United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Event Notification Report for July 12, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/11/2012 - 07/12/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48038 48065 48068 48087 48089 48092 48093 48094 48095 48096 48097

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 48038
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
                   LEU FABRICATION
                   LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 06/20/2012
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/2012
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
EARL EASTON (NMSS)

Event Text

DEGRADATION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT

"It was discovered at approximately 1700 EDT on 6/19/2012 that the moderation control in the gadolinia pellet press operation had been degraded. An operator error allowed a can containing approximately 14 kg of uranium powder to be processed without the required material move transaction, a process control that ensures the container and material type are allowed at the designated location.

"This resulted in a temporary degraded item relied on for safety (IROFS) condition involving a criticality control. The press moderation control is one of four IROFS to prevent a criticality accident. The gadolinia press station material control system functioned as designed and prompted the operator of an error. The other criticality controls on geometry were maintained at all times.

"At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation has been shut down and additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being evaluated.

"This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to 10 CFR 70, Appendix A (b) (2)."

* * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1359 EDT ON 7/11/12 * * *

"On 6/20/12, GNF-A conservatively made a 24 hour event notification (EN 48038) due to a single missed Fuel Business System (FBS) transaction on 6/19/12 at the gadolinia press operation. After further review of the identified condition, it has been determined to be not reportable to NRC and the event notification can be retracted."

Notified R2DO (Blamey) and NMSS EO (Silva).

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Agreement State Event Number: 48065
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: THOMAS BROTHERS INDUSTRIES
Region: 1
City: NORTH ANDOVER State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENATH TRAEGDE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/03/2012
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2012
Event Time: 06:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

DISCARDED COMPASS CONTAINING RADIUM FOUND

The following was received via email from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

"A military compass containing approximately 10 microcurie of Ra-226 was improperly discarded via trash by an unknown person and was detected at the Maine Energy Recovery Company in Biddeford, ME on June 28, 2012. The State of Maine Radiation Control Program notified our Agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts] and transfer back to the place of origin was arranged. This was Thomson Brothers Industries.

"The truck was off loaded at that site and the source was discovered by a contracted health physics consultant. We received notification of the discovery of the source from the consultant at 10:49 am on June 29, 2012.

"Our Agency is currently assisting Thomson Brothers Industries in making arrangements for the proper disposal/transfer of the compass."

* * * UPDATE AT 0837 ON 7/10/12 FROM TRAEGDE TO SNYDER * *

"The compass was confiscated by the [Massachusetts] Radiation Control Program on 7/6/12 and given to a Massachusetts licensee for disposal. This action closes this event."

Notified R1DO (Burritt) and FSME Events Resource (e-mail).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Agreement State Event Number: 48068
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BRUKER AXS HANDHELD, INC
Region: 4
City: KENNEWICK State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0282-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDIN KETTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/03/2012
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2012
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
CANADA (FAX)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST SEALED SOURCES

The following was reported from the state via e-mail:

"During a routine six-month inventory, the licensee was unable to locate four (4) sealed sources, of which one has an activity that exceeds exempt quantities. The last known person using the sources was contacted on June 5, 2012 to determine if they were in his possession. He indicated that the previous x-ray RSO had found them and returned them to the source locker. However, the former x-ray RSO indicated that in-fact he did not locate the sources. Management and the materials RSO was notified and an investigation was initiated.

"All staff members were questioned and asked to check around their work areas. The assistant RSO checked all devices, pigs, the source cabinet and surveyed the entire facility, including shipping and receiving, with a micro-R survey meter. None of the sources were located on any disposal or transfer records.

"The sources were used in a prototype instrument called Plombix, designed to operate with an exempt source in the shape of a washer, and were used only for in house experiments. The missing sources were designed for this prototype instrument and do not fit all other instruments at this facility.

"Washington Department of Health corrective action is pending.

"The Assistant RSO indicated that sufficient controls are not in place to maintain control of sources stored outside the source locker, and that a single company source custodian will be assigned for all sources.

"Source Number: 1;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CD-109, 0.000000194 Ci, 0.000007178 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: 1112-35.

"Source Number: 2;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CD-109, 0.000064 Ci, 0.002368 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: D1-472.

"Source Number: 3;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D ;
Radionuclide: CO-57, 0.000005 Ci, 0.000185 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: RFQ482-3;
Serial Number: C9-333.

"Source Number: 4;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CO-57, 0.000000122 Ci 0.000004514 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: 1096-28.

"Reference Number: WA-12-047"

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48087
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN GENEVA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 02:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2012
Event Time: 22:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF ERDS DUE TO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK MODULE FAILURE

"A 'Communications Network Module' failed rendering the Emergency Response Display System (ERDS) incapable of transmitting data to the NRC. ERDS is out of service for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment. Control Room Emergency Response Organization personnel will use backup methods already captured in emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected emergency response facilities and NRC during the plant data network outage. The module was removed from service and ERDS was restored at 2325 [EDT]."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48089
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 10:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/12/2012
Event Time: 14:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP ()

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

PART 21 - FAILED AUXILIARY CONTACTOR AFFECTING DIESEL GENERATOR

"On February 10, 2012, during the monthly testing of Diesel Generator 1 (DG-1), speed was raised from 500 RPM to 900 RPM. At approximately 750 RPM, the generator field did not 'flash', a term used to describe the normal voltage buildup in the field of a generator. Initial troubleshooting identified that the auxiliary contacts on the 2CR contactor did not close. This caused the field flash failure. The failure of the auxiliary contacts on the 2CR contactor prevented the diesel generator from performing its designed safety function. The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect is General Electric CR105X300 auxiliary contactor. The auxiliary contactor was manufactured by General Electric Company and supplied by Nuclear Logistic, Incorporated, as an auxiliary part of a General Electric CR305 contactor.

"Further evaluation of the failure determined it to be reportable under 10CFR21 on June 8, 2012. The Corporate Officer was informed on June 13, 2012. The Regional Administrator was notified as required, but, due to an oversight, this report was not made to the Operations Center. The required 30 day report has been submitted (ML 121910230)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48092
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 12:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 09:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER ACTUATION

"At 0928 EDT on May 14, 2012, the 'B' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel (RSP). The likely cause of the start was either human error in performing continuity checks or inadvertent contact with the manual start circuit in the RSP. Based on the likely cause, this was an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. This 60-day telephone notification is being made to meet the reporting requirements instead of submitting an LER since the actuation was invalid and was not an RPS actuation with the reactor critical.

"The following additional information is being provided as specified in NUREG-1022:

"The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The 'B' ESW pump inadvertently started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel.

"Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: This was a partial actuation (one of four ESW pumps).

"Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 'B' ESW pump started successfully, operated properly, and continued running until manually secured via normal controls."

At the time of the event, the licensee was performing a surveillance where control was shifted from the control room to the remote shutdown panel.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48093
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY MEEKINS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2012
Event Time: 11:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF AMMONIA FOUND IN GROUNDWATER

"A report to the State of New Jersey was made on July 11, 2012 at 1157 EDT. The report was in accordance with Attachment 16 of the ECG (Event Classification Guide). The report was due to 4-5 ppm ammonia found in ground water on an excavation site. Samples were obtained from ground water in the hole. Estimate of leakage into hole is 2 ounces per minute."

The licensee believes the ammonia is from leftover de-icing salt. An estimated 100 gallons of water was pumped from the hole into a treated system. The NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek township was notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48094
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: AMY BURKHART
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2012
Event Time: 16:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL CONTAINMENT SUPPORT BEAM EXCEEDS LOAD COMBINATION LIMIT

"Fort Calhoun Station is making an 8-hour verbal report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition. An internal containment support beam (B-22) has been identified by the station as not passing the required load combination as stated in the USAR for at power conditions. Beam B-22 is the designation for the two beams that directly support Safety Injection Tanks 6B and 6D.

"This beam was also identified as having potential loading conditions outside the allowable limits for the load combination for shutdown conditions. Specifically, it was determined that in order to bring the beam loading to within acceptable levels, the allowable floor live load would need to be reduced from the current designated load distribution of 200 pounds per square foot (psf) to 140 psf. A walkdown of the area by Design Engineering estimates the current floor live load is approximately 100 psf.

"Compensatory actions are being established to remove any equipment that is contributing to current live loading of the support beam and to isolate and post the affected area to ensure no equipment is stored without engineering analysis."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48095
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DVID RENN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2012
Event Time: 15:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CABLE ASSOCIATED WITH 4KV SHUTDOWN BOARD ROUTED INCORRECTLY

"On July 11, 2012, during the [National Fire Protection Association] NFPA 805 transition review process for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), it was discovered that a cable associated with 4kV Shutdown Board B cross-tie breaker 1828 differential lockout contacts was not routed in accordance with the Appendix R Separation Analysis. Specifically, the cable was determined to be routed in Fire Zone 03-02 and is considered to be an unanalyzed condition.

"In the event of an Appendix R fire in Fire Zone 03-02, fire damage to cables associated with 4kV Shutdown Board B cross-tie breaker 1828 and the 4kV Shutdown Board 3EB cross-tie breaker 1848 could occur. A fire induced hot short could cause spurious closure of breaker 1828. Fire damage to cable associated with 4kV Shutdown Board B cross-tie breaker 1828 differential lockout contacts could also result in the loss of the breaker trip function. This condition may result in the following two failures:

"1) If breaker 1828 spuriously closed, it could close onto a fault, since the cross-tie power cables from breaker 1828 on 4kV Shutdown Board B to Breaker 1848 on 4kV Shutdown Board 3EB are routed through Fire Zone 03-02 and would be subject to a fire induced fault, if energized. This could result in the trip of Diesel Generator B output breaker 1822 and deenergization of the 4kV Shutdown Board B.

"2) Breaker 1848 on 4kV Shutdown Board 3EB is also vulnerable to spurious closure in the event of an Appendix R fire in Fire Zone 03-02, as the control cable for this breaker is routed through Fire Zone 03-02. In accordance with the applicable BFN Safe Shutdown Instruction, breaker 1848 is isolated and tripped locally prior to connecting Diesel Generator 3B to 4kV Shutdown Board 3EB. If offsite power was lost and 4kV Shutdown Board B and 4kV Shutdown Board 3EB were powered from Diesel Generators B and 3B respectively, and fire damage occurred to the breaker 1848 control cable and the cable for the breaker 1828 differential lockout contacts (which are both routed in Fire Zone 03-02) prior to the completion of Safe Shutdown Instruction steps to isolate and trip breaker 1848, then the potential to parallel Diesel Generators B and 3B out of phase would exist. Paralleling the Diesel Generators B and 3B out of phase with each other or offsite power poses the potential to damage either Diesel Generator.

"Therefore, this condition could result in a loss of power to credited safe shutdown equipment that would challenge the ability to provide adequate core cooling during performance of BFN Safe Shutdown Instructions.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48096
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH MAESTAS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 02:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE

"The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant will be performing the semi-annual HVAC inspection of the TSC Building on 7/12/2012. The work is scheduled to start at 0500 EDT and complete at 1500 EDT. The projected non-functional time is 10 hours. The Emergency Response Organization duty team members will be informed to respond to alternate locations if activation is required during that period.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to loss of an emergency response facility."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48097
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 04:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 02:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 95 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOWERING CONDENSER VACUUM

"On July 12, 2012, at 0200 EDT, clean steam reboiler 'B' failed, causing a loss of sealing steam. This resulted in degrading condenser vacuum and rising off gas system pressure. The main steam backup supply for sealing steam also failed, and condenser vacuum and of gas system pressure continued to degrade.

"In response to rising off gas system pressure and lowering condenser vacuum, reactor power was lowered to 85% in accordance with Special Operating Procedures. With off gas system pressure approaching the procedural limit and condenser vacuum degrading rapidly, a manual reactor scram was inserted at 0220 EDT.

"All control rods fully inserted and all systems functioned as expected on the scram.

"Plant is currently shutdown and parameters are stable.

"The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures and plant cooldown is in progress.

"The cause of the loss of both the primary and backup sources of sealing steam is under investigation."

The shutdown electrical lineup is normal and decay heat is being removed via steam bypass valves to the main condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public Service Commission.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, July 12, 2012
Thursday, July 12, 2012