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ACRS/ACNW Joint Subcommittee, January 19, 2001


                Official Transcript of Proceedings

                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Title:                    Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
                               and Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste
                               Joint Subcommittee


Docket Number:  (not applicable)



Location:                 Rockville, Maryland



Date:                     Friday, January 19, 2001





Work Order No.: NRC-1632                              Pages 1-217






                   NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
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                     Washington, D.C.  20005
                          (202) 234-4433.                         UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                 + + + + +
                                  MEETING
              ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS (ACRS)
                ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE (ACNW)
                            JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE
                                 + + + + +
                                  FRIDAY
                             JANUARY 19, 2001
                                 + + + + +
                            ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
                                 + + + + +
                       The Joint Subcommittee met at the Nuclear
           Regulatory Commission, Room T2B3, Two White Fling
           North, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Dr. John
           Garrick, Chairman, presiding.
           COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
                 JOHN GARRICK                  Chairman
                 THOMAS KRESS                  Co-Chairman
                 MILTON LEVENSON               Member





           STAFF PRESENT:
                 MARISSA BAILEY, NMSS
                 THOMAS COX, NMSS
                 DENNIS DAMON, NMSS
                 DAVID DANCER, NMSS
                 ROBERT JOHNSON, NMSS
                 T. McCARTIN, NMSS
                 JOCELYN MITCHELL, RES
                 ROBERT PIERSON, NMSS
                 ANDREW PERSINKO, NMSS
                 PHILIP TING, NMSS
                 R. TORTIL, NMSS
                 ALBERT WONG, NMSS

           ALSO PRESENT:
                 RALPH BEEDLE, NEI
                 JACK BESS, DOE
                 JOHN BRONF, NEI
                 STAN ECHOLS, Winston & Strawn
                 CLIFT0N FARRELL, NEI
                 DONALD GOLDBACH, Westinghouse
                 DEALIS GWYN, DOE
                 PETER HASTINGS, DLS
                 FELIX KILLAR, NEI
                 CRAIG SELLERS, ITSC
           OTHERS PRESENT (Continued):
                 FRED STETSON, PARALAX, Inc.
                 TED WYKA, DOE
                 CARL YATES, BWXT, Inc.
                 KEITH ZIELENSKI, DOE




















                                 I-N-D-E-X
                            AGENDA ITEM                    PAGE
           Introduction, Dr. Garrick  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
           Current Licensing Status, Tom Cox  . . . . . . . . 8
           NRC/NMSS ISA Method, Dennis Damon  . . . . . . . .33
           Industry Presentation:
                 Ralph Beedle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
                 Jack Bronf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
           Department of Energy Presentation, Ted Wyka  . . 165
           NRC Staff Presentation, Lawrence Kokajko . . . . 197
















                           P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
                                                    (8:30 a.m.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Good morning.  Our
           meeting will now come to order.
                       This is a meeting of the Advisory
           Committee on Reactor Safeguards and Advisory Committee
           on Nuclear Waste Joint Subcommittee.
                       My name is John Garrick, Co-chairman of
           the Joint Subcommittee, representing the ACNW, and Tom
           Kress, my colleague on my left here, is the Co-
           chairman representing the ACRS.
                       Milt Levenson, a member of the Joint
           Subcommittee and of the ACNW, is in attendance.
                       The purpose of this meeting is to discuss
           risk assessment methods associated with integrated
           safety analysis and the status of risk informed
           activities in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety
           and Safeguards.
                       The subcommittee will also discuss risk
           analysis methods and applications associated with the
           Department of Energy's Integrated Safety Management
           Program.  The subcommittee is gathering information
           and will analyze relevant issues and facts and
           formulate positions and actions as appropriate for
           deliberation to the full committees, the two main
           committees.
                       Mike Markley is the designated federal
           official, the staff engineer from the ACRS/ACNW staff
           for this meeting.
                       The rules for participating in today's
           meeting have been announced as part of the notice of
           this meeting previously published in the Federal
           Register.  Publication was on December 28th.
                       A transcript of the meeting is being kept
           and will be made available as stated in the Federal
           Register notice, and as usual, if we have speakers
           other than the announced speakers, please identify
           yourselves and speak with clarity and volume so that
           we can hear you.
                       We haven't received any written comments
           or requests for time to make oral statement from
           members of the public regarding today's meeting.
           However, Donald Goldbach of Westinghouse has requested
           an opportunity to participate via telephone, and we
           are accommodating that request, I assume.
                       He's on line?  Good.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  And I thank you for that.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  And I hope you can hear
           everything.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Yes, it's coming through
           very well.  Thanks.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Thank you.
                       The Joint Subcommittee last met on May 4th
           of last year.  During that meeting, the subcommittee
           discussed the development of risk informed regulation
           in NMSS, including proposed revision to 10 CFR, Part
           70, domestic licensing of special nuclear material,
           and associated requirements for licensees to submit
           ISA summaries.
                       During that meeting and at the conclusion
           of that meeting, it was decided that the subcommittee
           wanted to get more informed, get more information on
           this whole matter of ISAs, how they were done, what
           they were, and a general what they really represent in
           the way of the movement towards risk informed and
           performance based regulatory practice.
                       This is of great interest to both the ACRS
           and the ACNW, and of course, what we're looking for as
           much as possible is consistency of application, taking
           advantage as much as we can of the experience in the
           safety field both from the point of view of the safety
           analysis report community and the probabilistic risk
           assessment community, which I sort of see the ISA as
           kind of a merging.
                       So with that, we'll now proceed, and as I
           understand it, Tom Cox of NMSS is going to lead off.
                       Tom, unless there's comments or opening
           questions by any of the members.
                       (No response.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  All right.
                       MR. COX:  Thank you, and good morning.
                       I am Tom Cox.  I work in the Fuel Cycle
           Safety and Safeguards Division of the Nuclear
           Materials Safety and Safeguards Office.  I actually
           work in a branch within the Fuel Cycle Safety Division
           that has responsibility for licensing interactions
           with fuel cycle licensees.
                       As you can see, this is just a title slide
           here, and basically we're talking about two parts of
           information this morning.  I'm going to go over
           something about what the revised Part 70 presented and
           offered, and then I will say something about what we
           are doing in the licensing arena to follow on the
           issuance of that rule, that revised rule, which
           occurred last fall.
                       I'm going to talk about essentially five
           brief topics.
                       One, I'll say something about the rule.
                       Then we'll go into the primary
           requirements of the rule, the submittals required by
           licensees, how the rule was made effective because it
           was not just a simple statement of October 18th, 2000.
           There are a few wrinkles in the submittal and the
           effectivity of the rule.
                       And finally we'll talk a little bit about
           the licensing status, which I mentioned is where we
           are in implementing the rule.
                       Any questions so far?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  So far it looks good.
                       MR. COX:  Okay.  What happened with this
           rule issuance?
                       We've spent several years getting this
           revision to the rule out.  Did you know Part 70 has
           existed for quite a few years?  This is a revision to
           Part 70 to add a Subpart H to the rule.  It's
           applicable to applicants or licensees with greater
           than a, quote, critical mass of special nuclear
           materials.
                       And the reason that's in quotes is because
           that is defined in 70.4 of the rule.  This is a
           measure applied essentially to limit the requirements
           of this new Subpart H of Part 70 to licensees that
           were considered to pose more risk.  The new Subpart H
           is limited in its application to those that have
           essentially a critical mass of special nuclear
           material as defined in the rule.
                       What was the rule designed to do or this
           revision designed to do?  It's the first addition or
           revision to Part 70 that really approaches and is
           intended to approach a risk informed, performance
           based, regulatory practice.  And I think as the day
           goes on you'll see how that plays out.
                       So what do we see has been added to the
           rule via Subpart H?
                       First of all, the primary requirement is
           that licensees perform an integrated safety analysis,
           and much of today we'll be talking about what is an
           integrated safety analysis.
                       At the end of each of these lines, I've
           simply placed the section of the rule that you can
           refer to to see what we are talking about in these
           line items.
                       Second, the licensee has to comply with
           certain performance requirements.  Performance
           requirements are actually laid out in this rule very
           specifically, and they are risk informed performance
           requirements.  They're the heart of the new Subpart H.
                       There's basically three major statements:
           high consequence events as posed by licensees'
           analyses to develop what accident sequences might be
           in the plant, potential accident sequences.  Of those,
           certain ones may be what is defined as high
           consequences in the rule, and the rule requires that
           they be highly unlikely.
                       So you have both the components of
           consequence and likelihood leading to a risk
           assessment.
                       Another performance requirement is that
           there are going to be probably some potential accident
           sequences that are not high consequence, but are what
           is defined at intermediate consequence  in the rule.
           Those are required to be made unlikely.
                       And then finally, there's a specific
           requirement on accident sequences that would arrive or
           could end in a criticality, and the requirement there
           is that these must be highly unlikely also independent
           of what threshold of consequences might actually
           arrive as measured in dose to a worker or the public.
                       So there are performance requirements,
           very specific performance requirements.  There are
           especially risk based, risk informed performance --
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Can we ask questions
           as you go along?
                       MR. COX:  Sure, surely.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Surely there's a whole
           spectrum of consequences and associated likelihood,
           and the rule apparently has decided it can bend those
           into three categories.  Is there a rationale behind
           just three categories instead of, say, five or seven
           or ten?
                       And are the criteria for getting into this
           particular category -- is it quantitative or is it
           just some sort of qualitative assessment, or is that
           something we're going to cover when we get to the ISA
           part?
                       MR. COX:  I think we'll cover this in more
           detail when we get there.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Okay.
                       MR. COX:  And I wouldn't assume or presume
           to be able to in a few minutes justify why there are
           three categories instead of five or six.  Suffice to
           say this has developed over several years of many
           discussions within the staff, and it was at the
           Commission in a proposed rule state and, you know,
           many back-and-forth discussions.
                       So we'll talk about that a little bit
           later, I'm sure, in Dennis Damon's presentation, but
           nevertheless the rule is set up in those categories at
           this point.
                       A third primary requirement is that the
           licensee  is to identify the items relied on for
           safety.  Now, what are those?
                       Those are essentially what many people a
           lot of the time call controls.  Within an accident
           sequence following an initiating event, you have
           controls in place to either prevent the ultimate
           consequence from being arrived at at all, or to
           mitigate the consequences that might be arrived at
           anyway.
                       So these controls are termed items relied
           on for safety in the rule language and in the standard
           review plan language, and there's a lot of discussion
           or explanation of what those things are and what the
           requirements are in 70.62(c).
                       Continuing with the primary requirements
           of the rule, the licensees are also to provide
           management measures which are those measures --
           sometimes they're parts of programs or they are
           functions within a plant structure that assure that
           the items relied on for safety are available and
           reliable to perform when needed.
                       These kinds of activities are like
           configuration management, training and qualifications
           of people, maintenance programs, procedures, and
           several other items that we will talk about a little
           bit during the day.
                       Fifth, the licensees are also to maintain
           the safety bases once it's established through the
           development of an integrated safety analysis, and that
           seems fairly obvious as to the why on that, because
           these plants are licensed for ten years, and the
           agency and the public need assurance that the licensee
           will maintain their safe basis of operation over that
           time.
                       They are to report changes to that safety
           basis, and there are various requirements on the
           reporting requirements for changes to the safety
           basis, as indicated by those section numbers there.
                       Number six, the licensee can make certain
           changes without NRC approval, and that's covered in a
           section that is intended to somewhat parallel the Part
           50.59 kind of procedure or facility or allowance
           because --
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Does it use those
           words, like no increase in --
                       MR. COX:  I'm sorry?
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Does it use the words
           like "minimal increase in consequence" or "minimal
           change in" --
                       MR. COX:  I don't think you'll find the
           word the "minimal increase" in this particular
           section.  We could get into that.
                       I think you were given this morning copies
           of the rule as issued on September 18th, and you can
           see in 70.72(c) what the language is there.
                       Finally, the licensee has reporting
           requirements.  These have been around in 70.50 for a
           long time.  They were added to and modified somewhat
           initially and in the latest revision to the rule.  The
           added parts of 70.72 and an Appendix A that lists the
           various types of events that have to be reported, some
           time constraints on how they are reported, but there
           are not a lot of major changes from the prior existing
           Part 70 in that regard.
                       And, finally, the NRC has adopted and put
           in the rule a back-fit constraint on the staff, if you
           will.  Under specified circumstances, the staff is
           obligated to perform analyses and justify the back-
           fit, which is an imposition of a requirement that's
           new or changed from a prior staff position.
                       This very much parallels the 50.109
           requirement in the reactor world.
                       Okay.  That's it for the primary
           requirements of the rule.  Now I'd like to get on to
           what are the basic submittals that Subpart H calls for
           now that it's on the street.  There are two.
                       The first one is coming out very quickly
           on April 18th this year.  We ask that the licensees
           submit their plan for producing an ISA.  It's
           obviously a significant piece of work, and we felt
           that there was a real advantage in staff, stakeholder-
           staff-licensee interactions prior to the complete ISA
           being produced because, after all, the rule was just
           out now in last September, basically effective in
           October, and we now are entering a phase when, if not
           starting from scratch, licensees will be making
           certain that any ISA work they've done or are going to
           do comports with the rule requirements.
                       So we would like to talk and understand
           the ISA approach that will be taken.
                       Second, the rule asks for a listing of the
           processes that will be analyzed because these
           processes may be defined at different levels.  In
           taking a block of the plant operation to analyze and
           do an integrated safety analysis of, you could start
           with something as small as a work station, which might
           be a glove box, or some licensee might talk about
           several work stations or an entire process line as
           something to be analyzed as a unit.
                       So we want to know what processes are
           going to be analyzed, and finally, we would like to
           know when the analyses will be completed for these
           pieces of the overall analysis.
                       And there's some flexibility there.
           Perhaps the licensees would want to submit their ISAs
           in more than one piece.  So that section of the rule
           actually requires these three items to be delivered on
           April 18th.
                       On October 18th, 2004, the licensees are
           supposed to have completed their ISA.  They will have
           corrected all unacceptable performance deficiencies
           that they identify, or if they've made some prior
           arrangement in the planning stage, which is the prior
           submittal, perhaps there is a plan for correcting
           performance deficiencies that would be all right also.
                       And the third thing is the licensee or
           applicant must submit an ISA summary.  Now, you notice
           the difference between number one and number three on
           that slide.
                       The licensees complete an ISA, but they
           don't necessarily deliver the ISA to us.  They
           deliver, rather, a summary of it for NRC approval, and
           that would be at the latest we'd have to see that on
           October 2004.  That's described in 70.65.
                       Those are the two basic submittals
           required under this.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Tom, is somebody going
           to get into the issue of scope in terms of what kind
           of an effort is involved here?
                       One of the issues, of course, that is at
           play is looking for alternatives to answering the risk
           oriented questions about a facility in as economical
           way as possible, and as I understand it, one of the
           attractions of the process hazard analysis based
           methods is that it's more economical, less complicated
           than what is perceived to be the implementation of
           traditional probabilistic risk assessment.
                       Is somebody going to give us some sense of
           the magnitude of these efforts?  Because my first
           glimpse at this is that that difference is not at all
           obvious, and I'm very curious based on practice.  For
           a significant fuel cycle facility, what is really
           involved in a comprehensive ISA, not just the summary,
           but the total ISA program such that you could maybe
           stack that up with something like a FSAR, a PRA or
           what have you in terms of resources.
                       MR. COX:  Well, I think there are several
           questions there, Dr. Garrick.  I'll try to give --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, I'm just looking
           for some context, and you don't have to do it now, but
           in the course of the discussions today, I think it
           would be of interest to the committee to kind of get
           a sense of scope of these things.
                       MR. COX:  Let me say I think you will see
           that in the next presentation where we are essentially
           going to discuss what our proposed method of analysis
           is, which is imbedded in Chapter 3 of our standard
           review plan, which is the only chapter of the ten
           chapter standard review plan that is not completely
           agreed on by all parties yet.  We're still working to
           arrive at that endpoint on that.
                       And the discussion there is about what
           you're talking about.  What is --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  And I've read that, and
           I have a number of questions from that specifically,
           but you know, it's not very specific about the
           question of scope as measured by something like cost
           or man-hours or schedule or what have you.
                       MR. COX:  Okay.  I don't think we'll get
           in too far today to discuss scope and man-hours, that
           is, man-hours from the standpoint of the staff, but
           the industry may have something to say about that.
                       But we will talk about the scope of the
           technical analysis that we think ought to be done and
           the way it ought to be done at this point, the staff's
           position on that.
                       So perhaps during the day there will be a
           lot of discussion.  I think we'll be able to cover
           some of these points.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  Thank you.
                       MR. COX:  We'll be around to deal with
           that.
                       Okay.  So we understand the summaries that
           will be provided.
                       How did this rule get put in place?  How
           does it get complied with?
                       Well, it's generally effective  as of
           October 18th, 2000.  That's as general a statement as
           you can make about it, but there are a couple of
           exceptions.
                       The back-fit section applies immediately
           to non-Subpart H requirements which are the
           requirements that were in place before this September
           18th issuance.
                       It applies to Subpart H requirements, that
           is, the focus of this discussion today, only after the
           ISA summary is approved by the NRC.
                       You used the word "final safety analysis
           report."  I'm thinking that in some ways the ISA
           summary could be considered a final safety analysis
           report at least to the technical analysis of risk for
           the plant.
                       Finally, the reporting requirements that
           are in 70.74 generally apply after the ISA summary is
           submitted, not necessarily approved, but just
           submitted, although there are three paragraphs within
           those reporting requirements that were effective
           already on October 18th last.
                       Okay.  That's essentially all I'm saying
           about the rule itself at this point.  Now, what are we
           doing to put the rule in place and to implement it?
                       Well, as we've kind of briefly alluded to
           here, one of the first and most important items
           priority-wise on our desktop right now is Chapter 3 of
           the standard review plan.  Again, it's the only
           chapter of the standard review plan that's not
           completely resolved yet, but it is the fundamental
           chapter, the heart of the whole standard review plan,
           and as I mentioned earlier, it could be considered the
           heart of the rule, the approach to doing an ISA and to
           reporting the results in an ISA summary.
                       So we last received the November 16th
           letter from Nuclear Energy Institute on this Chapter
           3, and we have had some other documents involved here,
           but the point is we do have some differences with the
           stakeholders in how we view what the licensees need to
           do to be responsive to the rule and to ultimately
           demonstrate compliance with the rule.
                       So we're talking about that with the
           stakeholders, and we are going to be sponsoring in the
           very new future some additional meetings, interactions
           with all the stakeholders to resolve those issues on
           Chapter 3 and get it down and get the whole standard
           review plan issues, which is the second item right
           there.
                       Chapter 3 will fit right into that at some
           point, and then we'll be able to issue the standard
           review plan, which appeared in draft form in your SECY
           paper that was issued on May 19th. I think it's SECY
           0111, which I think you have a copy of.  And there you
           see the whole standard review plan.
                       On Item 3 here, the NEI, Nuclear Energy
           Institute, has proposed what they call the industry
           guidance document on preparation of an ISA summary.
           This was posed to us I guess approximately a year ago.
           We've received several drafts of this over time, and
           the last dated November 5th, 2000.
                       And essentially this is proposed by NEI as
           an aid to the licensees doing their work and preparing
           the ISA summary.  We kind of think Chapter 3 is the
           staff's position on the necessary content and the
           recommended structure of a summary, an ISA summary,
           Chapter 3 of the SRP.
                       But as I mentioned, we have some
           differences with our stakeholders and NEI over the
           content and structure of Chapter 3.  So it's not yet
           determined finally just what our endorsement of this
           article, this document, might look like.  We just
           aren't prepared to take a position on that.
                       We think essentially it's a good summary
           of the technical elements that ought to be addressed
           in an ISA summary, but we're still talking about how
           the actual analysis, how the actual risk determination
           of potential actions in the plant ought to be
           considered and evaluated.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Are you going to get
           specific in the course of the day on what these
           differences are --
                       MR. COX:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  -- between the NRC and
           the stakeholders?
                       MR. COX:  Well, let me put it this way.
           We're going to explain what the staff thinks is a good
           approach to determining the risk of this plant, and it
           is not a PRA.  It is something short of a PRA, but we
           think it goes along basic reliability engineering
           principles and is adequate for fuel cycle facilities.
                       Dennis Damon is going to make this
           presentation.  I don't think we're going to come to a
           point-by-point discussion of, you know, we do this and
           somebody else is proposing this.  We're basically
           going to spend our time telling you the way we think
           it ought to be.
                       However, there is, I understand, an NEI
           presentation later in the day which may get into, you
           know, differences, but who knows what will come out of
           a discussion as we talk back and forth.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah.  Okay.
                       MR. COX:  But we'll get into it.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  You stoked our interest
           by making reference earlier to differences between the
           NRC and --
                       MR. COX:  Yes.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  -- and the
           stakeholders, particularly regarding Chapter 3 of the
           standard review plan, and to the extent that we can
           understand those differences, we're very interested.
                       MR. COX:  Okay.  I'll just try to
           generalize it at the top level by saying primarily we
           have an approach to risk analysis that is at least in
           part quantitative.  Our understanding of the
           industry's position is that they want to do a strictly
           qualitative approach to this, and not involve with
           failure frequencies and numbers like that.
                       But some of that will come out in later
           discussion, I believe.
                       Okay.  Where are we?  We're at number four
           then.
                       Review of previously submitted ISA
           material.  Over the last two, three years, several
           licensees, in fact, three or four of the seven that we
           have, submitted material that sort of runs over quite
           a spectrum of content, but basically it's their
           approach to doing an ISA or a part of it, an ISA
           summary or a part of it, and letting the NRC know what
           has been going on in their facilities as regard to
           these kinds of analyses.
                       This material is not necessarily -- any
           one of them is not necessarily a complete ISA summary,
           but it is certainly indicative of the way that the
           facility or the owners would do their ISA, and it was
           all into us prior to the issuance of the rule last
           September and October.
                       So it may not address all of the revised
           rule requirements.  However, these licensees have
           asked for some response from the staff that evaluates
           the material that they gave us, and we're trying to do
           that.
                       We've scheduled a response to the first
           licensee.  Actually I think it's by late January and
           only a couple of weeks, and we will respond to each
           licensee in turn.
                       Our response to that material that they
           submitted is essentially going to be a comment on the
           content, the depth and the scope of it, relative to
           the current or the issued revised Part 70.  We'll try
           to recognize those things that they have addressed,
           and perhaps then that will reduce the planning work
           load that they would report to us on April 18th, but
           we'll also be addressing those topics which we feel
           are not completely or adequately addressed.
                       So the letter that we issue to those
           people will be something like a completeness review,
           or an assessment on a fairly high level, not an
           extremely detailed level of what we think about that
           material.  But that is a work effort that is ongoing,
           and we have to conclude that.
                       Another item that we have committed to
           produce is called the ISA plan guidance.  Well, I've
           already mentioned to you they are the April 18th
           submittal by the licensees on their plans to produce
           the ISA or to revise it perhaps.
                       We plan to issue some guidance on how to
           go about that, and the requirement we're addressing is
           at 62(c)(3).  You can see that in the rule.
                       Our written guidance on this matter is on
           track for issuance with these letters that we will get
           back to the licensee commenting on the material that
           they have already submitted.
                       Okay.  To the next one, staff guidance on
           the change process and the reporting process or
           reporting requirements and the back-fitting matter,
           we're also going to develop guidance on those things.
           By "guidance," I mean some additional explanation over
           and above the words in the rule, and those matters are
           on track for work during this spring and summer.
                       And I think the first two we expect to be
           out in July-August time frame, and the back-fitting
           guidance will come along in September-October.
                       Okay.  On Item 7 there, we've talked a
           couple of times about these ISA plans.  Well, when
           that April 18th submittal comes in, then the staff has
           to review those things.  The rule requirement is that
           they be reviewed and approved.  So that's going to be
           another activity that will go on during this year, and
           I think the plan here is to finish those during this
           year.
                       Number 8 is NRC's --
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Excuse me one second.  In
           sort of the context of John's earlier question, you
           expect to finish those reviews within the year.  Do
           you have a guesstimate as to how many people it will
           take?  What are the staff resources that will permit
           you to complete review of all of those?
                       MR. COX:  Well, how many people is a
           pretty tough thing to say, but I would say I think we
           plan on doing those in a span time for each of them on
           the order of one to two months.
                       So we should be able to do six of them,
           you know, during the year.  Does that help at all?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Is there contract
           support in this process?
                       MR. COX:  At this time that's not planned.
           We're thinking about doing that in house.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Excuse me, Tom.  I didn't
           quite catch the answer to that question.  Would you
           mind repeating it?
                       This is Don Goldbach at Westinghouse.
                       MR. COX:  The answer to how long it will
           take to get it done?
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Yes, sir.
                       MR. COX:  We think we're going to finish
           those plan reviews this year, during the year.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Okay.  Thank you.
                       MR. COX:  Okay.  Now, I think I was
           starting to talk about NUREG 1513.
                       In 1995, the staff first issued our ISA
           guidance document, which is -- at the time it was
           intended to be a primer on just what an ISA is.  At
           that time, there was very little understanding of what
           an ISA is.  So that document was produced to give that
           kind of guidance.
                       It is not a detailed, prescriptive,
           description of how to produce an ISA, but a summary of
           the kinds of methods available for doing an ISA kind
           of job, you know, like so-called "as of" method, what
           if, the check list methods of going through these
           processes and coming up with what the accident
           sequences are, what the initiating events are, what
           the consequences are.
                       Most of those methods, and there are seven
           or eight of them out there that are available and have
           been used by various organizations at various times,
           particularly the chemical process industry, most of
           those methods are essentially qualitative.
                       But in that list and description are a
           couple of mentions of quantitative methods available.
           Of course you can do qualitative analyses on all of
           these methods simply by leaving out or putting in
           numbers.  You know, even fault trees can be
           constructed qualitatively, and you can learn a lot
           from it.
                       But the guidance document, NUREG 1513 that
           I mentioned was basically a review of these methods
           then in use by the chemical process industry.  It
           leaned heavily on a book produced by the ICHE and was
           essentially just our attempt to put something out
           there to help people understand what is meant by an
           integrated safety analysis.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Can I get that off of
           the NRC Web site on the Internet?
                       MR. COX:  NUREG 1513 I think you got a
           copy of in the last day or so.  Mike, didn't you get
           that?
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Yesterday, yeah, that
           was what you gave me yesterday.
                       MR. COX:  Yeah.  Now, that has been
           updated.  That book has been updated, and we plan to
           issue it within, I believe, like a month from now.  It
           should be on the street final.
                       ISA summary reviews, number nine.  Those,
           of course, are the full blown ISA summaries that would
           come in no later than October 2004, and of course, the
           staff will have to mount a major effort to review and
           approve the ISA summaries.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  Tom, how obsolete is the
           version that we have, the April of last year, relative
           to what's going to be issued in a month?
                       MR. COX:  It's pretty good because the
           changes that were made in it were primarily to
           recognize the few substantive changes in the rule that
           were requested by the Commission and to, you know,
           delete phrases like "proposed rule" and, you know,
           dates that were wrong, matters like that because, you
           know, back in May we didn't have a rule on the street,
           but you're right.  The last formal issuance of 1518 --
           "formal" I say because it's in a Commission paper that
           was publicly released -- that was the May 19th, 2000
           version of this document.
                       Okay.  As far as the ISA summary reviews
           go, they will be a fairly major effort, something on
           the order of, but maybe not as great as a renewal
           application review, and the staff is planning on
           dealing with those.
                       But the actual conduct and completion of
           those reviews will depend somewhat on what the plan of
           each individual licensee is to bring in the material,
           which could be, you know, waiting two or three years
           and then dumping a lot on the staff, or it could be a
           staged submittal.
                       So our review of that is going to be
           dependent upon what we find out from the individual
           licensees.
                       That's all I can say about the ISA summary
           reviews, and the last two items I don't have much to
           say about, except to point out that we do point out
           our interaction with stakeholders, which in this case
           include persons and groups like your own, number 11,
           and number 10 is interaction with the CRGR, which we
           anticipate here in the NRC.
                       The CRGR has already asked to understand
           better what it is we are doing or plan to do with the
           backfitting guidance, and I believe we're going to
           meet with CRGR in early February to at least discuss
           the schedule for the back-fitting guidance with them.
                       That really concludes my presentation this
           morning, and I think we will get on to much more
           interesting things with the discussion of the
           technical analysis approach that the staff is
           proposing.
                       Any questions on what you see?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah, any questions?
           Tom, at this point?
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  No, I think we're --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Milt?
                       (No response.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  Thank you.
                       MR. COX:  Thank you.
                       Now, if Richard is here, we have to figure
           out how to kill this current presentation.
                       MR. DAMON:  Good morning.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Good morning.
                       MR. DAMON:  My name is Dennis Damon.  I
           should thank Tom for referring all of the hard
           questions to me.
                       I work for the NMSS Risk Task Group now.
           I was formerly in Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and
           Safeguards with Tom in licensing, but now I'm part of
           the NMSS Risk Task Group involved in getting NMSS into
           risk informed regulation.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  You're just the guy we
           want to talk to then.
                       MR. DAMON:  I'm going to talk about what
           the objectives of the way I structured this
           presentation here.  I really intended to answer the
           question what is a real ISA look like because as an
           outcome of the previous presentation that we had made
           to the subcommittee, it seemed that that's what you
           wanted to see, was what do the contents of an ISA look
           like that's a real one.  What would the results look
           like?
                       But because the licensees did not choose
           to present to you what they actually had, I had to
           make up hypothetical examples.  So these are
           inventions.  These are not real analyses, but what I'm
           going to present are examples of analysis if it had
           been done using the method in Appendix A of the
           standard review plan, Chapter 3.
                       And so I'm just going to go through, and
           from what I can see from your questions to Tom Cox,
           you're more interested in certain aspects of this.
           You may have, in fact, already looked at the Chapter
           3, the ISA chapter of the Part 70 standard review
           plan, and so if you just want to get into those
           questions, I can do that at any time.
                       I can move through this presentation quite
           quickly if you're familiar with parts of it.  So just
           let me know what you want to do as we go along.
                       I'm going to explain the methods in that
           standard review plan, and I'm going to show typical
           results that you get when you apply that method to
           some examples which, as I say, I made these up.  It's
           going to discuss methods.  In other words, what are
           all of the tasks in an ISA, and what kind of methods
           are used to do them?
                       And eventually it's going to get to one
           particular task, which is likelihood evaluation,
           because that's the one task where Appendix A gives a
           method which is not really something that I can give
           you a standard reference to.  It is something that was
           done there just in Appendix A.
                       The other tasks in an ISA, there are
           referencing standard methodologies that are documented
           elsewhere, and I'll give those references as I just go
           quickly through them.
                       And then I'm going to apply that
           likelihood evaluation method to some typical fuel
           cycle processes, and in this I chose the examples to
           illustrate the diversity of processes there are, and
           also the fact that some of them involve issues that
           really don't lend themselves necessarily to a great
           deal of detail, but rather, involve subtle questions
           of judgment.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Dennis, I think the
           committee really appreciates your sensitivity to
           wanting to make sure that you cover the things that's
           of interest to the committee, and whether or not we
           need to do as comprehensive a coverage of Chapter 3 as
           you might otherwise.
                       I think we for the most part know
           generally what Chapter 3 is.  On the other hand, I
           think there is philosophical aspects of this that we
           are interested in that is sometimes revealed by people
           indicating how they interpret the standard review
           plan, and we're interested in that.
                       But if there is one aspect that might help
           focus this, and I would consult my colleagues here on
           whether they're in agreement, and that is the
           Commission white paper that was published a few years
           ago, in my opinion, took major strides forward in
           telling the world what the Commission at least
           understood to be risk informed and performance based
           approach.
                       And a component of that white paper, of
           course, was the triplet definition of risk, and so I
           think that if there's one aspect of all of this that
           would help focus our discussion here and recognizing
           that that contributes heavily, that is to say that the
           triplet definition contributes heavily to one
           interpretation of what is meant by risk informed; then
           I would say that that might be a guidance for what you
           talk about, namely, we're interested in the scenario
           and event sequence approach that's taken because that
           answers the first question of the triplet, namely,
           what can go wrong.
                       We've already had a number of references
           to the two other questions, namely, the consequence
           question and the likelihood question.
                       So I think that if there was one aspect of
           this that might move us to the area where we have lots
           of interest, it would be to focus on how the ISA
           addresses the triplet and, in particular, the issue of
           consequences and the issue of likelihood.
                       Because, quite frankly, there seems to be
           a tremendous effort in the standard review plan to, on
           the one hand, show full sensitivity to a risk informed
           approach, and then on the other hand, backing off from
           saying, "What we don't mean PRA."
                       And to me it's very confusing and is kind
           of irrelevant, and I see a merging of these processes,
           and I suspect that there's lots of miscommunication
           and confusion between the two schools, that is, the
           school that favors what you're now using that has its
           roots in the process hazards analysis business, and
           the school that has its roots in the reactor risk
           assessment business.
                       And I suspect that most of this is
           emotional and not real, and so we're interested in
           seeing these processes merge because we think that
           would simplify the licensing process, and it would
           move us in the direction of a genuine risk informed
           approach.
                       I'm trying to cut through a lot of stuff
           here.  My guess is that with all the energy that the
           standard review plans spans in trying to dance around
           the issue of likelihood; that if they took a head on
           approach and dealt with likelihood on the basis of
           what the evidence can support, that they would find
           that it would be much simpler, and they would also, I
           suspect, find that that would be a giant leap forward
           in the merging of the two idea.
                       So I think I wanted to make those comments
           just to give you some sense of why we're here.  We
           don't quite understand why the agency seems to insist
           on moving in all of these different directions in
           safety analysis.  They're doing it again in the waste
           field with something called PCSA, pre-closure risk
           safety assessment.  They're building a whole
           infrastructure of analysis to satisfy the risk
           informed requirements for the pre-closure phase of a
           waste repository.
                       And all of these put forth a great
           cosmetic front that they ave addressing the issues of
           likelihood.  They are addressing the issues of
           consequences, and it is based on answering the
           question of what can go wrong in the context of
           scenarios.
                       But when you dig underneath, there seems
           to be extreme differences and a lot of attention given
           to, as I said earlier, dancing around the issue of
           likelihood, in particular with risk indexing, with
           trying to define such abstract contracts as highly
           likelihood and extremely unlikely, and what have you.
                       And so we're kind of looking to how we can
           clean all of this up and make it much more
           straightforward and make it much simpler and put it in
           a framework where we don't have to do that as much,
           and that we can let the evidence speak for itself.
                       So I think if that helps in you focusing
           your presentation, then I'm pleased with that.  And if
           I've said anything that is at variance with any of the
           members, I'd like them to speak.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  You said it very
           eloquently.  I could not agree more.
                       One aspect of that that I would be
           interested in, and it's in the same category, is in
           the reactor safety business we start out by defining
           I call them risk acceptance criteria, like a core
           damage frequency or the quantitative safety goals.
                       What it does when one starts out by
           defining acceptance criteria that are quantitative in
           terms of risk, it requires essentially a PRA because
           that's the only way to get a quantitative risk number.
                       But safety goals or risk acceptance
           criteria are things that are basically judgment.
           They're what people are willing to accept.  Now, they
           don't have to be quantitative.  They don't have to be
           expressed in terms of frequency of deaths.  They could
           be expressed qualitatively in terms of things like we
           don't want to have an accident that would harm
           someone, expose them to radiation, and you don't have
           to put numbers on that, if this accident results from
           the failure of one or two or three protective
           measures.
                       You could do it qualitatively, and that's
           my impression at the moment of the difference between
           PRA and ISA.  It starts from what your objective is.
           What are your risk acceptance criteria?
                       And so I would be interested if the ISA
           process has started out with some sort of qualitative
           risk acceptance criteria and how those were arrived at
           and why we think those are acceptable.
                       That was a kind of expansion of what he's
           talking about with the triplet.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  I have a slightly different
           comment, and that is I think part of the problem that
           all the participants are facing is the presumption
           that PRA needs to be as complex and complicated as it
           currently is for reactors.
                       Some of us are old enough to remember when
           PRAs were much simpler, but the degree of complexity
           of a PRA ought to be pretty much directly related to
           the seriousness of realistic consequences.
                       And if we're talking about facilities that
           have orders of magnitude less potential consequences
           in a reactor accident, there is no reason why the PRA
           should not be significantly simpler, and I think
           that's part of the problem.
                       The practitioners are in many cases to
           blame because they're used to doing it this way.
           There is not recognition that the objective is not a
           pile of paper.  It's to assure safety, and if, in
           fact, you have a facility that can't cause major
           consequences, you need significantly less, but that's
           not a reason for not doing a PRA.  That's a reason for
           doing a much simpler PRA tailored for the needs of
           that program.
                       MR. DAMON:  I'm going to depart from the
           presentation to address your comments, and I was not
           really prepared to do that, but specifically Dr.
           Levenson's remark about the amount of work that's
           done, the level of detail, the level of complexity of
           analysis being proportional to the complexity and the
           degree of risk of a facility, those type words.
                       I just got done composing a section.  I
           was chairman of a writing group for the IIEA to write
           a guidance document on doing probabilistic safety
           assessment of nonreactor facilities.
                       I put a page in with almost exactly your
           philosophical expression.  Overseas, like in the
           United Kingdom, they mandate that quantitative
           probabilistic safety assessment be done for all
           facilities, even very simple ones, university labs and
           things like that.
                       And the phrase they use is different
           horses for different courses, and that means just what
           you expressed, which is the level of the complexity of
           the analysis reflects the level of complexity and risk
           in the facility that is being assessed, but they don't
           shy away from quantitative.
                       On our side, on the staff, in the process
           of involving Part 70, we don't have an analogous
           situation here where we can easily point to that same
           process and say, "Yes, that's what we want you to do."
                       Therefore, to address the concern that
           what the staff is demanding in Part 70 is, in fact,
           like a reactor PRA, breaking things down to component
           level and justifying your failure rates from
           databases; that to avoid that issue, it was made clear
           that that was not going to be required.
                       In addition, there's the real focus.
           Maybe when I get into the example you'll see from the
           examples.  The real focus of the staff's initiating
           the Part 70 rule was really to get an identification
           of what were the items relied on for safety so that
           the facilities could focus their management attention
           on those items.
                       And that's really the more significant
           part of it.  The fact of whether or not the safety
           design is adequate or not, I think, is a thing that
           should be addressed, and the AIChE PHA methodology
           recommends that be done.
                       But they leave it up to the analysts, the
           facility to decide what methodology to use, and they
           suggest you can do anything all the way from fully
           quantitative all the way over to a holistic judgment
           that the system design is adequate by the members of
           the ISA team, the PHA team.
                       And so AIChE doesn't pin you down as to
           where you are.  If you look at the presentation that
           I have here, you'll see that the staff's suggestion is
           trying to suggest that we move as far as we can in the
           direction of quantitative, but don't go any further
           than beyond the evidence, as you said, what the
           evidence will support.
                       In many cases that, you know, is not much.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, we don't want to
           complicate and disrupt the process, and we apologize
           for doing that a little bit, but we thought it was
           kind of important for us.
                       There are a number of language issues here
           that are contributing to this mass confusion.  You
           just used one where you said, "We don't want to go
           beyond the evidence," the implication being that PRA
           goes beyond the evidence, and that's absolute
           nonsense.
                       And we have to be very careful.  You know,
           there's language in this standard review plan that is
           to me very explosive.  Like here on 3-16 it says, "An
           applicant may use quantitative methods and definitions
           for evaluating compliance with 10 CFR 70.61, but
           nothing in this SRP should be construed as an
           interpretation that such methods are required.  In
           fact, it is recommended that in any case the reviewer
           focus on objective qualities and information provided
           concerning accident likelihoods," again implying that
           PRA and quantitative methods are nonobjective, and
           that's nonsense, too.
                       There has been a terrible miscommunication
           between the advocates of these concepts.  The whole
           idea of quantitative risk assessment is to let the
           evidence speak, and in order to let the evidence
           speak, you have to cast the information in a form that
           represents the evidence, and that usually means a set
           of probability curves.
                       And that's certainly much more objective
           than not doing that.  So anything less than a
           quantitative risk assessment is increasingly
           suggestive.  It has to be by definition.
                       And so the suggestions in here, you can be
           quantitative, but you'd better be careful because it's
           kind of being interpreted that the more you're being
           quantitative, the more subjective you're being.
                       And it's unfortunate that that kind of --
           with all of the experience of this agency, that that
           kind of message is captured in a rule, and I've seen
           it in two or three other places, and it's just plain
           wrong.  It's just a plain misinterpretation of what
           risk assessment is all about.
                       So I think the work that's been done in
           ISA is great work.  I've done lots of chemical risk
           analysis, and these people have made major
           contribution to safety analysis that's in a more
           systematic and unit operations fashion, and they have
           done the best job of any community in relating matters
           of throughput, matters of cost to the safety analysis.
                       And so the contributions are great, and we
           want to capture that as much as possible, but it
           shouldn't become a contest between qualitative and
           quantitative.  I don't see an interface between the
           two.  I just see degrees of scope, that one scope is
           more comprehensive than the other scope.
                       But one of the things that is disturbing
           to me is that there's so much fencing, of trying to
           avoid this confrontation if you wish with the issue of
           likelihood, trying to define what credibility is,
           trying to define what highly likely is, trying to
           define what likelihood is that it really seems to be
           a great waste of energy when what we should be doing
           is saying, "Well, let's let the information and the
           analysis determine what the likelihood is," not a
           bunch of artificial thresholds.
                       We've got ten to the minus three
           thresholds.  We've got ten to the minus six
           thresholds.  So we establish these very quantitative,
           point precise thresholds, and then we talk about
           qualitative responses to those very precise and very
           definite threshold levels, and even that doesn't make
           a heck of a lot of sense.
                       So I think the exercise is very good and
           it's very constructive, but there is an undertone to
           this whole process that there's a contest between the
           PHA way of doing things and the PRA way of doing
           things, and that's regrettable because both methods
           have provided great contribution to an integrated
           safety analysis thought process, and they should be
           exploited.
                       And this agency is a leader in certainly
           the quantitative side, and the fact that you would
           find in standard review plans this kind of stuff is a
           little bit surprising because it's just plain wrong,
           and we hope we eventually get that fixed.
                       MR. DAMON:  Well, I'm sure that the
           statements in the standard review plan could be stated
           better.  I want us to remember this.  The purpose of
           that chapter is guidance to staff reviewers.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  I understand.
                       MR. DAMON:  And the concern there is
           because really the reality here is that a risk is best
           understood as a quantitative thing.  It is the triplet
           you mentioned.
                       It has quantitative, conceptually
           quantitative things:  likelihood or probability and
           consequences.
                       There was concern that a staff reviewer
           would march down the road of saying that basically the
           information presented by the applicant had to be
           quantitative and that he had to justify all of that
           quantitative information when, in fact, the evidence
           might not exist.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah, I understand
           that, and  there had to be something done to deal with
           that, and I think that certainly probably a large
           fraction of what's been done is right on target in
           that regard.
                       But you know, I do see emerging -- if you
           look at the surface, you read the first few pages of
           this, you're very happy because it's clear that they
           are addressing sequences, scenarios, and they are
           addressing consequence, and they are addressing
           likelihood.
                       It's only when you dig a little deeper
           that you begin to see these differences that will
           eventually have to work out somehow.
                       MR. DAMON:  Well, you know, we have, the
           staff has a suggestion that's been made to the
           industry as to how to move forward on Chapter 3.  You
           have to realize Chapter 3 is not final.  It's in the
           process of being evolved here, and we're still working
           on it basically.  So that's about all I can say.
                       My own philosophy, of course, is that the
           best understanding you can reach as a person of what
           the risk of something is is to formulate it the way
           mathematical models of risk are formulated.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. DAMON:  That gives you that
           understanding, but what I would like to see people do
           is to relate those quantities that you're trying to
           quantify to objective evidence and to objective
           qualities of the safety hardware or procedures that
           are being used as opposed to what I've seen in some
           other nonreactor facilities where the analyst has been
           posed the challenge of demonstrating that something is
           less than ten to the minus six.  So they throw a bunch
           of numbers together and say it's less than ten to the
           minus six without any justification.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  That's part of my
           point, yes.
                       MR. DAMON:  Yes.  I want them to
           understand it the way you and I do, that the evidence
           speaks for itself.  Tell me the evidence, and then
           relate it to the equations.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah, and one has to
           remember that when we talk about evidence, we're not
           only talking about frequency information.  We're
           talking about the model itself as part of that
           evidence.
                       The one thing that distinguishes risk
           assessment from reliability analysis is that risk
           assessment was invented because we didn't have
           information.  You know, what amazes me is how often I
           hear the expression that we can't do risk assessment
           because we don't have the data.
                       The reason risk assessment was invented,
           we didn't have data.  We didn't know what a core melt
           frequency was.  We had no idea.  So we had to find a
           way to get a better insight about that, and the way we
           found how to do that is that we developed logic models
           that allowed us to move from the level at which we
           didn't have any data down to a level for which we did
           have data, and the whole integrity of that model then
           becomes that logic between those two points.
                       And so the motivation for the whole risk
           assessment culture was the absence of data and the
           desire to get better understanding and insights on
           these critical issues, and that's the big difference
           between the classical reliability analysis activity
           and the risk assessment community.
                       The risk assessment community has made its
           major contribution in the structuring of logic models
           from levels at which there is some information to
           levels of interest, and so I think that that
           fundamental idea seems to be missed in a lot of people
           that are kind of sitting on the outside and wondering
           what this risk assessment is all about, and that's
           kind of what it is about.
                       It's about getting a better understanding,
           getting insights on events for which we have little or
           no information, and when you talk to people about it
           in that context, you know, they're flabbergasted
           because they see it as a statistics game.
                       Statistics play a very minor role in a
           comprehensive probabilistic risk assessment, and what
           it really is more than anything else is a lot of hard
           nosed engineering analysis in structuring how the
           machine works and envisioning how it can fail, and
           that's why the modeling has to be done from the point
           of view of really understanding how it works.
                       And when people started getting involved
           that knew that, that's when we started making real
           progress in developing understandings of the risk of
           some of these more complex machines.
                       Well, that's enough of that.  I just think
           that it's very important for us to get up front what
           we're kind of looking for because if there's any way
           we can simplify this process, we're eager to do it,
           and one of the big issues as you clearly know is the
           issue of transparency, the issue of trying to figure
           out just what in the heck the safety analysts are
           doing.
                       And that would come, I think, from the
           merging of some of these approaches and some
           clarification on what we mean by a risk informed
           concept.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  You know, just a historical
           perspective, and that is that the risk assessment did
           not follow the collection of large databases.  When
           WASH 1400 was done, there was no database because I
           was at EPRI, and we started the very first database to
           start collecting failure rate data.
                       There had been isolated cases of
           proprietary bases by vendors and so forth, but the
           recognition that you needed eventually to find tune
           it, the big effort to collect data came after an
           acceptance recognition that you could get very useful
           insights and improve safety even in the absence of
           data.
                       Today, of course, we have huge data banks,
           but we need to remember that that came after.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  We're very sorry.
                       (Laughter.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  But now we'll stay
           awake.
                       MR. DAMON:  I think I'll just rush right
           through this presentation and try to get to the point
           where I'm talking about examples of analyses and then
           go to one of the examples that I think will illustrate
           some of the interesting -- it will get into some of
           these subtle points here about what you do.
                       My own attempt in Chapter 3 was, in fact,
           to move the modeling structure towards the actual risk
           equations for the system as opposed to an indexing
           method that is at a different level, where you're not
           thinking about the math and you're not thinking about
           the fact that the thing you're really pushing for is
           a quantitative entity, whether you know what it is or
           not.
                       I was trying to push it in that direction
           because I believe the equations illuminate exactly
           what it is that's being relied on in the system for
           safety, just as Dr. Levenson said.
                       And so even if you don't know whether
           there is data or not, it focuses your attention on the
           things you should be attempting to assess, you know.
           That's the attempt of that method, and as opposed to
           methods that are maybe at a different level in the
           process, maybe, as I say, a holistic level or some
           other intermediate point, I think you should go right
           down to the level of the equations and look at what
           they're telling you and attempt to make your judgment
           at that point.
                       The presentation is not focused on what
           type of analysis the staff would find acceptable
           because that's in the process of being discussed, and
           there's no discussion here of the status of the
           industry's ISAs because, as Tom pointed out, the rule
           was just revised, and they're going to submit their
           plans and schedules on April 18th and, therefore, the
           schedules are going to be in the future.
                       The rule mandates actually what an ISA is.
           An ISA really is just a regulatory concept that's
           embedded in this rule, and it says that the analysis
           must identify hazards, identify accident sequences,
           consequences and the like with it.
                       Well, there's the risk triplet right
           there.  Event:  identify action sequences,
           consequences, likelihood.  Identify items relied on
           for safety.
                       As I say, the real genesis of this whole
           process was to get a documented list of what the items
           are that are being relied on for safety so that it's
           clear to everyone what the system safety design is,
           and then it's also required that compliance with the
           performance requirements be evaluated.  What are
           performance requirements?
                       Performance requirements are three.  High
           consequence events have to be highly unlikely.
           Intermediate consequence events have to be unlikely,
           and criticalities have to be prevented regardless of
           consequences.
                       High consequences are defined as worker,
           100 rem or more or a chemical -- fatal levels of
           chemical exposure; persons off site, 25 rem or more.
           High consequences must be highly unlikely.
           Intermediate events are less severe.
                       One thing was mentioned or asked about,
           and that is why isn't there seven or ten categories,
           that issue there.  That issue was discussed over a
           long period of time. I  was not actually involved in
           the rule writing process at the point in time when the
           decision was made final.  So I cannot tell you exactly
           what the thoughts were at that moment when they
           decided to go with two categories.
                       But I was involved in addressing a couple
           of issues.  One of them is you'll notice the lower
           level of the consequence levels here for persons off
           site is five rem.  That is not the Part 20 exposure
           limit for persons off site, which is 100 millirem.  So
           there's a gap there between this and 100 millirem.
                       And originally there were three categories
           in this rule, and this lower category was lowered down
           to that Part 20 limit.  It was raised up.  So now
           there was consideration given:  should there be a
           third category down there or what?
                       Instead it was raised up and there's a gap
           left there, and there's a lot of discussion about what
           regulatory consequences that would have and so on, and
           the decision was made that it was unduly burdensome to
           require that events with consequences below this be
           required to be analyzed as part of an ISA because
           their level of consequences was sufficiently low.
                       We felt that they would be addressed by
           other regulatory requirements adequately, and so that
           gap was left for that reason.
                       There's another gap, which is, of course,
           100 rem exposure to a single individual or that type
           of thing.  You could say what about an event where
           there are fatalities to multiple persons or many
           persons or large levels of off site contamination
           where you might assess large numbers of latent cancer
           fatalities.
                       There was consideration given to having
           such higher consequence categories, and like I say, I
           do not know the full reason why it was not done.
                       One factor here is that the facilities at
           the moment who are subject to this requirement don't
           have such events as far as we're aware.  They don't
           have events that will produce that level of
           consequences.
                       However, in the standard review plan, this
           issue of what do you do if you have a facility that
           does have such events in it, that is discussed in the
           standard review plan, and the general idea with these
           categories was that they were left in a vague state.
                       There was consideration given to giving
           numerical limits in the rule, and it was explicitly
           rejected, that thought.  It was left flexible, and so
           we feel it's a graded approach that leaves everyone
           the flexibility to --
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Could you leave that
           on, that particular one?  I'm sorry.
                       You can debate endless about the specific
           values of these numbers and how they're arrived at.
           Twenty-five rems in the top one, the high consequence
           events has some precedence in the reactor field.
                       If you go down to the intermediate
           consequence events, the five rem, for example, for an
           off-site person, that's getting close to being
           indistinguishable from 25 rems from the standpoint of
           your ability to calculate it.
                       You know, maybe one rem is getting down to
           where you can distinguish your ability to calculate.
           So what bothers me is I don't see any reflection of
           the uncertainty in the ability to calculate reflected
           in these kind of acceptance consequences.  It's just
           a personal problem I have.
                       I don't have any problem with setting
           values like this, but it's the level of the numbers
           that begin to bother me.
                       Now, I would have probably chosen one rem,
           but that's not much different than five rem either.
                       MR. DAMON:  I mean it is a fact that, for
           example, the MOX people came and made a presentation
           recently.  They said based on their preliminary
           assessment of things, they don't see any difference
           between five rem and 25 rem, and they're not even
           going to take any credit for anything being in this
           intermediate consequence level.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Yeah, that was pretty
           much before, yeah.
                       MR. DAMON:  So that also we realized at
           the time -- but it was left in here on principle, on
           principle that some such thing could appear that would
           fall in that band.  It's a narrow band between five
           and 25, and that we wanted to put in something that
           recognized that the staff would expect less stringent
           controls to prevent such a thing than it would for a
           higher one.
                       So it's kind of a vague expression with
           very concrete numbers for what consequence levels
           you're talking about, but yet a vague expression that
           likelihood should be proportional to consequences.
                       This is just a slide that points out that
           the chemical standards only apply to those chemicals
           in those processes for which the NRC has cognizance.
           You know, in general, worker chemical safety is an
           OSHA responsibility and the general public chemical
           safety is an EPA domain, but there are definitely
           chemical accidents that involve license material, and
           therefore, the NRC has been held accountable for
           those.
                       Part 70 uses this term also.  I may drop
           into this terminology.  So I wanted to make sure that
           it was defined in here, this concept of item relied on
           for safety.  It's a concept that is used in this Part
           70 context, and it was chosen so that people didn't
           think that there was a one-to-one correlation between
           this and safety related or any other terminology, and
           primarily the significant thing here is an item line
           for safety includes activities and personnel, namely,
           what we call administrative controls, procedures for
           conducting an operation that must be followed or
           prohibitions against doing things.
                       Those are items relied on for safety in
           the context of this rule.
                       The standard review plan is just a
           guidance on how to review an applicant's evaluation,
           and it's structured to tell the reviewer to look at
           three things:  completeness, you know, and
           consequences and likelihood.  Again, this is the risk
           triplet again, you know.  Have you got them all in
           there?  Have you done them all?
                       That's the conceptual framework, and the
           chapter provides guidance to a staff reviewer on it.
           Appendix A of the chapter describes an example ISA
           likelihood analysis method and a way of presenting the
           information for reviews.  It does not discuss accident
           identification and consequence evaluation.  It's only
           addressing a couple of missing pieces of the puzzle.
                       Because the ISA has many tasks in it.  The
           first task, identify hazards, identify accidents.
           These two are what's called PHA, process hazard
           analysis.  Identify accidents, then estimating
           consequences, identifying items relied on for safety,
           specifying accident sequences, which is a little
           different from identifying accidents.
                       Identifying accidents can mean simply,
           well, I've got a tank of some -- up here, hazard
           identification -- I've got a tank of hazardous
           material.  The person would say the accident is some
           of it gets released.  That's not the same as an
           accident sequence to me.
                       An accidence sequence is specifically
           saying exactly what goes on, what fails, and why does
           the thing get released.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Could the identify
           accidents be something that some of this tank material
           gets released via a fire or via --
                       MR. DAMON:  It could be, yeah.  It could
           be at that level.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Right.
                       MR. DAMON:  But the idea is often when you
           tell someone to identify the actions, they will do it
           at this level of just it happens.  The stuff gets out
           somehow, somehow, without telling you how it happens.
                       Whereas with accident sequences, we're
           trying to get into the level of specificity of an
           event tree.  Then the task is to evaluate likelihoods
           of accident sequences, and the applicant is to define
           highly unlikely and unlikely, which means these two
           are related.
                       The idea is the rule requires evaluation
           of compliance with the performance requirements.
           These are the performance requirements.  So tell us
           how you do your evaluation and how you show that it's
           highly unlikely.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Would it be fair to say
           that one analogy between accidents and accident
           sequences would be the difference between a source
           term and how you get a source?
                       In other words, one of the big exercises
           in all of these things is defining the source term,
           the source term being an intermediate state, but the
           real sequence for getting a source term is something
           again.  So it's somewhat analogous to that.
                       One of the things I was very interested in
           as I went through this material is trying to figure
           out how you handle the coupling between different
           hazards and, in particular, between chemical hazards
           and radiation hazards.
                       And the sense I got out of it was that
           your interest in chemical hazards was principally in
           the context of how it became a driver, how chemical
           events might become a driver for radiation releases of
           some form or another, but that there seemed to be some
           backing off of chemical risk somewhat in isolation;
           that the interest was driving principally by how
           chemical events can contribute to a radiation source
           term.
                       So if you could clarify that.
                       MR. DAMON:  I think there may be sections
           where that concept is discussed because it certainly
           is one type of accident that would be of concern.
                       The one reason for mentioning -- but it's
           not the sole type of chemical accident.  In fact, it's
           probably not really the one of major concern.  The one
           major concern really is chemical exposure, and the
           worker gets the chemical effect and it's a licensed
           material, and we license the process, and we told them
           it was safe and somebody got killed from the chemical.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Right, yeah, and my
           point there is you have to understand the chemical
           processes and the chemical events because they are
           most likely in most cases going to be the principal
           drivers of establishing radiation release.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Except HF will kill
           you without any radiation involved.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, that's the other
           thing.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  And you don't want
           that to happen because it does come out of your
           facility.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Would it be a fair summary
           to say with the exception of fluorine related things,
           all other chemical risks, purely chemical risks, go to
           OSHA rather than NRC?
                       MR. DAMON:  Not quite.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Uranium is a heavy
           metal poison, and you have to deal with that.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Yeah, I mean, those few
           exceptions.
                       MR. DAMON:  Yeah, there are some other --
           there are ammonia based compounds here.  Ammonia can
           get involved, and you can get that.  That's another
           one.
                       Nitrous oxide is another one, you know.
           You know, these processes when you're dissolving
           uranium like at Tokaimura.  That's what they were
           doing.  That's why they were doing it outside the
           vessel.
                       I mean why they didn't tell the regulator
           was because the regulator would never have let them
           dissolved that stuff and generate nitrous oxide the
           way they were doing.  So, you know, there are several
           chemicals that can get you from these things.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Item 7 on that list
           was define what you mean by likely and highly
           unlikely.  It strikes me as a little strange that a
           regulatory body allows the regulated entity to define
           his own levels that he's going to be regulated to.
                       Could you speak to that?  I mean, you're
           going to let them define what those terms are, and I'm
           sure you have to say, "Yeah, we agree," but that seems
           a little strange to me for some reason.
                       MR. DAMON:  Well, at the time the things
           were formulated in that form, I was not involved in
           the rule.  So that's a historical question of what was
           the thought process there.
                       I can definitely -- you know, now me being
           confronted with now what do I do with this rule, I
           understand the issue.  There are guidance -- there is
           guidance out there that the commission in a general,
           broad context has given us as to what extent should we
           prevent accidents.  They have strategic safety
           performance goals and things like that, telling you
           let's not have any increase in exposures above 25 rem
           and things like that.
                       So there is that type of general guidance
           out there, but in the context of this rule, I don't
           know why there wasn't more  guidance given in this
           context as to what highly unlikely and unlikely
           really, really would mean.
                       There is in the standard review plan this
           example problem.  We illustrate that basically we
           interpret it as a quantitative thing, but just as a
           flexible guideline, not as a line in the stand that
           you're really going to come up against because, as you
           can see, we don't expect them to do it quantitatively
           necessarily and to be able to sum all accidents of a
           given consequence, up to a given consequence level and
           compare it to a numerical thing.
                       And because of that, because we wanted to
           leave that flexibility, it's a difficult subject to
           get more specific about.
                       The tasks that were listed there, the
           eight tasks, the first two, hazards identification and
           accident identification are discussed in NUREG 1513,
           which refers again the reader to the -- it synopsizes
           the AIChE red book on the different action
           identification methodologies and, you know, refers you
           to that and other sources for how to do event trees,
           fault trees, and HAZOP and other methods.
                       So those methods, I'm sure, are familiar
           to you gentlemen better than me, and, in fact, the
           other references are all available.  So I'm not going
           to discuss them.  Everyone knows what that's all
           about, but that guidance is there.
                       It gives a flow chart for how you select
           the method that's appropriate to the complexity of the
           process.  In fact, it says if you have a complex,
           redundant safety design, you should use a fault tree.
                       Another task in the list of things the ISA
           does is consequence estimation.  The consequences are
           defined quantitatively.  So the ISA has to estimate
           them quantitatively in some sense.
                       It doesn't necessarily have to do that for
           every single action sequence.  It can do bounding
           calculations that show roughly where you're at, and
           maybe that is sufficient given the source terms in
           specific cases so that you know that you're not going
           to exceed those thresholds.  So that's really what we
           expect to see, is a few bounding calculations to
           demonstrate or to benchmark things.
                       As far as the technical adequacy of the
           calculations, there's a guidance document NUREG CR-
           6410, which is called the fuel cycle accident analysis
           handbook that discusses computer codes and data that
           are out there and methods for quantifying exposures
           from radiological releases, chemical releases that
           would be applicable to a fuel cycle facility.
                       For example, if you spill a liquid
           chemical, how much is aerosolized?  That kind of issue
           and the codes that use heavy gas models.  So if those
           are involved, we've given guidance already on how to
           do that.
                       So now finally we get to accident sequence
           specification because that's what this Appendix A
           method is all about, and as it says here, this method
           in Appendix A is an example of how the staff thought
           you could resolve all of these issues of trying to
           dance around the issue of quantitative versus
           qualitative, and what does highly unlikely mean, and
           how would you analyze a process.
                       Other methods are acceptable.  In
           particular, the method in Appendix A doesn't talk
           about using fault trees, which really in the case of
           redundant systems with any degree of complexity are
           really a preferred way of displaying the information,
           but it uses instead a tabular summary, which is like
           listing each minimal cut set as one row in a table or
           one action sequence.
                       The method that's in Appendix A, as I say,
           the concept that is preached to there is to base the
           assessment or likelihood on the actual equation for
           the frequency of this accident sequence as a function
           of the underlying variables that make up that
           probability.
                       So I'm advocating here essentially making
           a model of the accident sequence of events and writing
           that equation down, and then using integer indices to
           judge roughly what you think those frequencies and
           times are.
                       In some cases you'll have information
           about these thing.  This is another.
                       What I've got following this is some
           examples.  This is an example of an equation for
           frequency of an accident that occurs in a system that
           they have two active redundant controls.  In other
           words, by active I mean that the two controls have to
           be continuously present while the process contains the
           hazardous material, and that if both are in a failed
           state at the same time, then you have the accident.
           So that's what's meant by active.
                       The control must remain in a success
           state, an active state, and when both are in a failed
           state, you have the accident.  So for like a Poisson
           process, this is the equation.  The lambdas are
           failure rates.  The Us are unavailabilities, and
           there's two controls, two redundant controls.  Both
           must be failed.  The frequency has two terms in it,
           the frequency of one failing times the probability.
           U is the probability that the other one is not
           available when the second one fails.
                       And if you just look at one of those
           terms, lambda U, to a good approximation usually that
           can be broken down this way, that the actual
           unavailability of the other second control is its
           failure rate times T2, which is its outage time, its
           duration, the duration that it would remain in a
           failed state.
                       So the point here is simply that the
           typical term expressing an accident sequence is
           actually a product of variables.  If you take the
           logarithm of the frequency of that one term, it then
           becomes a sum of logarithms of the factors in that
           term, and that's what the method in the Appendix A
           table summary is based on.  It's using logarithms.
                       For example, if the parameters have these
           values, you compute the logarithms.  You add them, and
           you get a value, and this value represents the
           frequency of the accident sequence at an order of
           magnitude level.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Was it done this way
           because people thought it was easier to add than to
           multiply?
                       (Laughter.)
                       MR. DAMON:  Yes, it was done to discretize
           the thing.  It was an attempt to discretize it and at
           rough orders of magnitude.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Okay.
                       MR. DAMON:  And this is another example
           where instead of that equation you just have a
           different equation that only has two terms in it.
                       The point is that there is some equation
           that you could develop that would express what you
           think is happening.  What's failing and causing the
           accident to occur?
                       And the point here really of doing that is
           to make sure you've thought of what it is you're
           actually relying on for safety, and you've identified
           it.  And I feel strongly that this type approach leads
           you to that, whereas if you don't write the equation
           down, there's a danger that you're led into a vague
           thinking, you know, vague, nebulous concept about what
           it is that's really happening here.
                       And so now the question is where do you
           get these index numbers that are supposed to relate to
           some extent to failure rates and times.  In Appendix
           A method, the suggestion is that they be predefined in
           tables of qualitative or quantitative criteria.
                       Again, this is the idea that you use what
           based on what evidence you have, and sometimes you do
           have quantitative information that bears on the value
           of something, in particular, outage times.
                       Outage times are typically -- the typical
           outage time for the kind of failure that happened in
           a plant like this is most of the things that can
           happen are obvious.  When that happens, it is obvious
           or it's fail safe, and so it will be corrected, and
           the length of time that it will remain in that failed,
           vulnerable condition -- for example, a powder spill on
           the floor, how long will it be sitting there with
           enough material that could be potentially critical is
           limited, and you know it's limited.  It might be
           corrected right away if the operator is present when
           it happens.
                       So the basis, the idea was that the
           criteria in these tables should be expressed fairly
           clearly and specifically so that the idea here is to
           achieve objectivity and consistency in evaluating
           systems as opposed to the holistic approach where the
           team, ISA team, would simply decide whether they
           thought that an accident was highly unlikely for that
           particular process design.  An approach like that
           could be radically inconsistent if you have different
           teams assessing identical designs.
                       So we wanted to force people to establish
           criteria, write them down, and force everybody to
           follow the same rule.  So that is really basically the
           idea here.
                       I'm going to skip ahead.  If you look --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Dennis, since I notice
           we're going to continue with you after the break, can
           you tell us when it is an appropriate time for or a
           logical time for us --
                       MR. DAMON:  This is it.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  I suspected
           that.
                       All right.  I'd like to allow us to take
           our scheduled break at this time.
                                   (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
                       the record at 10;15 a.m. and went back on
                       the record at 10:32 a.m.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Go ahead.
                       MR. DAMON:  This is Dennis Damon again.
                       If I knew how to work this slide show
           better, I would skip ahead to Example 3, but since I
           don't know how to skip around like that, I'm going to
           have to march straight forward.
                       There are three example problem.  As,
           again, I said, I made these up, but they are
           representative of things that I've seen, but I can't
           vouch that this particular safety design represents
           anything that is actually in any plant, but the type
           of general approach or process and the general types
           of controls, these are some.
                       You can't really say things are typical.
           There is a very large number of widely diverse types
           of process safety designs in the plants, and this
           first one is a very simple thing.  The concept here is
           that you have a chemical process, a liquid chemistry
           process.  You're processing uranium, and you're going
           to add an aqueous chemical to that process.  So you've
           got a water solution of some chemical that is toxic.
           How do you protect against the accident where that
           toxic chemical leaks out and might expose the workers
           that are working on that process?
                       The protection consists of in this case a
           double containment line.  You've got an inner pipe
           that contains the chemical, and then you've got an
           outer containment pipe that's normally dry.  So it's
           just a containment design to conduct surveillance to
           know whether that inner line has actually got a leak
           in it, the outer line at a low point in the system has
           a little trap with a visible sight glass where you can
           see whether any fluid has leaned out into that outer
           containment line.
                       That outer containment line sight glass is
           subjected to a weekly surveillance where an operator
           comes by and looks at the sight glass to see if
           there's any liquid in there.
                       The outer line is not surveilled that way.
           It is surveilled by testing it for leak tightness
           every two years, pressuring it with gas or something
           like that to see if it's in a leaking condition.  So
           how do you model a system like that using the method
           of Appendix A?
                       I'm going to show the equations  first and
           where the -- I'm going to show, rather, the parameters
           involved and where they come from.  Obviously there's
           going to be four terms involved just like the equation
           I showed previously for two active controls.
                       This is a two active, redundant control
           situation.  There's a failure rate, in other words, a
           leak rate for each of the pipes, and then there's a
           duration that the pipe would remain in a leak
           condition before detected and corrected.
                       So each pipe has these two parameters, and
           in the method of Appendix A, you would get the index
           values you would assign to those parameters by looking
           in the tables.  In the back of your handout, I have
           included a copy of the tables that are in Appendix A
           that are used to make these assignments.  The tables
           are in the back of your handout.  They look like this.
                       There are Tables A-3 through A-5.  These
           were strictly intended to be examples of the format
           and structure and the concept.  They were not intended
           to be used by somebody, but I'm going to actually use
           this scheme that was in there to assign these indices
           to see what you get.
                       I personally believed at the time that was
           formulated that the way you really do it is an
           iterative process by which you develop criteria.  You
           apply them, and then as you apply them you learn that
           they are either working for you or they're not, and
           you refine them as you go.
                       But in any case, in this first example for
           the leak rate, failure rate of the inner line, which
           is the likelihood of leakage, I'm saying that's a
           passive control, and if you look in Table A-3, a
           passive control failure frequency is given a minus
           two.
                       Again, I'm not vouching for the validity
           of this scheme in here.  It's a conceptual scheme.  It
           was supposed to have been developed by the applicant
           and justified based on whatever information is
           available.
                       But in any case, using that actual scheme
           that is in there, you put a minus two for the leak
           rate, the probability of the frequency per year of a
           leak so that that's once in 100 years; the average
           outage time of that line is a half a leak because
           they're surveilling it once a week.  So on average,
           the time between the time where a leak occurs and the
           time where it would be discovered is going to be a
           half a leak.  A half a leak is 1]100 of a year, and so
           using Table A-5, that scores as a minus two, or the
           minus two being 1/100 of a year, ten to the minus two
           year.
                       So that basically shows you how the scheme
           works.  I mean it is quantifying things, but it is
           doing it based on a tabulated criteria.
                       Again, the same thing, the leak rate of
           the outer line, ten to the minus two per year.  So it
           gets a minus two.  Now, the outer line, it's only
           being surveilled every two years.  So, on average, if
           a leak occurs in the outer line, it will stay in a
           failed state in the plant for a year.  So it gets a
           zero for that.
                       So now when you go to quantifying the
           frequency of the two accident sequences in the
           equation like this, what you do is simply add those
           numbers up.  The table -- you know, among the tables
           that I passed out, there's a Table A-1.  Now, that
           Table A-1 lays out this example that I just went
           through.  It lays it out as we envision it being laid
           out in this method.
                       There's two sequences.  The first sequence
           says the inner line leaks first.  So inner line leaks
           first.  Then outer line leaks before the inner line is
           corrected.  There's a second event here, and it shows
           how you take and you put those index values in there.
           You add them up, and the fourth column is labeled
           likelihood index.  So there you're adding those
           values.
                       And the last column is the consequences by
           category.  High is a three.  Intermediate is a two.
           So the idea here is to assess the likelihood and
           consequences by index values, and then establish a
           criterion for what would be an acceptable value for
           the likelihood index.
                       And so that's the method that's advocated
           in Appendix A.  This particular example shows that
           there are two sequences.  Inner line leaks first and
           outer line leaks first, and you notice the likelihood
           index for the two is quite different, and that's why
           I picked this example.  It illustrates that by using
           the equation you discover that there's quite a
           difference in the frequency, and that the reason for
           that is that the duration of failure of the outer line
           is very long compared to the inner line because it's
           not being tested very frequently, and that when you
           design something like a double containment line like
           that, there's no point in having weekly surveillance
           on only one of the two items.  Because the other one,
           the frequency of the two is going to be dominated by
           whichever one is the longer.
                       And so that's the point of analyzing these
           things correctly, is that it tells you that you're
           wasting your time doing surveillance on that inner
           line.  You should be doing it on both of them at the
           same frequency.
                       This is a summary of the method in
           Appendix A is about.  It's about having a table of
           accident sequences, one event per column.  The example
           I have only has two events, but the method suggests
           you could have whatever number of columns you need for
           outer line events.
                       So basically what you're doing is if
           you're done a fault tree on the process and you lay
           out the minimum cut sets as accident sequences, you
           just lay them out in this table.  The purpose of doing
           this is not simply quantification, but rather to leave
           room to describe the accident sequence to the reviewer
           as well as providing the consequences so that he can
           -- it facilitates the review.
                       It also is because the rule is formulated
           -- the rule requirement is formulated on a per event
           basis.  Each event must be highly unlikely.  So the
           reviewer really should be reviewing each event so that
           we have a table of accident sequences.  Then --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Just to point up the
           comment that I earlier made about this discussion
           between qualitative and quantitative, you're used the
           term several times in this example of quantifying
           this, and that's perfectly okay.  And I agree with you
           that these types of analyses really do expose the
           importance of the form of the information.  The
           surveillanced or unsurveillanced example is excellent.
                       But to me this is not a quantitative
           analysis because you're not dealing with parameter
           uncertainty, but either it comes from population
           ability or uncertainty infrequencies or uncertainty in
           the model, but it is a useful and important point
           estimate calculation, but it's not quantification
           because it does not communicate to me anything about
           confidence in the parameters.
                       But as I say, it is useful, and it
           provides an important understand, and in many cases
           you don't need to go the full range of quantification
           to get the results you want, and in many situations
           like this, this is all you do need to do to get the
           results.
                       But I just wanted to take advantage of the
           example to point up a difference between
           interpretation and how a calculation is interpreted.
                       This is not a quantitative analysis in the
           world of risk.
                       MR. DAMON:  So anyway, this slide is the
           summary of what is involved conceptually in this
           Appendix A method.  I can just go through a couple
           other examples because they illustrate different
           points about the kind of issues that come up in trying
           to apply a method like this.
                       This system is a mobile cart used to
           transfer uranium compounds around between processes in
           the plant.  The accident consists of overload the cart
           to the point where a nuclear criticality occurs.  So
           that's the potential accident.
                       The protection against this consists of
           two administrative controls, that is, procedures, and
           one passive engineering control.  The cart is used on
           the order of 100 times a year or less.
                       So what are the admin. controls?  The
           first admin. control requires the loading of the cans
           that are carried on the cart with material whose
           moderator content and weight of uranium in them is
           known, is measured, and is subject to a limit.  So a
           procedure is followed to load the cans.
                       Then there's a second procedure where the
           cans are loaded on the cart.  In this example, the
           first step is the cans are loaded by one person or a
           different team.  There's a separate group of people at
           a separate time that takes the cans and loads them on
           the cart in this example.  There's a limit on how many
           cans can be on the cart.
                       The passive control is the cart is
           structured so that it has places to put these cans,
           and it's difficult to do anything but put them where
           they're supposed to be.
                       The equation for the accident frequency
           has these parameters in it again, the frequency of
           uses of the cart, 100 times a year.  So that's a two,
           a plus two, 100 times a year.
                       The probability that the moderator limit
           on the cans is violated.  That's the first step here,
           loading the cans.  I'm giving that one in 1,000.
                       There actually are human reliability
           engineering studies that provide guidance on what are
           credible or reasonable values for different types of
           procedures, and these are not too dissimilar from
           those, but these are actually based on the tables that
           I've given.
                       This is a failure probability for a
           process, a procedure which is regularly conducted.
           The people are trained in it.  They do it every day.
           They're not going to make mistakes very often with
           something like that.
                       The second procedure is loading cans on
           the cart.  Again, that's given a minus three also.
           It's a low number because, again, it's a regular
           process.  They know what they're doing.
                       The last step here is probably the
           overload is sufficient to cause a criticality, and
           that's prevented by the structure of the cart being
           such that you almost cannot overload it.  I'm assuming
           here it's physically possible you could, but that it
           would be extremely difficult.
                       And so I'm giving it a minus four which is
           that the passive structure would have to be in a --
           that basically just reflects the fact that it's
           extremely unlikely.
                       This kind of illustrates -- the reason I
           included this is because it doesn't fit this criteria
           in this table very well.  This last one is an example
           of a thing that's very hard to quantify.  It's a very
           difficult thing to figure out what is the likelihood
           that someone would do such a thing, that they would
           not only violate -- it's fully probability given that
           they're neglecting the load limit on the cart.
           They're using that cart and overload it beyond what it
           is was intended for.  How likely is that?
                       There is another sequence here which is
           you've got the wrong cart.  You've got a cart that was
           not intended for this process.  It was intended for
           some other process.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Or you're loading two
           carts at the same time.
                       MR. DAMON:  Yes.  So there's other
           sequences that could be happening with this scheme,
           and I'm just illustrating the kind of things which
           come up which are difficult to quantify, but
           nevertheless, what I think is true is even though you
           encounter a thing like that, you should attempt to
           make a judgment about how much credit you're going to
           allow to this thing, which amounts to, in effect,
           assuming a quantitative value that the thing has, a
           frequency, a probability somebody would do it.
                       I think there is value to thinking of it
           in that way and assigning a credit, and another way
           this process could -- one thing about this process is
           these two steps in between loading the cans and then
           loading the cans on the cart were assumed to be
           independent.  If they're not, you're not going to get
           this kind of credit here.  This is done by the same
           people.
                       Again, the point of laying it out like
           this is that this reveals to the people who are
           structuring these procedures that there's a virtue to
           having two separate groups do this, whereas if you
           have the same group do it, all they have to do is fail
           to follow the procedure, and they're going to not get
           the credit for these steps here.  It's going to be
           just the likelihood they do not follow that procedure,
           which is probably going to be a minus three.  You're
           not going to get the other minus three there.
                       So you just add these numbers up, and of
           course, you get quite a low number if everything works
           the way -- this is extremely unlikely that you could
           actually cause a criticality by this mechanism, but it
           also reveals another thing, and that is supposing
           these two things here, these two minus threes weren't
           in here, you know, that you didn't have the two
           independent events, that it was only one minus three.
           Well, it would still be a minus five down here.
                       In other words, it kind of reveals to the
           -- what you're really relying on in this cart is not
           really these procedures.  It's this guy.  It's the way
           they've structured the cart, and that's really what
           you've got to focus on, make sure you get the right
           cart in the right place, and these facilities
           recognize this.
                       What they do is they go to extraordinary
           lengths to have the right to -- they will preclude
           having containers of the wrong size or type in an
           entire room or entire area.  That is the strategy that
           they use.   In other words, they're not just writing
           a procedure down telling you, "Don't use an incorrect
           container or an incorrect cart."  They will structure
           it so that those things are simply not available to
           the staff that operates that process.  They're
           physically not allowed.
                       So I think there's a lot of virtue to
           focusing or to laying out the real equation and
           focusing on, you know, what could make this different
           than it is, and that tells you what you really should
           be doing in the facility, I think.
                       This is the guideline we included in the
           rule as to, you know, is this minus eight an
           acceptable number or not.  We're saying, "Well, think
           about a minus five for these, these sequences," and
           this was based on the idea that if roughly there's
           1,000 accidents in the whole industry, and who knows
           how many one would formulate, that they would have to
           be a very low frequency of occurrence for any one
           sequence in order that the total not add up to some
           number that's so high that you would not find it
           acceptable.
                       So that's the general idea, is one might
           think ten to the minus five means once in 100,000
           years.  That sounds incredibly low, but as you can
           see, it's not that difficult to achieve in many cases,
           and, in fact, it is the kind of number that you have
           to achieve and that actually the facilities are
           achieving.  They haven't had a criticality event at
           the licensees that are subject to this.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  I see very little
           difference between that and normal PRA and entry.
           That's what they look at to me.  I didn't see any
           fault trees to get ten to the minus three.
                       MR. DAMON:  No, no, right.  The difference
           here  is the tables of qualitative criteria, sort of
           the mixture of quantitative, qualitative criteria for
           where you've got those numbers from.
                       Some of them, like, for example, the
           administrative control type thing, see, that's a
           generic thing.  I think one could prepare a table of
           qualitative situations where there would be some basis
           for assigning an index that represented a failure
           probability to carry out a procedure.  Then there's
           other ones like that one that I said, that I mentioned
           is loading.  How likely is it that they actually try
           to overload a cart and succeed in overloading it that
           has physical impediments to prevent you from doing it?
                       Well, to judge that, you have to look at
           that cart, you know.  I mean what else could you do?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Go ahead, Milt.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Where do the guidelines for
           acceptable indexes come from?
                       MR. DAMON:  That's what I'm saying.
           Supposing this number here that I had before, the idea
           is suppose there are -- you don't want nuclear
           criticalities to happen in the industry, which is what
           the Commission has told us.  They do not want them.
           They want zero that will occur.
                       I said, "What does that mean to me?  What
           is the lowest possible -- the highest possible
           frequency that I could conceivably say was consistent
           with the Commission's desire not to have
           criticalities?"
                       Well, if I walk myself up orders of
           magnitude, I say is one criticality a year acceptable?
           No.  Is one a 100 years acceptable?  No.
                       So I marched up to one in 100 years.  I
           said, well, that might just barely be acceptable.
           Well, if you want to hold the number of criticalities
           to one in 100 years in the industry, then if there are
           1,000 accidents in the entire ensemble of everything
           that's submitted, then each one of them has to be on
           average less than ten to the minus five.  So you know,
           ten to the minus two, you know, what's 100 years
           divided by ten to the minus three?  I mean 1,000
           accidents is ten to the minus five.
                       So that's just a guideline.  It's a
           numerical -- there's a little discussion of this.  Ten
           to the minus five also is on the order of the typical
           probability like occupational fatalities and
           manufacturing industries is four times ten to the
           minus five per year.  That's a risk if somebody would
           die on the job from what he's doing.
                       So it's on that order that you've got to,
           I think, start.  It's a guideline to people.  If your
           number is in that vicinity or if it's way below that,
           you're definitely okay.  If it's way above that,
           you're probably not okay.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Yeah, I understand what
           you're saying, but the problem is this one specific
           accident you, in essence, got some guidelines from the
           Commission, but in arriving at that, you threw in a
           number for the total number of accidents there are.
                       MR. DAMON:  Yes.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Which is an unknown.
                       MR. DAMON:  Right.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  What do you do for all of
           the lesser accidents where the Commission has said,
           "Don't have it happen"?  Is this a whole graded -- it
           is a whole big scale of these numbers?
                       And one thing you didn't mention, maybe
           it's inherent because of the guidance from the
           commissioners, but it seems to me what an acceptable
           guideline is has to be fairly closely related to
           consequences.
                       MR. DAMON:  Right, and that's what's
           discussed in the standard review plan.  That minus
           five number was related to the high consequence.  It's
           the high consequence category, and like you say, there
           is a little table in there that suggests, yes, it
           should be graded, that the lower consequence events
           should be held to a lesser standard.
                       And there's also a discussion of the fact
           that if you had an accident that was substantially
           greater than one fatality, you know, a very many, many
           fatality type event, then it should be proportionately
           less likely, roughly, you know, as a guideline.
                       But this whole issue of quantitative
           guidelines is very -- it has to be thought of as
           something that's treated very flexibly because it's
           complex.  It has not been subjected to the thorough
           going thought process, peer review, and the whole nine
           yards.  So we stated these as guidelines, something
           for the reviewer to think about or for the applicants
           to think about.
                       But I thought there was a virtue to
           stating it and going through that one derivation from,
           you know, once 100 years for the whole industry to
           once in ten to the minus five to show what kind of
           frequency we're talking about here, that we're not
           talking about once in 100 years per process being
           acceptable because you've got many, many processes.
           It will add up.  It will have too many accidents.
           It's got to be a very low number.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Yeah, one of the things
           that confuses it a little bit if you're thinking about
           a risk based program is that, in fact, I think by a
           fairly substantial majority the criticality accidents
           in the fuel cycle facilities have had no consequences
           except political.
                       MR. DAMON:  Well, I wouldn't say --
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  They sometimes kill
           workers.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Yes, but infrequently.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Infrequently.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Infrequently.  The bulk of
           them have not caused any injury or damage to the
           public.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Yeah, and the worker.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Yeah.  A number of them, in
           fact, there was serious -- it took a while to figure
           out when it really happened, like that little chem.
           plan.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Yeah.
                       DR. LEVENSON:  I think if you look at all
           of the criticality incidents in fuel cycle facilities,
           statistically they have not had serious consequences.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Yeah, I agree.
           Consequences, that's been over and over.
                       MR. DAMON:  Yeah, I know that.  I am a
           criticality specialist, and my counter to that is many
           of the places where criticalities have occurred have
           been in situations where the operators aren't
           necessarily physically present, right?
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Of course.
                       MR. DAMON:  These plants, normally the
           processes are operated by an operator, and the
           operators are physically standing right next to the
           S&M.  So in these plants my view is a much larger
           fraction of the criticalities would, in fact, give --
           the operator would get the fatal dose..
                       DR. LEVENSON:  I guess the point just is
           to avoid it being too prescriptive, that it ought to
           be related to the actual case.
                       MR. DAMON:  Yes, right.  It definitely --
           we tried to put all kinds of weasel words with this
           guideline number, but I thought there was some value
           to putting it in there, but you have to be very
           careful.
                       For example, an earthquake or some other
           thing might actually have a very substantial fraction
           of the risk at a plant, on one particular process, and
           you don't want to necessarily say that minus five for
           every sequence is a rigid limit of some kind, but it's
           a point of reference so that we're not so vague that
           we'll let -- the reviewer would let a process go by
           that was going to have clearly too high a frequency.
                       Because the other thing about this is
           really, as you point out, the public really isn't
           impacted by these accidents at uranium plants.  It's
           really the worker, and if a particular process is
           exceptionally risky and all the rest of them in the
           plant are not, it's still true that the one worker who
           operates that one process has all of that risk
           himself, you know.
                       So I think there's a point to -- that's
           one of the rationales for keeping this review at not
           integrating over a whole plant, but looking at each
           process separately.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  One other comment on
           your last example.  One of the principles of good
           regulation that's been expressed by NRC is defense in
           depth, and in the context of this last example, I
           would interpret that to mean how many of these indices
           do you have, how many levels of protection, and how
           far apart they are from each other in terms of the
           index.
                       For example, I could have chosen one that
           I got down to ten to the minus six with just one, and
           I would have had to meet your acceptance requirement,
           but I wouldn't have defense in depth, and I fail to
           see any good guidance on how that part of good
           regulation is reflected in this process.
                       I mean, how do I know how many lines of
           protection to put on there and how far apart each
           index can be?  Like I don't want each index to be one
           and then one of them five.  That's not good defense in
           depth either.
                       MR. DAMON:  That's true.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  So that's something I
           fail to see how it's well reflected in this process.
                       MR. DAMON:  That concept is well
           understood in the fuel cycle industry.  In fact,
           before this ISA stuff came up, the principal safety
           concern that involved the NRC at these facilities is
           criticality safety, and in criticality safety, years
           ago when criticalities were occurring too frequently,
           every couple of years, the community got together and
           said, "What do we need to do to stop this?"
                       And one of the things they came up with
           was redundancy.  Double contingency has been a
           recommended practice for -- I don't know -- 30 years,
           something like that, a long time.  They came up with
           the idea that this is really the way you do it, is
           independent redundancy.
                       And so that principal is well understood.
           All of the safety designs, all of these processes in
           general were designed way before all of this ISA
           discussion ever came up.  These plants were built
           years ago.  They were all built to a double
           contingency standard.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  But is that spelled
           out in the regulation anywhere that it has to be that
           way?
                       MR. DAMON:  Originally the two-tier
           system, the unlikely and the highly unlikely, one of
           the original formulations as that's the way it was
           stated was highly unlikely was two.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Two.
                       MR. DAMON:  Was two failures, and it was
           decided that that was too prescriptive because that's
           why this third example is here.  This is a single
           failure example, and there are situations which I
           believe are like this in facilities.  They often don't
           refer to them.  They might regard this as incredible,
           but I want to show why it's incredible, but it's still
           a single failure.
                       It is a single thing that can happen, and
           it can happen in any HEU facility, and that is you
           simply put too much HEU together.  If you put enough
           together, you know, eventually it will go critical,
           and you've got 97 percent enriched.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Since we've digressed
           a little bit into experience, one of the things that
           I continue to have a little concern about is the
           relationship between what ISA is looking for and what
           might actually happen, and the thought that most of
           the accidents, and particularly those that lead to
           injuries or fatalities are not going to be as a result
           of radiation release, but rather are going to be as a
           result of some sort of a chemical event.
                       Supposing we had an ISA program on
           Sequoyah Fuels several years ago when we had the
           autoclave accident that led to a fatality.  Do you
           think that -- and that fatality was not as a result of
           a radiation exposure -- do you think that it would
           have made a difference in that situation?
                       MR. DAMON:  I think that would have been
           a difficult one to pick up, but there is one point of
           reference where I think they might have, and that is
           my understanding or memory of that accident is that
           really the contributing factor was that they had a
           scale that had been designed for a smaller size of
           cylinder, and the cylinder sizes were increased or the
           cart that they're carried on or something, and that
           consequently when they went to weigh that one cylinder
           or when the loading was done, it was mispositioned on
           the scale because there was a mismatch in the size,
           and therefore, some of the weight was being born by
           the structure not being weighed on the scale.
                       So they got the thing overloaded.  And so
           that the way that kind of thing would be picked up is
           the facilities would -- if that facility had been
           subject to the typical kind of licensing structure
           that will now come under Part 70, when they changed
           the cylinder sizes and they went to the different
           cylinder, they would have had to come in and had that
           approved.  There would have been a safety review done
           by the NRC staff.  So that would have been subject to
           an explicit safety review.
                       But I still think you're right.  It would
           have been a tough call that the guy would have picked
           up on that.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes, yes.  Well, that's
           what we have to keep asking ourselves here.  Are these
           rules and guidance documents going to really result in
           increased safety and the saving of lives.  You know,
           we haven't had many events in the fuel cycle
           facilities that have resulted in injuries and
           fatalities, but particularly with respect to radiation
           exposure, but we've had quite a few events that have
           resulted in injuries and what have you from the
           chemical side, if you wish, of the problem.
                       And I don't know how much of that aspect
           that this is really going to capture.
                       MR. DAMON:  Well, that's very, very clear
           as was showed at the beginning of the presentation.
           The inclusion of chemical safety in the scope of what
           was regulated under Part 70 is a major innovation that
           actually is imbedded in this that often people
           overlook.
                       And in fact, the motivation for the rule
           came partly out of that Sequoyah Fuels event, and
           there was finally a realization at the agency that it
           wasn't clear in the regulations as to whether the NRC
           had authority to do this.
                       So they negotiated with OSHA as to whether
           or not -- what scope of authority the two agencies
           had.  It was agreed the NRC did have some scope of
           authority for chemicals involving license material,
           and so this Part 70 now implements that.
                       There's explicit regulation and the
           chemical standards are stated in there that these
           accidents are subject, and they would be reviewed.  As
           I said, if an amendment comes in on a process, we now
           have chemical safety engineers, people who are, you
           know, chemical engineers with a safety background who
           review these amendments.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. DAMON:  And looking at just the
           chemical safety.  So in that sense, Part 70 definitely
           addresses the Sequoyah event.   It is the regulation
           that now brings that quote of event under the NRC.
                       But I agree with you.  It would have been
           a difficult thing to detect the particular flaw that
           led to that accident.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  I guess one other part
           of that same question is that a lot of these accidents
           occur from a couple of primary reasons.  One is that
           the procedures were not followed because in Sequoyah
           they knew about these different sizes.
                       It could have been a temporary lapse or
           what have you, but they knew about that.  That was in
           the information base, and they had been trained on
           those, on that difference.  So it's a case of
           following the procedure.  It's a case of being aware
           that what happens to an autoclave under high
           temperature and the expansion level, the increase in
           the level, and the conditions under which you can get
           an overflow condition.
                       The other thing is believing your
           instruments, and you know, both of these things have
           entered into just about every accident that we can
           identify.  This business of following the procedures
           and believing the instruments, it's like Three Mile
           Island had that component in it as well of detecting
           that the fluctuating pressurizer indicators was due to
           two-phase flow, and understanding the steam tables.
                       So when we talk about safety management
           and really getting rules and regulations that deal
           with it, and particularly in the chemical business,
           it's a lot more than the frequency of the failure of
           a piece of equipment.  It's really understanding the
           dynamics of the process, as well, under out-of-the-
           envelope conditions.
                       And sometimes we really have to be sure
           that our rules and regulations capture those kinds of
           things.
                       MR. DAMON:  That's certainly something I
           believe as well.  I think many of the safety
           practitioners in the plants understand this.  The idea
           that you really don't want to rely on -- even though
           those processes, in fact, are operated by operators,
           are manually operated, you really don't want to rely
           on them carrying out a careful procedure of some kind
           like taking a measurement or weighing something.  You
           want to structure the process so that, yeah, even if
           they make a mistake, it's very unlikely that you would
           make it badly enough that it would cause an accident.
                       And this is an example here of what they
           do in the plants.  This example is simply you've got
           a process, and it has a mass limit of 350 grams of
           uranium.  So the operator is supposed to weigh out in
           batch, in a batched container, the whole 350 grams,
           the amount he's supposed to add, and he adds it to the
           process.
                       Okay, but the process is designed so that
           the accident is it turns out he has to add 70 kgs to
           make it go critical because they structure the
           container to be put in is either flat or narrow.  If
           you want to go to the extreme, you make it safe by
           geometry, which is basically then you can't have a
           criticality in the container.
                       But in some cases they can't quite achieve
           that, but they nevertheless leave big safety margins.
           These transfer carts and things like that, the example
           I gave before is another example.  Storage racks;
           almost all of the processes in a HEU facility are safe
           because there's a gigantic safety margin between what
           they actually do and what you would have to do to make
           it go critical.
                       Now, chemical safety isn't necessarily
           like this, but I'm saying big safety margin is really
           the typical way that these human operated things are
           structured so that the operator doesn't cause an
           accident.
                       This one, this is really an example of how
           even though the equation might have three terms in it,
           there's really only one event here.  In other words,
           the only way you'd make it critical is the operator
           somehow gets in his head that he's going to overload
           that thing.
                       So the real issue is simply it's focusing
           your attention on the fact that really what would
           motivate or cause an operator to do that.  Is that
           amount of 70 kgs physically available to him or not?
                       And it just focuses your attention on
           that, I think, you know, realizing that that really is
           what you're relying on.  The point of doing an
           analysis like that and identifying that it's the big
           safety margin is so that it's written down as a result
           of this ISA so that if the process is changed, the
           safety analyst who handles that change will realize
           that is the point; that is the way that process is
           designed, so that he will not design a process that
           does not have that safety margin, and it's the reason
           why you put things in this analysis that may appear to
           be trivial and of no value.  It's being put in there
           because that really is what is making that thing an
           unlikely event.
                       And if you don't write it down when the
           process is changed, you're just relying on the
           professional judgment of the next engineer that comes
           along to design it properly, but if you understand the
           conceptual structure of why the thing is unlikely and
           you document that, then that's the concept of this ISA
           stuff.  It's making a list of the items relied on for
           safety.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  I had a little trouble
           figuring out how you went from 200 batches required to
           the signing out of --
                       MR. DAMON:  Well, that's why I put that in
           there.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  That's where the
           judgment comes in?
                       MR. DAMON:  That's exactly why I put that
           in there.  I said this is an example of why we often
           say, you know, that this really isn't as quantitative.
           It's conceptually quantitative, but really it's a
           judgment call.  It's not -- as I say, this type of
           rationale is probably -- there's probably 50 processes
           that rely on that rationale for why they're safe in
           these plans for every one that relies on something
           that has engineered components in it that's relied on
           for safety.
                       It's like you go through pages and pages
           of these processes where the reason it's safe is
           because they're working with 350 grams and they need
           70 kgs, and then you come to one.  Oh, ah, there's a
           real safety design.  Okay?
                       But I'm just saying I'm trying to give a
           flavor for the fact these plants are dissimilar from
           a reactor which relies on active engineered
           components.  You find exceedingly few.
                       See, even that pipe example I gave, that's
           a passive safety.  It's all -- all of these what the
           plants are relying on are big safety margins,
           procedures, training, and passive, and once in a great
           while you'll see an active component in there.  You'll
           see a monitor.
                       Because to be a real active, engineered
           control you have to be totally automatic.  That's the
           definition we use.  There's no human being involved.
           Almost all of them the human being is involved.  They
           might have a sensor someplace with a meter, but it's
           the operator who's going to recognize what it means
           and take the action.
                       And so these processes don't -- in fact,
           there's very little even of that.  Most of these
           processes, the whole thing is dependent on the
           operator, and very, very little is it like a reactor
           with active engineered components with sensor, you
           know, logic, actuator, and an active component.  There
           is some of that, but very little.
                       Well, that's about all I have as a
           presentation.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  I think this has
           been quit helpful.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  Have you got any
           thoughts about how you would factor into this semi-
           quantification some uncertainty like John Garrick
           mentioned, which is really needed for full
           quantification?
                       MR. DAMON:  Well, I mean, someone could
           certainly do that, you know, do upper and lower bound
           and take a geometric mean and that kind of thing, you
           know, with simple methods like this.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  I would guess that we
           had --
                       MR. DAMON:  But, I mean, we didn't discuss
           that in any standard review plan or anything.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  One of the things I did
           want to ask you is I would guess you have quite a bit
           of information, especially on near misses.  I was
           involved in some space work in a situation where there
           was considerable frustration because of the absence of
           data on particular kinds of events, but when we
           started looking underneath the things that did occur,
           we found a very robust database on what might be
           called precursor events and what might be called near
           misses and was able to develop a pretty substantial
           knowledge base on the kinds of events that were
           causing some concern early in the space shuttle
           program, such as the failure of auxiliary power units.
                       And actually once we started looking at
           the experience base, it was possible to develop some
           pretty good models and to develop probability density
           functions on failure frequencies in the event sequence
           models that could be very highly defended.
                       With the information base that exists in
           the chemical field, I would think you'd be in a much
           better position than in most industries to develop
           good databases on accidents.
                       When you put together Part 70, was this
           done against a compendium of analysis of the accident
           history or the incident history of fuel cycle
           facilities, for example?
                       MR. DAMON:  I mean, there were studies
           done.  There have been.  We do have a database here at
           the NRC of material, the materials events database,
           and after the G.E. incident in '91, there was notice
           issued requesting that the licensees report failures
           of criticality safety controls.  So those events have
           been compiled now for ten years.  So there's ten years
           of events on the types of things that are failures of
           control.
                       So they're not criticalities.  They're
           just individual, single control failures, and so there
           is that information.  As you say, the chemical
           industry, AIChE has a chemical -- what do they call
           that? -- Chemical Safety Process Center or something.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. DAMON:  They have a database.  Yeah,
           there are databases that are relevant.  Westinghouse's
           Savannah River site did a survey of these databases a
           number of years ago.  Well, the Savannah River site
           has various processes and reactors and stuff down
           there.  So they did a survey of databases and compiled
           some recommended values for certain things, and we're
           looking at this stuff and thinking about it.
                       But, again, like I say, the large majority
           of the things that are actually in the facilities
           depend on these things like a big safety margin that's
           judmentally assessed kind of thing, you know.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, you also have to
           be very alert to process dependent events.  You know,
           before we had critically safe fuel cycle facilities.
           We had batch mass limited components in the chemical
           reprocessing facilities.
                       The original design of the Idaho plant
           based on use of hexone rather than TPP; the original
           dissolvers were batch mass limited.  An example of
           being very alert, and I was looking for that in the
           standard review plan, as well.  An example of having
           to be very alert to events that can come about not
           because of failure of equipment, but because of the
           build-up of a heel, for example, in batch mass limited
           dissolvers.
                       And we did a simple physics calculation in
           1952 in the start-up of the Idaho chem. plant, and
           calculated within a range of some uncertainty, but we
           bounded it pretty well, of how many dissolutions you'd
           have to have in order to accumulate a heel in that
           dissolver such that you would really run a high risk
           of having a critical mass, and it wasn't very many
           because after every dissolution there was a residue,
           and that residue contained highly enriched uranium.
                       And so there are lots of things having to
           do with the safety of nuclear related facilities that
           are very process dependent, not necessarily equipment
           performance dependent and not even procedural
           dependent unless you connect the procedure to the
           avoidance of those kind of more subtle things
           happening.
                       So it's an interesting challenge that we
           have to be ever so mindful of and recognize that the
           opportunities for something going wrong are not just
           equipment failure, but there are all kinds of things,
           including, of course, as we say, maybe most of it
           comes about by human failure or some aspect of human
           involvement.
                       And so I assume that when you do a review,
           that those kind of things, the process related
           phenomena are taken into account as well.  In a sense,
           the Sequoyah Fuels was a process related phenomenon as
           to what happens at elevated temperatures of UF6 in an
           autoclave.  They underestimated the expansion.
                       And so I hope that is a part of the
           evaluation in the whole ISA process as well.
                       MR. DAMON:  Yes, this likelihood of
           evaluation stuff that I ran through here really is in
           a sense -- it's just the tail end of the process.  The
           more important process is the front end, and that is
           the thoroughness with which the applicants conduct
           their attempt to identify all of the accidents that
           can happen, and like you say, accumulation of fissile
           material in locations, this is one reason I believe
           most of the applicants use what I would call an open
           ended methodology for -- how do I put it? -- more of
           a -- how do I put this?
                       If you use a fault tree on a reactor, you
           already know what the safety design is and what the
           safety features is, and your analysis tends to be what
           I would call closed forum.  You identify the things
           that it relied on, and you put that in your fault
           tree.
                       But in most of the way that the PHAs are
           done for these facilities, they use more open ended
           methods, like HAZOP and "what if" checklists, and one
           of the reasons is to pick because the safety design of
           things weren't designed from the ground up to address
           absolutely everything that could go wrong.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. DAMON:  So now you've got to put that
           in after the fact.  You've got to do the analysis and
           say, "Okay.  Where could there be fissile material in
           this process?  Where are all of the places?  How could
           it get there?"
                       And then by doing so, then you say, "Now,
           what am I doing to make sure that doesn't happen?"
                       So that's the logic process that has most
           of the emphasis in ISA, is going through that process.
           This likelihood of evaluation is something we feel
           that you should do, but it's the front end part.  If
           you don't do the front end part, this back end stuff
           is --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  I agree, and this is
           one of the lessons learned, I think, in the PRA
           community that has come from the chemical industry,
           but is now very much an integral and inherent part of
           most PRA analysis, and that is the understanding of
           the role of phenomenology in the whole risk assessment
           process.
                       One thing that bothers me a little bit is
           that people tend to associate PRA with just event
           trees and fault trees, and that's not PRA.  Those are
           useful tools, but they're not the essence of it.  To
           do a comprehensive nuclear plant PRA as much effort
           just about is gone into establishing success criteria,
           which is a phenominological issue of understanding the
           thermal hydraulics and making sure you understand the
           conditions under which the plant can continue to be in
           a safe mode, although degraded.
                       And I think that sometimes to the outside
           world, there is a failure to recognize that that is
           very much an integral part of contemporary risk
           assessment, namely, the phenomenological analysis.
                       And when we started doing containment
           response analysis and constructing logic models, the
           logic models were not based on on/off of active
           systems.  It was based on thresholds of
           phenomenological conditions, like have you reached a
           certain temperature; have you reached a certain
           pressure.
                       And that was a breakthrough in terms of
           adding credibility to the risk models because it began
           to teach us that the chemical way of thinking is an
           extremely important part of the whole process.
                       So a lot of the logic models don't even
           look like a fault tree.  They more or less are like
           multiple state decision diagrams, that if you go from
           this branch point to this one, it's dependent upon
           whether you've reached a certain threshold.
                       That threshold may be determined by some
           sort of thermodynamic condition, and a lot of input
           from the chemical industry has added to the
           credibility of those kinds of models, and they've
           improved the containment response in post core
           accident progression models a great deal.
                       Okay.  Any questions?
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  I asked them along the
           way.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Good.  Thanks a lot,
           Dennis, for putting up with us.
                       Let's see.  I guess our program calls for
           us to take lunch about this time, and then we'll pick
           up at 12:30 with industry presentations, which we're
           looking forward to.  So we'll adjourn for lunch.
                       (Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the meeting was
           recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 12:30 p.m., the
           same day.)
















           .                     A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N  S-E-S-S-I-O-N
                                                   (12:31 p.m.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Let's come to order.
                       We're now going to hear from industry
           representatives, and I'm pleased to see that we have
           adopted a rather informal approach here, kind of a
           round table type discussion.  It might be a good idea
           if each of you, or however you want to handle it,
           would introduce yourselves and tell us just a few
           lines about what your role or task or assignment or
           responsibilities are.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  Thank you very much, Dr.
           Garrick, for permitting us to talk with you today.
                       My name is Ralph Beedle.  I'm the chief
           nuclear officer, Nuclear Energy Institute.  And I'm
           responsible for the operation of the technical group
           called nuclear generation within the institute.
                       And with me, Jack Bronf and Felix Killar.
           I'll let them introduce themselves.
                       Jack.
                       MR. BRONS:  I am Jack Brons.  I'm the
           special assistant to the president of NEI.  But I am
           here today in my role as one of the members of the
           team of people to go with Bob Bernero and Jim Clark to
           produce the report that you have.  And my purpose will
           be to address that report.
                       MR. KILLAR:  And I'm Felix Killar,
           Director of materials licensees at NEI.  And my role
           at NEI is to facilitate and coordinate the industry
           response or initiatives to regulations, changes, and
           what have you whether it's by NRC, DOE, DOT, things on
           that line.
                       MR. GARRICK:  Very good.  Thank you.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  There is no doubt that the
           ISAs have been a valuable asset to the analysis of the
           facility operations and processes.  And we're not here
           to debate the merits of the ISA process.  That's not
           our purpose.
                       As I listened to the conversation this
           morning, I think I have to conclude that the issue
           that we are truly concerned with is a process one.
           And it's a process one in that the ISA that has been
           submitted to the NRC in the past and the one that is
           potentially being submitted in the future is going to
           be reviewed in a totally different fashion than in the
           development process that was used for that submission.
                       And by that I mean the ISA and its
           somewhat qualitative process, but nonetheless one that
           utilizes an extensive review of the process fault
           trees to determine vulnerabilities, but nonetheless
           qualitative in nature, is going to be subjected to a
           rather quantitative review.
                       And that bothers me probably more than
           anything else because that leads to all sorts of
           difficulties in trying to judge the merits of the
           submission and, I think, has been in part one of the
           reasons that we have submitted ISA's in the past and
           still are yet to get any results on it.
                       Because I think the staff is definitely a
           quandary on how they do the review and make it one
           that is a amenable to this analytical process that was
           described this morning.
                       What I'd like to do is talk a little --
                       MR. GARRICK:  By the way, we really
           appreciate your candidness on that because this is one
           of things that each of the members was stimulated by
           this morning, as to what these problems were and what
           the real issues are.
                       And to the extent that you can deal with
           those, I think it will help us.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  Well, I thought that a number
           of your questions this morning about the merits of a
           very detailed process where the risk of the system
           wasn't all that significant to begin with is one that
           we wrestle with all the time.
                       Now what is the cost-benefit on some
           process that you're getting ready to develop?
                       But I continually ask the people that come
           to me with solutions, I say, "What is the problem?
           What are you trying to resolve?"
                       So I'd like to talk a little bit about
           what are we trying to deal with here.   We are dealing
           with a relatively limited number of fuel cycles
           facilities.  And none of them are the same.  They're
           all different.  They're dealing with different
           processes.  They're dealing with different enrichments
           for sure.
                       And as a result of that we're trying to
           take a one size fits all approach.
                 And I certainly understand the difficulty that
           the staff has.  As the two fellows testified this
           morning, one of their concerns is the resources it
           takes to do these reviews.  They are more concerned
           about what it's going to take to do the reviews than
           what it's going to take these facilities to develop
           it.
                       So, you know, depending on what side of
           that fence you're sitting on, the resource allocation
           becomes a major issue for you.
                       But what I'd like to do is revisit the
           results of a report that was produced a number of
           years ago and reissued recently in the form of NUREG
           1140.  And it was assessment and historical
           perspective on the criticality problems at the field
           cycle facilities.
                       As you're probably well aware, there were
           seven reported inadvertent nuclear criticalities in
           the last 50 years at these facilities.  And in the
           look at those seven events, we find that they all
           occurred with fissile material in solution or
           slurries.  None occurred with powders.  None occurred
           when the material was being moved.  None of it
           occurred when it was being transported.  There were no
           equipment damages as a result of that.  None resulted
           in measurable fission product contamination beyond the
           property boundary.  None resulted in measurable
           exposure to the members of the public.
                       No accidents were caused by a single
           failure, equipment failure, or malfunction was wither
           minor or noncontributing factor in all the accidents.
           None were attributed to faulty calculations in
           critical analysis.  And the last occurred in 1978.
                       But from those, the lessons learned were
           that clear, unambiguous written procedures are really
           necessary in order to give yourself the best chance of
           avoiding any difficulties of that nature.
                       Good training of personnel, especially in
           the recognition and reporting of abnormal conditions,
           and in taking the -- and in not taking unapproved
           actions, and the involvement awareness of senior
           facility management and regulatory agency oversight.
                       Those are the lessons that were learned
           from these seven criticality events that occurred, the
           last one 1978.  I think the facilities have learned an
           awful lot since then.  They have developed improved
           processes for analyzing their systems.  And I think
           that's been in part as a result of the work that has
           been done through these ISAs over the last several
           years.
                       So with that we ended up with the
           Tokaimura event here two years ago.  And there was a
           heightened awareness of the potential for that.  And
           the question was asked could that happen here in the
           United States.
                       As a result of that, NEI commissioned a
           group of three individuals, very experienced in the
           nuclear business, to take a look at all of the
           facilities in the United States that handle that
           material.
                       And so with that I'd like to turn to Jack
           Brons who is one of those three members, to talk about
           the results of the review of the fuel cycle facilities
           done following the Tokaimura event.
                       Jack.
                       MR. BRONF:  Thanks, Ralph.
                       As Ralph mentioned, in the aftermath of
           the Tokaimura event and actually only a matter of days
           afterwards, the industry leadership and NEI got
           together and determined it would be appropriate for us
           to do a review of all of the fuel cycle facilities.
           And I want to stress at this point that we -- you've
           been largely talking about Part 70 licensees today.
           We looked at the one Part 40 licensee because there
           was emergency plan issues here and there were
           significant emergency plan issues in a Part 40
           facility.  All of Part 70 licensees and also the Part
           76 licensees or certificates.
                       So we put together a team, Bob Bernero,
           who I think all of you know, and probably --
                       MR. GARRICK:  Yeah, we certainly do.
                       MR. BRONF:  -- know well.  And Jim Clark,
           who you may not know, but who has -- we all, each of
           us, had 40 or 40 plus years or experience.  So
           together we brought 120 years of experience.
                       Jim's experience is primarily in the
           industry side of the fuel cycle business.  My
           background is primarily reactor side, and Bob of
           course is primarily regulatory.  But all three of us
           have some degree of involvement in the other aspects
           of it.
                       We got together, and the first thing we
           did was to try and do an analysis from available data
           of what were the causes or contributing factors to the
           Tokaimura event.  And my purpose today is not going to
           be to go into each of those areas, but we determined
           that there were nine contributing factors:  one
           dealing with the culture that permitted the
           organization to react differently under the stress of
           production or cost standards.
                       Also the presence of a management and
           staff orientation which sanctioned deviation from
           approved procedures.
                       Clear lack of something in the
           criticality/safety area or good controls there.
                       We didn't know an awful lot about them,
           but we surmised that there must have also been some
           weaknesses in the administrative control processes,
           training, oversight of operations, instrumentation --
           you may recall there were significant issues whether
           the plant was properly instrumented -- emergency plan
           areas and lastly regulatory oversight.
                       Those were the nine areas, and the report
           that you have goes into detail on what we found at our
           facilities in each one of those areas.
                       The way we did our review was to put
           together a protocol for doing the evaluation.  Then we
           required all the facilities to provide us a certain
           amount of documentation relative to a series of
           questions that we asked that are all contained in an
           appendix to the report.
                       We then went to the facility.  After
           reviewing the documentation provided, we went to the
           facilities, conducted what I'd call a focused
           interrogation of the management staff all together in
           one room.  We didn't allow ourselves to get in the
           situation for efficiency purposes where the buck could
           be passed.  We had all responsible parties there.
                       We did a focused interrogation.  We did
           staff interviews.  We did in-plant observation.  And
           based on those preceding factors, then spent several
           hours, each one of us, doing an in-depth, focused look
           in an area that we thought represented any
           vulnerabilities that we detected.
                       After that we provided input to the
           individual facility and ultimately compiled this
           report, which is not facility specific, but represents
           our overall conclusions relative to the industry.
                       We categorized our results in three
           different ways besides providing the individual
           observations.  First was what we called general
           results.
                       I want to begin there with that.  Overall
           we concluded that the licensees are beneficiaries of
           a very sensible regulatory scheme and also
           beneficiaries of a good standards process.  And in
           that our determination was that we found that the
           regulations and standards are observed, the plants --
           that provided for a fundamental level of safety, and
           we concluded that they were operating safely.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  One other thing I want
           to raise right there, because it reminds me of a
           little study that I was involved in in the chemical
           industry a few years ago where we tried to look at a
           half a dozen chemical plants, or so that were
           considered to have outstanding safety practices and
           safety systems a nd deal with the issue of how has
           this affected throughput.
                       How has this affected the general
           performance of the plant?
                       To try to get some sort of a counter to
           the sometimes argument put forward that it's safe but
           it costs so much to make it safe that we're not making
           much money with the plant.
                       And one of the things we found, very much
           to our pleasant surprise, was that the plants that
           generally followed the best procedures, had the best
           training programs, and as was said by Mr. Beedle
           earlier, senior management involvement, but did have
           a rigorous safety program were also the most
           successful in terms of throughput, in terms of
           performance, in terms of profitability.
                       I was just wondering if in your review and
           your analysis, if that becomes a very powerful output
           to this whole issue of if you follow a good safety
           schema, it doesn't necessarily mean that you're
           sacrificing at the bottom line.
                       MR. BRONF:  We would agree with that.  As
           you know, we see that very clearly in reactor
           operations, that safety and good performance are
           closely correlated, and that leads to most better
           output.
                       I would say that the same thing is true
           here.  We did not draw a specific inferred conclusion
           from that.  But we did not find any instances where
           the imposition of realistic safety measures, and I'm
           only quantifying it with the word "realistic" in that
           I think there is a brink or a point that you can go
           where --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Oh, sure.
                       MR. BRONF:  -- you're being wasteful.
                       But we found robust safety measures in
           place, and we did not find them to be interfering with
           operations.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah, yeah.
                       MR. BRONF:  And in fact, I would say while
           we did not make any rank ordering of best performance,
           we did identify best practices, and I will come to
           that in a minute.
                       But clearly the plants, and I would say if
           I were forced to make an overall comment, that were
           operating the best probably had the highest degree of
           involvement and the most robust safety.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah.  And the point
           here, it's not that the NRC is in the business of
           worrying about throughput or cost.  But rather what is
           important here is to point out to people whom you want
           engage in good safety practices that there's more
           benefit than just safety.
                       MR. BRONF:  And I would say that the
           managements recognize that investing in safety of
           operations is a concurrent investment in high
           productivity and good operating performance.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. BRONF:  I think that's understood and
           recognized.  And I'll come to examples of how it's
           being deployed.
                       Then the body of the report goes into the
           observations by contributing factors, and I'm going to
           skip that because it's not all that relevant to what
           we're talking about today.
                       We then go to part of the report that we
           call integrated results.  And our look at these plants
           is relatively unique.  In fact, I think it's
           singularly unique.  As far as Bob Bernero knew, there
           had never been a visit by a team of people to all of
           the fuel facilities in a brief period with the same
           agenda.
                       Even in the NRC's oversight, it would be
           various inspectors going.  There's a good deal of NRC
           involvement with the facilities, but it's not the same
           group of people going to all the plants with the same
           agenda.
                       So we had a relatively unique look at
           these plants.  And there were ten of them at the time.
           There's fewer than that now.  But we developed in our
           integrated results some concerns.
                       One of them was a concern about
           consolidation and competition, the concern that people
           would be distracted by what's going on in the industry
           as people are being acquired and sold and shut down
           and so on.  And we addressed that in a report.
                       Another concern was that there is apparent
           lack of understanding in a number of sectors that the
           facilities -- the degree of difference that exists
           between these facilities.  They sometimes do similar
           work, but they employ totally different strategies,
           and that results in a very different looking facility.
                       And so there is this concern or notion
           that one size fits all is out there and that was
           indeed one of our concerns, that people recognize the
           difference between these facilities.
                       And last, we have a section where we
           addressed the issue of risk in the regulatory process.
           And we developed concern on both the facility and the
           regulatory side of the equation, where we detected a
           movement to treat these facilities like reactors.
                       On the part of facility management, we
           encountered numerous instances where they were
           adopting relatively elegant processes that were
           appropriate to reactor operation, but frankly
           burdening and not effective for these facilities.
                       And similarly, in the material we reviewed
           from the regulatory side we also saw an apparent move
           to apply processes that are appropriate to reactors to
           them.
                       The one quote I'm going to use from this
           report is on page 13, in the last paragraph of this
           integrated conclusion section.  It says, "In the
           team's view, it's important that the facilities be
           recognized and treated as they are:  unique facilities
           with low and unique risk profiles.
                       "Expectations and programs should be
           directed at the realities of the processes being
           employed.  Efficiency and safety will both be enhanced
           if the imposition of elaborate measures better suited
           to other enterprises is avoided.  As much as each of
           these facilities is similar to the others, it is also
           sufficiently unique so that few one size fits all
           solutions are applicable."
                       The other kind of general conclusion that
           we came to, and I think is extremely important and it
           is going to underlie most of the remaining remarks
           that I have to make, is that we found, contrary to the
           situation at Tokaimura, a very strong and pervasive
           belief on the part of the work force and the
           management at all ten facilities, or at all nine
           facilities where criticality is possible, and at the
           tenth facility where the reality was a chemical
           accident exclusively, that it can happen here.
                       We found problems with some people
           understanding just exactly how a criticality or an
           accident does occur, but we found a very pervasive
           belief that it can happen here, even in the facilities
           that fundamentally push prefabricated pellets into
           fuel assemblies.
                       Now with respect specifically to ISA and
           PRA, what we found is that, of course, the fuel cycle
           facilities are a distributed series of unit
           operations.  They are not a linked, continuous,
           conditional series with a single outcome.
                       They are highly automated.  But they're
           rich in human involvement.
                       I would stress that the human involvement
           is more closely linked to logistics within the
           facility and quality, commercial quality kinds of
           issues rather than active operation of processes.
                       They're moving material from one point in
           the queue to another, and they're preforming a modest
           amount of oversight in active operation.
                       But nevertheless there's a lot of human
           involvement.  We found that many of the facilities
           were using fault trees and that they were very useful
           to take a systematic approach towards reviewing their
           facility, but they were not being used for
           quantification.
                       We felt that the best effort at
           quantification would be to go to a more or less a
           high, medium, low approach as you assessed various
           events or sequences in a fault tree.
                       We felt that efforts that were used to
           analyze operations did reveal dominant
           vulnerabilities.  But we would conclude as a team, and
           I would discuss these remarks with the team and very
           specifically and in great length with Bob Bernero, who
           would have been here.  His wife just recently had
           surgery which had successful outcome, but he's at home
           with her.
                       But there's no useful threshold
           probability.  Only reasoned judgement is an
           appropriate way to treat these analyses.
                       And that the greatest benefit from the
           analyses that we saw deployed was an outcome that was
           useable and understandable by operators because it is
           they who derive the relatively simple resolutions to
           vulnerabilities discovered.
                       In most cases, when you discover a
           vulnerability here, I don't know how to stress that
           too much unless you're familiar with the facilities,
           but the resolution is a relatively simple matter.
                       I'm thinking in one in particular where an
           ISA discovered a problem that could be caused by
           flooding and it was a storage situation and it was
           solved simply by moving the storage to another
           location.  It didn't change the process or anything
           that was in there.  It was just a movement.
                       We heard some description early this
           morning about the carts and they're -- you put a cart
           tabletop.  In order to make the procedures work, you
           can weld ring collars on the table top so that you can
           only place certain size cylinders on it and only so
           many.
                       And these are solutions that the operators
           come up with after these analyses.  And I would stress
           at this point that in the lengthy discussion with Bob
           Bernero just yesterday when I was going over this,
           what we were going to say today, Bob concurred that
           this type of analysis was in his mind, when he was
           responsible for really setting up the concept of ISA,
           was his intent.
                       And he commented on that a number of times
           during the course of these reviews.
                       I'd also point out that the regulatory and
           standards basis which provides us such a firm
           foundation for the safe operation of these facilities
           is deterministic.  And unlike reactors, it is a simple
           and relatively well understood and effective
           deterministic basis.  Fundamentally it's double
           contingency.
                       We found during the course of our reviews
           that all facilities preferred engineered or geometry
           type solutions for their contingencies.  All of them
           pursue to some degree the elimination of any
           administrative controls in place, some of them doing
           that with very formal programs and others with
           informal programs, but all of them could demonstrate
           to us a successful elimination of administrative
           controls as a function of time.
                       In our mind there is a significant
           question on the effort and the ability to quantify
           fundamental process elements in the very simple
           processes that we are talking about here, ad how to
           overlay a PRA type approach on probabilistic numbers
           on a deterministic process.
                       As I mentioned, the facilities are highly
           variable between facilities.  For example, a like
           process between two facilities that comes to mine, one
           case uses moderator exclusion and another one uses
           poison.  And they result in totally different
           processes, but they are dealing with the same blended
           powder in this case.
                       I would also suggest that there is a risk
           in moving the PRA of excesses focused on criticality
           as opposed to the more dominant and significant, at
           least from a public standpoint, and I suspect also
           from a workers standpoint, risk of chemical accident.
                       And the reason I say that focus is because
           there are so many processes that are subject to
           criticality risk by comparison to the number of
           processes that are subject to chemical risk, that you
           would end up focusing management's attention on
           criticality systems, which is probably the lowest risk
           of the two.
                       Now when we did these reviews not everyone
           was using ISA.  Some had -- all had some assessment
           process in place though.  And all had a corrective
           action program in place to deal with the results of
           assessments of their operations.
                       Those that were using ISA, I believe I
           could characterize them as thoughtful, reasoned,
           intellectual, systematic, and most importantly, action
           and improvement oriented.  All were choosing to
           eliminate hazards rather than sharpen their pencil.
           Why?
                       Well, as I mentioned earlier, our
           strongest and most gratifying conclusion was that they
           believe that criticality or chemical events could
           happen at their facility.  And they acted accordingly.
                       So the ISA in the less formal assessments,
           based on high, medium, and low quantification factors,
           produced very useful results.  We saw, for example,
           whether it was a criticality concern about the buildup
           of broken pellets and powder in some of the equipment;
           the substitution of plexiglass shields for otherwise
           not transparent material so the operator could see
           that.
                       We found instances where the geometry
           inside equipment was altered so that there couldn't be
           a buildup.  Dr. Garrick, you mentioned earlier heels.
           I'm sure you are aware that there are extensive
           processes involved no in terms of cleaning cylinders
           and so on for the very issues that you brought up.
                       We found replacement of administrative
           controls with altered geometry and active controls.
           We found an instance where pipe was replaced as a
           result of a review because it was a concern; it was a
           geometry concern, not a leakage concern that the
           thinning of the pipe wall by virtue of the chemical
           being handled could increase the geometry at the ID of
           the pipe.
                       And so a facility went in and replaced the
           pipe on that basis.  There was no leakage.  It was an
           outright geometry control issue.  We found people
           relocating processes so that the storage and the
           throughput process would prevent the buildup of a
           potential critical mass.
                       And very importantly, we found several
           facilities using the outcome of these assessments to
           develop what I would call early warning limits, almost
           an approach to a triple contingency where they develop
           within their management approaches to failure of a
           contingency, if you will, and then set up the internal
           processes to report that so that they could take
           corrective action early, all in spite of the high
           margins that existed.
                       Now, I mentioned that we identified best
           practices during that review and NEI is at the present
           time organizing a best practice transfer.
                       One of the burdens this industry has born
           is that these processes are so different that there
           are proprietary interests involved.  And as a result
           there hasn't been a lot of translation of best
           practice from one facility to another because if
           you're a GE guy you don't necessarily want the
           Westinghouse people coming through your plant and vice
           versa.
                       Because of this unique effort we have
           secured the agreement of the entire industry to take
           the best practices that we have defined in the course
           of this review and to orchestrate, put together a
           workshop where those best practices will be
           transferred.  And one of the subject areas is
           specifically the ISA.
                       And we did have -- we have a couple
           facilities out there that have been using ISA and
           using it extremely well.
                 And that will be subject to information transfer
           now between the facilities.
                       That concludes my remarks.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  Let me add a few more
           comments in connection with this.
                       When I look at the review that is proposed
           through this standard review plan, Chapter 3, where
           we're going to focus on the analytical processes, it
           is of concern to me that we would put our emphasis on
           the numerical evaluation of the ISA summary rather
           than applying the kind of rigor to a review of the
           facility that Jack Bronf just described that was
           conducted by that team.
                       And I think that that was precisely what
           Mr. Damon mentioned this morning as the real value in
           the ISA, was that up-front work of developing the
           logic models, the fault trees, the analysis that goes
           into determining where your vulnerabilities are and
           not in the analytical process of whether or not you're
           ten to the minus two or ten to the minus three.
                       That's where the value was.  That's where
           the value that this time saw that ISA in play at these
           facilities.  And I'm concerned that a fixation on the
           numbers is going to lead us away from that.
                       But aside from that I've still got to ask
           the question:  what's the problem we're trying to
           solve?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Any questions at this
           time?
                       MR. LEVENSON:  I just have one question.
           The title of this report implies that your study was
           limited to criticality accidents; is that correct?
                       MR. BRONF:  It could be inferred from the
           title but it's actually not correct because it does
           include emergency preparedness.  And because the basis
           for emergency preparedness at all of these facilities
           is almost exclusively based on chemical accidents,
           that is, where you involve the general public, it
           really takes a chemical accident because of site size
           and so on that we did get involved in the chemical
           side of things.
                       And as I mentioned also we looked at one
           facility that is only a Part 40 licensee.  That's the
           Allied Signal facility in Metropolis, Illinois.  And
           of course there is no criticality risk there, but a
           very substantial chemical risk.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  We're not through.
           You're going to proceed or he's a resource?
                       MR. BRONF:  He's a resource.
                       MR. KILLAR:  I am a resource.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.
                       MR. LEVENSON:  We didn't ask the right
           questions.  We didn't have to resource.
                       MR. KILLAR:  You didn't ask any of the
           difficult questions so I'm safe for now.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Let's get back to the
           question you posed.  And that is basically what is the
           issue.  What is the problem?  What is the question
           here?
                       I guess I ran an engineering organization
           for many years, and every time we'd get into trouble
           or into a project problem and we'd get our heads
           together, we would discover that the root of the
           problem was because different people were attempting
           to answer different question, rather than the same
           question.
                       And so I think a very good way to keep
           activities focused is to frame the questions that
           you're trying to answer as explicitly and as
           transparent as you possible can.
                       So what do you think is the issue here?
           Why are we even here today?
                       MR. BRONF:  Maybe I can address that.  I
           think that there is a concern about a distraction
           factor in order to produce a quantification of these
           things.  As I mentioned, there is a high level of
           involvement, human involvement, although it's largely
           for logistics reasons and less for operations reasons.
                       But that means that if you're going to do
           a quantitative analysis of any given process you have
           got to come up with some probability of human error
           going into it.
                       And I think that the development of a
           numerical factor for that would be significantly -- be
           an exercise that would take fair amount of time.
                       And I told Ralph I wasn't going to do this
           but I will do it.  And I do not mean to do it in any
           way that is disrespectful.  But you looked at an
           example this morning about a pipe.
                       I would argue, and I've had some
           experience with PRA, that it is not a simple two
           factor issue.  Whether the outer pipe leaks or not
           depends upon whether the leak is in the bottom of the
           pipe or the top of the pipe.  If its in the bottom of
           the pipe, will the operator detect a drip before the
           annuals or semi or biannual surveillance?
                       There are a whole host of other factors
           that would go into this if you want to be rigorous
           about it and the question really evolves down to where
           do we draw the line, in the standard at the level of
           rigor and the level of documentation.
                       And having done all that, will it achieve
           a better or different result?  And what I'm really
           trying to present to you from the results of our
           review, which was out there looking at the carts,
           looking at the pipes, and what people are doing with
           the qualitative analyses that we are doing, even those
           that are not doing ISA; I would suggest that you are
           getting a significantly beneficial result that could
           be derailed and could possibly have negative value.
                       And I'm not sure who will be benefitted by
           the number if it cannot be shown to be rigorously
           pristine, especially given that there is no similarity
           between the facilities.  So I can't do this on Process
           A at Facility 1 and compare the result of Process A at
           Facility 2 And suggest or infer in any way that they
           ought to be similar.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.  Well, it's not
           our intent here to get into a contest --
                       MR. BRONF:  No, I understand that.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  -- on what the merits
           of PRA versus integrated safety assessment or
           whatever.  What we are trying to do is to be as
           constructive as we can in advising the Commission on
           the best way to continue this movement towards a risk
           performance based regulatory practice on the basis
           that in the end everybody will benefit.
                       As you know from the PRA policy statement,
           one of the things that's embedded in that whole
           statement is to relieve the burden on industry.  And
           my personal feelings about this are that if we can't
           figure out how to adopt contemporary thought processes
           that give us a little more insight, particularly with
           respect to the perspective, with respect to the
           importance of different contributors to safety, then
           we shouldn't be advocating the approach.
                       The one thing that has been very clear to
           me, I've had the very fortunate experience of working
           PRA's in just about every major industry:
           transportation, petroleum products, and petroleum
           shipping, marine.
                       I rode a tanker down through the Prince
           William Sound to get a better feel for what happened
           with the Valdez.
                       I had the opportunity to spend a lot of
           time on the space shuttle risk management program.
           And the proof of concepts studies they've been
           conducting there to try to move into a more
           quantitative direction; very much involved with the
           chemical weapons disposal program; basically wrote the
           letter that went to the Secretary of the Army that
           eventually led to the decision require risk
           assessments for each of the chemical weapons disposal
           facilities.  That's eight facilities in the U.S. and
           the one out at Johnston Island.
                       And the one thing that I have observed in
           looking at all these different applications of this
           process is that there is a great desire for
           simplicity.  There's a great desire for trying to come
           up with methods that are acceptable to the people that
           are engaged in the operations themselves.
                       And I also further observed that the more
           they got involved in the ideas behind the quantitative
           approaches as we're now calling them, which I think is
           a pretty bad name, the more they were willing to
           embrace them.
                       I think the classic example is NASA.  NASA
           was very negative on the use of risk assessment.  They
           had a very bad experience with it in the early days of
           the Apollo program.  Risk assessment calculation got
           into the halls of Congress and embarrassed them a
           great deal in terms of getting support for the Apollo
           program.  And the Administrator at that time
           essentially declared that they would not employ
           probabilistic methods in the safety analysis program.
                       Well, that's reversing.  And quite
           dramatically reversing down even though it's been a
           long time.  And to the point where my prediction is
           that in maybe four of five years the nuclear industry
           will no longer be the leader in the implementation and
           the use of probabilistic risk assessment methods in
           the risk management arena, but probably will transfer
           to the space program.
                       But nevertheless, I don't think we want to
           get this into a level of a contest.  My observation
           has been that the biggest problem that we've had in
           selling the ideas of PRA is that there is an
           identification of what a PRA is with the massive fault
           tree/event tree models that have been employed in the
           nuclear power industry.  And a failure to recognize
           that there's hundreds of other much smaller and much
           more pointed risk assessments that have greatly
           assisted the risk management process in a whole
           variety of other applications that pretty much go
           unnoticed.
                       So I think there is an unfortunate
           association here with complexity that doesn't really
           have to be.  I don't see that a risk assessment has to
           be any more complicated than it has to be to answer
           the question that you're trying to get an answer to.
                       And my observation is that some time we
           will look back on this and we'll say that we now in
           the fuel cycle facility business learn how to do these
           assessments in such a way that they are much simpler
           than the ISAs we were developing in the first decade
           of the new millennium.
                       It may not happen.  But I suspect it could
           very well happen.  So I think that all we want to do
           is make sure that adequate methods are being employed
           to fulfill the commitments, the obligations that the
           agency has, of reaching reasonable assurance findings
           on the safety of a variety of facilities.
                       And if this doesn't help that, then we
           should find the method.
                       We are going through the same thing in the
           waste field.  The waste field is principally focused
           right now on geological repositories.  Opened up first
           repository for storage of radioactive waste in the
           world at the waste isolation pilot plant in Carlsbad,
           New Mexico.
                       The underlying document for certifying
           that facility was something called a performance
           assessment.  It was just a sharp word for a risk
           assessment.
                       But the transition from a non-
           probabilistic performance assessment to a
           probabilistic performance assessment has gone through
           the very same kind of anxieties and questioning and
           challenges that we've been talking about here today.
                       And now it's pretty clear that the
           transition has made its way most of the way in terms
           of the embracing of a probabilistic approach to
           performance assessment, very different from the
           reactor risk assessments, except in terms of some of
           the fundamental principles, those fundamental
           principles being in the things that we were talking
           about this morning of scenarios and consequences and
           likelihoods, a different way of having to get a handle
           on what the likelihoods were.  But nevertheless the
           same thing had to be done.
                       So I think that the idea here is we look
           at the ISA process and we ask ourselves if this is
           doing the job, if it does the job better than a PRA.
                       With all due regard to these issues that
           you point out of distractions, of confusion, of
           elaborateness, overkill, and focusing on things that
           were other than the real issue; with due consideration
           to those and then make our decisions, but I don't
           think there is, you know, a religious zealous
           determination here to employ one method over another.
           There is a very strong desire to make sure that these
           analyses bring us the kind of insights that allow the
           agency to make the best possible decisions they can
           make.
                       And perspective is very much a part of
           that.  And the probabilistic component has been very
           important in providing perspective.  So that's one
           point of view.
                       Now I know you're going to have to leave
           here momentarily, Tom.  And I want to make sure if you
           have any parting wisdom or shots to take that you have
           that opportunity to do that.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  First off, I think the
           ISA methodology does in some sense address your risk
           triplet.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  What can go wrong and
           what are the potential consequences and what are the
           frequencies.  And it does it in a less quantitative
           way than a full PRA does, but I agree with things Mr.
           Beedle and these people have said, that the degree to
           which you need to quantify those things ought to
           depend on the potential hazards that you have, and
           that in general these things we're dealing with NMSS
           are much less hazardous, much less complex than the
           nuclear reactor.
                       So it is not really appropriate to ask for
           the same level of quantification.  And I have a few
           concerns that go to mostly the details of the ISA such
           as do we have acceptance criteria that are basically
           meaningless in terms of their differentiation between
           each other in terms of, say, the consequences.  It
           looked to me like they were close enough together that
           that is one consequence instead of two or three.
                       I had questions about how you would ever
           incorporate uncertainties into the process, and I'm
           still unclear as to how that could be done, and I
           think uncertainties have to be considered some way,
           and I don't mean to say I need a full distribution of
           probabilities and a full distribution of consequences
           or risks.  But I think uncertainties need to be
           factored in because they're -- they help guide one's
           perspective on what's important, which lines of
           defense are important.
                       I didn't see real good guidance on how
           many lines of defense are necessary.  The thing that
           was mentioned was, well, double contingency, which is
           basically two lines, constitutes highly unlikely.  I'm
           not sure there's a good basis for that because I have
           to know how good both of these double contingencies
           are before I can make that judgement.  So I don't
           think that's as precise a definition as I would like.
                       So I think some sharpening is needed on
           how many lines of defense are appropriate and how good
           do each of those have to be in a qualitative sense.
                       And so in summary, I see some things that
           need sharpening up, but I'm relatively enthused about
           the process as an appropriate one for the NMSS
           activities mainly because I don't perceive the hazard
           to be as severe that it would require quite the
           quantification we do in the reactor unit.  So that's
           basically my view at the moment.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Very good.  Okay.
           Milt.
                       CO-CHAIRMAN KRESS:  With that I'm going to
           have to --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  I know you had
           some comments, Milt, about the categorization issues.
                       MR. LEVENSON:  I've got a couple of
           comments.
                       One, back to your original question as to
           what the objective is, I've heard the objective of the
           overall program stated as the objective is to reduce
           risk.  And I think that's an unfortunate statement of
           the objective.  The objective is to reduces risk to an
           acceptable level.  The implication that risk can be
           reduced to zero is sometimes implied without
           recognition that that can't ever be achieved.
                       Our objective is to reduce risk to an
           acceptable level.  The big difference I see between
           the reactors and what we're talking about here is
           while the reactors, everybody say's there are no two
           alike, at least the U.S. reactors, in fact, the
           consequences of an accident, of the severe type
           accident in any of them is approximately the same.
           And that's not true in our fuel cycle facilities at
           all.
                       I think we have to maybe reorder our
           looking at the risk items.  The first one is what can
           go wrong.  That I think everybody including the
           industry wants to follow all the way to the end.  You
           want to identify everything that can go wrong.
                       But then instead of putting how likely is
           it to go wrong second, that's not appropriate.  It is
           for reactors because the consequences are always the
           same.  They're catastrophic.
                       I think we need to put the consequences
           second.  If the consequences are acceptable, then it
           isn't so clear to me why we should spend a lot of
           money and effort defining how likely or unlikely it
           is.
                       So I know John and I don't necessarily
           completely agree on this.  I would like to see
           quantification, and including not necessarily precise
           quantification, but a good assessment of uncertainties
           to make sure that the consequences are acceptable.  If
           consequences are acceptable, then I'm much less
           concerned about what you do about likelihood.
                       MR. BRONF:  I think, I'll tell you from
           our review that that is largely the train of thought
           that is actually being deployed now.  There are some
           processes out there deal with highly enriched
           material, aqueous solutions, and so on, where clearly
           the number of things and the consequences are higher.
           And they are getting very rigorous reviews.  There are
           large numbers of processes out there that deal with
           apparently significantly lower potential consequences
           and they're being reviewed, but not to the same level.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah, and I don't see
           anything wrong with the graded approach to it.  And
           certainly I don't see anything wrong with ordering the
           items of the triplet differently.
                       Clearly I think reasonableness has to
           enter into the process.  In fact, the one thing that
           is very encouraging about the ISA is that it does
           contain a lot of the same activity.  I think as one of
           you said earlier, you learn a lot from developing the
           scenarios, developing the sequences.  And I would
           agree with that.
                       In fact, in many plants, especially
           outside the nuclear world that I've been involved in
           analyzing, we've not had to go the full scope of what
           we have indicated we were going to simply because by
           the time we started out, the various things that could
           go wrong, we learned enough about them and how to deal
           with them, how to control them, that we achieved
           essentially what was desired.
                       So reasonableness has to be a part of the
           process.  The point is that sooner or later, what
           happens is when you get to something that is highly
           redundant and highly diversified, and therefore highly
           reliable, it becomes increasingly difficult to sort
           out the importance of contributors.
                       And so that's one of the reasons why the
           reactor models are as large as they are, is because
           they do have a great deal of redundancy with their
           independent and separate safety trains and their very
           dedicated and high standards, mitigating equipment,
           and so in order to really get an understanding of what
           the contributors are, you have to dig quite deep.
                       So the fact that they are highly reliable
           contributes to the sometimes expanded scope, but I
           don't think the idea here is to do any more than you
           have to to get the answers that you are looking for.
           The ISA has enough of the same kind of activities in
           it as a PRA does to feel that if there's a clear
           advantage to going that extra step, then you certainly
           don't have to start over to do that.
                       You have a lot of the analysis work
           preformed that is necessary to go that extra step.
                       All right.
                       MR. LEVENSON:  I just have one other
           comment based on one example that was given this
           morning with which I really don't agree.  And that is
           redundant is not the same a diverse.
                       I used to once be a chemical engineer, and
           I know one case where a double walled hydrogen line
           was just wiped out by a guy driving through a plant
           with an elevated forklift.  And so one needs to
           recognize when you talk about multiple things, are
           they independent?
                       MR. BEEDLE:  That is where your ISA let
           you down.  You didn't do a good logic trend on that
           one.
                       MR. LEVENSON:  Not my idea.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  But I think this ISA has
           served the fuel cycle facilities very well.  It has
           given them a sense of discipline and a process to go
           analyze their various production methods to determine
           where their vulnerabilities are, which is the start of
           that PRA process that we've been using in the reactor
           systems for some years now.
                       Now, I, like you, Dr. Garrick, would hope
           that maybe some day we'll look back on this and say
           here's a very simplified method to determine the risk
           at these plants, and it employs lots of numbers, but
           it's very simple and easy to use.
                       And you know that was my hope in 1988 when
           we came out with that IPE process.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. BRONF:  And it has done nothing but
           grow since then.  We've got plants now that are
           spending 25 million dollars on PRA's, and I would
           argue that they are no better off with that 25 million
           dollar PRA than the ones that spent a million dollars
           ten years ago.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  We'll save that for
           another meeting.
                       (Laughter.)
                       PARTICIPANT:  That's just inflation.
                       MR. BRONF:  I encourage you to look at
           this ISA process as one that has done a great deal of
           good and I would not like to see the staff using an
           analytical process to review the ISA as a substitute
           for understanding how those plant processes work.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Very good.  Thank you
           very much.
                       MR. BRONF:  Thank you.
                       MR.KILLAR:  Thank you.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  This is Don Goldbach at
           Westinghouse.
                       Do I have time for a comment?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.  Go ahead.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Okay.  Going back to Mr.
           Beedle's question, and his question was what is the
           problem we're trying to solve, I don't think in the
           ensuing discussion I heard an answer to that, but let
           me propose an answer.
                       First of all, let me say what the problem
           is not.  It's not that we're exposing too many members
           of the public to excessive levels of radiation.  The
           problem is not that we're exposing our own employees
           to excessive levels of radiation.  The problem is not
           that we're having too many criticalities.  It's not
           that we're losing metric tons of uranium outside the
           gates except through diversion.  It's not that we're
           having too many chemical accidents.
                       So if it's not any of those real problems
           then what is it?  And I would propose that the problem
           is a self inflicted paper work problem.  And it comes
           from, it actually originates from our attempt to move
           from a what I'll call a prescriptive regulatory
           process to a risk-informed process.
                       And I would propose that the problem is
           really -- it appears to be an NRC problem right now
           and that the NRC is having trouble assessing or
           figuring out how to assess vastly different
           facilities.
                       And I think finally the problem is the NRC
           appears to be trying to assess afility (phonetic)
           safety levels by reviewing paper work, and
           specifically the ISA summary, and not the actually
           performance on the site.
                       And so that would be my problem statement
           for Mr. Beedle and for the others in the audience.
                       And I'd also like to add a comment that
           we, some of us in the industry, have put in a lot of
           time and money and effort over the past, say, two to
           five years developing our ISA processes and we feel
           that we've come a long way from where we had these
           processes, and to do anything different than what
           we've already done, in other words to put more time
           and money and resources on that, could have just the
           opposite effect that we want to achieve.
                       In other words, it could take our focus
           away from using our current risk informed process to
           identify where we need to improve our safety margin
           and put it on to more prescriptive type work.
                       And I certainly don't want to see that
           here at this facility.  I don't think that's good for
           the entire industry, and I would guess the NRC does
           not want to see that also.
                       And that's the end of my comments.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Don, what if we
           discovered in the process that we had become smart
           enough now about how to do risk assessment for
           example, that I could do one that costs half as much
           as your ISA, and tells me twice as much about the
           plant and gives me a lot more information on how to
           conduct operations with a strong risk management
           component?  What if I were able to do that?
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  I'd say convince me.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  I think that's -- the
           truth is I think that's a very feasible thing.  I
           think the ISAs are out of control based on what
           limited thing I have seen.  You talk as if this was a
           simplification of the process.  You're going to have
           to convince us of that.
                       I actually see a much greater opportunity
           for simplification through a PRA thought process than
           I do an ISA process simply because of all the dittling
           (phonetic) you're trying to do to justify not
           calculating with any rational and systematic and
           deliberate process these likelihoods.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Simplifying for whom?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  I think it's
           simplifying for everybody.  But, you know, this time
           will have to tell.  I think you're out of touch with
           what's going on out in the world with respect to the
           application of risk assessments in the chemical
           industry.
                       I'm seeing things that EPA's doing that
           are remarkable in terms of employing some of these
           principles to build rather simple models that are
           extremely useful in addressing some of these same
           issues.
                       I'm not saying we're there yet.  All I'm
           saying is that -- and I asked this question at the
           outset, and I didn't get an answer.  How much is it
           costing to do a plant ISA?  I'm not just talking about
           the summary.  The standard review plan has in it what
           they call an ISA program with five elements to it.
           And I think that's good.
                       But what I'm asking is, you know, what is
           the life cycle cost of this exercise?  And I suspect
           that once you focus in on a more direct and explicit
           way of dealing with some of these issues that are now
           causing you a lot of anxiety and aggravation like the
           likelihood calculation, you would find that there is
           maybe much greater opportunity for simplification in
           applying PRA principles than trying to continue to
           figure out how to justify, and not in a very
           satisfactory way, your addressing of the likelihood.
                       I just think we have to keep an open mind
           about it.  I think the ISA is a very important step
           and it has in it something that will be very
           beneficial to the PRA community in that it addresses
           an entirely different kind of plant that has a flow
           character to it, has a dynamic character to it.  It's
           got the same elements to it as modeling the space
           shuttle, where you have to model different  phases of
           emission, in the case of the plant.
                       You have to model different stages of the
           process, different unit operations.  And this made
           major contribution in how to do that.  And the ideas
           and the concepts are being embraced in a lot of other
           plants.
                       But all I'm suggesting here is that I
           think it's the wrong way to go to fight PRA because I
           think as we found in the waste field and as we're
           finding in a number of other applications that if you
           shake yourself from the baggage of the reactor PRA's,
           that the fundamental thought processes associated with
           PRA are basic and rather clear and rather
           straightforward.
                       That the opportunities for streamlining
           the safety analysis process are very great.  And I
           just hope we keep an open mind about that.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Let me just first of all
           say, just to use your words, fight.  I'm not
           specifically fighting PRA. I would say I'm fighting
           any different method that would be proposed, even a
           qualitative method at this point.
                       We have been working, we have been trying
           to work, we, Westinghouse, with the NRC for at least
           the past five years as this new revised Part 70 was
           even being formulated throughout this time, to try to
           understand and work very closely with NRC, what the
           requirements were going to be, what the ISA
           requirements, what it all meant.
                       And we as the new Part 70 was being
           developed, we were developing out ASA process.  And
           that's similar to other licensees.  So I'm not
           fighting specifically PRAs.  It's just again it gets
           back to the fundamental question, and I haven't heard
           even in your response an answer to the fundamental
           question.  What is the problem we're trying to solve?
                       I think reality, if you want to talk in
           terms of reality, is the things I mentioned that the
           problem is not.  We are operating and have been
           operating very safely.  We're not exposing members of
           the public.  We're not overexposing our employees.
           There are many things we're not doing because we were
           operating these facilities very safely over the years.
                       And we volunteered basically as this rule
           was being developed to incorporate the what we thought
           would be the requirements of the ISA and the
           management measures into our -- actually our approved
           license back in 1995.
                       We were saying yes.  We agree it's a good
           process.  We're going to start implementing it now.
           But again I think you're avoiding answering the
           question, what is the real problem we're trying to
           solve.  And you jump right away defending PRA.  And
           that's not what I'm saying.
                       I'm not fighting PRA, though I don't think
           it's the right way to go.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, you know, we
           don't want to get in that position of just defending
           any particular approach because our interests should
           be much more basic than that.  But we do have a
           problem in this industry of building public
           confidence.
                       And there's no difference between
           perceived risk and real risk, as far as getting
           something done.  It's equal in its capability to
           prevent progress.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  Well, if it's building
           public confidence is the problem, if public
           confidence, let's say, is the problem, then a PRA
           method of risk determination is not going to build
           public confidence.  That would be a whole different
           approach to solve that problem.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, I disagree.  And
           we're not going to solve this on here.  I think that
           when you ask what is the issue, the issue is risk
           management.  And as far as the NRC is concerned their
           mission remains the same.  And all they're looking for
           is tools to enable them to reach conclusions on these
           licensees that are in the best interest of the public.
                       d I think we could discuss this issue of
           what is it we're trying to do ad infinitum and we
           probably ought to move on with our agenda, even though
           I appreciate the comments and you've made some very
           good points.  And you're absolutely right about the
           consequences, as far as injury and safety is
           concerned.
                       But it seems as though we're dealing with
           something much deeper than that in order to enable
           society to make good use of this technology.
                       Okay.  Let's move on.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  If I may, one observation.
           We may be facing an issue where the tools that we're
           using for assessment and operation of the facilities
           is a different tool than the NRC needs to deal with
           the regulation of the facility.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  Now, you would hope that
           those tools are the same.  But we may be at a point
           here where maybe they're different.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yeah.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  The problem I think that Mr.
           Damon was describing this morning or the process he
           was describing is more a tool for the use by the NRC
           staff than it is a tool for use by the facility to
           judge the adequacy of their processes.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.  Okay.  All right.
           Let's see.
                       MR. BEEDLE:  Thank you very much.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Thank you.  Thank you
           very much.  And thank you, Don.
                       MR. GOLDBACH:  You're welcome.  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  I guess we're
           ready to hear from DOE.  Will you introduce yourself?
                       MR. WYKA:  Good afternoon, gentlemen.  For
           the record my name is Ted Wyka.  I'm the Director of
           the Department of Energy's Integrated Safety
           Management Program.  I work for the Deputy Secretary
           of Energy, implementing integrated safety management
           throughout the D0E complex.
                       I appreciate the opportunity to come talk
           to the Joint Committee today.  I was asked to brief
           the committee on the department's integrated safety
           management program.
                       I know I have a lot of paper work with me.
           What I intend to do is go briskly through the slides
           so  you can stop me in the area's that you're most
           interested in.  What I was planning to do was give you
           an overview of the department's integrated safety
           management program.
                       This is something we've been working for
           the last five years.  And when I talk safety, I talk
           safety in the context of protection of the public, the
           workers as well as the environment.  It includes all
           aspects of daily work, both federal as well as
           contracted work.  And this runs the gamut of our
           facilities, everything from the handful of Cat 1
           nuclear facilities, a couple of hundred; Cat 2,
           several hundred; Cat 3, RAD facilities, accelerators,
           our national labs, windmills, petroleum facilities.
                       So it runs the entire gamut of daily
           operations, including weapons production; science,
           which was done in the national labs; material
           stabilization activities; DND and clean-up activities;
           as well as project management, even through the phase
           of procurement, design and construction of facilities.
           Integrated safety management is the way of doing DOE
           work.
                       It also includes all type of hazards,
           everything from radiological to criticality, chemical,
           industrial, explosive, fire.  Simply it's the way we
           do work.
                       In fact we're beginning -- somewhere we've
           taken off the word safety and calling it the
           management system.  In fact you probably realize that
           we've had problems at DOE with safeguards and
           security.  The safeguards and security folks have
           basically adopted this system as the way they do
           business as well.
                       The first reaction and the first reaction
           I get from everybody, there's nothing new here.  This
           is all common sense.  There's probably something to
           that.
                       We had probably back in '95, the best
           minds in the department from our national labs.  Both
           federal as well as the contractors, put this system in
           place.
                       We're not there yet.  We're far from it.
           In fact we're probably just at the initial
           implementation stages this past September, September
           2000.
                       And in my mind we've sort of reached the
           low hanging fruit.  So surfaces look simple but then
           as you pull the treads, at least what we're finding
           out it's a complicated system.
                       Let me just sort of give you a quick
           overview, and I sort of enjoyed the questions from the
           last discussion because those are really the same
           questions I get on an everyday basis.  What's broken?
           What are we trying to fix?  Is this going to work and
           how much is it going to cost me?
                       ISM was originally developed back in '95
           in response to a Defense Board recommendation.  that's
           the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board.  It was
           recommendation 95-2.
                       Essentially we needed a complete system to
           better integrate safety into the management and work
           practices at all levels.  ISM was developed in
           response to some key underlining issues.  One is
           integrating safety management functions and activities
           into the business process, tailoring the programs
           based on the complexity and hazards associated with
           the work
                       And probably the most important thing was
           really reconciling the existing programs into one
           coherent safety management system so  that it's not a
           multiplicity of systems that compete for management
           attention.
                       Bottom line, you're probably familiar with
           the DOE sites, but we're all across the   country.  We
           have multiple program offices.  The facilities have
           multiple landlords, multiple program offices involved
           in activities, and the key struggle is just getting
           the program offices talking with each other and to
           getting the sites talking with each other in
           developing this program.
                       And also clear roles and responsibilities.
           It was just quite recently until we really defined the
           clear roles and responsibilities from the Secretary
           down to the deck plate level.
                       In October '96, DOE policy 450.4 expanded
           this initiative to all sites, facilities, and
           activities.  It started off as a Defense Nuclear
           Facility type activity as a result of a board
           recommendation, but it quickly developed into this
           makes sense to do department wide.
                       In March 1999, the Secretary of Energy
           directed that all programs and sites complete initial
           implementation of ISM by September 2000, which were
           essentially there with the exception of about three
           facilities.
                       Integrated safety management, what is it?
           It's a successful top-bottom, top-down as well as
           bottom-up approach.  It's an evolution rather than
           revolution.  And it's really true.
                       There's a lot of things that we did over
           the last 12 years that led up to integrated safety
           management, especially in the area of nuclear safety
           rules, upgrades, improvement of the DOE directives,
           central contract management changes, and processes in
           defining our standards and requirements that we put
           into the contracts.
                       System components are both structural as
           well as flexible, structural in that each program in
           site adheres to the same set of principles and core
           functions which I'll go through, and flexible in that
           each program in site is encouraged to tailor their ISM
           systems to their unique work and hazards.
                       It's also an umbrella system.  At DOE like
           in most agencies you have programs.  People develop
           and offices develop programs and they're the best
           program's running.  And they all try to implement them
           at the same time.
                       One thing that integrated safety
           management does is take these programs and tries to
           make sure that we're going off in the same course,
           meeting the same objectives.  And that's better
           performance of work, whether we're talking about
           safety, productivity, mission, and cost.
                       And it's basically broken down in three
           area's:  public safety, as well as environmental
           protection, and workers safety.  I think this diagram
           identify's some of those programs that integrated
           safety management tries to shepherd into their common
           goal.
                       In nuclear, whether we're talking CRIT
           safety, chemical safety, responsible care, pollution
           prevention, environmental management systems, that's
           as a result of an executive order on Green in
           Government and in a various worker safety programs.
                       I have some documentation.  This program
           has teeth.  It has a lot of paper work to support it,
           but it's also implementation.  It starts off with
           policies.
                       There's three policies on integrated
           safety management.  We've had three Secretaries over
           the last seven years.  And all three have put their
           footprints on integrated safety management with policy
           statements.
                       We had DEAR clauses.  These are
           acquisition clauses, which go into every DOE contract,
           every prime contract.  And this is what provides the
           teeth.
                       It lays out, you know, the bare structure,
           what's required in terms of developing this system,
           what's involved in the system description which
           basically identifies the system, and how to flow it
           down to the subcontracts, into what subcontracts to
           flow it down to.
                       It also has a laws clause, which talks
           about having two sets, either a List A for laws and
           regulations, and List B for establishing the DOE
           standards and requirements through various approved
           mechanisms.
                       Then it has a conditional payment of fee
           clause which is in every contract which ties
           performance to earned and award fees.
                       Below that we have guidance documentation,
           probably about three inches thick on how to develop
           integrated safety management and how to implement it,
           as well as a team leaders handbook which I'll go
           through later in the presentation.
                       We do verification assessments on both the
           quality of the system descriptions, i.e., the paper
           work, as well as we flow the report down into the
           implementation to verify adequate implementation of
           the systems.
                       I'll go through this real quickly.  This
           isn't a handout, but this is basically a sketch, the
           outline of the system.  It's broken into six
           components:  clear objective, guiding principles, core
           functions, ISM mechanisms, which I'll talk about a
           little bit, ISM responsibilities, and implementation.
           That's sort of the latter, the framework of the
           system.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Ted, did you answer
           this question?  Does this operate out of headquarters
           or one of the -- it does operate out of --"
                       MR. WYKA:  No, no.  Good question.  In
           fact, it would fail if it operated out of
           headquarters.  It's a line management responsible for
           safety.  You know, the Deputy Secretary has his
           personal thumbprint on it.  And that's sort of my
           role.  But the ownership is the field managers that
           own and are accountable for the work at their
           facilities, as well as up the program offices, and
           through the Deputy Secretary.
                       So it's line management.  And that's a
           good point and I get to it later because there's a
           piece which deals with the implementation of ISM at
           the contract level, but then there's also a DOE role
           in the successful implementation of ISM.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Thank you.
                       MR. WYKA:  The objective, just as stated,
           it's systematically integrate safety considerations
           into the management and work practices at all level to
           accomplish missions while protecting the public, the
           worker, and environment.  These are the ISM
           principles.
                       Again first reaction is is this all common
           sense.  Principles form the fundamental elements of
           integrated safety management.
                       The first three are the interrelated and
           applied water core functions which I'll go over.  They
           ensure that the management structure has personnel
           that focused on safety, understand their assignments,
           and capable of carrying out their core functions.
           This gets into the technical competence and makes sure
           that we have the right people in the right slots.
                       Balanced priorities, make sure that we
           prioritize our resources, balanced among our competing
           priorities.
                       And that the resources are adequately
           allocated to address the safety as well as
           programmatic and operational considerations.
                       Identification of the safety requirements
           through hazard identifications and requirements of
           established to approve processes, which I'll go over
           in detail in a little bit.
                       Hazard controls, obviously the admin, and
           the engineering controls as well as personal controls.
           Operations authorization is conditions and
           requirements to be satisfied for operations shall be
           clearly established and agreed upon.
                       MR. LEVENSON:  Let me ask a question.  An
           academy report of a couple of years ago called
           "Barriers to Science" made a major point of the fact
           that in fact DOE in many cases does not -- they
           clearly allocate authority and they clearly allocate
           responsibility, but they allocate them differently.
