Event Notification Report for July 05, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/04/2001 - 07/05/2001
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38116
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BORING
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BORING
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/05/2001
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2001
Event Time: 10:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2001
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2001
Event Time: 10:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2001
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
TAD MARSH (EO)
CALDWELL (FEMA)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
TAD MARSH (EO)
CALDWELL (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY SCRAMMED FROM 100% POWER DUE TO HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE
The plant entered an Alert @ 1019CDT due to drywell pressure rising above the ECCS setpoint(2 psig). The reactor was manually scrammed at 1006 and drywell pressure peaked at 2.3 psig. All rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. ECCS functioned as required, but no injection initiated. Drywell pressure is currently 2.1 psig and slowly trending down.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with state ,local and other Government agencies. Other agencies notified by NRC: Tanner(EPA), Young(DOE), Conley( USDA), Gray(HHS), Robertson(DOT), and Watson(USSS).
NRC entered the monitoring mode at 1209 EDT.
* * * UPDATE @ 1300EDT COMMISSIONERS ASSISTANT'S BRIEFING * * *
Wessman(IRO), Borchardt(NRR), Gagner(PAO), Combs(SP), Hauber(IP), Madden(CO), Bergman(EDO), Paperiello(DEDMRS), Tschiltz(Chairman Assist.), Hiltz(Commissioner Dicus), Beall(Commissioner McGaffigan) Thoma(Commissioner Merrifield), Dyer(Reg 3 Briefer), and Gamberoni(Secy)
Monitoring mode was terminated at 1737 EDT.
* * * UPDATE AT 1757 ON 7/05/01 BY MOHR TO GOULD * * *
Subsequent to earlier notification, information has been obtained that verifies the cause of the high drywell pressure was due to a loss of containment cooling. A redundant cooling water train was placed in service and the drywell temperature and pressure have been trending down to normal ranges. The drywell sump was pumped and confirmed that RCS leak rates have not increased. Drywell radiation levels were verified to be normal. Additionally, drywell atmosphere samples were normal. Drywell pressure is currently .37 PSIG. The plant has been stabilized in accordance with procedures and equipment repairs are being made. Plans are being developed for unit return to service.
The Alert was terminated at 1602 CDT.
The NRC Resident Inspector and State have been informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1825 ON 7/5/01 BY MOHR TO GOULD * * *
The plant also had groups 2 and 3 isolations, low pressure and high pressure ECCS initiation signals and Unit 3 and 2/3 swing emergency diesel generator auto starts.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
* * * UPDATE 1900 ON 7/05/91 MODIFIED COMMISSIONER ASSISTANT'S BRIEFING * * *
Dyer(REG3), Marsh(NRR), Tschiltz(Chairman's Assistants), Thoma(Commissioner Merrifield's Assistant), and Hiltz(Commissioner Dicus' Assistant)
Agencies notified by the NRC: Cegielski(FEMA), Poppell(EPA), Morrone(DOE), Conley(USDA), Robertson(DOT), Farrow-Collier(CDC). Notified Beckner(EO), Wessman(IRO), Hayden(PA) and Vegel(REG 3 RDO).
The plant entered an Alert @ 1019CDT due to drywell pressure rising above the ECCS setpoint(2 psig). The reactor was manually scrammed at 1006 and drywell pressure peaked at 2.3 psig. All rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted. ECCS functioned as required, but no injection initiated. Drywell pressure is currently 2.1 psig and slowly trending down.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with state ,local and other Government agencies. Other agencies notified by NRC: Tanner(EPA), Young(DOE), Conley( USDA), Gray(HHS), Robertson(DOT), and Watson(USSS).
NRC entered the monitoring mode at 1209 EDT.
* * * UPDATE @ 1300EDT COMMISSIONERS ASSISTANT'S BRIEFING * * *
Wessman(IRO), Borchardt(NRR), Gagner(PAO), Combs(SP), Hauber(IP), Madden(CO), Bergman(EDO), Paperiello(DEDMRS), Tschiltz(Chairman Assist.), Hiltz(Commissioner Dicus), Beall(Commissioner McGaffigan) Thoma(Commissioner Merrifield), Dyer(Reg 3 Briefer), and Gamberoni(Secy)
Monitoring mode was terminated at 1737 EDT.
* * * UPDATE AT 1757 ON 7/05/01 BY MOHR TO GOULD * * *
Subsequent to earlier notification, information has been obtained that verifies the cause of the high drywell pressure was due to a loss of containment cooling. A redundant cooling water train was placed in service and the drywell temperature and pressure have been trending down to normal ranges. The drywell sump was pumped and confirmed that RCS leak rates have not increased. Drywell radiation levels were verified to be normal. Additionally, drywell atmosphere samples were normal. Drywell pressure is currently .37 PSIG. The plant has been stabilized in accordance with procedures and equipment repairs are being made. Plans are being developed for unit return to service.
The Alert was terminated at 1602 CDT.
The NRC Resident Inspector and State have been informed.
* * * UPDATE AT 1825 ON 7/5/01 BY MOHR TO GOULD * * *
The plant also had groups 2 and 3 isolations, low pressure and high pressure ECCS initiation signals and Unit 3 and 2/3 swing emergency diesel generator auto starts.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.
* * * UPDATE 1900 ON 7/05/91 MODIFIED COMMISSIONER ASSISTANT'S BRIEFING * * *
Dyer(REG3), Marsh(NRR), Tschiltz(Chairman's Assistants), Thoma(Commissioner Merrifield's Assistant), and Hiltz(Commissioner Dicus' Assistant)
Agencies notified by the NRC: Cegielski(FEMA), Poppell(EPA), Morrone(DOE), Conley(USDA), Robertson(DOT), Farrow-Collier(CDC). Notified Beckner(EO), Wessman(IRO), Hayden(PA) and Vegel(REG 3 RDO).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38117
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 07/05/2001
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2001
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2001
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
The licensee notified the Maryland Department of Environment due to a positive coliform count in the drinking water at the educational center. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee notified the Maryland Department of Environment due to a positive coliform count in the drinking water at the educational center. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38119
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: COSEI
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: COSEI
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/05/2001
Notification Time: 16:03 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2001
Notification Time: 16:03 [ET]
Event Date: 07/05/2001
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON-CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS FOR OPRM SCRAM SETPOINTS
On July 5, 2001, Detroit Edison received confirmation from General Electric of a non-conservative analysis that supports Operation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) scram setpoints. The non-conservative analysis is generic and been determined to affect Fermi 2. The OPRM had been conservatively declared inoperable on June 27, 2001, at 1333 hours as a result of preliminary notification by General Electric.
The consequences of the non-conservative analysis are that the associated OPRM Reactor Protective System (RPS) scram setpoints are non-conservative. The non-conservative RPS setpoints may result in violating the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limit during a thermal-hydraulic instability.
All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action J requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods have been established, thus, the Technical Specification required action is satisfied. Fermi 2 has 120 days to restore the OPRMs to an operable condition.
This initial report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (B)(3)(V)(A) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor.
See EN #38104, GE Nuclear Energy 10CFR21 report.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1443 EDT ON 8/17/2001 BY PATRICK FALLON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee is retracting the event notification.
"Subsequent design calculations have concluded that there was sufficient conservatism in the existing OPRM RPS scram setpoints to accommodate corrections for the non-conservative analysis performed by General Electric, which was the subject of their 10 CFR 21 Notification dated June 29, 2001 (SC01 -01), and still provide protection for the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit during a thermal-hydraulic instability throughout the current operating cycle. The OPRM RPS scram function was not required to be operable prior to the current operating cycle. Since the existing OPRM RPS scram setpoints have been shown to be set conservatively, the OPRM system was operable, and therefore no situation existed which was reportable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Thomas Kozak) has been notified.
On July 5, 2001, Detroit Edison received confirmation from General Electric of a non-conservative analysis that supports Operation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) scram setpoints. The non-conservative analysis is generic and been determined to affect Fermi 2. The OPRM had been conservatively declared inoperable on June 27, 2001, at 1333 hours as a result of preliminary notification by General Electric.
The consequences of the non-conservative analysis are that the associated OPRM Reactor Protective System (RPS) scram setpoints are non-conservative. The non-conservative RPS setpoints may result in violating the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) safety limit during a thermal-hydraulic instability.
All OPRM channels have been declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action J requires an alternate method of detecting and suppressing thermal-hydraulic instabilities to be implemented within 12 hours. Alternate methods have been established, thus, the Technical Specification required action is satisfied. Fermi 2 has 120 days to restore the OPRMs to an operable condition.
This initial report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (B)(3)(V)(A) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shutdown the reactor.
See EN #38104, GE Nuclear Energy 10CFR21 report.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1443 EDT ON 8/17/2001 BY PATRICK FALLON TO FANGIE JONES * * *
The licensee is retracting the event notification.
"Subsequent design calculations have concluded that there was sufficient conservatism in the existing OPRM RPS scram setpoints to accommodate corrections for the non-conservative analysis performed by General Electric, which was the subject of their 10 CFR 21 Notification dated June 29, 2001 (SC01 -01), and still provide protection for the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit during a thermal-hydraulic instability throughout the current operating cycle. The OPRM RPS scram function was not required to be operable prior to the current operating cycle. Since the existing OPRM RPS scram setpoints have been shown to be set conservatively, the OPRM system was operable, and therefore no situation existed which was reportable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Thomas Kozak) has been notified.