Event Notification Report for August 01, 2006

RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

"At approximately 0335 EDT, LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Action C was entered due to the identification of a pressure boundary leak. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak is believed to be a small pinhole on the weld on the downstream side of the check valve on Loop 1 Cold Leg Safety Injection Line. The estimated RCS leak rate is 0.1 gallons per minute. The Unit was in Mode 3 at the time of discovery. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"The plant is currently evaluating the appropriate repair method for this condition."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AUDIBLE HORN SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

"During a routine monthly test of the Criticality Warning System (CWS), a segment of that system (DCP & DOP Warehouse) was found to have no audible horns functioning. Processes were shutdown, the personnel evacuated and the emergency organization assembled.

"The preliminary investigation found that an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) that supplies power to the CWS horn amplifiers was not functioning.

"After a retest verified that the horns in the balance of the plant were functioning, those areas were allowed to resume operations. At the same time, the UPS for the DCP/DOP Warehouse segment of the system was replaced with a new unit and allowed to charge. Once charged, the system was tested and verified to have audible horn coverage. Operations were then allowed to restart in these areas.

"As of approximately 1210 PM the CWS horns were fully operational and the facility was returned to normal operational status. Investigation of the incident is continuing including an attempt to determine the root cause of the UPS malfunction."

The licensee notified Region II (J. Pelchat) and will notify State and local organizations.

FAILURE OF A RADIOGRAPHIC CAMERA LOCKING MECHANISM


The following information is from a letter that was sent to the NRC:

"During an NRC inspection it was brought to our attention that we are required by 10CFR 34.101 to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of any failure of a radiographic device or a component critical to the safe operation of the device to properly perform its intended function. The following is the information requested in 10CFR 34.101.

"1. The key mechanism would not lock on a 660B Tech Ops Camera.

"2. The failure of the locking mechanism is not known by us.

"3. The manufacture of the equipment is AEA Technology QSA, Inc., Burlington, MA.

"4. The place was Anchorage, Alaska and the date 7/23/2003.

"5. The action taken to establish normal operations is ship the camera back to AEA Technology QSA and have them fix the lock mechanism when we need and additional camera. The iridium source was transferred to a IN Model IR-50 source changer and shipped to Industrial Nuclear for disposal. The camera at this time is empty and awaiting a time when we would need an additional camera. We have four operational cameras and do not have a need for this camera anytime in the foreseeable future.

"6. We plan to have AEA Technology QSA repair the lock mechanism.

"7. (Deleted) President of Alaska Industrial X-ray a former RSO and radiographer took the above action to prevent any over exposure to our personnel."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was received from the state via e-mail:

"The Creston Public School purchased two self-luminous signs in 1990. The signs were SRB model Betalux E 10 with 9.75 curies of tritium in each sign. The school did an inventory in 2005. The School did not return its annual inventory in 2006. The school was dissolved in May of 2006 and the property was transferred to Leigh Public School. Leigh Public Schools informed the Agency [Nebraska Division of Radioactive materials] that the property was transferred to the Village of Creston. Representatives of the Village of Creston, speculate that the school was possibly left unlocked and unattended for a period time and during that time period the signs were removed. The disposition of the signs is unknown. The Agency made numerous attempts to determine the status of the signs and ultimately the Agency determined that the signs are lost."

The licensee discovered that the signs were missing on 01/01/2008.

Manufacturer: SRB Technologies Inc
Serial Number: 13152 and 13153

Nebraska event NE080006

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- COMPOSITE LISTING OF MISSING GENERAL LICENSED DEVICES

The following fifty-four (54) lost licensee tritium signs were submitted by the State of Colorado via email:

1. American Soda LLP; (2) Isolite; Model 2040; S/N A081034 and A081076; H-3; 11500 mCi/each
2. Beaudrey American Services; (2) Isolite; Model SLX60; S/N Unknown; H-3; 6200 mCi/each
3. Boulder Manor; (8) SRB Technologies; Model BR20BK; S/N 659038 to 659039 and 659066 to 659067; H-3; 17800 mCi/each
4. Carquest; (4) Best Lighting Products; Model SLXTU1RW10; S/N Unknown; H-3; 7030 mCi/each
5. GE Johnson; (1) Safety Light; Model 880-12-6; C27200; H-3; 7500 mCi
6. Grace Management; (2) Isolite Corporation; Model SLX60; S/N 14610; H-3; 3750 mCi/each
7. Hampton Inn; ; (14) SRB Technologies; Model BXU10GS; S/N Unknown; H-3; 9210 mCi/each
8. Industrialex MFG Co; (1) NRD Inc.; Model P-2021; S/N A2HL117; PO-210; 10 mCi
9. Kinder Morgan; (4) Isolite; Model SLX60; S/N Y24490-Y24493; H-3; 7500 mCi/each
10. New Belgium Brewing; (1) Shield Source Inc.; Model SLX; S/N10-29211; H-3; 6200 mCi
11. Old West Management; (1) Isolite; Model 2040; S/N Unknown; ; H-3; 7000 mCi
12. Platt River Power Authority; (4) SRB Technologies; Model BX15WH; S/N CO12440-12443; H-3; 9210 mCi/each
13. Sisters of St. Francis; (1) Isolite; Model 2040; S/N Unknown; H-3; 7500 mCi
14. Wild Oats Markets Inc.; (1) NRD Inc.; Model T-4001; S/N Unknown; H-3; 6700 mCi
15. Wynkoop Building LLC; (8) Safety Light; Model 8801206; S/N 432968 to 432975; H-3; 7500 mCi/each


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf