| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/30/2011 - 12/01/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information | Event Number: 45459 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/23/2009
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
J.THORP (e-mail) (NRR)
O.TABATABAI (e-mail) (NRO)
| Event Text INTERIM REPORT ON THERMOSTATIC VALVE FAILURE ON PALO VERDE EDG
"This interim report is being issued because Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) is not able to complete an evaluation of an identified deviation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21.21. The evaluation is expected to be completed no later than November 30, 2009.
"ESI began an evaluation of a thermostatic valve element failure on August 24, 2009. Palo Verde Nuclear Plant notified ESI of the failure as a result of a failure analysis they were performing on a thermostatic valve that had been removed from the lube oil system of their 2A-EDG. The element was in service since April 2008 and Palo Verde verified operation of the element prior to installation.
"The Palo Verde failure analysis determined that one of two elements within the valve was defective. The element failure was attributed to wax leakage past the diaphragm seal on one of two power pills within the element. Evidence of mechanical binding of the piston is believed to have caused the wax leakage. If the piston was jammed, the expanding wax could have over pressurized the diaphragm seal leading to wax leakage. The failure analysis noted the following to support piston binding:
- The piston was initially difficult to remove from its guide tube.
- A gouge was observed on the piston surface.
- The rubber plug within the power pill exhibited brass machining chip debris.
"ESI has been coordinating with Palo Verde and the manufacturer (AMOT) to complete our evaluation and to determine if this is a generic issue or if it is an isolated incident.
"To date, no other similar failures with AMOT thermostatic valves have been reported to ESI."
Palo Verde has Cooper Bessemer KSV-20T diesel engines that use one 6" thermostatic valve in the engine jacket water system and one in the engine lube oil system to regulate system temperatures during engine operation. The thermostatic valve is an AMOT model 6HAS. The AMOT thermostatic valve element (P/N 9760X) is the defective part. ESI did not provide any information on other nuclear power plants that have EDGs that utilize this model thermostatic valve.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA EMAIL FROM PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO TO DONG PARK AT 1642 EST ON 12/01/09 * * *
"This report is a follow-up to an interim report (10CFR21-0098-INT) issued by Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) on 10/23/09 which identified a deviation with an Amot thermostatic valve element. The interim report was issued because ESI was not able to complete the evaluation within the 60 day requirement of 10CFR21. The evaluation was completed on 11/30/09 and the deviation was determined be a reportable defect as by defined by 10CFR21.
"The Exelon analysis also reports that similar brass machining debris was observed on the plugs from the other three power pills to varying degrees. None of the stems of these pills displayed evidence of gouging or binding.
"To date, no other similar failures with Amot thermostatic valves have been reported to ESI.
"ESI has contacted the valve manufacturer (Amot) to discuss these findings. A copy of the Palo Verde failure analysis and eleven (11) element assemblies from ESI inventory were sent to Amot for evaluation. The following elements were sent to Amot for evaluation:
"Qty. 8: PIN 9760 X-170' (CES PIN 2-05V-419-107)
"Qty. 3: PIN 9760 X-160' (CES PIN 2-05V-419-109)
"Both part number elements are the same except for the temperature setting ('-170' indicates 170?F nominal and '-160' indicates 160?F nominal).
"Upon completion of their evaluation, Amot has reported the following:
"Fine shavings/powder of brass was observed in some of the element pills.
"None of the pill stems had any evidence of gouging.
"The pills used in the 9760X elements are made by converting another part number pill. This conversion consists of removing the stem from the pill and performing some machining. Amot believes the brass debris may have entered the pill as a result of this conversion process.
"Amot has not made any changes to this conversion process in recent history and has not had reports of similar problems with these elements.
"Machining debris, while undesirable, was evident in other pills which did not exhibit any operability issues; therefore this is not believed to be the cause of the pill failure.
"The primary cause of the failure is believed to be the gouge found in the pill stem. The gouge could have occurred during the conversion process as the stem is removed and handled at that time.
"As a precaution, Amot has made changes to their conversion process for this pill. The drilling fixture was modified to eliminate the possibility of chips entering the pill during the machining operation. This change was made effective 10/22/09.
"A listing of users with the thermostatic valves that contain the Amot 9760X element is provided in the table below.
"Site - Thermostatic Valve - System:
"Braidwood - 6HAS - Lube
"Byron - 6HAS - Lube
"Nine Mile Point - 6HAS- Lube
"Oconee - 4HAS & 6HAS - Water
"Palo Verde - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"South Texas Project - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Susquehanna - 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Waterford - 5HAS & 6HAS - Lube & Water
"Corrective Action: The element failure at Palo Verde is considered to be an isolated incident related to a gouge in the pill stem. Thus, there is no recommended corrective action for users of the Amot 9760X element. The evaluation also indicated a weakness in Amot's manufacturing process for the element pill which introduced machining debris. While not believed to be the cause of the Palo Verde element failure, machining debris within the element pill is undesirable and increases the potential for failure in the future. Users with thermostatic valves containing Amot PIN 9760X elements should be aware of this issue so that they can monitor their systems for any indications of thermostat element problems.
Notified R1DO (Holody), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Deese), NRR (Thorp) via e-mail, NRO (Tabatabai) via email.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA FAX FROM TOM HORNER TO DONG PARK AT 1613 EST ON 04/01/11 * * *
Two sentences were added to address the safety hazard which is created or could be created by this defect.
"This defect could affect operability of the thermostatic valve within the diesel engine cooling water and/or lube oil system, resulting in elevated fluid system temperatures during engine operation. Engine performance and/or load carrying capability could be impacted with the possibility of eventual engine failure, thereby preventing the emergency diesel generator from performing its safety related function."
Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Lantz), PART 21 GROUP via e-mail.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED VIA FAX FROM TOM HORNER TO VINCE KLCO AT 1611 EST ON 12/01/11 * * *
The report was updated to revise part numbers for Oconee, Waterford and Laguna Verde (Mexico). Affected users added include the following: Susquehanna 5th EDG and Ergytech/Iberdroia (Spain).
Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Farnholtz) and PART 21 GROUP via e-mail. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Hospital | Event Number: 47384 | Rep Org: JEPPESEN RADIATION ONCOLOGY
Licensee: BAY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: BAY CITY State: MI
County:
License #: 21-18585-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS KEHOE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/28/2011
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
LYDIA CHANG (FSME)
| Event Text MEDICAL EVENT - MISADMINISTRATION OF PROSTATE CANCER SEEDS
During a recent inspection, an NRC inspector noted two cases which occurred on 8/23/11 and 1/11/11, respectively in which two separate patients were under dosed by greater than 20% during prostate cancer treatment using Iodine 125 seeds. The underdose was determined during post operative treatments. The same physician administered the procedure in both cases. The licensee has informed the prescribing physician, and is investigating the cause of the events. There is no long term permanent functional damage suspected to any organ in either case.
The licensee discussed the issue with NRC Region 3 (Gattone).
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS KEHOE TO VINCE KLCO ON 11/01/11 AT 1841 EDT * * *
After the licensee reviewed 3 years of medical reports, fourteen patents were found to have been under-dosed greater than 20% of the prescribed dose. Specific under-dose dates were: 4/10/08; 4/21/08; 4/25/08; 9/15/08; 10/17/08; 11/03/08; 2/17/09; 8/27/09; 1/05/10; 1/14/10; 5/25/10; 10/12/10; 5/03/11 and 5/19/11.
The licensee discussed the issue with NRC Region 3 (Gattone).
Notified the R3DO (Valos) and the FSME EO (Camper).
* * * RETRACTION FROM DENNIS KEHOE TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/1/2011 AT 1440 EDT * * *
The licensee is retracting this event due to the fact that the prostate seed implant for all the above 16 referenced events are planned intra-operatively within the operation. The licensee evaluates the seed implants at the end of the implant operation.
Notified the R3DO (Riemer) and FSME (McIntosh).
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47480 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE
Region: 1
City: RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK State: NC
County:
License #: 032-0131-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HENRY BARNES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/28/2011
Notification Time: 09:17 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2011
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text NORTH CAROLINA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE
The following information was obtained from the State of North Carolina via email:
"On November 18, 2011, the RSO of Research Triangle Institute (RTI), License Number 032-0131-1, performed a leak test on a sealed source. The results of the leak test revealed greater than 0.005 microcuries of removable contamination. The leak test showed 0.00517 microcuries of removable contamination. Subsequent surveys continued to show elevated results.
"The survey was performed with a Packard 1900 TR liquid scintillation counter, S/N 103761, calibrated Aug. 24, 2011.
"The source was a Ni-63 Electron Capture source. It had been removed from service and placed in storage in 2008. The source was being leak tested to prepare for disposal. Upon determination that the source was leaking, the RSO double-bagged the source, removed it from storage and segregated it, and contacted the waste broker for instructions on source disposal. The RSO performed contamination surveys of the storage area and the area is clean.
"Source information:
"Isotope: Ni-63, Quantity: 11.3 mCi, Mfg: Franklin GNO Corporation, Drawing No: 801-023, Serial Number: 37, Source date: October 20, 1975
"The licensee met all reporting requirements for the 5-day notification of a leaking source and is preparing a report with additional information." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47484 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SAINT JOSEPH HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: EUREKA State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 11/28/2011
Notification Time: 19:52 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2011
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
JIM LUEHMAN (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL LEFT UNATTENDED
The following was received from the State of California via email:
"During the holiday weekend, November 26, 2011, [a carrier] delivered a source containing 11.35 Ci of Ir-192 to Saint Joseph Hospital in Eureka, CA. There were no radiation safety personnel on site to receive the package and [the carrier] left the package with the receptionist, who is not authorized to receive radioactive material. The package was stored in the shipping and receiving area over the weekend. On Monday, November 28, 2011, the RSO became aware that the package had been sitting unsecured in the shipping and receiving area all weekend and notified the CA/RHB (California Radiation Health Branch)."
CA 5010 Number: 112811 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47490 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK GILBERT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/30/2011
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2011
Event Time: 09:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"A planned maintenance evolution at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) to replace power supplies in the plant process computer will result in a loss of some Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) indications for a duration of less than 5 hours. No other indicators or annunciators will be unavailable during this maintenance to affect the plant's ability to assess or monitor an accident or transient in progress.
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/30/11 AT 1442 EST FROM GILBERT TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee reports that the plant process computer work has been completed and SPDS has been functionally tested and returned to an operable status.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Riemer) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47491 | Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BRINKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/30/2011
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2011
Event Time: 05:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text TURBINE TRIP PROTECTION DISABLED WHILE IN MODE 3
"On November 20, 2011 at 0546 hours [CST], STP Unit 2 transitioned modes from Mode 4 to Mode 3. Prior to the mode change, all Solid State Protection System (SSPS) generated turbine trip signals were defeated by a maintenance work activity that installed a jumper in both channels (Train R and S) of non-class relays to the turbine trip circuit. The SSPS signals to the non-class relays that were defeated by the jumpers included the turbine trip from reactor trip breakers open (P4), turbine trip from a reactor trip signal (P-16), and the turbine trip from Steam Generator HI- HI (P-14). T.S. 3.3.2 Items 5a (P4) and 5b (P-14) are required in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The jumpers were removed around 0930 on November 20, 2011 with U2 still in Mode 3.
"Both the UFSAR and TS bases identify that the turbine trip mitigates the consequences of an accident. The TS bases states that an ESFAS initiated turbine trip mitigates the consequences of a steam line break or loss of coolant accident. The accident analysis for SGTR also assumes a turbine trip on a reactor trip to isolate the steam path.
"Although Unit 2 was in Mode 3, with the reactor trip breakers open, and turbine throttle valves closed while the jumpers were installed, this condition is conservatively considered to be a safety system functional failure. If not corrected, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the accident mitigating and control of the release of radiation safety functions. A review of the performance of this activity in previous outages was conducted. It was identified that during 2RE14 in April of 2010, a work package for this activity was not closed until after Mode 3. The 60 day LER will address if the jumpers were installed in Mode 3 in April, 2010.
"This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) parts (C) and (D)."
The licensee did not determine the reportability of this event until 1415 CST on 11/30/11. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47492 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEN GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 11/30/2011
Notification Time: 22:09 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2011
Event Time: 17:47 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On November 30, 2011, at 1747 hours [EST], with the reactor at 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) declared the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable due to the HPCI turbine control valve (HPCI-24) failing to go open during planned post-maintenance testing. The HPCI-24 is a hydraulically operated control valve and its normal position is closed. The HPCI-24 valve has a safety function to open on a demand signal during certain event mitigation scenarios requiring the HPCI system operation.
"Based on the turbine control valve failing to open during post-maintenance testing and a subsequent check out run per PNPS Procedure 8.5.4.1, the HPCI system was declared inoperable at 1747 hours and the appropriate LCO was entered. An investigation of the event is underway and continuing.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector bas been notified.
"This is an 8-hour notification made in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47493 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE ODELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/01/2011
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2011
Event Time: 13:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 5 | Startup | 5 | Startup | Event Text CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
"At 1344 hours (EST) on December 1, 2011, the Control Building Instrument Air Dryer failed resulting in loss of control air. As a result, the three Control Room Air Conditioning subsystems required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4, 'Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System,' and the two Control Room Emergency Ventilation [CREV] subsystems required by TS 3.7.3, 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System,' became inoperable. As a result, this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for these systems. Because Brunswick has a shared control room, Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1, for two CREV subsystems inoperable (i.e., be in Mode 3 within 12 hours) and TS 3.7.4, Required Action E.1, for three Control Room AC subsystems inoperable (i.e., enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately).
"Operability of two Control Room AC subsystems and one CREV subsystem was restored and LCO 3.0.3 was exited, at 1410 hours, when the Instrument Air Dryer was bypassed.
"No power reduction took place as a result of the LCO 3.0.3 entry. This report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition existed for approximately 26 minutes. Plant staff took immediate actions to return the equipment to service. For the brief time the Control Room AC and CREV systems were inoperable, performance of plant personnel and equipment in the Control Room was not adversely affected. The maximum Control Room back panel temperature during this event was approximately 68 degrees F. Troubleshooting activities are under way to determine the cause of the Instrument Air Dryer failure."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |