Event Notification Report for February 14, 2000

4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF MASS CONTROL

At approximately 1145 on February 14, 2000, nuclear safety confirmed that 55 cans of grinder swarf material (grindings from making fuel pellets) was stored at pad storage in violation of the established mass limit for heterogeneous material. The mass limit used to determine each can's allowable weight was incorrectly assigned. The storage of these cans at this location resulted in a loss of mass control. Geometry control on spacing remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed.

Relocation of affected cans to approved storage locations is in progress and is expected to be completed within 90 minutes of this report. Scrap material movement from the Gadolinium Shop to Fuel Support pad storage has been suspended pending investigation and implementation for corrective actions.

SAFETY SIGNICANCE OF EVENTS:

Low safety significance - fixed geometry/spacing control on heterogeneous scrap storage remained intact.

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:

Multiple failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur.

CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATIO, ETC.)

Geometry/Spacing: single-planar array of 3-gallon heterogeneous scrap demonstrated safe optimally moderated, 12-inches edge-to-edge spacing provided by treated wooden storage racks. Mass: mass of 3-gallon heterogeneous scrap material limited to 16.5 kgs (gross) weight per can.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL :

Affected 3-gallon gadolinium grinder scrap cans contained approximately 25 kgs of Uranium Dioxide versus limit of 16.5 kgs gross weight. At a 12-inch edge-to-edge spacing, single planar array storage configuration is demonstrated safe for "optimally moderated" heterogeneous Uranium Dioxide plus water mixture.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTATION OF THE FAILURES OF DEFICIENCIES:

Administrative mass control on gadolinium grinder swarf.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

1. All gadolinium scrap movement to fuel support suspended.
2. Relocated affected cans to approved storage locations under NSE direction.
3. Investigation and implementation of corrective actions pending.

The Licensee will inform NRC Region 2, State and Local officials of this event notification.

24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF GEOMETRY/VOLUME CRITICALITY CONTROL IN THE X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY

"On 2/14/00 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of the loss of one control parameter, geometry/volume in the X-705 decontamination facility. A vinyl covered foam padded chair was found in the high bay area with the vinyl covering worn open. This is a violation of NSCA-0705_076 inadvertent containers. The foam padding thickness was greater than the requirement for absorbent material described in NCSA-0705_076.

"The system integrity of nearby uranium-bearing pipes was maintained. Therefore, no solution was actually present to accumulate on/in the padding of the chair.

"The chair was moved to an area in the high bay not covered by the above described NCSA. Compliance with NCSA--0705_076 is restored

"THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

"A padded chair (seat dimensions approximately 17.5" x 21" x 3.5") was used near a uranium solution transfer line. The vinyl on the seat was damaged to the point that any solution if splashed in to the chair could have accumulated in the padding. The padding is an unsafe height > 1 .5") and has a total volume >20 liters, which is well above the allowed limit of 4.8 liters. The transfer line near this seat can contain high concentrations of HEU solution.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):

"If the solution line had failed, uranium-bearing solution could have splashed/sprayed onto the seat padding and accumulated. Since the total volume of the padding was greater than the allowed 4.8 liters and the height (excluding and swelling of the material) was greater than the allowed 1.5" an unsafe condition would have resulted and a criticality could have resulted.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):

The parameter lost was the geometry/volume of the absorbent material on the chair. The physical integrity of the transfer line was maintained.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST

"No material accumulated on/in the chair padding. The transfer line near the chair can contain HEU solutions with high uranium concentrations.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES

"Requirement #4 requires that absorbent material be covered or modified to prevent an unfavorable accumulation in the event of a solution leak in a nearby system. The chair padding was absorbent and the vinyl covering had degraded to the point that solution hitting the chair could accumulate in the padding.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:

"Compliance was regained when the chair was moved to an area not covered by NCSA-0705_076. Crew briefing are being conducted shiftily and the chair in question is caution boundaried."

Operations personnel notified both the DOE Site Representative and the NRC Resident Inspector.

SPDS DECLARED INOPERABLE

THE PLANT NOTICED A FAILURE OF THEIR SPDS PORTION OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY COMPUTER SYSTEM (ERFCS) AT 1133 EST. HOWEVER ,THE SYSTEM WAS RETURNED TO OPERABLE CONDITION AT 1140 HOURS. THIS CONDITION WAS DUE TO SYSTEM TIME NOT UPDATING.
THE ERFCS WAS REBOOTED SATISFACTORILY AND ALL PORTIONS OF THE SYSTEM WERE NOTED TO BE FUNCTIONING CORRECTLY AT 1140 HOURS. INSPECTION OF THE SYSTEM ALARM SUMMARY INDICATED THAT THE LAST TIME A VALID SYSTEM TIME UPDATE OCCURRED WAS 1013 HOURS.

THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.

THREE CONTAINMENT NITROGEN MAKEUP FOR TORUS AND DRYWELL VALVES ARE NOT CAPABLE OF CLOSING DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT.

Control Room was notified by system engineering that design basis review calculations have determined that Air Operated Valves CV4311, CV4312, and CV4313 (containment nitrogen makeup for torus and drywell) are not capable of closing during a design basis accident. The spring closing force is borderline such that the spring force may not be large enough to close the valve when the containment is at its maximum pressure during a design basis accident.

CV4311, CV4312, and CV4313 have been declared inoperable. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 condition B to isolate the affected penetrations within one hour. The valves have been closed and at this time the licensee is de-energizing the power to the valves.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE AT 1137 ON 02/22/00 BY BRIAN HUPKE TO JOLLIFFE * * *

After testing the above valves and reviewing the margins in the analysis used, the licensee has concluded that the valves were actually capable of performing their intended containment isolation function. The licensee declared these valves operable at 1619 CST on 02/17/00. Since this event is no longer reportable to the NRC, the licensee desires to retract this event and does not plan to submit an LER on this event.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Jim Creed.