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Event Notification Report for October 13, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/12/2000 - 10/13/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37285  37423  37424  37425  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37285       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/01/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:08[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        09/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:40[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MCDONNELL                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE PLACING THE PLANT IN A   |
| 14 DAY LCO ACTION STATEMENT.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| During the performance of 8.5.4.1 (HPCI operability test), HPCI failed to    |
| meet acceptance criteria.  The HPCI pump failed to meet the required flow,   |
| pressure and rpm requirements.  Troubleshooting of the problem is in         |
| progress to make HPCI operable within the 14 day LCO action statement        |
| requirement.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.                                     |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/12/00 @ 1736 BY OLSON TO GOULD * * *  RETRACTION          |
|                                                                              |
| After further analysis of this event, it was determined HPCI would have      |
| performed its safety function, therefore, this event is not reportable and   |
| is being retracted.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
| Region 1 RDO(Doerflein) was informed.                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37423       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUMMER                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:07[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        10/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAUL CROGEN                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KEN BARR             R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ED GOODWIN           NRR     |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|                                                |TAD MARSH            EO      |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL CONDITION OF A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BOUNDARY DEGRADATION         |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is s portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "...  The plant is currently in Cold Shutdown (Mode 6) of Refueling Outage   |
| 12."                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "On October 7 [at] 2000 [hours], plant personnel identified an accumulation  |
| of approximately 100 pounds of boric acid in the 'A' hot leg area of the     |
| reactor vessel.  Some boric acid and insulation was removed from the area of |
| the suspected leak path to allow for further inspection."                    |
|                                                                              |
| "On October 12 at 0630 hours, plant personnel visually identified a          |
| potential leak area on the first weld off the reactor vessel at the nozzle   |
| to pipe connection of the 'A' loop hot leg.  Visual inspection has revealed  |
| trace amounts of boron buildup on the weld between the vessel nozzle and the |
| hot leg pipe.  Based on this preliminary information, plant personnel        |
| suspect some leakage has occurred through the pressure boundary at this      |
| weld."                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The RCS is currently depressurized.  We have suspended preparations to      |
| remove the reactor vessel head to allow time to perform [non-destructive     |
| examination (NDE)] on the weld.  V.C. Summer expects the NDE inspection to   |
| be completed around noon today.  The results will be used to develop repair  |
| plans."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed of the condition."           |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/12/00 @ 1452 BY CROGEN TO GOULD  * * *                    |
|                                                                              |
| V. C. Summer is providing an update to the initial 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i)     |
| notification made at 0907 this morning. Plant personnel have completed the   |
| cleanup and dye penetrant test of the weld on the 'A' RCS Hot Leg. The test  |
| has confirmed a 4" long hairline crack in the weld between the hot leg       |
| piping and the Reactor vessel nozzle. This pipe is about 30" in diameter.    |
| This weld is located about 3 feet from the vessel wall and is accessible in  |
| the inspection port at the Reactor vessel flange area.  The crack is located |
| about 17" from the top of the pipe.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The plant will continue defueling and initiate weld repair of the affected   |
| nozzle.  Technical and repair support is being pursued at this time to make  |
| appropriate inspections and repairs.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been made aware of the latest findings.       |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 2 RDO(Barr), EO(Goodwin), IRO(Giitter) were notified.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37424       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:39[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        10/11/2000|
|           FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY         |EVENT TIME:        10:45[PDT]|
|           COMMERICAL LWR FUEL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/12/2000|
|    CITY:  RICHLAND                 REGION:  4  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  BENTON                    STATE:  WA |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  SNM-1227              AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
|  DOCKET:  07001257                             |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MAAS                         |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN  VIOLATION OF MASS CONTROL                            |
|                                                                              |
| "On 10/10/00 at about 11:30 a.m. while sorting drums of 'wet waste' in the   |
| Modular Extraction/ Recovery Facility (MERF), SPC process operators found    |
| three sock filters that contained larger than expected amounts of sludge.    |
| These sock filters came from two separate waste drums that had been packaged |
| in 1993 or early 1994.   Per Criticality Safety Specifications and Standard  |
| Operating Procedures, the process operators removed the sludge from the      |
| filters and placed it into three separate 4-gallon containers.  Operators    |
| sampled the material in each of the containers and sent the samples to the   |
| SPC laboratory for analysis.  The 4-gallon containers were transferred from  |
| MERF to an authorized storage location for moderated material.  The lead     |
| process operator contacted the process engineer who in turn contacted        |
| Criticality Safety."                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "On 10/11/00 at about 10:45 a.m., the SPC laboratory reported the percent U  |
| in the sludge. The results are summarized in the following table."           |
|                                                                              |
| "Container #        Net Wt.(kg)            %U                  %235U         |
| Grams U            Grams 235U                                                |
|                                                                              |
| 56696                       15.4                     71.4                    |
| 3.55                     10,979.8                  389.8                     |
|                                                                              |
| 56697                         8.7                     74.4                   |
| 1.88                      6,635.8                   123.1                    |
|                                                                              |
| 56698                       13.9                     72.4                    |
| 1.89                     10,111.2                  191.3                     |
|                                                                              |
| Total                         38.1                      NA                   |
| NA                     27,626.8                  704.2 "                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The total 235U present in the process batch at MERF (in the sock filter     |
| sludge plus other waste material) was calculated to be 895.9 grams, which    |
| exceeds the 790 gram 235U limit for the facility by about 106 grams."        |
|                                                                              |
| "This data also indicates an infraction of the 200 g 235U mass control limit |
| placed on individual waste drums on the waste storage pad."                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Safety Significance Of Event:"                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. The mass of uranium present   |
| in the process batch of waste drums being sorted in MERF was less than a     |
| safe mass (45% of critical) for the enrichments actually present.  The       |
| actual enrichment of the materials involved was less than 3.6% 235U, however |
| if the facility enrichment limit of 5 wt.% 235U is assumed, the total 235U   |
| mass was about 51% of a minimum critical mass.  The information derived from |
| the MERF infraction reveals an infraction of the mass control limit for      |
| drums on the storage pad."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The criticality safety limit on surface density restricts a vertical stack  |
| of waste drums to 626 grams 235U.  This is controlled by limiting any drum   |
| in a three tier array of waste drums to 200 grams 235U.  If the two drums    |
| containing sock filters and another drum at the 200 g 235U limit were        |
| present in a three tier stack, the total mass in the stack would have been   |
| approximately 965 g 225U.  A criticality area density is over 550 g 235U per |
| sq. ft. which corresponds to 1,512 g 235U in a 2.75 sq. ft. area, the        |
| footprint area of a single drum.  This is less than 64% of a minimum         |
| critical surface density."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Potential Criticality Pathways:"                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "For criticality to occur in a single waste drum requires a minimum of about |
| 40 kg U02 enriched to 5 wt.% 235U. Current SOPs require sorting of waste and |
| NDA assay before waste can be moved to the waste pad."                       |
|                                                                              |
| "To exceed an allowed surface density for stacked drums on the waste pad     |
| would require more than 600 grams 235U in a vertical stack of drums. This    |
| surface density limit would result in drum arrays that are substantially     |
| subcritical."                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "For criticality to occur in the processing equipment in MERF would require  |
| a minimum of 40 kg U02 enriched to 5 wt.% 235U. Before such large amounts    |
| could be processed in this equipment, the operating staff would have to fail |
| to perform the following actions required by the applicable criticality      |
| safety specification (CSS) and SOPs:                                         |
| * re-sort the waste and remove all uniquely identifiable quantities of       |
| uranium,                                                                     |
| * shred cartridge filters, HEPA filters and similar items                    |
| * re-assay the sorted and shredded waste                                     |
| * remove any material in excess of 250 grams 235U mass from the mass         |
| controlled area and stage it to become part of the next process batch to be  |
| processed through the MERF equipment."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Controlled Parameters:"                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "For the MERF process, the controlled criticality parameter is mass.  Per    |
| the SPC operating license, mass control as the only controlled parameter is  |
| allowed provided:"                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "1. The work station shall be limited to one safe batch, where a safe batch  |
| is defined as no more than 0.45 of the minimum critical mass of the material |
| in process;"                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "2. No more than one safe batch may be moved at one time when introducing or |
| removing material from a workstation;"                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "3. Individual safe batches shall be spaced a specified minimum distance     |
| apart;"                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "4. A record shall be maintained of the SNM inventory at each mass-limited   |
| workstation; and"                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "5. SNM inventory control shall assure material buildup over time will not   |
| cause the batch limit to be exceeded."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "In MERF the mass limit is 790 g 235U, < 45% of a minimum critical mass at 5 |
| wt.% enriched.  An inventory of the material processed through the facility  |
| is maintained and the facility is inspected by operating and engineering     |
| personnel for potential holdup after each batch is processed through the     |
| facility.  The following controls are used to ensure compliance with the 790 |
| g 235U mass limit:"                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Prior to being considered for a process batch, each drum / HEPA filter has  |
| a three party check or an electronic comparison between two separate record  |
| systems to ensure that the mass assigned to the drum is free from            |
| transcription / transposition errors.  If sufficient data does not exist,    |
| the drum or HEPA must be recounted."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Target batch size is limited to 250 g 235U."                                |
|                                                                              |
| "SPC operating staff selects a batch of drums and transfer them to a locked  |
| location."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "SPC engineering staff verifies the target batch size of 250 g 235U is not   |
| exceeded."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "SPC Process Operator and Supervisor or lead technician verify the drums in  |
| the locked area are part of the designated batch and that the target batch   |
| size of 250 g 235U is not exceeded."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Operating staff then resorts the waste to identify any uniquely             |
| identifiable quantities of U compounds prior to processing the waste through |
| the washer."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "After resorting and shredding cartridge filters, HEPA filters and similar   |
| items, the material in the process batch is recounted using NDA. Any         |
| material in excess of 250 g 235U is set aside outside the mass controlled    |
| area and becomes a part of the next process batch."                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Estimated Amount, Enrichment, and Form Of Licensed Material:"               |
|                                                                              |
| "The licensed material is urania sludge.  The total 235U present in the      |
| process batch was calculated to be 895.9 grams.  This is 51% of the minimum  |
| critical mass for this type of material enriched to 5 wt.% 235U.  The actual |
| material involved was enriched to less than 3.6 wt% 235U."                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) Or Control Systems and a Description  |
| of the Failures Or Deficiencies:"                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The filters came from two separate waste drums that had been packaged in    |
| 1993 or early 1994.  Although waste segregation/accumulation controls were   |
| not as robust at that time as they are presently, wastes placed in such      |
| drums were required by criticality safety instructional card to contain only |
| contamination levels of uranium. Therefore, sock filters containing this     |
| much U bearing material should not have been placed in a waste drum. The NDA |
| system used to determine the U content of waste drums does not provide       |
| accurate results for concentrated high density materials such as the sludge  |
| contained in the sock filters.  This is a known limitation of the NDA        |
| system.  SPC currently takes extra precautions to ensure that the use of NDA |
| is compatible with the known limitations of this equipment and that the      |
| waste matrix in the waste drums is adequately similar to that in the         |
| standard used to calibrate the NDA system.  As previously stated, in 1993    |
| and 1994 the procedures for segregating and processing waste were not as     |
| stringent as they are now."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Corrective Actions To Restore Safety Systems and When Each Was              |
| Implemented:"                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The MERF process operators promptly segregated, sampled, and then removed   |
| from MERF the sludge accumulations discovered in the waste drums, thereby    |
| restoring compliance with the mass control limit for the facility."          |
|                                                                              |
| "SPO operating, engineering and safety personnel have reviewed all other     |
| stored containerized waste types and have confirmed that only wet waste      |
| drums may be subject to this type of failure. This determination is based on |
| the date of generation of the other drums in storage and the types of        |
| material in the drums."                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "As a precautionary measure, SPC operating personnel have started placing    |
| wet waste drums on the waste storage pad into a single tier storage array.   |
| Because record keeping requirements dictate that the storage location of     |
| each drum be accurately recorded, this action is expected to be completed in |
| about 1 week."                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Additional corrective actions are still being evaluated."                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will notify NRC Region 4.                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37425       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:59[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  YOUNG                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN   R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK 31 INOPERABLE DURING MAINTENANCE                         |
|                                                                              |
| On July 21, 2000 the Spray Additive Tank 31 Outlet Isolation Valve (SI-1841) |
| was shut for approximately eight and one half-hours, to perform maintenance  |
| on one of the downstream automatic Sodium Hydroxide isolation valves.  This  |
| would have effectively prevented Sodium Hydroxide from being sprayed into    |
| Containment if the Spray Pumps had been required.  This is not in accordance |
| with Tech Spec 3.3.B.1a, and the associated Bases which requires the Spray   |
| Additive Tank to be operable above Cold Shutdown.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Therefore, isolation of this tank could have potentially placed the          |
| Containment Spray System outside of its design basis; however, the           |
| investigation of this event is ongoing.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| This event was discovered by the System Engineer while performing a periodic |
| review of system unavailability (time) in accordance with the Maintenance    |
| Rule.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+