| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/18/2006 - 07/19/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42706 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUELS
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #: 065-0317-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDY CROWE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2006
Event Time: 15:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
WILLIAM RULAND (NMSS)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT EXCEEDING EXTERNAL RADIATION LIMITS
A control rod drive mechanism was shipped to Global Nuclear from Mexico's Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant with package external radiation levels exceeding transportation limits. The package arrived at Global Nuclear with a surface radiation level of 245 millirem per hour which exceeds the limit of 200 millirem hour. There was no external contamination on the package and all other aspects of the shipment were within regulatory limits. The shipment was transported by Tri-State Motor Transport as an exclusive use shipment.
Although Global Nuclear is an NRC licensee, the activity being performed by Global Nuclear for Laguna Verde is being conducted under its North Carolina State licensee and not under its NRC license.
The NC report number for this incident is 06-22. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42712 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KELLY FERNEAU
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 07/17/2006
Notification Time: 23:56 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2006
Event Time: 21:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY EVACUATION SIREN FAILURES DUE TO THUNDERSTORMS
"Greater than 25% of the emergency sirens have failed due to a severe thunderstorm in the area."
The licensee stated that 30 sirens had failed and that restoration activities were currently in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM J. KOEPLIN TO M. RIPLEY 0503 ET 07/18/06 * * *
As of 2317 CDT 07/18/06, the number of inoperable sirens fell below 25% of all sirens with 23 failed sirens not restored to service. Restoration activities remain in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3 DO (Cameron) |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 42713 | Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: FT BRAGG State: NC
County:
License #: 12-0722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 07/18/2006
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2006
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text UNPLANNED TRITIUM CONTAMINATION DURING MAINTENANCE
"On July 6, 2006 a range indicator SSDR no. NR-155-S-116-S containing [four] 0.8 Ci [curies] tritium lamps [3.2 curies total] was broken during a maintenance procedure at Ft. Bragg, NC Special OPS, 3rd Group Direct Support weapons room, Bldg E-1978. The Ft. Bragg RSO was notified on 7 July 2006 of the incident. Improper maintenance procedure was the reason for the breakage of the tritium sealed source. Two persons were involved in the incident. One tritium bioassay was taken of one individual. The second individual did not have a bioassay taken due to the fact he went on TDY [Temporary Duty] before the discovery of the accident. Leak test of the broken range indicator showed removable contamination of 0.95 microcuries. An area survey of the weapons room by the Ft. Bragg RSO showed a maximum contamination of 0.3 micro curies (64,944 dpm). The Ft. Bragg RSO closed and secured the arms room from re-entry of personnel. The Ft Bragg RSO performed decontamination of the weapons room and brought the tritium removable contamination below regulatory concerns (<10,000 dpm). The licensee was notified of the incident on July 12, 2006." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42714 | Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ARNIE CRIBB
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/18/2006
Notification Time: 22:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2006
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL FLOODING COMMON MODE FAILURE OF SERVICE WATER PUMPS
"At 1715, it was determined that current plant configuration does not match the assumptions of the Service Water Pump House flooding design calculation. The calculation assumes that a leak developing in the discharge valve bay would cause the water level to rise to the level of the system piping and then stabilize due to leakage out of the valve bay through the area where the piping penetrated the wall. This level is below any electrical equipment and therefore would have no adverse impact on the system. The area around the piping where it was assumed the water would escape was found to be sealed with a fire barrier material. Since the water could not escape, it would continue to rise until it impacted the pump discharge valve (motor operated valve). This would potentially render the Service Water train inoperable.
"A second issue with the design calculation was discovered in that it assumed the pump discharge bays for the other two pumps were physically isolated from each other. This is not the case. The discharge piping for the three pumps are cross-connected via a line which penetrates all three bays. The area between the cross connect piping and the bay walls is not sealed. Any leakage in one bay will be communicated to all three bays. This results in the potential for a leak in any of the bays to possibly impact the operability of both trains of Service Water."
The licensee has put compensatory measures in place to maintain equipment operability. The licensee has determined that by putting either of the two following compensatory measures in place equipment operability will be maintained:
1. They will provide a continuous watch of the areas to detect water leakage that may cause a flooding concern and close service water pump discharge valves within 15 minutes and secure the affected service water pump, or
2. They will remove the fire seals causing the potential flooding concern in rooms 25-01, 25-02 and 25-03 of the service water pump house.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42715 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN SEMETER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 07/19/2006
Notification Time: 01:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2006
Event Time: 22:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER
"48 of 165 offsite sirens are not functioning due to loss of power/equipment problems because of recent storm. Efforts are in progress to restore power to the affected sirens."
The affected sirens are located in Chester County. Compensatory measures are in effect to alert the public should the need arise.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |