United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Individuals - B

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Name and
NRC Action Number
NRC Action Type Date Issued Description
Robbie E. Balentine
IA-06-043
IAORDER 04/13/2007 On April 13, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Balentine as a result of a settlement agreement entered into as a result of Alternative Dispute Resolution requested by the individual. The settlement agreement acknowledges the NRC and the individual's agreement to disagree that the individual deliberately violated 10 CFR 50.5, "Deliberate Misconduct," when, as Lead Foreman for Stone and Webster Engineering Company, he directed and allowed unauthorized open blasting to be performed inside the torus of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, causing the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant to be in violation of its procedures associated with radiation protection. The individual did acknowledge that, as Lead Foreman, his communications to employees in the area of safe work practices must be especially clear and unequivocal and that, contrary to this, his communications were poor and failed to convey clear instructions or expectations.
Jay T. Barnes
IA-12-003
IANOV 04/12/2012 On April 12, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Jay T. Barnes, formerly a security shift supervisor at Northern States Power Company’s Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (Prairie Island), for a violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2) associated with a Severity Level III violation involving his deliberate submittal to a licensee information that he knew to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC.  Specifically, while employed as a security shift supervisor at Prairie Island, Mr. Barnes deliberately submitted a urine sample to Northern States Power Company that he knew was not his own taken at the time of testing during a random drug screen on July 23, 2010.  The accuracy of fitness-for-duty test results is material to the NRC. 
Bradley Berg
IA-12-08
IANOV 08/10/2012 On August 10, 2012, the NRC issued Mr. Bradley Berg, a radiographer’s assistant, a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.10 involving Mr. Berg’s deliberate actions while performing radiographic operations for Quality Inspection and Testing, Inc. on October 27, 2010. Specifically, Mr. Berg deliberately failed to (1) maintain control and constant surveillance of licensed material that is not in storage, pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1802, and (2) wear, on the trunk of his body, a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm rate meter, and a personnel dosimeter, pursuant to 10 CFR 34.47(a).
Steve L. Bibb
IA-11-042
IANOV 01/05/2012 On January 5, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Steve L. Bibb, a licensed operator at the River Bend Station for a Severity Level IV violation involving 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate misconduct.  Mr. Bibb deliberately violated an Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure which prohibits internet access in the At-the-Controls area of the Control Room, except as specifically authorized by the Operations Manager and caused the River Bend Station to be in violation of Technical Specifications.  Specifically, Mr. Bibb accessed the internet, for non-work-related purposes, while standing watch as the reactor operator “At-the-Controls” in the “At-the-Controls” area of the control room.
Terry N. Blanchard
IA-11-043
IANOV 01/05/2012 On January 5, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Terry N. Blanchard, a licensed operator at the River Bend Station for a Severity Level IV violation involving 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate misconduct.  Mr. Blanchard deliberately violated an Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure which prohibits internet access in the At-the-Controls area of the Control Room, except as specifically authorized by the Operations Manager and caused the River Bend Station to be in violation of Technical Specifications.  Specifically, Mr. Blanchard accessed the internet, for non-work-related purposes, while standing watch as the reactor operator “At-the-Controls” in the “At-the-Controls” area of the control room.
Landon E. Brittain
IA 13-024
IAORDER 10/28/2013 On October 28, 2013, the NRC issued an immediately effective Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities to Mr. Landon E. Brittain, a former Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden) senior reactor operator (SRO) until such time that he can provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s requirements. Specifically, the NRC determined that Mr. Brittain was approached and recruited by a now former Dresden SRO to assist in an armored car robbery. Mr. Brittain’s failure to report this aberrant behavior to Dresden management is a violation of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants.” The NRC is also aware that local authorities have charged Mr. Brittain with a number of criminal offenses, including aggravated vehicular hijacking, vehicular hijacking, and obstruction of justice. The NRC has concluded that Mr. Brittain’s failure to report the questionable behavior and his apparent participation in criminal activities have demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness. This enforcement action is necessary to provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that the protection of public health and safety will not be compromised by Mr. Brittain’s involvement in NRC-licensed activities.
Louis F. Brown, III
IA-11-046
IANOV 01/05/2012 On January 5, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Louis F. Brown, III, a licensed operator at the River Bend Station for a Severity Level IV violation involving 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate misconduct.  Mr. Brown deliberately violated an Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure which prohibits internet access in the At-the-Controls area of the Control Room, except as specifically authorized by the Operations Manager and caused the River Bend Station to be in violation of Technical Specifications.  Specifically, Mr. Brown accessed the internet, for non-work-related purposes, while standing watch as the reactor operator “At-the-Controls” in the “At-the-Controls” area of the control room.
Jon Brumer
IA-07-027
IAORDER 01/22/2008 On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a contract security Lieutenant with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on activities that occurred on or about August of 2005. Specifically, Mr. Brumer deliberately removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency response weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. As a result, Mr. Brumer caused FPL to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 73. Mr. Brumer's actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1), which states that an employee of a licensee or contractor, who knowingly provides to any licensee, applicant, contractor, or subcontractor, any components, equipment, materials, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's activities in this part, may not engage in deliberate misconduct that causes or would have caused, if not detected, a licensee or applicant to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order. Additionally, on or about February 19, 2006, Mr. Brumer provided a transcribed statement to an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) agent regarding his involvement in the breaking of a firing pin that was later determined to be incomplete and inaccurate. Mr. Brumer's actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2), which states, in part, that an employee of a licensee or contractor may not deliberately submit to the NRC, a licensee, or a licensee=s contractor, information that the person submitting the information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC.
Michael J. Buhrman
IA 13-025
IAORDER 10/28/2013 On October 28, 2013, the NRC issued an immediately effective Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities to Mr. Michael J. Buhrman, a former Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden) senior reactor operator (SRO) until such time that he can provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s requirements. Specifically, the NRC determined that Mr. Buhrman held conversations with a now former Dresden Station SRO and a former equipment operator, in which Mr. Buhrman either recruited them, or attempted to recruit them to assist him in an armored car robbery. However, prior to executing the armored car robbery, Mr. Buhrman was apprehended by police for hijacking a car at gunpoint, released on bail and fled the country. Mr. Buhrman was later tried in absentia, found guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking and sentenced to a 40-year prison term. The NRC has concluded that Mr. Buhrman’s criminal activities related to both the carjacking and the planning of an armored car robbery have demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness. This enforcement action is necessary to provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that the protection of public health and safety will not be compromised by Mr. Buhrman’s involvement in NRC-licensed activities.
Anthony Bullard
IA-13-026
IANOV 07/29/2013 On July 29, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Anthony Bullard, formerly employed as a contract General Foreman at Florida Power and Light Company's (FPL) Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, for a violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2) associated with a Severity Level III violation involving his deliberate submittal to a licensee, information that he knew to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC. Specifically, while employed as a contract General Foreman at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Mr. Bullard signed paperwork certifying that the urine specimen he was providing during a random drug screen was his and was not adulterated. He then submitted a urine sample to FPL that he knew was not his own at the time of testing, in an attempt to subvert the testing. The information was material to the NRC because licensees, through fitness-for-duty testing, provide the requisite assurance that workplaces are free from the presence of illegal drugs and alcohol.
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, December 26, 2013