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12	The Committee met in Room T2 B3 of the
13	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint
14	North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, at
15	8:30 a.m., Michael T. Ryan, Chairman, presiding.
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17	<u>PRESENT</u> :
18	MICHAEL T. RYAN ACNW Chairman
19	ALLEN G. CROFF ACNW Vice Chairman
20	RUTH F. WEINER ACNW Member
21	JAMES H. CLARKE ACNW Member
22	WILLIAM J. HINZE ACNW Member
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## P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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8:34 a.m.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. If I could ask folks to, please, move to their seats and come to order. This is the third day of the 170<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste. My name is Michael Ryan, Chairman of the ACNW. The other Members of the Committee present are Allen Croff, Vice Chair, Ruth Weiner, James Clarke and William Hinze.

During today's meeting, the Committee will be briefed by the National Academy of Science Staff on the findings of the Congressionally-mandated study of radioactive waste streams stored in tanks at three DOE sites. We'll be updated by the NRC staff on the progress and the development of standard review plans to be used by the NRC staff to review DOE waste determinations and we will be briefed by the NRC staff regarding the International Commission on Radiological Protection Draft Report, titled "The Scope Radiological Protection Regulations." The Committee will also discuss proposed letters and reports.

Latif Hamdan is the designated federal official for today's initial session and this meeting is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. We have

received no written comments or requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's sessions. However, should anyone wish to address the Committee, please, make your wishes known to one of the Committee staff.

It is requested that speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so they can be readily heard. It is also requested that if you have cell phones or pagers, you kindly turn them off. Thank you very much.

I would like to open by first recognizing Commissioner Lyons is with us this morning for a time and we appreciate your attendance Commissioner and thank you very much for being here.

Without further ado, I'll turn over this session to Vice Chair Allen Croff who will be leading us on the next few topics through lunch. Allen?

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thank you, Dr. Ryan.

Our first order of business is we're going to hear a report on a recently completed National Academy of Sciences study, familiarly known as the Study on Certain Tank Wastes. The longer title is on the screen and I won't read it. I would like to introduce our speakers.

First is Dr. Frank Parker, who chaired the Committee. He is a distinguished professor of civil and environmental engineering at Vanderbilt. His research interests include hazardous and chemical radioactive waste disposal policy, risk analysis of hazardous and radioactive waste disposal, thermal pollution and water resource engineering.

Next, Milt Levenson, over here on my left, is a chemical engineer with more than 50 years of experience in nuclear energy and related fields, including work related to nuclear safety, fuel cycle, water reactors, advanced reactors and remote control. He has worked in a number of places, including Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne, EPRI, Bechtel and he is a former member of this Committee.

Next, Dr. Anne Smith, over on my far left, is an expert in integrated assessment of environmental and energy problems, specializing in risk management, decision analysis, benefit cost analysis and economic modeling. She has applied these techniques to issues such as contaminated site management, nuclear waste management, global climate change, air quality and food safety.

And also with us on my far right are two members of the National Academy of Sciences staff that

1 worked on the report, Kevin Crowley, closest to me, 2 who is, I guess, the staff director, is that the proper title, for the Nuclear and Radiation Studies 3 I got it right. And next to him is Micah 4 Lowenthal, who was the lead staff member on this 5 6 particular study. 7 With that, Frank, go ahead and take it 8 away. Well, it's a very distinct 9 DR. PARKER: pleasure for me to be here, though I'm used to sitting 10 11 on the other side of the table more than I am standing 12 up here in front of the Committee. I'm going to try to stay closely to what the report had to say, but 13 14 since this is being taped and will be reproduced, I'm 15 going to throw in some personal asides and I'll try to identify those as we go along. 16 If not, I'm sure the Committee Members or 17 the staff will be happy to straighten me out and 18 19 particularly the chair of this session, who is also a Committee Member by the way, he forgot to mention that 20 21 he has a conflict of interest, because he was also a 22 very prominent member of our committee. The three sites, of course, are Hanford, 23 24 Savannah River and Idaho and the report, as you know,

was produced as a result of a Congressional-mandate,

which required us to have an interim report six months out on Savannah River site and then six months later on the three sites.

As you know, this is a very accelerated schedule and we've had some discussions with staff and ourselves about how to avoid being in those circumstances, as people in this room can well understand, that doesn't necessarily lead to the best results.

We have also been forced then to reduce the scope of the study that the Congress asked us to do, because we could not cover it in sufficient detail to satisfy ourselves with the requirements of the Academy.

Okay. This is an outline of what I'm going to say, of course, in the time available to me, I'm going to try to talk for less than a half hour, though faculty members, as you know, 50 minutes is the standard time period, but we'll have some of the other committee members also join in, I'm sure, to say a few words about whether they agree or disagree with the things that I had to say.

Under the background, I want to point out, and you'll see that in the slides in a moment, the differences in the tanks at each site and between

sites. As some of you know, I was a consultant to the predecessor of this Committee for many years and we looked at these sites and we looked at these tanks and because we looked at only specific features of it, I think I and some of the members of the staff, who had also been to these sites a number of times, were really surprised when you look in detail at what these tanks contain and how they differ from site to site.

And so if we look at it, and you'll see in a moment, the tanks differ among themselves at each site, and you'll see that in the overheads. The construction of them differs, the contents of them differ and their natural surroundings differ, as well as the social and political climate in which they individually operate. So there's no cookie cutter that will produce a result that will satisfy all of these tanks.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Frank, just a quick interruption, I apologize. We have a phone bridge to Savannah River site, Kent Rosenberger, from the SRS staff is on the line. I just wanted everybody to realize we had a phone bridge. Thanks.

DR. PARKER: I want to say something about the committee. It was a very large committee. We had 21 members in the committee. We had six staff members

with -- including ex-officio Kevin Crowley, who played an important role as well, so it was very well staffed, but also having a committee of 21 people is a problem, as you mostly likely gather.

I want to do this in a chronological order, the order in which the tanks were built. And here we see, of course, very familiar the single and double-shell tanks at the Hanford site. And you can also see on it a quite large number of rises or entry points, but as you can notice, even though this is not the scale, these are very, very small, so it's very difficult to get the instrumentation in there. It's very difficult to get the machinery or the tools that will be able to take the waste out of the tank.

And here is a very idealized view of what we're going to look at, the supernate and the salt cake and then the sludge. I should say that all of these tanks, as almost all of you know, are beyond their design lifetime. And in the single-shell tank, a good fraction are known leakers and I think we could almost say that the rest of them mostly likely have leakers as well, they just haven't been tested enough to find out, because it wouldn't make very much difference as to what's going on.

One of the reasons why the Hanford tank,

and I'll come back to the tanks, is so different, they had a much more checkered history than the other sites and we'll look at that in just a moment. And here are the Savannah River sites, you know, it's surprising that the Hanford tanks differed so much, but this is almost like the reactors in this country, everyone wanted their own design. And so here, we see four designs and only one of them, as you can see here, is actually a double-shell tank. So it's the only one that would be compliant and that would meet the EPA requirements.

I should also point out, which I think everybody in this room knows, that the processing is an aqueous acidic product and then it has to be neutralized before it is put into these tanks for Savannah River and Hanford. Whereas, when we go to the next one, which is the Idaho, there they have stayed in the acidic farm and just calcined.

Again, you see the differences in the design, even though these simple bins -- I should also point out that some of the Savannah River tanks actually sit in the groundwater or tend to be reached by the groundwater. Whereas, of course, the Hanford and the Idaho tanks are a very great distance above the water table. I think most people don't realize

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and I don't think we realize ourselves until we actually saw a markup of it.

This is the inside of the Savannah River tank and these are the coolant coils. This is before start-up and so the net result is after the wastes the in there and after sludges started accumulating and some of the material hardened, now, you're going to have to try to clean out. And these, of course, are almost nuclide for the precipitation of the material onto these pipes. Now, you're going to have to get in there and get the waste out of this maze and that's a big challenge in itself.

That's too far. And this is the tank waste sludge from Savannah River site and, as you can see, it doesn't flow very easily and some of it is very, very hard to get out. And put down some of the very specific conditions and how the sites differ from each other, since you have it all -- oops, I skipped one some how or the other, I want to go back a moment then. I want to go back two, actually, three. There we are.

Not only do the single-shell tanks leak, the double-shell tanks leak and here is what we see on the outside of the double-shell tank, but within the containing pad and it's going to be a difficult

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problem to get this waste out of there as well. This is an idealized view. The reason I wanted to put this in here is because notice that the majority of the radioactive material is in the salt supernate, which is the easiest part to get out and in the sludge. And the salt cake actually has very small amounts of the waste.

And the other thing that I don't think is widely appreciated is the amount of junk that is These are steel measuring tossed into those tanks. tapes which after they took the measurements, they just dropped them in the tank and that's not the only thing that they drop into the tanks and the next one we will see some of that. As you can see, we talked about the different things that were put into the tanks and so we're going to have to cover the waste, trying to get around some of the things that were put see, soil, debris, failed in there, as we can equipment put into the tanks. And so it's not a simple task even without that, with that in there it makes it, of course, even more difficult.

Okay. If we look at the natural features,

I think it's quite important to notice how different
they are. In this, the Idaho and the Hanford sites
are very, very -- are much more similar to each other

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than they are to the -- sorry. The Hanford and Savannah -- I said it right the first time.

The Hanford and Idaho are very similar to each other in the physical and the natural conditions. Whereas, on the radioactive conditions, the Savannah River and the Hanford site are very similar. But if you look at the important items, look at the distances to the nearest surface water, the nearest ground water, the depth that flows into those things, the depths of the groundwater table, the precipitation and the amount of infiltration, you can see how different they are and the different problems that they all present.

And, of course, the main objective in showing this is we want to figure out how to prevent this infiltration to getting into the tanks and through the covers. And I think it's -- I don't know where it is in this slide list. I guess, there's an addendum to the cover, it would be on there and it will eventually show. None of these have been installed, so we really don't want to say very much about it now and didn't say very much about it.

Well, I mentioned that this was a result of a Congressional-mandate in the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, and they asked the

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committee to look at the radiological characteristics of the waste and see whether there was enough information available to proceed and they asked us to look more about the compliance with the performance objectives and the adequacy of the plans for monitoring and whether the technology was suitable and the technology gaps, etcetera.

I'm not going to read it, because you have it in front of you, but I think the last part perhaps, from my point of view, was good, because it said we could make recommendations that we consider appropriate including, so this gave us a lot of leeway and we took advantage of it to the extent that we have the time to do that.

Well, one of the things that we didn't highlight in the report, but I want to say a few words about at the moment, and that's to try to put this into some time perspective and this is my own -- these are my own views. The first international meeting on radioactive waste disposal took place in 1959 in Monte There were papers presented by Hanford, Carlo. Oak Ridge that dealt Brookhaven and with the experiments on vitrification of tank waste. in '59 and that means that a lot of people in this room weren't even born and people were already talking

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about vitrifying the tank wastes.

The second item I want to put in perspective, by the mid-1960s, experiments had been carried out with spent fuel in salt mines where they reached the temperature and the dosages to the salt that showed that it was possible for salt to contain the waste, even though these were short period tests. So that's over 30 years ago, more than 30 years ago that proof had been shown, at least to a limited extent.

And in 1972, Burger or DOE or AEC, whatever it was called at that time, they announced in 1972 that within three years they would have an operating repository at a total cost of \$25 million. And when you look at the \$6 billion and counting and where we are on Yucca Mountain, you see that times have changed a bit. But I'm doing this to put it in perspective on what it means when we made our recommendations. This was certainly in the back of our minds, at least it was in the back of my mind, when we were talking about this.

The other thing I wanted to talk about or say in putting it in perspective, any private company that operated on that basis would have taken 50 years to get close to solving or maybe getting close to

solving the problem, obviously, would be out of business.

Well, we weren't asked that question and we didn't, obviously, try to answer it. We also looked, and I'll say a few more words about it and did say something about it, about we're asked to look at DOE's recommendations. And as you know, in some cases, they talk about doing things in perpetuity, which means infinity. And the question is how is that possible? It's like the million years that you people here at NRC are going to have to wrestle with very shortly when they get an application. I mean, it's insane on the face of it, as far as I'm concerned, in my own views, obviously.

The next thing that we did in the committee is we set up an ideal case. What would we like to see in an ideal case? What would be the best possible thing that could happen? Of course, we would like to see 100 percent retrieval. Get all of the waste out of the tank, but leave the tank bodies themselves behind, the cost and the worker risk of excavating the tanks is just out of proportion to the reduction and the risk that they will represent.

The second thing we would like to see is 100 percent separation of the radioactive material

from the nonradioactive material. This would reduce the cost enormously of treating the radioactive waste.

And the third thing we would like to see is that the radioactive end waste would be bound up in some fashion that it would last in perpetuity, obviously, none of that is possible. So the question is what is feasible? And we also point out we need to do that taking into account the other wastes that are on the sites, the other sources of radio -- dosages of radioactive material and dosages to the people and to the environment and to the workers.

Because if we did the ideal thing, the dosages to the workers would be the main risk. Whereas, the dosages to the public would be remarkably reduced. We knew we had to back off of that, because that was not possible. And then our first major finding is that we believe that DOE's overall approach for management and disposal of tank waste is When we say the overall approach, we mean applicable. the retrieval, the stabilization and the disposal, but there are still very many important technical and programmatic challenges.

The essential question that's in the back of everybody's mind is how clean is clean enough? How much do we really have to get out of there? Well,

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it's clear, from what I have said earlier and that's one of the reasons I went through that other material, that there's no single answer and that there are a whole flock of things that need to be taken into account, because of the very great differences within the tanks, within the sites themselves, etcetera.

And I want to emphasize we're dealing with all of these periods -- problems over a period of time and so things are going to change, as they have changed since those waste were actually put into the tanks. And so we recommend that DOE should pursue a more risk informed, consistent, participatory and transparent process. And we believe very much that this will produce a better decision and will reduce the programmatic risk. And as you probably know, this has been a mantra in recent Academy reports. They all basically say this and we think that this will be a better and more widely accepted solution.

The other thing I think people -- I think we didn't appreciate ourselves until we actually got to the point of doing it. That only two tanks out of the 246 tanks at the three sites have been cleaned out and backfilled with grout. None of them has a permanent cover on this. And when you stop to think how many years now plutonium production has ceased at

these sites, this is a long time for this to take place.

I don't want to dump on DOE. They are not totally responsible for all of this. A lot of things were beyond their control. And so since we're just at the very beginning of this, this is certainly not an introduction. We're not in an industrial mode here at all. And I also should say that the two tanks were among the easiest tanks, the simplest ones, were the least problems. And so we haven't really tackled the main problems of these tanks.

And so we say in our report there's still time to develop the tools and the processes to address these things and that DOE should initiate a very targeted and aggressive R&D program and we make some recommendations. If you look at the amount of money that DOE has spent in research on this, not just development but research, it's not commensurate with the cost of cleaning up these sites, not even close to the costs of cleaning up these sites.

So they have a lot to gain by doing a good deal more of research. And eventually, this would make the cost much less and would make the time to complete the job much less than it is. Certainly, it has been going on for a long period of time. There

ought to be ways to hasten that.

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Everybody in this room knows this sort of flow diagram, so I'm not going to look at it. You can look at it at your leisure if you like. Again, as you know, Hanford and Savannah River are very similar to Idaho. Sorry?

PARTICIPANT: Do you want to go back one? DR. PARKER: That's it. Okay. One of the first questions was does DOE know enough about the tank waste characteristics? Now, if you'll look at what's been done at all the sites, they have spent a lot of time, a lot of money and everyone comes to basically the same conclusion. There is very little to be gained by regurgitating that material again. They do know enough now to get the material out of the tanks, but then to go further, they need to know the waste composition in greater detail for processing So this can only be done after the waste comes out of the tank.

Okay. We also made a recommendation in our interim report and mostly likely this raised DOE's ire more than almost anything else, that they should decouple the schedule for the tank waste retrieval from tank closure. We believe, now, we say this in the report, that there is little technical advantage

to accelerated closure of the individual tanks. And if the R&D program that we recommend is followed out, then it would be possible to remove more of the waste and hopefully in a shorter time and get closer to the ideal of getting most of the waste out of there.

And I also point out in the report that DOE, at the Savannah River site, is decoupling the closure from the retrieval for some of the tanks. So that's already in their own plants. And as we say, we don't believe this needs to delay the final closure of the tanks. Again, we make a very strong point that decisions should not be based solely on schedule conformance. If everything were done according to schedule, obviously, we wouldn't be waiting 50 years to close up the tanks as we are now.

We are happy to say that we believe that the technical quality and the public transparency of the DOE report has improved markedly over the last year. And we certainly commend that. We have great difficulty with some of the earlier documents. We first noticed that difference in the responses to requests for information by the U.S. NRC for their review and those of the states, and we believe that the DOE should continue to provide these transparent independent peer review of critical data and analysis.

I should point out that the Academy does This report had 15 outside reviewers, 15 this, too. outside reviewers, and that's not the end, because the Academy also has a Report Review Committee. And they think that is such an important -- to see that committee responds our to the reviewers. They think it is so important that the Report Review Committee is staffed only by Members of the Academy. They have no outside people. take peer review very seriously. And I personally believe that every report and every decision, major decision is improved by peer review.

One of the other things we were asked about was post-closure. And as I said, none of the tanks have gotten to this point yet, but we don't think they can afford to neglect what they should be doing at this time and that is to be making plans and installing devices that would give them means of monitoring the closure or the grout as they do it. So it cannot wait 30 years before they come up with a similar plan. They need to do it, but without great haste, but with -- stay on the course.

We have specific recommendations for the various sites. At Savannah River, we have doubts about the plans for closure, point compliance and

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assumptions about exposure scenarios. We also -based upon our belief that we should get as close as
feasible to the ideal state about the installation and
use of the DDA for longer periods of time, therefore,
leaving much more radioactive material on site. We
recommended that DOE should develop alternatives or
enhancements to solve the tank space problem.

At the Hanford site, we also have reservations about the bulk vitrification process and we think that that ought to be reviewed.

At the Idaho Laboratory, we thought they were making really quite good progress.

We have other issues that we did not deal with in quite as great length and some of which you have already seen, the interwall spaces and the double-wall tanks, the disposal of the calcite, the bin waste at the Idaho site, that's not been done without the actual waste, but we think it ought to be tested with the actual waste and some problems about whether or not the -- it's possible to have off-site disposal of some of the Hanford tank waste in the Idaho sodium-bearing waste and the philosophy and methodology from the post-closure monitor.

And so we think they need to do some more work on these items as well and we believe that how

the Government will define perpetuity at the sites that are unsuitable for unrestricted release.

You know, I've hit the highlights and I just want to say a few more words and then I would like to see if any of the committee members or staff want to make corrections or other observations. We had a very large committee, a very talented committee and we see the names of the people here. Paul Craig is not listed here, because he had already resigned from the committee at the end of the interim report, so his name does appear on the interim report and mostly likely we should put down his name as resigned as of a certain date.

And Rod Ewing for other professional reasons which found that he had to withdraw as a member, but we wanted his expertise so much that he has agreed to stay on as a consultant and was very helpful to that. And finally, I want to thank all of the people that made it possible with this very tight time line with all the very good cooperation and with DOE people, both from D.C. and at the sites, the contractor personnel, the U.S. NRC staff who are looking at some of the very same issues and we've got very detailed responses to their questions and state regulators.

We had two people on our committee, by the way, who had been or is right now a state regulator, so we had very good input from the state side, the staff at the Yakama Indian Nation and our own National Academy of Science National Research Council staff. It was a privilege for me to serve as the chairman. So as the staff can tell you, we had many sleepless hours and arguments and incriminations, but we finally got the report out and I think it's a good report, considering all of the constraints.

I'm happy to answer any questions, but I think perhaps, Allen, if you're agreeable, I'll ask the other committee members if they would like -- and staff if they would like to make any comments.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Yes, certainly. Let me just go around the table, first, and I would certainly like to hear any observations the rest of the attenders might have, especially within sort of your areas of interest within the report. I tried to get sort of a diversity here to represent different areas of interest, so, Milt, do you want to go first?

MR. LEVENSON: Okay. Well, let me say, as most of you know, I have been on a number of Academy committees over the year. I think this is the first one where the first meeting of the committee a Member

of Congress and two senior staffers from the Senate staff showed up to let the committee know how important they thought this study was. And that's somewhat unusual attention, in my experience.

Two things which have happened since our report was issued. The bulk vit process at Hanford that Frank mentioned, we seriously questioned, it is now the subject of DOE has established an external Peer Review Committee and Ray Wymer, who is a former member of the ACNW, is a member of that committee and that just started a week or so ago.

And secondly, at Savannah River, they have charted an external peer review group to look at Tank 48, that's the classic, maybe worst of the tanks which has organic residues from in-tank process days. So apparently some of the advice has been taken to heart and actually those two reviews are underway already.

I just want to mention, I think the most difficult things to cope with was even though the guidance contained the so-called Commerce Clause, namely look into anything else the committee thinks is important, with a finite number of people, all of them volunteers, and a deadline from Congress, it's not really able to do that. But one of the things that overhangs the whole business of cleaning up the tanks

is that's like trying to do a jigsaw puzzle with only the middle piece of it.

The question of how much you should leave in a tank, clearly is related to how much you leave on the same site in the burial grounds and what do you do about things that have leaked. So these are issues that were outside the scope of the committee. But in the big picture, you know, cleaning up the tank to a pristine state, even if that were possible, in the middle of a large area of contaminated ground, doesn't make a lot of sense either. So there remains really a separate issue on how clean is clean enough and it goes beyond the tanks. Anne?

MS. SMITH: There's sort of two observations that I guess I'm prepared to make. First, as we came into this, it seemed that the focus was very much on what were the performance assessments, how well were they being done and whether there were additional actions or information that would be needed to have a better understanding of whether the performance objectives could be met.

And an interesting aspect of working on this committee was that really those performance assessments really weren't there at the beginning and then they started to appear and they were evolving

rapidly. And it was really very difficult for us to opine very clearly on the quality of the work that was going into them, although we did observe patterns and trends that were showing an improvement and it had to do with the iterative process with the NRC in particular.

But also, I think what we tried to bring out, and I think it came out pretty clearly in Franks' presentation, is that really there's a broader set of issues than just performing a good performance assessment. There's really a whole risk decision making issue here that needs to take into consideration many issues that won't even appear in the formal construct of the performance assessment and I think that's sort of the, to me, key theme in the report.

The decision making process has to be more of a participatory process and one that takes into account far more than just sort of the narrowly construed definition of meeting performance objectives through a performance assessment.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Kevin, Micah?

MR. LOWENTHAL: I'll just note one thing,
which is something that I don't think Anne or Milt
have heard, but Frank has heard. Ken Picha, who is in

1 the audience here, indicated he works for DOE. 2 indicated that DOE has constructed a matrix to track 3 all of the findings and recommendations in the report 4 and what they are going to be doing about each one. 5 And so this is just to mention that it sounds like DOE is taking this very seriously. 6 7 DR. PARKER: Allen, do you want to take 8 your hat as chairman off and say something as a Member 9 of the Committee? VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: No, I don't think 10 I'm going to. 11 PARKER: Well, I would like to 12 DR. reinforce what Milt said, because we couldn't state 13 14 I didn't think we might get consensus on the 15 Committee. So in my prerogative as chairman, in the preface, I emphasized the point that Milt just brought 16 17 up and we said we have refrained to some -- page X, we have refrained from looking holistically at 18 19 problem of environmental releases, because it was not 20 in our charter. However, we would be remiss if we did not 21 22 call attention to other radioactive and hazardous 23 chemicals at the site that also can pose risks to human health and the environment. As noted in the 24

report, the tradeoff between the cost and risk of

retrieving the processing tank in this must take into consideration risk from other waste and contamination already committed to the site. So I think we -- I thought behind -- when I heard the committee members here, at least, all felt -- feel very strongly about that part.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Anybody else?

Okay. Then let's put some questions here. Professor

Hinze?

MEMBER HINZE: Frank, I enjoyed your presentation, but I would like to know a little bit more about what your consideration was of the materials that have been contaminated by leakage from tanks. Did you consider that material as well as the material in the tanks and how did you define it if you evaluated it?

DR. PARKER: We didn't consider it deliberately, because that would open up a whole flock of other things that is not in our charter at all. Where would we stop if we did that? Would we look at all the things that settle all the way to the Columbia River, all the things that went all the way to the Columbia River from the tanks? I mean, we would be looking at, you know, a great deal of the Hanford site.

1 MEMBER HINZE: Right. 2 DR. PARKER: But we did look a little bit at the piping and the space between the inner wall and 3 4 the outer wall, but even there we didn't spend much 5 time in that. MEMBER HINZE: You did mention the 6 7 monitoring centers. Are these within the tanks? Did 8 you look at them external to the tanks at all? 9 DR. PARKER: Well, at all of the sites, 10 there is a very wide network of monitoring outside the 11 tanks. We were looking at -- again, there is nothing 12 formulated yet, as I have already mentioned, about putting in sensors within the tanks, within the grout 13 14 that would cover and within the vadose zone and 15 there's practically none of that kind of marking going on in any of those sites. 16 17 MEMBER HINZE: Another question then. In terms of the research that you suggested, how in depth 18 19 did you go to suggest research areas and topics and 20 approaches and methodologies and so forth? 21 DR. PARKER: We did it with a very broad 22 brush and the way we came up with the numbers, we 23 looked at the amount of money that is in the EMSP 24 program and used that as a guide. But as I said, I

don't think that's sufficient. If you just look at

1	the total costs of the clean-up, there we should be
2	putting in much greater fraction of the resources into
3	that, because it would I think it will prove that
4	it will save a great deal of money in the future.
5	And I know that in private discussions
6	that I have had with EM-1, Jim Rispoli, he feels very
7	strongly that they have to have a much more aggressive
8	R&D program than the EM program.
9	MEMBER HINZE: Did you prioritize these
LO	research?
L1	DR. PARKER: No.
L2	MEMBER HINZE: No. Okay.
L3	DR. PARKER: We did not.
L4	MEMBER HINZE: I'll pass.
L5	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Micah, you want to
L6	add something?
L7	MR. LOWENTHAL: Yes, if I can just add
L8	that there is actually a whole chapter, Chapter 9 of
L9	the report, that is devoted to research and
20	development and so there are some specific
21	recommendations there, but most of them are pretty
22	high level as Dr. Parker mentioned.
23	I should also mention that the legislation
24	coming out of the House right now, at least on the
25	Armed Services Committee, which requested this, put

1 \$20 million into the R&D program for dealing with tank 2 I think they were not particularly more 3 specific than that, but this looks like it's a direct 4 result of the recommendations here. 5 MEMBER HINZE: Are there -- if I may? 6 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Go ahead. 7 MEMBER HINZE: Is there a DOE advisory group that is looking at the kinds of research and 8 9 prioritizing the research into the tank remediation? 10 MR. LOWENTHAL: Well, I can't speak to what DOE is doing on that, because I don't know. 11 12 the recommendation in the report is for competitive And so that would require something like that 13 14 Steering group. 15 Nothing else. MEMBER HINZE: Okay. Thank 16 you. 17 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Well, come to a microphone and name an affiliation and then --18 19 MR. PICHA: Hi, my name is Ken Picha. 20 with the Office of Environmental Management and I'll 21 say a little bit and my colleague, Marty Louterneau, 22 perhaps knows a bit more. This came at a good timing, 23 as Frank said, with regard to some of our preparation 24 activities for '08 as well as trying to see what we 25 can do with '07, this is for '07, and so we're

certainly vigorously looking at what kind of opportunities we can do in the R&D arena based on that.

Actually, this last week, we had a technical interchange workshop between representatives from Hanford, Idaho and Savannah River. It's an annual activity where they try to exchange where the sites are in terms of their different tank waste programs, including looking at things like where their technology development needs are. And coming out of that, we're hoping there is going to be some specific recommendations.

We're also, next week, reorganizing. The EM organization is reorganizing and so -- but also -- yes, I know, it's time, right? It's been a year or two, so it's time. But nonetheless, all these activities together will, I think, help us to focus a little bit more on the R&D needs and where we need to put some of our efforts, particular in the tank arena. Do you want to say anything else?

MR. LOUTERNEAU: Yes, I'm Marty Louterneau and a colleague of Ken's. I've been working on the tank closure project and I'm also the chairman of EM's Low Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group and this is the organization that in addition to

conducting the peer reviews of our low level waste disposal facility performance assessments, also develops guidance and recommendations for the preparation and conduct of our performance assessments and our waste management activities.

We had our annual business meeting three

We had our annual business meeting three weeks ago and one of the primary recommendations coming out of that meeting was for the development of a more focused R&D effort, specifically on the issues of tank closures and related to waste forums and retrievals and, hopefully in the next two weeks, that's going to be part of our recommendation package that we're going to be briefing to EM-1.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Thank you.
Milton?

MR. LEVENSON: I might make a couple of comments in response to Bill's question. The question of did we look at other waste, you know, this study grew out of Congressional action necessary and the question of reclassification, which is a political legal technical issue, and our charter was specifically to look at the wastes in the tank.

We couldn't help put in the report and in the preface notice there are other problems. I think you are familiar enough with the Academy studies to

1 know that if we had expanded the scope beyond that, it 2 wouldn't have made it past the review board. 3 because the report doesn't address the other issues, 4 doesn't mean we don't think it's important. 5 Secondly, our review of monitoring really wasn't focused on what they are doing now or what they 6 7 have done in the past. Our concern was how do you 8 plan ahead, so you could monitor after the tank farms 9 are closed, capped, etcetera, the much longer range view, which is somewhat different than the current 10 monitoring? 11 12 VICE CHAIRMAN Very helpful CROFF: Thanks, Milton. 13 remarks. 14 MR. LEVENSON: Thanks. 15 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Mike? Thanks, Frank, for a great 16 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 17 summary. It's a formidable task in the time scale involved. One of the things that we were involved in, 18 19 the ACNW, I and Latif Hamdan attended a tank cleaning 20 workshop that was held in Atlanta at the end of March 21 and it was interesting, because I'm on your slide 16 22 where you recommend that DOE should initiate a 23 targeted aggressive collaborative research program and 24 so on. 25 Could you just maybe put that up for

everybody's benefit? And I found this conference to be pretty interesting, because it brought together all the folks you mentioned, Idaho, Savannah River, Hanford and actually West Valley. So we got into a little bit of the vitrification. And a large component of folks from the service industry, let me just call it that for lack of a better term, that are expert in cleaning technologies from anything you can think of, from water-based technologies to others.

And I found it to be an interesting technical meeting from the standpoint of they really were working hard to explore state of the art and what's needed and what's coming next. So from that standpoint, it was pretty satisfying. Some of the NMSS staff with responsibilities for review activities here within the Agency also attended and had the benefit of those discussions.

So I just wanted to, you know, mention to you and the Committee that it seems like that recommendation is also being acted on. So I find it to be an excellent technical meeting. In addition, I gained a stronger appreciation for the fact that these tank clean-outs are not easy. You know, I think about radiation protection when I look at a complex sludgy mess of pipes, of tanks and manholes and all of that

1 and a formidable part of the planning for all the 2 activities is clearly focused on worker protection 3 from industrial safety and radiation safety point of 4 view. So I think sometimes we talk about the 5 waste independent of the actual work to manage it and 6 7 we have to remember that the folks that are doing the work have significant challenges to make sure that 8 workers are protected and that ALARA is maintained and 9 hopefully that balance of total radiation protection 10 will be part of the equation when we get to thinking 11 12 about closure and disposal in terms of residual radioactive material. 13 14 How many sieverts should we expend to save, theoretical sieverts down the line? So that 15 aspect of it became very clear in this conference. 16 offer 17 And Ι just wanted to that comment and observation as a contemporaneous activity that really 18 19 addresses the recommendation you've got 20 report. Thanks. Any questions? 21 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: No, I don't have any 22 other questions. 23 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. 24 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thanks. Dr. Weiner? 25 Thank you and I would MEMBER WEINER:

really like to thank the Academy and Dr. Parker for a very informative report. I wanted to ask you in 1986 under the leadership of Mike Lawrence, who was at that time the director at Hanford, a report was issued by a committee, Citizen's Committee that Mike Lawrence put together and we looked -- I served on the committee and fortuitously, I represented the Sierra Club on that committee.

We put together a report with some recommendations regarding the 149 single-shell tanks at Hanford. And I wondered if that document had ever surfaced in your study, because there was no reference made to it.

DR. PARKER: Was it in the bibliography? We certainly didn't examine it in any detail, that's for certain. I'm not aware of it.

MEMBER WEINER: Oh, it's very interesting. I would be happy to have a copy made. This was precomputer, so all I have is my hard copy. But it might be of interest, especially in some of your comments about transparency and risk assessment. The committee consisted of 30 people and had representatives from the State Legislatures of both Washington and Oregon, representatives from the Department of Energy and its contractors, citizen -- several citizens groups, it

2 of the staff of then Senator Henry Jackson was a 3 member of the committee. 4 The recommendation and -- we looked at all 5 manner of address to, just as you did, what was in the and we even have a publication on what 6 7 radionuclides posed the greatest risk, which was 8 interesting to do. Our recommendation was to look 9 more closely at stabilization in place, precisely because of the occupational hazards, this was 20 years 10 ago, incident on removing everything from the tanks. 11 12 We had one member who suggested that everything, including the tank, be dug up and we 13 14 rejected that. But my question is what is the basis 15 for your 100 percent retrieval and 100 percent 16 recommendation, 100 percent separation recommendation, and were there considerations given at least to the 17 Hanford tanks to stabilization in place with covers? 18 19 DR. PARKER: I don't believe that I said 20 that we should have 100 percent retrieval. 21 MEMBER WEINER: Oh. 22 DR. PARKER: I believe I said the ideal 23 case would be that, because that would remove all of 24 the waste from the site. 25 MEMBER WEINER: I see.

was very wide ranging, Members of Congress, a Member

1	DR. PARKER: And I also pointed out that
2	that would be at increased worker risk. And I might
3	point out, I think it was the first Academy report on
4	Hanford that Konnie Krauskopf chaired and in that he
5	said that removing the waste from the tanks at Hanford
6	should be approached with great caution, that one
7	should look at the possibility of stabilizing it in
8	place.
9	MEMBER WEINER: That's
10	DR. PARKER: I don't remember the exact
11	date, but it certainly must be in the '60s sometime.
12	But I think the problem with that is proving that they
13	are stabilized.
14	MEMBER WEINER: I was just curious to the
15	extent to which this report looks at stabilization in
16	place.
17	DR. PARKER: We did not look at that
18	explicitly. The charge to us was to look at whether
19	or not it could be considered low activity waste that
20	would be right there.
21	MEMBER WEINER: I have one other question.
22	DR. PARKER: Yes?
23	MEMBER WEINER: When we looked at the
24	Hanford tanks in the 1980s, we were assured and it was
25	to some extent demonstrated that the material had

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1	largely been dewatered. Did you find that to be the
2	case?
3	DR. PARKER: I don't think that's the case
4	at all.
5	MEMBER WEINER: Okay. Thank you.
6	MR. LEVENSON: It is in the single-shell
7	tanks.
8	MEMBER WEINER: In the single-shell tanks.
9	DR. PARKER: I have to disagree with my
10	colleague. It has a great deal of entrained captured
11	water in there. So in that sense, the mobile water
12	has been removed. I agree with that. But that
13	doesn't mean it's a totally dry system at all.
14	MEMBER WEINER: No, we only looked when
15	they said dewatered, they only meant the mobile water.
16	DR. PARKER: Yes.
17	MEMBER WEINER: They did not mean and
18	that's why I wondered. We knew there was water
19	entrained.
20	DR. PARKER: Yes.
21	MEMBER WEINER: Thank you.
22	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Micah?
23	MR. LOWENTHAL: Yes. On this question of
24	stabilization in place, one thing we should probably
25	point out is that both DOE's internal orders and the

law that was created in conjunction at the same time as this study was mandated requires that the waste be removed from the tanks to the maximum state practical, so they are required to do that regardless. And so the committee wasn't looking at the possibility of stabilizing the entire contents of the tank in place. However, whatever is left, it is a stabilize in place sort of situation.

MR. LEVENSON: It is also complicated by a legal commitment via the Tripartite Agreements the DOE has signed to get the stuff off the site. So it wasn't this committee's function to disagree with legal contracts.

DR. PARKER: If I could go outside of what we actually reviewed just based upon the knowledge of the conditions there itself, we recognize that it's almost impossible to get a representative sample in those tanks. That means that you can't stir it up enough to get it uniformly, and so then to stabilize it, you would have no idea whether it was going to be really stabilized well or not and there have been some attempts to do some things of that sort with somewhat disastrous results. And so I don't think there is a technical basis that would warrant it at this time. The law also precludes it.

1	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Dr. Clarke?
2	MEMBER CLARKE: Thanks, Frank. With
3	respect to your, I think, very excellent
4	recommendation about it's not too soon to start
5	thinking about post-closure monitoring and sensors and
6	how all of that would integrate with the cover design
7	as well, I was reminded that I think in one case, I
8	want to say Fernald, but I could be wrong, the cover
9	of the first disposal cell, I think, was actually
10	retrofitted to install sensors. So this is not too
11	soon to be thinking about these things.
12	I had a question which is probably
13	premature, but I think your presentation mentioned it
14	in passing. You showed us a slide that gives a real
15	nice summary of the differences in the natural
16	environments for these three sites. And you had a
17	backup slide on a cover design which is a
18	DR. PARKER: That's what I was trying to
19	bring up when I screwed up the system.
20	MEMBER CLARKE: Okay.
21	DR. PARKER: I think it's the very last
22	one. The second to the last.
23	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Go ahead,
24	James.
25	MEMBER CLARKE: Well, all I was going to
ļ	

1 say, Frank, is you had a summary of the natural 2 environment at each of these sites. DR. PARKER: 3 Yes. 4 MEMBER CLARKE: And a backup slide under 5 modified RCRA Subtitle C28, we don't need it, but -and I guess, Frank, what I was wondering is is there--6 7 again, this question may be premature, because it doesn't sound like you were able to do too much on 8 9 this piece, but will there be a recognition that these natural environments are different, Hanford and Idaho 10 being more similar and Savannah River being a little 11 more different, so that there's flexibility in the 12 design or is this the point? 13 14 DR. PARKER: At least in my list it's 15 slide 13, where it shows the differences at the sites and it mentions that each tank or group of tanks have 16 to be looked at individually. So I mean, I think, 17 that's a very strong recognition. 18 19 MEMBER CLARKE: The reason I bring it up is I think Idaho has had a successful demonstration 20 21 with an evapotranspiration cap, they probably looked 22 at for other purposes, but I just wonder if that 23 flexibility is there. 24 PARKER: Well, we certainly have 25 recommended that, but it's individual decisions in

1 each tank or group of tanks at each site. 2 Thank you. It was a very MEMBER CLARKE: 3 nice summary. 4 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: I would like to 5 invite, I'm not sure who, which of you, to sort of summarize, let me call it the reactions to the report, 6 7 subsequent to the publication of the report, I mean, 8 as briefed to the people who asked for it, to 9 Congress, to DOE of course. I think there were 10 briefings to the states and sort of what kind of reactions are you seeing to these recommendations. 11 We have heard a little bit of it as we 12 have gone through how DOE has reacted and some events 13 14 that have occurred, but I would be interested in a 15 more general discussion about who. This report was briefed to 16 MR. LOWENTHAL: 17 DOE and to Congress, who originally requested it. There was a briefing for NRC and the states via 18 conference call and there have been sort of more 19 informal discussions otherwise and there has been some 20 21 dissemination. And I would say that probably Congress 22 was the most receptive to this. 23 I think when we spoke to the staffers and 24 in what we have heard following up, they found it very

It addressed the questions that they were

useful.

looking at and I think we have seen some responses. As I mentioned, there has been some funding put in, at least the bill for dealing with R&D issues which was something that they said, well, you know, clearly funding is our responsibility and so they took that up.

DOE has had a mixed response to it. DOE was very receptive to some of the messages in the report and disagrees with some of the recommendations, including the decoupling recommendation that Frank mentioned. So it's a mixed bag, as you would expect. We have not gotten any direct response from any of the states and we haven't heard very much from them. It's possible that other people have, but we haven't. There was not -- they were being pretty cautious about it, I think. They were taking in the message and not pushing on it too hard.

Now, after the interim report, which was focused on Savannah River, South Carolina said that, you know, representatives in their Regulator's Office said that they disagree with the decoupling recommendation, because it had first appeared in that. And they basically said, you know, we have an agreement to make progress on closing these. We think it's safest to do that, and so they want to stick to

And so I think there is a definite

2 disagreement particularly with South Carolina on that 3 issue. 4 Besides that, I don't -- we haven't gotten 5 any formal feedback from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, although I would expect that they would be 6 7 reasonably happy because the report is complimentary to the work that the Commission staff 8 has done on this and really emphasizes the value of 9 I think that DOE recognizes that to some 10 peer review. extent and I think that the Commission has it 11 ingrained as part of its culture, that this is some --12 you know, review is a necessary part of any action. 13 14 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Thanks. 15 Dave, have you got any questions? The question came up about 16 MR. KOCHER: looking at risks in a more holistic fashion rather 17 than just a specific compliance point for a specific 18 19 tank or tank farm or whatever. DOE does have this 20 composite analysis process that in some sense tries to 21 and I'm wondering to what extent your 22 committee looked into their composite analysis 23 process. Did you review specific reports that these 24 25 sites had produced and what did you think of it?

their schedule.

DR. PARKER: I don't think in any of the reports we reviewed on individual tanks that there was any mention of composite analysis.

MR. LOWENTHAL: Actually, each site has a

composite analysis of some kind and so the Savannah River site does have a composite analysis. Unfortunately, the composite analysis for the Savannah River site does not have any of the data on the recent decisions. And so the source terms that they are using in their analysis there are outdated. It hasn't been updated recently and I think it's scheduled for update next year or something like that.

But it doesn't take into account any of the changes that have occurred in planning for the saltstone vaults, which means an increase by orders of magnitude in the amount of radioactive material going there, doesn't account for changes in planning for the tanks and it doesn't account for certain other changes on the site. So that one was not up to date. The Hanford site, they have their, what is that system, the system assessment capability, their SAC.

In that case they are actually -- the site is spread out enough that you don't have as much source term interaction or you don't have as much plume interaction and there wasn't as much concern

about that, but they are developing a more integrated view of the groundwater on the site and the report specifically notes that for that site.

At Idaho it's most isolated. You know, the actual locations within the site are so far apart that it's possible to just look at the tank farm and worry just about the tank farm. The only issue there is that they have leaks that are already in place and that has been the focus of most of their work so far. So they are a bit out of step between the composite analysis, the sort of integrated view of the whole site, versus what they are doing for the tank farms specifically.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Latif?

MR. HAMDAN: Yes. The question I have is concerning the recommendation on decoupling of removal of the waste and the tank closure, and the question is when the Committee made their recommendation, was the recommendation rooted in the economics or does it have a safety component as well?

DR. PARKER: Well, we looked at a few tanks where they have actually done the cleanup and in one instance, for example, they used the same technique quite a number of times and when they saw no further improvement in removing waste, they stopped at

that point.

And we said that it would have been advisable to look at other techniques, but we never did, and I don't think they did, look at the difference in the risk reduction per unit of effort utilized. That's a topic we said was extremely important when you looked at it from a holistic point of view. I don't know, Anne, do you want to --

MS. SMITH: Well, yes. There really was—
I would say it was mainly focused on the safety issue
and the tradeoff. I think of safety as worker risk
and long-term risk, the tradeoff between those that
you're making if you choose to close the tank right
away on a schedule. So there really wasn't an
economic component in my mind to it at all.

were to say yes, we could delay the closure and clean out more. Then there is also a question of is it worth spending the money that that would take to clean out more, but that wasn't really behind the recommendation so much as simply we don't see a significant added risk by waiting a few years to see if we could clean it out more through other methods, but we do see some potential long-term benefits from that.

And then, of course, worker risk would come in once you say, well, what would be the method to clean it out if you do find a method to get a greater amount removed, but we didn't even really get to that step other than to acknowledge that it should be considered.

MR. LEVENSON: This was kind of a philosophical question, Latif, so different Committee Members had different views. I think the thing we looked at first from a safety standpoint was was there any risk once you removed as much as you could to delay grouting it and we couldn't identify any safety risk, exposure to people or anything by letting it sit.

And if your philosophical objective is to remove as much as possible, particularly with some of the tanks which are very complex, cooling clouds that by the time you got through the next 30, 40, 50 tanks, you would probably have advanced technology that would allow you to clean better. Then you would make the decision, economic and exposure work, should you go back to one of the tanks that you could go back to because you now have an advanced technology. So it's sort of a philosophical let's not close the door on being able to get out more.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Milt, there was a practical example that was discussed at that workshop I mentioned that is kind of on point with what you're talking about, and the idea was that there was an area where it was hard to get to the stuff that needed to So they are actually talking about, well, be removed. if we could create a grout platform with the fill grout, that would allow us to get to the area easily with the right equipment and all of that and maybe excavate that remaining grout that needed to be removed, and there might be a residual rim around it. But, you know, a very practical as approach though, well, we can maximize what we remove,

approach though, well, we can maximize what we remove, but there has got to be a little creative thinking on how we do the engineering and all the work that needed to be done from a practical standpoint to make that happen. So, you know, it's interesting to think about it as a concept. But then, you know, as you turn it into real work sometimes you have to, you know, look at a combination as you go along, and I think recognizing that eventual scheme would be helpful.

DR. PARKER: If you look at Item No. 4 that we were asked, they asked us to do explicitly what you have said, assessment of the cost consequences for worker safety and long-term

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1	consequences for environmental and human health, and
2	we explicitly say in the report, because there was so
3	little data available from DOE itself, that we just
4	could not do a reasonable analysis of the question
5	that you asked.
6	MR. LOWENTHAL: Frank just
7	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes, and I offer my
8	comment not as a criticism of the report, but
9	recognizing that flexibility when you do get to that
10	real kind of decision making is always a reasonable
11	way to go.
12	MR. LOWENTHAL: Frank just made the point
13	that I was going to add, and one other thing that is
14	mentioned in the report is that it would be very
15	useful if DOE kept careful track of the worker doses
16	and the costs involved as they make progress here,
17	because there was so little to work from in decision
18	making as we looked at it at this point.
19	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay.
20	MEMBER WEINER: Allen, could I ask another
21	question?
22	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Sure.
23	MEMBER WEINER: Excuse me for intruding
24	with this, but one of your recommendations is that the
25	Committee also has reservations about the bulk

1 vitrification process and I was just curious as to 2 what the reservations were, what your view of that process was at Hanford. 3 4 DR. PARKER: I could try, but Milt is our 5 expert on that, so I will defer to him. Strangely enough, probably MR. LEVENSON: 6 7 The idea that you could vitrify one-third of 8 the waste in a plant costing a billion dollars behind 9 walls of ultimate seismic, concrete etcetera, 10 etcetera, and maybe two-thirds of the waste you are going to vitrify in a shipping container without even 11 12 a building around it, and the assumption that you would have no off-gas problems, there were just a 13 large list of questions to which there were no answers 14 that satisfied the Committee. 15 And, as I say, there is right now a rather 16 17 senior review group doing a review for DOE. Wymer, who was formerly a member of the ACNW, is on 18 19 that review. 20 MEMBER WEINER: Do you envision that some 21 similar process, some similar stabilization process --22 I mean, you're going to have to do something with the 23 material that is removed from the tanks. MR. LEVENSON: Well, the other thing it 24 25 points out in the report is that Idaho for a similar

group of material had selected steam reforming, and it wasn't obvious to the Committee what the large difference was and why you needed to develop several different things. It also pointed out in the report that bulk fit was at the beginning of a research program.

Steam reforming selected by Idaho operates on a commercial basis in Tennessee for large amounts of the waste from civilian nuclear plants. I think that is a facility licensed by the NRC, in fact, and that DOE ought to look seriously into that whole issue.

MEMBER WEINER: Thank you.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thanks. Anybody else on the staff? I think, at this point, I would like to -- anybody from the Department has any comment or any updates on what is going on? You don't have to do this, but does anybody want to say anything? No? Okay.

Mike, you got a point you want to make?

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes. I want to take

advantage of the fact that the Academy is back two

months in a row. We had the benefit of the report on

the transportation report and some comments that came

up from those presentations piqued my interest about

driver doses.

Kevin commented on the concern or a question about it, so I actually went back and spoke with the folks at Chem-Nuclear and have a letter from Bill House summarizing actual driver doses from 1976 through 1994, and I will just pull up the -- and I will certainly be happy to provide you with a copy of this because it came to us.

For those years the number of drivers, of course, started out small, increased and now has decreased a bit from three or four or a few in the mid '70s up to 45 or so in the mid '80s and then it has trailed off a bit since there per year. The average dose in the '70s was about 350 millirem. In the '80s it was 90 millirem and in the -- I'm sorry, the '80s 90 millirem and in the '90s 58 millirem per year per driver.

So the notion that -- and, of course, everybody realizes that the dose rate limit in the cab is independent of high level waste or low level waste. People have challenged and said, well, with low level waste you have less dose in the cab and that is not true, because they designed the shielding to maximize the payload and meet the requirements. So there is not a lot of excess shielding there, so that 2

1 millirem per year is really an appropriate benchmark 2 for both. 3 If you average all years in all drivers, 4 it's about 138 millirem per year. So there is no 5 question in my mind that any limit or any guidance point of any kind would be challenged by the actual 6 7 data for that fleet that transports low level waste 8 around the United States. So just a benchmark for 9 everybody's benefit, so I will be happy to provide 10 that for our record and for anybody that wants a copy. VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thanks. 11 12 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Thanks, Allen. VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thanks, Mike. 13 14 CHAIRMAN RYAN: I just didn't want to pass 15 up the opportunity to share that with the Academy while we're all together again. 16 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: 17 Okay. Well, seeing no more hands up and nobody wanting to ask a question, 18 19 I would like to thank all of you very much for coming. 20 It was a very informative presentation and I think the 21 background is going to help us a lot as we move 22 forward here looking at waste determination issues. 23 I would note, I think at least some of you 24 know this, but at 10:45 we're going to have a briefing 25 Standard Review from NRC staff on their Plan

1	concerning waste determinations. So if you're still
2	interested in the area, you're of course welcome to
3	attend. I think with that, let's take a break until
4	10:15 and then we'll reconvene and I think we'll
5	CHAIRMAN RYAN: We have a short finishing
6	job to do to on Professor Hinze's letter.
7	MEMBER HINZE: A little more work done.
8	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. All right. Fine.
9	So we'll just reconvene. Do you want to start a
10	little early or is that all right?
11	MEMBER HINZE: I don't know if we can get
12	the
13	MR. HAMDAN: I'm not sure. I'm not sure
14	it will stick.
15	CHAIRMAN RYAN: The original schedule.
16	MEMBER HINZE: Yes, stick to the original
17	schedule.
18	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: We'll be back here
19	at 10:45 then.
20	(Whereupon, at 9:53 a.m. a recess until
21	10:45 a.m.)
22	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Come to order, please.
23	Take your seats. Thank you. I would like to resume.
24	We have got now, we're going to hear from the NRC
25	staff on the Standard Review Plan for Waste

1	Determinations. We have got, I guess, Ryan Whited,
2	Christine, Christianne, I'm sorry, Ridge and David Esh
3	and I'm not sure who is going to start. Ryan, take it
4	away.
5	MR. WHITED: Thank you, Dr. Croff. I am
6	Ryan Whited. I am Chief of the Low Level Waste
7	Section in DWMEP. I am pleased to be here today to
8	discuss our progress on a Standard Review Plan for our
9	reviews of DOE incidental waste determinations. With
10	me today are Dr. Christianne Ridge, Dr. Dave Esh,
11	members of the performance assessment staff in DWMEP.
12	CHAIRMAN RYAN: And just to make sure, do
13	we have a bridge for anybody at SRS or do we have them
14	wanting to call in or
15	PARTICIPANT: I thought we were finished
16	with the bridge.
17	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Are they finished? They
18	didn't want to be on this call?
19	PARTICIPANT: I thought they got off the
20	line. The bridge is still up.
21	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Is there anybody on the
22	phone?
23	MR. ROSENBERGER: Yes. This is Kent
24	Rosenberger, Savannah River.
25	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay, Kent. I just wanted

to make sure if you wanted to be on that you were on.

Thanks for chiming in.

MR. ROSENBERGER: Thanks, Mike.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay.

MR. WHITED: Okay. Dr. Ridge and Dr. Esh will discuss some of the technical issues addressed in the SRP. My portion of the presentation will include a brief background discussion, a high level overview of the SRP and a general discussion of how the recommendations provided in ACNW's December letter were addressed.

I know the Committee is familiar with incidental waste, so I'm not going to spend time discussing the criteria or previous waste determination reviews. Our focus today will be on those chapters of the SRP that relate to the major areas of our reviews.

As you know, the SRP is not yet publicly available, so our presentation and any questions and answers today will need to recognize that. We do expect the SRP to be issued next week for a 60 day public comment period and if the Committee so desires, we would be happy to come back in a few months to answer any questions you have following your review of the document.

After my remarks, Dr. Ridge will address the criterion regarding removal of radionuclides to the maximum extent practical and Dr. Esh will focus on two of the performance objectives in 10 CFR 61 Subpart C, protection of the public and the associated review of a performance assessment and protection of intruders.

First, some brief background. The NDAA was passed on October 28<sup>th</sup> of 2004. In mid-November of '04 we briefed the ACNW on the staff's incidental waste activities and we subsequently developed a Commission paper that described in detail the staff's plans for implementing our new responsibilities under the NDAA, which included the development of a Standard Review Plan to guide our reviews and provide consistency across reviewers.

That paper was sent to the Commission on April 28<sup>th</sup> of 2005 and we received the SRM on June the 30<sup>th</sup> of '05. In the SRM the Commission approved our plans with a few comments. They noted that the staff should take the time necessary to complete its reviews and also to ensure that the technical basis for our decisions are transparent, traceable, complete and as open to the public and interested stakeholders as possible. And, certainly, we feel that we have been

implementing this direction in our NDAA activities thus far.

ACNW held a two day public working group meeting on incidental waste in August of '05 and NRC staff provided a presentation at that meeting. We also held a public scoping meeting in November of 2005 to obtain comments and recommendations on the contents of the SRP. We had a very good exchange at that meeting and following the meeting we received three comment letters from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, the Savannah River Site Citizens Advisory Board and the State of Washington.

know, the NDAA requires As you determination of the waste class, either Class C or less or greater than Class C. Due to the high interest of various stakeholders, as well as DOE's stated need for additional guidance on the application of NRC's concentration averaging principles to waste determinations, staff issued draft quidance on this particular issue in December of '05. concentration averaging quidance is specific situations likely to be encountered by DOE in its waste determinations, and Dave will touch briefly on this guidance later in the presentation.

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We received six comment letters on the concentration averaging guidance. Several state agencies commented. However, the guidance hasn't been revised in the draft SRP that will go out next week, except for minor editorial changes. We'll consider the comments we received to this point along with any others we receive during the 60 day public comment period. And, as I said before, we expect to issue the draft SRP sometime next week and the final SRP at the end of this year.

The purpose of the SRP. The SRP is primarily intended to be an internal guidance document that will be used by the staff during its reviews of DOE waste determinations. It describes the types of information that may be assessed by the staff during its reviews and also provides review procedures. The key objective really is to provide consistency, consistency across different types of reviews and across different technical reviewers, and we also view the SRP as a very important knowledge transfer tool.

And, fortunately, the staff that has the most experience in the reviews, Dr. Ridge, Dr. Esh and Anna Bradford, were the primary authors of this document and that is extremely important, given that we have a relatively new and growing program that

needs to bring new staff up to speed quickly while also trying to accommodate aggressive schedules to complete the reviews.

Schedules are important to DOE and certain other stakeholders and, you know, we have been targeting review times around 9 to 10 months for our NDAA reviews compared to an historical precedent of about 15 months, so that certainly is a challenge that we're trying to meet. Although the SRP is not explicitly meant for use by DOE, it certainly could be used by the Department to understand what information NRC is looking for and how we'll conduct our reviews.

The next several slides give an overview of the outline of the SRP. The SRP begins with an introduction to provide context to the rest of the document. The introduction covers background information, how to use the SRP, a brief historical discussion including the evolution of the various incidental waste criteria sets, as well as a discussion of the NRC's role in waste determinations.

Chapter 1 discusses information about a site, the surrounding area and the associated waste management activities that a reviewer should evaluate at the beginning of a waste determination review. The purpose of this chapter is really to ensure that the

reviewer establishes the proper context for the detailed technical review that is to follow, and so to help focus the review. General information includes areas such as land use, meteorology and climatology, geology, seismology, etcetera, that are relevant to the review.

Site-specific system descriptions include the systems being analyzed in the waste determination, such as a tank farm or a waste treatment facility, as well as any other systems or equipment that are relevant. Subsequently, the SRP lists the four DOE sites that may have incidental waste and the sources of the incidental waste criteria. That is the NDAA DOE Order 435.1 and the West Valley policy statement.

The SRP notes that reviewers should consider any other relevant previously completed waste determinations to ensure that the knowledge gained from prior efforts is retained and, again, to help ensure consistency across reviews. I did want to make the point though. You know, certainly, there is a difference between the reviews we conducted prior to the NDAA in South Carolina and Idaho and the reviews that we're now conducting under the NDAA.

You know, one key reason for that is we have a monitoring role under the NDAA that is subject

to judicial review. So, certainly, it's reasonable that we might consider other things in our NDAA reviews and perhaps consider some things more thoroughly than we did in the prior reviews when we were only operating in an advisory capacity to DOE.

Chapter 2. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the different sets of incidental waste criteria and provides a comparison of the criteria and house staff should interpret and apply the criteria. For example, NDAA refers to highly radioactive radionuclides while DOE Order 435.1 and the West Valley policy statement refer to key radionuclides. During our first review under the NDAA, the saltstone review, staff noted, believe, that highly radioactive radionuclides are those that contribute most significantly to risk, which is the same concept as key radionuclides.

So this section makes exactly that point to ensure that reviewers have a common understanding of terminology. And I will note that that was one of ACNW's recommendations specifically on this issue of highly radioactive radionuclides versus key radionuclides.

Another example is removal of waste to the maximum extent practical, as stated in the NDAA, versus the maximum extent technically and economically

practical, as stated in Order 435.1 and the West Valley policy statement. In this instance there is a slight nuance in terminology and the section seeks to clarify that for the reviewer.

Chapter 2 also discusses review of the first criterion of the NDAA, which is that the waste does not require permanent isolation in a deep geologic repository for spent fuel or high level waste. The review procedures for this criterion are consistent with how it was approached in the saltstone review.

And, finally, the chapter discusses at a very high level removal of radionuclides to the maximum extent practical and then refers the reader to Chapter 3 and also discusses at a high level the performance objectives of 10 CFR 61 Subpart C and refers the reader to Chapters 4 through 7. mentioned earlier, each set of incidental criteria contains requirement that а highly radioactive or key radionuclides be removed to the maximum extent practical.

Chapter 3 guides the reviewer through an evaluation of this requirement, including assessing the inventory of radionuclides in the waste, identifying highly radioactive radionuclides, removal

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of those radionuclides, the cost-benefit analysis to help evaluate whether additional waste removal or treatment needs to be performed and evaluating the concentration of the waste. In fact, this is where the December concentration averaging guidance has been incorporated at the end of this chapter, and Christianne is going to discuss this in more detail.

Chapter 4 provides guidance for the review of the performance assessment used by DOE to demonstrate compliance with the performance objective of 10 CFR 61.41, protection of the general public from releases of radioactivity. Dave is going to go through this chapter in some detail, so I won't elaborate here. This slide shows the remainder of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 addresses the evaluation of intruder analyses and doses per the performance objective in 10 CFR 61.42. Dave is also going to touch on that area.

Chapter 6 addresses the performance objective for protection of individuals during operations in 10 CFR 61.43. This chapter guides the staff's review to confirm that operation of the facility will provide reasonable assurance that the radiation protection standards in 10 CFR Part 20 will be met, including exposures to both workers and

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members of the public.

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addition, 10 CFR 61.43 includes requirements that every reasonable effort will be made to maintain radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable or ALARA. We recognize DOE is selfregulating with respect to its operational activities and it uses regulations in 10 CFR Part 835, occupational radiation protection, to set operational dose limits for workers and members of the public and to demonstrate ALARA.

In our prior reviews, DOE has shown that their regulations in 10 CFR Part 835 are similar to those found in Part 20 and are, therefore, just as protective. And the SRP confirms that this is an acceptable approach.

Chapter 7 addresses the last of the four performance objectives, site stability. It focuses on the stability of the proposed disposal site, including the potential for erosion, flooding and other disruptive processes. It also addresses stability of the waste and the engineered features of a disposal facility.

Chapter 8 addresses the review of DOE's

Quality Assurance Program as applied to the waste

determination. The primary purpose of this chapter is

to verify that DOE has applied quality assurance measures to its data collection, analyses, waste determinations and performance assessments. However, the level of review recognizes that we're not regulating DOE and the primary objective is to ensure that the information DOE provides to us is accurate.

Chapter 9 provides general guidance on preparing requests for additional information and preparing the final technical evaluation report.

Again, this is primarily for new staff who may be developing these products for the first time.

Finally, Chapter 10. Chapter 10 discusses our monitoring role under the NDAA. As the Committee knows, we're required by the NDAA to monitor in coordination with the state DOE's disposal actions to assess compliance with the performance objectives in 10 CFR 61 Subpart C. This section is purposefully written at a high level. We expect monitoring activities to vary for individual waste determinations, and so the details of our monitoring approach will be provided in individual monitoring plans.

In fact, we're currently working with DOE in the State of South Carolina to develop our monitoring approach for saltstone. Monitoring will be

risk-informed and performance-based and will partially depend on the findings of the technical evaluation report.

For example, in the saltstone TER we identified certain key assumptions, such as the hydraulic conductivity of the waste form and the rate of waste oxidation that needed to be monitored due to their importance to that facility meeting the performance objectives.

Key aspects of the staff's monitoring activities are expected to include both on-site observation, such as sample collection, and technical review of environmental data, updates to the performance assessment model, results of experiments, etcetera. And, certainly, the scope of monitoring is expected to change as waste management activities proceed.

You know, again using the saltstone example, you know, the early stage focus might be on the characteristics of the feed to the salt waste processing facility while later on, you know, once the saltstone is in place, we might focus on, you know, properties of the grouted waste form. So we do expect the monitoring approach to change over time.

Finally, I would like to briefly discuss

the incorporation of ACNW's recommendations in the SRP. The staff appreciates ACNW's work in this area and we carefully considered the recommendations provided by the Committee in its December letter.

Upon reviewing the document, I think you will find nearly all of the Committee's recommendations have been addressed and, in fact, the discussions by Christianne and Dave will touch on some of these areas and I, in fact, touched on some of them as well when I discussed the comparison of highly radioactive radionuclides versus key radionuclides.

As I mentioned earlier, we would be happy to come back at a later time to answer any questions t.he Committee has on the SRP regarding the incorporation of your recommendations or any other area you would like to discuss. Guidance in the SRP will help the staff provide risk-informed reviews of waste determinations. It also provides flexibility to allow for the fact that waste determinations require a case-by-case evaluation.

However, as you have heard me discuss, a key objective of the SRP is certainly to provide consistency where appropriate, for example in defining waste criteria and considering the results of prior waste determination reviews. The SRP considers and

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references other NRC guidance and documents, such as our guidance on performance assessment provided in NUREG-1573 and the decommissioning guidance in NUREG-1757.

To conclude my portion of the presentation, I hope you enjoy reviewing the document. It should be available next week and we're certainly proud of the effort, and we thank the Committee for its input. I will now turn things over to Christianne.

DR. RIDGE: Good morning. I know you're all aware, well-aware, of the various sets of criteria that govern the waste determinations and Ryan touched on earlier some of the slight differences in wording and the SRP does clarify those, how we interpret those But, essentially, each set of criteria differences. contains а requirement that radionuclides, radionuclides, highly radioactive radionuclides, be removed to the maximum extent practical.

And we cover, the SRP covers, four general review areas, radionuclide inventories, selection of highly radioactive radionuclides, selection of radionuclide removal technologies and the practicality of additional removal which often is addressed by DOE as a cost-benefit analysis. I am going to in my

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following slides talk about each of these areas in a little more detail, but first I want to make two general points about radionuclide removal.

One is that waste determinations may be submitted either before or after most of the removal activities have taken place. So, for example, in the saltstone review we reviewed a case in which most of the treatment of the salt waste had yet to take place and we were reviewing the plans. In another case for the Savannah River Tanks 18 and 19 that we're looking at now, most of that removal activity or all of that removal activity has taken place.

And so that changes the tenor of the review a little bit, because in one case we're looking at activities that DOE considers to be complete. In another case we're looking at plans for removal. But, essentially, in either case we're judging what were the criterions for stopping and would it be reasonable to achieve more.

The other general point I wanted to make was that removal of radionuclides refers both to removal of waste -- we tend to focus on tanks, so it can refer to removal of waste from the system, which is to say removal of waste from tanks or from another system, but it also could refer to selective removal

of radionuclides from the waste.

So, for instance, in the saltstone review we did, we were looking at DOE's plan to remove radionuclides from the salt waste. So when we talk about radionuclide removal, we mean both removal of bulk, of the physical volume of waste from the system, and also selective radionuclides from the waste that will be left in place.

The first step of the review is to look at the radionuclide inventory and this review also supports the development of the source term that Dr. Esh will be talking about as part of the performance assessment and inadvertent intruder analyses. The SRI directs the reviewer to look at the development of inventory and expect that we'll be looking at both the concentration of radionuclides in the waste and the volumes of waste that will be left or that will be disposed of, and both of these parts contribute uncertainties.

So, for example, some sources of concentration data can include samples that DOE has taken for instance from tanks or process knowledge for some radionuclides that can't be adequately sampled for whatever reason or in a case where we're looking at treatment to selectively remove radionuclides, for

instance in the saltstone case, the concentrations, the predicted concentrations, were based on treatment efficiencies rather than samples because the sampling hadn't taken place yet.

Potential sources for the volume include mapping, visual mapping of waste heels, reel tape readings, process knowledge. Again, in cases in which the removal hasn't been accomplished, process knowledge would be important and the amount of waste you expect to remove and you expect to treat.

So, as I said, each of these contribute uncertainties and the SRP directs the reviewer to carefully review these uncertainties. For instance, if data is based on sampling, we would be looking primarily at analytic uncertainties. Also, sample variability and whether the waste heterogeneity has been adequately characterized. So we would be looking at things like DOE sampling plans, where samples were taken, how many samples were taken.

For other radionuclides in which inventories are based on process knowledge, we would be looking at whether or not there is -- the relative completeness of knowledge of tank receipts would be one source of information. And for treatment processes, such as the salt waste treatment process we

looked at at Savannah River site for saltstone, we would look at uncertainty in the predicted treatment efficiencies. And these are just some examples of potential sources of information. Certainly, this list is not exhaustive.

So after the reviewer looks at the inventories, the SRP directs the reviewer to look at the selection of highly radioactive radionuclides. As Ryan stated, the NRC staff believes that highly radioactive radionuclides are those that contribute most significantly to risk to the public, workers and the environment. And the review of the selection is expected to include DOE's technical basis for which radionuclides they included.

But because our definition is riskinformed, we also would be looking at the results of
the performance assessment, inadvertent intruder
analyses, predicted doses to workers to make sure that
the expected risk drivers are on that list. That is
what we would essentially be looking for.

Now, the only thing I wanted to point out is that we would expect that risk drivers in the predicted case are included, but also we would expect to look at sensitivity analyses so that if the system doesn't perform as well as expected, if there are any

radionuclides that emerge as risk drivers in that case, that those also should be included on the list and that is really the only nuance there in that review.

After establishing the list of radionuclides that need to be removed to the maximum extent practical, the reviewer would look at the technology, at DOE's technology selection, and there are really two main review areas that the SRP covers. The first is that we want to make sure that an appropriate range of technologies should be evaluated. So, for example, we would expect that the reviewer would be aware of technologies that have been used at various DOE sites and to try to evaluate whether any of those would be applicable to the problem at hand.

And, again, the reviewer would want to look at whether or not there was any opportunity to selectively remove radionuclides from the waste in addition to simply looking at whether or not there are opportunities to reduce the volume of waste that is going to be determined to be not high level waste or waste incidental through processing.

So some factors that we would expect would affect the choice of removal technologies would include the expected effectiveness of the

technologies, technological maturity, the schedule impact of implementing different technologies, implementation costs, worker safety impacts and system-wide effects.

And an example of that might be the impacts on waste storage space or chemical effects on downstream systems. So the second review area would really be looking more at the process that DOE chose, that it used, sorry, the process that DOE used to choose the technology selections after making sure that a reasonable range of technologies were evaluated.

So, as I said earlier, waste determinations can be submitted either before or after removal, DOE considers removal to be complete. And in either case really, the reviewer needs to look at DOE's basis for stopping removal activities. So in a case in which DOE considers removal to be complete, we would be looking at documentation for why removal was stopped.

And I think Dr. Parker mentioned earlier this morning in his briefing using a case in which DOE maybe used a single technology until they determined it was no longer effective. And then the question would be, well, could any enhancements be made to that

technology or was there another technology at hand that could have been implemented. And those would be the kinds of questions that we would be looking at to determine if activities that DOE considers to be complete, the basis for them being stopped.

In cases in which the activities have not been completed in DOE's view, we would be looking at DOE's criteria for determining when they will consider them to be complete. So, essentially, when are we going to know that we have stopped and we can move on?

Often this decision is determined based on benefits of additional the expected cost and radionuclide removal. So in either case often DOE would be -- we would expect DOE to be looking at, based on our previous experience with them, to be saying, well, we expect that we can reduce risk by this much by continuing removal and it would cause this cost or this worker impact or this schedule impact.

And the only real point we make in the SRP with respect to this evaluation of costs and benefits that might be somewhat -- well, at any rate, an additional point that we make is that the uncertainties in the dose estimates, once you're quantifying costs and benefits, do impact what the

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benefits of additional removal will be.

So, for instance, if later in the review of the performance assessment through an iterative process it becomes clear that the predicted doses might not be what were expected, then that might change the balance of benefits that you would expect from additional removal. Essentially, if there is a lot more risk there, there is a lot more to be gained from reducing it.

So to just be a little bit more specific than I was on the last slide, we do expect to look at the cost and benefits of additional removal and some of the factors that we would expect to look at are risk considerations, and that would include potential risk to workers and risk to the public, as well as other considerations, the economic costs of additional removal, potential schedule impacts and other system impacts that I mentioned earlier.

And, if possible, we direct the reviewer to try to quantify the cost and benefits in terms of economic cost and expected risk just to facilitate comparison. Well, we understand that, for instance, the schedule impacts are part of the evaluation of practicality. We would try to tie those schedule impacts into the economic costs just to facilitate

comparison among different alternatives.

And so that's all I'm going to say this morning in this presentation about radionuclide removal. Dr. Esh is going to talk about concentration limits and then continue with information on the performance assessment and inadvertent intruder analysis review.

DR. ESH: Thank you. I am David Esh. I'm pleased to be here today. I'm going to cover a number of topics with you. Maybe if we had this to do over, we would have reordered things and put the slowest talker first instead of last, but you'll have to suffer through.

Concentration limits. What we have basically done in the SRP is we provided the same concentration averaging guidance as we published in the <u>Federal Register</u> notice in December 2005. The reason why we did this, and I guess this might prevent you from writing David Esh is a slacker on the notes of your slides, but we basically had an issue of we knew we were going to put it in the SRP. We received comments already, but we didn't want to put a new version in there and then be receiving comments on the new version, potentially comments on the old version, people confused.

We didn't want to partially modify the concentration averaging guidance and people say, hey, you didn't address my comment, but you did address their comments. And so we thought this was the best approach. We have been considering those comments. We're working on how to resolve them. There is quite a range of opinions on the subject and we'll do what we think is right as an agency, but probably not everybody is going to end up being happy where that guidance ends up.

But the reason why we have this in the SRP is that some of the criteria require you to determine the class of the waste. For instance, under the NDAA the class of the waste is needed to see whether you're kicked into another phase where NRC also evaluates the disposal plans or interacts with DOE on the disposal plans.

What is found in this guidance is basically the same principles that are in 10 CFR Part 61 and in the 1995 branch technical position. We feel like we have been faithful to the principles, but the language may be somewhat different and, certainly, it's tailored to the problems that are most pertinent to these DOE sites instead of the commercial low level waste disposal.

Now, Ι will move to performance on Performance assessment we expect is going assessment. be the analysis approach that is used demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 61.41. Of course, it's not a requirement to use performance assessment, but it's typically what is done and it's what we expect in the future.

The main challenge that we had in writing the SRP for the performance assessment review procedures was to balance this issue of allowing for flexibility while still ensuring uniformity, and they seem to be kind of counter to one another, but hopefully in a few slides here I will try to convince you how we did that.

This performance assessment review though that is if someone is using the SRP that they will perform, it will be a risk-informed and performance-based review. So it is not a prescriptive approach. It does not provide a prescriptive checklist that you must walk through and if everybody were to follow through that checklist, they will end up at the same point.

It allows for flexibility for site-to-site and problem-to-problem and that is very important, because people tend to think about just tanks and tank

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residuals. And there is enough variability from siteto-site in just that problem, let alone it also has to
address removal of waste from the tanks, potentially
treatment of that waste, disposal in different
configurations and potential removal and disposal of
large pieces of equipment or that sort of thing from
the tanks.

So it covers a pretty broad spectrum, but there are some very complicated and detailed technical problems within that broad spectrum. So it was a challenge to write it, but hopefully you will agree that we did a decent job with it.

Now, the overview of this performance assessment section in the document is it provides both some generic technical review procedures to ensure this comprehensiveness, and then it also provides technical review procedures, specific technical review procedures, and we think that this approach will allow us to achieve this comprehensiveness while still maintaining the flexibility.

Using the specific technical review procedures, the reviewer would ensure that the key elements are evaluated in each area and I will show you that in a second. Using the comprehensive technical review procedures, it would ensure that

every reviewer covers all the main elements that need to be covered to ensure the technical sufficiency of the information.

We have provided review procedures for evaluating uncertainty and sensitivity analysis explicitly, because we feel that's kind of an important issue for these problems. And model support and uncertainty are emphasized throughout this whole section of the SRP, and that is because those issues are pretty pervasive to the problem we think and, therefore, they are pervasive in the review plan also.

I knew somebody wouldn't get this clicker and, evidently, it's me. The main elements, and this is just basically a summary of the outline of the document, it starts off with scenario selection and receptor groups and then we have these generic review procedures followed by the specific ones. The specific ones are broken up into main, basically submodels of the performance assessment ranging from climate and infiltration down through radionuclide transport and then to the biosphere part of the calculation.

We also provide review methods or review procedures on the computational models and computer codes, how to evaluate those. As I stated earlier,

uncertainty and sensitivity analysis. We have a section on how to evaluate the model results and in that section, that is where we talk about defining barrier contributions and performing enough analysis of your problem to understand how it's working.

And that is a key element in order for us to do a risk-informed review, is that enough information is provided or that we generate to understand how the problem is working. And then there is also a part two, the ALARA analysis.

So under scenario selection and receptors, this is where we address the period of performance which is consistent with NUREG-1573 and institutional controls, which can be important for these problems. Those can define or help define the scenarios that you need to evaluate and also the receptors that you should evaluate.

The review procedures for scenario identification are provided and this, e.g., I think is a little confusing. What it is attempting to say is that the scenario identification should consider the release and exposure pathways and the physical form of the released waste, not that that is an example of a scenario identification. So just to clarify that a little bit.

The identification of the relevant features and processes. So you have a new reviewer that picks up the SRP and they are assigned to review a determination that comes in from Hanford, and they will look at the documents given by DOE and any external documents, but they have to try to think. You have to try to help them determine whether the information submitted is complete or not.

So how do you know that you have looked at all the necessary features of that site, features, events and processes that may influence the decision. It's a challenge especially for a junior reviewer and it's a challenge especially for even a senior reviewer at a complicated site. Many times we learn what is important by observation and some of these observations may be somewhat limited.

But what we have done in the SRP is we have provided a generic list of what we think the major ones are that would apply to most sites. That doesn't mean that it's a comprehensive list, that it contains every feature, event or process that would apply at a site. That is where the flexibility aspect comes in, but we think enough is there that it's going to provide a comprehensive evaluation from site-to-site.

There is also a lot of variability from site-to-site and problem-to-problem, as I mentioned earlier. So if we were attempting to provide a comprehensive FEP list, which is done in some programs, I don't see that there would be a large amount of value to that in this arena, mainly because a lot of the aspects of the sites are already -- you're not selecting a disposal site.

These sites are already determined where the material is. So you are evaluating it and they have been evaluated for a number of decades. So surprises can happen, but I don't think a generic FEP list is the way to make sure that you capture all those surprises.

Receptor characteristics. We basically advocate in the SRP that those are defined for the public and intruder receptors using a buffer zone concept, and that is basically that the intruders are the receptors that perform actions inside the buffer zone.

The public receptor is outside the buffer zone. The public receptor is the site boundary may be at a further location than the buffer zone while there is active institutional control. So when the active institutional controls end, then the buffer zone

distance defines where the public receptor is and that distance is on the order of hundreds of meters or at the point of maximum exposure.

Now, for our general or generic technical review procedures, we took an approach similar to what was taken in the Yucca Mountain Review Plan, but a little bit different. We have basically these five areas, system description, data sufficiency, data uncertainty, model uncertainty and model support, and they provide review procedures on those topics that every reviewer will use.

So we may have a specialist in hydrology that is only going to look at hydrology, but we want to ensure that he covers uncertainty just the same as geochemist does they our when are looking at geochemistry aspects. So instead of writing essentially the same text over and exchanging the word hydrology with geochemistry, we wrote a generic review procedure that each one is directed to use and it will ensure the comprehensiveness of the review basically, these technical areas.

And then, as I said, these would be applied to all the different models or sub-models or areas of the performance assessment, and this I think greatly reduces the redundancy in the document. So

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contrary to popular belief, we do believe in being as efficient as possible and we generally don't believe that huge review plans of hundreds and hundreds of pages benefit anyone. So we try to be as concise as possible, but having as much detail as we need to make sure the reviews are performed consistently and everything is technically accurate.

The specific technical procedures then are provided for each area of the performance assessment, say the source term or infiltration or what have you, and they have specific elements that the reviewer in that area should focus on. They are generally developed based on our past experience with waste determination reviews or other reviews of similar problems.

So, for instance, in the area of infiltration we may have a review procedure for somebody to consider abandoned boreholes and those sorts of things on infiltration estimates or if the site has been disturbed in the area where the infiltration measurements are or infiltration is being estimated, how does the disturbed area estimates -- how would they compare to ambient area estimates, those sorts of things.

An example here for the source term and

near-field release is we provide specific technical review procedures in this area on inventory, the degradation release of the waste forms, the source term models, chemical, environment and gaseous releases.

In addition to these two main areas that apply to all these, basically, models in the performance assessment, we provide review procedures on more higher level topics pertinent to performance assessment, including whether it's a deterministic or probabilistic approach that is used. We provide a separate section on uncertainty and sensitivity analysis. And, as I stated earlier, an important part of the review is evaluating the model results and defining the contributions of the barrier as a natural system.

If you want to do a risk-informed approach and reduce the number of questions you may receive and the time it takes to do the review, if you can clearly present what are the most important parts of the problem and that you have adequate basis for those parts of the problem, that will get you to your endpoint as fast as possible. So we think this is a very important part of the SRP and then in our application or execution of the SRP.

We emphasize throughout, as I stated, the need for adequate model support. It's a very important part of the review. We believe that the amount of moral support should be commensurate with the risk significance of the model. So if you can demonstrate that your results are not strongly dependent on that model, then you don't need to justify how accurate you are with that part of the problem.

But if your results are strongly dependent on the model, then you better have a lot of support to justify that that is the way that the system will work. And we recognize that the model support may entail multiple lines of evidence and also that traditional validation may not be possible for these types of problems. This slide and the two slides that follow are all directly in line with the previous ACNW recommendations that we received.

The SRP provides guidance. I think I skipped one. No, sorry, I was wrong. This slide, No. 28 and 29 and 30, are the three that address your recommendations. I was one behind. The SRP provides guidance on evaluating the long-term performance of cementitious materials. We provide common degradation mechanisms that the reviewer could consider, and we

also address the coupling of processes when evaluating long-term performance.

Now, switching gears to the inadvertent intrusion analysis. I only have one slide on this. The intruders may be defined based on site-specific considerations. An important element is that technical basis is needed for the performance of intruder protection systems, so it's not a guarantee that you can see I have an intruder barrier. Therefore, I evaluate my intruders in one manner.

We consider that you could have a variety though dependent of scenarios site-specific on conditions and intruder protection systems ranging from the common ones like t.he resident and agricultural scenario to maybe a less intrusive and less common one of a recreational type scenario. we have a box there for other if something else comes up that we didn't think of.

We emphasize in this area that sitespecific parameters should be used when available.

People have a tendency to default to Part 61, Draft

EIS, because an intruder analysis was done there, but
that was an intruder analysis for a generic type
problem for a regulatory -- for just defining some
things in the regulation basically. So if you have

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1 site-specific information that is more pertinent and 2 can change things in either direction, favorable or 3 unfavorable, you should probably be using your site-4 specific information when available. 5 That's all I had. Conclusions. Ryan, do you want me to do these, you can do them? 6 7 MR. WHITED: Sure. The SRP will facilitate risk-8 9 informed performance-based reviews of the This is what we hope. 10 determinations. The review areas take into account existing NRC guidance, our 11 experience, previous reviews and ACNW recommendations. 12 And we look forward to your comments on the draft SRP. 13 14 We, in our process of developing it, have 15 had our newer staff, our more junior staff, look at it 16 and say, okay, would this help you to perform the review, but we're also interested in the comments from 17 your group who may have a knowledge level that is 18 19 different than them or external groups, 20 ultimately this SRP is not intended to just be a 21 document and then people go off and do things the way 22 they have always done them. 23 We want it to be very useful and to help 24 ensure the consistency of the reviews, so would like

feedback on whether it looks like it's going to

achieve that goal or not. It is a challenge though, I would note. As I tried to emphasize, it's a real challenge to put all the specific elements in there that you think may be needed for different sites and different problems without being overly prescriptive and overly redundant.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: You never get them all.

DR. ESH: You never get them all anyway.

You keep extending it and chopping off the tail and
the tail gets longer and you have more and you chop
that off. You never get there. So that's all we have
and we'll appreciate any questions you may have.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Jim?

MEMBER CLARKE: Thank you. I have a couple of questions that come under the general heading of how clean is clean, and I wonder if we could go to slide 13.

The practicality of additional removal would be determined on a cost-benefit analysis and the benefit would be framed in terms of the risk reduction. So it has been my experience with removals and treatment, especially that you hit a point of diminishing returns where the cost for incremental risk reduction is just overwhelming, and that could arguably be a place to stop.

1 Is there a threshold on the risk where there is a place to stop independent of the cost? 2 Well, I think, certainly our 3 DR. RIDGE: decisions on risk of course are, but the primary 4 5 consideration --MEMBER CLARKE: You may have a legal piece 6 7 that I'm not sensitive to, but is the thinking that 8 you continue to remove as long as the costs are commensurate with the risk reduction, is that --9 10 DR. RIDGE: Well, I mean, there are a couple of things I want to say. Of course, the 11 12 performance objectives are primary and the primary risk considerations are looked at in terms of the 13 14 performance objectives. But I believe that one of the 15 ACNW's recommendations in this area was to look at risk in terms of other risks on the site and that is 16 actually what the SRP -- the SRP does address it in 17 that way, is consistent with that recommendation. 18 19 MEMBER CLARKE: Okay. That's a good 20 answer, that came up this morning when we were talking 21 to the Academy about whether or not they would be able 22 In other words, this risk is not a to address that. 23 tank risk in a vacuum. It does consider the 24 surroundings to the extent that that can be done. 25 The other question I have is it looks like

you have a single criteria here, but I'm suspecting that that's not totally accurate. In other words, in addition to cost-benefit are you considering short-term versus long-term, risk to the public versus risk to workers?

DR. RIDGE: Yes. As I think we tried to touch on later in the presentation that maybe bears some clarification that the removal to the extent practical allows for consideration of a number of factors, you know, short-term risks, worker risks, longer term risk to the public, schedule impact and we would consider all of those. To the extent that they can be quantified, that facilitates comparison and analysis, but of course there are considerations that aren't quantifiable and we do recognize that.

MEMBER CLARKE: I just wanted to ask this. CERCLA, which is another law and another situation, does have a set of nine criteria, some of which I would encourage you not to consider, but they have a set of what they call balancing criteria that looks at short-term versus long-term technical feasibility cost and risk to workers, risk to the public, risk to the environment.

And so while your slide looked like you were really making this decision on a cost per risk

reduction basis, I just wanted to probe you a little bit on that and see if there were other factors involved. Thank you.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Ruth?

MEMBER WEINER: I don't mean to be beating a dead horse, but the use of the term "highly radioactive" still troubles me because that does have a specific meaning. Radioactivity has a specific meaning. It is measured in curies or becquerels. And since you are going to use this term, I would strongly encourage you to have right up front an explanation that this is not the usual use of the term. This is not the common use of the term, that you are using it in a specific way to mean key radionuclides.

The reason I make such a strong point of this is I think this is a real point of confusion, in particular for people who really have only a shaky understanding of what radioactivity is. And if you're concerned about public, communication with the public, the last thing you want to do is make your own definition for a commonly used term.

So the only way that I can see, since you have made the decision clearly, is to have an up front explanation that in this document highly radioactive means important to risk and does not necessarily mean

1 the most radioactive radionuclide, the one with the 2 largest, highest activity, if you will. 3 Beyond that, when you say removal, do you 4 give any consideration as to where this material is 5 going to be removed to or is that beyond the scope of this? Somebody is going to raise the question, I'm 6 7 sure. 8 DR. RIDGE: The SRP doesn't specifically 9 address where the material is removed to. Now, each problem is site-specific. So in the case of 10 saltstone, the removal would have meant radionuclides 11 12 that were taken out of the salt waste and then would not be disposed of at saltstone. But, I mean, in most 13 14 cases I think that removal implies the waste that is then going to be vitrified, has been the case so far, 15 16 but is going to be not the waste that we're then 17 thinking about. So it does somewhat leave the scope, I 18 19 think, is what I'm trying to say, and the SRP does not address where the radionuclides that are removed then 20 21 go. 22 It may never be a problem. MEMBER WEINER: 23 It's just a question, it seems to me, that for a large

and complex site somebody is going to ask that.

Somebody is going to say, okay, what are you going to

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do with this stuff then?

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On the question of screening features, events and processes, does the applicant do that?

Does NRC do it? Does NRC repeat the applicant's screening?

DR. ESH: Yes, that's a good question. date, we haven't ever in any of our waste determinations had or received a formal screening process that was done to develop, say, the performance It's always the performance assessment is assessment. basically done and it explains why it represents the site and the features and the analysis is presented.

So considering the history at a lot of these sites and the fact that most of the performance assessment activities would not be starting from square one, I think it is reasonable to not have a formal screening process, but you still want to do something to ensure completeness of all the significant features.

And the way that we did that is to provide a list of what we thought the major features and processes would be that would be included, so that if Christianne is reviewing a site, she can step through that list and if all those features are there, she has a reasonably high degree of confidence that nothing

1 major has been missed in the analysis or isn't part of 2 the analysis without asking somebody like Dick Codell, 3 who works in high level waste for 30 years, and he 4 says oh, yes, there was a site in Tennessee that had 5 this problem and I think it applies here, you know. We, as an agency, lose our institutional 6 7 knowledge and so something like this is the best that 8 we can do. The best that we can do to help to retain 9 that comprehensiveness, I guess, or completeness of 10 the analysis. MEMBER WEINER: Following up on Jim's 11 12 question for a moment, the risks, the various risks as I'm sure you recognize are going to have to be 13 14 balanced off against each other, because they don't 15 all work the same way. You don't always decrease public risk and decrease worker risk at the same time. 16 17 So are you planning some general format, guidance, quantitative quidance for that or are you just going 18 19 to do it on a case-by-case basis? 20 DR. RIDGE: Well, the SRP does direct the 21 reviewer to look at the risks and costs in terms of 22 other DOE activities at the site. 23 MEMBER WEINER: Okav. 24 DR. RIDGE: And at this point, neither --25 the SRP does not recommend a quantitative -- you know,

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1	workers should get this dose, you know. There is this
2	multiplicative factor between workers. I mean, we
3	actually in the SRP specifically note that there are
4	certain types of quantitative comparisons that aren't
5	appropriate.
6	MEMBER WEINER: Yes.
7	DR. RIDGE: But I think it does direct the
8	reviewer to look at them in terms of other activities
9	at the site.
10	MEMBER WEINER: Yes, that's a very good
11	point. Finally
12	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Ruth?
13	MEMBER WEINER: Yes?
14	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Just a second. I
15	think Scott had wanted to weigh in on an earlier
16	question.
17	MEMBER WEINER: Oh, I'm sorry.
18	DR. FLANDERS: I just wanted to add to the
19	response to a couple of your questions. One of them,
20	the use of the term highly radioactive radionuclides,
21	we agree clearly with your views on that. The reason
22	why that term is in is that's the term that's actually
23	in the legislation that's directing us, our activities
24	under the NDAA. And as Christianne mentioned earlier,
25	one of the things that we felt equally important was

1 to define what we mean by highly radioactive 2 radionuclides in the context of these reviews. 3 And we talked about how we compare those 4 to or used a similar definition that we use when we 5 talk about key radionuclides in the past. reason why we -- that term is in here is because it's 6 7 in the legislation that gave us this responsibility, but we do define it up front early in the document. 8 9 MEMBER WEINER: Thank you. In terms of how it is used. 10 DR. FLANDERS: MEMBER WEINER: Thanks for that 11 12 That's very helpful and I recognize we explanation. have discussed this question before. 13 14 DR. FLANDERS: The second issue is where 15 the waste is going. I think Christianne answered well that the majority of the waste that is removed from 16 these tanks will be vitrified and disposed of in a 17 high level waste repository. And then in some cases, 18 19 such as the saltstone review, which we have completed, 20 where there is some waste that's actually going to be 21 disposed of on-site, and for that waste it's going to 22 be disposed of on-site, that's within the scope of the 23 review. 24 DR. ESH: Ruth, I think your reason for 25 commenting on that is the analysis of the cumulative

1 impacts of the decision though, right? 2 Yes, yes. MEMBER WEINER: 3 DR. ESH: You vitrify it, but you still 4 have to ship it and dispose of it somewhere else and 5 there is impacts associated with that shipping and disposal. Yes, we don't evaluate the shipping and 6 7 disposal impacts in our evaluation, but I believe it 8 would be part of DOE's environmental impact statement 9 type analysis. 10 DR. FLANDERS: That is a part of their 11 impact statement. The DOE folks can talk to it as it 12 relates to the sites, but also, you know, as you know for the environmental impacts for Yucca Mountain, the 13 14 waste associated for disposal from these tanks are 15 factored analysis also into that in terms of 16 transport. 17 MEMBER WEINER: Thank you. I'll let it go 18 Thank you. at that. 19 CHAIRMAN RYAN: First, let me compliment 20 you on taking on a tough technical challenge and 21 really doing a great job of getting it organized to 22 We really look forward to the document. this point. 23 I think you have certainly organized your thoughts and 24 approached it in a really technically sound manner and

that's coming through loud and clear to me, so I

appreciate that and everybody's part.

Second is SRPs are used by two groups.

First, it's used by the staff to review and typically it's used by the user or the applicant to organize their materials in a way that flows into the review process. And maybe I'm anticipating what you've already -- you know, what will be in the document.

We'll see in a few weeks. But examples. Do you have enough examples where you can kind of guide folks through this process of thinking about range of values and, you know, how to risk inform and then you can say okay, we don't need to worry about this process, because it's a lower priority or doesn't contribute to those kind of things? How is that going to work?

DR. ESH: Yes, I think that we have provided a lot of, or at least some, additional text to explain some issues and talk about different things like problistic analysis and various issues like that. But we probably don't have a lot of examples in there, you know. This site provided data on infiltration that was derived. As an example. This site provided data on infiltration that was derived from estimates based on measurements of moisture content or something and they got a range of this.

How would the reviewer evaluate that and

1	determine whether it was acceptable or appropriate?
2	I don't think we have like that level of detail in
3	there. And the primary reason is there is too much
4	variation. You have very arid sites to humid sites.
5	You have waste removed from tanks, disposed of at the
6	land surface almost under engineer barriers. You have
7	waste disposed of deeper without maybe the same types
8	of barriers.
9	CHAIRMAN RYAN: So it's literally and
10	figuratively all over the map?
11	DR. ESH: Yes. We could certainly provide
12	some examples about evaluating or representing like on
13	certain data, things like that, providing okay.
14	You have four sample measurements and how would you
15	assign a probability distribution to that? We could
16	provide that sort of thing, I think, but to provide
17	the level of detail beyond that as in terms of
18	examples, it would be extremely difficult.
19	It was very difficult. What you will see
20	was very difficult to produce. So I
21	CHAIRMAN RYAN: I actually appreciate
22	that. That's a fair response and don't offer any
23	criticism at all. Thinking ahead then, is there a way
24	to, you know, as you go through determinations how are

you going to capture that sort of build the body and

1	knowledge for everybody's benefit? Will there be case
2	reports? You know, and then I'm thinking ahead and
3	this is just thinking out loud that, you know, it
4	would be kind of interesting if you did a
5	determination, although there were really five things
6	we struggled with, to maybe write up those five things
7	as part of a case study or, you know, and maybe even
8	have appendixes or via 2s, 3s and 4s and you get them
9	to add to the review plan.
10	That helps you with your body and
11	knowledge and your knowledge management question. I
12	just throw that out as a thought, but you're going to
13	be carving a lot of new ground, I'm going to guess.
14	DR. ESH: Well, I think
15	CHAIRMAN RYAN: In all of this.
16	DR. ESH: it's a definite challenge,
17	because as we perform reviews, we'll have different
18	groups that will perform the reviews. Now, albeit,
19	we're not a huge group of people, so we have weekly
20	meetings where we communicate with each other.
21	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes.
22	DR. ESH: And people talk with each other.
23	I don't think we have anywhere near a dysfunctional
24	unit that we're not communicating well on the
25	different types of reviews that people are doing. But

we also have a challenge with -- in the SRP, it says you should consider previous reviews. Well, what does that mean? Does that mean I should go back and review five TERs before I start doing my review on this new site?

I don't think it means that, but you should certainly be aware of the main issues that were covered in those previous reports, probably by looking at the assumptions and recommendations and those sorts of things and also communicating. You know, if you see something when you are using the SRP and I worry how I'm going to review it, I feel like I don't have enough detail in the SRP, I certainly need to talk to the people that have also faced that problem and say okay, what did you do on this site or the other site.

It's much more a significant problem say in performing a decommissioning review, where they are so much more frequent and there are so many of them then in incidental waste where we're dealing with four sites and, you know, handfuls of reviews each year. So I think this goes a big step in ensuring our consistency, but it's not the only step. I think there are other things that we have to do like some of the things you talked about to try to achieve that.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes.

1 DR. FLANDERS: If I could just add to 2 One of the objectives that we have in Dave's answer? 3 our operating plan is required to do a lessons learned 4 report. And while we haven't done one yet and we 5 haven't scoped it out, your comments are well-taken. Maybe we'll take that under consideration in terms of 6 7 how we factor that into our system. CHAIRMAN RYAN: And again, maybe we can 8 9 put more shape to them when we get the plan and review it in detail and then, you know, maybe some specific 10 11 things will drop out. But like you said in the 12 beginning, it sounds like you have really taken on a tough task in a short period of time and applied your 13 14 collective talents to it well. So we'll look forward to the document. 15 Thanks. 16 DR. ESH: Thank you. 17 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Bill? A single question, minor 18 MEMBER HINZE: 19 natured, for clarification and this also relates to this slide 13. In the selection of radionuclide 20 removal technologies, are you requiring DOE to look on 21 22 a cost-benefit basis comparative nature of comparison 23 of different technologies on a cost-benefit basis? 24 How are you -- how do you arrive at a decision on

that?

1 DR. RIDGE: Well, I think some of the 2 factors that we would expect DOE to look at and again 3 SRP, of course, isn't requiring DOE to 4 anything, but some of the factors that we would expect 5 DOE to look at and that we would expect to look at, I think, we tried to touch on maybe on slide 18, we 6 7 would look at their process for choosing technologies, 8 the expected effectiveness. 9 in some cases, DOE produces I mean, reports that say well, we expect this technology might 10 cost this much and they have produced information like 11 12 that in the past, but may only remove waste to this certain level and this other technology, we expect it 13 14 could do a little better, but it might have these other tradeoffs as far as downstream impact or 15 uncertainty in how well it could do. Technological 16 17 maturity, of course, is a big consideration. I'm not sure I'm getting to the heart of 18 19 your question, but I think the answer is yes, we --20 MEMBER HINZE: You are anticipating having 21 a comparison, so that you can review it adequately. 22 DR. RIDGE: We are and that is based on 23 our experience in the past. In prior cases, DOE has looked at and provided to us information on the 24

technologies they have used and what they believe the

1 pros and cons were of various technologies and why 2 they chose the technologies they did. 3 MEMBER HINZE: Thank you. 4 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: I've got questions, 5 I think, in a couple of areas, but maybe a little bit more general. First, on monitoring, I have heard 6 7 monitoring mentioned in this context in the last 8 couple of days a few times and most of the time, it's 9 followed immediately by this statement "Monitoring is 10 subject to judicial review." And I'm not sure exactly what that means or how it makes it different from the 11 other aspects of this waste determination business. 12 Can somebody explain why that's important or what it 13 14 means? Don't all leap up at once. 15 DR. FLANDERS: I think we're looking for 16 OGC. 17 MR. WHITED: Allen, we're looking for OGC to help us answer this question. I'll attempt to and 18 19 I don't pretend to be an attorney at all, so you'll 20 get that kind of an answer. You get what you pay for. 21 Maybe we should ask DOE's ESH: 22 consultant. No. 23 DR. FLANDERS: The term "judicial review," 24 is specific to the monitoring aspect of it and what we 25 take away from that is that while, of course, we have

to fulfill our responsibilities under the legislation as required, but that the monitoring activities if we were not to carry it out, one could come back and challenge whether or not the agency is fully fulfilling it's responsibilities and it would be subject to a legal process.

Now, the details of that, we would have to get back to you with OGC and give you a full interpretation of what that means, but it's written into the legislation and the aspect of judicial review is pointed directly at our monitoring responsibilities. So that's how we are interpreting it as a lay-person, but I'm sure you see it as a much more sophisticated analysis of what it means.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Does that extend to the point -- let's presume there is -- I'm picking the saltstone vaults, they are closed and monitoring is going on and results are coming out every year in a report or something and somebody could challenge the NRC or the state, because they think you should have acted on the basis of the monitoring results.

DR. FLANDERS: Right. I think they could challenge. Yes, they could challenge as to whether or not we're evaluating that information and how we are

assuring ourselves that they are, in fact, meeting the performance objectives.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. The second thing on monitoring, it was mentioned that the NRC and state and I guess DOE were working on a plan, I guess, for saltstone. When might that plan be revealed, be available for review?

MR. THAGGARD: Yes, we don't have a definite schedule on that right now. Oh, I'm sorry. I'm Mark Thaggard with the NRC. We don't have a definite plan on that right now. I think DOE has got an aggressive schedule to try to get their plan to develop some time this summer and, obviously, we can't develop our implementation plan until we figure out exactly what they are doing. So we don't have an exact schedule on that yet.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thanks. A somewhat different line. After you have completed one recent review on the saltstone and I think you got a couple of others in progress and you've got a draft SRP that's essentially done, except for the printing, I After having gone through all of that and done a lot of thinking and soul searching, what seems to be bubbling up to the top as the most critical technical issues that you're seeing, the most critical

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1	assumptions or data parameters or models or whatever
2	that seem to be revealed by all this?
3	DR. ESH: I think I can answer that.
4	There is always a high degree of uncertainty with
5	inventory estimates for a variety of reasons, so
6	that's one of the important factors.
7	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Even the residual
8	inventory? I mean, like the heel?
9	DR. ESH: Right through, yes.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay.
11	DR. ESH: Yes. But probably more
12	importantly is the long-term performance of the
13	cementitious materials or other engineer barriers put
14	in place to help achieve 61.41 performance objective.
15	That seems to be a driver. Now, granted, that as a
16	driver or say saltstone may not be a driver at a site
17	like Idaho that has a deep vadose zone, a deep
18	unsaturated zone and some of the parts of the natural
19	system may play a more important role the geologic,
20	the natural system may play a more important role at
21	a site like Idaho.
22	VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Yes.
23	DR. ESH: But at a humid site like
24	Savannah River, it's almost all engineering source
25	term inventory-related as the driver of the problem.

At West Valley we don't have any waste determinations under review right now, but we anticipate them in the future. It will be somewhat similar to Savannah River with the added complexity of erosional processes, I believe. And Hanford and Idaho are pretty similar. They are both semi-arid sites and have similar problems there.

But the quantity and concentration of material at Hanford might be significantly larger than at Idaho. So they might have to have a higher reliance on engineered systems there, even though it is a semi-arid site than say Idaho would, who tends to have a fairly small quantity of waste on a relative basis with the other DOE sites.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: To what extent is making these maximum extent practical decisions of an issue? I can -- in sort of looking at what's going on, it would seem that -- well, the tradeoffs themselves are complicated to make, but just keeping track of the status of technology. In other words, has DOE considered all the right things or is there something else out there for retrieval or solvent extraction or whatever? Just keeping track of all that with somewhat of an independent eye on it would seem to be a real challenge.

It is a challenge. 1 DR. RIDGE: 2 think Mike Ryan mentioned earlier that some of the 3 staff working on this, Dr. Esh and myself included, 4 went to a recent seminar or workshop rather that DOE 5 was involved with regarding different technologies that are available to remove waste from tanks. 6 7 so, I mean, we do try to keep up with things that are 8 available. Obviously, we would be -- you know, our 9 major source of information is different technologies that are being used at different sites, but we do try 10 to look at other reports. 11 I mean, in the past, NAS has done reports 12 on technologies that DOE has used and their selection 13 14 process for technologies, we try to keep aware of things like that. 15 But I agree with you, keeping track of what is being done at different sites and what 16 maybe has not been implemented yet, but could be if 17 some work were put into it, also is a challenge. 18 19 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. 20 Dave? 21 MR. KOCHER: Yes, mostly I want to second 22 Mike Ryan's comments. Most of what I have heard here 23 is very encouraging to me. You've certainly thought 24 about what's important and you have certainly thought 25 about what are reasonable ways to go about evaluating

what's important in these analyses. And of course, the devil will be in the details and you'll learn a lot more as you get real cases.

But I'm very, very encouraged and I found myself relating some of what was presented here to some of the discussions we had over the last two days about newly generated low level waste. And I sort of came to the conclusion that there is not a lot of overlap between some of these problems. We spent a time discussing issues of concentration averaging and why maybe -- well, I put forth just a thought and I don't know if anybody agreed that maybe some of the approaches to concentration averaging in the branch technical position were really not quite right when it comes down to intrusion analyses into a disposal facility.

But I think that problem goes away. It certainly goes away with saltstone, because you have this humongous homogenous waste form and you're starting with liquid waste, so those kind of issues go away. When it comes to complying with the performance objective for inadvertent intruders, you know, I have seen your evaluation of the saltstone work and it's clear for perfectly understandable reasons that you have to kind of do a tap dance here, because you don't

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really have them numbered in Part 61 that you work to, so you have to have some kind of surrogate. And that's fine, I mean, you need a 3

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target. But by the same token, I guess, I would encourage you to look at compliance as not just meeting a number. There are subjective qualitative issues about probabilities that something will happen or whether this scenario is reasonable that can kind of factor into a decision process here about whether this has been met. And I'm sure you're aware of this, because those issues will -- it's all in how you define the scenarios and that's really the key.

A question I had was about ALARA, because I have never really quite -- even though I've done an ALARA analysis for a PA, I have really -- I'm not entirely comfortable with how this works when it comes to, you know, long-term highly uncertain projections and you are kind of stuck with fixed disposal technologies and making incremental changes of those technologies don't really make sense.

And I wonder if, in a minute or less, you could give me some idea of how you look at this ALARA problem in these evaluations?

Well, ALARA in these DR. RIDGE: evaluations is covered in part by the criterion to, I suppose, this requirement that radionuclides be removed to the maximum extent practical. That's a big part of the ALARA analysis. The thought being that if you remove them from the system, not only have you removed the potential dose, but you have removed a lot of the uncertainty.

It's no longer a question of how well the stabilization is going to work, but they are out of the system and so this requirement that the radionuclides, the key radionuclides or highly radioactive radionuclides be removed to the maximum extent practical, does go a long way towards the ALARA argument.

I think that we do regard ALARA as being slightly broader in that it does also include have you stabilized the waste to the -- a reasonable extent? If you have -- you know, removing it is one step of reducing the dose and reducing the uncertainty, but stabilizing the waste where it is, also, of course, is an important part of that. So it's a little broader.

MR. KOCHER: That's a really helpful answer, because, of course, my mindset was evaluating ALARA with respect to putting waste in a saltstone vault. And I see your point and you might well say that if their base case analysis for saltstone

disposal shows a maximum dose to the public of a tenth of a millirem, you probably would declare victory and go home, assuming that the other parts of the waste removal had been satisfied. Now, I appreciate that answer.

DR. ESH: I think at one time Christianne gave, to me I think, an example that illustrates the concept that I think is pretty pertinent here. Say you have a heel on the bottom of the tank and you're going to put grout in it to help immobilize it, well, the -- you may in your modeling analyze it one way and say it's not highly important whether I mix that grout with the waste or not to achieve the performance objectives.

But the reality is if that waste is better mixed with your constituents that you're putting in or your cementitious material, you are probably going to limit its release better than if it's a pancake type system with a layer of waste and a layer of cement on top of it. So from an ALARA perspective, if it's not costly to try to facilitate that mixing, you should probably facilitate that mixing, even if in your analysis you've shown that the dose is .4 millirem if I do mix it or, you know, .4 and .3.

So there may be things like that that we

1 believe would be ALARA type considerations that are 2 also then outside of waste removal. There are other 3 things you can do to try to reduce your potential 4 future impacts. 5 MR. KOCHER: One other quick comment, if I was -- I'll be looking forward to seeing 6 7 discussions more details and about sensitivity 8 uncertainly analysis. And I think I saw the right, 9 for me, words on the slides that what you are really 10 concerned about here is uncertainty with respect to, robustness of meeting the performance 11 you know, objectives and not necessarily uncertainty in the 12 actual outcome of disposal. 13 14 MR. HAMDAN: I have a question for David. 15 Microphone. CHAIRMAN RYAN: 16 MR. HAMDAN: Oh. Have you mentioned the 17 importance of model support and how it is emphasized in the SRP? What kinds of examples are you thinking 18 19 about or did you think about? And will you include 20 these examples in the SRP or not? 21 DR. ESH: I think we think of multiple 22 types of model support ranging from experiments to 23 determine parameter values, field scale, larger scale 24 experiments to address uncertainties with the scaling 25 and other processes, experience at analogous sites or

systems. You are trying to develop a cap for one of these types of incidental waste problems. You may be able to look at the design and performance of caps for CERCLA sites or uranium mill tailing sites and learn from their experience.

Natural analogs when available. I guess there are a smattering of things. I think we talk about all of those, but, of course, we don't go into detail of providing for an engineered cap. Here are the types of analogs that people have used and how would you determine whether the information supplied by DOE appropriately demonstrates from an analog perspective the performance of their system?

We don't provide that level of detail in the SRP and I think that's appropriate, because there are -- I can stress it again. There are a number of permutations of things you can get into. And so if you try to provide the detail, the document would expand and expand and expand and it would get to the point where I don't think it would be very useful for people. It wouldn't be useful for our staff and it wouldn't be useful for DOE and it wouldn't be useful say for the Committee here.

MR. HAMDAN: You probably never could provide everything anyway. Thanks.

VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Thank you. Any other questions from staff? Okay. Seeing none, I would very much like to thank the three of you for a very informative briefing and for the rest of the NMSS folks that showed up and helped with the questions. Before we adjourn, I would like to talk a little bit about why we got everybody here in terms of the Committee and NMSS, I guess, a little bit about letter writing.

I'm going to suggest to the Committee we don't see a letter out of the Academy briefing. It's for our background information and commenting on an existing report doesn't seem to be very useful. I'm going to suspect we're going to want to write a letter on the draft SRP, but we don't have that yet, of course, and it will be -- we will get it, let's say, approximately, June 1 with a two month window for comments, which means we're probably going to want to work on a letter, have a draft letter coming into the July meeting.

We can't do anything in June, because the meeting is so soon. So I think what we're going to have to do, my suggestion is, we'll take what we have heard this morning, the background, general background, we'll get copies of the draft SRP,

1 presumably next week. It will be posted on a website, 2 right? MR. WHITED: 3 Yes. 4 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: And I'll scheme a 5 little bit on a schedule and send out some emails when I would like to get your input, allow time to read the 6 7 thing, but, you know, some time, you know, later in 8 June get your input and we'll start working on a 9 letter off-line, if you will, and try to get something 10 into shape. I think that's what we're left with. that --11 12 Sounds great. CHAIRMAN RYAN: VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. With that, 13 14 five minutes early, thank you very much. 15 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Just so we finish up and 16 we can cover the topic now that we've got all the 17 right folks, I mean a lot of the right folks here, and I think we clearly will write a letter on the low 18 19 level waste working group in the last two days and so 20 we've checked that box. We'll be taking that up at 21 our next meeting in the July time frame. So we'll 22 have a draft and be up and running with that as well. 23 VICE CHAIRMAN CROFF: Okay. Back at 1:30. 24 CHAIRMAN RYAN: We're adjourned until 25 1:30.

## 1 A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N 2 1:34 p.m. Don, we're pleased to have 3 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 4 you here to talk to us about the recent International 5 Commission on Radiological Protection Draft Report Scope of Radiological Protection 6 entitled "The 7 Regulations." We're looking forward to your insights 8 and hopefully you can illuminate what was readily 9 apparent for us. So take it away. 10 DR. COOL: Thank you. Okay. 11 Glad to be with you. For the record, I'm afternoon. 12 Donald Cool. Am I ringing? It feels like I'm just 13 ringing. 14 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well, I would move it down 15 maybe. DR. COOL: See, I was being coached over 16 17 here about how I had to get it up very close to my throat in order to be able to be heard. 18 19 CHAIRMAN RYAN: It's actually a little 20 better right now for us. 21 DR. COOL: Okay. Is that better? 22 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes. 23 DR. COOL: All right. Donald Cool, I'm 24 the Senior Advisor for Radiation Safety,

international liaison, from the Office of Nuclear

1 Material Safety and Safequards. Before I get started, 2 I would note that working on these activities, I work 3 closely with Dr. Vince Holahan in the Office of 4 Research. 5 I was thinking about saying that Vince regrets being here today, although I'm afraid I would 6 7 have to disappoint you. He has chosen to be at the 8 NRC's annual awards ceremony, since he is receiving 9 this afternoon the Honorary Meritorious Service Award. CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well, let's add to our 10 record that we congratulate Vince on the recognition 11 12 of his excellent work on such a prestigious award. Thank you. 13 14 DR. COOL: So with that, what I am going 15 to try and do in the next few minutes for you is give you a brief overview of the ICRP draft report. 16 17 give you some of the staff's preliminary views. are in the process of developing and assembling the 18 19 comments that we will provide to ICRP shortly and then 20 open it up for discussion with the Committee. So to start with, an overview of the 21 22 report and done without any bias or perception, I 23 The intent of the report as given by the ICRP 24 to provide some recommended criteria for defining

radiation exposure situations that can and need to be

subject to radiologic protection regulations and provide some description of the concepts of exclusion, exemption and their application.

Basically, what that boils down to is trying to provide some information on what, as you know, can be a rather torturous line along the edges of what you are trying to control, what you're not trying to control and why at any given moment you applying those controls. This is also might be somewhat important for **ICRP** in that the recommendations that the ICRP would produce or NCRP or others would also have to have some definition of what they would apply to or don't apply to.

This particular report is intended as one of the foundational building blocks that the ICRP has working on in support οf their recommendations. There are actually two types of documents as ICRP now defines them. A couple of foundation documents, as they call them, which were the ones specifically related to the biology and some of the modeling, which may, in fact, end up to be appendices of the recommendations themselves and then this series of building blocks which were intended to elaborate some particular concept or provide some additional information.

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The report with an introduction and some discussion of the Commission's regulations versus the construction of the regulatory approach particular country, discussion of what they refer to as dichotomous control, discussions of exclusion, extended discussion of how exemption, an concepts might apply in some specific situation and then some further discussion on defining the regular radiological scope of the regulations.

The first major concept is that exclusion. That being those situations that need not be covered by radiological protection legislation, because they are considered to be unamenable to control by any means. As in there is nothing that can be reasonably done or done at all, depending upon how you look at it, to provide any control to a situation and thus that there would be no reason to apply any regulations or other kinds of criteria to those particular kinds of exposures.

They do have some specific recommendations on those. This is similar to that which the NRC has in Part 20, for example, suggesting excluding things like cosmic radiation, radionuclides of natural origin in the human body and, as they put it, anything else that the legislator or the regulator decides he wants

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to exclude, which is a fairly large caveat of things that you could pour into the hole or not pour into the hole, depending upon how they would look at it. Note that in NRC's regulatory construct,

there are several things that are excluded in terms of items that Part 20 regulations would not apply to, that's what the concepts of exclusion are. So this is not at all inconsistent with the way that the NRC, the United States and most other countries, the IAEA basic safety standards have been constructed.

The second concept that of exemption. The process of identifying a situation that might be within the scope of what you are trying to control, but that can be released or the process of not applying regulations or perhaps taking away some of the requirements from a particular application, as in deciding not to do the full situation that you might otherwise apply to an exposure.

Again, this is a very typical sort of thing that we see in most regulations, including the various NRC regulations, not only Part 20, but 30, 40, 50, 70, 72, 76, etcetera, all have certain things that are exempt where the full set of requirements is not applied for a variety of reasons.

Now, some of these are the typical things

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and some of these you will start to sense a bit of controversy around. The first one, devices, admitting the adventitious radiation as in those very soft level x-rays, the cathode ray tube, like our -- maybe not these, but the older fashions in our TVs and some of those sorts of things produce.

The second one, which they recommend and we'll come back to this in a little bit when we get the staff views, recommending activity concentration smaller than those specified in FAO or WHO, that's the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and the World Health Organization, WHO, for food substance and drinking water and for non-edible commodities as was laid out in IAEA in the recent Safety Guide RSG-1.7, which was on exemption exclusion clearance.

Now, in addition to that, there are quite a lot of numerical values that float around into various portions of this draft ICRP report dealing with artificial nuclides and radionuclides and they draw upon a fairly large base of information, particularly generated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but also by the European Commission and others around what has been slowly coming together as at least somewhat of a consensus for situations in

which most people are not applying regulatory controls or providing clearance.

So about a becquerel per kilogram for alpha emitters I have put our units in. Sometimes I am successful being, one, bilingual, sometimes I am not. Hopefully, I have done my math correctly in these cases. 10 becquerels per kilogram for some of the beta gamma emitters. You'll notice that's a very interesting number there. And then for natural radionuclides 1,000 becquerels, this is head of chain, for the natural occurring chains and 10,000 becquerels Potassium-40 in the body.

In addition to which, they have a caveat associated with some of the constructs around building materials and some additional constraints might be necessary because of the kinds of exposure scenarios that you might have, depending on your situations. So I said most all of this has been derived from the modeling work that was done by the EC and the IAEA. I would note that it is very similar to and numerically quite equivalent.

No, not exactly by the numerics, but they all fall within a very small space with the modeling work that the NRC did in the Office of Research in developing the underlying basis when we were working

on the proposals for control of solid material. So numerically, there are some consistencies. There are some places where these are inconsistent.

And what they have done, ICRP has tried to generalize these numbers to provide sort of a global overview that doesn't mimic exactly what some of those individual documents would have had in it, but what they do is perhaps representing something that could be considered as a consensus.

Now, I'll change my hat and put on my regular NRC staff hat and talk about some of the staff's preliminary views. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced I'm going to be able to shed a great deal of light, as you would have hoped, in being able to explain this document. But I will tell you it is complex. It is difficult to interpret and it is confusing.

We spent a great deal of time reading it, to look at it, we looked at it and it doesn't help us a great deal either. It's, in fact, not at all clear to us that in the United States or another country which had a well-developed regulatory regime this would be of any particular use. In fact, it poses some conflicts with those of us that have fairly well-established numbers in a variety of situations. We'll

talk about that in a moment.

And unfortunately, if I was in a country somewhere who was attempting to reach out for information on how I should construct a good logical, consistent, coherent risk-informed regulatory basis, this would not be the document that I would suggest that they go and use. It covers a wide range of topics, the only similarity of which is that they all in one way or another deal with what you might or might not control.

But having said that, because it attempts to cover the waterfront of all of those boundaries, you find huge discrepancies in the kinds of things that are being discussed and you find huge discrepancies in the rationales that are used and the numerical values that result from it.

I would note that the report in paragraph 119, if you want to go and try and find it sometime, the report itself notes that "The regulatory concepts and terminology are difficult enough without making them unnecessarily torturous and complex." The staff is not convinced that they haven't succeeded in making it perhaps a bit more torturous and complex.

Amongst other things, there is at least one reference to concerns about how some things are

not readily translatable into other languages. Unfortunately, a lot of the Latin in the report itself is also very difficult to translate into other languages. And for anyone who isn't perhaps of the Latin/Roman sort of legislative structure, the regulatory structures themselves may not necessarily even translate.

So let's look at a few slightly more specific comments. First, we do not believe that the draft, in fact, resolves important issues. For example, an issue that we ran into as we were preparing a proposal for the Commission on the control of solid material, the numerical values at which you could clear or exempt from further controls, both materials are not the same as the criteria that are used for deciding when you might need to placard something for transportation.

Thus, we discovered that you could clear the material and you could not drive it off the site without placarding the truck. This report, unfortunately, notes that that is true and proceeds to assume that you should just use whichever criteria are available, as in it does not provide any path forward towards trying to resolve that particular issue. That is one example.

A second example, which may be a lot more difficult, is that fact that natural materials and artificial materials are treated differently. This report, in fact, pretty much assumes that people view them differently. Therefore, they are treated differently. Therefore, they should be treated differently which is, of course, one way of thinking about it, but leads us to some of the rather interesting discontinuities in the numerical values that are used and, therefore, the risks that are posed at different points for when you would apply or not apply regulatory controls.

Secondly, the numerical values that are in this report do not correspond to a number of the U.S. controls in existence today. For example, the U.S. drinking water standards are about five times more restrictive than what is suggested here for at least some of the radionuclides. The Codex Alimentarius values, these are the WHO and FAO values, were actually derived, if you might recall, for what to do following a nuclear accident.

A lot of these were worked on and revised following Chernobyl, because there was a great deal of concern about foodstuffs, use of foodstuffs, what will be acceptable for someone to consume post-accident.

Amongst other things, in that model is an assumption that only part of the foodstuffs that are consumed are actually contaminated, so that you're not getting your entire diet out of these materials.

So the NRC staff has a bit of a difficulty understanding why these could now be suggested as being an automatic exemption, perfectly suitable any time, any place under any circumstance. The underlying logic just doesn't quite seem to fit together for us.

It also notes that a number of the generic exemption levels that they have provided here for a lot of these radionuclides exceed the screening criteria, the Memorandum of Understanding criteria, for which the NRC and the EPA have agreed we will consult in decommissioning 5 pico curies per gram radium.

Now, I suppose that there would be two ways to look at it, attempting to be fair, which maybe we are being too restrictive on where we think we have to consult with each other, but certainly these values don't comport with what you might expect to be a universally agreed upon situation where one would need to think no further upon the particular subject and, therefore, exempt it without any further

consideration.

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On top of that, if we stand back a few paces, the discussion in this report is apparently inconsistent or seems to be inconsistent with the ICRP's philosophy, as we understand they are moving forward, of establishing a constraint for any particular exposure situation and then applying optimization.

in the current of **ICRP** Now, set recommendations, Publication 60, which essentially any different from what was in ICRP 26 which underlies our Part 20, you have a situation where you establish an orderly construct. all focused on practices. In other words things that you have control over. And then there was this thing called interventions, what you do if there is an emergency or otherwise, for which an entirely different radiation protection regime seemed to apply.

With the recommendations that ICRP is working on, witness the draft that was out almost two years ago now, in the summer of 2004, the ICRP has started moving towards a regulatory regime where everything can be fitted into the same framework. Namely, that for any particular source you establish a constraint, a boundary at which you want to take

some control action for the exposures from that source. You then apply optimization to try and find the optimum level of protection for that particular situation.

In addition to that, you have individual dose limits because you want to make sure that any particular individual does not exceed some acceptable level of dose. Unfortunately, it's very difficult to understand how this building block report on the scope of regulatory regulations fits in with that kind of approach, because a number of these numeric values don't seem to fit the model of a constraint. Surely they don't mean for you to optimize below when they are assuming that you just get rid of it.

On the other hand, we have heard talks by
Lars Eric Holm recently which say that all of the
documents that have come out on all of the numeric
values over the last 10 years should all be viewed as
constraints. Again, there is some discontinuity which
we simply cannot resolve and, therefore, we expect to
comment to them that this is an area which needs to be
reconciled within the ICRP family of documents, not
obvious to us even in which direction you might want
to go.

A couple of more egregious examples is the

exemption intervention levels. For the life of me I can't quite figure out how you exempt yourself from deciding if you're going to intervene in a situation, because the whole first step in deciding that you have got an accident is deciding whether you want to do something. And if you exempt yourself from the decision of wanting to do something, I'm not quite sure where you are in this decision making process, personally.

The second might be an example of patient release. For the most part, this report does not deal with medical at all, but there is one very interesting discussion which basically is focused on patient release noting that patients are released with a considerable quantity of radioactive material potentially on board and they are walking around and they are exempted from any further controls.

It goes on to strongly suggest, in fact, that regulators might wish to reexamine that issue. We do not believe that is necessary. And, in fact, we seriously wonder if, in fact, this particular report takes in that word right there, since it seems to have missed the whole question of other medical treatment, care giver support and a variety of other things which the last we knew all fitted under those social and

economic conditions that are part of the definition of optimization.

So there are some situations here which do not seem to align and which could potentially serve as something that would cause us a bit of difficulty. So what is the next step in the process? This was released for public comment on their website. Comments are due by, I believe it's June 19 th. The staff is preparing some comments. What I have given you are just sort of some of the high points.

We have several pages of more detailed comments underneath that, and that is without attempting to do anything like nitpicking various and sundry editorial remarks and expellings and otherwise. It didn't seem, in fact, to the NRC staff at this point that comments at such a level were even worthwhile, given the fundamental nature of some of our issues.

Of more import is the fact that ICRP expects to put out its revised draft recommendations, this would be round two of public comment, soon. Now, Lars Eric Holm a couple of months ago talking with the NCRP was saying late May, early June. Underneath that was a nice little email from Jack Valentin, who is the secretary of ICRP, which admitted that that pretty

1 much had to do with the degree of speed with which 2 some of the homework that was assigned at the Madrid 3 ICRP meeting was actually finished off. 4 But the expectation is that within the 5 next few weeks that a report will be available on their website and will be available for public 6 7 comment. This would be an update of the report upon 8 which we spent a great deal of time reviewing two 9 years ago and the staff expects, told the Commission 10 that we expect to review that report. And, in fact, in that case, because it's 11 the recommendations themselves, the staff will take 12 those comments, provide them to the Commission for the 13 14 Commission's agreement before providing them to the ICRP. 15 Just for clarification, 16 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 17 this latter report is the revision of the one we offered a letter on a couple of years ago. 18 19 DR. COOL: Correct. 20 CHAIRMAN RYAN: And this current report, 21 you are preparing separate comments, that what are the 22 due dates for the separate comments on this current report we're talking about today? 23 24 DR. COOL: This report, comments are due by June 19<sup>th</sup>. 25

1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: June 19 <sup>th</sup> .
2	DR. COOL: So fairly shortly.
3	Unfortunately, none of these comments will come in and
4	they will not have been able to look at it before
5	whatever portions of this might appear in the revised
б	recommendations will actually be out for public
7	comment.
8	CHAIRMAN RYAN: It's a bit schizophrenic
9	that they try to develop two documents that
10	interrelate simultaneously.
11	DR. COOL: Yes.
12	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay.
13	DR. COOL: We have made that observation
14	at least once before, as I recall, Mr. Chairman.
15	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes.
16	DR. COOL: This is in part because the
17	ICRP, as it has continued its revision process,
18	realized that there were several other places where it
19	probably should have had some supporting documents
20	beyond just what it was drafting in the
21	recommendations. So there were a series of reports,
22	the foundation documents, that were available last
23	year. We met with you at that time and went over a
24	number of those documents.
25	Several of those are now moving towards

being finalized and into the ICRP's publication system, and I expect to be reflected in this revised draft of the recommendations that will be released in a few weeks.

But in addition to this, there was this

report on scope and there is a document related to medical exposure which we have not yet seen, but which we understand will also be available for public comment this summer. They may be available in parallel. I don't have a specific date associated with those at this time.

So we still have a bit of out of cycle associated with some of the documents and comments, so we may be in a situation. It's too soon to tell. We may be in a situation where some of the observations that we're making here will also end up having to be observations that might be made for the recommendations draft themselves when we start to prepare our comments on this.

And I want to be very clear about where we are procedurally. On this report, the scope of radiological protection recommendations, the staff is developing comments and the staff intends to make those comments to ICRP.

We will provide that information to the

Commission, but we will not be asking the Commission to approve those comments just as we did not go to the Commission and ask them to approve each of the comments on the foundation documents last year. We do plan to go to the Commission for Commission approval, so they are Commission level comments, when we comment on the recommendations that will be coming out this summer.

And the other thing I would just note for your advanced planning and calendar, we have been working closely with the Nuclear Energy Agency based in Paris have workshop the to а on ICRP recommendations here in the United States. it to be here in Rockville, although the contract with hasn't actually been the hotel signed Ι yet, It will be August 28 th and 29 th of 2006 and it will be on the revised draft recommendations, because we expect by that point they will have been We will have had an opportunity to review them and have a discussion.

We are expecting that it will be not just a United States workshop. We have invitations out that have been accepted in Canada and in Mexico. We expect to have multiple panels, including regulatory viewpoints, industry viewpoints, some public

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1 organizations and non-Governmental organizations, some 2 of the medical folks. A variety of people are going to be asked to participate and be part of various 3 4 panels on that discussion, and we look forward to that 5 helping us trying to understand and help the ICRP as they move forward with their draft recommendations. 6 7 And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will close my presentation and entertain any questions that you 8 9 Thank you very much. might have. 10 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. Great. Thanks, Don, we appreciate your insights. The good news is I 11 12 think we share your frustration and lack of clarity on You know, I read it one afternoon for 13 the document. 14 the first time and then I said, well, I need to read this first thing in the morning and it wasn't any 15 better. So I read it at night. 16 That wasn't any 17 better either. But I took note of a few things about the 18 19 One is this is not a committee product of 20 any kind through ICRP. It has Roger Clarke, who is 21 the last chair of ICRP, John Cooper, who I don't know, 22 Able Gonzalez, who is a coordinator, Ches Mason and 23 Anthony Wrixon, kind of a broad spectrum of people. 24 DR. COOL: Yes. This was, in essence, a

task group of the main Commission.

1 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Of the main Commission. 2 DR. COOL: The majority of the writing, as 3 I understand it, was by Able Gonzalez. John Cooper is in what was 4 senior official NRPB, now the 5 Radiological Protection Division. 6 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Right. 7 DR. COOL: In the United Kingdom. the vice chair of ICRP Committee 4. Ches Mason and 8 9 Tony Wrixon are both staff individuals in the 10 International Atomic Energy Agency. CHAIRMAN RYAN: Got you. Well, thanks, 11 12 that's helpful. I then read in the abstract the "The report recommends criteria following sentences. 13 14 of a universal and generic nature for defining radiation exposure situations that can and need to be 15 subject to radiologic protection regulations and those 16 that cannot or need not." 17 18 Further, the report notes, that's my 19 words, and it says "It is suggested that the relevant 20 legislation should specifically define those situations that should be covered by the legislation 21 22 because they can be controlled, and those that may be 23 excluded from legislation because they cannot be 24 controlled by any reasonable means."

I guess what I'm struggling with is the

ICRP now taking on the role of political advisor for a Government structure? I really don't see why this sort of argument makes any sense or is even in the purview or the charter of the ICRP. It is certainly not based in science.

I then went on to the end of the document. You know, being a teacher, I usually read the first paragraph and the last paragraph of a document handed in for class, and I found out that this has suffered from what students suffer from, which is theme drift.

The concluding reflections now talk about whether the legislative principles of de minimis non curat lex or exclusion or de minimum non curat praetor or exemption are used to give legal effect to the various components and recommendations in this report depends on national regulatory and legal practice.

Well, you know, how do we get from A to B? And then in the middle are all the problems on numerical values relative to U.S. practice. So, you know, I then started seeing, well, I need to do what you have done so well in your presentation, which was try and delineate this. And I'm struggling with how to say anything other than this is just schizophrenic. I mean, it doesn't offer anything of value to the United States Radiation Protection Program that I can

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Ι Ι	see

You know, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission through its own devices to its licensee and through the agreement states offers a fairly robust system that is in place for, you know, lots of applications and lots of reasons and has addressed pretty much every example in one way or another with one requirement, exemption or another that is in this document quite effectively, I guess, from my own point of view. And I don't see where there is any added value.

That is kind of my opening comment. What do you think? By the way, Codex Alimentarius, can you help us with that for those who didn't take Latin? I think that means food that you eat.

DR. COOL: Yes.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. Good. We got that all squared away.

DR. COOL: The Codex Alimentarius is a document of the Food and Agricultural Organization which lays out criteria for radionuclides in food. It is actually its own commission which looks at many things besides just radionuclides in food products.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: I quess my --

DR. COOL: It is based on Geneva, I think.

1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: After I get through the
2	frustration, I think about the fact that the ICRP was
3	chartered to develop radiation protection guidance for
4	the world. Now, if we in the United States, given
5	that we have some standing in radiation protection
6	practice in this organization, are struggling with
7	this, can you imagine what an emerging radiation
8	protection program is going to do with it? I just
9	can't see where this is even close to on target.
LO	DR. COOL: I would agree.
L1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well
L2	DR. COOL: That is exactly the position
L3	that we find ourselves in.
L4	CHAIRMAN RYAN: I guess
L5	DR. COOL: And I am in hopes, Mr.
L6	Chairman, that you do not think that I can actually
L7	give you an answer in this particular case.
L8	CHAIRMAN RYAN: No.
L9	DR. COOL: As to why ICRP has written this
20	particular document and certainly in this particular
21	way, because I cannot. As I said, we have not found
22	it particularly useful. We have found it confusing
23	and, in fact, there are a number of places where we
24	could find it, dare I say, dangerous because of some
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of its suggestions and the discontinuities with the

1 established system that we have. 2 CHAIRMAN RYAN: You know, and if I try and 3 reach for a science principle that's missing here, it 4 is what we would call ALARA. They call it 5 optimization. I mean, they mention it in passing and give a definition of it, but there is no coherent 6 7 application of optimization to any of those values or any of those situations that they talk about in the 8 9 report. You know, I mean, releasing patients with 10 11 radioactive material from therapeutic or а 12 diagnostic procedure in the big picture of radiation exposure is not a huge risk. There aren't that many 13 14 patients released per day and, you know, care givers 15 and the other things have all been addressed either in 16 NRC or agreement state requirements. 17 struggle with where is the real value to helping radiation protection practitioners enhance their 18 19 radiation protection program. I don't get it. 20 DR. COOL: We haven't found any either. 21 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. 22 DR. COOL: As I would --23 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes. 24 DR. COOL: As I would note, I think we are

very much -- actually, very much already aligned with

1 the things that you are suggesting, because it is 2 seemingly inconsistent. 3 CHAIRMAN RYAN: I'll maybe come back to a 4 summary. 5 DR. COOL: I'm just talking as the staff 6 here. 7 Right. CHAIRMAN RYAN: DR. COOL: But it's inconsistent with an 8 9 approach of constraints. And, as you have pointed at all clear what this is in 10 it's not relationship to optimization because clearly there are 11 12 In fact, the report at one point is some cases. sufficiently schizophrenic that it talks about these 13 14 being generic levels, but that one should always do 15 more when there is a component that gets to be worked So there is at least one place in this report 16 17 where the hand giveth and the hand taketh away in the space of two lines. 18 19 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes. Let me offer other 20 Members the opportunity to ask questions and I will 21 maybe come back to a summary point that I think would 22 be really a very short letter for us to write, but let 23 me -- and I'll talk to you about that in a minute. 24 Jim? 25 MEMBER CLARKE: Just one question, Don,

1	and I think you addressed it. I just want to make
2	sure I understood it. Can you back up one slide,
3	slide 14? The generic exemption levels exceed
4	decommissioning screening criteria. This is the
5	attachment to the NRC/EPA Memorandum of Understanding.
6	DR. COOL: Correct.
7	MEMBER CLARKE: Of the soil levels,
8	groundwater.
9	DR. COOL: Correct, correct.
10	MEMBER CLARKE: Okay.
11	DR. COOL: That equally applies to some of
12	the other things that are ensconced even in some of
13	the legislation of UMTRCA and some other places where
14	you find values for radium and uranium and you look at
15	those values. And then you look at the values that
16	are suggested for head of chain as a generic exemption
17	and you see that their generic exemption is at a
18	greater activity per unit concentration than that
19	which our regulation, that our legislation, our legal
20	construct, requires consideration.
21	MEMBER CLARKE: Okay. Thank you.
22	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Ruth?
23	MEMBER WEINER: I share your concern about
24	the inconsistencies and I just have one question. Are
25	the exemptions consistent with TAFA A1 and A2 values?

DR. COOL: Mostly, but not completely. I will speak from not having done that particular analysis this time around. But, in fact, as we were working with the IAEA and the EC related to the control of solid material, and particularly the Office of Research working on, I think it was, NUREG-1640, our modeling, there was some effort to try and look at what was Al, A2, what was the various criteria.

And there are similarities, but there are also differences because the models use different assumptions about the exposure scenarios and otherwise. And so, in fact, you do not have a line-by-line consistent harmony of the requirements.

Where that causes more problems, I believe, now I'm doing this off the top of my head, there are more problems with the surface dose/surface contamination transportation requirements which would fairly easily be tripped by transportation of larger bulk quantities of a material at the activity per becquerel generic exemption level.

This was something that the staff pointed out to the Commission as we prepared our proposal for them a year ago. In fact, the staff in taking that proposal to the Commission chose to use the transportation levels so as to try and have the

1 proposal that giving them have some we were 2 consistency and avoid that disconnect. The Commission, of course, at this point has chosen to put 3 4 that rule making on hold given some of the other 5 issues in security and otherwise. So that hasn't ever gone through more of 6 7 the rule making process. But, in fact, that is exactly an issue which we attempted to try and deal 8 9 with and this report simply notes that it exists and you should use whichever one is applicable at the 10 moment, which again, as I noted to the Chairman a 11 12 moment ago, doesn't particularly help if you're actually trying to construct a new on first principles 13 14 regulatory construct or to use IAEA's more fancy 15 language, a de novo regulatory regime. 16 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Bill? 17 MEMBER HINZE: One quick question, Don. On slide 7, can you give me the rationale for 18 19 excluding cosmic radiation at ground level, but say 20 nothing about earth shine, about the radiation flux 21 from the earth itself? 22 DR. COOL: No. 23 MEMBER HINZE: Okay. I like that kind of 24 answer. 25 CHAIRMAN RYAN: That's one more example.

1	MR. KOCHER: Just for example.
2	MEMBER HINZE: I suspect there is an
3	answer to that and that is it's handled in the
4	exemption levels for specific naturally occurring
5	radionuclides is my guess.
6	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes, but that could be
7	internal only for the
8	MEMBER HINZE: Right.
9	CHAIRMAN RYAN: naturally occurring
10	radionuclides. Who knows. It's not clear either on
11	that point.
12	MEMBER HINZE: Natural origin in the human
13	body.
14	MR. KOCHER: I wanted to ask a question
15	about
16	DR. COOL: I didn't come back quite far
17	enough, did I? There we go.
18	MEMBER HINZE: No, sorry, I'm through.
19	MR. KOCHER: Could you go to page 10 for
20	a second? Yes, thanks. This is what I was referring
21	to, these exemptions or exclusions for natural
22	radionuclides and materials, and what I wanted to ask
23	you, Don, was do they define materials? Does this
24	include, for example, hectares of overburden from a
25	mine or

1	DR. COOL: In this you're referring to?
2	MR. KOCHER: One up, yes. I mean, do they
3	give a definition of materials in any way, shape or
4	form?
5	DR. COOL: They give a very broad sort of
6	view, so they don't give a very precise definition.
7	I think your hectares of overburden could be
8	considered as part of that at this concentration.
9	Amongst other places, a one word
10	transposition gives them products versus, I forget
11	what it was, produce, which gives them considerable
12	difficulty as they describe how some of these things
13	should be applied. It's one thing if you apply it to
14	produce. It's quite a different thing if you apply it
15	to all products.
16	MR. KOCHER: I suspect that one of the
17	issues that is behind a lot of this is ICRP is kind of
18	forced in a way to seek a lowest common denominator.
19	And if they have set these exemption levels for
20	natural materials quite a bit lower, then you have
21	large regions of Brazil that must be controlled.
22	DR. COOL: Correct, correct. And that has
23	been
24	MR. KOCHER: So they are not really out to
25	define a regulatory framework that would fit the

160 1 United States or any other particular country and this 2 is, you know, a problem. 3 DR. COOL: You are correct. That issue 4 and the rather large variations you see from place-to-5 place and time-to-time has been a constant theme of discussion or a thorn in the side, depending on how 6 7 you look at it. As we and others have tried to develop 8 9 criteria for when you might release solid materials and otherwise, as I think perhaps if Commissioner 10 McGaffigan were here, he would be quick to point out, 11 12 either at some of these sorts of levels, if you get down to the Capitol Building and the House and Senate 13 14 Office Buildings, you have discovered that you haven't 15 chosen a greater quantity than these. Depending on how you write this, most of the Cliffs of Cornwall 16 would not be -- would have to be controlled in some 17 18 various way. 19 MR. KOCHER: Yes. 20 DR. COOL: So there is a difficulty. 21 Quite obviously, there is a difficulty between how you

Quite obviously, there is a difficulty between how you might construct a philosophy that would allow you to make a decision in a particular circumstance and some attempt to define universally a set of numbers that would always be reasonable and appropriate.

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The first is something which seemingly could be done in terms of a decision pathway, an approach that could be taken. The second, of course, is much more difficult. And, in fact, this gets to something which underlies this, which is the continuing theme that doses on the order of a few, some tens of micro sieverts, a millirem or two, are things which people accept without further consideration.

Now, that is a very interesting and rather boldfaced statement which is true or not true depending upon the way in which you look at it. And here I will give you my personal view on this particular subject. If I were to come up to you, Ruth, and say is 1 millirem acceptable, you would say no, because there is no context anything associated with it and why should acceptable without any context.

But if after the space of six months where we have been talking about this particular site that you may be interested in, and what all the impacts are and how much it's going to cost and all the damage that it does to everyone and the dust and things from cleaning all of this up or doing whatever it is, you might conclude that 1 millirem in that particular

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context, in that particular decision process, is perfectly appropriate.

The difficulty comes in taking that result of a decision process with all of the factors that are associated with that particular decision and assuming that someone outside of that decision process or in a different decision process or without any decision process would reach the same conclusion.

Way of thinking, the root of the problem. The root of the problem is this, to me, reads as if it's two documents that they kind of tossed the pages up and recollected them and put them in that order. There is a document that talks about these principles. It's kind of written like the European Union charter. There is an international, you know, flavor of legalistic kind of language and principles and all of that.

And then they have woven into it these very specific technical recommendations that when you get to things in the EU, for example, they are in safety directives or they are in other documents. There's lots of other examples, you know, of U.N. treaties and charters and agreements that don't get into this detail, that that is done later in

implementation documents.

And I'm just trying to understand the rationale here of why you would try and create a principles document that will address Brazil, Uruguay or the United States, Canada or, you know, the Republic of the Marshall Islands for that matter, and principles of how you would set something up like this and then, you know, leave it at least in some generic way for how you would implement it for those particular circumstances in those places with those folks.

And, I mean, I just really don't understand how the ICRP, based on its charter, can get to this, frankly. So I'm struggling. Dave, have you got any more questions?

MR. KOCHER: I'm not a regulator, thank goodness for everybody. If I am the NRC and looking at this, I am a lot less nervous if my criteria are coming in under the bar than I am if they are coming in over the bar, so to speak. So the fact that -- drinking water standards is a perfectly good example. This is not an NRC problem, but it's a U.S. situation because it's now in law.

These were based on what in a U.S. society and economic system was judged to be reasonably

1 achievable, but to say that set of criteria applies in 2 Kazakhstan is a different story entirely. And, I mean, you should feel good if you're -- I would think 3 4 you should feel good if your criteria come in under 5 the numbers that these people are putting out. might be a little more nervous if you're well over. 6 7 CHAIRMAN RYAN: I would say, Dave, that you could take that view, but I would take perhaps a 8 9 different view. I think the very process that created the drinking water standards stands on its own two 10 It was deemed to be an acceptable and risk-11 informed view of drinking water in the United States. 12 There is absolutely no reason that there has to be 13 14 concurrence above or below any other country's 15 decision. That is my view and that is why I struggle 16 with this document. It tries to regularize something 17 18 that by its very nature does not have to be and 19 perhaps should not be regular. You know, think of it 20 just in the abstract. If we decided medical X-rays shouldn't exceed some number, well, what if you need 21 22 three X-rays to diagnose the disease? 23 You know, the doctor says we're going to

do a cardiac catheterization on you and you're going

to get 50 rads to the chest so I can figure out how to

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1	keep you from dying today, are you okay with that?
2	Yes, sir, go for it. You know, that kind of thing.
3	So I struggle with the fact that these absolute
4	numerical values in this document have any meaning
5	beyond just some kind of benchmark that, you know,
6	could be exactly misused in the way you talk about.
7	People feel good because they are under
8	it. Maybe they didn't optimize enough. It could be
9	they could do a lot better. Or they are over it. Oh,
10	my God, we got to do something when, in fact, there is
11	only 1,600 people that are even affected in that area.
12	So I am struggling with how you get what is a
13	principles document now seasoned with these numbers
14	throughout. So I really don't see the value of this.
15	In fact, as Dr. Cool pointed out at the
16	beginning, I see the potential for huge confusion as
17	we did, by the way, with the previous ICRP draft
18	documents. Latif, you had a question?
19	MR. HAMDAN: No, I have a question, but
20	I'm waiting, you know, until my turn comes.
21	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Okay. Well, you had your
22	hand up a couple of times. I saw his hand first.
23	MR. HAMDAN: Okay. Okay. You probably
24	stole my thunder a little bit.
25	COURT REPORTER: Mike.

MR. HAMDAN: Oh, I'm sorry. The question, you know, let's step back to the document. We know what the document is and what the comments on the document are from you and Mike and everybody else and that is clear. It's not a very useful document and it's confusing, all of the things that were mentioned.

But don't we have another? If this is the

But don't we have another? If this is the case and this is the ICRP, such a prestigious organization, and I suppose we know them a little bit or we know a little more about them, you know, than probably most other people, wouldn't we have a responsibility then to answer two other questions? Number one, what are the programmatic — there is probably some programmatic problems, whether they are related to process or to policy or philosophy, all these were mentioned.

And so I think this question needs to be at least somehow rather to the document itself. In other words, you look at this document and other documents that you know about, and whatever you know about this ICRP and really you need to make some -- you may want to make some observations about that. And number two is, you know, I'm not really familiar with the ICRP. That is why I'm suggesting this.

You know, the U.S. influences everything

1	in this world and I know you have been there more than
2	once, you know, and Mike, you know, he is the head of
3	the Physics Society and what have you. Don't we have
4	a responsibility to influence this organization and if
5	we do not, why we don't? Why don't we?
6	CHAIRMAN RYAN: What is the question,
7	Latif?
8	MR. HAMDAN: The question is are there
9	structural or programmatic problems with the ICRP?
10	And the other question is can the U.S. delegation do
11	something about them?
12	DR. COOL: Okay. Well, that's a very
13	interesting pair of questions.
14	CHAIRMAN RYAN: If I may, Don.
15	DR. COOL: Let me deal with the second one
16	first, but please feel free.
17	CHAIRMAN RYAN: That's an unfair question
18	of Don and let me tell you why. Don is a member of a
19	committee for the ICRP and he is on a particular
20	science committee. And I think it's unfair to put him
21	on the spot with that question, frankly, because
22	you're asking him to make a judgment about an
23	organization in which he has got standing and so
24	forth.
25	So I would offer you that that's probably

1 answer it if you like, but, you know, I would 2 certainly understand if you didn't want to answer it. I will make a couple of 3 DR. COOL: observations. First, although we try to take every 4 5 opportunity to influence international organizations, not just ICRP, IAEA, NEA and others, the degree of our 6 7 influence is at least in part dependent upon the degree of our standing within that organization. 8 9 So for IAEA the United States has an official member seat in the Commission on Safety 10 Standards. Marty Virgilio holds that seat. We have 11 12 an official seat in the Radiation Safety Standards Charles Miller holds that seat. Committee. 13 14 And so we can take multiple opportunities 15 to influence and craft and we always have perhaps the opportunities to jump up and down and play the 800 16 pound gorilla for things which are really egregiously 17 difficult and should not move forward, and we have 18 19 been known to do that on occasion. 20 The independent **ICRP** is an charity 21 chartered in the United Kingdom, members of whom are 22 asked to serve on this commission under the auspices 23 of International Radiological Protection the 24 Association and have no organizational or

And so our ability to influence such an

standing.

1 organization comes simply by our ability to be 2 constructive and useful in helping them see particular 3 issues and in working with them to see how things can 4 be put together. 5 And, in fact, we have been quite successful in doing that in some cases. 6 And there 7 have been cases such as this where we have had no role 8 to play and which, in looking at it, perhaps I'm just 9 as glad. CHAIRMAN RYAN: Let me sum up by offering 10 Don -- oh, I'm sorry, Ruth. Go ahead. Pardon me. 11 12 DR. COOL: Ruth? Since I have been sitting 13 MEMBER WEINER: 14 here staring at your slide 10 --15 DR. COOL: You have found something now. MEMBER WEINER: Well, you look at it long 16 17 enough and the confusion starts to dissipate into a question. A becquerel of Thorium-232 is a becquerel 18 Why the difference between natural 19 of Thorium-232. 20 radionuclides? 21 can see a sort of rationale for a 22 standard for natural radionuclides that is based 23 somehow on natural occurrence. I mean, if you have 24 got this much Thorium-232 in the ground then, you 25 know, you may as well set the standard there.

But I don't understand the rationale for a different standard for -- exactly. I don't understand the rationale for a different standard for artificial, the same radionuclide artificially produced, whatever that means. And could you enlighten me as to what the rationale for that was, is? Maybe I'm all wet.

CHAIRMAN RYAN: Well, join the club, Ruth.

DR. COOL: My first response is to simply say no. My second response, I cannot enlighten you.

No, I cannot enlighten you.

My second response is to simply make the observation that in this report it seems to be driven by the pragmatic realities of what has been done in various and sundry places to sidestep or otherwise get around the difficult issue that a radionuclide in the ground existing at some concentration, highly variable from place-to-place within a particular country, is not really something that you can do anything about or exert any controls over, but that for some reason, perhaps because we made them or perhaps because we moved them around from place-to-place, we entertain the notion that if it was manmade or that we did something with it, that we then can exercise a much greater degree of control and, therefore, we should

1 irrespective of whether or not it poses a similar 2 I'll go back to my first answer. 3 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes, go back to no. MEMBER WEINER: Yes, I think no was the 4 5 answer from the point of view of effect. I mean, I'm sure that I am preaching to the choir here. 6 From the 7 point of view of effect, it doesn't make any sense. 8 DR. COOL: You are correct. 9 CHAIRMAN RYAN: I tried to jot down a 10 couple of sentences, Don, that hopefully will sum up what I think our discussion has led us to. The ACNW 11 12 in short believes that this document does not add any significant value to the Radiation Protection Programs 13 14 in the United States, especially those promulgated by the Commission for its licensees and for licensees and 15 agreement states authorized by the Commission. 16 The Committee also believes that there are 17 inconsistencies between this ICRP draft document in 18 19 terminology, form and details of the 20 regulations and supporting documents that regulate 21 radioactive materials and radiation in all aspects in 22 the United States. Therefore, the Committee believes 23 this document should be rejected in whole. 24 DR. COOL: I'm not sure what rejected 25 means to the ICRP, but the NRC staff in drafting up

its comments has reached the same conclusions as --1 2 CHAIRMAN RYAN: How about rejected as 3 unacceptable? 4 DR. COOL: Is not acceptable or not 5 To be quite frank with you, our effort to try and write something has led us to the sorts of things 6 7 in the way of expressing it that I had it here. find it confusing. We find it not useful. 8 9 don't understand how it can help to elaborate the 10 basis of the draft recommendations, which understand it is intended to be an underpinning of. 11 12 And those are the comments that we intend to prepare. It sounds like the Committee is in exact agreement 13 14 with the positions that we are in. 15 I guess what I'm CHAIRMAN RYAN: struggling with now, and I appreciate any staff views, 16 17 is think the letter we could write to the 18 Commission, supports the staff's views one, 19 presented by Dr. Cool today and, two, this short 20 summary paragraph is all we need to say. 21 I don't think we need to try and go 22 through any detailed analysis as you have obviously 23 presented, the front end of yours to us today and, as 24 you have mentioned, have more analysis that will go in

your comments, and we write a very short letter to the

1 Commission that says we just find this draft to be 2 unhelpful, unuseful and it should be rejected as not 3 adding any value to our radiation protection practice 4 or programs. End of story. I mean, is that --5 MEMBER CLARKE: I would recommend a short 6 letter. 7 CHAIRMAN RYAN: A very short, one or two 8 paragraph letter, one page and we're done. You know, 9 I mean, it was tough enough to get through the 10 foundation documents and the supporting documents, you know, on the draft recommendations, but I just don't 11 12 see how the ICRP can think of this as being effective to now write this one separately, reissue a new draft 13 14 that may incorporate some of this stuff, God knows 15 how, and then, you know, somehow resolve all the 16 hundreds of comments they got on the foundation 17 documents and the principle recommendations 18 declare victory issue principle and new 19 recommendation. I just don't see how they are going 20 to get there. 21 DR. COOL: Well, I can't help you with 22 that letter question, because --23 CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes. I mean, that's just 24 an observation. I'm not looking for a question and

answer there.

1 DR. COOL: From the staff's viewpoint, I 2 don't believe that we need any such letter to reinforce our view that we need to send them the 3 4 comments that we have drafted. I just would leave it 5 up to the committee. CHAIRMAN RYAN: But I do think we have got 6 7 the obligation and because of our scope of work for 8 the Commission, that we owe them a letter to tell them 9 we certainly support your approach and your comments, as you have presented today, and that we in our own 10 reading find this to be an unhelpful, unuseful 11 12 document just so they hear it from us. DR. COOL: As I noted, the staff plans to 13 14 provide its comments to the ICRP as staff comments. 15 We'll be providing a copy of that to the Commission for their awareness probably through the typical D 16 17 note type of process because we don't --And maybe, in fact, we'll 18 CHAIRMAN RYAN: 19 recognize that path in our letter. MEMBER CLARKE: The Commission can take 20 21 those documents to --22 DR. COOL: We have not viewed this as 23 something which needed, warranted getting Commission 24 views on. On the other hand, the draft 25 recommendations when they come out will.

1	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Yes, that's
2	DR. COOL: That is
3	CHAIRMAN RYAN: That will need everybody's
4	approval.
5	DR. COOL: And so what we have been trying
6	to do is to pursue within the staff a consistent
7	framework for how we're behaving towards some of these
8	documents and how we will behave in a more elevated
9	and specific manner with the draft recommendations.
10	CHAIRMAN RYAN: With the Committee's
11	indulgence, I will draft a very short letter and we'll
12	take it up tomorrow to read out, sign out and get to
13	the Commission. All right. Any other comments,
14	questions? Well, Don I'm sorry. Jim?
15	MEMBER CLARKE: Under the "for what it's
16	worth" category, I thought your second answer to
17	Ruth's question was very thoughtful, measured and
18	right on target. My experience with environmental
19	restoration for non-radionuclides supports that. We
20	know there is background lead. We know there is
21	background arsenic. We can't do anything about that,
22	but we can do something about your site and this is
23	the number we want you to achieve.
24	So, I mean, I really think and I'm not
25	an advocate of this thinking, by the way, but I think

1	your answer was probably right on target and it
2	certainly supports my experience.
3	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Sure. Thank you. Don,
4	thanks very much. I know it's a struggle to get
5	through a document like this. We really appreciate
6	your insights and coming down for an hour.
7	DR. COOL: And we look forward to being
8	with you again probably in another couple of months
9	when we have got the main recommendations.
10	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Indeed.
11	DR. COOL: And we will have some
12	interesting discussions, I suspect.
13	CHAIRMAN RYAN: Indeed. Thanks very much.
14	Anything else? I guess we're at the letter writing
15	stage. Professor Hinze, are we ready?
16	MEMBER HINZE: Ready.
17	CHAIRMAN RYAN: I'm going to suggest we
18	take just a five minute break and let everybody
19	freshen up, and then we'll be right back.
20	(Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at
21	2:36 p.m.)
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