Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Individuals - B
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NRC Action Number
|NRC Action Type||Date Issued||Description|
|Robbie E. Balentine
|IAORDER||04/13/2007||On April 13, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Balentine as a result of a settlement agreement entered into as a result of Alternative Dispute Resolution requested by the individual. The settlement agreement acknowledges the NRC and the individual's agreement to disagree that the individual deliberately violated 10 CFR 50.5, "Deliberate Misconduct," when, as Lead Foreman for Stone and Webster Engineering Company, he directed and allowed unauthorized open blasting to be performed inside the torus of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, causing the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant to be in violation of its procedures associated with radiation protection. The individual did acknowledge that, as Lead Foreman, his communications to employees in the area of safe work practices must be especially clear and unequivocal and that, contrary to this, his communications were poor and failed to convey clear instructions or expectations.|
|IAORDER||07/24/2014||On July 24, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Trey Brattin for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(1) involving deliberate misconduct that caused his employer, Techchorr USA, LLC, to be in violation of the 10 CFR 34.47(a) requirement for dosimetry to be worn by an individual while performing radiographic operations. Specifically, at various times between July 2010 and January 2011, Mr. Brattin deliberately failed to wear, on the trunk of his body, a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm ratemeter, and a personnel dosimeter while conducting radiographic operations in Wyoming.|
|Landon E. Brittain
|IAORDER||10/28/2013||On October 28, 2013, the NRC issued an immediately effective Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities to Mr. Landon E. Brittain, a former Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden) senior reactor operator (SRO) until such time that he can provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s requirements. Specifically, the NRC determined that Mr. Brittain was approached and recruited by a now former Dresden SRO to assist in an armored car robbery. Mr. Brittain’s failure to report this aberrant behavior to Dresden management is a violation of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants.” The NRC is also aware that local authorities have charged Mr. Brittain with a number of criminal offenses, including aggravated vehicular hijacking, vehicular hijacking, and obstruction of justice. The NRC has concluded that Mr. Brittain’s failure to report the questionable behavior and his apparent participation in criminal activities have demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness. This enforcement action is necessary to provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that the protection of public health and safety will not be compromised by Mr. Brittain’s involvement in NRC-licensed activities.|
|IAORDER||01/22/2008||On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a contract security Lieutenant with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on activities that occurred on or about August of 2005. Specifically, Mr. Brumer deliberately removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency response weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. As a result, Mr. Brumer caused FPL to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 73. Mr. Brumer's actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1), which states that an employee of a licensee or contractor, who knowingly provides to any licensee, applicant, contractor, or subcontractor, any components, equipment, materials, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's activities in this part, may not engage in deliberate misconduct that causes or would have caused, if not detected, a licensee or applicant to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order. Additionally, on or about February 19, 2006, Mr. Brumer provided a transcribed statement to an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) agent regarding his involvement in the breaking of a firing pin that was later determined to be incomplete and inaccurate. Mr. Brumer's actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2), which states, in part, that an employee of a licensee or contractor may not deliberately submit to the NRC, a licensee, or a licensee=s contractor, information that the person submitting the information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC.|
|Bryan J. Buchanan
On April 20, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Bryan J. Buchanan, a former Rigging Manager at the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I), for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 52.4, “Deliberate Misconduct.” Specifically, on March 1, 2013, Mr. Buchanan deliberately instructed subordinate employees at CB&I’s Lake Charles facility (CB&I-LC) to knowingly omit from statements supporting an Incident Investigation Report that: (1) the V. C. Summer CA 01-20 sub-module had dropped approximately 3.5 feet; (2) improper rigging equipment (nylon slings) had been used and had broken; and (3) the sub-module had sustained damage. These actions caused other CB&I-LC employees to submit incomplete and inaccurate information to their employer, a contractor to an NRC license holder, regarding the incident, and caused the company to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions,” for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality.
|Michael J. Buhrman
|IAORDER||10/28/2013||On October 28, 2013, the NRC issued an immediately effective Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities to Mr. Michael J. Buhrman, a former Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden) senior reactor operator (SRO) until such time that he can provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s requirements. Specifically, the NRC determined that Mr. Buhrman held conversations with a now former Dresden Station SRO and a former equipment operator, in which Mr. Buhrman either recruited them, or attempted to recruit them to assist him in an armored car robbery. However, prior to executing the armored car robbery, Mr. Buhrman was apprehended by police for hijacking a car at gunpoint, released on bail and fled the country. Mr. Buhrman was later tried in absentia, found guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking and sentenced to a 40-year prison term. The NRC has concluded that Mr. Buhrman’s criminal activities related to both the carjacking and the planning of an armored car robbery have demonstrated a lack of trustworthiness. This enforcement action is necessary to provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that the protection of public health and safety will not be compromised by Mr. Buhrman’s involvement in NRC-licensed activities.|