE TO PROVIDE POWER TO SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING APPENDIX R FIRE
"During BFNP [Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant] NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 805 transition review, it was determined in the event of an Appendix R fire, the ability to provide power to equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown may be adversely impacted. In certain fire zones/areas, feeder breakers for the 480V Shutdown Boards are credited for backup control operation using the 43 emergency switches, which isolate the breaker controls from circuits going to the control bay, and allow for local operation of the breaker. Fire damage to Main Control Room 480V Shutdown Board transfer switch cables could cause the control circuit fuses for the credited breaker to clear prior to the use of the 43 emergency switch. In addition, cable fire damage in the same fire areas could also cause the normal and/or alternate feeder breakers to spuriously trip. These breakers do not have separate emergency fuses like other BFNP breakers equipped with backup controls. Therefore, Safe Shutdown Instruction (SSI) procedure steps to use 43 switches to perform local breaker operation to supply power to safe shutdown equipment may not work as written where this cable fire damage can occur.
"Compensatory actions in the form of fire watches to mitigate this condition are in place in accordance with the BFNP Fire Protection Report.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A),(B),(C).&(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"During BFNP [Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant] NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 805 transition review, it was determined in the event of an Appendix R fire, the ability to provide power to equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown may be adversely impacted. In certain fire zones/areas, feeder breakers for the 480V Shutdown Boards are credited for backup control operation using the 43 emergency switches, which isolate the breaker controls from circuits going to the control bay, and allow for local operation of the breaker. Fire damage to Main Control Room 480V Shutdown Board transfer switch cables could cause the control circuit fuses for the credited breaker to clear prior to the use of the 43 emergency switch. In addition, cable fire damage in the same fire areas could also cause the normal and/or alternate feeder breakers to spuriously trip. These breakers do not have separate emergency fuses like other BFNP breakers equipped with backup controls. Therefore, Safe Shutdown Instruction (SSI) procedure steps to use 43 switches to perform local breaker operation to supply power to safe shutdown equipment may not work as written where this cable fire damage can occur.
"Compensatory actions in the form of fire watches to mitigate this condition are in place in accordance with the BFNP Fire Protection Report.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A),(B),(C).&(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 48484
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC
Region: 1
City: TAMAQUA State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1131
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC
Region: 1
City: TAMAQUA State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1131
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 11/06/2012
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2012
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/31/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FAILURE
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
"While performing a leak test and shutter check on October 31, 2012, it was discovered that one of the level gauges had an inoperable shutter. Because the location of the gauge was on an operating tank and inaccessible to personnel, no exposure issues were plausible.
"The device is identified as:
"Manufacturer: Ohmart Corp Cincinnati OH
"Model: Minirad II
"Source Holder Model: SHF2
"Isotope: Cs-137
"Activity: 500 mCi
"The manufacturer was notified to make repairs. The licensee plans to increase shutter testing and have the manufacturer install a cover over the source holder to better protect it. DEP plans to follow up with a reactive inspection."
Event Report No: PA 120038
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
"While performing a leak test and shutter check on October 31, 2012, it was discovered that one of the level gauges had an inoperable shutter. Because the location of the gauge was on an operating tank and inaccessible to personnel, no exposure issues were plausible.
"The device is identified as:
"Manufacturer: Ohmart Corp Cincinnati OH
"Model: Minirad II
"Source Holder Model: SHF2
"Isotope: Cs-137
"Activity: 500 mCi
"The manufacturer was notified to make repairs. The licensee plans to increase shutter testing and have the manufacturer install a cover over the source holder to better protect it. DEP plans to follow up with a reactive inspection."
Event Report No: PA 120038