| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/08/2004 - 11/09/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41172 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA, INC.
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERRY EAKINS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 11/02/2004
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2004
Event Time: 16:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING IMPROPER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT
On 11/02/04 the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control was notified by U.S. Customs at the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport of the arrival of an aircraft from the Bahamas " . . . Carrying [a] RAM holder 650L (depleted uranium) with a depleted Ir-192 source [approximately 10 curies]. [The] pilot initially said that he had nothing to declare. Customs investigator's dosimeters alarmed when they examined the plane and they subsequently found the holder. The pilot then claimed that Bahamas Oil Refining Co. paid him to fly the holder to Ft. Lauderdale and send it to owner via FedEx. He then made a false statement that the holder was empty. The pilot was not hazmat qualified, was not licensed to handle RAM, and did not have proper shipping papers. The holder was impounded. [The] owner [AEA Technology, Inc.] provided proper shipping papers and had the item shipped back to them. This office [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] will take no further action on this incident."
Incident Number: FL04-150
A conference call was established between the NMSS EO (Tom Essig) and the FL BRC Representative (Jerry Eakins) to discuss the situation. During followup on 11/4/04, it was determined that the initial notification constituted an Agreement State Report.
Notified RDO (David Silk), NMSS EO (Sandra Wastler) and TAS Duty Officer (Aaron Danis). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41180 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/08/2004
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2004
Event Time: 18:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION FROM LOSS-OF-POWER TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) BUS 3B
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
" On September 25, 2004, with Unit 3 operating at 100% thermal power, at 1814 hours CDT, a voltage regulator problem occurred on RPS motor-generator (MG) set 3B. The associated RPS circuit protectors sensed an undervoltage condition and opened, thereby de-energizing RPS bus 3B. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from this bus lost power, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps, Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains Isolation.
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water clean-up system.
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation, Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems.
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design, with the exception that Unit 2 refuel zone ventilation system supply inboard isolation damper 2-DMP-064-0006 failed to close. The series damper, 2-DMP-064-0005, fully closed, therefore there would have been no impact to secondary containment integrity had this been an actual event. The damper's failure to close resulted from a sticking solenoid valve which was subsequently replaced.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for resolution.
" The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41181 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/08/2004
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2004
Event Time: 13:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION FROM LOSS-OF-POWER TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) BUS 2A
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On September 28, 2004, with Unit 2 operating at 100% thermal power, at 1302 hours CDT during maintenance work associated with protective relaying on 480 VAC Shutdown Board 2A, the board was inadvertently tripped. Associated RPS motor-generator (MG) set 2A lost power, and RPS bus 2A, which is powered from this MG set, was de-energized. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from this bus lost power, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps [and] Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water cleanup system.
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System [and] Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation [and] Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation system.
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for resolution.
"The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified." | |