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                Official Transcript of Proceedings

                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Title:                    Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste
                              131st Meeting

Docket Number:  (not applicable)

Location:                 Rockville, Maryland

Date:                     Wednesday, January 9, 2002


Work Order No.: NRC-166                               Pages 1-315





                   NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
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           NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                     + + + + +
        ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE
                   131ST MEETING
                     + + + + +
                    WEDNESDAY,
                  JANUARY 9, 2002
                     + + + + +
                ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
                     + + + + +

                       The subcommittee met at the Nuclear
           Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North,
           Room T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m.,
           George M. Hornberger, Chairman, presiding.

           COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
                 GEORGE M. HORNBERGER        Chairman
                 RAYMOND G. WYMER            Vice Chairman
                 B. JOHN GARRICK             Member
                 MILTON N. LEVENSON          Member



           STAFF PRESENT:
                 HOWARD J. LARSON, Special Assistant
                 RICHARD K. MAJOR
                 LYNN DEERING
                 LATIF HAMDAN
                 SHER BAHADUR
                 AMARJIT SINGH
                 JOHN T. LARKINS
                 RICHARD P. SAVIO
                 CAROL A. HARRIS

           ALSO PRESENT:
                 JAMES ANDERSON
                 BILL REAMER
                 JIM WINTERLE
                 BRET LESLIE
                 NEIL COLEMAN
                 RANDY FEDORS
                 JEFF POHLE
                 PAUL BERTETTI
                 JOHN BRADBURY
                 ROBERTO PABALAN
                 GOODLUCK OFOEGBU
                 MYSORE NATARAJA
                 TAE AHN

           ALSO PRESENT: (cont.)
                 BIS DASGUPTA
                 TIM McCARTIN
                 BANAD JAGANATH
                 WES PATRICK
                 DENNIS WILLIAMS





           .                                A-G-E-N-D-A
                         AGENDA ITEM                       PAGE
           Opening Statement by Chairman Hornberger . . . . . 5
           Management Overview, Bill Reamer . . . . . . . . . 7
           Risk Insights, Bret Leslie . . . . . . . . . . . .19
           Total System Performance Assessment. . . . . . . .53
                 and Integration, James Weldy
           Igneous Activity, Brittain Hill. . . . . . . . . .81
           Structural Deformation and . . . . . . . . . . . 115
                 Seismicity, John Stamatakos
           Container Life and Source Term . . . . . . . . . 132
                 Gustavo Cragnolino
           Unsaturated and Saturated Flow Under . . . . . . 161
                 Isothermal Conditions, Jim Winterle
           Thermal Effects on Flow, Randy Fedors. . . . . . 177
           Radionuclide Transport, Paul Bertetti. . . . . . 199
           Evolution of the Near-Field Environment, . . . . 229
                 Roberto Pabalan
           Repository Design and Thermal-mechanical . . . . 250
                 Effects, Goodluck Ofoegbu
           Preclosure, Bis Dasgupta . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
           Summary of Issue Resolution Status, Schedule . . 287
                 Lessons Learned, James Anderson

           .                           P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
                                                    (8:35 a.m.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  The meeting will
           come to order.
                       This is the second day of the 131st
           meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste.
           My name is George Hornberger, Chairman of the ACNW.
           Other members of the committee present are John
           Garrick, Milton Levenson, and Raymond Wymer.
                       Today the committee will receive an update
           on the status of key technical issues.  Howard J.
           Larson is the designated federal official for today's
           initial session.
                       This meeting is being conducted in
           accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory
           Committee Act.  We have received no written comments
           or requests for time to make oral statements from
           members of the public regarding today's sessions.
           Should anyone wish to address the committee, please
           make your wishes known to one of the committee staff.
                       It is requested that the speakers use one
           of the microphones, identify themselves, and speak
           with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be
           readily heard.  I want to emphasize the fact that we
           need to have speakers, including those in San Antonio,
           identify themselves clearly, because this is being
           recorded.  And also, here, for people on the other end
           of the video, please make sure -- this includes all of
           the speakers -- to clearly identify yourselves.
                       The key technical issues have been, as we
           know, a focus of the interactions between DOE and NRC.
           Key technical issues were the term that the NRC came
           up with to guide their evaluation of DOE's work on
           Yucca Mountain.  There have been, as we know, many
           technical exchanges and agreements with -- between the
           NRC and the Department of Energy.
                       And today -- well, back up just a minute,
           the Commission has expressed interest in having the
           ACNW give them their views on the status of key
           technical issues, and in particular where the most
           difficult parts in reaching agreement between the --
           reaching agreements between the Department of Energy
           and NRC lie.
                       And also, the committee has, for many
           years, been interested in all of the discussions of
           KTIs as to how the NRC is risk informing their work.
           And, in fact, we are -- we continue to be interested
           in where the NRC sees the most risk significant issues
           in the whole KTI system.
                       We've also, of course, been interested in
           the past as to how KTIs cover the whole landscape and
           have asked -- continually asked questions as to
           whether there are gaps between the KTIs and how the
           KTIs interface with each other, and how, in fact,
           everything gets integrated at the end.
                       And so the committee has typically
           questioned the NRC staff on these topics and others.
           Today we're going to get a -- I think some fairly
           detailed updates on the issue resolution -- the KTI
           and issue resolution process, and we have a whole
           series of presentations.
                       So Bill Reamer is going to kick us off on
           the overview.
                       MR. REAMER:  Good morning.  Bill Reamer,
           NRC staff.
                       We will try to accomplish each of the
           items that you mentioned today.  We've I think got
           everyone here, although I know that the weather has
           been a problem for some of the staff folks.  We'll go
           through the key technical issues issue by issue, give
           you the status, describe our path forward with the
           Department of Energy.
                       I can't give you a date when there will be
           a Department of Energy license application.  First
           off, we don't know what the outcome will be of the
           site recommendation process, when and whether the
           Secretary will make a decision to recommend the site.
           We also don't have the Department of Energy schedule
           for possible license application as well, but I don't
           think that that needs to necessarily impact our
           discussions today.
                       I think this will become more clear in the
           March timeframe, but today I don't have a date to give
           you on when to -- we would expect a DOE license
           application if there is one.
                       We do want to answer the committee's
           questions completely on the relationship of the KTIs
           to risk, but you're not going to find, at least in my
           presentation and the presentations that follow, the
           five top KTIs from a risk standpoint.
                       Someone said yesterday, "Today you will
           hear everything that you need to know about KTIs, and
           maybe something that you don't need to know."  And I
           think if you hear something you feel like you don't
           need to know, you should ask, because our view is you
           may need to know that.
                       So, just briefly, my agenda is to start
           with the result for issue resolution as our goal and
           to describe our approach to get there, where we are in
           a programmatic sense, what we have planned in terms of
           the path forward in a program sense, how we're
           supporting that from the standpoint of using risk
           information, program uncertainties that affect our
           path forward as well.
                       So the NRC's role -- the NRC staff role is
           to -- under the law is to be able to review a
           Department of Energy license application, if there is
           one, and make a decision on a possible construction
           authorization in three years.  Our prelicensing
           activities with the DOE have generally been focused on
           gaining confidence that any license application that
           we get will be sufficient for us to commence a review
           and write a safety evaluation report and make a
           recommendation.
                       And so issue resolution and our path
           forward on the KTIs takes its cue from this.  If DOE
           submits a license application, it should be
           sufficient.  It needs to be sufficient for the NRC to
           commence a review.  Generally, therefore, we would
           take the position as the staff that if a license
           application addresses some of the KTIs and not other
           KTIs, that's not going to be sufficient for us to go
           forward with the review.
                       Now that's obviously an extreme case.
           It's never going to occur.  But if some KTIs are dealt
           with well and other KTIs are not dealt with, that's
           putting a problem for us into the license review
           process.  That's saying that additional information
           that we may need is going to have to be gained after
           the license application is received, and that's not
           our preferred course.
                       Our preferred course is to resolve the
           KTIs with the Department of Energy before any license
           application is received.  And the key here, again, is
           the three-year clock that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
           puts on the Commission to make a decision.
                       I think what I've just said is consistent
           with what you'll find in the Commission's preliminary
           comments to the Department of Energy submitted on
           November 13.
                       Basic approach that we're following is to
           identify gaps in the DOE supporting information.  By
           this we're considering the DOE story, the DOE
           argument, the DOE performance assessment, the safety
           assessment, what we need to review -- that story --
           and reach conclusions.
                       We're taking into account information not
           only that we get from DOE but information in public
           literature.  We're taking into account the views of
           other stakeholders.  We're taking into account the
           views of this body, Nuclear Waste Technical Review
           Board, the state.
                       We're looking at risk information and how
           that impacts the identification of gaps.  But
           remember, we need to have confidence that overall
           there is an understanding on the part of the
           Department of Energy and ourselves that we understand
           the full system, the total system, and that's why each
           of the KTIs -- that's one of the arguments why each of
           the KTIs is important.  It's important to gain that
           understanding of the whole system.
                       The reasons why we identify information as
           being needed, that's important as well, and that's
           what we'll be talking about with you in more detail
           today.  We also are taking the approach to get the DOE
           agreement on what we see as the information gaps, and
           by that we -- we get a signal from the Department of
           Energy that they understand what we're saying and that
           they are prepared to follow up and do something in
           response.
                       We'll be documenting the technical basis
           of issue resolution periodically, and we involve the
           public throughout the process.
                       Where we are now is that we've identified
           over the past two years what we think are the
           remaining gaps for DOE to address with respect to the
           key technical issues.  I cannot overstate the effort
           that the staff has made, the staff of the NRC, the
           staff of the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory
           Analysis, to evaluate the DOE supporting information,
           and identify what information is needed and to state
           the reasons why.
                       The results have been the 293 agreements
           that are the product of the 18 technical exchanges
           that we've held with DOE.  I think people should
           resist the temptation to say 293 agreements is an
           indication that the process is not working.  I think
           it's a strong indication that the process is working,
           that we are focusing, that we're reaching a
           convergence, that the process of refining the
           information gaps and what additional information is
           needed is working, and that we have a reasonable basis
           to proceed.
                       We'll be issuing the integrated issue
           resolution status report in the spring of '02, and I
           think we're on your meeting calendar in April to talk
           about that.  The path forward is to continue to
           actively monitor the Department of Energy response to
           the agreements.
                       We're working on two fronts.  We're
           specifically working on the -- from the standpoint of
           tracking DOE schedules with respect to specific
           agreements, to provide a response, reviewing the
           responses that we receive, and providing feedback to
           DOE.  Looking to set up our next round of meetings
           with the Department of Energy to further refine where
           we are on the DOE information gaps.
                       But on another front, we're also looking
           programmatically at the process, how close is DOE
           getting in terms of their response to what we think
           we've agreed to, and looking at ways that we can
           improve the process so that responses are, from our
           standpoint, on target.
                       We have a meeting tentatively planned with
           DOE on February 5, I believe it is.  I know that that
           potentially conflicts with the committee's meeting,
           but I think we ought to try to find a way that there
           can be some coverage, some involvement, some
           observation at least from the committee or committee
           staff as to that meeting, because I think that may
           provide some additional information that can --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  What's the focus of
           that meeting, Bill?
                       MR. REAMER:  It's more in the nature of a
           meeting on meetings.  It's a meeting to plan our next
           set of technical exchanges with DOE to get an
           understanding of how the process needs to work in
           order to make those meetings effective and to provide
           feedback that we have to provide on the process, how
           close is DOE meeting the target on the responses that
           we've seen thus far, suggestions as to how we might
           improve the interaction that exists in order to get
           closer alignment.
                       DOE is working on a plan to -- of their
           work from 2002 to a potential license application, and
           we think that will be available in the March timeframe
           from DOE.
                       Now, generally supporting the path forward
           and the planned activities are all of the activities
           we're doing with respect to risk informing the
           process.  We won't talk a lot about the Yucca Mountain
           review plan, but it is an important tool to risk
           informing our review.
                       The Yucca Mountain review plan really in
           many ways reflects experience with the KTIs and the
           criteria and the acceptance criteria and reasoning
           that we've developed in the context of addressing the
           KTIs.  So I don't think it's going to be a major
           impact.
                       It does address and move forward on the
           basis of what we call the integrated subissues, which
           is our device for assuring -- one of our devices for
           assuring that the key technical issues are risk
           informed.  And that's also the format we will be using
           in the issue resolution status report, so I think that
           will be helpful to give a transparency to how the KTIs
           are integrated with the overall performance of the
           repository and our efforts there.
                       The presentation that follows mine will
           get in heavily to our efforts in the risk information
           area.  But generally what we're trying to do is using
           sensitivity analyses, examine the important risk
           contributors, quantify the uncertainties associated
           with those important risk contributors, and use them
           as a basis to assure that the PA is routed in the
           evidence and not in something else.
                       Next slide is really more for our
           colleagues at the Department of Energy, to remind them
           -- remind everyone that really the burden to address
           or not address the key technical issues, the
           regulators, the key technical issues or the
           regulators' issues here, is on the potential
           applicant, the DOE.  The staff's role I think is to
           actively focus on refining what's acceptable and why.
                       The KTIs are the logic that we are using
           to do that.  The activities I hope the committee will
           feel at the end of the day are risk informed.  I have
           every reason to believe that this process can work and
           will work, that if a license application is submitted
           that it will be sufficient for the NRC to conduct a
           review and reach a decision.
                       I did mention earlier the plan that DOE is
           working on, which we view as the -- providing the
           information to address this -- what I call this
           program uncertainty.
                       So the gist, then, is the issue resolution
           is progressing.  We're monitoring the agreements, the
           performance on specific agreements in the process as
           well.  We are factoring in risk insights continuously,
           continuing the technical exchanges, the next round of
           technical exchanges with DOE, and the -- what I
           mentioned, the LA plan, the planned LA is an important
           input that will be coming.
                       That's all I had.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks, Bill.
                       MR. REAMER:  Any questions for me?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  A couple.  Well, one
           -- a comment and then a question for you.  I'm really
           happy to hear that you are moving forward with plans
           to continue technical exchanges.  My personal opinion
           is that they have been extraordinarily helpful, the
           technical exchanges between DOE and NRC.
                       My question related to that is I know that
           you're moving forward with an integrated IRSR.  And
           the question, then, is the previous technical
           exchanges were focused on KTIs, and in moving to an
           integrated IRSR there is not a total move away from
           KTIs but really taking a more integrated view.  Do you
           have any ideas on how future technical exchanges will
           be structured in light of this integrated IRSR
           approach?
                       MR. REAMER:  Well, they are going to be
           structured to basically accomplish two things to
           assure that the KTIs, which are the logic for the
           staff's prelicensing activities, get addressed in a
           way that meets the goal that I described.  So the KTIs
           will continue to be a major player and focus.
                       But to do so in a way that's consistent
           with the way we will do the license application
           review, which is the Yucca Mountain review plan and
           the integrated approach that we will take there.  And
           so we want both.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.
                       Questions from the committee?  Milt?  Ray?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes, one.  Will the
           integrated approach tend to focus on the most risk
           important issues?  Is that what will emerge from the
           integrated approach?
                       MR. REAMER:  Well, the integrated approach
           will surely make sure that that information is
           available and known and assure its integration into
           our approach.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Will it identify
           them clearly or --
                       MR. REAMER:  I think you will today get a
           good sense of the -- from the presentations of what's
           important from a risk standpoint.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, you partly answered
           that.  You said up front -- and I appreciate that --
           that we weren't going to get an importance ranking of
           the KTIs out of today's proceedings and --
                       MR. REAMER:  No.  I said you wouldn't see
           a list --
                       (Laughter.)
                       -- in my presentation and the other
           presentations.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes, okay.
                       MR. REAMER:  But I'm sure I -- I'm
           satisfied that you came to the meeting with an
           expectation, and that when the meeting is over your
           expectation will be satisfied.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.  Well, that's
           encouraging.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Staff?  Anyone from
           the audience?
                       Okay.  Well, we are going to move along.
           We have a full schedule.  Thanks very much, Bill.
                       Next up is Bret, is that correct?
                       MR. LESLIE:  Let's see if I've got the
           right angle to be able to push the slides down as I
           talk through this.
                       During our preparations for this meeting
           I got the short straw to make this presentation.  And,
           really, what I'm trying to do right now is to provide
           an overview to directly address the concern.  I mean,
           Bill said that we're not going to have a list of what
           are the most important KTIs, but I'm hoping to provide
           enough of an overview on some of the ways we've tried
           to look at prioritizing the KTIs so that you'll have
           the necessary information to come up with whatever
           conclusion you want to.
                       I'm going to expand on a few -- several
           things that Bill has already addressed.  So some of
           this is a repeat, but I'm trying to provide a little
           more detail, so that the following presentations on
           each of the individual KTIs you'll try to -- see the
           picture.
                       Okay.  It's a little slower than me.
                       As I said, this is an overview.  And what
           I want to do is lay out the framework, see if I can
           make some of the connections for you.  And the
           specific applications for each KTI will be later, so
           if you start to ask me a question about a specific KTI
           or an integrated ISI, I'll defer your question.
                       The idea is I want to do really three
           things.  I want to give an overview again of the issue
           resolution, what that overall goal is, explain in some
           respects, given the regulatory constraints, how we use
           risk insights, then move on to what are the risk
           insights we have gained from our performance
           assessment.
                       And, finally, something that was just
           briefly crossed -- touched on by Bill is a risk
           insights initiative.  And this is something that we
           had planned on presenting to the committee in March,
           and what you're going to see is a couple slides of
           snapshots.  We're just starting that process -- but
           where we think we can do a better job.
                       Moving on to the risk -- issue resolution
           overview, as Bill indicated, the goal is in terms of
           a -- for a potential license application.  The
           information that we receive from the Department of
           Energy must be sufficient and of high quality.  So
           that's the overarching goal, and we're guided by
           what's in Part 63.  In particular, when we're looking
           for post-closure and performance assessment, we're
           guided by Section 63-114, which are the requirements
           for performance assessment, which say what is
           necessary for any performance assessment for post-
           closure.
                       So that's kind of in the background of
           where all these agreements are coming for.  If you
           look at detail in the agreements, some of the same
           words in Part 63 provide a technical basis.  Those are
           the types of information that we're trying to get in
           closing those gaps.
                       In identifying the gaps, again, we're
           identifying the gaps in the Department of Energy's
           approach, and we're looking at the data and analysis
           and models that they're using in their performance
           assessment.  And, again, how we identify those gaps
           are based upon the requirements in 63-114, what is
           required for a performance assessment in any potential
           license application.
                       But also, it plays into risk insights.
           And I'm kind of jumping the gun, but recall that the
           risk triplet is answering three questions.  You can
           have risk insights not just about consequences but
           what can go wrong, its likelihood.  Okay?  You can't
           say what is most important in terms of risk by only
           focusing on consequences because if DOE has left out
           a technical basis for a process that could impact the
           consequences, then how good is that assessment of the
           overall performance of the system?
                       So, really, you have to have the
           information for each of these to get the overall
           importance of -- in terms of risk insights.  And what
           you'll see -- what can go wrong is really the
           features, events, and processes.  And this is a non-
           negligible portion of our agreements.  Many of the
           agreements are talking about provide the technical
           basis for screening something out.
                       And, again, you have to know what to put
           in the performance assessment or provide a basis for
           screening it out for removing it from the performance
           assessment.
                       Those gaps, as Bill indicated, are also
           identified by other people, gaps identified in
           performance assessments by EPRI, or insights from the
           ACNW or the NWTRB, or the State of Nevada.  What
           things are they focusing on?
                       Because, again, we're thinking in terms of
           down the road for a potential license application we
           need to have those gaps identified and addressed.
                       And, finally, our risk insights come not
           only from our own work but from the Department of
           Energy, from both their performance assessment and
           what their safety case will be, because, again, we're
           looking for a sufficient, high-quality license
           application, but the safety case is the Department of
           Energy's to make.  So we have to focus on what they
           are asserting or proposing to use in their performance
           assessment and their licensing case, potential
           licensing case.
                       So how have we been applying the risk
           insights?  Well, in terms of the issue resolution
           meetings, early on, you know, we learned -- as Bill
           indicated, we've learned things as we've gone through
           these technical exchanges.  And one of the first
           things we realized is that we needed to have a proper
           perspective on what the DOE considered in terms of
           each KTI, in terms of performance base.
                       So we requested that after that first
           meeting each subsequent key technical issue, technical
           exchange, have a presentation on the Department of
           Energy's performance assessment, so that we could try
           to have this conversation in a risk informed manner.
                       Prior to these meetings, both the Center
           and the NRC staff conducted numerous evaluations, both
           at the system and the process level, to gain insights,
           so that when we went into the meetings we were focused
           on the things that were most important.  With that in
           mind, the agreements that we -- came out of those
           meetings are a function of the risk insights that went
           into them.
                       And so we believe that the agreements are
           risk informed, again remembering in a broad sense risk
           informed in terms of also any potential license
           application identifying the gaps and providing that
           information.
                       As Bill indicated, our products are
           applying those risk insights.  The Yucca Mountain
           review plan, which is due out later this spring, and
           the integrated issue resolution status report, which
           will be out this spring, will show how we've applied
           those risk insights.
                       But also, in the presentations that follow
           you'll see in each of the KTIs how the independent
           efforts that they're doing, the independent
           investigations, are -- how they've applied those risk
           insights to what information they're trying to assess,
           what they've assessed last year, and also in the
           upcoming year.  So they're applying the risk insights
           to figure out what additional information is needed.
                       Moving on to the second part of this
           presentation, we have used the iterative performance
           assessment approach, and the committee is well aware
           of that.  This iterative approach has been used
           approximately for the last 10 years by the NRC and the
           Center to focus on gaining risk insights and
           information, and the value of the iterative approach
           is that it allows us, as we go along, to refine what
           the insights are.
                       Suppose the first iteration of a
           particular portion of the code is coarsely
           represented, and we do an analysis and say, "This area
           is important."  So when we go back and revise our
           code, we may add additional complexity to the code to
           see which part is causing the importance.
                       And this iterative approach is not only
           for the post-closure, it's for the pre-closure.  So
           when we talk about identifying the parts important to
           waste isolation, there we're talking about the TPA
           code and the post-closure assessment.  And when we're
           identifying the parts important to safety, this is in
           terms of pre-closure and the pre-closure safety tool
           that we're using.
                       This iterative approach causes the staff
           to focus our review and the prelicensing documents on
           the data -- on quantifying the uncertainties.  What
           are the most important uncertainties?  And so that
           guides us in terms of, what are the gaps -- some of
           the gaps that the Department of Energy should address?
                       And, finally, this iterative approach
           allows us, if data are very scarce or very uncertain,
           conservative approaches can be adopted in the first
           cut.  But as the data are gathered, conservatives are
           reduced and realism is increased as we go on.
                       One of the outcomes of this iterative
           performance assessment process is it allows the
           identification of the risk important features of the
           repository system.  And this has been called the
           flowdown diagram.  And this is an important diagram to
           understand, because these are integrated subissues.
                       This is the format of how we're doing our
           reviews in the Yucca Mountain review plan.  It's how
           we'll be documenting things in an integrated
           resolution status report upcoming.  But it's really
           the integration of information in KTIs.
                       And I put this post up -- it's slides 16
           and 17, and this is kind of the road map.  On the left
           side of those two slides are the integrated subissues.
           The titles are ENG1.  I -- let me back up.  Across the
           top are the integrated subissue -- ENG1.  On the left
           side are the listing of all of the KTIs and their
           subissues.
                       So from an integrated performance
           assessment standpoint, if you look at ENG1, which is
           degradation of engineered barriers, which I believe
           the committee believes is highly important, you can
           see that multiple key technical issues -- the thermal
           effects on flow, the near field KTI, the container
           life and source term, the TPA -- TSPA KTI, and the
           repository design and thermal-mechano effects -- all
           provide input.  It's that integration of the
           information of each of the KTIs that is important in
           evaluating the performance assessment.
                       So I've kind of left this crosswalk up,
           and I think it may help you, as you go through, or
           asking a KTI, well, how do you fit into the
           performance assessment?  Well, this -- these two
           diagrams are the key to understanding that when we're
           talking about resolution of KTIs, you have to look at
           where that information is fed in terms of performance
           assessment.
                       As Bill indicated, we have been using
           sensitivity analyses to understand, in terms of the
           previous slide, what are the most important areas.  So
           here we go.  Degradation of integrated -- degradation
           of engineered barrier pops up as -- when we run the
           TPA code as being one of the more risk significant,
           integrated subissues.  Okay?
                       And you can get to the point where you're
           identifying specific parameters that are important to
           the overall system performance.  And you can also
           address the barriers.
                       So we're using these various sensitivity
           analysis techniques and total system performance
           assessment code to gain insights on which portions are
           important to waste isolation, which parameters matter,
           and we can gain insights on the different barriers'
           performance.
                       So what are -- in an overall picture, what
           are some of the results?  And what drops out?  Now,
           the committee has heard this information before, and
           I'm just trying to summarize it in a different way.
                       What are some of the significant features
           and processes that our sensitivity analysis tell us
           are important?  And this is a list.  I'm not really
           going to go through it.  You should hear in the
           subsequent talks how the KTIs are contributing to
           things.  Direct release of volcanism -- Brit will walk
           you through that.  But from an overall system
           performance assessment, this is what our code is
           telling us.
                       Okay.  But -- those are the things that
           our code is telling us are important.  Well, you can
           also get insights on what's less important.  Less risk
           significant features and processes in our own
           assessment and our code, how we've seen -- well, we
           suggest -- our results suggest that unsaturated zone
           flow and transport is relatively unimportant.
                       This means that the two integrated
           subissues -- flow paths in the unsaturated zone and
           radionuclide transport in the unsaturated zone --
           those integrated subissues are relatively less
           important, at least in our view.  That's only part of
           the question -- part of the picture, and we'll get to
           the rest of the picture in a second.
                       Also, direct mechanical disruption by
           falling rock and direct mechanical disruption by
           faulting are also of relatively low importance.  But
           those two items are focused and figure -- feed into
           that mechanical degradation integrated subissue.
                       If you only focused on this, you'd say,
           then, why are we spending any time on these items?
           Okay?  Well, you have to put it in the regulatory
           perspective.  Our focus of issue resolution is guided
           by the identification of what is risk significant, and
           also what is DOE's potential safety case.  What is DOE
           relying on?
                       So, again, the focus of the issue
           resolution, as we went into these meetings, we knew
           what were the most important things.  These were the
           things we tried to focus on in those meetings, in each
           KTI, keeping in mind KTI might be unsaturated zone
           flow and flow and transport under -- I mean, excuse
           me, unsaturated zone, saturated zone, under isothermal
           condition, USFIC.
                       Well, what portion of USFIC is important?
           Well, it turns out the quantity of water.  So
           understanding the seepage is important, and so if you
           look at the KTIs you'll see that there is a focus on
           those things that are important.
                       In the latter part, in the Department of
           Energy's approach, mechanical disruption of engineered
           barriers is important for its absence in its
           performance assessment.  They're relying on -- they're
           relying on screening out mechanical degradation.
           Okay.  So if you're going to screen out this process
           that we suggest may have some impact, you've got to
           have an adequate technical basis to provide that
           screening out.
                       And our concern here, really, is as -- as
           rock fall damage could lead to stress corrosion
           cracking -- which, again, the waste package is an
           important barrier that we know impacts the overall
           system performance.  So, really, we're asking for the
           technical basis for them for screening out, and I
           think the --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Bret, when you say
           quantity and chemistry of water, do you in the
           chemistry mean also the quality of the water?
                       MR. LESLIE:  Yes.  The chemistry is the
           quality.  What --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  So the composition issue
           is covered in the chemistry of --
                       MR. LESLIE:  Exactly.  The chemistry of
           the water means the composition.
                       Also, again, the Department of Energy, in
           their supplemental science and performance analysis
           report, relies on the unsaturated zone quite a bit for
           performance.  Our own assessment suggests that it's
           not very important.  Okay?  Well, DOE wants to rely on
           it.  They are under the -- they have the burden to
           support that.  And so what we're asking for is
           information to support their assertions of significant
           performance in the unsaturated zone.
                       So, again, issue resolution -- the big
           picture is guided by what the Department of Energy is
           proposing, us identifying the gaps and using our risk
           insights.
                       Now moving on to the slide that you
           probably want to know -- prioritization of the key
           technical issues.  What I just said is summarized in
           this first bullet and what Bill indicated.  All of the
           KTIs are needed for a high-quality license
           application, and that's, again, constrained by our
           limit by law of a three-year review period.
                       So the answer is all of them are needed.
           That's the first answer.
                       What is needed is a function of what the
           Department of Energy proposes for their safety case.
           If they had a simpler safety case or wanted to rely on
           things that were less -- had less gaps, let's say,
           then our request for information or our agreements
           scope might be smaller.
                       So the agreements are, again, a function
           of what the Department of Energy is proposing, our
           identification of the gaps, and our request for DOE to
           close those gaps.
                       And I'll give you an example.  We can only
           be as risk informed as the Department of Energy.
           There might be things that they can screen out by
           doing a simple consequence analysis.  Criticality may
           be one.  Okay?
                       Well, the Department of Energy has chosen
           -- that's their choice -- not to screen out on showing
           what the consequences are.  Instead, they've adopted
           a different approach.  We have to respond to what
           their approach is.  We don't decide what they do.
           They decide what they want to do and the approach they
           take.
                       If the approach that they're taking isn't
           very risk informed, we can't make them become risk
           informed.  We can show the risk insights, but it's up
           to the Department of Energy to decide how they want to
           put their case together or address a particular issue.
                       The results from the performance
           assessment, I went through that in the previous
           slides, slides 6 through 10.  We've also tried to get
           at the overall complexity of the subissue agreements.
           And we added these slides at the very end.  And if
           you'll kind of look at 32 and 33 -- these are in your
           backups at the very end -- what we did is -- is -- and
           this is a fairly recent -- well, not so recent effort.
           It happened before the site recommendation, so this
           table is somewhat dated.
                       The first thing you'll note is 282 does
           not equal 293, and that's because we didn't include
           pre-closure and we didn't include subsequent technical
           change.  So don't focus too much on the numbers.  But
           what we did is we tried to break out by subissue in
           each KTI the number of agreements first.
                       And we polled the staff and said, "Okay.
           Based upon what you're expecting in the scope of the
           agreements, do you categorize the information need as
           minor, moderate to major, or major?"  So this is
           another way of focusing within a key technical issue
           where is the dominant focus.
                       And so I'm not going to discuss this
           anymore.  I just wanted -- it's information for you to
           have in the backup.
                       And now I'd like to move on to the third
           part.  We realize -- and the committee has -- has
           written -- that it's not always clear that we are
           using risk insights or risk informed in the issue
           resolution process.  And there could be a couple
           reasons.  One, we're not communicating it.  Okay?  Or
           we're truly not risk informed.
                       And so Bill and I and a couple others have
           brainstormed and said, "Well, what can we do to
           improve that communication and make sure that our work
           is truly risk informed?"  And we've come up with this
           project that I'm going to be working on over the next
           month, six weeks, and this is anticipation of the
           DOE's rebaselining out in March, that we need to be
           prepared for that discussion with the Department of
           Energy.
                       But, really, it's to document the insights
           and tie it to the resolution of the KTIs.  And the
           idea is that we need to be better communicating to the
           ACNW and others what are those risk insights tied to
           those agreements.  Why are we asking this information?
           Both from a regulatory perspective, but also from a
           performance assessment perspective or a risk
           perspective.
                       We also want to make sure that we're
           properly implementing risk insights into the program.
           The timing is near term.  Again, the Department of
           Energy, in the March timeframe, is likely to come out
           with a rebaselining of their activities, what they
           think are most important to complete.
                       And so in the near term we expect to have
           some -- make some -- make some observations and
           document them and create some guidance.  But at the
           end of the year, the total system performance
           assessment KTI is planning a major intermediate
           milestone that would document all of these risk
           insights.
                       But the idea is that we get our staff
           prepared for that exchange with the Department of
           Energy.  Again, the idea is that we document very
           clearly in terms of the agreements, why are we -- why
           do we have this agreement?  What risk insights can we
           apply to this agreement?  What are the drivers for
           this agreement?
                       And, finally, the outcome -- the other
           outcome is guidance from staff.  Are there areas where
           we -- if we find that there are ways we can better
           communicate this risk information, we'll try to
           document that and make sure it's implemented.
                       So who will participate?  There's a core
           group that's leading it.  It includes Chris Grosman of
           the PA staff, myself, and a couple people from the
           Center.  Everyone is going to participate.  We're
           going to be working together with the issue resolution
           staffs.
                       We're going to sit down with them and kind
           of go through what information can they bring to the
           table, what can the PA people bring from -- to the
           table in terms of the overall system -- you know,
           overall and -- and system level, and detailed process-
           oriented level analyses, what are the risk insights.
                       And so we'll be going down and talking to
           the key technical issue teams.  Again, we're getting
           the risk insights from and for each key technical
           issue.  We're going to be going through the issue
           resolution agreements, each of the agreements, to see
           indeed that they are risk informed.
                       And also, we may try to get some of the
           insights from the recent licensing activity such as
           PFS.  What have they found in terms of their risk
           informed analysis?  What insights might they give to
           us to help us along on our path as well?
                       So I think by now you understand what the
           purpose of this presentation was.  It's, again, to
           reiterate what the overall goal of issue resolution
           is.  It can't -- it's informed by risk insights, but
           the overall goal guides our work.  In other words, a
           sufficient and high-quality license application, it's
           dependent upon what the Department of Energy's case
           is.
                       I think you have seen that the risk
           insights are derived from a variety of techniques and
           from different sources, and you'll hear more about
           those risk insights from each of the key technical
           issues.  And we're also interested in improving our
           program through the risk sights initiative.
                       That's kind of a summary of my
           presentation, but I want to kind of lay out the
           groundwork for the rest of the presentations.  This
           might not be the right order.  This was the order that
           we had proposed a couple days ago; management had
           agreed.
                       But basically we want to start off with
           the total system performance assessment perspective
           with James Weldy, and then we're going to go to
           igneous activity, Brit Hill.  This is one of the areas
           that the committee is keenly interested.  We want to
           get your enthusiasm up early in the morning.  And the
           other two that we had -- that I know Ray and others
           are interested in are later in the afternoon, so we
           can wake you up again.
                       (Laughter.)
                       But each of these presentations is going
           to have the same format and feel, and this is -- this
           is because of the short time constraints we had, we
           have relied on presentations we have already given
           elsewhere.  And so it might not be the right title on
           the top of the slide, but we think we're trying to
           address the information.
                       And, basically, each of the following key
           technical issues presentations will talk about the
           status of the subissue resolution, discuss the risk
           information insights which include what DOE needs to
           provide before any potential license application, and
           what the NRC needs to do before any potential license
           application.
                       And the idea is that they are going to be
           providing select examples of how those risk insights
           have been applied to the Center's work.  Why is the
           center focusing on in the near field what salts
           matter?  Okay?  And Bobby will go through why that --
           why is that important and the type of work they've
           done, and how they will apply risk insights in this
           fiscal year coming up.  And then each of the KTIs will
           have a summary.
                       And we'll be flexible.  If you're finding,
           you know, after two or three or four of these that a
           particular portion of the presentation isn't
           scratching the itch and we're running short on time,
           we'll be flexible and revise on the fly as needed.  So
           that's kind of -- yes?
                       MR. REAMER:  Bret, Bill Reamer.  Just on
           the sequence.  I think the order has been changed
           slightly.  The fourth item, unsaturated and saturated
           zone flow, will be moved to the container life and
           source term item, and it will be moved up to the
           fourth item.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Right.  We had intended to
           keep these two together.  They're intimately related.
           But one of our staffers -- I think Tae Ahn -- who is
           involved in container life and source term can only be
           here this morning, so we switched it around.  So it
           won't -- we'll only have half the punch in the
           afternoon.
                       The backup slides, again, are -- I'm not
           going to go through, but the first two are the
           relationship to this chart.  You know, you probably --
           might not be able to see this chart, but you might
           want to pull them aside, so as you're going through
           you can see the relationship to the KTIs and the
           integrated subissues.
                       And then the subsequent pages from
           pages 19 through 30 are really out of our comments,
           the sufficiency comments, the November 13th letter.
           And they are a synopsis of what kind of information we
           need from each of the key technical issues.  They also
           provide the reference for where our agreements are.
                       And, again, you might want to rip that
           page out as you go along and have it in front of you
           as we go to each of the key technical issues.  And,
           again, the final two of the backup slides are the
           level of complexity.
                       With that, I'll stop.  I know that's a
           lot.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks, Bret.
                       Questions for Bret?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Bret, the key technical
           issues have been around several years.  Has the list
           really changed?
                       MR. LESLIE:  I think the statement stands
           by itself.  Yes, they've been around.  The list hasn't
           -- the key technical issue list hasn't changed.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Have the subissues?
                       MR. LESLIE:  Have the subissues changed?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, I guess what I'm
           thinking of, when the key technical issues were first
           generated, the discussion and thought processes were
           very much geotechnical oriented.  There wasn't nearly
           the emphasis that now exists on the engineered
           systems.
                       So I guess what you're saying is that they
           are sufficiently global or high level that they
           probably haven't changed, but to be sure the subissues
           have been quite dynamic and affected by that -- by the
           change in emphasis with respect to engineered
           barriers, for example.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Right.  While the emphasis
           might have changed, we believe that to describe the
           overall system these -- this is the information you
           still need to do.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. LESLIE:  You can't just do an analysis
           on a particular barrier.  The idea is that the
           emphasis and the resources and the focus may have
           changed, but overall to describe repository
           performance you still need that information on all
           those issues.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.  I guess the other
           thought here is, how complete is the set?  In the
           course of time, at least at the KTI level, have we --
           if we had our druthers, would we add or subtract any
           KT -- one of the things you said was that all of the
           KTIs have to be addressed I think you said by law.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Well, I didn't say by law,
           but --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  And so as far as the
           overall and global considerations are concerned, there
           hasn't really been any change in several years, since
           the list first pretty much came out.  And that's --
           what's that been, five years or some time --
                       MR. LESLIE:  Something like that.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. LESLIE:  You could bend this a lot of
           different ways.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. LESLIE:  And what we're focused on is,
           do they have the necessary information?  You could
           bend it by integrated subissue, and then you'd have 13
           or 14.  The information I believe remains the same
           however you bend them.  I -- we have worked by KTIs.
           I don't think we're planning on changing the number of
           KTIs.  It's the information that matters.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.  At one time we
           were trying to --
                       MR. PATRICK:  Bret, could I interject?
                       MR. LESLIE:  Yes.
                       MR. PATRICK:  Bret, if I could, please,
           just interject, I think Dr. Garrick did make an
           important point, that the KTIs are quite broad in
           their scope.  We continue to reexamine, as we conduct
           process level modeling, to assure ourselves that they
           continue to cast a net that's sufficiently broad that
           nothing is missed on the one hand, and on the other to
           eliminate those items that are no longer in some cases
           even relevant, frankly.  The part where the evolution
           has occurred and is most visible is at a much lower
           level, down in the subissue level.
                       A good example, you mentioned, Dr.
           Garrick, the emphasis on container life.  Even more
           specifically, you can point out that as the selection
           of metals that DOE is proposing has evolved over time,
           there are new phenomena that we did not consider in
           1996 for instance that we now see as very important,
           because different classes of materials are being used.
                       Likewise, there are some phenomena that we
           were examining back in those days that are no longer
           relevant for these new materials that are being
           considered by the Department of Energy.  So at that
           level, there has been a good deal of evolution, but
           it's still -- in that example case, it's still all
           within the broad container life and source term key
           technical issue.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  For the record, that
           was Wes Patrick from the Center.
                       Wes, you weren't here this morning when I
           asked everyone to make sure they introduced
           themselves.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Thanks, Wes.
                       MR. PATRICK:  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Raymond?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes.  As you know
           very well, we've been interested in the degree to
           which evidence supports the DOE case.  And so you've
           been very interested in that, too.  But my question
           is, then, one you probably can't answer very
           precisely, is what criteria or formal process or what
           mechanism do you have for deciding how much evidence
           is needed?
                       MR. LESLIE:  Part of that depends on how
           the Department of Energy -- for instance, in screening
           out, they must provide a technical basis for screening
           out.  Well, it talks in terms of you can screen it out
           if it -- or you do not need to examine it in detail if
           it does not make a difference in the magnitude or time
           of dose.  Okay?
                       If DOE came in and did a calculation that
           it did not matter in terms of times and dose, and we
           could agree that that was a robust calculation, that's
           sufficient.  If they want to make arguments -- and
           I'll give the example of rock fall, that -- that they
           are suggesting that they would design away rock fall.
           Okay?
                       Without having given us a design, okay, we
           need to ensure that the information that would go into
           the design decision is complete.  So that means how
           many rocks, how big rocks.  You know, it depends,
           again, on how they frame what they want to do.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  It's a very
           judgmental thing.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes, I've got I guess
           two questions, one a very broad one and one a very
           narrow one.  The broad one -- the objective of the KTI
           program, as I understand it, is not to resolve
           specific issues.  That gets done when you review a
           license application.  It's to assure yourself that
           you've identified all of the issues to be addressed in
           the license application.  Is that correct?
                       MR. LESLIE:  It's not just the
           identification.  It's that sufficient --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  No.  What information
           would be provided to back up those issues?  That
           doesn't mean that just because you've identified that
           information that it will be acceptable.  You still
           have to review it all --
                       MR. LESLIE:  That's absolutely --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  -- the license
           application.
                       MR. LESLIE:  -- correct.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  My question is:
           Isn't there a loose end in your ability to identify
           everything you're going to need, since you have not
           seen the formal safety case that will be presented by
           DOE in its license application?
                       MR. LESLIE:  I'll answer this -- that
           this --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I mean, what you're
           looking at is everything you need to know to review
           not the generic question but specifically a license
           application and the safety case it makes.
                       MR. LESLIE:  We define issue resolution as
           in terms of what we know now, and we've emphasized
           that to the Department of Energy.  As they make
           changes in design, or provide additional detail, there
           may be additional questions.
                       So in a way, yes, you're right.  We're
           hoping, you know, that whatever DOE decides they stick
           to it, because if they change in a big sense and bring
           in a lot of new issues, we're going to have to review
           it to make sure that whatever they propose is, you
           know, supported.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  But what I'm saying is
           that you're not in a position to say you have
           identified all of the necessary KTIs until you've seen
           their actual formal safety case.
                       MR. LESLIE:  I would disagree with that,
           because this is what is needed in terms of knowledge.
           Whatever their design is has to take into account what
           the reality of the situation is, that certain
           processes occur, you know, groundwater flow, and so on
           and so forth.
                       How they emphasize things in their
           potential safety case is up to them.  The emphasis
           might change, but we believe we have everything that
           is necessary to describe the system.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Regardless of what their
           safety case is.
                       MR. LESLIE:  I believe that's where we're
           at.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  The other is
           very, very detailed.  What is subissue RDTME4?
           Because it's on your slide but not on your chart
           there.  And, secondly, while it's on your slide, it
           isn't relevant to any integrated subissue?
                       MR. LESLIE:  Where is it on the slides?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  And it has major impact,
           right?
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. LESLIE:  Well, I --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I just want you to know
           I looked at your slides.  It's number 18.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Yes.  Part of this -- and I
           didn't state that when I showed this in the backup
           slides.  This is a crosswalk.  We have -- you know,
           we're evolving, and as we've written the Yucca
           Mountain review plan, and as we're developing the
           integrated resolution status report, the boxes might
           change, the overall perspective might change.
                       When we first started KTIs we didn't have
           a Part 63.  RDTME number 4, repository design and
           thermal mechanical effects, subissue 4 was seals.
           Okay?  Well, seals was in Part 60.  Part 60 is no
           longer relevant.  So this is an old slide, and you'll
           see that I -- I actually caught it here and bend it --
           you know, there's no RDTME4 on this thing.  I just
           didn't have an opportunity to change the slide last
           night after I saw that, so thanks for --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Bret, I guess I have
           a question that follows on Ray's and Milt's question
           I think.  It's hard for -- I know I want to ask you a
           general question and not a specific, but just to give
           the flavor I'll just refer to one specific.  But my
           question is general.
                       There is plenty of room for disagreement
           among scientists on these -- the kind of issues we're
           dealing with here.  So as an example, you showed in
           your slides that your analysis of the unsaturated zone
           is significantly different from DOE's analysis of the
           unsaturated zone.  And there may even at the end of
           the day be room for disagreement among scientists.
           And my question is:  are you comfortable that you have
           a process, either through -- well, somehow I guess
           through the issue resolution process, to deal with
           these kind of disagreements.
                       MR. LESLIE:  That's a great question,
           because if you look -- for instance, we'll give the
           example the conceptualization of the unsaturated zone.
           Part 63 says evaluate alternative conceptual models.
           And, in essence, that's what you're saying.  The
           Department of Energy has a conceptual model where
           transport times are very slow in the unsaturated zone.
                       Okay.  If you look at what the unsaturated
           folks have asked for in information is adequate
           information to support evaluation of both conceptual
           models.  In other words, give us your results of the
           chlorine 36 study, which suggests that the DOE's
           conceptual model may not be correct.  We need
           sufficient information to evaluate both alternative
           conceptual models.  There's a requirement to -- for
           the Department of Energy to do that.
                       So, yes, disagree -- we're not saying that
           a particular model is correct.  But if there are
           alternate conceptual models that can address the same
           issue, that adequate information -- and that those
           alternate models are considered in the performance
           assessment.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Questions from the
           staff?  John?
                       MR. LARKINS:  Quick question.  I'm just
           curious.  What constitutes major, moderate to major,
           and minor?  Are these levels of uncertainty?  Timing?
           Data needs?  Or what types of considerations went into
           this categorization?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Tim McCartin will
           give us a presentation on that next time.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. LESLIE:  No, that's not the answer.
                       (Laughter.)
                       I'm not intimately involved with what --
           this was an effort put together by the Center, and it
           incorporated the KTI resolution staff here.  But the
           idea was, okay, take a look at the agreements you've
           asked for.  What is the scope of information?  Are you
           talking about long-term testing?  How large are those
           uncertainties?
                       We'll go to the engineered degradation
           barriers -- or degradation of engineered barriers and
           container life and source term.  Of those subissues,
           what is the key driver?  Okay.  And how much
           information is needed to support that?
                       So it's qualitative.  It wasn't
           quantitative.  This was an informal type of analysis
           to try to get -- another way of trying to get a handle
           on how much information is really required.  So the
           answer is there aren't specifics.  It was staff's
           effort to try to assess what level of effort was
           really needed or the complexity of the information
           needs.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Okay.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Thanks very
           much, Bret.
                       Let's see.  I think the schedule says
           we're due for a break, and I think that we'll take a
           break.  Let's reconvene at 9:50.
                                   (Whereupon, the proceedings in the
                       foregoing matter went off the record at
                       9:40 a.m. and went back on the record at
                       9:53 a.m.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  The meeting will
           come to order again.
                       So the schedule that I have says that
           we're next going to hear from James Weldy on
           performance assessment.  Is that right?
                       MR. WELDY:  That's correct.
                       Good morning.  I'm James Weldy, and I'm
           going to be talking today about the status of
           resolution of the TSPA and I key technical issue.  The
           outline of my talk is we're going to talk about status
           of issue resolution, what DOE needs to provide, what
           NRC and CNWRA are going to be doing before license
           application to prepare for the review, talk about what
           we've done in fiscal year 2001 and what we're planning
           on doing for fiscal year 2002.
                       Current status of issue resolution for all
           four key technical issues, subissues, is closed
           pending.  We've reached agreements with DOE to provide
           the appropriate information by the time of license
           application, so all four subissues are closed pending.
           None have reached closure at this point.
                       And, of course --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  James?
                       MR. WELDY:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I just want to
           check, is the microphone adequate?  Any need to move
           it closer?  Is it okay for the recorder?  Oh, it is
           okay.  Okay.
                       MR. WELDY:  Are there problems in the back
           of the room hearing me?  Is this better?  Okay.
                       And I just wanted to point out the
           limitation within the overall performance objective
           subissue that the achievement of closed pending -- the
           closed pending status is only related to methodology
           issues, not related to any sort of determination that
           -- as to whether DOE has met the standard or will meet
           the standard or not.  It's not a comparison of the
           dose limits and the groundwater protection limits.
                       So going into detail about what DOE needs
           to do, based on our agreements before license
           application, within subissue 1, multiple barriers, DOE
           has presented a number of different methodologies,
           different techniques that they have in mind to make
           their case for -- that they have multiple barriers.
           But they really haven't put together an overall case,
           how they're going to use these techniques to address
           all of the issues and concerns within multiple
           barriers.
                       The issues such as barrier -- variability
           of performance of the barriers, independence and
           interdependence of the different barriers, and
           parameter model uncertainty considerations -- how are
           they going to put all these techniques that they have
           together and make a case to say we do have multiple
           barriers in the repository system?
                       And to -- their schedule for addressing
           these issues is that in fiscal year 2002 they will put
           together the approaches, and by the license
           application they'll present the results.  And we -- it
           resulted in two agreements for which the NRC and DOE
           came to agreement, and we have not, of course,
           received any information yet due to the late date of
           the TSPA technical exchanges in August 2001.
                       This will be a common theme throughout,
           that we haven't received much information to resolve
           the agreements at this point.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Can you just say
           something briefly about the -- the content of the
           agreements -- not a big elaboration, but just to give
           us some sense of your own classification of minor,
           major, etcetera?
                       MR. WELDY:  I would say that they are
           relatively minor in the sense that they really do have
           the techniques already that they've put together, and
           it's just really explaining how they're going to make
           that determination as for what they need to reach
           closure on the issue.
                       Since they have a lot of the information
           put together, all of the -- a lot of the techniques
           put together already, and the techniques seem pretty
           reasonable, and they're the types of things that we
           would consider using as well to make that sort of
           argument, we believe that it shouldn't be too
           difficult for them to put together all of the
           different techniques and put it together in a
           comprehensive argument that they do have multiple
           barriers.
                       MR. BAHADUR:  May I ask --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Go ahead, Sher.  You
           need to use the microphone and --
                       MR. BAHADUR:  This is Sher Bahadur of ACRS
           staff, ACNW staff.  The total system performance -- I
           was looking at the number of agreements in the list
           that was provided before, and 42 elements are
           classified as major.  And so it -- most of these have
           not been resolved yet, or do you have any feel for
           those?
                       MR. WELDY:  As for status resolution, like
           I said, we had a late technical exchange where we
           reached closure, so -- a closed pending status.  It
           was just in August, so DOE hasn't provided a lot of
           the information -- much of the information yet to
           close those agreements.
                       As for the number of agreements, the 42
           classified as major, I'd --
                       MR. WHITMEYER:  May I interject?  This is
           Gordon Whitmeyer from the Center.  I don't know
           exactly which chart you're reading from, Sher, but I
           believe what is shown or should be shown, if there's
           the word "major" next to one of the subissues it may
           be TSPA and I number 3.
                       MR. BAHADUR:  Right.
                       MR. WHITMEYER:  And there are 42
           agreements.  That's a summary that's saying that if
           you look at the total number of agreements, and the
           amount of information that's required of DOE to meet
           those agreements, it requires a fairly major effort on
           their part.  Doesn't necessarily mean there are 42
           major agreements.  I don't know if that helps clarify
           things or not.
                       MR. PATRICK:  And that also deals with
           model abstraction and --
                       MR. WHITMEYER:  That's the model
           abstraction --
                       MR. PATRICK:  -- multiple barriers --
                       MR. WHITMEYER:  -- for subissues.
                       MR. WELDY:  That's subissue 3, which we'll
           be getting to shortly.
                       MR. BAHADUR:  Thank you.
                       MR. WELDY:  Okay.  Within subissue 2,
           scenario analysis, DOE has completed FEPS database,
           which they have made the argument is comprehensive and
           complete.  And, in our opinion, it seems to cover
           everything, but the biggest problem we've found with
           it is more transparency and traceability issue.
                       The real concern is that they really have
           different levels of broadness for their different
           FEPS, and for a number of the FEPS it's difficult to
           tell features, events, and processes.  I apologize for
           the acronym.
                       For a number of the different features,
           events, and processes that they've defined, it's
           difficult to tell exactly what falls within the scope
           of that features, event -- that FEP.  It's just some
           things are so broad that they can lump any issue that
           they -- that gets brought up into that FEP and
           indicate that it will be covered -- that they will
           address it during the modeling rather than during the
           screening argument.
                       So it's -- it's hard to tell whether they
           have put together a completely comprehensive list, if
           you can't tell what's in with -- within each of the
           FEP, and what they actually thought of when they were
           developing it.
                       So the -- that's the major theme of the
           issues that we've brought up in the agreements that
           we've made with the DOE -- is that we really need to
           be able to tell what's in the FEP and what they're
           doing with it and how it's getting propagated into the
           performance assessment.
                       Of course, there are additional agreements
           on clarifying their screening argument or providing a
           more acceptable screening argument for some of the
           FEPs, but we don't think that there is anything -- any
           huge issues that they've missed that wouldn't be --
           couldn't possibly be covered by some of their
           currently defined FEPs.  It's just not very
           transparent or traceable to find out what's going on.
                       Of course, this information is required to
           demonstrate that the -- they have considered
           everything that's important within their performance
           assessment.  And we reached seven agreements within
           the subissue to achieve closed status, and we have not
           received any information from the DOE on those
           agreements at this point.
                       For subissue 3, model abstraction, this
           one is a very broad category, and the agreements cover
           a number of different issues.  Primarily, we tried to
           focus on methodology issues, but there are also a
           number of specific technical issues that -- for which
           we had to reach agreements in this category.
                       But they tended to boil down into some
           major categories, such as how they've represented
           uncertainty within the system, and have they done it
           consistently from abstraction to abstraction, have
           they represented the uncertainty from detailed process
           level models appropriately within the abstraction when
           they went from the detailed model to the abstraction.
                       Other issues include the integration of
           the different process level models.  Are they
           consistent between the different models?  And
           transparent explanations of how they've simplified
           models, how they've used conservatism, how they've
           represented parameter uncertainty.
                       There were a number of consistency issues
           that they found that while not necessarily wrong or a
           real problem just were not consistent between
           different models and was not clearly explained why
           they were inconsistent, which we didn't -- we thought
           definitely needed a little more explanation within
           their safety case.
                       And, of course, the information on model
           abstraction is necessary to ensure that data
           collection, model development, and treatment of
           uncertainty are adequate to provide a basis for their
           performance assessment.  And we've reached 43
           agreements within this subissue, and so at this point
           they have provided information to complete one of the
           agreements, and that information was sufficient to
           provide the information that the NRC needed.  So it is
           considered resolved by the NRC staff at this point.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Are these -- again,
           just to get a general feeling for the nature of these
           agreements.  Are these agreements for DOE to either
           modify or augment their AMRs to provide the
           traceability to the model abstractions?  Is that the
           flavor?
                       MR. WELDY:  That's probably a reasonable
           characterization of a lot of the agreements.  Based on
           the wide range of the model abstraction, there is a
           mixed bag, of course.  There's a number of very
           detailed, specific technical comments that we included
           in here.  Everything on the biosphere was included
           under the model of the TSPAI KTI, since it doesn't
           have a KTI of its own to reach closure on.  So there's
           a number of detailed technical comments related to
           that within this group.  So it's a fairly wide range.
                       Now, has that addressed your question?
                       MR. BAHADUR:  Yes.
                       MR. WELDY:  Okay, good.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes, Jim?
                       MR. FIRTH:  James Firth, NRC staff.  I
           guess I would point you back to the presentation that
           we gave back to the committee where we laid out some
           of the specific agreements that we got, and this was
           the August 29th presentation.
                       That goes through -- a lot more specific
           in terms of what the agreements were.  And to
           reemphasize what James had said is that a number of
           these things address similar concerns to what was
           being addressed by the KTIs in their meetings, but
           reflect what was the information in the TSPA SR
           documentation which was not available at that time.
                       So there's a range of modeling questions
           and concerns -- questions that we had that were being
           addressed through the agreements.
                       There were also cases where, as we started
           doing things from the ISI perspective, to make sure
           that everything was covered in the KTI meetings
           earlier, that there were a couple things that we felt
           that we didn't have the information, to make sure that
           we have the information consistent with what we would
           see in the eventual Yucca Mountain review plan, and to
           show -- to meet the acceptance criteria.  So we'd have
           the information to be able to do a review.
                       MR. WELDY:  And, finally, subissue 4,
           overall performance objective.  The agreements that we
           reached -- one of the bigger issues that we found and
           had with them is their strategy and implementation of
           their software verification and model support or
           validation that the DOE has been doing for their
           software.
                       We really need to get some more
           information and get improved results from that from
           DOE to have confidence in the results of their models.
                       Other things that we've reached agreements
           on within overall performance objective is looking at
           more details on their -- how they are running their
           TSPA, how they're demonstrating convergence of the
           results, how they're demonstrating that they've
           addressed variability sufficiently with their time
           steps, with the level of discretization, and make sure
           that they're not running into incorrect results just
           due to the way that they set up the models.
                       And this information is required, of
           course, to provide confidence in the results of the
           TSPA and any decisions that might be made on -- as a
           result of the TSPA calculations.  And within this
           subissue, we reached seven agreements and have not
           received any information on these agreements yet.
                       Well, that's what DOE is going to be
           doing.  What are NRC and CNWRA going to be doing up
           until the time of license application?  Of course, one
           of our primary jobs is going to be monitoring what DOE
           is doing, reviewing the information that they provide
           us to meet the agreements and make sure that the
           information is acceptable and provide them feedback
           where we find that it's not acceptable.
                       And we're going to continue to participate
           as an observer in the DOE quality assurance audit to
           monitor issues such as validation, verification,
           transparency, and traceability within their documents,
           and make sure they are moving forward in the right
           direction.
                       We're going to complete development of our
           own TSPA, the TPA code, perform sensitivity analyses
           and visualization tool to help us get insights into
           how the system is behaving, focus our review and
           enable us to really focus on those things that are
           most important to the DOE's safety case based on our
           own independent modeling.
                       And we're going to conduct a thorough
           review of the consideration and propagation of
           uncertainties from detailed models to the TSPA model
           and look at where you could run into problems, where
           you could run into issues of risk dilution, so that
           we're able to do a good review of the DOE work.
                       In fiscal year 2001, the CNWRA and NRC
           staff outside of the issue resolution activities,
           primarily we've been working on developing tools to
           help us review any DOE potential license application.
           We've been updating the TPA code, which is, of course,
           our own tool for assessing the performance of the
           system.  We've been performing uncertainty and
           sensitivity analyses to identify the scenarios,
           processes, models, and parameters that influence the
           results the most, so we can really focus our review of
           the DOE work.
                       We've been working on approaches to
           understand and gain insights on overall performance of
           the system, and we've been doing some confidence-
           building efforts on our own tools.  So we've been
           starting to develop a software validation test plan
           for our own TPA code, and also the TPA code was
           subjected to an external review a couple of years ago,
           and we're continuing to work on responses to the
           external reviewer's comments and have just about
           completed that activity.
                       And those sorts of activities will help to
           provide confidence in our tools, so we are focusing on
           the right thing, make sure we're focusing on the right
           things for -- of the DOE TSPA.
                       We've also been working on pre- and post-
           processors for the TPA code to make it easier to use,
           make it easier to extract results, and make it easier
           to understand what's going on in the system.
                       Some more details on the sensitivity
           analyses that we've been doing over the past fiscal
           year, we've been looking at distributional
           sensitivity.  Some of the distributions defined within
           the TPA code may be defined on just a few data points,
           and we have to assume what distribution corresponds to
           those data points.  And so we're looking at what would
           the effect be on the results if we -- instead of a
           normal distribution we selected a log normal?  What if
           we shifted the mean up a little bit?  How much would
           that affect results?
                       We've been looking at alternative
           conceptual models and how that could affect results.
           If we replace the model of one repository system with
           an alternative, such as the dissolution rate of the
           spent fuel, how much will that affect performance?
                       And we've been doing barrier analyses to
           gain insights on barrier capabilities and importance
           to the performance of the repository, and also to get
           insight into barrier capabilities through the --
           looking at intermediate results, how barriers affect
           the transport of materials through the system.
                       For 2002, we plan on continuing some of
           the similar activities and adding some new ones.  We
           plan on continuing the issue resolution process,
           reviewing DOE work, providing comments, resolving
           issues, narrowing down those agreements and seeing if
           we can reach closed status on some of the TSPAI
           subissues.
                       We're going to be developing Version 5.0
           of the TPA code which will be another major step
           forward in the TPA code, replace -- evaluate some of
           the simplifications in the code, try and improve the
           models, and get an idea of what some of these
           uncertainties will have on the performance of the
           system.
                       We're going to be doing more uncertainty
           sensitivity analyses, the quantitative evaluation of
           the TSPA and TPA code results.  We're also going to be
           looking at detail at the DOE's TSPA code.  We've
           acquired the software, and we're going to be looking
           at the implementation of how they're doing things and
           see if we can -- if we identify any concerns with
           what's going on, that you can't do just by looking at
           a document but you actually have to look at the code
           itself.
                       And we're also going to be starting off on
           a risk insights project where we document those issues
           that -- the risk insights that we use to help develop
           the agreements with the -- within TSPA and with the
           other KTIs.  And what we did and what we looked at to
           identify those things that needed agreements and were
           important to the performance of the system, and also
           work on a way to communicate those risk insights to
           members of the public and other NRC stakeholders.
                       And brief summary -- we achieved closed
           pending status on all four of our subissues in the
           last fiscal year, and we're going to continue to
           monitor DOE work to ensure that they are keeping up
           with the agreements and submitting high-quality
           products that meet the needs of -- the informational
           needs that we identified to write the agreements.
                       We're going to continue to work to improve
           our understanding of the repository system, and we're
           going to put some more effort into identifying,
           documenting, and communicating risk insights that we
           have with other NRC stakeholders.
                       And with that, I'll open up the floor to
           questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thank you, James.
                       Questions from the committee?  Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Since today is
           January 9th, it's time for me to ask the two questions
           I ask every six months.  Since you're presenting on
           the overall assessment integration, does the system
           current -- have they added conservation of mass to the
           overall analysis and system, or is it still lacking?
                       MR. WELDY:  Within the DOE TSPA code?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.
                       MR. WELDY:  My indication is that they
           have not done a full conservation of mass at this
           point.  Randy, would you like to explain?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  You have to come to
           a microphone and identify yourself and -- for the
           record.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Randy Fedors from the Center.
           I believe there's a technical agreement on those that
           they will look into that, and I -- it's a closed
           pending because they'll develop the approach.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  So you can ask the
           question again in six months.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I think this is now the
           fourth year, so --
                       (Laughter.)
                       The second question is a similar one.  We
           got a presentation a few months ago at which one of
           the analyses -- they just removed a few of the extra
           so-called conservatisms.  It changed the result by a
           factor of 104 on the dose.  It's my feeling that we
           have no idea how many places things are either
           overestimated or underestimated in the name of
           conservatism, because it seems to be done by modelers,
           by data input people, by abstracters, all along the
           way.
                       Are you people making any effort to try to
           not necessarily correct all of this but get a feel for
           how far from realism the analysis has been pushed in
           the name of -- I don't like the "conservative" because
           overestimates and underestimates are not necessarily
           conservative, even if you think they might be.  But it
           seems to me it would be fairly important in the final
           analysis, before you can identify what is the real
           risk, you have to have a handle on all of these
           perturbations.
                       MR. WELDY:  Yes.  And, specifically, to
           answer your question, we do have an agreement in the
           TSPAI subissue, under subissue 3 -- I don't know the
           number off hand -- but that specifically relates to
           DOE doing a much better -- a better job of documenting
           how they're using conservatism, where they're using
           conservatism, the guidance they're giving to their
           modelers and staff on where and how to use
           conservatism.
                       So we are looking at that issue and
           ensuring that they are doing a consistent job across
           it of at least documenting -- across the different
           KTIs and different technical areas of at least
           documenting where they are claiming conservatism and
           why they believe it is conservative, or, if you don't
           like the word "conservative," will lead to higher dose
           estimates rather than not -- lower dose estimates.
                       Of course, when we're developing the
           agreements, we look at -- if we find an issue that we
           -- a technical issue that we have concerns about, we
           do think about, well, will this lower dose or increase
           dose at the critical group location?  And if it's
           likely to lower dose, we -- if the issue -- if the
           problem results in a high -- is likely to result in a
           higher dose, we generally still submit it to them but
           at a lower priority level.
                       We do it as an issue of clarity and
           documentation and generally won't get it -- a specific
           agreement written for it.  But if it's something that
           results in an overly conservative -- or a result that
           lowers dose, then we'll generally write an agreement
           for it.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Our concern -- my
           concern is that such complex systems -- it is seldom
           obvious where it would lead to a higher or lower dose.
           The classic case is, why don't we make the containers
           a lot smaller so that as you analyze each container it
           contributes a small amount to the risk.  But a large
           increase in the number of containers does not
           necessarily reduce the final risk.
                       MR. WELDY:  Right.  And that's actually
           the third category is where we just can't tell we --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, in a significant
           fraction of the cases in -- especially non-linear
           systems, but even when it is linear but complex, it is
           not obvious what the effect of overestimating,
           underestimating, which is why we keep coming back to
           let's do the most realistic job and then add the
           safety margins.
                       MR. WELDY:  Yes, and there are certainly
           areas where you can tell for sure, such as in igneous
           activity.  If you assume that the waste package
           provides no protection and all the waste is -- that is
           contacted by the magma is extracted from the mountain,
           that's going to lead to higher dose results than if
           you do more complex modeling and are able to defend a
           greater level of protection.
                       MR. FIRTH:  James, could I add a few
           things?
                       MR. WELDY:  Okay.
                       MR. FIRTH:  James Firth, NRC staff.  I
           guess, Milt, going back to your original question, I
           guess one of the important aspects is, has DOE
           provided a sufficient basis to show that the
           repository would be safe in terms of the long-term
           performance?  And that's slightly different than
           knowing what the actual performance would be, and we
           have regulations in place that we will be evaluating
           what DOE is coming in with, and we'll be evaluating to
           see that it is sufficiently safe.
                       That's a different question, and we don't
           necessarily have to push DOE to find out what the
           exact level of risk is.  And I guess the second point
           is on your follow up question -- we recognize that it
           is very difficult in some cases to evaluate whether
           something really is conservative in terms of leading
           to higher dose estimates or not.
                       And that's why we do have an agreement
           with the Department of Energy, so that they will be
           more rigorous in terms of providing the evidence and
           the basis to show -- to support their assertions that
           this is the effect of this assumption or this way of
           analyzing it.  So that it's not quite as liberal in
           terms of the use of asserting that this is
           conservative, that it does get more evidence-based.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I just want to make one
           thing very clear, and that is that I am very much in
           favor of it being conservative.  I just want to make
           sure that what we think is conservative really is
           conservative.
                       MR. FIRTH:  Yes, and we would -- James
           Firth, NRC staff.  We would agree that we want the
           basis to support that they are not being non-
           conservative or leading to lower dose estimates
           because they've not looked at things in enough detail,
           that they are backing up their assertions with some
           evidence.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Raymond?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes.  Well, there's
           quite a few subissues that are still to be resolved.
           Some of them are not very important with respect to
           the overall risk of the repository.  Some handful are
           important.
                       And in order to answer some of the
           questions with respect to these subissues there's been
           a request for a lot of detailed work to be done by
           DOE, in some cases experimental work that will require
           some time to complete.
                       My question is:  with respect to timing,
           and this may be kind of an unfair question, but are
           there some agreements that are not likely to be
           resolved by DOE within the time available for -- by
           the time the license application is submitted?
                       And the kind of thing that comes to mind
           right off the top is some of the corrosion issues like
           alloy 22 that it's kind of hard to determine what the
           10,000 year behavior will be of an alloy in a six-
           month experiment.  So are there issues like that?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  What we might do is
           actually defer that question to the rest of the
           presenters, and perhaps ask you, in fairness, if there
           are any with respect to TSPA itself.
                       MR. WELDY:  Within TSPA itself, most of
           them we expect will be resolved by the time of license
           application.  I mean, it's primarily modeling issues
           and issues related to the DOE safety case itself, so
           there is not really much there that can be deferred
           until later.
                       There might be some model validation work
           that will continue to be done to just confirm that
           they have completed the work and confirm the
           confidence in the model.  But I believe that the
           majority of it we would expect to be completed and
           needs to be completed by the license application.
                       Jim?
                       MR. FIRTH:  James Firth, NRC staff.  I
           just -- in terms of the performance assessment, like
           demonstration of the overall performance measures,
           multiple barriers, and scenario analysis, those things
           -- the agreements there deal with things that we would
           need in time of a license application.
                       Some elements of model abstraction --
           there becomes more of a line in terms of what's needed
           to make the decision for -- in terms of what DOE is
           provided in terms of demonstrating that it's safe.
           That may be confirmed through a performance
           confirmation that would come later, but the premise of
           all the agreements is that this is information that we
           believe we would need to review a license application.
                       We're not establishing what DOE's schedule
           is, so --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes, we know that,
           and I don't -- you know, just to interrupt you, James,
           I think what we're looking for is not necessarily a
           long discourse on what your agreements expect.  I
           think Ray's question was we are interested in your
           gut-level feeling as to whether there is -- might be
           a potential problem in terms of delivering information
           that you think is necessary in time for a license
           application.
                       So pretty clear cut, the answer is no, we
           anticipate that all this information will be
           delivered.  That's fine.  We're just interested in any
           insights that you might have, and maybe if Gustavo
           wants to go out on a limb and say, well, I don't think
           they can get this information in three years --
                       (Laughter.)
                       -- that's what we're interested in.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Why me?
                       (Laughter.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Did you have a
           follow up?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, I was just -- you
           know, inherent in the question Ray and you have asked
           is an implication that these guys have some
           information which I don't think they have, which is,
           when are they going to get -- how long is it to
           license application -- if you can estimate how long to
           get the data.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Well, we realize
           it's a question that puts people on the spot.  We
           recognize that it may be a question that people don't
           want to answer directly, and yet it is a question that
           occurs to us that as you go forward with these
           agreements to provide information, as scientists you
           might have a good sense as to how long this might take
           and whether or not it's doable within a reasonable
           licensing timeframe.
                       You may decide you don't want to answer
           that question, but that's the thrust of our question.
                       John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  I found several of my
           questions answered in the backup slides, which are
           very helpful.
                       MR. WELDY:  Glad to hear it.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  And several issues that
           you have planned to deal with in this following year,
           in this year.
                       But I would like to ask, on the -- your
           review of the supplemental science and performance
           assessment, do you consider this a part of the TSPA?
                       MR. WELDY:  It's additional information
           that DOE has collected.  It's certainly something that
           we need to look at and understand what they've done
           there, what new information they've found and what
           sort of sensitivity analyses they've done to help us
           get an understanding of the system.
                       And if there's new information in there
           that wasn't in other TSPA documents that they've
           provided us, we need to consider that and make sure
           we're aware of it for a review of other documents.
                       I don't think DOE intends that to be any
           formal part of their licensing case, but I can't
           answer that for DOE.  But there is certainly useful
           information in there that we need to review and
           understand what -- what they've collected and what
           they're doing.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, I had kind of a
           different impression.  I had an impression that it was
           very much -- very well could have been just an
           amendment to the TSPA because they sharpened up a lot
           of the assumptions in the TSPA model, particularly
           having to do with things like solubility, and some of
           the -- what they identified as very conservative
           assumptions in the TSPA SR were -- took a much more
           realistic scope in the supplemental report.
                       MR. WELDY:  And I think it also gives us
           an opportunity to prepare for where DOE might be
           going.  So we can start looking at the issues --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. WELDY:  -- that they are trying to
           sharpen the pencil on and make sure that we understand
           any additional concerns we might have related to those
           issues.
                       James Firth, what --
                       MR. FIRTH:  James Firth, NRC staff.
           Anything that DOE is going to be carrying forward from
           the SSPA is going to be working its way into the AMRs,
           the TSPA, so we're going to be focusing on their
           changes to all of those documents.
                       And that's where we're going to be
           focusing on our review, so we'll consider the
           information there to help inform the questions that we
           ask, but we're really focusing on the safety case that
           they may be developing if they go forward with the
           license application.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Thank you.  That's all.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Thanks very
           much, James.
                       MR. WELDY:  Okay.  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  We are going
           to move on to it looks like one of our favorite topics
           here -- igneous activity.
                       MR. HILL:  I always wonder what you mean
           when you say "favorite."
                       (Laughter.)
                       Well, since we had our last interactions
           in July and August, there have been a few new things
           that we can talk about on igneous activity.  We can
           have a new update on issue resolution and also put the
           risk information into a little more straightforward
           path on what are the most risk important topics and
           how are we going to move forward with the Department
           of Energy on these topics?
                       We'll also use that information to show
           how we're focusing the work last year and this year on
           the most risk significant aspects for issue
           resolution.
                       Now, probability -- the first main
           subissue for igneous activity -- has been closed
           pending since August 2000.  We have one agreement
           that's fairly minor, one that's probably minor but has
           the potential to become a larger level of effort --
           I'll talk about that in just a moment.  But,
           basically, probability is well in hand.
                       On consequences, in September we had a
           very productive technical exchange with the Department
           of Energy.  We reached four major agreements that are
           going to give us a path forward for closing the
           igneous activity consequences subissue.
                       The remaining agreements that we had
           reached, the previous technical exchanges, and
           including the September technical exchange, there's a
           number of minor agreements that appear to be very well
           on track to completion in this fiscal year and the
           following fiscal year.  So I think we're in very good
           shape for them.
                       The four major agreements, however, it's
           really been too soon to tell.  That only occurred in
           September.  We've got ongoing discussions with the
           Department and plans for updates regularly throughout
           the year to keep track of progress.
                       Hello?  Okay.  Just to bring you up on
           probability, the risk insights for probability is that
           there are a number of published alternative models
           that give probability values anywhere from a factor of
           10 to a factor of 100 higher than the DOE mean value
           of 1.6 times 10-8 per year.
                       Now, the way that we've resolved to go
           forward with the Department is that DOE has agreed to
           conduct a sensitivity analysis in any licensing
           application that should arise using a probability of
           10-7 per year.  And that will give us a way to
           evaluate whether these differences between the
           Department's preferred value and the value that we
           would prefer, whether those differences are truly
           significant to risk or not.
                       DOE has also agreed to evaluate some new
           aeromagnetic data that's been collected by the U.S.
           geological survey.  This aeromagnetic data will give
           us insights as to whether there are additional buried
           features in the Yucca Mountain region that could
           represent basaltic volcanoes.
                       We received the technical update impact
           report right around Thanksgiving that has a
           preliminary interpretation of these aeromagnetic data
           that say there could be 13 additional igneous features
           in 30 kilometers or so of the proposed repository
           site.  That is a preliminary analysis that's subject
           to ongoing interpretation by the Department and their
           contractors.
                       We're going to be meeting with the
           Department some time this spring and will be holding
           a teleconference in February to go over some of this
           information.  But if that interpretation stands or if
           there are additional features that haven't been
           incorporated into existing probability models, the DOE
           has agreed to evaluate the impact of that new
           information on the probability models.
                       We'll also need to determine if there are
           additional basaltic igneous features in the Crater
           Flat Basin that may be present but undetected by this
           new aeromagnetic technique or any existing geophysical
           technique that's been used to characterize the site.
                       Well, consequences -- to focus on the four
           major technical agreements that we have with the
           Department.  The first of these is probably the most
           important to understanding risk on -- it's about magma
           repository interactions.  We talked about this quite
           extensively in the July meeting.
                       But, basically, how can repository
           structures affect normal igneous processes?  As magma
           continues -- or if magma is rising, it interacts with
           the subsurface system.  How could alternative flow
           paths develop as opposed to a normal volcanic conduit?
                       The risk significance of all this is these
           alternative flow paths may increase the number of
           waste packages that we have potentially disrupted
           during an igneous event.
                       Now, we have received, again, a very
           preliminary scoping calculation from the Department in
           its technical update impact report that says now
           they've looked at just potentially some of these
           alternative flow paths.  They don't agree that there's
           a technical basis to support these flow paths.  But if
           these flow paths occurred, they would have a risk
           impact of about one millirem per year with an event
           probability of 1.6 times 10-8.
                       Now, it is important to note that using
           that scoping calculation and using a probability that
           would be sufficient for prelicensing issue resolution
           -- 10-7 per year -- that would change that risk
           significance up to about 10 millirems per year.  So
           you can see that alternative flow models, in addition
           to alternative probabilities, have a truly
           demonstrable risk impact on the total system
           performance assessment.
                       The way forward here is that the
           Department has agreed to evaluate how repository
           structures can affect igneous processes, in particular
           how magma may be affected during its accent and rise
           in the subsurface, how conduits -- the pathway to the
           surface, how those conduits localize in drifts or in
           pillars or away from the repository itself, and how
           that conduit and flow system may evolve for the
           duration of an event.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Before you leave that,
           how does the probability affect the dose?
                       MR. HILL:  It affects the risk.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  But you're quoting
           a dose.
                       MR. HILL:  No, I was quoting the risk.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Not the probability of
           a dose, which is --
                       MR. HILL:  No, that was a risk.  The DOE's
           risk was one millirem per year at a probability of
           10-6 for the event.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  Now, you change
           the probability, but might be much more likely
           somebody would get that dose, but how does it increase
           the dose?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  It's a weighted
           dose.  It's a probability weighted dose.  You need
           to --
                       MR. HILL:  Yes.  It's the expected annual
           dose.  Now, if you change the probability of the event
           by a factor of 10, the risk would increase by a factor
           of 10.  The risk is the probability times its
           consequence.  So we have --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  But millirem is --
                       MR. HILL:  -- two components.  Pardon?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  But the millirem per
           year is only half of that.
                       MR. HILL:  I'm sorry.  I -- half of it?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, okay.  Never mind.
                       MR. HILL:  No.  The probability weighted
           expected annual dose is one millirem per year.  That
           includes the dose consequences multiplied by a 1.6
           times 10-8 event probability.  If that probability
           increased by an order of magnitude, the resulting
           expected annual dose would also increase by an order
           of magnitude.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  If it were not weighted,
           it would be one big dose.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes.  So if a
           volcano occurs, the dose is much higher than one
           millirem.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. HILL:  That's been documented in the
           issue resolution status report for a number of years.
                       Okay.  The second area of major agreement
           would be on magma waste package interactions.  And,
           again, how could potential igneous activity affect
           waste packages?  The reason this is risk significant
           is that controls the source term for both volcanic
           release and intrusive release or subsequent hydrologic
           flow and transport.
                       There's really very little technical
           information on how the alloys that would make up the
           waste package and drip shield -- how all of these
           would behave under igneous conditions.  So we're
           having to extrapolate from fairly limited information.
                       The Department recently agreed to evaluate
           waste package response for a realistic range of
           igneous conditions.  That would include the
           temperatures and pressures and dynamic pressure
           variations that would be representative of typical
           basaltic igneous events, and also consider the
           potential effects of magmatic gas affecting corrosion
           processes -- waste packages located some place away
           from the direct impact of magma.
                       We also need to make sure we're looking at
           a duration of an igneous event, because these events
           can last for days to weeks to potentially a month of
           duration.  And so these thermal, mechanical, and
           chemical loads can be impacting the system for many
           years following the igneous event.
                       Also, after the event we have to worry
           about seismicity, because one of the characteristics
           of alloy C22 is embrittlement after exposure to 1,000
           degree Centigrade temperatures and cooling back to
           ambient conditions.  So even if we had an intact waste
           package following exposure to these sort of magmatic
           conditions, any sort of shaking could potentially
           cause a fracture to occur in the waste package.  So we
           have to look at the post-event impacts on performance
           as well.
                       The third area is magma waste form
           interaction.  So if waste packages are disrupted, what
           is the likely process for waste entrainment?  This is
           a very difficult problem because there is no natural
           analogs to this.  We don't have experience with
           10 gram per cubic centimeter material being
           incorporated into basaltic igneous events before.
                       But the risk significance is that if there
           isn't effective incorporation of this material we
           could be reducing the source term for volcanic
           disruption or also affecting the waste form for
           subsequent hydrologic flow and transport.
                       So we really have to understand, and the
           DOE has agreed to evaluate, how a potential magma flow
           can affect the cladding of the waste, changes in the
           waste form, and also mechanically how that affected
           waste and waste products can be incorporated into a
           flowing igneous system.  And that, of course, is going
           to have to build on the knowledge from the magma
           repository interaction studies as well, to get the
           appropriate flow conditions.
                       And, finally, the last part is on tephra-
           fall remobilization.  So if we have a repository
           penetrating volcanic event, how could the tephra from
           that volcanic eruption erode and be remobilized on the
           surface in the years after the event?  The reason
           that's risk significant is that the rate of erosion
           and deposition strongly affects the long-term risk
           calculation.
                       The risk really can be broken into two
           main components.  First is the risk of an event in the
           year of an eruption.  That would be weighted by the
           probability of 10-7 of having an eruption in that
           year.  There is also an accumulation of risk from
           prior events that also have, in each year, a 10-7
           probability of occurrence.
                       And when you look at calculations for an
           expected annual dose in any given year following
           closure that expected annual dose for most years is
           dominated by the accumulation of risk from prior
           events and not by the event occurring in the year that
           you're calculating.
                       So this process of remobilization by wind
           and water, where potential tephra is mobilized off the
           slope surrounding the volcano on the Yucca Mountain
           where you have a fairly steep topographic gradient,
           transport down the Fortymile Wash basin by both
           flowing water and by wind and deposition in the area
           that would affect a reasonably maximally exposed
           individual.
                       These processes are key to understanding
           the expected annual dose that's going to need to be
           used for compliance with 10 CFR 63.
                       What do we need to do?  What does the NRC
           need to do before license application?  Again, we're
           focusing on evaluating the DOE models and reasonable
           alternatives for these four most risk significant
           issues.  We have to confirm the numerical and analog
           experimental investigations for flow dynamic on
           sustained magma repository interactions.
                       Again, there is no data, there's no
           analogs, there's no simple way of doing this except
           through numerical modeling and some analog experiments
           to really understand the flow dynamics of a repository
           penetrating event.
                       We also have to evaluate the risk
           significance of long-term remobilization by wind and
           water.  The reason that's difficult is because the
           youngest eruption in the Yucca Mountain region is
           80,000 years old.  The deposits from that volcano, the
           distal tephra deposits, the ones that are most
           analogous to this situation, they've all been eroded
           away and have been deposited down in other basins.
                       So we have no site-specific data to
           evaluate how tephra erodes and is transported from the
           Yucca Mountain system.  And analogs have some very
           important limitations in terms of their eroding and
           transporting processes.
                       We can get some good insights, though,
           from analogs and field investigations of magma ascent
           processes.  How do conduits localize?  What are the
           controlling stresses and rock mechanical properties
           that can affect conduit localization once you get a
           dike going?  And I think that's one area that we're
           going to be investigating in the next couple of years
           to come up with a good basis for reviewing DOE work in
           this area.
                       And, finally, we need to review -- review
           new information on the responses of engineered
           materials to igneous events, and this is an area we
           see a lot of work coming in from the Department trying
           to explain how igneous temperatures and conditions can
           affect the engineered materials proposed for the
           repository systems.
                       So our technical accomplishments last year
           really were the bases to reach the closed pending
           agreements.  We talked about these quite a bit at the
           July ACNW meeting.  And, very quickly, it was the
           numerical models for initial magma repository
           interactions, the Bokhove and Woods paper if you will.
           Some of the preliminary models for sustained magma
           flow will redevelop the alternative flow paths.  That
           was the Woods et al. paper.  And some of the initial
           evaluations for long-term tephra remobilization, where
           we talked about rates of remobilization being
           important.
                       So in fiscal year two, the emphasis is
           going to be on sustained magma flow, not the initial
           interactions that we looked at last year -- but how
           does a conduit develop and flow develop occur during
           a potential igneous event?  Really, it comes down to
           two options.  Do we have a normal vertical conduit
           that can come up through a drift where there's a
           potential for circulation and wall erosion through
           time?
                       Could we have some entrainment of waste
           away from the conduit?  We're going to be trying to
           answer that question this year.  But also for the
           second flow path where a breakout occurs at some
           distance away from the point of interaction, how could
           that occur?
                       What would be the potential for a
           segregation of flow and waste entrainment during this
           inclined part of flow in the system?  And could high-
           level waste be concentrated in a low velocity zone?
           Or would the normal convection, back pressure, and
           churning in the system essentially give you waste
           incorporation?
                       We're going to be doing numerical and
           analog experiments this year to try to answer some of
           those questions on sustained flow in different
           geometries.
                       Also, we'll be continuing the
           remobilization work and parameter evaluation, complete
           the Yucca Mountain petrology studies.  Those are the
           studies of the origin of the basalt.  They give us
           some very important insights for evaluating the
           probability of the event.
                       Finalize updates to PVHView.  This is the
           computer code that puts in the probability models.  It
           will allow us an independent tool to evaluate impacts
           of new volcanic centers and new repository footprints.
           And also to continue to work with NRC staff for some
           alternative high-level waste incorporation models
           during flow.
                       The model we're currently using is just a
           simple mathematical relationship.  We're trying to get
           a better mechanistic understanding of how high-level
           waste could be incorporated into an erupting volcano.
                       So to wrap this up, moving igneous
           activity from closed pending to closed is going to
           require substantial effort by the Department of
           Energy.  The reason is there are very few data, there
           are limited analogs, and it's a complex physical
           process.  We also have the need for model validation
           and alternative conceptual model requirements, and
           these are things that are going to need to be done
           before licensing.
                       Our current risk calculations
           unfortunately do not capture these uncertainties in
           the intrusive and extrusive event source terms for
           these alternative flow paths and also for waste
           incorporation.  Also, we're not looking at the range
           of uncertainty for long-term remobilization.
                       These uncertainties directly understand --
           directly affect our understanding of risk to health
           and safety, which is currently on order of a millirem
           per year in terms of expected annual dose, the
           probability weighted dose.  DOE is going to need to
           resolve these uncertainties before we get to the
           license application stage, if that stage arises.
                       There is a little supplemental information
           in your package about the links to sufficiency, and a
           few more details of the technical work for this fiscal
           year.
                       I'm sure you've got some questions for me.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks, Brit.
           Perhaps we could start with Ray's question.  Do you --
           as a -- your personal view as a scientist, do you see
           any data that is absolutely essential to have that is
           unlikely to be forthcoming in a short time period?
                       MR. HILL:  I think the Department can meet
           the technical needs to support its models by licensing
           in all of these four areas in the time remaining.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thank you.
                       John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  You mentioned earlier
           that it was very important to consider the post-magma
           events with respect to things like seismicity, and
           what have you.  Now, that's not a combined load
           situation.  That's a sequential load kind of
           situation.
                       MR. HILL:  Yes.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Doesn't that really
           introduce some rather serious modeling challenges?
                       MR. HILL:  I think we can abstract the
           process to a very simple level.  Part of this is going
           to depend on the engineering results, but a lot of the
           need right now is looking at the embrittlement that
           would occur in C22 following an event, where the
           impact toughness drops to a very low level.  I think
           it's on order of 10 foot pounds is the impact
           toughness from an original approximately 250 foot
           pounds impact toughness.
                       So even the sort of ambient seismicity,
           the things magnitude four or so that would be part of
           base case scenarios, could have a potential impact on
           the canister performance quite significantly.  So I
           think we could look at a generalized model for --
           given the amount of -- extent of magma flow given a
           likely failure distribution, what would be subsequent
           to the event, the risk significance of that sort of
           canister failure, without having to get into a complex
           mechanistic model.
                       We'll just start up -- you know, we run
           for various times of the initiating event, run
           seismicity with the appropriate failure fraction, and
           see what the risk significance of that is.  So I think
           we can evaluate that quite easily.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.  Now you mentioned
           here on the consequence end of the scale, the risk
           scale, that there is considerable work yet to be done
           with respect to the uncertainties, the quantification
           of uncertainties.
                       Now, on the probability side, I assume
           that -- and I seem to recall that the uncertainty
           analysis is -- has been done.  Otherwise, you wouldn't
           really be able to identify those numbers as true
           means, because means have to come from a distribution
           -- a distribution that would manifest uncertainties,
           I assume.
                       One strategy that is often employed is to
           not necessarily try to quantify the uncertainty in the
           consequences but quantify it in the context of the
           probability in terms of specifying a consequence and
           asking the question, what is the likelihood of that
           consequence occurring?
                       And I'm just asking what kind of strategy
           might you employ here.  Will you be identifying a
           specific consequence and asking the question, what is
           the likelihood of that consequence occurring?  Or are
           you really going to try to do an uncertainty analysis
           of a range of consequences, for example?
                       MR. HILL:  I think part of this comes down
           to how we're going to treat alternative conceptual
           models.  And right now the cleanest way of looking at
           this is evaluating them independently and not trying
           to assign probabilities to alternative conceptual
           models.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. HILL:  I think it's a big enough
           technical challenge just to find the consequence
           events -- excuse me, the consequence model that we're
           going to have to abstract and evaluate.  Trying to
           assign a probability for a range of different
           consequence models I think is, in the time available,
           would be extraordinarily difficult to accomplish.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes, and that's why I
           asked the question, because you indicate on there some
           commentary about identifying the uncertainties.
                       MR. HILL:  The way I'm looking at it is
           the probability of an igneous event, either volcanic
           or intrusive, impacting the proposed repository site.
           And I think that's as far as we're going to be able to
           get to probability in order of having a technically
           defensible way of assigning probability is the -- if
           you will the initiating event.  I --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. HILL:  -- realize we don't quite say
           it that way.  It's the initiating probability is about
           all we can get to.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.  That helps.  Thank
           you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Raymond?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes.  It looks like
           this whole issue of the effects of a volcanic eruption
           right in the vicinity of the waste repository is going
           to be kind of a focal point of a lot of discussion and
           a lot of dispute for the -- in the time of the license
           application.
                       And also, the -- you're still trying to
           zero in on the probabilities.  And from your viewgraph
           -- the probability of such an event.  And from your
           viewgraphs it looks like in the one extreme that the
           dose that somebody might get is flirting with the
           limit of the dose all by itself, without any other
           contributors that would be tolerable from the
           repository, given all that, then.
                       Is there any serious study, assuming that
           maybe things will come out adversely, of the use of
           backfill as an ameliorating mechanism for reducing the
           effects of the volcanic eruption?
                       MR. HILL:  That's certainly within the
           Department of Energy's realm, to consider any design
           option that they wanted to implement for --
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  The question is --
                       MR. HILL:  -- potentially adverse impacts.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  -- is there any
           serious study being made of it?
                       MR. HILL:  By us or the Department?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Anybody.
                       MR. HILL:  I think the Department
           seriously considered the effects of backfill in the
           first round of the analysis model reports that we
           received.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  By considering --
                       MR. HILL:  When they had a backfilled
           repository design, and that the Rev 1 updates were
           looking at the no backfill option.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I know when we were
           down at the Center recently there was a fairly good
           presentation on the potential effects of backfill.
                       MR. HILL:  Right.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  That you've done
           down there.  And I wondered if that sort of preempts
           or supersedes or agrees with what DOE had done.
                       MR. HILL:  Well, I think we look at --
           we're evaluating what is the currently proposed
           design.  If that design changes, we'll evaluate the
           impacts on that.  But as we talked about in August,
           clearly having backfill in the drifts would
           significantly affect the ability of igneous magma to
           flow down the drifts.
                       How far and the reduction in risk impact,
           we don't know quantitatively, but it's logical to
           assume it would ameliorate some of the adverse
           affects.
                       Okay.  So if we got to the scenario that
           you were introducing of having a risk that could be
           approaching a very uncomfortable number, then there
           are mitigation strategies that could ameliorate some
           of the igneous impacts.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  And you are poised
           to deal with DOE's efforts to ameliorate these --
                       MR. HILL:  I think we have the ability to
           respond to whatever design changes the Department
           proposes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Before going to
           Milt, I just -- just a clarification.  I believe that
           the result that you reported, DOE's calculation of
           about a millirem per year on that consequence, is an
           all pathways analysis.  It's not only volcanic
           activity.  It counts everything.  It's a probability-
           weighted dose, right?
                       MR. HILL:  I believe it was portrayed as
           just a disruptive igneous event and didn't really
           consider the hydrologic impacts.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  So that was just a
           one off analysis, then.  They didn't use their TSPA.
                       MR. HILL:  It was essentially looking at
           an increase in the volcanic source term.  Say that
           your volcano had an alternative flow pathway.  And,
           again, I want to emphasize the Department has not
           agreed that that pathway would occur.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  No, no, right.
                       MR. HILL:  It's in response to the models
           that we have put out there in the Bokhove and Woods
           and Woods et al models as a scoping calculation.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Oh, okay.  So that
           was a scoping calculation.
                       MR. HILL:  And if your source term for
           volcanism --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I didn't understand
           that, then.
                       MR. HILL:  -- incorporated that
           alternative pathway, it would give a probability-
           weighted dose with the Department's model on order of
           a millirem per year.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Thanks.
                       Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  You mentioned that
           there --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Microphone.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Sorry.  You know, both
           new boys and old men forget these things.
                       (Laughter.)
                       You mentioned that there is no natural
           analog, but we come close to having a manmade one
           called Chernobyl where a couple hundred tons of molten
           UO2 flowed across some floors.  All of the models that
           I'm aware of, all of the computer analysis, all had
           predicted that that would just go right through there
           a la The China Syndrome, etcetera.
                       In reality, of course, none of it did.  It
           flowed across the floors and poured down stairwells or
           other places that were existing openings.  Do you know
           whether DOE is looking at that type information?  And
           were -- as a follow up to that, it has been going on
           almost continuously in Sweden at the Royal Institute
           of Technology, on the matter of interaction between
           things like molten UO2 and various materials, is
           anybody following that?
                       MR. HILL:  I'm not aware of any Department
           of Energy investigations in looking at the flow
           analogies for UO2 at Chernobyl.  And I'm not aware of
           any investigations we're looking at either.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  The basic thing is that
           the common wisdom at the time was wrong.
                       MR. HILL:  Yes.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Are we using that same
           common wisdom? is my question.
                       MR. HILL:  Depends whose perspective of
           common wisdom.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  It's an unfair question,
           because we're talking about what --
                       MR. HILL:  Well, it depends on whose
           common wisdom we're talking about here.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  -- DOE is doing --
           right, yes.  Okay.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks.
                       Latif?
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Brit, of the consequences
           that you went through in your presentation -- and
           there are quite a few -- can you tell us how many of
           those are already incorporated in one way or another
           in the TSPA?
                       MR. HILL:  In terms of consequences?
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Yes, the consequences that
           you went through.  Are they incorporated in the TSPA
           right now, or are they not?
                       MR. HILL:  Do you mean the four areas that
           we have agreements --
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Yes.
                       MR. HILL:  -- in?
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Yes.
                       MR. HILL:  Aspects of those already
           incorporated.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Okay.
                       MR. HILL:  For example, we currently
           assume that waste packages fail when they're put into
           a conduit.  The Department makes the same assumption.
           We recognize there is no mechanistic basis behind
           that, and nobody has done a full-blown engineering
           analysis to look at the impacts.  But it's a
           reasonable interpretation that's in the performance
           assessment.
                       If new information comes out that shows
           there is resiliency, we can modify that appropriately.
           The same thing for waste incorporation.  There is not
           an efficiency factor for incorporation, because nobody
           has proposed a technical basis for that.  But it would
           be a very simple way to incorporate that new
           information into any of the performance assessments.
                       So the critical aspects are there, and we
           can evaluate them.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  So that's not going to be a
           big -- it will not take too much time to modify the
           code, or what have you, when we --
                       MR. HILL:  I think most of this can be
           evaluated with simple parameter distributions and some
           code modifications we're doing right now in TPA5 for
           remobilization.  But the problem isn't in making the
           code do what you want.  It's to come up with a
           technical basis that justifies why you're taking
           80 percent credit for a certain process.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Thank you.  Thanks.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Other questions?
           John?
                       MR. LARKINS:  Just a quick question.  I
           notice that you're going to do an FY2002 continued
           remobilization modeling and parameter evaluation.  How
           sensitive is the -- those calculations to the
           composition of the material that's deposited either
           aerosol or other material from a volcanic event?
                       MR. HILL:  The volcanic material doesn't
           have any impact on dose.  It's only the waste
           incorporated in it.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Yes.  But what I meant is
           the form of that material.
                       MR. HILL:  Okay.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Or the composition.
                       MR. HILL:  I believe we're just assuming
           the form is the standard or high-level waste form.
           There has been no change to that waste form as part of
           the process.
                       MR. LARKINS:  No, to the chemical
           composition.
                       MR. HILL:  There has been no oxidation
           effects, no other chemical reactions during
           entrainment and transport.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  But you do make an
           assumption about particle size.
                       MR. HILL:  We do make the assumption on
           particle size.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Yes.  Well, I know it's
           sensitive to particle size.  I just -- also, it seems
           like there may be some changes in oxidation, which may
           increase or change the -- how soluble the material is
           in terms of reentrainment.
                       MR. HILL:  Well, the real -- the two
           leading isotopes of concern are americium and
           plutonium, and under the range of fairly rapid
           transport from igneous we don't think there is much
           instantaneous effect, if you will, from the minute to
           hour of transport, because the igneous system itself
           is very reducing.
                       It's only when you get atmospheric mixing
           at temperature do you have any potential oxidation
           effects.  And we think those are fairly small for
           americium and plutonium isotopes of concern.
                       Of course, for the overall waste form,
           following the event, in the years following the event,
           at the surface you certainly think that we'd have to
           get a better handle on the kinetics of oxidation and
           other sorts of chemical processes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  You just mentioned
           that the principal isotope is plutonium, americium, so
           that must mean that the external dose is not the
           primary aspect here.  It's an inhaled dose?
                       MR. HILL:  Correct.  It's an inhalation
           dose is 90 percent of the total dose.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  Does your
           calculations for resuspension and the inhaled dose,
           etcetera, include the mass of everything there?  The
           context of my question is some years ago an analysis
           of -- near Rocky Flats of a motorcyclist driving
           around contaminated soil and steering up a cloud
           indicated that in order for him to have gotten maximum
           allowable dose his lungs would have contained between
           two and three pounds of dirt, and the dose was
           insignificant in health effects.
                       MR. HILL:  Right.  We --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Is such an analysis
           being done here?  Are you including the mass of the
           carrier when you calculate inhalation?
                       MR. HILL:  The answer is directly no.
           It's not explicitly put in there, but we have done
           scoping calculations to show that the amount of mass
           per year per lung for total particulate -- it's not
           just respirable particulate, but the total suspended
           particulate -- is small compared to what the lung and
           tracheal/bronchiole system can absorb.
                       So we're not talking about putting two
           pounds of dirt into somebody's lungs in an unrealistic
           sort of inhalation model.  The concentrations we're
           using on average are one milligram per cubic meter of
           total suspended particulate.  And of that there is a
           much lower concentration of high-level waste.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, you know, I come
           back to my -- one of my pet hangups.  If your code
           doesn't contain conservation of mass, I don't know how
           you -- if you're distributing this plutonium over
           hundreds and thousands of tons of magma --
                       MR. HILL:  Yes.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  -- how you get
           significant amounts in somebody's lungs without having
           massive amounts of magma.
                       MR. HILL:  Well, it comes down to the dose
           conversion factors that are being used and the
           efficiency.  This is why we're backed down for a lot
           of this being from the inhalation dose, because of the
           dose conversion factors that are being used for
           americium and plutonium for inhalation dose.
                       You do not need a large mass of high-level
           waste to effect those levels of total effective dose
           equivalent impact.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, you don't need a
           big mass of spent fuel, but -- but it's -- well, I
           guess it comes down to your assumptions about how much
           dilution occurs.
                       MR. HILL:  I'm not positive if you want to
           talk about a mass or a particle number basis, but I
           believe we're talking 10-2 grams per square centimeter
           for ash loading and about 10-6 grams per square
           centimeter of waste loading.  So about a four order of
           magnitude ratio between the mass of ash and the mass
           of waste at 18 kilometers.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.
                       MR. HILL:  I could be corrected --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  What was the ratio of
           plutonium to magma in your masses?
                       MR. HILL:  Plutonium or --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Of fuel.
                       MR. HILL:  -- of all waste, of high-level
           waste.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.
                       MR. HILL:  The waste form.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.
                       MR. HILL:  Is about four orders of
           magnitude smaller, off the top of my head, and a
           number that should be checked.  I'm trying to go from
           what I remember from the TPA outputs on aerial loading
           at 18 kilometers.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  So for the
           plutonium it's maybe six orders of magnitude.
                       MR. HILL:  I believe somebody who knows
           the inventory better than I do would put that --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Tim?
                       MR. McCARTIN:  Yes.  If I could just --
           Tim McCartin, NRC staff.  We do conserve mass with
           this calculation, and there is an explicit amount of
           ash and radionuclides at specific locations, and it is
           accounted for.  But I can assure you it is -- you
           know, what Brit's referring to, there isn't an --
           there aren't some explicit numbers you'll see in the
           output of the code, but in -- within the code it is
           determining how much mass is getting there.
                       We keep track of it.  There is a dilution
           mechanism of the radionuclides getting mixed into the
           soil to a certain depth, how much of that is ash, how
           much is radionuclides, and a certain percentage of the
           overall dust in the air is comprised by looking at how
           much of the stuff there, let's say in the top 15
           centimeters, which I'll just throw out -- I don't know
           the exact number -- is radionuclides.
                       But we do -- it is -- there is an
           accounting for that, but it --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  In your analysis.
                       MR. McCARTIN:  Yes.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  So --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I think we should
           move on.  I mean, I think that we can explore this
           further.  As Brit says, we could check the numbers,
           but the question has been posed.  Any other --
           remaining issues?  Okay.  If not, let's move on.
                       Thanks, Brit.
                       Our next presentation is on structural
           deformation and seismicity.
                       John, you can introduce yourself, so I
           don't mispronounce your last name.
                                   (Whereupon, there was a long pause while
                       the next set of slides were being set
                       up.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  So what happened?
           Did we have an earthquake that wiped out this
           presentation on the computer?
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  It wants to start halfway
           through, wants me to be done quicker.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Well, we don't mind
           that.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Won't let me get to the
           introduction.
                       I'll go to Plan B.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Plan B.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Okay.  Okay.  How's that?
                       My name is John Stamatakos, pronounced
           originally Stahmatacos (phonetic), so you had many
           options.
                       (Laughter.)
                       You had many, many choices that you could
           have -- I'm going to talk about structural deformation
           and seismicity.  And I'm going to apologize from the
           outset in that in my haste, even though I was told to
           do it, I forgot to include an outline slide, although
           my outline follows very closely with what everybody
           else has done.
                       The other point I would just make in terms
           of introduction of this particular subissue is
           recognition that of all of the KTIs I think we're the
           -- one of the ones that could be considered most
           upstream.  A lot of the things we do really feed into
           a lot of the other issues in terms of the description
           of the site and site characterization.  So at times
           it's actually most difficult for us to sometimes see
           how what we do ultimately comes out in a risk
           calculation.
                       Also, I think you'll see that a lot of the
           work that we're doing now is really well integrated
           with many of the other KTIs, not just in issues that
           were originally identified under structural
           deformation and seismicity.
                       And, finally, I think a lot of what we do
           contributes directly to pre-closure, so there are some
           instances where I'm going to talk a little bit about
           how the work that we do relates to pre-closure.
                       In the SDS KTI we had four subissues that
           were originally identified -- tectonics, faulting,
           seismicity, and fractures.  I've lumped the faulting
           and seismicity together because they contain many very
           similar agreement items.  The first of our issues is
           closed, and tectonics -- it has been closed for -- for
           some time now.
                       In faulting and seismicity, we have a
           small number of agreement items.  Most of them I would
           classify as minor.  Some of them are moderate and have
           the potential to be more significant, depending on the
           outcome of the agreements.
                       Of all of the remaining subissues that we
           have, the fracturing and structural framework one is
           the one that is directing most of our attention now,
           and that one is one where we think most of the
           remaining work needs to be done by the Department of
           Energy.
                       So I'm going to go through them in stages.
           I'll first talk about seismicity and faulting.  I've
           prepared my organization in a way of first trying to
           identify what the risk is, looking at a DOE approach,
           and then where the status is.  I'll follow these with
           slides that give some specific information about the
           things that we need to do and the things that we think
           DOE needs to do to reach closed status on the
           subissue.
                       The risk for seismicity and faulting
           mainly has to do with the degradation of the
           engineered system, damage to waste packages, damage to
           the drifts themselves.  Up until probably last fall,
           the DOE approach has been to screen these disruptive
           events by looking at or promising to develop a robust
           enough design so that any impacts would be able to be
           handled by the design of the waste packages and the
           repository.
                       So we didn't have a direct link in TSPA in
           that way, because everything was evaluated as
           something that was essentially screened out of the
           TSPA.  In answering our questions from the technical
           exchange and in our agreements, DOE now proposed to us
           in a letter that was sent in October to do an
           alternative approach to looking at specifically
           seismicity, and that is that they now propose to do a
           full sort of seismic risk assessment in order to
           quantify inputs that they're going to incorporate in
           TSPA-LA.
                       We've only seen the plans for that.  We
           haven't seen exactly how they're going to implement
           that, but that's a pretty significant change in the
           approach, I think pretty significant change in the
           approach that they have in looking at seismicity issue
           for -- for post-closure.
                       So in terms of status of the -- we had six
           agreement items that were outstanding with DOE, plus
           some additional items that are integrated with the
           other KTIs -- pre-closure, RDTME, and some of the flow
           issues.  It looks to me like this new DOE approach, if
           it's what it says it is, may satisfy many of the
           agreements in seismicity and faulting.
                       What DOE needs to do prior to LA is most
           importantly we need now to see the details of how they
           propose to do their seismic risk approach.  They say
           it's a sort of standard type of seismic risk approach,
           just propagated out to the large time period.  So I
           think that will be the biggest challenge is, how do
           you take -- how do you do that kind of an assessment
           for a 10,000 year repository?
                       One of the other issues that I think has
           the potential for some effort on DOE's part is that we
           have some questions about their -- when they did their
           seismic hazard calculations, they did it as an expert
           elicitation.  During that elicitation, we've raised
           some questions about the procedures that were used,
           particularly one component of the expert elicitation.
                       And we're asking for some documentation,
           and we have some ongoing discussions with DOE on
           whether or not that documentation exists or what form
           of documentation would be required to sort of satisfy
           the completeness of their expert elicitation process.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John, could you just
           say a couple words about why it's a challenge to do
           this for 10,000 years?  It seems to me it should be
           straightforward?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Well, I think the trick
           part has to be in coming up with fragility estimates
           for components out in the -- not the seismic part.
           The seismic part -- you've got to involve it with the
           fragility to come up with the risk.
                       And then a large part of what's left in
           the seismic has to do with site-specific information,
           and this really relates to pre-closure and surface
           design questions more than post-closure.  But DOE has
           collected information, but we don't yet have all of
           the information for developing a site response model
           and all of the things that come with that to develop
           design ground motions that will be inputs for the --
                       MR. LARKINS:  Quick question on the expert
           elicitation.
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Yes.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Is there a standard or
           something that you're using for --
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Yes, there's an NRC NUREG
           that they agreed to follow, plus their own
           documentation that they agreed to follow in -- in
           conducting and documenting --
                       MR. LARKINS:  And that's where the
           difference is.
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  That's part of where the
           differences are.  There's kind of an interesting twist
           to that, because where we see the differences actually
           leads to potentially some of the ground motion experts
           having inputs into the process that led to what we
           might characterize as very large ground motion.
                       So when you look at the -- this is the
           seismic hazard curve for Yucca Mountain, and the
           ground motions at the low probabilities is 10-6 here,
           10-7.  I don't even have the -- extrapolate 10-8.  So
           ground motions are quite large and the uncertainties
           are quite large.
                       And so there's sort of an interesting
           twist in the sense that, you know, what's come out of
           the ground motion part are some of these very large
           uncertainties that lead to very large ground motions.
           And I think it speaks to the questions about, you
           know, where they may be potential very large
           overconservatisms in the analysis.
                       What we need to do prior to LA, most
           importantly I think is we need to -- our continued
           interactions with DOE.  We're very anxious now to see
           what their new approach is going to entail.  We would
           like to meet with DOE, and DOE just yesterday or day
           before yesterday sent us some documentation on
           proposals to resolve our expert elicitation questions.
                       We're working on developing some
           additional technical bases to help evaluate the DOE
           ground motion results, and we'd like to continue to
           work on that.
                       The last two items really pertain to
           issues more in line with pre-closure.  DOE is going to
           provide information in what's going to be called
           Topical Report 3 with a companion seismic design input
           report, and those reports will summarize the
           information that we need for the site-specific
           information that will get us from the generic hazard
           curve to the design basis inputs that will be used for
           the pre-closure design issues.
                       The other subissue that we're looking at
           has to do with fractures, and this is a much broader
           issue and is very diversely integrated with lots of
           the other KTIs.
                       Basically, we recognize that fractures and
           faults and other parts of the geologic setting control
           many aspects of groundwater flow, and also those
           features are very important in developing accurate
           pictures of the rock mass properties that are used for
           modeling in rock fall calculations or drift stability,
           things like that.
                       The DOE approach is sort of two-fold.  For
           their flow calculations, DOE mainly relies on bounding
           assumptions or modeling results to constrain the
           fracture properties.  And so our work has mainly been
           trying to see how -- sort of validate those modeling
           procedures against what the fracture information and
           characterization tells us on the site.
                       For the rock fall analyses, DOE is using
           direct measurements that they got from the ESF and the
           ECRB, but we have some questions about the
           applicability of that data directly, and so we've
           raised some questions related to how that data is
           used.
                       But it's been the process of sort of an
           active, ongoing interaction between DOE and ourselves.
           We have about four agreements with DOE, plus, as I
           said, some other additional agreements that are
           integrated with the other KTIs.  DOE is considering
           some of our responses, and we're currently considering
           some of their responses.  So we are involved in an
           active discussion of this particular issue.
                       In particular, some specific things that
           DOE needs to provide us is the -- a response to a
           review that we had of one of their major documents on
           fractures.  This is sort of the focal point of a lot
           of the discussion about the fracture database and the
           fracture characterization.
                       And in addition to that, there are some
           things that DOE has to do that we're working on but
           are really related to items that -- from the
           unsaturated flow KTI and from the NT KTI.  These have
           to do with characterization of the stratigraphy and
           sedimentology in the alluvium and valley fill portion
           of Yucca Mountain as that relates to flow models.
                       And we've been working on the issue
           related to the potential for hydrothermal activity,
           the whole fluid inclusion debate.  We've done some
           independent studies related to that as well.
                       What we plan to do before LA is to
           continue to establish our technical basis for
           identifying which parts of the fracture database are
           really critical to performance and which ones aren't,
           and that's a highly integrated effort with a lot of
           the other KTIs.
                       We're working on developing some
           independent stratigraphy and stratigraphic studies
           that we can use to help the flow people in the
           alluvial part of the aquifer.  We've done a lot of
           work on the fluid inclusion work, and we're about
           ready to submit a paper of our own independent
           evaluation of some of the secondary mineralization as
           it relates to this hydrothermal question in the ESF
           and ECRB.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Can you tell me the
           bottom line of your analysis of the fluid inclusions?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  I think the bottom line
           of fluid inclusions is that there are still a lot of
           contradictory interpretations of those results.  I
           think ultimately what we would argue, along with I
           think probably what the -- parts of the GS would say,
           is that we think that a lot of the evidence for that
           is that they are quite old and not modern.
                       We don't necessarily agree with some of
           the interpretations of the sort of long-term heating
           that led to some of the younger ages in the fluid
           inclusion studies, but it's still a very I think
           technically challenging issue.
                       One of the things that I would point out
           is in terms of potential developments, it has to do
           with modifications that might come about in the
           design, or in this case if DOE proposes an alternative
           operational mode in which there are other parts of the
           repository that are their proposed use rather than the
           original primary block.
                       We've done some work to evaluate what
           significance that might have on characterization, and
           what we would say is that there is the potential that
           -- for a significant amount of additional work, or at
           least some work on DOE's part to how they would
           provide a technical basis to justify the applicability
           of existing characterizations of the details in this
           particular part of the repository to other elements of
           the repository.
                       So in 2001, a summary of some of our work
           and accomplishments.  Obviously, we've done a lot of
           work trying to continue our discussions with DOE on
           our -- all of our agreement items.  We've worked on
           developing some technical assessments for that
           potential alternative load -- thermal load option in
           the repository design.
                       We've completed some work on issues
           related to some of the other KTIs.  In particular,
           we've done a lot of work on looking at the issues
           related to hydrology in the alluvial part and these
           fluid inclusion questions.
                       In FY2002, we're going to continue much of
           that work, although we are now focusing more and more
           on looking at how the site characterization relates to
           pre-closure safety as well.  We're going to continue
           to work with the other KTIs on issues related to their
           agreements.
                       We certainly want to try to continue to
           understand how aspects of faults and fractures are
           most important to performance, and we're going to
           continue to work on issues related to the seismic
           hazard, both as they relate to pre-closure and post-
           closure.
                       So, in summary, I would say that for SDS
           we've reached a significant amount of progress.  Our
           tectonics subissue has been closed.  It is closed for
           some time.  We see substantial progress on many of our
           agreements related to faulting and seismicity.  Most
           of our remaining work is going to be related to the
           fracture characterization and how those fractures and
           faults -- what role they play in both groundwater flow
           and in repository design and drift stability
           calculations, how that integrates with the other KTIs.
                       So, in summary, I'd say that our work is
           highly integrated with much of the agreements reached
           in the other -- on the other KTIs.
                       And with that, I hopefully got us back on
           schedule, and I'll take your questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thank you, John.
                       Milt?  No?  Ray?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes.  You've already
           touched pretty heavily on something I'm going to ask,
           but I'm going to ask it in -- the question in slightly
           a different way than you have dealt with it in your
           viewgraphs.  And it relates to how sensitive are the
           results that you obtain with respect to detailed
           knowledge of the site characteristics?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Which results?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  The calculations of
           the --
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Of ground motion?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes, and of the
           impact of this on the ultimate dose.
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Well, that's a hard
           question to answer because the -- the approach that's
           been taken over the last several years has been one in
           which the seismic hazard has been sort of an input
           into design decisions to say we will maintain waste
           packages and drip shields, so that they can withstand
           any rock fall size that the repository can deliver
           during any size earthquake.  So in a sense they've
           just become sort of a benchmark.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  So what you really
           said is all of this work is meaningless.
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Well, I don't think that
           it's meaningless.  I think the new approach is going
           to be -- is going to be able to directly answer your
           question in the sense that now what DOE proposes to do
           is to actually incorporate the seismic results
           directly in a TSPA-type calculation.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  You're going to
           challenge the statement that everything is designed so
           that it won't make any difference?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Well, their response to
           some of our questions is now -- is that instead of the
           approach that it won't make difference, they're going
           to incorporate it into a sort of risk-type calculation
           by doing this seismic risk approach.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Is the site well
           enough characterized to do everything you need to do?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  In terms of seismicity?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes.
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  I think so.  We haven't
           seen the final specifics.  You know, we have a generic
           -- that hazard curve I showed you is a generic hazard
           curve for some hypothetical site, and what we have to
           now do is propagate that seismic energy through the
           soil and rock column to the surface and do those kinds
           of calculations.
                       But I think in terms of the overall
           seismic hazard results, yes, I think that the DOE is
           well characterized, minus that one question about --
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Extending the site?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  -- the ground motion and
           extending the site, yes.
                       And in answer to your generic question, I
           think that in terms of our KTI we're well on the way
           to being able to have almost or nearly everything that
           we need well before license.  I don't see any reason
           why all of the information won't be available for --
           before licensing.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, that was going to
           be my question.  Most of the other speakers -- I guess
           all of them have expressed considerable optimism that
           the path forward is pretty optimistic relative to
           resolution of the agreements.  So I assume you feel
           the same way?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Yes.  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  We haven't heard
           from --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, that's right.
           Okay.  No, that's all.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John, I have a quick
           question.  I know that -- let's see, the DOE saturated
           zone model uses, if I recall correctly, a fracture
           spacing on the order of 20 meters or something on
           average.  Do you think that's about right?
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  It may be right in that
           ultimate abstraction, but the -- what we've found in
           our fracture studies -- and my fracture guy is not
           here, so I'm going to reach a little bit -- but is
           that -- that the -- it's much less uniform and
           homogeneous than that.
                       So that fracture spacing may be correct
           only on a small scale, and there are clusters of
           fractures that -- of large fractures that occur very
           close together, and there are areas that are not
           nearly as heavily fractured.  So it's much more
           heterogeneous than that, but we don't -- I don't -- I
           can't answer whether or not that heterogeneity
           ultimately plays a significant role.
                       On the large scale of the saturated zone,
           we know that the large faults certainly play a role in
           the flow path, and that the flow is not just
           controlled by the surface of the water table, but that
           there is an anti-satrapy that's induced and -- by the
           faults or fractures, and DOE has now incorporated that
           into their saturated zone flow water.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Phil?
                       MR. JUSTICE:  Phil Justice, NRC staff.
           DOE doesn't use a single fracture spacing in all of
           its flow or transport models where fractures are
           needed.  And 20 meters, I haven't seen that one in a
           while.
                       In the ECRB testing of facilities, for
           example, such as alcove 8, niche 3 test, the spacing
           in the middle non-lithologic -- lithoficile unit
           that's being used is on the order of roughly 1.3
           meters.
                       The question to us is not so much the
           number, but the representativeness of the source of
           data that allowed that generalization, and whether
           that generalization for the particular test or portion
           of the repository being evaluated is representative of
           the entire repository system of interest.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks.
                       Thanks very much, John.
                       MR. STAMATAKOS:  Sure.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  We have a
           substitution, according to -- or a modification in the
           original agenda, and I think Gustavo is going to go
           next and talk about container life and source term.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Okay.  Good morning.  My
           name is Gustavo Cragnolino, and this is all of the
           people that have made this presentation possible.  And
           I want to emphasize the name of our project element
           manager at NRC, Tae Ahn.
                       My outline is, as you have seen before,
           similar to the previous presentation, and I want to
           emphasize this.  And I am going to go directly to the
           status of the CLST subissue resolution.  The several
           subissues, six in our case, are listed here.  The
           first one is effects of corrosion processes on the
           lifetime of containers, and, as the other one, is
           closed pending.
                       You can cover additional detail in the
           last of my backup slides, what was presented before by
           Brit, in terms of the scope of the CLST, the type --
           the nature of the agreement with the DOE and what is
           expected.  And I'm not going to go into detail of
           that.
                       Let me go to the main point that you are
           interested to know about our view regarding what DOE
           needs to provide before LA.  And this is not only
           analyzed in terms of specific subissues, but the text
           in blue indicates precisely the main scope of the
           subissues.
                       And this is relating particularly to the
           case of subissue 2 and is what we consider the -- it's
           necessary for part of the DOE event evaluation of
           premature waste package failure, because this has an
           important impact essentially in the problem of
           criticality, in-package criticality, and we need a
           reassessment of the probability of early failure
           arising from an effectual defect, and, in particular,
           closure welding and post-welding operations.
                       However, the subissue where we have a
           special concern is what is reflected in subissue
           number 1, and what we need is a better technical basis
           to resolve uncertainty in container life prediction.
           And the point -- and I'm not reflecting exactly the
           agreement.  There are 17 agreements here, but I'm
           focusing on what are the important ones because seven
           of the agreements are subsidiaries to this.
                       And one is the definition of the aqueous
           environment in contact with the waste package, and
           this is an issue that Bobby Pabalan is going to deal
           with.
                       What we have is -- providing alternative
           measure for passive corrosion rates.  Data and
           modeling support to establish that you have really
           long-term stability of the passive film, because this
           is the main issue in which you would like to have
           long-term container life.
                       Here is an issue that in some way is an
           answer to the question which arose before regarding
           something that has scientific relevance and is in the
           study of this.  We think that the repassivation
           potential is the basic criteria for the decision if
           you have a container that is susceptible or not for
           localized corrosion.
                       By that other point of view, in the
           scientific community, in the corrosion community, and
           this discussion -- and DOE favors this type of
           context.  This is an issue that has to be resolved.
           And they are dealing -- but we need a more technically
           accepted criteria for the selection of their
           initiation potential for localized corrosion.
                       And this is very important, because we can
           talk in theory about the behavior of the material, but
           when you start to fabricate a container you have
           potential problems related to welding, post-welding,
           and this is important on corrosion and stress
           corrosion cracking.
                       And to illustrate the point, this is
           experimental data showing that this repassivation
           potential has some sort of threshold potential for the
           initiation of localized corrosion in our criteria,
           because it's a lower bond, decreased significantly is
           the material, alloy 22, and this solution is heat-
           treated at 870 degrees Celsius for only five minutes.
                       And this is something that would happen
           during the processing, with the slow cooling from the
           annealing temperature, the fabrication of post-welding
           treatment.  Therefore, if you have corrosion potential
           values in this range you have the potential for the
           localized corrosion of the container material.
                       Defective welding appeared to be less
           pronounced, but we need additional data in which the
           defective welding plus this type of treatment is
           evaluated.  And this is a matter of concern, and this
           is something that we expect that we've solved.
                       For the other subissues, -- we need a
           better estimation of the rate of radinuclides released
           from the waste, but this is essentially related and
           focused on what is the definition of the in-package
           aqueous environment.  And what is the impact of this
           environment of corrosion or stress corrosion cracking
           because, as you know, DOE put a lot of emphasis and
           gave a lot of credit to the container.
                       Finally, this is an issue that concerns
           us, too, because it has to do with the role of the
           titanium drip shield, and we believe that DOE should
           provide more data on stress corrosion cracking
           testing, technical basis for the choice of the
           hydrogen pickup fraction, and also justification for
           this value that they have adopted.
                       They can move from 400 ppl to 1,000.  I
           think that they are moving in the right direction, but
           not with this quote, because this could have an impact
           in the evaluation as has been shown very clear in this
           figure.
                       A slight increase in the fluoride
           concentration to 10-3, increased the anodic current
           density, and, therefore, the corrosion rate by three
           orders of magnitude, and this rate, obviously,
           significantly reduces the lifetime of the drip shield
           and was, even if you have sulfate and nitrate or
           nitrate plus sulfate, you cannot inhibit the
           detrimental effect of fluoride.
                       And this is a point of concern that DOE
           will need to progress.
                       What we should do to go and move ahead in
           this path flow, and try to find resolution of these
           issues that I mentioned.  What I am talking about is
           that we should very closely monitor the DOE progress,
           because it is all viewed as a risk progress, and this
           has to be very clearly emphasized.
                       They say that movement in the right
           direction from the part of the DOE, and we need to
           review and respond to the revised AMRs and the dated
           information.
                       And although this is a mechanism that we
           find more appropriate, this is related to what I
           mentioned before regarding the importance of
           publication process, and virtually any change in the
           design, and we have to be prepared to assess.
                       And this is a range of uncertainty because
           even though everything looks fine, we can have
           surprises.  Obviously, we need to do in order to be
           able to tackle what is shown before now with an
           independent evaluation of issues and we will focus
           experimental program and the model program.
                       And this is the approach, and I don't need
           to insist, but we have two other areas; uncertainly
           that still exists in the environment, and the site and
           component fabrication, material procurement, closure
           welding and post-welding treatments.  And I forget to
           say that you can interrupt me at any time to ask
           questions.
                       When we come down and what we have done in
           this previous year, and we prepared Revision 3 of the
           CLST IRSR, and that was the basis of our input to the
           Revision 0 of the Integrated IRSR, and essentially in
           the area of engineering environment, and where we
           provide input also to other of the different type of
           model areas of the differing -- presented by breaking
           -- regarding engineering, too, that is degradation by
           mechanical disruption, or the ones related to the
           direct contact of the radioactive ash as a result of
           organic eruption.
                       But participating in several technical
           change, and this is what we have been doing all this
           time through different types of reports and
           publication and addressing pending issues on corrosion
           of Alloy 22, and Titanium Grade 7, with the purpose of
           evaluating the accuracy of the DOE data, and the
           methodology for predicting early failures.
                       And we have been trying to follow very
           closely any advances that have been done in the
           evaluation of the source model, and this is a
           secondary activity, but also was important for us to
           support the evaluation of in-package criticality for
           Navy spent fuel.
                       Finally, this is something that we have
           paid attention to, and something that we have been
           pushing forward because we consider the assessment of
           the approach and the methodology for waste package,
           and engineering barriers performance confirmation is
           something that has to be kept in mind for the
           evolution of this program.
                       We initiated a effort culminating, and
           very soon we are going to have a report for the
           evolution of natural industrial analog for Alloy 22,
           and obviously we would like to support as much as
           possible you, and the Nuclear Waste Chemical Review
           Board, and participating in several meetings.
                       This will be our work plan for 2002.  It
           is important to conduct our independent evaluation of
           the DOE status and follow all the information that we
           will receive, and we will provide input for the model
           abstractions of TPA Version 5.0 in our two related
           modules for EBSFAIL and EBSREL release.
                       And as I mentioned before, we have
           completed practically this, and continued activities
           related to performance confirmation.  Now, this is
           what I wanted to call your special attention to.
                       We believe that the activities of the DOE
           in order to obtain resolution of the issue has a broad
           scope, and that in some ways is good, but there is not
           clear prioritization.
                       And this is not our own words.  This is
           one of the reasons why the waste package proponent was
           called by the DOE, and to help them to define the
           product decision of the work.
                       And to follow in some cases a very
           aggressive schedule, and may not have sufficient
           resources.  It is not my problem, the resources, and
           I can't throw away the last one, but I give you
           something to think about.
                       An evaluation of the radionuclide release
           continued to be affected by significant uncertainties
           in the definition of the aqueous environments, but
           there is important progress there.
                       Finally, after many years the focus is
           very clear and we expect to have more research.  These
           affect corrosion of the waste package and drift
           shield.
                       By the way, in the black and white copies
           that I have drift instead of drip, and I clarify that,
           and knowing the design, I don't want to cover a drift
           with a shield, and maybe wood, but I would not want to
           do it.
                       And this is a problem for radionuclide
           release because the cladding corrosion is still an
           issue.  And DOE knows this very well.  This is an
           important point.
                       If you look in the SSPA, there are
           significant modifications in the model abstraction,
           but they base it in very insufficient data, and this
           is where we have to be concerned.
                       If there is a modification that has an
           implication for a substantive reduction in the dose
           because it is less concerned about drip, but has no
           basis.  And I don't want to dwell on the example, but
           I can give it if you want.
                       And this is what we need in terms of
           performance confirmation.  We think that this is an
           integral part of the program, and can be considered of
           something to be done in the future, because
           performance confirmation planning is integral to
           design.  And this is experience in any important and
           significant industry that has had failures.
                       In summary, performance estimates are
           affected by uncertainty in container life predictions,
           including effects of fabrication and welding.  This is
           very important.
                       And a good evaluation of premature waste
           package failure, and always as we mentioned before, we
           have some uncertainty in the package embridlement that
           has to be solved, and the drip shield case.
                       And I think from our part that active
           monitoring of DOE progress, and I emphasize again
           there are clear progress in the resolution of
           agreements is needed to close all the pending
           subissues at the time of the proposed license
           application.  And this finishes my presentation, and
           I am open to any questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thank you very much,
           Gustavo.  Raymond, do you want to start?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  What I am going to
           ask you, you have included by implication, Gustavo,
           but you have not addressed it exclusively.  A big deal
           in recent years has been the effect of trace
           impurities, such as lead, mercury, and things like
           this.
                       What have you come up with recently, or
           what are you planning to do, or where do you stand on
           it?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Well, we are exploring
           these.  We had difficulties in the study, for
           instance, and one impurity that has been claimed that
           is very important, and that is lead, to obtain
           reproducible conditions to do these experiments.
                       And the preliminary work that we have done
           up until now doesn't indicate a potential risk unless
           you have extraordinarily high concentration of leads.
                       It is preliminary, but this is what we
           think.  I think we have to look more in the range of
           comparison of environment that DOE is exploring now,
           and going beyond the famous or infamous high
           concentrations type of environment, and looking to the
           variation that tends to go to the alkaline side or a
           little bit to the acidic side.
                       But we are looking at the effect of trace
           impurities, but my opinion, and the opinion that we
           have, is that we are going to continue looking for
           that mostly important period to be before.  And this
           is our preliminary type of conclusion.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Okay.  I have one
           additional question.  On your next to the last view-
           graph, you say prior experience with sensors and
           monitoring devices in further or in other applications
           reveals an extensive development and prolonged periods
           of testing and verification, perhaps for many years,
           are necessary.
                       Just how troublesome will that be with
           respect to approving a license application?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Well, it is not
           troubling, but for the time of the license as a part
           of Part 63, it is very clear that there has to be a
           plan, a performance confirmation plan, and this plan
           cannot be a series of generalities.
                       It should include provisions for these
           types of issues, because this is an indication that
           any type of potential problem that arises, there is
           the advice or the sense of an approach to take over
           and resolve the problem, or at least the possibility
           to attack the problem.
                       And for this reason, it is not necessary
           for us to be completely solved at the time of the
           license, but you know there has to be a plan, and
           there has to be a clear indication --  as a part of
           this program, and certain experience in this type of
           sense.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Well, if those
           periods are necessary, and then the carrying out of
           those extensive tests, to discover that the
           performance that was assumed isn't there, that is bad
           news isn't it?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  I guess so.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  This is Tae Ahn of
           NRC staff.  I believe we have a dual purpose for
           pursuing these types of testings.  One is as Gustavo
           stated, to be prepared to evaluate DOE's confirmation
           plan in the licensing application.
                       They will attach the performance
           confirmation plan.  That is one purpose.  The other
           purpose is these tests will validate to a certain
           extent the elaborate testing that we are conducting
           right now.  Most of these were being done on the
           capacity condition with rock block and so forth.
                       And so we probably have two different
           purposes for doing this type of testing.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  So the implication
           is that by the time of the license application, you
           would have progressed far enough down the road in
           verification that you have reasonable expectations
           that there are not going to be any clinkers.  Okay.
           Thanks.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I am not sure that
           I followed your question or your comment.  I mean, a
           performance confirmation plan is a plan isn't it?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  It is a plan,yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  It does not require
           that you have the results.
                       MR. AHN:  That's what I added, and that we
           have another purpose; to validate the lab testing
           result in the real posture environment.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  This -- let me give you
           a simple example for your satisfaction.  It is very
           simple.  That product has nothing to do, and the plan
           cannot say that we are going to measure corrosion
           potential.  No way.
                       We have to say that in order to measure
           corrosion potential, if this is an issue, we have
           decided or we know that there is a potential problem,
           and the way to address this is to develop the specific
           instrument that can be prepared in such a time, in
           five years, and we have a plan for this.  This is the
           response.
                       What is important, too, and this is part
           of the plan for my confirmation, has to be a clear
           indication that in the confirmation period will be a
           verification basis for continuation of the type of
           tests they have been doing now.
                       And even we have a provision in the
           agreement, specific agreement, that said that in order
           to complete, for instance, this type of information
           that we are requesting here in the measure methods for
           possible corrosion rate, or even this, that this
           information will be provided during the course of the
           eventual license application, because this is
           information that will take time.
                       But we have to make sure that at the time
           of the license -- and I am correcting you.  You said
           six months of testing, and they have far more than six
           months.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I was biased.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  They have several years
           of testing.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I know that, yes.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  And this is important,
           but we are going to gain more confidence if they have
           a clear plan to continue this, because this is one
           table in which all these types of clarifications
           should appear in order to evaluate the license.
                       We need sufficient data, but a clear plan
           as to what are they and different times.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I just wanted to be
           sure that we brought out the clarification of that
           point, and so we fully understood it.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes, and I would
           make one comment on that.  I think the words on your
           slide give a little bit of a false impression that
           they are generic, and you refer to all monitoring and
           measuring, and my home, the thermal couples in my
           furnace, are 45 years old, and still functioning very
           well.
                       And if you are talking about sophisticated
           instrumentation to measure corrosion films, you are
           right.  But I don't think it is correct to use the
           general thing that all monitoring and sensing
           instruments need development.  There is a lot of
           things that function very well for long times.  But --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  And to make one further
           question --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Please go ahead.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  I have to review my --
           well, I have to put the condition as closed there and
           say that not thermal couples, but a few others.  But
           for simplification, you need this type of thing.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  Well, the generic
           statement of sensors and monitoring devices, and other
           application is much too broad.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Well, you know, my
           manager told me that I have to remove the application
           that I have in mind, and one of them is a RST
           generator in a nuclear power plant; and the other one
           is reactor core.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I have one question, and
           that is in doing your studies on release source term
           from inside the canister, how many of the types of
           things that will be -- that are scheduled or might be
           there, are included in your review?
                       I mean, we have the spent fuel, and there
           is the vitrified waste from Savannah River, the two
           obvious ones.  Did you also look at -- and I don't
           know if this month it is in or out, but the Cannon Can
           Program for disposing of weapons grade plutonium by
           putting massive amounts of plutonium in the middle of
           vitrified logs, and then the aluminum waste program
           from Savannah River?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  No.  We don't look in
           that detail, but we have looked precisely in Navy
           fuel, and release from Navy Fuel, and all the
           potential problems.
                       We have been looking at the way that DOE
           has characterized in general the different types of --
           because there is a large number of spent fuel as you
           know that has been used in many different applications
           for certain reactors, and that belong in many States
           and so on that have been put together, and are going
           to be disposed of.
                       And we have been looking in great detail,
           but we have a clear understanding of the most
           important type of fuel and the way that they are going
           to be disposed by.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, it is not clear to
           me that massive amounts of almost pure plutonium in
           the middle of a vitrified log is a less significant
           source than the fuel.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  I am sorry to interrupt.
           The point is that we evaluate what DOE presents to us
           in a document, and we cannot move forward to some
           potential scenario related to something else.
                       What my concern is that there could be
           design changes as you mentioned of this nature.  We
           are not in the condition of evaluating now until the
           DOE puts this in the table.
                       But it is this type of thing happening and
           in the event of putting us in the situation that it
           would be difficult to complete certain aspects of the
           evaluation and the documentation.
                       And therefore we will prepare in the same
           way for the license, but this is something that should
           be evaluated, depending upon the nature of the
           problem.
                       I agree with you, but you have to realize,
           too, that this is mostly is commensurate with spent
           nuclear fuel and this is not our concern, because it
           mainly contributes to the goal, and this is what we
           are putting a lot of our resources to evaluate.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I don't think we
           want to try to resolve all possible design changes
           here.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  No, no, no.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  The real question is
           where do we stand with KTIs.
                       MR. AHN:  I would like to add what Gustavo
           explained to you, the force and theory of TSPA, as
           well as the NRC TPA.  We concede that there are three
           different types of inventory.
                       The first one is the commercial spent
           nuclear fuel.  The second one is the high level waste
           clad.  The third one is the 270 different types of
           fuels, and that is called DOE owned-spent nuclear
           fuel, including Navy fuel, and plutonium disposition
           fuel as you mentioned.
                       The third type of category has a very
           small amount of inventory compared with the first two.
           Therefore, it does not directly affect the dose,
           except for the criticality.
                       And as you mentioned in the criticality
           assessment, there are fissile material in plutonium
           glass contributes to that.  That is separately
           treated, and in Subissue 5.
                       So therefore we believe that we consider
           also in actually the assessment that DOE uses
           artificially and very conservatively in this scenario.
                       The actual radionuclide release is based
           therefore on the solubility limits.  We even did not
           discuss about their approach because they chose the
           very conservative approach in the last package
           changes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I wanted to say one
           other thing.  I think this whole issue of container
           life and source term is probably the most complex of
           all of the issues involved in the repository.  It
           certainly is extremely complex.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Yes, I would say so.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  And I want to say
           that I think the center is doing an outstanding job in
           dealing with all these issues considering the
           complexity of them.  I just wanted to be sure that I
           didn't give the wrong flavor to my discussion.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  On your status table,
           Viewgraph Number 3, I guess it is.  Would you comment
           on which of these subissues gives you the greatest
           concern, or which 2 or 3, in terms of resolution?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  I would say that this is
           the one that has the most significant impact.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  That tallies with
           what Bret presented, because that is the one that you
           had major, and you had 2 through 5 being moderate to
           major.  And you had number six being minor.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Right.  Right.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  In the way that we relate
           it, because originally we decided this subissue --
           that there were more options in the DOE program.  Now
           it is reduced to drip shield, and several since are
           tackled together here.
                       But you are completely right.  This is the
           dominant one, and there are others that we have to
           obviously keep track of.  In this area, the DOE has
           done very good work, and there is a lot of progress.
                       In this area the problem has been
           accelerated in the last few years, and now we know
           that DOE has put in a lot of research, and this is
           reflected here in the technically updated biyearly
           report.
                       And one of the more solids in thermal
           sizing is to provide additional new information in
           Appendix Number E, and that is the waste package.
           That means that obviously we have to concern ourselves
           to be very clear to express the concern, and at some
           point at the time of the license that we not be
           completely clarified.
                       But the duration is right, and I think
           that we are in the condition of evaluating the
           progress.  We need to monitor this very closely and
           help to rectify.  If we see that the priorities are
           going to some issues that are not so relevant as
           others.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.  Thank you.  I have
           no further questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Gustavo, I just had
           one question.  You had mentioned in your work plan for
           2002 that you were going to complete the assessment of
           natural archeological and industrial analogs.
                       Are there any requirements -- do any of
           your KTI agreements go to natural analogs, or is this
           something that you are doing because you think that it
           is important information to bring to bear on the
           analysis?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Yes.  There was not
           specific agreement in the CLST KTI, but this turned
           out to what is called multiple lying of evidence
           issue, and I think it is important.
                       It is clearly something that we overlooked
           at the time of the CLST agreement, because we were the
           first kids on the block really.  We didn't pay
           attention, and also we have to recognize ourselves
           that the fact that the industrialist period was just
           very limited, and we did not give it the importance.
                       And that we realized that there was
           concern on their part, and there was concern on the
           nuclear waste technique review board and the title is
           a little bit out of the issues, because it is very
           difficult to cover completely this type of issue.
                       And the industrialist period in Alloy-22
           is 20 years, but we tried to combine as much as
           possible information for other industries, and also
           made the fundamental case of specific localized
           corrosion for natural or archeological analogs that
           can't have something relied.  This is the only thing
           that we can say.
                       MR. AHN:  This is Tae Ahn, and I would
           like to add one more thing.  We did not specifically
           write any agreement.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  You did.  And
           as you pointed out, Gustavo, you were the new kids on
           the block.  Have other kids followed you on to the
           block?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  We don't have too much
           integration to people.  Well, the center has a
           tradition in this.  You have to realize that many
           years ago there was precisely in the center that we
           were sharp to this kind of issue of natural analog for
           all of your geochemical type of aspects in particular,
           and in relation to source term.
                       And the center has the very good feeling
           of what you call in NOPAL 1, the face of --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  No, I know all of
           that, but my question was a bit more specific, and
           that is do you know if DOE in particular is doing any
           work on analogs related to the current materials?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  As far as I am aware, no.
           In the case of metallic containers.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Right.  Thank you.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  I'm sorry, for the source
           term, you know -- you are aware of that?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes.  No, I am aware
           of all of that.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Gustavo, since you --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Use the microphone.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  You seem to -- I mean, you
           seem to be allowing for the option of doing some of
           this work during the performance confirmation,
           correct?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Well, no, no.  Repeat the
           question again?
                       MR. HAMDAN:  The question is that in the
           things that you think need to be done --
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Yes.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  -- that some of this work can
           be postponed, or will be done during the performance
           confirmation.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  No.  There is a different
           level.  I see that the confirmation -- DOE is
           conducting a program in which they tried to measure
           corrosion rates in a series of embriddlement that are
           in principle relevant for Yucca Mountain.
                       At the time of the license application,
           and I don't know when it is going to be, but let's
           assume that the license application is going to be 2
           years down the road, or 3 years down the road.
                       Then we have 3 years or 5 years down the
           road where they are already done for several
           environments, and they provide the time that they will
           be used for the license application.
                       But the series of embriddlements and where
           they started the tests very early, or very late,
           modification that came from the other studies that
           maybe they have only 1 or 2 years, or just one year of
           testing.
                       So that means that 3 years will be 4
           years, and this is a very limited time.  For this, we
           need to have a clear plan that they are going to
           continue this, because there could be surprises in
           this new type of new environment that they are
           testing.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  But the question I want to
           ask is because of this option being available with the
           first confirmation, is it correct or incorrect to say
           that really the license application is an artificial
           midline, and it is because if there is something that
           they do not finish, or they do not have enough data
           for, they can always take it from the prelicense
           application column, and put it in the performance
           confirmation column?
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  But to put it in --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Let me interrupt and
           ask if Bill Reamer would like to give a short answer
           to that question.
                       MR. CRAGNOLINO:  Sure.  That is not my
           answer.
                       MR. REAMER:  Thank you.  Bill Reamer.  I
           am not sure that it is quite that simple.  I think
           that there probably are examples within specific KTIs
           -- perhaps this KTI -- of certain agreements that
           involve testing, and where data could come in after
           the license application under a performance
           confirmation label, or as part of the performance
           confirmation plan.
                       But to say that information that the staff
           needs for license application, if it is not available,
           could simply be moved to the performance confirmation
           column is probably not correct, because there is
           certain information that we need and we have provided
           that information to DOE.  And we expect that it will
           be provided to us.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  I just wanted to make one
           comment.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Really short.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Very short.  This question
           was basically to the container because their life is
           10,000 years.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Right.  Yes, but it
           is a more general question, and Bill, I think, had
           answered it, and we don't want to confuse the issue by
           saying that it is arbitrary, that license, and
           everything can be moved to performance confirmation.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Tae Ahn.
                       MR. AHN:  Yes, I would like to add to
           Gustavo's answer to your question on whether the
           theories are working on the analogs.  I believe they
           do to a certain extent, because they are implementing
           the agreement they had made with us.
                       I reviewed several presentations that
           analyzed the passive film to a certain extent.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Thank you.
           Any other questions or comments?  Okay.  Thank you,
           Gustavo.  We are going to break for lunch, and we will
           start at one o'clock.
                       (Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a luncheon
           recess was taken.)



           .                     A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N  S-E-S-S-I-O-N
                                                    (1:06 p.m.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  All right.  The
           meeting will come to order.  This afternoon, again all
           afternoon, it is a continuation of our being updated
           on the key technical issues.
                       And we are just going to continue on.
           This is the presentation that was postponed from the
           original 11:20 presentation on unsaturated and
           saturated flow.  So, go ahead.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  Okay.  I guess the mike is
           working.  I am Jim Winterle from the Center, and the
           KTI is unsaturated and saturated flow under isothermal
           conditions.
                       The outline is pretty much the same as
           what all the other KTIs have been.  I will try to add
           in a few extra remarks based on some of the questions
           that I have heard earlier today.  But I will just go
           through that.
                       The KTI subissues are as follows.  They
           are climate, and which was a category that the first
           two subissues fell under; present and future climate,
           and the hydrologic effects.  That issue has been
           closed for some time based on the recent technical
           exchanges.
                       Shallow infiltration is another one that
           is closed-pending. Deep Percolation, that is flow that
           moves below the root zone and the unsaturated zone,
           and that is also closed-pending based on agreements
           that I will talk about in a few minutes.
                       Saturated zone flow, and that is also
           closed-pending.  And matrix diffusion is a cross
           between flow and a transport topic, but it has managed
           to find its way up through or under this KTI that is
           also closed-pending.
                       Let's see.  What DOE needs to do.  First
           of all, they need to decide on a repository design or
           set of design alternatives, and make sure that their
           model is consistent with that, and I bring this bullet
           up because of the low temperature operating modes that
           were illustrated in the SSPA, supplemental science and
           performance assessment reports.
                       And they showed some designs that diffused
           would necessitate changes to their unsaturated flow
           models.  And that is the second bullet; that they
           would need to update the models to be consistent with
           the design alternatives.
                       And the third one, which is mostly what I
           am going to talk about, is that they need to provide
           the additional information related to what was agreed
           to in the recent technical exchanges.
                       And I will break those down in a general
           sense without going into each, but the shallow
           infiltration sub-issue has two open agreements, and
           both are due this year.
                       And if that information is acceptable,
           that should move to a closed status.  The deep
           percolation subissue has six open agreements; one due
           this year, and five are due in '03 fiscal year.  For
           the saturated zone, there are 12 open agreements, and
           two of them rely on USGS and Nye County data dealing
           with Death Valley regional models, and the Nye County
           drilling programs.
                       And so we are not too sure if DOE can
           commit to the date that we will receive that, but
           other than those two, the one is due in October, which
           is not yet received, and we will talk more about
           overdue agreements in a minute.
                       And nine are due this year, and the matrix
           diffusion, there is one that is not yet received, and
           two due this year.  Let me back up to a previous one.
                       I will just generally go over the topics
           of the information that we are looking for.  The
           shallow infiltration subissue; we are looking for them
           to document the Monte Carlo approach that they used to
           bound the uncertainty in infiltration.
                       The high and the low range, and the
           probabilities, and receiving certain distributions of
           infiltration, and the mountain surface was based on
           this, and it was not entirely clear to us how that
           process worked.
                       And then we also want them to justify the
           values of the parameters that were used in that
           analysis, and we expect that information this year
           again.
                       For deep percolation, there is an
           extensive ongoing field testing to justify the seepage
           estimates in the underground, and then we are also
           looking for some geochemical data to help substantiate
           their predictions of where flow will go below the
           repository.
                       For the saturated zone, we are looking for
           well data and analysis.  Some of that from the C-
           wells, and the testing has been long since finished,
           but we have not seen all of the final results and
           analysis related to that.
                       And some of that is related to the Nye
           County wells, some of which are still being drilled.
           We have asked them to look at some alternative
           conceptual models for flow, and there is also an
           update to the regional flow model for the Death Valley
           ground water basin.
                       And we have not seen the update to that.
           That is a USGS report, and so we expected it last
           October, but it is just a little behind schedule.  For
           matrix diffusion, we are looking for tracer test
           results, and we asked them to do some sensitivity
           analysis to help us gain some risk insight to how
           important that process is.
                       The overdue agreements I talked about, and
           three were due in October, and two of those three, the
           first and third ones, 501 and 604, had to do with the
           C-wells test, and we are still waiting for that final
           report.
                       And one had to do with the water level
           analysis with both the new wells that have just been
           drilled.  In November, we were expecting some
           additional information regarding how the regional
           sites get models and interface, and are constructed.
                       I am not too worried at this point about
           any of these overdue agreements.  All indications are
           that it is in the works, but it is something to keep
           an eye on if the backlog of overdue agreements gets
           big.  We might want to bring that to a higher level.
                       A lot of the agreements are related to
           ongoing field studies and one of the questions before
           were if we were at all worried about information that
           might not be able to be completed before a license
           application could be submitted.
                       And I would say if there is anything that
           we are worried about, it would have to do with these
           ongoing tests in the unsaturated zone, and the tests
           dealing with the Nye County wells.
                       Presumably they should be able to finish
           this work by then, but as scientists, and as you
           yourselves all know, that the analysis of those tests
           can often take a long time.
                       The interpretation of those analyses can
           often be the subject of debate.  We might be surprised
           by the results of the tests that we see, and offer
           alternative interpretations where the results of those
           tests might not be consistent with the current
           abstraction.
                       So those are potential areas where we
           might need to go back and request more additional
           information, or determine which fraction of the
           additional information we need or interpretations of
           those tests can be relegated to a performance
           confirmation period.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Jim, have they
           resolved the problems that they had with the ECRB
           passive tests?
                       MR. WINTERLE:  That is a good example of
           communication between the NRC and DOE staff.  They had
           found -- I think my next slide deals with that.  Yes.
           In the close off, it was almost a two kilometer
           section of the east-west cross-drift, and to our
           surprise it seemed like there was a lot more water
           observed in there on a recent entry than was thought.
                       And to our further surprise, it seemed
           that tests were going to be terminated before there
           was a good handle on where that water came from and
           its source.
                       And I think Neil Coleman deserves a lot of
           the credit for this, and for getting with the
           Department of Energy people and insisting that we
           really need to understand where that water came from.
                       The early indications are that it is
           formed from condensate, but that raises the issue does
           condensate dripping need to be considered in the
           performance assessment extraction.  Currently, it is
           not.
                       So where it has gone from there is the
           test plans for that ECRB were extended, and
           significantly enhanced, and cameras were installed,
           and sensors were installed, and air flow monitors were
           installed, and humidity monitors, and the period for
           the test now to my knowledge is specified as
           indefinite basically until they find the answers to
           the questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Can't they analyze
           the puddles and just figure out very quickly?
                       MR. WINTERLE:  They have taken some
           preliminary samples and that is -- the early
           indications are that it is condensate.  Of course, it
           lands on the conveyor belt and there is all kinds of
           crud on there.
                       So they have rigged up collections systems
           underneath rock bolts, and plastic sheets so that they
           can try to collect water in a more scientifically
           robust fashion.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Was that the section that
           they thought they had closed off and in fact the
           ventilation duct went through the seal and was not
           sealed?  Do you know?
                       MR. WINTERLE:  I don't think so.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Brett Leslie from the staff.
           I think you are talking about the heater test.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  Yes, this one has a double-
           bolt cut head over a large portion of it, and so I am
           sure that there is some escape through the cracks
           around the bulk head, but they have done a good job to
           minimize that.
                       MR. COLEMAN:  Excuse me, Jim, before you
           go on.  Neil Coleman, NRC staff.  One other item worth
           pointing out here that DOE needs to do before LA is
           resolving the chlorine 36 paradox, where there was one
           study that indicated no bump posts chlorine 36 at
           repository level,and all of the previous studies
           indicated numerous occurrences.  We have an agreement
           related to that.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  Thank you, Neil.  What the
           NRC and CNWRA need to do before a license application
           would be to continue reviewing this DOE data
           collection associated analysis that they are going to
           use to validate the process in abstracted models, and
           review their modeling activities used to validate
           process in abstracted models.
                       And maintain familiarity with DOE methods
           and assumptions is a big part of what we do.  There is
           a mountain of reports.  And continue to develop the
           sites from our own process modeling, and I will
           mention some of that in a few minutes.
                       And interact with DOE as we have been
           doing over the past few years to make sure that they
           understand what our underlying concerns are.  In 2001,
           some of our accomplishments were -- well, I guess I
           will start with the first bullet.
                       We identified and prioritized our tasks by
           those with the greatest technical and regulatory risk
           significance, which is what led to the KTI agreements,
           and we reviewed a mount of AMRs, and participated in
           the technical exchanges.
                       We have done our own independent
           unsaturated zone modeling and field studies.  We have
           evaluated DOE's field studies that are ongoing.  We
           have developed a saturated zone flow model that we can
           use in our own performance assessment, and to test
           alternative models for how geologic structure might
           affect flow.
                       And we are supporting the TPA code
           development  and we have provided input for the Yucca
           Mountain review plan.  In 2002, we have got a few
           milestone reports that we will provide to the NRC
           dealing with saturated zone modeling, and the
           hydrogeology of the Valley-Fill based on what we are
           seeing from the Nye County wells.
                       And that will be in integration with the
           structural defamation and seismicity KTI.  A lot of
           that work.  And we are going to do some of our own
           independent -- document some of our own independent
           modeling, and review DOE field studies in a report to
           NRC.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I am interested in
           that last bullet because you are talking about field
           studies, but you are going to do modeling and not any
           field studies of your own.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  We are going to do --
           document some of our modeling of flow in the paint
           brush tough layer.  There is -- this might be a good
           point to bring up changes that the Department of
           Energy made to their unsaturated zone model for the
           SSPA.
                       And we are not sure if that was just an
           aside from the TSPA SR, or if that is what they are
           planning to go forward with in the license
           application.
                       Those changes allow for significant
           lateral diversion of flow in the PT, and up to 40
           percent of infiltration can now be diverted away from
           a repository area.
                       We don't necessarily believe that there is
           data to support that and so we are probing with
           independent models of how that might work.  We are
           also looking at effects of heterogeneity.
                       And then in addition to that, we will have
           a separate chapter of the report that summarizes what
           we know so far based on the early information from the
           seepage studies.
                       And, of course, we are going to continue
           to review all the technical documents that come out of
           the Department of Energy.  And this is more repeat,
           but we are going to continue our own independent
           modeling which improves our understanding of risk
           significance and preparedness.
                       I think it makes us better reviewers when
           we occasionally attempt to model some of these things
           ourselves.  Review results of ongoing in situ niche
           and alcove studies and this provides feedback into the
           milestone reports that we will provide.
                       And on to the summary, where we have
           obtained agreements with DOE that we need to close or
           closed-pending status for all of our subissues.  There
           is a review and is now incorporated into seven risk-
           informed integrated subissues.
                       I don't know how familiar the committee
           members are with the integrated subissues, but there
           are seven of those that this specific KIA provides
           input to.
                       I guess that relates to Bret's table here.
           The independent modeling and technical investigations
           that we do continue to provide us insights for the
           review of DOE models, and technical basis for our own
           TPA development.
                       And our review of the DOE field studies is
           vital for closure of these KTI subissues.  There is
           also a table in the back that summarizes how all of
           this boils down into the sufficiency review.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  So in Bret's table,
           Subissues 3 and 6, you had classified as minor, the
           level of complexity of the agreements, and 4 and 5
           were moderate to major.
                       So I guess it is pretty clear that you
           don't anticipate that DOE has any truly monumental
           hurdles to get over here?
                       MR. WINTERLE:  Well, Subissue 3, that was
           closed before and they made some changes to their
           infiltration estimates.  So we reopened that one.  So
           we are expecting since the changes weren't drastic
           that that is a minor level.
                       The matrix diffusion one, that is Subissue
           6.  I was actually surprised recently to find out how
           important that seems to be to their transport
           calculations in the unsaturated zone.
                       Yet it doesn't seem important for the
           saturated zone, and one of our agreements is for them
           to clarify why that is, and to make sure that all of
           the numbers are plugged in there correctly, because it
           doesn't seem to make sense.
                       But I think if they can answer that
           question, then it is minor in terms of the level of
           effort that it is going to take to close it.  It is
           not necessarily in terms of importance.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Bret Leslie from the staff.
           Just to remind you that this was a snapshot done
           approximately back in September.  So that is as much
           as the information is worth.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  As I said, we will
           get a presentation quantitatively what moderate to
           major means.  Milt, do you have any questions?
           Raymond?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Only kind of an
           observation.  We keep -- these keep being added into
           the models, and not only by you, but by everybody
           else.  And then there is the question of updating all
           these models and running new tests.
                       It seems to me what is happening here, and
           what could be happening, is that you are generating
           mountainous piles of information that need to be gone
           through and examined for differences to find anything
           that is significant that changed.
           What kind of or how practical is this, and can it be
           done?
                       MR. WINTERLE:  Well, that is a good point.
           I am still finding things in the SSPA document that I
           didn't catch before.  One example is the range of
           uncertainty for saturated flow, and it is from a
           factor of 10 to now a factor of 3.  We are still
           considering whether that needs to be brought up as a
           problem.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  That is you and
           everybody else, you know.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  It is a difficult
           situation, and we can achieve closure with one certain
           model, but does that mean DOE shouldn't try to improve
           if they can their model?  So I guess at some point
           they are going to need to stop and say this is what we
           are going forward with the license application with.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  There is not much
           evidence of that so far.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  I agree, that is really
           something that we are trying to stay on top of.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Can you just make a
           couple of comments about the scope and schedule of the
           DOE field studies?
                       MR. WINTERLE:  The scope and schedule?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, I will give the
           disclaimer that everybody gave, that that is up to
           DOE.  But I think it is an ambitious undertaking.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  But it is part of the
           agreements isn't it?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  It is part of the
           agreement.
                       MR. WINTERLE:  The PTI agreements.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  I think the testing
           schedule that they have done, the tests certainly can
           be completed by the last I heard was 2004 for the
           license application.  Don't anybody quote me on that.
           But I think that is reasonable.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  This is being piped
           directly to --
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. WINTERLE:  But I think the testing can
           be finished, and the Nye County wells can be drilled.
           It is just a matter of whether the information and
           analyses that come out of that become controversial,
           or counter the current model abstractions.  You just
           don't know what you are going to get.
                       Early indications with -- there is one
           test called Alcove 8-Niche 3, and they have an Alcove
           one 10 meters above the other, and I guess things in
           the field never go as smoothly as you would hope.
                       And they hoped that the water was going to
           go straight down on the fault pass and it looks like
           some of it is coming out into the access drift, and
           you can see it on the walls.
                       That wasn't really in the plan, but that
           does not necessarily mean that you can't get useful
           information from the test.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Anything else?
           Staff.  Okay.  Thank you, Jim.  And I guess we will go
           from isothermal to thermal.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Things are heating up.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:
                       (Brief Pause.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Randy, if you can
           introduce yourself for the record, please.
                       MR. FEDORS:  For the record, I am Randy
           Fedors.  I just recently took over the TEF part for
           the Center.  I have listed the contributors, and most
           of them from last year contributed various portions of
           this.
                       And Jeff Pohle and Asas Chowdhury, too,
           are the managers on either end.  It is the same
           outline that you have seen all along.  The status and
           what DOE needs to do, and what we need to do, and what
           we have done in the past year, and this coming year.
                       This was unintended on how fancy that came
           out, and I didn't know what I was doing. It w as a
           template from somebody else.  Subissues.  There are
           two subissues for TEF.
                       One of them is related to the features,
           events, and processes, and that just says the two
           technical agreements on the reports in the database
           are closed-pending.
                       The other subissue deals with all the
           topics for thermal effects, and can people hear me in
           the back by the way?  Okay.  I will assume everybody
           can.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Nobody responded and
           so that can mean yes or no.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. FEDORS:  Okay.  A thumbnail sketch of
           the different technical agreements for the TEF and
           determining temperature, humidity, saturation, and
           flux, and in numerical order here, and in no order of
           priority for us.
                       The first one is losses through the drift
           scale thermal test bulkhead.  There was a question
           that started to allude to that topic, and the notion
           that they put heaters into a drift to mimic canisters,
           and then realized after they had been going for a
           while that there was quite a bit of heat loss out, and
           quite a bit of water loss out.
                       And on the order of two-thirds of the
           vaporized water is what they are predicting right now
           is exited through the bulkheads.  So there is a
           technical agreement to come to some resolution of
           that.
                       The next one, the cold trap effect, is
           what I am lumping together, and the process where you
           have well known unsaturated zones, and ambient
           conditions or otherwise, that you should expect near
           99.9 percent relative humidity in the core space.
                       When you get that in a drift, as thermal
           pulses, you are not going to get -- as you are not
           drying out the zone, and you will start wrapping up
           that relative humidity to that near a hundred percent.
                       And you might start redistributing the
           vapor in the drift, and temperature readings are one
           reason that you would look for that.  So if there is
           an edge effect in the repository, you might be driving
           moisture to the cooler zone, and condensing there.
                       So there would be an evaporation
           someplace, and then the question is how much movement
           of that vapor to another location were you then
           condensing.
                       By the way the passive test in the last
           presentation was what really brought that back to the
           forefront, and now the Department of Energy is dealing
           with.  The next topic is the ventilation model, and
           two agreements.  One was the ventilation test plan and
           the other one was document the ventilation model.
                       Since I might not discuss that later, I
           will just quickly summarize it; that the DOE model was
           a linked model.  Here is our ventilation and here is
           our thermal hydrology, and we will just apply a flat
           rate heat loss reduction to mimic ventilation.
                       The Center turned around and linked it
           directly with multi-flow and a ventilation model that
           entwined, and came up with a DOE approach that seemed
           to be reasonable.
                       So I may not mention that again the rest
           of this presentation.  The next three, parameter
           uncertainty, and full uncertainty, and model
           uncertainty, there are four or five agreements that
           deal with this, and essentially we are looking for
           -- there is a lot that we are not sure of.
                       There is a lot of parameter uncertainty
           and model uncertainty.  We want to take a stab at
           incorporating a full ensemble of model and parameter
           uncertainty in the TSPA, or come up with a
           justification for why it is not there.  That is the
           gist of those agreements.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Did you specify in any
           way how any of these things should be done?  I am
           thinking of something like model uncertainty, which
           there is lots of discussion, debate, and controversy.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Well, in a later slide where
           I tell you what we are trying to do in Fiscal year
           2002, I would have said that we are going to try and
           take a stab at ourselves first, and see where it is
           going to go so that we have some background if DOE
           comes up and says something, and that we will have a
           little bit more understanding of what is going on.
                       It is something that you don't look in the
           published literature for here is how to do it.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  That's why I asked the
           question.
                       MR. FEDORS:  One way to do it, I think, is
           pure brute force and spend lots of manhours, but I
           don't think that is practical.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  I was just curious if you
           had developed some interesting and ingenious approach
           to that problem.  Proceed.
                       MR. FEDORS:  I am not that quick.  The
           progress on the technical agreements, I put down that
           there are three that are considered satisfactorily
           addressed.
                       I think you can fluctuate that number
           between 2 and 4 depending on who you talk to and what
           the programmatic decision on what satisfies an
           agreement.
                       For the ones that we are going to be a
           little more concerned with, one technical agreement
           required a path forward, and that was the one that
           treat model and parameter uncertainly literally
           written into the technical agreement, stated that this
           will be discussed at the TSPA technical exchange.
                       Well, we needed a path forward, because
           that is not a path forward, and that's -- well, Jeff
           Ponle was telling me today that the NRC letter pending
           is not -- well, it is going through concurrence right
           now on how -- you know, what the path forward will be
           for that technical agreement.
                       We did not specify where it is going to be
           documented, but here is the essence of what we were
           looking for.  There is one technical agreement waiting
           for a DOE response, and that has to do with the drift
           scale heater test.  There was a white paper on that
           prepared by the Department of Energy.
                       And NRC responded, and then part of the
           technical agreement said that the Department of Energy
           will address NRC's comments.  Seven technical
           agreements had some documents due in Fiscal Year 2002.
           So those are coming up.
                       Three agreements had delayed documents and
           the Department of Energy sent letters in July and
           October stating here is when we think these things
           will happen.
                       And also my last bullet notes that the
           approach that the thermal effects group has taken in
           the past year was that as things were delivered that
           letters were sent to the NRC either reviewing it or
           acknowledging that things were completed.
                       What does DOE need to provide before
           license application?  With the flexible design and
           operating mode, one of the first thoughts that would
           come to my mind is, well, if they go with the low
           temperature operating mode, I don't think we have
           enough information for that.
                       It is a case where it is not only where
           they are expanding the repository domain and there is
           a characterization issue, but there is also maybe the
           cold trap effect that is going to become even more
           important for that operating mode.
                       And that is the second bullet and there is
           some data to support the cold trap effect.  That is
           not to say that the cold trap is not going to occur
           during the high temperature mode, but for example, the
           low temperature mode, if there is no ventilation, you
           will be near a hundred percent relative humidity the
           entire duration.
                       With the high temperature mode, you get to
           60 percent relative humidity after 2 to 3,000 years
           approximately, and the canisters don't to below a
           hundred degrees C until 3 or 4,000 years, or something
           like that.
                       Anyway, there is a much shorter duration
           when the cold trap effect will be important for moving
           fluids around along the drift axis, for example.
                       The other thing that we are looking for
           before LA is some approach for the model and parameter
           uncertainty, and as was already noted, that is not
           clear how that is going to be done yet, and I think
           how one would do that.
                       I think it will end up being a combination
           of here is what is reasonable to do, and we will
           justify what we don't include, and we will expand
           uncertainty and account for things, and I will leave
           that one alone.
                       And then the last bullet is just a catch-
           all for the rest of the technical agreements.  The
           first bullet where I just wanted to reemphasize that
           there is going to be water in these drifts at some
           time or other, and how it redistributes during the
           10,000 year period is what we really want to look at.
                       The passive test brought to the forefront
           really the cold trap effect, and that is an example,
           and we are concerned about that one.  The data that
           has to be collected by license application, the
           importance of the Cross Drift Thermal Test is becoming
           more prominent here, but it is a test that is not
           projected to be started until 2003, and I have heard
           2004.
                       It is down the line for some reason, and
           I say that in terms of in light of the drift scale
           test problems, we are not sure what conclusions that
           we would be able to support coming from the drift
           scale test given all the water loss out of that test.
                       And some of those observations I would be
           referring to are when water starts -- the possibility
           of water going down fractures and through the dry out
           zone, the fingering, the reflux approach.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Do your agreements
           require our call for results from the cross drift
           thermal test prior to an LA?
                       MR. FEDORS:  No.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.
                       MR. FEDORS:  And my feeling on that was
           that it was a combination that was practical and there
           is some information that you can get out of the drift
           scale heater test still.
                       But I think our position on that, if I can
           speak for others, is that there may be difficulties in
           quantifying that loss out there and what effect it
           has, and you had better include it in the model and
           parameter uncertainty.
                       The field and laboratory data to support
           the cold trap model.  That one we don't even know what
           the DOE cold trap model is going to be, and that is
           not documented and presented to us yet.
                       I know that people are working on it, and
           that is about it.  And the characterization and
           heterogeneity of properties in the lower lithophysal
           zone, that is the whole reason that they created the
           enhanced characterization repository drift block or
           block drift, was to get at the lower lith (sic).
                       That is proceeding along I think and it is
           not going to be an issue.  Another bullet, coming
           forward with the mismatch.  This is kind of playing up
           to what I alluded to before.
                       Depending on the operating mode, other
           certain processes are going to become more important.
           So we may be caught in a bind at the end and we may
           not have this prior knowledge that the bind is going
           to be there.
                       And the last bullet on the model is
           parameter uncertainty, and we talked about that a
           little bit, but I might also add the point that this
           is a difficult one to handle because of the
           transparency issue with the multi-scale thermal
           hydrologic model.
                       There is an assemblage of 4, or 5, or 6
           numerical models linked by abstractions, and scan
           lines as they call it now.  I think that may be going
           under some revision, but in essence how do you trace
           at least your parameter uncertainty through that whole
           chain?  It is not straightforward.
                       What does the NRC need to do before LA?
           Well, you have probably seen a few of these same
           things here.  I might just summarize them as a little
           bit of our job is to kind of anticipate what we are
           going to run into down the line, and that the meetings
           that we have with the Department of Energy certainly
           facilitate us being a little bit more up to speed on
           things, rather than waiting for a document to come out
           sometime later.
                       Fiscal Year 2001 work.  The major
           activities, and all the technical exchanges are on the
           top of that list for a reason, I guess, time wise.
                       The ventilation modeling I alluded to
           earlier.  The Mountain-scale thermohydrological
           modeling studies, and the main focus of those were
           primer sensitivity, and edge effects, and how that
           might dovetail with the cold trap effect.
                       I have the cold trap listed here and the
           technical support for the TPA code.  In other words,
           providing temperature and relative humidity histories
           for the duration of the 10,000 year compliance period.
                       And I have one example to present, and
           that's the cross-drift thermal test.  Some modeling
           was done prior, and obviously prior modeling, and
           predictive modeling.
                       The importance of this was that this niche
           test is in the lower lithophysal, and the other
           important factor is the problems with the drift scale
           test.
                       So the main objectives are put in thermal
           heaters and see if we can predict the sheding of the
           water, and how water is going to flow through the
           fractures, and then analyze that water.
                       The modeling that I am showing here, this
           is a saturation, a three-dimensional model.  The blue
           you can tell is where the dry out zones are,and that
           is the low saturation.
                       And the higher saturations are the yellows
           and oranges, and you can see some of the shedding
           going on there.  The bore hold locations where there
           would be some collection, you can kind of pick that up
           here.
                       There is some little blue spots there.
           And in the modeling, they turned out to have a low
           saturation because it is difficult to get water into
           those.  One of the conclusions of this study was that
           looking at the flux of the water that got in there, it
           was that it was condensed water.
                       It was water that evaporated and it was
           transported into there, and then condensed in the bore
           hole.  That would have a major implication for how you
           are interpreting the chemistry of this test and the
           drift scale thermal test.
                       Work plan for Fiscal Year 2002.  I will
           jump quickly since we are almost up to the 15 minutes
           here.  The intermediate milestone reports are the
           focus of what we are doing, and that is, one, review
           all the technical agreement documents that we have
           gotten, and that will be organized around dealing with
           the model parameter uncertainty for the most part, and
           the cold trap effect, and dealing with the drift scale
           thermal test results.
                       I will also plug the cold trap modeling
           and that we have created a little laboratory
           experiment to try to understand a little more fully
           with an analytical solution to start up and design the
           experiment.
                       We have gone through some initial testing
           just to see and make sure that water is condensing,
           and that all of our sensors are reading stuff.  I am
           not aware that the Department of Energy has a
           laboratory or a field test in the plans at all to
           support any of a cold trap model.
                       And to summarize, there are three
           technical agreements essentially completed, and seven
           more should be done this year.  And the three have
           been delayed, and with that, I will take any
           questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  I don't think I have any
           questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Raymond.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Well, this question
           is going to tell you very clearly that I don't know
           anything about these kinds of processes.  But what is
           more important with respect to humidity in the
           repository; the water that is brought in by the
           ventilation or water that drips in from percolation?
                       MR. FEDORS:  It would be the other way
           around for the ventilation.  The ventilation -- I
           think it was initially brought in to remove the heat
           load, but it is very effective at keeping the humidity
           way down low.
                       So as you soon as you shut off the
           ventilation -- for example, like during the low
           temperature operating mode -- the relative humidity
           shoots up immediately to a hundred percent.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  And this gets
           outside of your scope, but the plan is that as each
           drift gets filled, they will close it?
                       MR. FEDORS:  That is something that I have
           not sorted out entirely, and I thought there was some
           confusion because some discussion of ventilation,
           natural ventilation, so they would leave the drifts
           open to take advantage of any -- you know, they have
           got the infrastructure down there and there might be
           additional ventilation over and above an ambient
           ventilation through the mountain that would help them
           out.
                       But as I understand from the igneous group
           that they have -- that we need bulkheads in here to
           help out.  So there is a conflict there.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Okay.  Thanks.
           That's all that I have.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Milt.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes, I'm not sure that
           you used those very clearly defined words like
           important and less important, and more important, and
           likely.
                       But since water is the 800 pound gorilla
           in this entire thing, and there appears to be water in
           the drifts, and there isn't any corrosion, et cetera,
           how would you categorize the importance to the overall
           program of this particular KTI group?
                       MR. FEDORS:  Well, if you want me to rate
           it, I would say it is 799 pounds.  Do you want it more
           likely or less likely?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  No, no, I think you
           would agree that it is one of the most important ones
           probably.
                       MR. FEDORS:  It is an important issue, and
           I think the focus should be on the duration of time
           over which it is going to be left in there.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Are you comfortable with
           the modeling of thermal effects on flow vis-a-vis
           what's going on in the rock?  In other words, do you
           think that we have a good enough grasp of the
           phenomena so that the questions of hot versus cold
           repository, et cetera, can be accurately modeled?
                       MR. FEDORS:  I think the thermal part --
           if I had to categorize things, the isothermal part is
           very complex, and if you give me that part of it, I'd
           be a lot more confident in getting the thermal part
           correct.  Is that kind of answering your question?  I
           believe it's very complex how water flows through
           fractures.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes, but it's much more
           complex than just how water flows through fractures in
           that if you have a hot repository for a few hundred
           years, you're going to be having evaporation in the
           pores.  If you have a cold repository, presumably you
           have almost none.  Are those effects part of what
           you're looking at when you talk about thermal effects
           on flow?  If you're evaporating water for 500 years,
           is there any porosity left when it finally cools down,
           et cetera?  It seems to me there are some major
           issues.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Then my point would be how
           quickly does it re-wet.  We know that it will -- water
           will be supplied to the drifts through the fractures
           rather quickly to pass the test, things like that, but
           filling the matrix --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes, but filling your
           tea kettle up with water -- filling your tea kettle up
           with water doesn't redissolve the deposited stuff.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Doesn't redissolve the
           depositing stuff.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  For 500 years, if
           you're boiling or evaporating water out of these
           pores, at the end of that time, those pores are not
           automatically going to just open up.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Milt, this is Bret Leslie
           from the NRC staff.  This is really a question for the
           near-field where we take into account and evaluate
           those things.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  I withdraw it.
           I was trying to find out where it's being covered.
                       MR. LESLIE:  It's covered.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Thermalhydrologic chemical
           near-field.  So your question had to do with you've
           plugged up the pores of the matrix.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Just the whole -- all of
           the things that are different between the hot and cold
           repositories.  There are many things.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  On one of your
           slides where you listed -- the title was "Concerns."
           And the bottom bullet talking about incorporation of
           ensemble model and parameter uncertainty in TSPA and
           it says something about the path forward is the
           subject of a pending NRC letter to DOE.  Can you tell
           me a little bit about that letter?
                       MR. FEDORS:  Yes.  Actually, I noted that
           in two slides.  In the other slide, I mentioned that
           Jeff Pohle had mentioned today that that's going
           through concurrence right now.  The letter basically
           said, "We realize that there's no path forward for
           this agreement.  Here's what NRC was trying to get at
           with this techno agreement -- incorporate model
           parameter uncertainty or justify not including it in
           the TSPA.  Please put this in some document, either
           one of those."
                       MR. POHLE:  Yes.  This is Jeff Pohle, NRC
           staff.  It's basically a paragraph within the letter
           that covers a number of KTIs coming out to Jim
           Anderson.  Basically, what we do in that paragraph is
           tie it into a number of items the Department said they
           were going to do.  At the technical exchange, we got
           this thick handout, so we called out of there, "This
           is what you said you're going to do, and we think if
           you're doing this way to this agreement, that
           agreement, that agreement, this ensemble, if you did
           this, would be the path forward to resolve this
           particular item."  I don't know the numbers well right
           now.
                       MR. FEDORS:  I probably would say it's not
           a worry either.  There was some discussion whether we
           even had to come up with a path forward, because these
           other technical agreements separately address
           different aspects of it.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  But it's --
                       MR. FEDORS:  So we just want to be clear
           on it is all.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  So it's basically
           just clarifying the path forward.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  George, I have a
           question.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Sure.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  On your backup slide,
           Number 14, you give the technical support for the TPA
           code.  Starting at time zero and going out for close
           to 100 years, the high temperature mode has the waste
           package temperature below 100 degrees, and that seems
           awfully low since the reason for going to the low
           temperature was to keep the rock temperature below 100
           degrees.  And the waste package has got to be hotter
           than the rocks since it's the source of the heat, so
           it just seems that for a high temperature to be below
           100 degrees seems awfully low.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Okay.  These results contain
           a ventilation module, and you'll see the first spike
           straight up as, what, 50 years about?  So this assumes
           forced ventilation for 50 years, and that's why I was
           alluding to it's very effective at removing heat and
           moisture.  And in this particular modeling approach,
           they also played around with natural, quote, "natural"
           -- you know, what if natural ventilation kept going
           after the 50 years?  So we'll ramp the ventilation
           down in the model to some fraction of the forced
           ventilation, and they did it in two steps.  That's
           where these other spikes are coming from, just to
           explain the graph.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  One other question:  Do
           you know when they talk about natural ventilation, are
           they talking only about the chimney effect or are they
           taking into account the breathing of the Mountain?
           The USGS made some rather extensive measurements on
           Yucca Mountain Proper which indicates that there's
           very, very significant air flow in and out of the
           Mountain even if you have no drifts and tunnels.  Was
           that taken into account in the natural ventilation
           analysis?
                       MR. FEDORS:  No.  This was more scoping
           analyses -- what if ventilation was -- I don't think
           the Department of Energy has any -- I don't know what
           their stance is on ventilation after forced
           ventilation period is.  We think that might be
           important, and we are looking at models now to first
           let's get the natural ambient condition right with
           drifts, and then if there's a thermally perturbed
           through buoyancy effects, that you would have
           ventilation from that in between the ambient and the
           thermal -- rather the force ventilation at the onset.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, the USGS also
           measured barometric pumping --
                       MR. FEDORS:  Yes.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  -- and a number of other
           phenomena, and it was very extensive.
                       MR. FEDORS:  Yes.  We're looking into some
           of those very reports right now to kind of help us
           bound -- create boundary conditions and tell us
           whether it's reasonable for the air flow, because it's
           difficult to get air flow out of that, you're just
           monitoring the pressure.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Questions from
           staff?  Anyone else?  Thanks very much, Randy.  Let's
           see, where are we?  We are on the near-field --
           evolution of the near-field environment.  Oh, did I
           skip one?  Oh, yes, okay.  I didn't mean to skip you,
           Paul.  I didn't mean to skip you, Paul, but, again,
           I'll let you introduce yourself for the record.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Okay.  Hopefully everyone
           can hear me just fine.  My name again is Paul
           Bertetti, and I'll talk a little bit about
           radionuclide transport.  Part of this project is
           experimental in nature too, so this morning I
           conducted a couple of experiments on the slipperiness
           of the ice and the hardness of the concrete, and my
           preliminary results are that the ice is slippery and
           the concrete is hard.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  That's project
           confirmation.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  That's right.  Well, I'll
           do some more of that tomorrow morning.
                       Well, my outline is the same as many of
           the previous ones.  We'll talk a little bit about
           status of subissue resolution here with respect to
           transport -- what we're doing, what we think DOE and
           we need to do in the future.
                       Radionuclide transport just looks at
           processes that control radionuclide migration, both in
           the unsaturated part of the system and in a saturated
           zone, outside of the area that's influenced by what we
           call the near-field environment.
                       We have four subissues:  transport through
           porous rock, which is essentially that unsaturated
           material; transport through alluvium, essentially all
           saturated material; and transport through fractured
           rock, which incorporates both the unsaturated zone and
           the fractured volcanic top that is saturated below the
           repository, and the fourth one is the nuclear
           criticality issue, which people haven't said much
           about.  That's kind of -- there are several KTIs that
           have this criticality component.  They're kind of all
           addressed together in one lump group, so I won't say
           a whole lot about that.
                       We have several agreements.  I'll discuss
           them in detail in the following slides.  Essentially,
           they're focused on getting information that we need to
           be comfortable about the processes used to model and
           represent radionuclide transport.
                       So we'll start with Subissue Number 1,
           which is the radionuclide transport through porous
           rock.  We have five agreements.  One of these is
           partially complete.  What that means is we received
           some of the documentation necessary to satisfy that
           agreement, and that's undergone review.  And we've
           requested a little bit of additional information.
           And, specifically, what we had requested was a
           technical basis for screening criteria of
           radionuclides, and I think maybe the way we
           communicated what we wanted to satisfy that agreement
           wasn't really understood by the DOE, so we've kind of
           tried to clarify that position so that we get a little
           bit more information in that respect.  Four have
           documents that supposedly will be delivered in fiscal
           year 2002, given DOE's plan of action and their
           current resources.
                       Just specifically, one of the most
           important agreements that we have is kind of a very
           generic one and that is provide analysis and
           documentation of transport parameters.  Essentially,
           a lot of the values used for KDs throughout the
           transport models in the system were based on expert
           judgment, so the particular values are derived from a
           very limited group of experts who kind of made
           estimates on what those KD values should be.  Yet
           there's not a specific set of documents that provide
           traceability and justification for those values.  And
           so what we've asked, and DOE's agreed to, provide that
           information to us.
                       We also have asked for providing results
           of the in situ field testing in the unsaturated zone,
           and that alludes to the stuff that Jim Winterle talked
           about earlier which are the alcove 8 niche 3 testing
           and information that we can get from unsaturated zone.
                       I will add also here that we did a lot of
           work in trying to come up with the language of those
           agreements and what we were going to ask for, and I'd
           say the majority of our agreements, the vast majority
           of our agreements, are essentially just a request for
           information that the DOE had already indicated that
           they were going to produce.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Paul?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Yes, sir.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  The last bullet:
           Plutonium, uranium and?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Correct.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  You mean --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Protactinium.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes.  So
           protactinium is an issue?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, this agreement comes
           from DOE documents that indicated that they needed to
           do more sensitivity studies to confirm that the data
           that they had for these was adequate.  So they
           mentioned that there was some concern that the value
           for the unsaturated zone of porous rock, that these
           numbers that they had were adequate.  It kind of
           relates to this documentation.  What they had is some
           limited number of experiments.  So what we asked for
           is just to continue that work and provide the
           sensitivity studies to see, well, do you really need
           to worry about this or not.  And so that's what we're
           asking is can you provide some risk information to
           justify what you're using or not.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  But that's not an
           indication that you really think that's a problem.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, we really don't know
           unless we have some sort of information to gauge that.
           Well, I mean that's part of the problem is we can make
           a lot -- radionuclide transport is an interesting
           issue, because a great many people think they know a
           whole lot about it in the sense of, "Well, we can
           model this using a KD."  And the problem is there
           aren't too many real examples of where a KD model has
           been successful at predicting that actually has
           happened.  And so what we'd like to do is get some
           information so we can check off the box.  And I would
           agree with you for the unsaturated zone in this sort
           of transport, you're probably correct.
                       Subissue 2 is radionuclide transport
           through alluvium.  We have a number of agreements
           related to this.  One of them is complete.  That was
           kind of a request for an updated features, events and
           processes document.  One was due in October 2001.
           Specifically, we had requested pre-test predictions
           for tests conducted at the alluvium testing complex.
           And the idea behind that was if we could have some
           indication of what DOE expected to get from their
           field experimental results, then we would have a
           better way of assessing whether or not their
           conceptual model and their process model, on which
           their TSPA model was based, was adequate.  We have not
           received that yet, but they're making progress in the
           testing, and ideally we'll get a testing plan in the
           near future.  Five of them are due next year, there's
           another one due in the following fiscal year.
                       The alluvium is an interesting part of the
           transport path in that it's not very well
           characterized, and this kind goes to the question of,
           well, how much information is enough?  And I guess
           that depends on how important that part of the system
           is and whether or not you feel that your
           characterization is sufficient to justify the way
           you're modeling the system.
                       And as Bret mentioned earlier, this is
           kind of way of -- an area where DOE and NRC have
           differed in the way they model the system.  The
           saturated alluvium and saturated zone transport is
           somewhat important in the NRC TPA code, at least in
           terms of sensitivity studies, but is not very
           important and the unsaturated zone component is the
           most important for DOE.
                       So there's a little bit of disagreement in
           terms of importance and sensitivity and as a result
           you might see a little bit of difference in how much
           characterization might be needed.  So we worked hard
           to get a set of agreements that satisfied both parties
           in the technical exchange.  I'll talk about some
           specific information when I show -- when I discuss the
           work that we've done over the last year.
                       Our Subissue 3 is radionuclide transport
           through fractured rock.  We have a number of
           agreements here again.  One of them is under review.
           That's essentially the fractured, unsaturated zone
           test plan that we've looked at.  We'd like to get more
           information to provide plans for characterization and
           results of the in situ testing and to get information
           from the fractured saturated zone testing.
                       Essentially, that's the testing that was
           done at the Sea Wells complex.  So the document that
           we're waiting on is essentially the Sea Wells AMR that
           will provide us with the results and the testing
           process that was done at that location.  And the
           reason that's important is that's maybe the only field
           test that's done in saturated, fractured volcanic
           rock, so it's kind of an important, basic
           characterization of the system.
                       I have a bullet on for colloids so I'll
           mention them.  Whether or not colloids are very
           important to dose or very important to the performance
           of the system is of some question; however, there's
           field evidence that colloids may have been transported
           at the Nevada Test Site, DOE has incorporated colloid
           modeling in their TSPA model, we are going to
           incorporate it in the next revision of the TPA code to
           help us evaluate the importance of that.  So what
           we're asking for is a sensitivity analysis to kind of
           test the importance of the parameters used to develop
           that colloid model.
                       As I said, the criticality issue is
           essentially kind of combined over a number of KTIs,
           and it essentially involves delivery of numerous
           topical reports to hopefully close out that issue.
                       What does the NRC need to do before
           license application?  Well, as mentioned over and over
           again today, we need to monitor DOE's progress and
           hopefully inform ourselves as to how they're
           conducting their work and whether or not it's relevant
           to what we think is important.  And I think it's
           particularly important for radionuclide transport,
           because there's still a number of characterization and
           field tests ongoing.  And there's a lot of basic data
           being collected, so we have to be particularly careful
           about our ability to understand what's going on, how
           things may or may not change during the collection of
           that characterization data.  I think everything else
           is pretty self-explanatory there.
                       While this slide is not particularly
           useful for this meeting, but it does -- the importance
           here is that we spent a significant effort, like I
           mentioned earlier, trying to understand the risk
           significance and the documentation that DOE had
           provided before our technical exchange.  We were kind
           of like the middle of the line, essentially, so we
           spent a particular amount of effort to try to get
           things as risk informed as possible.
                       Other things that we've done over the last
           year, we've collected and analyzed some actual samples
           from the Early Warning Drilling Project program.  One
           of the problems with data collection and
           characterization is that there's a significant span of
           time between collection of the sample, analysis,
           reporting of the data so that it can be used in part
           of people's interpretations and models.
                       So we have to take a very proactive role
           collecting our data, assembling the data that has been
           collected and may not be readily available.  For
           instance, one of the things that we did is we took all
           of the Nye County data, the data that Nye County had
           collected as part of their program, assembled it and
           put it into this document so that it could be used by
           CNWRA and NRC staff as part of their work.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Paul, but you also
           actually ran some samples?  What's the purpose?
           Cross-lab confirmation testing or are you measuring
           something else?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, two things is that I
           can get results in a very short time period so that I
           can actually start working on an analysis of water
           chemistry from our standpoint.  The other thing is
           that we can try to confirm whether or not the results
           are meaningful.  Remember because these things are
           ongoing, QA of samples is very important.  We have a
           way of -- it's kind of like an oversight and
           confirmation process.
                       The other things that we're doing that I
           think are pretty important are that we've tried to
           apply some of the process level models, especially
           using a surface complexation approach to evaluate an
           alternative mechanism for modeling radionuclide
           transport in the system.  I think we've been pretty
           successful at that, and to that end we've conducted
           focus experimental studies to build up our own
           database for that and to help us provide a robust
           model.  And we're actually -- the next revision of the
           TPA code should incorporate, in a limited basis, the
           ability to use results from our surface complexation
           modeling approach in our TPA code.  And we'll kind of
           do that on look-up table basis, at least that's the
           indications so far.  And some of what we've done there
           is laboratory studies of neptunium on calcite.  I'll
           talk about that in a minute.
                       And a good example is some analysis of
           technetium uptake on clinoptilolite, which is kind of
           a material that can substitute for alluvium.  And the
           fact was at one point DOE had claimed some minor
           credit for technetium sorption.  Our results indicated
           that that was probably in the experimental noise, and
           DOE, on further analysis, acknowledged that, yes, that
           was essentially experimental noise.
                       Okay.  So here are some examples of
           information that we can gather from our own analysis
           and collection of materials.  This, for instance, is
           a sample of alluvium collected from one of the Early
           Warning Drilling Project wells, showing that there's
           maybe some fine-grain codings on some of these grains.
           And some recent studies have indicated that maybe with
           these kind of codings they actually drive the sorption
           drive process, and they might be actually fairly
           generic and that they actually may be very much like
           clay.  And it turns out that recent DOE results also
           indicate that the sorption of alluvium is kind of
           driven by the presence of clay above maybe anything
           else.  And you can also start to group well water
           chemistries, not only with respect to depth in the
           saturated zone but spatially as well.  So that's some
           important things that we can do, and then we can be
           prepared for the next step of characterization and
           modeling.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  What's the size of
           that grain, Paul?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  I'm sorry, this slide right
           here is about two millimeters across.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Oh, it's that big?
           Okay.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Yes, sir.  So here's an
           example of the experimental results for neptunium
           uptake on calcite.  This is just the distribution
           coefficient, or KD, for neptunium and plotted against
           the pH or the solution.  What I don't want to say is
           neptunium sorption on calcite is not necessarily the
           most important aspect of transport in the alluvium,
           but what's important about this is that DOE
           assumptions of transport of the alluvium for the TSPA
           VA were based on these limited results with water from
           UE25-p#1, which is that deep carbonate aquifer well.
           And, in fact, the processes that control this sorption
           and the magnitude of sorption are not really related
           to the process controlling sorption in the alluvium.
           In fact, now DOE has conducted some data with alluvium
           samples, but we're still limited to a very narrow
           range of pH.  And so I think we have to be careful
           about potential invalid assumptions regarding
           mechanism and the magnitude of sorption.
                       And the reason that's important is that we
           might be able to get the magnitude right, and that
           might be okay.  The problem is the real uncertainty
           and variability, both in chemistry, and the kinds of
           variability that we want to add to our modeling to
           incorporate real levels of uncertainty and realism we
           should be able to do a better job at the experimental
           part.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Speaking of variability,
           and I realize you're outside the near-field, how are
           you accounting for the source term -- the variations
           in the source term, because that's certainly going to
           effect the radionuclide transport, is it not?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Variations in what respect?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  If you mean chemical
           variations in terms of a plume, those are not
           accounted for.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  And they're not accounted
           for in either model.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  So it's kind of
           idealistic.  It's not really very representative of --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  That's absolutely correct.
           And one advantage that a surface complexation model
           approach rather than the -- rather than providing a
           distribution to sample from, a distribution of KDs
           from which to sample, that are geared at one pH, using
           a distribution of KDs that have a range of real system
           chemistry, like CO2 and pH and other factors, well,
           that at least you can evaluate the uncertainty and
           make an argument of whether or not your plume may have
           a distinct chemistry from the surrounding environment
           or whether dilution will essentially make it into a
           background sort of transport system, in which case you
           might have a pretty realistic approach to the
           uncertainty.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  By picking a KD model
           that's based on one pH and a distribution that's based
           on some experiments that don't have a really good
           variability in chemistry, no, I don't think that's a
           very effective way.  But that's my opinion.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I'm disappointed you
           haven't said anything about valence.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, you know, I'd like to
           do that.  I mean to me that's -- the redox state of
           the system is very important, and that goes to the
           characterization.  Some people might make an argument
           that specific mineral surfaces might provide a micro
           redox environment that really would enhance sorption.
           The problem is if you have four wells over ten
           kilometers, to try to characterize that, you're not
           going to be able to make a defensible argument to
           support that.
                       The other thing I would add is that, Neil,
           I've added these little dots between the red and the
           green, so those of you who are red/green challenged
           should be able to see that graph.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Before you take that off
           --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Yes, sir.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  -- I'm intrigued by,
           looking at your red circle, the influence of time --
           seven days, 14 days, 21, 31 days -- because all of
           those are infinitesimally short in the time constant
           of what we're looking at.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  It keeps going up
           for 10,000 years, you think?
                       (Laughter.)
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, the question is
           how valid are the yellow ones if they were instantly
           measured?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, the factor is that
           these, over the same time period of the red dots, stay
           constant.  I didn't mention that specifically, and
           that's in a difference in the mechanism of sorption.
           In this system, we start out with the water that's
           essentially saturated with respect to calcite, so you
           have a surface reorganization of the calcite and some
           precipitation that goes on, and that kind of enhances
           the uptake of neptunium.  And we've kind of confirmed
           that with our own co-precipitation experiments.
                       Whereas, if you have a system that's
           undersaturated with respect to calcite, like the
           alluvium -- saturated alluvium is now, you have
           essentially kind of this stable sorption --
           equilibrium sorption curve that you get with silicate
           minerals and other minerals too.
                       So I mean it's a big -- it's not
           insignificant that we have a similar sort of sorption
           curve shape with a carbonate mineral that we do with
           aluminum silicate.  So the problem is over a long
           period of time we could have a significant change in
           chemistry and mechanism of uptake and processes, and,
           frankly, that's not incorporated.  Temporal changes
           are not incorporated.
                       So what are we planning to do?  Well,
           obviously, we'd like to keep up with DOE documents and
           the products that they contribute over the next year.
           We'd like to continue to prioritize our modeling and
           analysis so that we're looking at hopefully the right
           issues and the risk prioritized features.  To that
           end, what we're going to do is we're going to continue
           some focused experimental studies, we're also going to
           look at our field characterization activities and
           evaluations.
                       One thing I would mention is DOE has a
           major effort and going down to the natural analog site
           at Pennyblanca, and we're going to participate in that
           in terms of observation and maybe some sampling and
           confirmation activity as well.  We'll continue with
           these neptunium results to include some modeling and
           hopefully build a more robust database for ourselves.
                       We're doing some sensitivity analysis and
           colloidal transport modeling on our own to look at the
           kinetics of that system, and maybe we find that it
           might be actually driven by kinetic process.  I think
           at the recent MRS meeting some German investigators
           looked at neptunium sorption on human colloids and
           found that it was very much kinetically controlled.
           And we'll also report some additional results on some
           detailed modeling of processes.
                       In summary, we've just looked at risk
           informed.  I think we do a good job providing some
           independent technical investigation, and we're trying
           to maintain our risk-informed approach to the work
           that we do.  And that's all I have.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thank you, Paul.
           Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I asked them along the
           way.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Raymond?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I had a couple,
           Paul.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Yes, sir.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  One, with respect to
           the KDs, you said that a lot of it was expert
           elicitation of derived -- that's where DOE got a lot
           of results.  There weren't many really experimental.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Correct, especially for the
           volcanic top, porous material.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Then you said that
           DOE's going to tell you how they got their results.
           Does that mean they're going to tell you how they ran
           their expert elicitation or does that mean they're
           going to go out and get more results?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, I would characterize
           it like an expert judgment, and I think the idea is
           they have expressed a desire to provide documentation
           information about how those expert judgments were
           derived.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  So that's what it
           meant.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  And if they cannot do that,
           then that could become an issue.  So that issue is
           probably minor unless that documentation doesn't
           exist, and then it might be a major effort for them to
           provide the adequate documentation.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Documentation on how
           you do an expert elicitation isn't nearly as
           convincing as documentation on experimental --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  That may be correct.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Well, that's one
           point.  You know, I'm sure, and I know you know, that
           NRC has --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, I wouldn't be so
           sure.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  You'll know you know
           in a minute.
                       (Laughter.)
                       NRC has a very nice research program on
           mechanisms of radionuclide transport going underway.
           You were at the working group meeting where they
           discussed that.  I gather from what you said in the
           course along the way that it is the result -- those
           results are those kinds of results that are going to
           be used to check the results obtained by KD values.
           Did you not imply that in one of your viewgraphs?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, I think what we'd
           like to do is for nuclides like neptunium that might
           have a small but variable retardation coefficient is
           that to actually incorporate our surface complexation
           modeling results and put them into the TPA code, and
           then have the TPA code sampled the natural variable
           parameters like pH and CO2 to produce an output and
           then compare that to the sampling of KD in which you
           have a distribution of KD that's not dependent on the
           real -- the advantage of that is we can go out in the
           field and measure pH and pCO2 and determine a real
           system variability, which is something that we can
           measure, and it's kind of hard to measure the
           probability distribution and function of KDs
           independent of that, which is what is essentially done
           now.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  And, finally, with
           respect to protactinium, it probably, in the entire
           periodic table, is the element most prone to
           hydrolysis.  I've worked some with it; it's terrible,
           it's a terrible material.  So if you're going to
           discuss protactinium and its transport, you're
           probably talking about a colloid other than any sort
           of ionic format.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  I would agree with that
           entirely.  Every time we do a neptunium experiment
           with neptunium 237, we essentially do a protactinium
           experiment as well, because the immediate daughter is
           protactinium 233.  And so we kind of get a little bit
           of information about how protactinium is behaving in
           the system, and I would say that my very preliminary
           indications are that protactinium is sorbed
           significantly, and that's very consistent with our
           studies of actinides to show that when they start to
           hydrologize that's when you start to see a significant
           sorption.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Right.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  So except for competing
           anions and other complexes, I would expect
           protactinium to have a significant sorption potential.
                       MR. BRADBURY:  Yes, this is John Bradbury,
           NRC.  With regard to your questions concerning expert
           judgment, first of all, it was our -- DOE and their
           labs have collected a lot of sorption data for man
           years.  I was our understanding that the use of the
           expert judgment was mainly with regard to establishing
           distributions to be applied in performance assessment,
           and so we were looking for the explanation concerning
           how the distributions were --
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I guess I don't
           really understand what you just said, because
           distribution is the whole ballgame on KDs.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Probability.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Probability
           distribution.
                       MR. BRADBURY:  Probability distribution as
           opposed -- since there's a limited number of
           experiments that are done and how are those
           represented out spatially and temporally?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Oh, okay.  I
           understand now.  All right.  Thanks.
                       MR. BRADBURY:  So that was one thing I
           wanted to --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  I would agree with that,
           and I'd also temper that, that there are some nuclides
           that are not -- weren't well studied.  I mean there's
           a little bit of minor nuclides that may not be
           important that didn't have a lot of experimental basis
           behind them.
                       MR. BRADBURY:  Yes.  Can I expand on that
           a little bit?  The three radionuclides that have been
           mentioned, the plutonium, uranium and protactinium, I
           believe in our earlier issue resolution status report
           and the agreements that we came up -- we established
           in those, there are certain assumptions that have to
           be shown to be valid for KDs to apply to
           radionuclides.  And for plutonium, uranium and
           protactinium, there were certain aspects of those
           experiments that created problems, and so they are
           going to go -- for example, with regard to plutonium,
           one of the assumptions should be that the sorption
           process should be fast, and there were indications
           that their sorption experiments that the KDs were
           changing with time, that kind of situation.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  I'm not a chemist, as
           you'll find out in a minute, or a geochemist or
           something, but I guess I'm wondering why this is a
           KTI.  There's no question --
                       MR. BERTETTI:  DOE has mentioned that as
           well.  DOE had a suggestion that the radionuclide
           transport KTI would be rolled into one large KTI that
           would essentially be called flow and transport,
           primarily because that's how they have organized their
           system.  I think it's important -- why is it a KTI?
           I think there a lot of aspects of radionuclide
           transport that take a lot of resources to address the
           --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, don't get me wrong.
           I think radionuclide transport is important.  What I'm
           confused by a little bit is the decoupling of the work
           that's going on from what I would call a
           scientifically based source term that has tremendous
           impact on the radionuclide transport.  And the absence
           of temporal effects makes me wonder, this program, as
           it's outlined, what its relevance is, because things
           are really going to be very different in a couple
           process sense.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Well, I'm not sure I can
           answer that.  What I would say is I think that there
           are temporal changes in terms of the magnitude and the
           value of the source term.  I don't think there are
           temporal changes applied with respect to chemistry,
           and I think that's one of the things that was a
           comment from our TPA review, the peer review of our
           TPA code.  We tried to address those.
                       I think there is a -- personally, I think
           that there is a disconnect between whether or not you
           try to envision transport within some sort of plume
           that has an isolated geochemistry or whether or not
           you have mixing and how temporal effects on flow
           change chemistry.  So I really don't know how to
           answer that.  I would say that I kind of agree that
           there seems to be a disconnect there, and I really
           don't have another answer other than that.  Bret is
           eager to pipe in.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Partially, I think Paul --
           this is Bret Leslie from the NRC staff -- Paul was
           careful when he said where RT kicks in.  Beyond the
           point of coupled processes.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. LESLIE:  So we're talking far field
           now.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.  He did say that.
                       MR. LESLIE:  And I think that's part of
           the answer to your question is RT is looking at the
           ambient conditions in the far field.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes, and therefore my
           reaction is so what?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  The implication is
           that even if you have a coupled effect and you produce
           something different from what you're going to find in
           the far field, that like a valence change, that that
           will then occur as you move away from the near-field,
           that you'll get back to the species that you're
           looking at.  That's the implication of what you're
           saying, I believe.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Well, I know.  The other
           thing is, again, we had that flow-down diagram, and
           you have to answer the complete system.  We have to
           represent the natural system, and radionuclide
           retardation is part of that natural system.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, I agree with that.
           I agree with all of that, that radionuclide
           retardation is something that probably isn't accounted
           for to the extent that it should be.  And all I'm
           suggesting is that any time -- I've had lots of
           experience with source terms of a different type
           having to do with nuclear power plants and what have
           you, and we couldn't get anywhere until we had done a
           pretty good job of defining the source term, because
           you have no idea of what kind of release dates you're
           dealing with.  And until you can define the release
           dates, you have no real good technical basis for
           calculating any off-site consequences, et cetera.
                       And I think there's a similarity here,
           even though the mediums are very different, and I even
           know in WIPP that there was a tremendous amount of
           effort, especially late in the program, in trying to
           define the source term.  And I suspect we're going to
           hear about that when we hear about the near-field
           work, but I do see a real disconnect in what we've
           heard this afternoon with respect to radionuclide
           transport.
                       MR. LESLIE:  This is Bret Leslie again
           from the NRC staff.  I think Gustavo actually covered
           it but in a minor sense because of the focus of the
           container life and source term is both container life
           and source term.  That source term does define what
           those downstream releases are and to the effect that
           the near-field chemistry also influences that, but he
           didn't dwell on it that much.  And, again, in terms of
           risk information, it's the container that is where
           most of the insights derive.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.  Yes, I understand
           that.  Okay.  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Just to make sure
           that I'm clear on this, I want to make sure that it's
           not a disconnect in a bad sense.  I mean John is
           saying it's a disconnect, but it's only a true
           disconnect if in fact you're working off on the source
           term here and you're working on radionuclide transport
           completely independently of that, and I don't think
           that's what you're doing, is it?
                       MR. BERTETTI:  No.  I guess what I might
           add is that if you make a reasonable assumption that
           there's a significant amount of mixing in the
           saturated zone with respect to kind of equalizing a
           distinct chemical signature that the source term would
           have, then our approach is I think very sound.  And it
           is coupled in that nature, because we can account for
           the chemical variability in the natural system outside
           of that altered area of the near-field.
                       The problem might lie in that if you have
           a very distinct near-field chemistry that perpetuates
           itself in the natural system, then our current
           characterization of the natural system may not
           adequately represent the transport characteristics
           from that.  And results from our near-field studies
           and modeling and from the source term should help us
           identify whether or not the magnitude and the volume
           of material is released essentially would have that
           kind of characteristic.
                       So it's something that needs to be
           evaluated as we learn more about how the near-field
           chemistry responds, and right now that's one of the
           large areas of uncertainty is what's happening in the
           waste package in and around the waste package
           chemistry?  And I don't want to step on what Bobby
           might say, but that's a high degree of uncertainty.
           And so until we get a better handle on what that
           chemistry is and how that responds as we have some
           infiltration, then I think it's very tough to couple
           anything.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I guess, just to
           pursue this, not too much farther, but it strikes me
           that if you have massive changes propagating
           themselves, what you're basically going to have to
           conclude is that the near-field extends all the way to
           the saturated zone.  I mean, to me, the far field, by
           definition, you're into sort of trace amounts.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Right, right, right.  I
           just want to say that you could have a trace amount of
           chemistry, and I don't know how that would effect the
           system overall.  I would agree with you on that, yes.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I think, George, to some
           extent, all of the KTIs are really independent.  You
           take the pieces and that's what the modeling and the
           code -- just like the corrosion didn't discuss that
           it's probably irrelevant if there's no water, from the
           standpoint each KTI, to some extent, is completely
           independent.  They have to depend on the other
           operations to put them together.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Right.  And that's
           what I -- in my introductory remarks, I pointed out
           that one of the things we were interested in is how
           the KTIs link together to make sure that in fact they
           are being integrated.  Anything else?  Staff?  Thanks,
           Paul.
                       MR. BERTETTI:  Sure.  I'm not sure if I
           would have wanted to be skipped or --
                       (Laughter.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  That was a -- well,
           I guess at the GSA meeting the year before last, I was
           chairing a session and did exactly the same thing.  I
           was going down the list and actually introduced a
           speaker out of order, and I was accused by the speaker
           I skipped of having a senior moment.  So that's okay
           if you do that.  And, Bobby, I'll let you introduce
           yourself, as I have for the other people, for the
           record.
                       MR. PABALAN:  My name is Roberto, or
           Bobby, Pabalan.  I have listed in my first viewgraph
           the people who have contributed to this KTI of
           evolution of the near-field environment, or ENFE.  And
           if you have any questions, please feel free to ask
           them.
                       (Laughter.)
                       And I will also try to answer your
           questions.  The ENFE KTI -- this is the outline for my
           presentation, which is pretty much the same as the
           previous ones, so I'm going to skip this.  The ENFE
           subissues, there are five of them, each pertaining to
           the effects of coupled processes.  The first one
           pertains specifically to the drift seepage and flow.
           The second one pertains to the waste package chemical
           environment.  The third one is on the chemical
           environment for radionuclide release.  And the fourth
           one is on radionuclide transport in the near-field.
           And the fifth one is on the effects of coupled THC
           processes on potential nuclear criticality in the
           near-field.
                       At the start of fiscal year 2001, four of
           them, the first four were open, the fifth one was
           closed-pending as of the start of the fiscal year.  At
           the end of fiscal year 2001, all of these are closed-
           pending as a result of the NRC/DOE technical exchange
           that was held sometime in January of last year.
                       Now, we wanted to show what DOE needs to
           provide before license application.  Well, the most
           important thing is they need to decide on the
           repository design and the thermal operating mode.  As
           we all know, the materials -- the repository design,
           the materials that go into the repository and the
           temperature conditions under which these materials are
           exposed to are the main drivers for the coupled THC
           processes.
                       So, in essence, the DOE needs to update
           the evolution of the near-field environment process
           models and the TSPA model abstractions to be
           consistent with the selected design and the thermal
           operating mode, whether they go to high temperature or
           the low temperature operating mode.
                       The analyses that we have conducted in the
           past year are based on AMRs and PMRs that basically
           relied on the high temperature operating conditions.
           So if there's any change in the design or in the
           operating mode, then we need to review any new
           information or changed information that will come in.
                       The DOE also needs to provide additional
           information as a result of the agreements we had at
           the technical exchange.  There are 41 agreements as a
           result of the technical exchange.  That's a long
           laundry list.  Fourteen of those have been received,
           and we expect to receive 27 sometime in this fiscal
           year.  Although it's a long list, many of them are
           relatively straightforward.  For example, it ranges
           from providing sufficient technical basis for some of
           the FEPs that have been excluded from the abstraction
           all the way to more complex requirements dealing with
           data uncertainty, model uncertainty and model
           validation.
                       We don't expect these agreements to
           present a problem in terms of fulfilling the
           agreements prior to the license application.  I think
           many of them are straightforward.  I wouldn't be
           surprised, though, that some of them may actually be
           completed in the post-LA period, specifically with
           respect to model validation and also those pertaining
           to the analysis of the model uncertainties, the
           implementation of those uncertainties and the
           propagation of these uncertainties in the TSPA
           calculations, as well as in the analysis of the
           uncertainties in the data supporting these model
           calculations.
                       I'm going to give just a few examples of
           the more important agreements for each of the
           subissues.  For Subissue 1, which pertains to the
           coupled THC processes on drift seepage and flow, the
           DOE needs to address the various sources of model and
           data uncertainty in its THC abstraction.  One of the
           agreements that we came to at the tech exchange was
           that DOE needs to provide physical evidence that
           supports the model of matrix/fracture interactions,
           specifically the facts on precipitation processes.
           The DOE is supposed to provide data on the post-test
           overcoring.  I believe this pertains to the single
           heater test.  And also they need to provide the
           results of ongoing sidewall sampling for the drift
           scale heater test.  Some of the information I believe
           has been provided.  Most of these results are still to
           be expected for this fiscal year 2002.
                       For Subissue 2, which pertains to the
           waste package and drip shield chemical environment,
           Gustavo pointed out of the need for the DOE to provide
           a good handle on the quantity and the chemistry of
           water contacting the drip shield and the waste
           package.  Because the chemistry and the quantity
           determines the performance of the drip shield and the
           waste package materials.  As you all know, the
           performance of the waste package and drip shield is a
           key safety attribute of the DOE safety case.  The DOE
           needs to place bounds on the concentrations of the
           minor and trace elements which are important to
           performance, for example, fluoride in the case of the
           titanium alloy drip shield.  The DOE needs to evaluate
           the effects of evaporation or salt deposition or the
           interaction with engineered materials on the chemistry
           of the water contacting the drip shield and the waste
           package surfaces.
                       In addition, for Subissue 2, DOE needs to
           document the data, including the uncertainties, used
           to calibrate the models or to support model
           predictions.  And they also need to propagate the data
           and the model uncertainties through the TSPA
           calculations.
                       With respect to Subissue 3, which is the
           effects of coupled THC processes in the chemical
           environment for radionuclide release, again, as
           Gustavo pointed out and that Leslie alluded to, the
           DOE needs to reduce and/or quantify the uncertainties
           in the chemistry of water inside the waste package,
           because it affects directly the degradation of the
           cladding as well as of the waste forms.  In addition,
           our review of the DOE reports indicate that the DOE
           colloid concentration model is extremely sensitive to
           the in-package chemistry.  The DOE also needs to
           provide analysis to verify that the bulk-scale
           processes dominate the in-package chemical
           environment, which is the main assumption in the DOE's
           in-package abstraction.
                       In addition, again, they need to document
           the data, including uncertainties used the support the
           in-package chemistry calculations as well as provide
           stronger technical basis for the radionuclide and
           waste form types selected for the colloid release
           models.
                       For Subissue 4, pertaining to radionuclide
           transport in the near-field, I think the things that
           DOE needs to do are relatively straightforward.  They
           just need to provide the technical basis for screening
           out coupled THC effects on the radionuclide transport
           by diffusion of colloids.  They also need to
           demonstrate the suitability of the colloid models and
           parameters for conditions in a perturbed near-field
           environment, because there are abstractions basically
           based on conditions under -- basically based on
           ambient condition assumptions.  If DOE also implements
           retardation in the waste package or in the engineered
           barrier system, as appears to be the case in the SSPA,
           then they will need to provide the technical basis for
           the transport parameters they use for the in-package
           -- for the waste package transport and EBS transport.
                       For Subissue 5, on the potential
           criticality in the near-field, all they need to do is
           they need to close the open items remaining in the NRC
           safety evaluation report with respect to the disposal
           criticality analysis methodology topical report.  And
           they also need to revise the FEPs screening arguments
           concerning criticality.  So those are fairly
           straightforward.
                       So what does the NRC and Center staff need
           to do before LA?  Obviously, we need to keep on top of
           the DOE progress with respect to fulfilling the
           technical exchange agreements.  We need to review the
           DOE data collection and model activities used to
           support its process and abstracted models.  We need to
           continue independent evaluation of issues through a
           focused and experimental modeling program.  I'm going
           to talk about some of those activities in the next few
           viewgraphs.  We need to maintain in-depth familiarity
           with DOE methods and assumptions, models and model
           abstractions, and we also need to be prepared to
           respond to changes in the DOE safety strategy and the
           repository design or in the process abstracted models.
           And we also need to validate our own codes that we use
           to review the DOE safety case.
                       For FY 2001, we have basically spent most
           of our time conducting an intensive and critical
           review of DOE documents related to a near-field --
           various reports, technical basis documents, SER, SSPA
           and AMRs and PMRs.  We conveyed -- we contributed to
           NRC reviews of these documents and helped convey NRC
           concerns to the DOE staff in various technical
           exchanges and in numerous pre-tech exchange
           teleconferences, and also in addition to the
           teleconference and sufficiency review.  We helped
           identify risk-formed paths through resolution of NRC
           concerns, resulting in the status of the first four
           ENFE subissues being changed from open to closed-
           pending.  We also documented our review and the status
           of subissue resolution in the integrated IRSR report
           that's going to come out sometime this year.
                       MULTIFLO is a coupled THC model that's
           being used by NRC and Center staff for various KTI
           activities, including near-fields, thermal effects on
           flow, USFIC and TSPAI KTIs.  For the past fiscal year,
           development of version 2.0 was initiated.  Version 1.5
           was released, which includes new features, including
           free-drainage boundary condition and improved
           description of the fracture-to-matrix flow processes.
           We also developed a graphical user interface for
           MULTIFLO and a workshop training was held here at
           Whiteflint for NRC staff.
                       In addition to the MULTIFLO work, we
           conducted focused application of process-level models
           to test DOE hypotheses pertaining to the deliquescence
           points of salt mixtures that can deposit on the drip
           shield and waste package surfaces.  We also looked at
           the chemical evolution of our Yucca Mountain
           groundwaters that can result due to evaporation.  We
           also conducted focused experimental studies to study
           deliquescence points of mixed salt systems, as well as
           studies relating to uranophane solubility.
                       This last bullet on the uranophane
           solubility is a preliminary step towards conducting
           neptunium core precipitation experiments.  This is one
           of those activities that we stopped two years ago,
           because in a TSPA-SR report it was apparent that the
           DOE would not claim credit for secondary phase
           precipitation.
                       It is now evident from the SSPA reports
           that they might actually take credit for such
           processes.  So, again, doing a risk-informed type of
           approach, we determined it was important to reinitiate
           or redo -- start again the uranophane solubility
           experiments and the follow-on work, the neptunium core
           precipitation work.
                       The next two viewgraphs basically show the
           results of those process modeling work.  This
           particular study was designed to test the DOE
           hypothesis.  The DOE, in its abstraction of the
           chemistry of water on the waste package and drip
           shield surface, assumed that aqueous corrosion begins
           when the relative humidity reaches the deliquescence
           relative humidity of pure salt.  In the TSPA-SR
           report, they assumed -- they used the sodium nitrate
           deliquescence humidity as a lower bound for the
           deliquescence point of salts that could form in the
           waste package drip shield surface.
                       Our thermodynamic calculations are shown
           in these figures.  These calculations were done for a
           temperature of 90 degrees centigrade, a temperature
           which can be sustained for about 1,000 years or more
           based on RTEF calculations.  These systems are for
           brine or mixtures of two salts.  The Figure A is for
           NaCL plus KCL; the second one is for NaCL plus
           magnesium chloride, and the third one is for KCL and
           magnesium chloride.  The solid curves are the
           calculated deliquescence humidities for the mixed
           solids.  The dashed line is plotted as a reference.
           It gives the deliquescence humidity for pure sodium
           nitrate at 90 degrees centigrade.
                       Basically, the bottom line of the
           calculations suggest that, okay, if you have sodium
           chloride plus potassium chloride mixture, then it's
           okay to use a pure sodium nitrate deliquescence
           humidity as your bounding point for the deliquescence
           point of the mixture.  On the other hand, if you have
           a magnesium chloride mixture with NaCL or KCL, and
           also in essence with calcium chloride, which is
           another salt that has very low deliquescence humidity,
           then it's not appropriate to use a pure sodium nitrate
           salt as a lower bound for the deliquescence part
           because of the salt mixture.
                       In the SSBA, it indicates that DOE is also
           looking at using the magnesium chloride and calcium
           chloride properties as an estimate for the
           deliquescence point for the salt mixtures.  So I think
           there is improvement in the DOE approach that's
           evident from the more recent information.
                       So the question then is, okay, what kind
           of salts can form on the waste package and drip shield
           surface?  One mechanism by which we can form these
           salts is by evaporation of Yucca Mountain pore waters
           that drip into the drift environment.  What we've done
           here is we've taken a few chemical compositions
           published by Yang et al. for Yucca Mountain pore
           waters.  Basically, they're plotted up in the first
           what we call a pie per diagram, for the initial
           composition and the final compositions are plotted in
           the second pie per diagram.
                       The initial compositions really range in
           terms of the cationic composition -- you know, it has
           a very well distributed range for the calcium and
           sodium, potassium, magnesium chloride concentrations.
           And it also varies with respect to sulfate chloride
           and bicarbonate carbonate.  When you expose these
           Yucca Mountain pore waters to evaporated
           concentration, what you form are basically two types
           of brines.
                       Some of the initial Yucca Mountain pore
           waters evolve into what can be called a calcium,
           magnesium, sodium chloride brine.  These brines, if
           you take it to full evaporation, will form salt
           deposits with very low deliquescence points, basically
           because of calcium and magnesium.  But what is also
           important is that you form very low concentrations of
           the corrosion-inhibiting species.
                       The nitrate -- this is the free nitrate
           concentration accounting for the -- this is the
           uncomplexed nitrate concentration.  It's less than
           0.01 molar.  The total nitrate concentration in
           solution can be very large, but the free nitrate
           concentration is constrained by the formation of
           calcium nitrate ion pair complexes in solution.
           Sulfate is constrained by precipitation of calcium
           sulfate during the evaporation process.  On the other
           hand, you can have Yucca Mountain pore waters evolve
           into potassium, sodium chloride nitrate brines.
                       Now, the deliquescence points of salt
           mixtures that can form from these brines will have
           relatively higher deliquescence points than those that
           form from the calcium magnesium brines.  But on the
           other hand, they're still going to be lower than those
           of the pure sodium nitrate salt.  These salts have
           much higher free nitrate concentrations, hence you can
           have possible waste package corrosion inhibitor.  On
           the other hand, where you have some amount of fluoride
           initially in the solution, upon evaporation, in this
           case I think it evaporated to about 15,000 times
           concentration factor, you can have very high
           concentrations of fluoride.  In one particular case,
           about 0.014 molar, which is much greater than the
           0.001 molar threshold for accelerated general
           corrosion of titanium alloy, which is observed in some
           of the Center experiments.
                       For FY 2002, our plan is basically to
           review the DOE documents relevant to near-field
           subissues.  We will continue those process-level
           modeling work that may have been conducted.  Those are
           supported by some experimental studies because there's
           really no experimental data on the deliquescence point
           of salt mixtures at elevated temperatures.  I have a
           backup slide, I believe Number 2, that demonstrates
           some of those results.  We will continue to develop
           MULTIFLO version 2 with enhanced capability to
           simulate coupled THC processes.  MULTIFLO will be used
           to predict the quantity and chemistry of seepage water
           and to help quantify uncertainties associated at the
           process level and PA simulations for complex coupled
           processes.  We plan to validate these process-level
           models that we have used in reviewing the DOE
           analysis, and we will provide input to the integrated
           IRSR rev 1.
                       So in summary, for the past fiscal year,
           like I said, we've spent quite a bit of work in
           conducting a critical evaluation of the DOE analysis
           relevant to near-field subissues.  We have interacted
           with the DOE to resolve NRC concerns, resulting in all
           ENFE subissues becoming closed, pending confirmation.
           We continue to develop MULTIFLO, and we've conducted
           some process-level modeling and experimental studies
           which are designed to probe DOE assumptions regarding
           processes judged to be the most risk-significant.
           That's all I have, and I'll take your questions.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks, Bobby.  Ray,
           you want to start?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes, I'll start.  I
           think you'd probably agree that the chemistry of the
           near-field and especially the chemistry in the package
           is extremely complex and especially with regard to
           potential solid phase formation.  And I just wondered
           if the thermodynamic database available for your
           modeling is anywhere near adequate to deal with all
           the potential phases that could form and tie up some
           of these things?
                       MR. PABALAN:  With respect to the pure
           phases, there might be enough information to allow us
           to do the evaluation.  But there are certainly more
           complex solid solutions and things like that where we
           don't have any information.  Can we use better
           thermodynamic data?  Certainly.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  But you feel what
           you have is adequate to the task.
                       MR. PABALAN:  It will allow us to evaluate
           trends in the evolution and the chemistry of not only
           water outside the waste package but also inside the
           waste package.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Okay.  The second
           question I had is I was -- just kind of an
           observation.  I was a little bit surprised to hear you
           say that you thought that the calcium nitrate ion
           pairs are sufficiently strong that they would
           significantly reduce the nitrate ion -- free nitrate
           ion concentration.
                       MR. PABALAN:  Yes.  You're not the first
           one to ask me that, and I've done a literature search
           on calcium nitrate.  There are a couple of what we
           consider multiple lines of evidence.  There are some
           indirect measurements of water activities or osmotic
           coefficients and some more direct, like x-ray
           diffraction analysis of calcium nitrates, which
           suggest that you do form strong calcium nitrate,
           especially at the higher concentrations which is of
           interest to us.  That's a review that I'm still doing.
                       I also have some random spectroscopy
           literature that I just got precisely to address the
           potential for -- whether it's true, whether calcium
           nitrate does form strong complexes.  But the
           indications are, yes, it does.  I don't know if it's
           greater to the extent that is suggested by the
           thermodynamic modeling.  That's something that we will
           pursue in the next few months.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Yes, I'm skeptical.
           Okay.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I've got, I guess, two
           questions, and it's more maybe to determine whether
           they're included in your scope or not included in your
           scope.  In the near-field, you've discussed the
           chemistry.  Where are the mechanical assumptions
           reviewed?  And by that I mean things like the
           corrosion of the waste container is going to occur
           here and not there.  The thing at one of the modelings
           that we came across said the minute you penetrate and
           the container is no longer vacuum-tight, you make the
           assumption that 50 percent of the surface of the
           container is gone.  There's a lot of mechanical
           assumptions in the near-field that are in the
           modeling.  Is the review of those things under your
           area or is that somewhere else?
                       MR. PABALAN:  We help review the DOE
           approach to these kinds of calculations.  We don't do
           independent analysis, whether experimental or
           modeling, with respect to that, although we provide
           some input in the TSPAI type of analysis, which kind
           of puts these things together.  We're more focused on
           the chemistry aspect versus the mechanical type of
           information.
                       MR. LESLIE:  This is Bret Leslie from the
           staff.  If Bobby moves a little bit that way, it's
           important to remember that when we developed our
           sufficiency comments, we took -- we may have five KTIs
           reviewing the same AMR, and they're reviewing it under
           their KTI, but we're providing integrated comments.
           So the answer to your question is, no, the mechanical
           things aren't necessarily reviewed by the near-field,
           but they're either reviewed by the container life and
           source term or the repository design and thermal
           mechanical effects.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  My question was were
           they included here and the answer is no, right?
                       MR. LESLIE:  That's correct.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  The second
           question is a similar one, whether it's included here
           or not, and that is the assumptions in the modeling in
           the near-field of how water behaves.  In some of the
           models, there's kind of strange behavior for water in
           that water vapor moves independent of -- pressure
           moves only on a gradient of temperature, so you don't
           lose any water from the rock into the drift.  It all
           moves away.  Now, there are similar things that are
           assumed assumptions without evidence in the modeling
           but in the near-field.  Is that also somewhere else?
                       MR. PABALAN:  Subissue I pertaining to
           seepage and flow addresses specifically that issue,
           but it is not -- well, it is but not in the -- it's
           not considered in the modeling activity that I
           discussed with respect to the --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Somewhere else.
                       MR. PABALAN:  Yes, it's done somewhere
           else.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, just a comment.  By
           the number of agreements, one might get the impression
           that as far as the near-field goes, DOE did very
           little right.  And yet I've always had the impression
           that this is where a lot of effort was given.  Is it
           possible that this is a product of what one might call
           the lamp post syndrome, because there was quite a bit
           of work done there is an opportunity for searching for
           more details?  I'm just struck by the amount of -- the
           number of agreements that are involved here.  It's
           just --
                       MR. PABALAN:  I would disagree with your
           characterization that the DOE did very little.  In
           fact, it could be the lamp post effect.  It's evident
           since the publication of the TSPA-VA and subsequent
           reports that the DOE has significantly improved their
           THC models and model abstractions for the near-field
           environment.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, maybe that's the
           problem.  Maybe it's the timing is what -- what's the
           cutoff time for these 41 agreements, I guess is what's
           --
                       MR. PABALAN:  The tech exchange was held
           January, second week of 2001.  So we -- I believe we
           had some teleconferences prior to that, so I suppose
           we completed our reviews a month before the tech
           exchange.  So that was the cutoff.  The 41 agreements,
           as I pointed out, most of them -- many of them are
           straightforward, just asking for technical basis for
           excluded FEPs, give us the FEPs database, give us the
           ET-36 input files.  So, essentially, most of them are
           relatively straightforward to fulfill.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.  Well, the timing
           answers part of it, because you had on there a lot of
           information about propagation of uncertainty, and I
           know there's been quite a bit of that sort of work
           done in the last year.
                       MR. PABALAN:  Yes.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.  Okay.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Other questions?
           Staff?  Comments?  Okay.  We're going to take a 15-
           minute break.
                       (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
                       the record at 3:08 p.m. and went back on
                       the record at 3:25 p.m.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  The meeting will
           come to order.  If I have my schedule right now, we
           have three remaining presentations on KTI, and the
           next one is on repository design and thermal-
           mechanical effects.  Don't run away.  You ready?  And
           I'll let you introduce yourself, for the record, as
           everyone else.
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  My name is Goodluck Ofoegbu.
           I'm going to present -- do the presentation on
           repository design and thermal-mechanical effects.
                       The presentation follows the same outline
           as others have followed, but some of the issues of
           resolution talk about what needs to be done before
           license application.  There are actually -- there used
           to be four subissues, but the fourth one has been
           resolved, and we've essentially taken it off the list.
           All of the components of Issue Number 1 is resolved,
           and the components of Issue Number 2 also have been --
           is closed-pending.  Issue Number 3 is where I'm going
           to -- well, Issue Number 2 actually is an input to the
           first component of Issue Number 3.  So I'm going to
           concentrate my discussion on these three.
                       There is a component that deals with
           repository design which really is part of the
           preclosure that has been discussed along with other
           aspects of the -- possibility aspects of the
           repository, and that's why I happen to be talking
           about it.  And then there are two components of
           Subissue 3 that led to the post-closure repository
           performance that is rockfall and drift collapse and
           their longtime hydrological properties.  And all of
           these issues -- all of these components are closed-
           pending because of the technical exchange meeting --
           the results of the technical exchange meeting that was
           last week.
                       On repository design, we have agreements
           that deal with essentially the inputs, the design and
           analysis.  The first one is about seismic topical
           report 3, which is going to be the time histories of
           ground -- which -- that should be applied for the
           design of subsurface facilities and surface
           facilities.  That report is supposed to be -- they've
           postponed a number of times.  It's supposed to be
           delivered finally in January of this year and is
           probably on its way as I speak, I believe.
                       The properties of ground support, the only
           issue here is that -- the only concern, I should say,
           is that DOE wants to exclude corrosion of ground
           support -- possible corrosion of ground support
           material during the pre-closure period.  And the
           argument for that is that we don't want that to cause
           cooling corrosion or obvious corrosion.  All they need
           to consider is dry air oxidation and to get rid of
           that is very slow for -- and will not cause
           appreciable corrosion for 300 years.
                       And we asked them to produce a technical
           basis to support this position on humidity.  They have
           in fact submitted a report on that.  We've looked at
           the report, and we are in the process of getting back
           to DOE on it.  The one thing I can say is that we are
           not convinced that a satisfactory case has been met to
           exclude corrosion of ground support materials for the
           200 or so years of the pre-closure period.
                       On rock properties, DOE approach is to use
           the Yucca Mountain fracture data to obtain values of
           rock mass in this list that can then be used to get
           the mean values of rock mass properties that are used
           in design.  And that is a valid approach except that
           we are not convinced that DOE has done enough to
           define the uncertainties.  For example, Yangs Modulus
           controls the stress.  It is possible on the analysis
           to go from a favorable analysis result to highly
           unfavorable analysis result by changing the value of
           the Yangs Modulus.
                       So one of the things we want to know is
           within which range is it -- I mean what are the range
           of things of Yangs Modulus for each quality value.
           The same thing applies to the rock's strength
           parameters.  Of particular concern here is also that
           quality in the -- the practice of using quality
           indices to characterize rock mass actually tries to
           account for the face of fractures and not the face of
           spherical discontinuities like the lithophytes which
           are caused over more than 70 percent of the proposed
           repository horizon.
                       So we asked DOE to provide an analysis of
           what the approach is for dealing with lithophyzing.
           And DOE has agreed to do this, along with all the
           analysis that they need to do for our properties.
           They are going to look at the information they have,
           analyze it and then decide that that is necessary and
           then compile all of this in the design analysis -- I
           mean design parameter analysis report that should be
           submitted sometime within this year.  And we believe
           that if they do all that, that the information
           presented is likely to be sufficient for review.
                       Then the DOE intends to use rock mechanics
           analysis to demonstrate that the -- all the ground
           openings will be stable through the pre-closure period
           to support the pre-closure and all the things that are
           required.  And that is, again, a good approach.  It
           could be supplemented with a maintenance plan, but
           that hasn't been discussed.
                       But in the analysis there are several
           things that -- several analysis approaches that we
           found unsatisfactory.  For example, to specify
           boundary conditions, how they are specified.  For
           instance, in the seismic loading, they were using it
           in a certain way that is based on the zero
           acceleration.  But the ground motion is characterized
           by a time history that contains multiple frequencies.
           And they argued that this approach is satisfactory,
           except that we have not seen the basis on some kind of
           testing or some kind of modeling that says that these
           two systems of loading I approve of them.  Then
           conduct some sensitivity analysis and submit a report
           of the analysis by I think it's 2003, so that's not
           coming this year.
                       On post-closure, the first is rockfall and
           drift collapse.  Not included in performance
           assessment, the point is cleaned out using a
           combination of design and probability.  For rockfall,
           DOE wants to design -- DOE wants to select a design
           basis rock impact and design the drip shields and
           waste packages to withstand such rock impact, and then
           argue that the probability of larger impacts will --
           what's happening?  I thought you could hear me.
                       PARTICIPANT:  You didn't turn it on.
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Oh.
                       PARTICIPANT:  You've been talking very
           load.
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Oh, really?  Okay.  The
           problem is I can get too loud now.
                       (Laughter.)
                       Okay.  So they want to design the drip
           shield and waste package to withstand the design basis
           rock impact and then argue that larger impacts -- the
           probability of larger impacts is below the regulatory
           limit.  And we believe that this approach is valid.
           There are a number of things, the way that they define
           the design basis rock impact, both the size and
           frequency.  We had problems with that.  We had problem
           with how they conduct analysis to demonstrate a drip
           shield and waste packages will withstand impact.  We
           also have problem with the probability of larger
           impacts.  But the approach that DOE has selected
           should lead to a resolution of these if things are
           carried out satisfactorily.  And there is no reason
           why they cannot be carried out satisfactorily.
                       Where we have considerable doubt about the
           DOE approach is in drift collapse.  DOE wants to prove
           that the placement drifts are not going to collapse
           for 10,000 years.  And all of the analyses that we
           have done at the Center, all of the information
           available from underground rock engineering experience
           and in fact even advice provided by DOE's own expert
           panel on emplacement drift stability lead us to
           believe that the emplacement drifts are likely to
           collapse soon after the cessation of maintenance.
                       And because of that we are not able to
           anticipate that a satisfactory technical basis can be
           developed to support the DOE position that emplacement
           drifts will not collapse.  Instead we anticipate a
           satisfactory case can be made by considering the
           magnitude of these potential effects of drift collapse
           and maybe making an argument based on the magnitudes
           of propagation of those magnitudes where necessary to
           the ultimate performance measure, which is dose.  And
           that such an argument will leave considerable room for
           resolution of the concern.  But an argument that is
           based on the drifts maintaining the integrity for
           10,000 years, even without ground support, is going to
           be very difficult to assert.
                       On long-term hydrological properties,
           again, the main concern here is that there is -- the
           thermal loading will induce rock failure in the pillar
           areas, and there are analysis results that indicate
           that this is possible.  And such rock failure would
           cause the dilation, the opening up, of the horizontal
           fractures, and that may cause diversion of water from
           the pillar to the drift area.  DOE has agreed to look
           into this and the analysis that we expect will resolve
           this concern will be submitted sometime in 2003.
                       Well, what the analysis intends to do to
           support all this?  We'll review DOE documents and
           continue interactions with DOE.  There is one meeting
           that we were going to hold sometime about October or
           November last year to look at their plan for
           implementing some of their agreements, but the meeting
           got postponed, and we are hoping that that kind of
           meeting will be held in the near future.
                       We also expect to conduct our own
           independent analysis to support our review of the DOE
           documents and to assess risk significance.  We are
           doing these analysis to examine -- to look at the
           effects of rockfall impact on the design of drip
           shields and waste packages and to look at the effects
           of drift collapse on the drip shields and waste
           packages, on seepage into drifts and on waste package
           temperature.  We will also do some scoping size --
           block size distribution analysis that will evaluate
           DOE's design basis rock size and the frequency of
           beyond design basis rock size, if I might use that
           kind of expression.
                       This is one of the analysis we conducted
           to evaluate the previous drip shield design.  At that
           time, the design basis rock size was supposed to be
           13,000 kilograms, and this analysis tested the design
           to look at the response of the drip shield on the
           design -- on the rock impact of 8,000 kilograms.
           Okay.  And what we found was that the drip shield --
           that particular design wouldn't be able to perform its
           functions on the rock impact of -- an impact by an
           eight-kilogram rock.  And we found that this result
           actually can be modified by changing the boundary
           conditions.
                       The analysis that the DOE did previously
           met certain assumptions about it -- connections of how
           the base of the drip shield is connected and all that.
           And by looking at the impacts of this, we were about
           to decide among us that that particular design would
           not be good to satisfy the rock impact that was the
           design basis at that time.  But I think DOE people are
           aware of these and we have been told that the
           assumptions is maybe in the design or maybe in the
           design basis rock, but we haven't seen where the
           change will be.
                       Okay.  We're also going to do analysis to
           try to evaluate block size distributions that will
           enable us to do an evaluation of DOE's design basis
           rock size.  We're also going to look at the assumption
           of our seepage.  Currently, what is happening in DOE's
           performance assessment is that 95 percent of the
           worker that contacts that would go through the drift
           footprints, which is an ares of 5.5 meters times I
           think 5.23 meters in the drift direction, that the
           amount of moisture that heats that area 95 percent,
           almost 95 percent of that moisture is directed around
           the drift because of the capillary barrier around the
           drift opening.
                       The capillary barrier arising from -- if
           water heats an opening -- water tries to intersect an
           opening around such a medium, the water is going to
           flow around -- flow along the surface of the solid.
           So the tendency to flow into the opening is reduced
           and only about five percent of the water is actually
           going through.  On the other hand, if you look at this
           block size, the solution comes from a simulation that
           was done at the Center.  This is just one realization
           that could be obtained from the Yucca Mountain
           fracture that -- they are all realizations, so this is
           just one example.
                       But if you apply the same concept of water
           flowing parallel to the surface of a solid, you are
           going to quickly conclude that instead of moisture
           diverting around, that in fact a lot of the moisture
           are going to be diverted along fractures and
           eventually find their way to the opening.
                       So the capillary barrier assumption that
           is currently in the DOE TSPA model and also in the
           analysis TPA needs to be modified to account for the
           potential effects of drift collapse on seepage.  We
           are going to be looking at that.  It's not going to be
           easy, but we hope that it can done.
                       There are other potential effects of drift
           collapse.  This was just shows that there is a
           variability of the kind of results that may be
           expected, different types and degrees of drift
           collapse.  This one, for instance, would be at the
           early stages of collapse or maybe a collapse in the
           relatively stable rock that has very little fracture
           control.  This will be early stages in vertical
           fracture control, final stages of that.  And the kind
           of thing we can expect from horizontal fracture
           control, the collapse.
                       Each of these is going to effect the
           mechanical load on the drip shield or waste packages.
           They will also effect the temperature.  In this case,
           for instance, you see that heat -- there is room for
           -- the only way that heat is transpired from here to
           there is by radiation, but here it's going to account
           as some kind of insulating effect from the rock around
           it.  So we think that these effects need to be
           evaluated, and if it is necessary carried forward to
           performance assessment.
                       In 2002, there will be many reviewing
           DOE's reports, at least those that I expected.  We'll
           be trying to make input to the TPA 5.0 code on the
           mechanical failure of drip shields and waste package,
           input to IRSR on the independent analysis for
           DECOVALEX.  Analysis participation in DECOVALEX is in
           important.  In fact, it is true DECOVALEX that we'll
           be able to decide with confidence that the thermal
           properties of in-tact rock can be used to characterize
           conductive heat flowing in a rock mass.  So that's one
           valuable contribution, and that's why we continue to
           support that.
                       In 2001, most of our accomplishments are
           really related to the technical exchange and to the
           participation in DECOVALEX.  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thank you very much.
           Milt, questions?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  I have one.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Microphone.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I have one question on
           the -- where you asked for the providing of seismic
           loads, the NRC is sending out for public comment 10
           CFR Part 72, which is geological and seismological
           characteristics for siting and design of dry cask
           independent spent fuel storage installations.  Is
           what's being done here consistent with that since that
           seems to be a very advanced stage?
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  I'll let Raj handle that
           question.
                       MR. NATARAJA:  This is Raj Nataraja, NRC
           staff.  Part 72 is a very focused rulemaking just for
           the ISFSI and NRS, and they had full options under
           consideration, one of them being consistent with what
           we are doing in Part 60 and 63.  And they changed
           their approach, and now they're going with a single
           2,000-year return period earthquake, which they
           believe is consistent with the risk level for the
           ISFSI.  However, for the repository, we have the
           topical report approach where we have agreed on two
           different levels of earthquakes -- Category 1 DBE,
           Category 2 DBEs -- which it corresponds to 10,000-year
           and 1,000-year earthquakes.  So Part 72 is not going
           to be doing what Part 63 is doing.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  I guess my question
           really is I view the Part 72 as recognizing that the
           potential risk from a spent cask storage facility is
           not the same as that of a reactor.
                       MR. NATARAJA:  That's right.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  And, therefore, the
           general thinking and ground rules that go with a
           reactor, safe shutdown, earthquake, et cetera, are
           being set aside, and we're saying, "Let's tailor the
           seismic requirements to the potential consequences."
           I guess really my question is which philosophy is this
           based on, reactor philosophy or the dry cask storage
           facility?
                       MR. NATARAJA:  It is neither.  It is based
           on the repository philosophy, which is a third
           category, I would say.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  But that -- okay.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Ray?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I had just a couple
           of things.  I couldn't help but wonder why if they're
           designing the drip shield to withstand a rockfall
           impact, and that's part of their argument, why they're
           also doing that for the waste package or visa versa.
           If they're designing the waste package to withstand
           rockfall, why the drip shield?
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Well, actually we have asked
           the same question.  It's not yet clear whether the
           drip shield is being designed to protect the waste
           package from rockfall impact.  What it appears is that
           at this point the function of the drip shield is to
           protect it from dripping water, and so in analysis
           then we are going to look at the possibility of a drip
           shield actually contacting the waste package during
           the deformation episode.  We are going to look at the
           waste package carrying some static load and then
           vibrating on the seismic load, a number of things like
           that.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Second question is
           how is it assumed that the rocks fall?  Do they fall
           flat?  Do they fall on an edge?  Do they fall on a
           point?
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Well, those are all
           possibilities.  The previous DOE analysis actually
           assumed they fall flat, and it's one of the things
           that we were not happy about, and there is an
           agreement item under the technical seal list area to
           consider point impact.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Point impact is what
           you're using.
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  That's one of them.  Point
           impact, line impact, surface impact are all
           possibilities, so those have all been --
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  And you're looking
           at all of them; is that what --
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Yes, yes.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  And, finally, you
           said at one point toward the end there that heat
           transfer is only by radiation from the drip shield to
           the drift wall.  What happened to convection?
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Well, convection too, but
           it's mostly radiation.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  The whole thing
           doesn't hit you too hard that those temperatures --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  It's hard to believe
           it's mostly radiation at these low temperatures.
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Okay.  The point that -- let
           me now go into it.  The point there is that when the
           drift if filled with broken rock, the role is
           radiation is going to be removed and you're going to
           have conduction through broken rock and maybe
           convection through the pore space that is still
           available.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  That's all I have.
                       MR. AHN:  Can I --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Tae Ahn?
                       MR. AHN:  Yes.  Tae Ahn, NRC staff.
           Regarding the rockfalls, CNSTE is coordinating with
           IDTME.  The staff member at the Center who is working
           on is Dr. Goody, and I believe DOE threat is to avoid
           any waste package failure by rockfall.  The primary
           barrier to prevent the rockfall failure is drip
           shield.  Therefore, they tried to design drip shields
           to withstand the rockfall.  Nonetheless, Dr. Goody
           raises several detailed questions, including rockfall
           effect on the waste package.
                       PARTICIPANT:  That's sort of go back.
                       MR. AHN:  Yes, that's what we did.  The
           second one is in his analysis by Dr. Goody he also
           raised the point of contact.  We raised that issue in
           the preclosure tech exchange as well as IDTME tech
           exchange with DOE.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Tae Ahn just answered my
           question.  I'm in good shape.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Other
           questions, staff?  Thanks very much Goodluck.
                       MR. OFOEGBU:  Okay.  Thank you.
                       MR. NATARAJA:  Let me just add one more
           thing to the question related to the seismic design.
           The Part 72 considers a 20-year design life, whereas
           we are talking about 100 years preclosure right now
           for design purposes.  That is one major difference.
           And the quantity of waste is another difference
           between the two.  And because we had this topical
           report agreement with DOE, we are not going to make
           changes based on what Part 72 is doing.  We are
           expecting Part 72 to be doing what we are doing
           originally, but because of some of the exemption
           requests that they had, they took this approach.  And
           we are working with them closely.  We are not
           inconsistent with what they are doing.  In terms of
           risk space, we are quite similar.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  We're going
           to hear about preclosure.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Good afternoon.  My name is
           Bis Dasgupta.  I'm here to present to you the
           preclosure aspects of the RDTME KTI.  I would like to
           first acknowledge the contributions of the NRC and the
           Center staff.  From the number of participants, you
           can guess that there has been quite an increased
           activity on the preclosure in the past year.
                       This is the outline of this presentation.
           The format of this presentation is similar to all
           other KTIs that you have been hearing so far, so I'm
           not going to go through this list again.  The summary
           of issue resolution status, staff had their first
           technical exchange and management meeting with DOE on
           the preclosure safety.  It was held on July of 2001.
                       Preclosure safety was divided into ten
           topics consistent with the Yucca Mountain review plan,
           and each of those topics were further divided into
           subtopics.  Selected subtopics under some of these
           topics were discussed at the technical exchange.
           Based on the discussions, NRC and DOE have reached a
           number of agreements on selected subtopics.
                       The next three slides actually summarizes
           the ten preclosure topics that DOE needs to address
           before the license application.  The subtopics and key
           concerns and the number of agreements that has been
           reached.  The total number of agreements were about
           nine, and in addition to these agreements there were
           three position papers that were developed by NRC.  I'm
           not going to go through the details of these three
           slides, but I would like to, however, point out that
           the identifications of these subtopics and concerns
           were based on limited, focused, risk-informed review.
           And some of the concerns were of higher level or
           general in nature, and some of them were specific.
                       More concerns will be identified with
           ongoing review, and those concerns will be discussed
           in the coming technical exchanges that we plan to have
           with DOE.  And all topics -- we will have concerns on
           all topics, including those listed over here.
                       What does DOE need to provide before LA?
           The list that you will see in this slide and the next
           slide is actually based on the July technical
           exchange.  First of all, DOE will revise the flow
           diagram that defines the preclosure safety analysis
           methodology that incorporate and consider both
           internal and external events in the preclosure safety
           analysis process.
                       As regards the naturally occurring and
           human-induced hazards and initiating events, NRC has
           discussed only two hazards in this technical exchange.
           One was aircraft crash hazard, and the other is
           tornado missile impact on the waste package.  NRC has
           pointed out that the exclusion of aircraft crash
           hazard as a potential hazard in the preclosure period
           is kind of premature.  NRC stated that DOE should
           provide detailed analysis taking into account all
           types of aircraft flying in the vicinity, including
           the reasonable projections of the future activity.
           Flight modes of military aircraft and combat training
           aircraft should also be included in their analysis.
           DOE will assess these hazards and will provide updated
           reports on the aircraft crash hazard analysis.
                       DOE will also assess their evaluation of
           the tornado missile impact on waste package.  These
           were the two agreements that were reached on the
           hazards during the technical exchange.
                       In the future technical exchange, we will
           discuss the operational hazards in nearby industrial
           and military hazards, fire hazards and any other
           hazards for which we've completed a review and have
           the concerns ready to discuss with DOE.
                       The third bullet is the justification of
           screening and categorization of event sequences.  DOE
           plans to eliminate event and event sequences from the
           preclosure safety analysis based on the design of
           structure system components important to safety.  NRC
           indicated that the DOE process of elimination of
           events and event sequences must be consistent with the
           risk-informed performance-based philosophy and should
           be screened based on probability consequence.
                       The second point on this one is that DOE
           presented their event sequence analysis with a point
           estimate of probability of component failure.  NRC
           indicated that DOE probability should consider
           uncertainty distribution in their event sequence
           analysis.  However, the mean value of the event
           sequences can be used for categorization of these
           event sequences.  Categorization means Category 1 and
           Category 2 even frequencies.
                       The consequence analysis of Category 1
           event sequences were also discussed in this technical
           exchange.  NRC has reviewed DOE evaluation of those
           calculations to public for Category 1 and Category 2
           event sequences, developed the position paper,
           accepting the overall approach of the methodology for
           the public dose calculation and the compliance with
           the performance objective.
                       In addition to the analyzed dose approach,
           which DOE is using for performance objective, for
           showing the compliance with the performance objective,
           NRC has pointed out that DOE should also look into the
           individual event dose limits, and that they should
           comply with the regulatory dose limits.  And also
           consider multiple events occurring in a single year,
           and that multiple event dose should also be complied
           with the dose limits.  One of the important outcomes
           of the preclosure safety analysis and also requirement
           of Part 63 is that the structure system components
           important to safety should be identified.
                       Number 2, topics that were discussed
           during the technical exchange.  One is the Q list, and
           the other is the quality level categorization that was
           presented by DOE.  Two agreements were reached in this
           area.  One was that DOE will modify the procedure QAP
           2-3 to identify and categorize structure system
           components involved with the safety, to include the
           risk insight gained from the preclosure safety
           analysis.  DOE will also provide guidance document for
           conduct of preclosure safety analysis.  These were the
           two agreements reached under the structure system
           components important to safety.
                       The design information of structure system
           and components important to safety, there were three
           aspects that were discussed.  One was a preclosure
           criticality issue, burn-up credit, waste package drop
           of numerical modeling and waste package fabrication
           process.  DOE will provide updated preclosure
           criticality analysis and resolve the burn-up credit.
           There was an agreement on that.  As regards the waste
           package, DOE will provide additional information on
           final modeling of waste package drop analysis, for
           example, the mischaracterization, boundary condition,
           failure criteria used.  This was one agreement that
           was reached.
                       The waste package fabrication, staff had
           several questions on the welding and fabrication of
           waste package performance, and there were three
           agreements that were developed during the preclosure
           technical exchange meeting.
                       What does NRC need to do before LA?  One
           aspect of work is to assess DOE issue closure.  DOE
           will provide the data model analysis as part of the
           agreement, and our job is to review that DOE has
           fulfilled the agreements or not.  Complete development
           of PCSA tool.  This is a tool that we are working on
           to review DOE preclosure safety analysis.  Develop
           confirmatory hazard identification and failure rate
           database.  Review DOE documents on preclosure safety
           analysis.  We will perform limited analysis using the
           preclosure safety analysis tool or any other modeling
           that we're required to do in order to satisfy us that
           the DOE's calculations are in the right direction.
           Conduct NRC and DOE technical exchange on remaining
           preclosure topics.  Those concerns, as I said, will be
           raised as the review progresses.  Prepare preclosure
           section of integrated issue resolution status report.
           That's an ongoing process.
                       Overview of fiscal year 2001 activities
           and accomplishments.  As I just said, NRC and DOE has
           just completed -- not just -- but in July they
           completed the first technical exchange.  We discussed
           12 topics, subtopics, and nine agreements were
           reached.  Preclosure preliminary design basis
           document.  Integrated issue resolution status reports
           is under development.  There were two sections that
           were already developed.  One was on the site
           description, other is the design of SSC, structure
           system component, for subsurface facility.  Currently,
           we are working on five other sections, and those will
           be available sometime during this year.
                       Preclosure tool development, this provides
           the capability to review DOE preclosure safety
           analysis, and this tool is consistent with the
           regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 63, and it is
           also compatible with the review matters of Yucca
           Mountain's review plan.  This tool also has the
           capability to conduct independent analysis on all
           aspects of preclosure safety analysis.
                       We have also reviewed and looked into the
           incorporation of human reliability and software
           reliability analysis in the preclosure safety
           analysis.  We reviewed the basic concept of selected
           methodologies from considerable research and guidance
           developed by NRC on human reliability analysis.  We
           explored the significance of software reliability and
           reviewed basic concepts of methodology from research
           and guidance again developed by the NRC.  This
           software reliability, I want to clarify, is that DOE
           is planning to use remote operations in the preclosure
           in the surface and subsurface facility operations, so
           we'd like to look into that reliability of the
           hardware and software in those remote operations and
           what sort of hazards that they can lead to.
                       Last is the development of hazard
           identification database.  Staff is collecting
           information on the nearby military and the industrial
           facility to prepare for the review.  The amount of
           information is substantial, and it will be complex.
           And this advanced activity will reduce the level of
           FERP required during the review of the license
           application.  The component failure rate database that
           we are developing, it is primarily for the PCSA tool.
                       The work plan for fiscal year 2002, we
           would like to incorporate the human reliability and
           software reliability capabilities in the tool,
           primarily to review DOE's work, incorporate
           probablistic safety assessment capability, improve on
           the existing features based on the NRC and Center
           staff feedback.  This would be an ongoing process.  We
           would like to fix whatever problems that we have with
           the tool, and this is therefore that we will devote
           ourselves in this year.  Review DOE documents and
           preclosure safety analysis, including limited
           independent analysis, prepare for NRC/DOE technical
           exchange for an Appendix 7 meeting, including
           identification of key concerns, continued preparations
           of preclosure section of the integrated issue
           resolution report, and continue development of hazard
           identification database.
                       In summary, the main -- as I said, there
           has been quite a bit of activity in the past year.  We
           had the first technical exchange with DOE.  We
           continued development of the preclosure safety
           analysis tool, and we have also started working and
           developing the preclosure section of the integrated
           issue resolution status report.  With this, I would
           like to answer any questions you have.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks very much.
           Let me start with one that occurs to me.  Has there
           been any recent impetus to consider hazards due to
           terrorist activities?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Well, I'll have Banad
           answer that, because we are really following the Part
           63.
                       MR. JAGANATH:  Right now there are -- this
           is Banad Jaganath, NRC staff.  Right now we are only
           working towards the current Part 63, but I know
           there's been going on about the hazards thing.  Tim
           McCartin does that because he's a Part 63 man.
                       MR. MCCARTIN:  Yes.  Briefly, in final 63,
           the Commission did speak briefly to that, and right
           now -- and it's really in its early stages.  The
           Commission is reevaluating fiscal security
           requirements, et cetera.  And right now there is no
           planned changes to any regulations; however, it's
           currently going on.  We'll see what happens, if there
           are changes, that it be done through a public
           rulemaking.  And it is possible.  Right now there
           aren't particular changes in mind.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks.  John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  It's been a while since
           we heard about the PCSA, that's preclosure safety
           assessment; is that what that is?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  The tool you're talking
           about?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes, the tool.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Tool, yes.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes, preclosure safety
           assessment.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  And as I recall, that was
           pretty much quite similar to and based on integrated
           safety analysis method that's described in Part 70.
           And the analysis is focused on the event sequences and
           establishing likelihoods and consequences of specific
           sequences.  Can you tell me, and the thing that we
           have been looking at in Part 70 is how ISA independent
           safety analysis, the tool that's been developed, can
           serve as a building block towards PRA, or QRA, if you
           prefer, probablistic risk assessment.  Has that been
           kind of the strategy with respect to PCSA is to
           structure in such a way that you could go to the next
           level without having to do a lot of things over?
           Number one.
                       Number two, is there an aggregation of
           assembly component to the PCSA model; that is to say
           do you aggregate or assemble the scenarios, the event
           sequences to some higher measure of risk?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes.  I think there's a lot
           of activities going on in that preclosure safety
           analysis area, in the tool development area.  First of
           all, I'd like to say that this tool really combines
           the methodology that has been used in the integrated
           safety analysis concept and the softwares that are
           used in the preclosure -- or PRA business.  So we are
           not doing anything new.  It's only that we are sort of
           keeping all these different gradients under one
           umbrella.
                       And the main function the tool really does
           is to follow the Part 63, or the Yucca Mountain review
           plan, what the requirements are, for example, the
           hazard analysis, the natural and human-induced hazard
           analysis, operational hazard analysis.  You know, you
           have all those different techniques.  So we have those
           techniques that are already existing that pertain to
           the tool.  Then we have the even sequence analysis by
           using the SOPHAEROS software that's been approved by
           NRC.  So we could develop those models and try to
           analyze those even sequences and do a sensitivity
           analysis and uncertainty analysis using those tools.
                       And then use the consequence analysis,
           part of it we are using in our software, to use the
           consequence analysis.  Then integrate all these
           results and try to see how the performance assessment
           or the performance objectives are made.  Because
           safety assessment in preclosure has to follow the Part
           63 Category 1 performance objectives and Category 2
           performance objectives.
                       Now, answering your questions, we probably
           have all categories or all aspects of PRA in it.  That
           means hazard analysis, we have even sequence analysis,
           we have consequence analysis.  And the safety
           assessment with the risk insight comes -- has been
           built as it is required in the Part 63.  Now, in this
           tool, we are going a little forward and trying to also
           do a probablistic -- you know, add the probablistic
           capability of the overall safety assessment in which
           we would look into the frequency probability
           distribution as well as the consequence probability
           distribution.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  And try to assess the risk
           as well.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, I was really quite
           interested in whether or not it has in it the feature
           of being able to assemble the individual event
           sequences into a total representation of --
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  That's what exactly it is.
           Yes, I mean we take all these things --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Because the ISA doesn't
           quite do that.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  No, no, no.  But this tool
           goes farther beyond that, yes.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  And it goes into it and
           then collects all this information and then tries to
           assess the risk insight of these Category 1, Category
           2 event sequences.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Raymond?
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Just a point of
           clarification.  Under the heading, "What Does NRC Need
           to do Before LA," one of the items there is, "Develop
           confirmatory hazard identification and failure rate
           database."  And then under the next viewgraph,
           "Overview of Fiscal Year 2001 Activities and
           Accomplishments," you say, "Development of hazard
           identification database and component failure rate
           database."  And then over on the next viewgraph, you
           say you're going to develop --
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  It says, "developed."
           Well, it's an ongoing process, actually, because we
           started this component failure rate database as well
           as hazard identification database, and we thought that
           we probably have reached, but there's a lot of
           information out there.  We are researching on it and
           then putting things.  So it's not complete.  Yes, it's
           an ongoing process.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Okay.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  And I think we would stop
           before LA.  And this database will be helping us in
           reviewing the --
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  I do have a real
           question to follow-up.  I don't think I understand
           what hazard identification database is.  I don't know
           where the data come in.  It seems like that might be
           a list, but I don't --
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes.  Well, as I said
           before, and I can have -- Milt is attending from there
           can jump in whenever you feel like.  This is
           collecting -- this is actually collecting information
           of the nearby military and industrial facility.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Sorry, of the what?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Nearby military activity
           and the industrial activities around the Yucca
           Mountain area.  I think there are a lot of information
           that we need to process before the license
           application, because DOE has to analyze that hazard,
           taking all the data into consideration.  And then we
           are trying to do a proactive job to develop that
           database also, because when the license application
           comes, it will be very difficult within a short period
           to process this data and to --
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Okay, thanks.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  So data sometimes is
           more than chemical concentrations developed from
           spectrophotometers.
                       (Laughter.)
                       Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  I have one
           question and one comment, sort of, I guess.
           Previously, we've been told that the KTIs are
           relatively broad so that there's a good chance that
           whatever safety case DOE chooses to make, you will
           have it covered.  You may have changed the emphasis.
           For the preclosure, is what's going on adequate to
           cover the case of whether DOE decides to use truck or
           rail shipment, because that makes a significant
           difference on the front end?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Well, are you here looking
           at within the facility, because what we are looking at
           --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes, yes.  Yes, yes.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Not the process of
           transportation.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Okay.  Well, I really
           didn't understand your question, but can you repeat
           that again?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  Previously, we
           were told that the information being assembled -- the
           whole KTI process provided you enough information so
           that no matter which safety case DOE came in with you
           would have adequate information to review that case.
           Some cases you wouldn't use all the information, the
           emphasis would be different.  And my question is on
           the preclosure, the information that you have
           requested so far, would it enable you to assess a
           preclosure system based on trucks, and much smaller
           casks, therefore, or rail cars and the different
           issues that come up with that?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes.  I mean it all depends
           upon their operations and their structure system
           components that they are using.  So they would have to
           make their safety case by whatever process --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes, yes.  I know, but
           the question is --
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  -- the information that
           you have already asked for --
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  -- in the KTIs, would it
           cover both cases?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Right now?  Yes, go ahead.
                       MR. LESLIE:  This is Bret Leslie from the
           staff.  You have to remember that both DOE and NRC
           have only recently begun preclosure in terms of
           preclosure safety assessment, and I think Bis did a
           very good job of saying of what has been provided this
           is what we have, and we anticipate more information --
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay, okay.
                       MR. LESLIE:  -- and exchanges.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Okay.  The next is a
           comment, and that is you mentioned remote operations
           as though it was something relatively new.  There is
           in Idaho some 40 years of experience of very high
           quality remote operation -- the manufacture of reactor
           fuel.  The welding, the inspection and everything,
           there's a very, very extensive database on failure
           rates and remote operations and lots of hot cell data
           all over the country, but that one is QA level that is
           comparable to this.  And I just wondered whether
           you're accessing that.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Yes.  I think we are just
           starting to work on this area and try to see what data
           is available and what are the processes that are
           available in this area.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Questions from
           staff?
                       MR. LARKINS:  Yes.  I just wanted to
           expand upon Milt's question.  Is there really enough
           information know about the above-ground facility and
           stuff that you can do an adequate hazards analysis,
           and how do you plan to treat things like fires without
           knowing a little more about the design?
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Well, I mean right now we
           have to depend upon the level of design that DOE has,
           and DOE has, for instance, you mentioned fire hazards,
           and they have reports on fire hazards, and we have not
           reviewed it totally.  It's in the process of review,
           and we didn't discuss it in this technical exchange,
           because we didn't -- but we plan to do it at the next
           technical exchange.
                       Similarly, you know, I mean, whatever the
           information DOE has, the level of details, and we are
           going to look into that and try to see that the safety
           case has been made based on that details.  If there is
           lacking in details, that we feel that DOE needs to
           provide us more information, we will definitely ask
           for it.  And this is the whole process of the
           preclosure safety analysis that we'll work through.
                       MR. LARKINS:  It will be an iterative
           process.
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  It is iterative process.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Yes.  Do you have a model
           for fire hazards calculating loads and --
                       MR. DASGUPTA:  Well, this is currently
           being looked into.  I mean I'm not really in a
           position right now to expand on that.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Okay.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Thank you.
           And now we come to our wrap-up, James Anderson.
                       VICE CHAIRMAN WYMER:  Nothing personal,
           James, but I have to leave.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  We've saved all the tough
           questions for you, Jim.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  Great.  Can you hear me all
           right?  Good.  Again, my name is Jim Anderson with the
           NRC staff, and I'm going to try to wrap this all up,
           and hopefully, like I've said, you've asked all the
           tough questions already.  Basically, what I'm going to
           try to do is I'm going to try to pull a lot of
           thoughts that people have presented and maybe pull
           them all together for the whole issue resolution
           process.  And if you have any questions after that, we
           can get into those specific ones.
                       Basically, the outline for my
           presentation, what I'm going to try to cover is the
           status of all the key technical subissues.  That will
           probably be pretty quick, because you were already
           given most of them.  I'm just going to try to
           integrate them all together.
                       Schedule and status of the KTI agreements,
           some current NRC staff activities -- planning future
           issue resolution meetings, using the risk insights in
           the issue resolution process, a little bit about the
           integrated issue resolution status report, or
           integrated IRSR.  I know I'm scheduled to give you a
           brief on that I believe in April, and hopefully that
           document will be out by that point in time.  And then
           a brief summary.
                       As has been discussed in the previous
           presentations, we've conducted technical exchanges in
           all the KTIs, and we've also had one preclosure
           meeting, and it, like this, mentioned additional
           meetings are needed, because that was only like a
           preliminary discussion of just some of the preclosure
           safety topics.
                       As a result of the meetings, the 37 key
           technical issue subissues are currently categorized as
           either closed or closed-pending, and in the backup
           slides I've included the definitions for closed,
           closed-pending and open, and I've also provided a
           table that lists all the key technical issues and the
           subissues and their current status in one place.  So
           if you need to look at those.
                       The technical exchanges also resulted in
           293 NRC and DOE agreements.  And the agreements cover
           a variety of issues -- documentation.  DOE provided
           some information at the meetings and all we needed was
           the documenting of that information.  We asked for
           additional technical basis and justification, as
           you've heard in a number of examples in the earlier
           presentations.
                       In some instances, we've asked for data
           files that we want to review as part of our analysis
           of what DOE's doing.  So I guess the point I'm trying
           to make is I've heard a lot of discussions of the 293
           agreements being 293 issues, and it's really not 293
           issues.  There's a lot less than that.  Most of this
           is confirmation type information or just data files
           and things like that.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Jim, let me try to
           get a little clarification on that.  Yesterday, John
           Garrick and I spoke with Commissioner Merrifield, and
           he expressed an interest in knowing from the KTIs
           which ones were potholes, speed bumps or road blocks.
           On the 293 exchanges -- or agreements, rather, how
           many of them would you say fell into this category of,
           "Please give us a data file on this or give us your
           data on this"?  That's number one, and maybe they're
           potholes, I don't know.  And how many of them are
           detailed requirements for, let's say, two years of
           data collection?
                       MR. ANDERSON:  I really haven't look at
           them in that specific of detail.  Probably a good way
           to look at those would be the chart that Bret
           presented in his presentation which had major --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Right.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  I would say in those areas,
           the ones that are listed as major probably have the
           two-year testing things you're talking about there.
           And the ones that are listed in more of the minor
           category are probably just, you know, "We're
           interested in the data files that back up some DOE
           position on something like that."
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Push a little
           harder.  Give me your gut-level feeling.  Of 293, are
           150 of them in this category of data files?
                       MR. ANDERSON:  No.  There's a lot less
           than that are category of the data files.  I would say
           the majority of the agreements are -- I don't know if
           it was Bret or someone else in the presentation
           characterized them as, you know, if DOE said they were
           exclude something in TSPA, we wanted additional
           justification or technical bases for why they're
           excluding it.  I think most of the -- and if I'm
           speaking, Bret, you can correct me -- but I think most
           of them fall into that type of category more so than
           the data files category.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Just carrying that
           onward, I guess DOE hasn't indicated any ballpark
           effort that's required to fulfill these agreements.
           And then if one knew that, you could ask, well, how
           many are above a certain -- some thresholds of level
           of effort would be very helpful in kind of grasping
           what we're really talking about right here, because
           these numbers are being used abusively around the
           country, that we converted a few KTIs into 300 issues
           very easily.
                       And it's true that a large number of them
           are just requests for reports and existing data and
           what have you, but there's probably some number, 50,
           that require a level of effort that maybe is multi-man
           year, I don't know.  Some sort of a comprehension of
           what we are really talking about here would certainly
           be helpful.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  Right, and I think we'll
           probably get closer to that in the next several
           months.  As Bret mentioned, he, with a number of other
           people, are doing the risk insights initiative, which
           will be some of our look at which KTIs, KTI subissues
           and agreements might be more risk -- have more risk
           than others.
                       And then also the DOE plan, when they
           present their plan for going from fiscal year '02 to
           license application and they were going to include in
           that how they're going to address the 293 agreements,
           I think that information might also add to our
           understanding of which ones that are going to have the
           most effort -- that are going to need the most effort.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  John, we might ask the
           other side of that coin:  Has anybody in NRC made an
           estimate as to how many man years it will take you to
           review those 293?  That you should have done for
           planning purposes?
                       MR. ANDERSON:  Well, I think we took a
           very quick look at with Bret's table.  I don't think
           -- there's just too many variable, especially with the
           possible design changes and things like that.  Some of
           the agreements could take a long time if they do one
           design but could take very little if they do a
           different design.  So I think an effort like that on
           the NRC side I think -- I don't know if it's fruitful.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  I guess the only point
           here is that somehow we need to blunt the somewhat
           facetious interpretation of what's going on here, that
           we've converted ten key technical issues into 293
           technical issues.  And that's what we're wrestling
           with.  And I know they're not issues -- they're not
           technical issues.
                       MR. PATRICK:  Dr. Garrick, Wes Patrick
           here at the Center.  Perhaps a couple points I would
           add to that.  One of the problems we seem to continue
           to bump into is semantics.  You certainly, and I think
           a number of others on ACNW, are more familiar with the
           term of RAI, request for additional information, that
           comes into play once a license application has been
           received.
                       In my view, the agreements are much more
           analogous to RAIs.  They're items that are necessary
           for the staff to receive and review to be able to
           reach a determination that there is reasonable
           assurance that the public health and safety is going
           to be protected in accordance with the regulation.
                       The KTIs are considerably higher than
           that, and Tim McCartin could speak to this, but we
           worked very hard to craft Part 63 in a way that would
           address things in those larger lumps, if you will, of
           technical concern processes, groups of processes that
           are important to understanding the risks associated
           with pre- and post-closure performance of the
           repository.
                       I think if people were go to back and look
           at a typical reactor case, certainly we're very
           familiar with it here with regard to independent spent
           fuel storage installations.  It's not at all uncommon
           for there to be scores, perhaps hundreds of requests
           for additional information.
                       What makes things a bit different here,
           and this is the second point I would make, is that the
           Nuclear Waste Policy Act specifically directed NRC and
           DOE to get some of that work done ahead of time.
           Hence, the introduction of terminology of agreements,
           meaning pre-license application sorts of requests for
           additional information.  So I don't see these
           particularly unusual when they're taken in that sort
           of a context.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  I'm sure you're right,
           and all we're trying to do is to help this process of
           communicating with the outside world.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  Thanks, Wes.  All right.
           That's about all I had to say about the status of the
           key technical issue subissues.  I was going to move on
           to schedule and status of KTI agreements.  As of the
           end of the year, DOE submitted information pertaining
           to 88 of the 293 agreements.  Understand this is a
           fluid-type process, so basically whenever they submit
           something or whenever we review some documents and
           send letters back to them, the numbers will change.
                       The DOE schedule for providing information
           on the remaining agreements is as indicated right
           there:  89 in fiscal year '02, 84 in fiscal year '03
           and 32 by license application.  And I'm sure a number
           of you will add all four of those numbers up to see if
           they equal 293.
                       (Laughter.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  They don't.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. ANDERSON:  Moving onto the next slide,
           for the fiscal year '02 agreements, and those I mean
           the agreements which were due in fiscal year '02, DOE
           submitted the information mostly on time.  And by what
           mostly on time I mean is within a month of the due
           dates.  We've reviewed probably about half of those
           agreements, and additional information has been needed
           on several of those.  We're in the process of issuing
           three or four additional letters, which will cover the
           rest -- I shouldn't say the rest -- almost all of the
           rest of those agreements.  Those should be issued
           hopefully within the next couple weeks.
                       For the fiscal year '02 and beyond, the
           agreements which are due in fiscal year '02 and
           beyond, DOE is currently preparing a plan to address
           all the agreements in its fiscal year '02 and beyond
           planning to LA, so we really haven't gotten too much
           information in fiscal year '02 yet, and I'm sure that
           once the plan is announced, we'll get a better idea of
           what to expect in fiscal year '02, '03 and beyond.
                       And the current plan, at least which was
           discussed at the management meeting we held with DOE
           in December, was that they would have their initial
           plan ready for discussion in the March time frame.
           And I think they've indicated that the whole overall
           process would probably go a couple months after that,
           but we should have some initial information during the
           March 2002 time frame.
                       Next area I was going to address was the
           current NRC staff activities.  Planning future issue
           resolution meetings.  I've been internally referring
           to this as round two of issue resolution.  In round
           one, we kind of -- we've discussed all the KTIs, we
           tried to identify the information gaps the NRC felt
           needed to be filled by DOE.  And during this next
           round of issue resolution meetings, I hope to focus on
           those agreements and any new information/design
           changes that might have come up since the last
           meetings and try to refine that information gap.  With
           293 agreements, I'm sure we haven't nailed down
           exactly in words exactly what we want, so I think
           there's room for discussions between NRC and DOE to
           really focus on what exactly do we need.
                       And in those discussions, and I'm kind of
           moving ahead to the red bullet there, we're planning
           to have a meeting in early February to discuss future
           meetings -- how we're going to conduct those meetings,
           how we're going to use risk insights in the process,
           priority -- which KTI or which agreements do we want
           to discuss first.  And also during that meeting I'm
           hoping we can discuss some NRC/DOE communication
           issues.
                       And by those I mean how we're
           communicating the status of current activities just so
           when we do get documents in, they're not surprising to
           us.  Or when we issue reviews and stuff, they're not
           surprising to DOE.  So that's what I'm hoping to
           accomplish in the early February meeting, and I
           already mentioned that hopefully in March we'll
           discuss the DOE plan.
                       And in the remainder of fiscal year '02,
           we'll start holding these meetings, and I think
           there's going to be both Appendix 7 and technical
           exchange type meetings.  I think Appendix 7s, and I
           believe DOE would agree with me, may be needed more
           than the big formal technical exchange meetings.  The
           Appendix 7s, the key technical people can get together
           and really discuss what the information needs are.  So
           hopefully there will be a number of each of those type
           meetings in fiscal year '02 and as I move on to '03.
                       And in the preclosure area, like Bis
           mentioned earlier, we still need to have some initial
           meetings in that area to really iron out what the
           concerns or information gaps are, and DOE needs to
           provide us information on where they're going in that
           area.
                       Bret really hit this one earlier, but I'm
           just going to try to recap it a little bit -- risk
           insights and the issue resolution process.  As we've
           discussed with you in the past, the NRC has used risk
           insights in preparation for issue resolution meetings,
           the round one meetings, as I've been calling them.  As
           we move forward into the next round with DOE, DOE has
           been looking at these agreements, I'm pretty sure,
           from a risk point.  And using Bret's initiative and
           some of the information we'll get out of that, we can
           go into those meetings and really focus on the
           agreements and see just to make sure we're asking the
           appropriate RAIs, as Wes called them.
                       And the last bullet, future issue
           resolution meetings will also use risk insights, and
           the point I was trying to get there is, basically that
           the bottom bullet, is that based on the discussions of
           risk some of the agreements may change in scope or
           possibly could be deleted all together if a DOE
           strategy is changed or things like that.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Would that also mean that
           you may recategorize the agreements?
                       MR. ANDERSON:  Categorize the subissues?
                       MR. LARKINS:  Yes.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  It could.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Not the agreement, the
           agreements.  Rather than having what you call 293
           agreements, have them recategorized.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  You mean have less or --
           I'm not sure what --
                       MR. LARKINS:  Combined group package.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  Yes.  I mean, basically,
           what -- I'm trying to think what we'd do in situations
           like that.  We've used a number of different things.
           We could just say agreements complete superseded by
           another agreement.  We could do that way or in some
           instances we've actually modified the wording of the
           agreement to be more specific.  I'm not sure if I'm
           answering your question, though.
                       MR. LARKINS:  I was going back to this
           communication issue that John had raised earlier, if
           there was a better way of categorizing the 293
           agreements into something that was more readily
           understood and less misunderstood.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  I don't think we have any
           effort at this point to do that.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  I think you can take
           that as a comment and just go on.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  At that, I will.  Moving
           on, just a quick status of where we're at with the
           integrated issue resolution status report.  This has
           been a work in progress for quite a while, and it will
           document the status of issue resolution.  It will
           follow the Yucca Mountain review plan format, and we
           expect to issue it sometime hopefully in the next few
           months, spring of 2002, which is on the slide there.
                       The first version will discuss the KTIs
           preclosure and quality assurance areas, and then
           future revisions will discuss remaining areas within
           the Yucca Mountain review plan.  As the last
           presentation in preclosure, there's a couple areas
           where -- in the preclosure area where DOE hasn't given
           us any information, so they won't be addressed in this
           first version, but hopefully we can include that type
           of information in future revisions.
                       In summary, we believe the issue
           resolution process is progressing.  The NRC staff is
           actively monitoring the agreements, and like I
           mentioned earlier, we're in the process of getting out
           several reviews of agreements that DOE has already
           provided information for.  We're anxiously awaiting
           DOE's plan to see how they're going to go from fiscal
           year '02 to LA, and I think that will help both -- I'm
           sure it will help DOE, and it will also help NRC in
           our planning for products and how we want to handle
           meetings in the future.  NRC staff will continue to
           refine the use of risk insights, and the next round of
           technical exchanges will further refine information
           gaps, which I've briefly discussed.
                       So I guess with that -- I guess I didn't
           point out during my presentation, I mentioned the
           subissue table in the backup documents.  There's also
           another table which outlines all the agreements, and
           the slide before that has the five categories I used
           to status the agreements.  So that last table is
           hopefully to capture the status of all the agreements
           in one spot.  So with that, if there's any questions
           I can try to address or I can hand off to someone
           else.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks very much,
           James.  John?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Jim.  I attended one of
           the technical exchange sessions and was reasonably
           impressed with the efficiency with which it was
           conducted, considering the size of the group that was
           there and the somewhat formal process.  You indicated
           that you're having a meeting to kind of decide what
           might be described as how to do the next round.
                       Do you anticipate any fundamental changes?
           What kind of lessons have you learned?  Do you find
           that the system from the point of view of NRC staff is
           working well?  Or if there are problems, what are
           those problems?  What do you see as the major
           difference between the second round and the first
           round in terms of the process?
                       MR. ANDERSON:  The process, at least the
           way I envision it, and, again, that's one of the
           reasons for the meeting in February with DOE just to
           make sure we're all together on it, the way I envision
           it is we'd focus to the most extent on the agreements
           themselves and any new information that comes up.  I
           think to try to just keep refining what the
           information gaps are, any additional information
           letters we've sent out to discuss those, just to make
           sure that DOE understands what the NRC's asking for
           and that the NRC understands where DOE's going, just
           to continue to refine that process.
                       One of the aspects of the first round of
           meetings that I think we will definitely need to
           continue is the number of pre-call or preparation type
           phone calls with DOE just so we're all clear on what
           we're going to try to discuss during these meetings.
           I think that was the key all the preparation for those
           phone calls and the phone calls themselves I think
           really helped focus both the NRC and DOE staffs to
           really have a productive meeting, especially when we
           have that many people involved in the broad areas.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Since these are open
           meetings to the public, do you anticipate any change
           in terms of how the public participates in the
           process?
                       MR. ANDERSON:  I think we'll try to
           continue some of the things we did toward the end of
           the first round of meetings, basically presenting kind
           of an overview of the technical area we're going to
           discuss to help the public understand the issues that
           are going to be discussed during that meeting.  We
           will continue addressing questions the public has
           during breaks or at different parts of the meetings we
           open it up for public questions and participation.
           Besides that I don't -- nothing comes to the top of my
           head, but --
                       MR. AHN:  Yes.  This is Tae Ahn.  During
           our follow-ups of DOE's implementation of the
           agreement, we learned that their official document
           lacks many details of their accomplishment.  In other
           words, they could have closed certain agreements by
           laying out properly, but they didn't do.  We know they
           implemented those aspects, but in the documents they
           just simply did not write all of them.  So in the
           coming meeting, with face-to-face meeting, we'd like
           to make sure they did they, they implement the
           agreement.  That may be an example of new things, at
           least in our set of KTIs.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Milt?
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Yes.  One question, Jim,
           which is kind of a maybe rewording that's been asked
           twice before, and I assume maybe you'll -- in the 293,
           if you were to make a guess as to are any of them, and
           if so how many, potentially road blocks, have the
           potential to say, "We're in big trouble"?
                       MR. ANDERSON:  You know, I would have to
           give those questions to the KTI leads, because I'm not
           technically smart enough to know -- I'm a process
           person.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, you're the only
           person I know that's heard all the KTI discussions, so
           I just wondered whether you'd heard people say, "Oh,
           boy, that's going to be a tough one," or whether you
           have a -- are there any potentially that are real road
           show stoppers, so to speak, do we know?  I mean just
           a feeling.  I can't ask you to project the future
           because --
                       MR. ANDERSON:  I mean I would have to go
           back again to the chart that Bret provided and which
           categories are major efforts on DOE's part.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Well, maybe a major
           effort.  That's not really the question.  A major
           effort implies that if they put some people on it,
           they can do it.  That's not necessarily a show
           stopper.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Yes.  And I think what you've
           got now is if we felt that there was a road block,
           then a subissue would have been open.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  Right.
                       MR. LESLIE:  Okay.  If you look at how
           issue resolution is defined, basically you come to
           that conclusion.  We've come to the conclusion that
           are subissues are closed-pending, which we've outlined
           what the gap is, DOE has agreed to provide that
           information, and we believe that they will provide
           that information.
                       MEMBER LEVENSON:  If I put some words in
           your mouth, would you say then that as of now you
           don't -- you can't identify any among the 293 that are
           potentially show stoppers?  Okay.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  The record doesn't deal
           with nods.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. LESLIE:  I was only imitating my boss.
                       (Laughter.)
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  And that was a vertical
           nod, John.
                       (Laughter.)
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Any other questions?
           Latif?
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Yes.  I think I want to make
           one comment that will clarify to Dr. Garrick and,
           Milt, also question.  The way to think, and this will
           follow-up maybe on what Milt said.  In other NRC
           programs, we do what's called acceptance reviews, and
           these reviews are done after a license application or
           license application is received for the sole purpose
           of determining whether or not the licensee has
           submitted a complete application, complete enough to
           conduct an objective review.  In this case, if you
           think of this as an acceptance review, then before the
           license application in the pre-license space, this
           will clarify a lot of things.  You will not find road
           blocks.  All that's being done now is saying, yes, if
           you honor these agreements, if you give us these RAIs,
           then hopefully by the time the license application we
           will have a complete application, we will accept the
           application and start the review.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Yes, we appreciate that,
           and what you're really saying is that we have to keep
           reminding ourselves that what we're talking about here
           is what constitutes a sufficient amount of information
           to be a reasonable license application.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  So when you take --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  We're not offering a
           license.
                       MR. HAMDAN:  Yes.  So the road block, if
           they come, and hopefully they will never, if they are
           ever going to come, they will come after --
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Having said all
           that, and we do appreciate that, and you know the
           sense of the reason that we're questioning.  But
           having said that, we do have not just suspicions but
           pretty well-founded arguments that all 293 are not
           equal, right?  And what we were simply looking for was
           some accounting of which ones are the ones that will
           require a major investment of person hours by DOE?  So
           that was the nature of our question had two aspects.
           But we appreciate that.
                       Thanks very much, James.  I wanted to ask
           April Gill if there was anything that I had said that
           she wanted to correct or if she wanted to comment on
           anything that has been said.  Anyone from DOE?
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Well, we just got an
           offer.  They might be willing to make a few comments
           that offer a little perspective to this.  I think we
           ought to take them up on it.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Please.
                       MR. WILLIAMS:  Dennis Williams, DOE.
           There's a lot of ways to bin up 293 agreements, and of
           course we've done -- am I coming across okay?  And
           we've done quite a bit of work on that, because we've
           had quite a bit of discussion on what these 293
           agreements entail.  And I do have one work-up here
           that has some categories and it has the number of
           agreements and percentages in those particular
           categories.  One is perform testing with the
           associated analysis.  There's 11 agreements that speak
           to that.  There's one category that says basically
           just perform some analysis.  There's 41 agreements
           that speak to that.  There's a category that says
           provide additional technical bases or documentation.
           There's 188 in that particular category; that's 64
           percent.
                       And in that category, some of those are
           where we provided what we thought was appropriate, but
           a lot of it was based on judgment, a lot of it was
           based on -- I'll put it this way:  Whenever some of
           our technical people write a report, as all technical
           people do, they understand it very well.  But
           oftentimes it doesn't come across very well to the
           reader or understandable.  So that's the traceability
           issue, the transparency issue, and a lot of that is in
           the category of documentation.  And many times we have
           an agreement that says, "Provide a technical basis or
           the DOE provide a technical basis or basically other
           evidence on how you are proceeding with regard to an
           agreement."
                       Procedures or guides that are provided,
           six.  Provide a test or study documentation.  These
           are tests or study plans; 24.  Provide existing data
           and databases, databases that already exist but
           weren't available; 13 in that category.  And then
           there's a miscellaneous category of about ten, and
           that should add up to the 273.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  One number I missed, the
           one that was the third one you gave, the additional
           technical basis and documentation.
                       MR. WILLIAMS:  Hundred and eighty-eight.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.
                       MR. WILLIAMS:  Which constitutes 64
           percent.
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  Okay.  So that --
                       MR. WILLIAMS:  And I can give you, you
           know, these --
                       MEMBER GARRICK:  These others are the subs
           of that.
                       MR. WILLIAMS:  Right.  Right, the numbers
           after that.  When we went into these technical
           exchanges and we started deciding what DOE would or
           could do, in the beginning it was, to a large extent,
           fairly simple, because most of this work was already
           in our plan.  So it was just a matter of pulling it
           out of the plan, communicating with the Nuclear
           Regulatory Commission and then deciding on when we
           would do it.  When we would do it has become more of
           the difficulty a lot of times than actually what needs
           to be done, because I think there's a lot of agreement
           on what needs to be done, because we have a technical
           staff, they have a technical staff.  They're pretty
           close on the needs.  So most of it was sorting out
           when we would actually get the work done.
                       As far as addressing the potholes, I think
           there are some potholes out there that will slow
           things down a little bit.  Are there any tar pits that
           we will become embroiled in that we will never get out
           of?  I don't think so.  I think that one of the terms
           is, "this isn't rocket science."  I mean most of these
           things can be worked out.  Some take a little bit more
           time than others.
                       We have a pretty good idea that we can
           work out these things, because we've ran the plans
           out, we've ran the scopes out.  We have a pretty good
           idea of what scope we need to have to satisfy these
           agreements.  The only problem is it extends out for
           quite a period of time, and now we're in the process
           of figuring out how do we refine that, how do we run
           some things in parallel, how do we make it come in a
           little bit sooner?
                       The areas that are the potholes, in my
           estimation, they're areas where we hadn't done a whole
           lot of work on, like container life and source term.
           We've delayed that a lot over the years.  Probably the
           other area that's going to take a lot of effort to get
           it sorted out is igneous activity.  Not that we didn't
           know about a lot of these things.  Our technical
           people had noted that some of these things needed to
           be done depending a lot on what kind of a design we
           had.
                       And as we pulled back out of the design,
           some of these things became more important.  Igneous
           activity, we've got a plan that our people have put
           together.  It's a two- to three-year program.  There's
           several million dollars involved in it, but it can be
           done.  Again, there's nothing there that is really,
           really difficult.  Biggest issues are associated with
           when we can get it done based on the resources that we
           can apply.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Good.  Thank you.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Can I ask a quick question?
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Yes.  Go ahead.
                       MR. LARKINS:  Are you prioritizing these
           now, going back, looking and establishing some
           priority for these?
                       MR. WILLIAMS:  We don't specifically
           prioritize the KTIs or prioritize the agreements.
           What is more, I think, important is doing -- certain
           things you have to do first before -- okay, in some
           cases, you have to do some testing before you can do
           the analysis of it, before you can move it into the
           abstractions and into the models.  So I think we're
           more concerned about that kind of a sequence than
           specifically prioritizing one as being more important
           than the other.
                       One other thing I just thought of, and
           that has to do with whether or not we had agreed to
           something that couldn't be done.  And one case I
           remember specifically, and that had to do with
           drilling our undisturbed samples from the alluvium,
           drilling to get undisturbed samples from alluvium.
           And in my mind, that was in impossible task, because
           I've tried to do that several times over the past 30
           years.  It just doesn't work out.  We had a lot of
           debate about that.
                       In the end, we agreed that it couldn't be
           done, we would figure out a different way of doing it.
           So based on that and some other discussions that we
           had during the sessions, I don't think that we've
           described anything that cannot be done.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Thanks very much.
           Thanks, James.  I didn't mean to keep you standing
           there all that time.
                       MR. ANDERSON:  No problem.
                       CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER:  Okay.  Well, I think
           we are pretty much on time.  That's quite amazing
           after a full day, a very full day.  I want to thank
           not only all of the presenters but all of the people
           who contributed to the material being presented, and
           I know it was a lot of people.  I know this was done
           in  a big hurry.  I appreciate that you said that you
           utilized some information that you had available prior
           to it.
                       Nevertheless, this was a big investment of
           time and effort, and certainly the ACNW and our staff
           really appreciate the effort that people went to to do
           this.  It's been very good for us to get this update,
           and after we have some discussion we may in fact get
           back to you with any points that we need clarified.
                       With that, I think what I am going to do
           is thank you for all of the Center people too down
           there at the Center.  Yes, I included the Center in my
           thanks.  I'm going to call a five-minute break.  We
           will end the recorded portion of the meeting.  I ask
           the members to come back in five minutes.  There are
           some things that we need to discuss, and potentially
           make some headway on our research report.  Five-minute
           break.
                       (Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the recorded
           portion of the ACNW Meeting was concluded.)


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