| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/13/2007 - 08/14/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43554 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: INTEGRITY INSPECTION SOLUTIONS
Region: 4
City: LAFAYETTE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-11357-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/08/2007
Notification Time: 09:55 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
| Event Text RADIOGRAPHIC CAMERA SOURCE CONNECTOR ASSEMBLY MALFUNCTION
The following information was provided by the State via facsimile:
"On 8/1/07, one of Integrity Inspection Solutions crews was setting up for radiographic operations at a temporary job site. While connecting the crankout to the exposure device, the source connector assembly broke. Due to this happening before the first exposure on the job, there was no source disconnect. Another crankout was available and the job was completed. The crankout manufacturer could not be determined. The crankout will be sent to an authorized agent for repair. The crankout was used with a SPEC 150 camera."
LA Event Report ID No.: LA070023 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43557 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PIEDMONT CARDIOLOGY ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: LENOIR State: NC
County:
License #: 014-1144-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/08/2007
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
KEITH McCONNELL (FSME)
| Event Text NORTH CAROLINA AGREEMENT STATE - NUCLEAR MEDICINE TECHNOLOGIST SELF ADMINISTERED SPARE RADIONUCLIDES
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Incident description as reported to NCRP [North Carolina Radiation Protection]: Nuclear Medicine Technologist (NMT) working in the Lenoir, NC office of the Licensee performed a diagnostic cardiac imaging exam on himself. He administered himself with 39.4mCi Tc-99m Myoview for a stress test and followed it up with 11.6 mCi Tc-99m Myoview for the rest test. Both administrations occurred on 8/6/07 and were done without the Licensee's or an Authorized User's knowledge or consent; using a dose intended for a patient that did not show-up for their scheduled diagnostic cardiac imaging exam. The NMT 'read' the resulting diagnostic images and observed a cardiac problem, then apparently called the Licensee's office in Hickory to get a second opinion. The Nuc Med Supervisor (Located in the Hickory Office) was made aware of the administration at approximately 1530 on 8/6/07, and the RSO was notified at approximately 1800 on 8/7/07.
"The Licensee reported that the Lenoir office is attended by a single NMT assisted by a Nurse. The rest of the Lenoir office is a non-nuclear cardiology practice although there is an Authorized User (an MD) at that location. At the time of the administration the Authorized User was attending non-nuclear study patients and was not aware of the activities being performed by the NMT on himself. The NMT performed the stress part of this diagnostic administration with Nursing assistance. The licensee reported that the Nurse felt that the NMT was doing something wrong but assisted the treadmill portion of the stress test for safety reasons. Sometime during this span of time the Authorized User at the Lenoir office went to the Hickory office to attend patients and was at that office when the NMT called and reported what he had done.
"NCRPS actions:
(1) requested a complete written report with statements from all individuals involved from the Licensee, which will be evaluated;
(2) report to NRC Op Center in case this turns out to be immediately reportable;
(3) consider follow-up inspection/incident investigation;
(4) possible escalated enforcement actions to be determined."
NC Incident # 07-41 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43561 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/13/2007
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY VENTILATION INOPERABLE
"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of offsite emergency response capability.
"At 2325 Central Daylight Time (CDT) on 8/12/2007, Callaway Plant received a trouble alarm for the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Investigation revealed the EOF had lost one phase of incoming rural electric power which is believed to have been caused by a severe thunderstorm in the area. At 0001 CDT on 8/13/2007, the EOF diesel generator was started and aligned to provide power to all building loads. An EOF functionality evaluation was performed for a loss on normal power with the EOF being supplied from the diesel generator and pre-existing degraded air conditioning cooling capacity. The evaluation concluded that the EOF was fully functional.
"At approximately 1000 CDT on 8/13/2007, maintenance personnel reported to the Control Room that the emergency ventilation system in the EOF was not functional based on the pressurization fans rotating in reverse. Three phase electrical loads at the EOF are incorrectly polarized apparently due to improper terminations at the diesel generator. If an emergency condition occurs during the time repairs are being made, the EOF will be utilized as long as radiological conditions allow. Procedure EIP-ZZ-C0010, EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OPERATIONS, section 4.4, directs EOF management to evaluate the need to relocate operations to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility, as required. Affected emergency responders have been notified of facility conditions and a courtesy notification has been made to the State Operations Branch Chief."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43562 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: EUGENE SKELTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 08/13/2007
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADEQUATE FIRE PROTECTION ON SAFETY CHILLED WATER SYSTEM ELECTRICAL CABLES
"At 0900 on July 30 2007, an Engineer noted during the review of a revision to the Comanche Peak Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis that a cable associated with the control circuitry for Train B of the Safety Chilled Water System may not be adequately protected from a potential fire. By design, electrical control cables for Trains A and B of the Safety Chilled Water System are located in the same fire zone. The original design specified that the Train B electrical control cables in this zone were to be protected with fire barrier material (thermolag). However, in this case the fire barrier material was found to be missing from the Train B electrical control cables. Upon discovery of this condition, a fire impairment was implemented for the affected fire zone.
"Engineering performed an evaluation of this condition and at 0900 on August 13, 2007 concluded that if a fire occurred in the affected fire zone, the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains was inadequate (i.e. both A and B trains were affected) and this would adversely affect the control circuitry and potentially prevent the Unit 1 Safety Chilled Water System from performing its intended safety function. The Unit 1 Safety Chilled Water Systems safety function at Comanche Peak is to remove heat dissipated from engineering safety features equipment and to maintain ambient temperatures in rooms containing safety related equipment below maximum design temperatures.
"This condition is similar to an example given in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, Section 3.2.4 for an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety (fire barrier missing such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking). Therefore, this condition is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43563 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/13/2007
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: 14:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INOPERABLE RADIATION MONITORS DUE TO SETPOINT CALCULATION ERRORS
"On August 13, 2007 at 14:20 [EDT], the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that during review of calculations for the Secondary Containment Radiation Monitor Setpoints errors were identified in Tech Spec Allowable Values and TRM Trip Setpoints that rendered them non-conservative. The affected instruments are Refuel Floor Wall, Refuel Floor High, and Railroad Access radiation monitors. The condition affects both Susquehanna Units. The radiation monitors are required to be operable for conditions noted in footnotes (a), (b), and (c) in Tech Spec tables 3.3.6.2-1 and 3.3.7.1-1 (i.e. operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, during CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within or above the Railroad Access Shaft). The function of these instruments is to initiate systems that limit fission product release during and following certain postulated accidents and to minimize the consequences of radioactive material in the control room environment.
"The radiation monitoring instruments were declared inoperable. All movement of irradiate fuel assemblies was halted (dry fuel storage activities were in progress at the time of notification). Based on this action, these monitors are no longer within the specified Applicability, and are therefore not currently required to be operable. The event has been determined to be reportable within 8 hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43564 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 08/13/2007
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: 15:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL HOT SHORT ISSUE WITH CONTAINMENT SPRAY SUMP SUCTION VALVES
" A condition is being reported as a conservative measure regarding a situation involving potential fire induced circuit failures on associated circuits. Plant Vogtle is considered to be in compliance with its current fire protection licensing basis, Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5.1 as endorsed by UFSAR Appendix 9B, however, this condition is being reported as the generic industry issues associated with multiple spurious circuit failures have not been resolved to date.
"A potential hot short issue exists involving Containment Spray Sump Suction valves 1(2)HV-9002A, 1(2)HV- 9003A, 1(2)HV-9002B, and 1(2)HV-9003B. If a fire were to occur in a location where the control circuit cables for those valves run in the same electrical raceway, a credible condition exists where either flowpath could spuriously open which would cause the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to drain down to the containment sumps.
"The fire zones where associated cables are located were placed under a compensatory hourly fire watch until compensatory measures were established. As an interim corrective action, operator manual actions have been specified and incorporated into plant procedures to deenergize and verify closed one valve in the series flowpath upon determination that a credible fire exists. These manual actions are in accordance with RIS 2006-10 for plants which are licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. Southern Nuclear will determine long term corrective actions for this condition.
"The effects of a fire sufficient to cause a spurious operation of multiple valves is not expected to be immediate and thus will allow sufficient time to perform the manual actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |