

DRAFT Nuclear Sector Specific Plan (NSSP),
Chapter 5, Develop and Implement Protective Programs

DHS supported edits to the previously approved Commission text are bolded and bracketed.

Since any revision to the NRC DBTs (i.e., for radiological sabotage or theft or diversion) should include an assessment of the best available intelligence information, the NRC will maintain its collaboration with the Intelligence and law enforcement communities, including DHS, regarding its assessment of the threat environment **[to the nuclear sector]** as part of the DBT development process. In addition, recognizing that the DBT characteristics form the basis for the protective measures and designs of the protective strategies for commercial nuclear power plants and Category 1 fuel cycle facilities, in developing proposed changes to either DBT, the NRC **[should]**, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, continue to seek the views of the plant owner/operators and Sector Security Partners regarding the impacts of the proposed changes. **[In accordance with its statutory responsibilities and authorities, DHS will seek the views of its security partners on the proposed changes for consistency with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan approach to risk management and provide feedback to the NRC.]** The NRC will consider these and other inputs as part of its decision-making process with its statutory responsibilities and authority.

Enclosure