                       Is that true also in the safety thing or
           does the responsibility and authority go together, and
           if it does go together how do you do that in a line
           organization which doesn't do it for the other work?
                       MR. WYKA:  I think they go together.  You
           know, the line management responsible for safety and
           that starts with the field manager, with the program
           office, the PSO which is one of the Assistant
           Secretaries, the line Secretary that owns the work,
           and up to the Secretary.
                       And we have a functions responsibility and
           authority system which has, you know, laid out the
           flow of responsibilities and accountabilities
           throughout the department.
                       The accountability and the safety go
           together.  And that was a key, was tying in safety
           with the work, tying in the ES and H and support
           organizations with the line management.
                       Did I answer your question, sir?
                       MR. LEVENSON:  Not really because to place
           the responsibility and authority you need the people
           who have the responsibility, if they're going to have
           the responsibility, need some say over things like
           resources, like budget, et cetera.  And I just don't
           -- I understand what you're saying, but in an
           organization that in many cases for the line
           responsibilities and the line authorities do not have
           them in the same place, I'm not sure how you can put
           the safety in the same place.
                       MR. WYKA:  That's a good point.  And
           that's what the essence of, you know, probably our
           biggest problem with the department.  Bottom line is
           the field manager owns the work and owns the safety
           and responsibility for safety and the public and the
           workers and the environment.  If something breaks he's
           the one called on the carpet.
                       And you're right.  He's competing, you
           know.  He has to make sure he has the resources, the
           personnel to accomplish his mission and that's where
           he's dealing with sometimes several program offices
           that have control over getting that individual the
           funds.
                       ISM functions, these are the core
           functions and it's sort of broken down like any step,
           check, plan do check type system.  It's applied as a
           continuous circle.  This is instantly called the
           prayer wheel because it's usually seen as a circle
           defining the scope of work, analyzing the hazards,
           development and implementing hazard controls,
           preforming work within the controls, and providing
           feedback and continuous improvement.
                       These core functions provide the necessary
           structure for any work activity and probably more
           procedural that philosophical.  I think they're
           philosophical pieces are the guiding principles, and,
           again they're usually in the circle.  They're not
           independent,  They're sequential functions,  They all
           happen at the same time.
                       Defining the scope of work means missions
           are translated into work, expectations are set, tasks
           are identified and prioritized, and resources
           allocated.
                       Analyzing hazards is identified, analyzed,
           and categorized, includes worker, public, as well the
           environment in analyzing accident scenarios.  Develop
           and implement hazard controls, identifying applicable
           standards and agreed upon standard sets, identifying
           controls to prevent accidents and mitigate
           consequences, establishing bounties for safe
           operations and maintaining configuration control.
                       Let me move to the next slide because this
           sort of I think explains the first two.  This is
           really our system.  This illustrates the general
           concept of developing environment safety and health
           controls for various hazards and integrating them at
           the activity level, defining the boundaries for
           activity, scoping out the work, activity location,
           system equipment, and process hazard materials,
           identifying the hazards basically in three areas for
           the workers, public, as well as the environment.
                       It's a two step process, identifying and
           categorizing hazards, which includes assessing defence
           in depth, worker safety, and environmental protection
           provisions in estimating likelihood.
                       The second step is analyzing the accidents
           scenarios related to the hazardous work.  And this
           means developing accident scenarios, identifying
           source term and consequences, identifying analysis
           assumptions and comparing it to our evaluation
           guidelines; then identifying the safety class and
           safety significant systems, technical safety
           requirements based on the guidelines.
                       Dependant upon the type of facilities
           especially in the middle column, looking at the
           public, use a SAR or SAR requirement, equivalents,
           equivalent would be for like a weapons production type
           activities, and nuclear explosives safety studied in
           NESS (phonetic) program, or the weapons integrated
           system, the SS21, which is used at pantex.
                       And process hazard analysis for the high
           hazard non-nuclear facilities, as well as a safety
           analysis documents for accelerators.  So again we have
           a wide gamut of facilities and different processes
           that we use.
                       The lower column identifies the various
           controls that basically fall into four areas, the
           engineering design features, which are equipments,
           again, safety class, safety significance, systems,
           structures, components, or in remote siting, as well
           as admin. controls which are identified in the
           technical safety requirements and work practice
           controls which alter the manner in which the tasks are
           performed, such as procedural controls and then
           personal protective equipment.
                       So it's using this process for all of our
           activities to come up with or identify the hazards
           and, you know, establish the controls.  For at least
           the nuclear facilities, it's 5480.23, is the DOE
           order, the standard for developing the safety analysis
           requirements, or is the DOE standard 3009 which is
           about a two inch document which goes through the
           calculations as well as the evaluation guidelines.
                       In performing work within controls,
           readiness is confirmed.  Formality and rigor is
           tailored and work is performed.  And this is a
           critical piece which I'll go through in a couple of
           minutes.
                       Provide feedback and improvement; include
           self-assessments, independent assessments; performance
           indicators, occurrence reports, trending analysis, and
           process monitoring; and again, line management uses
           this information to confirm that safe performance of
           work affect the implementation of ISM to improve
           opportunities.
                       This is sort of what I was talking about
           the circular diagram of the core functions.  As you
           could tell, it's three dimensional or actually three
           layers here:  institutional facility and activity.
                       Institutional level includes the safety
           related topic, such as radiation protection,
           industrial hygiene, industrial safety, and emergency
           planning.
                       Facility activities would include
           configuration management, conduct of operations
           activity would be -- level topics would include things
           like quality inspection, work packages, procedures,
           activity specific training, personnel protective
           equipment, and lock-out and tag-out programs.
                       Again, ISM starts from essentially the
           Secretary on through the various levels of the
           activity, from the institution facility as well as
           activity level.
                       Let me go through at least --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Ted, has the
           implementation of this as an overall management
           process had much of an impact on the tools of analysis
           or the way in which safety is actually implemented?
                       I can see the overarching structure here,
           and one of the very important things that you're
           trying to accomplish in this is, of course, the
           integration part, but has it materially changed the
           way you do things in the more detailed level?
                       MR. WYKA:  Yes.  You know, it looks at the
           --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  I mean it's very
           important that it elevate the consciousness --
                       MR. WYKA:  Absolutely.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  -- of everybody and
           especially the line management, and if it does that,
           you know, you've made a major contribution.  So I'm
           not suggesting that that's all that's important, that
           is to say, how you do your analysis and what have you.
                       I'm just really asking:  did it impact
           your philosophy of the tools that you employ?
                       MR. WYKA:  Yes, it has.  It looks at in an
           integrated fashion the hazards and the work going on.
           Let me give you an example of probably something you
           may see in our national labs.  You may have a building
           which has several different experiments going on at
           the same time, and I think once of the areas that I
           think this has really helped us is looking at all of
           those particular events and activities, looking at the
           hazards, identifying and establishing the controls,
           but also looking at the cumulative effect of all those
           different activities on the safety boundary of the
           building.
                       So I think it has sort of moved the
           department to look at, you know, the specific hazards
           and with respect to each other, whether they're rad,
           chemical, CRIT (phonetic) safety type hazards, fire,
           or industrial type hazards.
                       So I think we developed a department and
           its processes to look at the integrated effect and
           cumulative effect of hazards --
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  Thank you.
                       MR. WYKA:  -- of the safety envelope
           ability.
                       Mechanisms, that's identified in one of
           the initial slides as a fourth step, and again,
           there's DOE mechanisms.  I mentioned the DEAR clauses,
           the contracts, authorization protocols to implement
           it.
                       Contractor mechanisms includes the
           contracts, subcontracts, the ISM description documents
           which actually are documents in which they define
           their integrated safety management systems, as well as
           their other various documents.
                       Let me just spend a couple of minutes
           talking about the authorization protocols.  That's the
           process used to communicate acceptance by DOE of the
           contractor's integrated plans for hazardous work.  For
           the low type hazards, it's the basic contract.
                       For the high moderate hazards, we had
           developed an authorization agreement as a part of
           integrated safety management.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  In nuclear explosive
           safety, they have something called an authorization
           basis document.  Is that what that is?
                       MR. WYKA:  Yes, sir.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.
                       MR. WYKA:  Well, no.  There's
           authorization basis, and then the authorization
           agreement is actually a distillation of the
           authorization basis.  In fact, it's very equivalent --
           it's somewhat equivalent to licensing agreement, you
           know, that the NRC uses.  It's about a three to four
           page document which defines the scope of the
           agreement, the DOE basis for the approval, such as the
           SAR, TSRs, the List B requirements, the particular
           orders, the List A rules, and the operational
           readiness assessments or various assessments that was
           done to verify start-up.
                       It talks about listing of documents that
           constitutes the authorization basis.  It establishes
           the terms and conditions requiring DOE review and
           approval.  Specific procedures or manuals of practice,
           configuration management, reporting noncompliances.
           So establishes strict terms and conditions.
                       Contractor qualification, it usually
           addresses that.  Special conditions, such as
           safeguards and security, protection of property,
           special notifications, effective, and expiration date,
           and the statement of agreement and signatures.
                       And what I tried to do was go through and
           do somewhat of an analogy with I think at least my
           interpretation of the NRC licensing.  It's a three to
           four page document which, again, is signed by the
           president of the company and then the DOE site
           manager.
                       And it's done for CAT I and CAT II nuclear
           facilities or other facilities such as CAT III
           facilities at the discretion of the field manager
           based on the complexities and hazards associated with
           the work.
                       The process of implementing how this is
           done.  First, we incorporate ISM into the DOE
           directives and DEAR clauses.  We incorporate the DEAR
           clauses into the contract.  Then DOE and contractor
           agree on the system descriptions, on the List B safety
           requirements and the authorization agreements.
                       Those are basically the main documents for
           integrated safety management.
                       DOE and contractor conducts an initial
           implementation of safety management, and then we go
           through a couple of verifications.  So they put the
           building blocks in place, which is a system
           description which describes their system.  They have
           the 450.5 which establishes effective line oversight,
           and they have List B and appropriate authorization
           agreements, and they go through various verification
           assessments.  We've done probably about 100, over
           about 150 over the last couple of years.  They are in
           Phase I and Phase II verifications.
                       The Phase Is are looking at the system
           descriptions, the documentation, pulling the threads,
           again, from the DOE OPS office to the contractor
           senior management, all the way down to deck plate
           level.
                       The Phase II is looking at the
           implementation of integrated safety management.
                       This is sort of a status of where we're
           at.  As you can tell, the blue indicates initial
           implementation of ISM.  Where they're with the
           exception of a few facilities, but again, this is just
           initial because we still have a lot of problems here.
                       Flow down of integrated safety management
           to the appropriate contract; so it's subcontracts.
           Are we there?  No.  Again, you need to look at the
           complexities and hazards associated with work and with
           the subcontracts.
                       Flow down to the actual work.  Is it with
           the designers, with the planners, ingrained into the
           work packages?  It's at various levels as you go
           through the complex.
                       Worker involvement, and this is probably
           the key to ISM, is get their involvement, you know,
           through the various functions defining hazards,
           establishing the controls especially in the feedback
           and improvement systems.
                       Feedback and improvement, the department
           is good at identifying things, not so good necessarily
           at tracking to closure, and that's what we found
           basically throughout the complexes.  You know,
           effective systems for following up on deficiencies
           found whether through these verifications or
           independent oversight or other various avenues of
           identifying the issues.
                       Lessons learned, sharing effectively,
           getting information from one site to the next, as well
           as program offices to program offices, clear roles and
           responsibilities, high quality safety basis
           documentation.  They're safe, but are they high
           quality?  No, there's a lot of work, I think
           throughout the complex, again, various levels of
           maturity.
                       Contractor self-assessments and line
           oversight and involvement of the DOE facility
           representatives, which are technical experts actually
           out there in the buildings.  You get them involved in
           the activity level.
                       I mention for the longest time this looked
           like an activity that was done at the contract level
           with the contractor, between the local DOE office and
           the contractor in developing their safety management
           systems and the implementation.
                       It's a department effort, and one thing
           that we had the Deputy Secretary sign out probably
           about a year ago was through the program offices,
           through the Assistant Secretaries and all of the field
           managers, that you have a role in the implementation
           of integrated safety management, and that's in making
           sure that you have effective feedback and improvement
           systems, that you have control over the budget, that
           you establish good line oversight programs that are in
           place and effective, and that you establish a
           documented system to insure that you continue to
           maintain and improve the system that we have, I think,
           just started to establish.
                       This was the topic of a recent memo that
           was put out by the Deputy Secretary, again, to the
           department saying that we're there.  You know, we met
           initially, but again, we still have a lot of work to
           do and emphasized conducting effective line oversight,
           making the annual ISM updates meaningful, and that's
           key.
                       We went through the initial stages of
           verification assessments to make sure that the system
           descriptions are set and that they're implementing it,
           but on an annual basis as a requirement for them to
           not only look at their performance measures,
           objectives, and commitments based on performance,
           direction, budgeting and guidance, to make sure that
           their standards and requirements are up to date, but
           also to verify that their systems are still current,
           valid and being implemented, as well as look at the
           DOE site.
                       And then independent oversight of ISM; we
           have an office of independent oversight which is also
           doing assessments on the implementation of ISM.
                       Integrate key DOE processes with ISM.
           Again, integrate ISM throughout the facility life
           cycle, everything from procurement, design,
           construction, D&D.
                       Strengthen the activity integration with
           the budgeting process.  That's where we're still weak,
           and to make this thing really work, we need to make
           sure that the program offices and the Assistant
           Secretaries are looking at the high priority projects
           and making sure that we have the funds to do the work,
           and then improving the feedback and improvement
           system.
                       The bottom line, and then I'll open it up
           for questions, these are sort of goals that we have
           for 2001.  One is to with the various verifications
           that we've done over the last year is to fix some of
           the things that we've found, areas of weaknesses, and
           there's a lot of those.
                       To implement a systematic approach to
           sustaining and improving ISM systems as evaluated
           during the annual ISM updates.
                       Integrate and update DOE systems or
           feedback and improvement processes so that they are
           effective for continuous improvement of ISM
           performance.
                       Realize improvement and the safe
           performance of work activities as determined by the
           IMS performance measures.  This is a key point because
           this answers the select question.  You know, now that
           we've been putting this thing in place for five years,
           what are we getting for it?  Are we seeing actual
           performance and the work in terms of safety, as well
           as productivity mission and cost?
                       We has developed an initial set of ISM
           performance measures that we're using complex wide to
           help us with this.  We started with five total
           recordable case rates, occupational safety cost index,
           hypothetical radiation dose to the public, our worker
           radiation dose and reportable occurrences of releases
           to the environment.
                       The only thing everybody liked about that
           set was that nobody liked them.  You know, but they
           do.  We've had various groups take a look at it,
           contractor groups, various contractor groups, as well
           as INPO (phonetic), came in and did sort of an initial
           peer group review on the set of five.  So it came up
           with the same collusion that we came up with, that
           it's a good starting set, but we need to continue to
           mature the set to be able to answer that "so what"
           question and to look at some of the other variables.
                       And that concludes my prepared remarks.
           I'm then open to questions.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Just back on this one,
           I'm not sure what it meant.  Does the red mean they're
           losing?
                       MR. WYKA:  Well, no, because then I don't
           want to give the blue that much credit.  Blue means
           that they -- I'm telling everybody it's like a
           marathon and they're up to the starting blocks.  The
           reds aren't there yet.
                       Specifically like the Los Alamos is one,
           and that was a result of the Sierra Grande fire.  You
           know it caused some of their milestones to defer about
           six months.
                       A couple of them threw out the
           verification processes.  We found some issues in the
           feedback improvement and the training programs, the
           way that some of them did their hazard analysis.  So
           they're going off and fixing issues to in their mind
           reach initial implementation, and that's sort of the
           key point.
                       Initial implementation is the line
           manager's call.  You know, they're developing their
           systems using this framework that the department is
           using complex-wide and making the call that, you know,
           my systems are adequate, and we're implementing this
           process, and that's when they turn blue in the chart,
           but that's where the race begins because, you know,
           again, a lot of these issues are complex-wide, and
           even then the ones that have determined that they're
           implementing, you know, they still have a lot of work
           to do in the real flow down to the subcontracts, you
           know, establish really effective feedback improvement
           systems.
                       They may have feedback improvement
           systems, but they're not all that effective.  The same
           with the lessons learned; the same with, you know,
           their safety basis documentation and continuous
           upgrades to those.
                       Flow down to the actual work.  You know,
           in some places it might still be caught in a mid-level
           management area, but it's flowing down to the actual
           work packages to designers and planners, again, at
           various levels of maturity throughout the department.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Given the diversity of
           activities that the Department of Energy is engaged
           in, just about every kind of hazard --
                       MR. WYKA:  Sure.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  -- from explosives of
           different types to every chemical, to all forms of
           radiation, one would think that there's a great
           opportunity for some degree of harmonization.  Is
           there any effort to do that?
                       You know, there is this international
           movement that's not doing very well in trying to deal
           with the issue of risk harmonization to put in better
           context the whole issue of radiation safety, partly
           driven by their "radiophobia" that exists.
                       Has the department got any kind of
           deliberate program to establish some sort of
           consistency of measures between the risks of different
           hazards?
                       MR. WYKA:  Probably not, probably not all
           that mature, and I think, you know, that's really the
           essence of this integrated safety management program,
           is, I think, to help us along that area because like
           you mentioned, you know, some of our sites are as big
           as small states, and you have a wide variety of
           activities taking place on them.  You have roads going
           through those sites.  You have libraries on some of
           the sites.  You have privatized activities, and you're
           dealing with a wide gamut of risks.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.
                       MR. WYKA:  And this integrated safety
           management is driving us to look at an integrated
           fashion to weigh the radiological risks against the
           chemical hazards, do the fire and explosive type
           hazards, as well as an industrial.
                       And I guess the performance metrics or at
           least the basic five that we're starting with, with
           the intent, I think, from the Deputy, from the
           Secretary on down to continue to mature to be able to,
           you know, use these metrics which will flow down to
           the field offices, you know, where the work is done
           and, you know, try to measure, you know, performance.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Good.  Milt.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  Yeah.  This kind of catches
           me as a little bit of a TQM with a risk twist to it,
           and I guess the thing that I always fear when I look
           at stuff like this, although I love TQM, is how much
           do people end up managing paper instead of risk.
                       MR. WYKA:  Yeah, a good question.  In
           fact, it's now TQM.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  Yeah, I realize that.
                       MR. WYKA:  In fact, when we sat five years
           ago and established the system, that was sort of the
           reaction, not a problem, you know, from the national
           labs and from our various contractors to go out and
           implement this.  Five years later they're still
           implementing.
                       You have to pull the threads into the
           systems to, you know, look at each of the guiding
           principles and core functions.  What does that mean?
           And they're describing, and they have to establish
           their system based on their work and hazards.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.  Well, we
           appreciate your coming and giving us a presentation.
                       All right.  We're supposed to have a
           break, but what I'd like to do is just suggest people
           take their breaks as they feel they need to, and that
           we continue on given that we're running a little
           behind primarily because of my protracted commentary.
                       So I guess it's time for the NMSS to take
           the floor.
                       Okay.  Lights.
                       Because of some extenuating circumstances,
           I think that -- and to give you an advanced notice --
           we're going to fall below a critical mass here at
           about three o'clock.  So --
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  I can do it.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Okay.
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  I can do it.  Are you ready?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes, sir.  Tell us a
           little bit about yourself.
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  Thank you very much.
                       My name is Lawrence Kokajko.  I'm the
           Section Chief for the Risk Task Group, and I'm going
           to tell you why I have the best job in the agency
           right now.
                       (Laughter.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, that woke us up.
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  First of all, I have a
           highly energetic and dedicated staff, and you met one
           of the people today, Dr. Dennis Damon, who talked
           about ISAs, and I have Marissa Bailey in the back
           right there.  She is also on my group.  She is the
           head of our case study project right now, and I want
           to talk to you a little bit about that.
                       I have representatives from all divisions
           of NMSS, fuel cycle, spent fuel project office,
           Industrial Medical Nuclear Safety Division, as well as
           the Division of Waste Management.
                       And I also have a person, Dr. Patricia
           Rathman, who is working with us on risk communication
           activities as well.
                       In SECY 99-100, the staff proposed the
           framework to risk inform regulated activities in the
           materials and waste arena areas.  The staff had an
           approach which I'm going to talk about later, but the
           SRN that came back said, "We want you to go ahead and
           while you're implementing SECY 99-100, we want you to
           develop appropriate material and waste safety goals
           and to use an enhanced participatory process at the
           same time."
                       And we started this back in April of last
           year.  We had a two-day workshop where we had
           stakeholders from a variety of areas come and talk to
           us, and some of the things that rolled out of that
           meeting in April are what we're implementing now.
                       The two primary things that I'm going to
           talk about are case studies and the screening
           criteria.
                       What the staff proposed was a five-step
           implementation process.  We said, well, we're going to
           identify the candidate regulatory applications and who
           was going to be responsible for implementing them.
                       Then we were going to decide how to modify
           the current regulatory approaches, change them,
           implement the approaches and develop or adapt risk
           informed tools.
                       Now, it may appear that these are out of
           order, and they are.  To be quite candid, the areas
           within NMSS are quite diverse, and they start at
           different levels in the process.
                       For example, the tools that are used in
           various areas of NMSS vary greatly.  You might use
           hazard barrier analysis in the medical applications.
           You might use PRA in spent fuel storage.  You might
           use ISA as you heard this morning in fuel cycle, use
           some type of performance assessment in waste
           management.
                       First and foremost, we are meeting to
           maintain safety performance goal.  Our link to the
           strategic plan is, first and foremost, maintain
           safety.
                       However, I believe our biggest bang for
           the buck will be in meeting the third performance
           goal, which is making NRC activities and decisions
           more effective, efficient and realistic, while
           maintaining safety.
                       We have three major activities.  One is to
           conduct the case studies to see what we can do in
           terms of developing or teasing out draft safety goals
           and to test our screening criteria.
                       We are also conducting training within
           NMSS, and we are assisting the divisions in
           implementing their risk informed regulatory
           activities.
                       The first thing I mentioned was the case
           studies.  This is the first step in developing our
           framework.  We said we are going to take a look at
           doing case studies to see what could be the baseline
           measure of how we might approach a risk informed in
           the materials and waste arenas.
                       I'd like to repeat what I said earlier.
           We did not -- this did not come out of the staff idea.
           This came from the workshop that was held last April.
           It was our stakeholders that said this may be an
           appropriate approach for us to take.
                       To illuminate our case studies as we're
           going through them, we are following some of the other
           activities that are going on nationally as well as
           internationally.  In our own Office of Research, they
           have several activities that are going on.
                       One is the dry cast storage PRA, as well
           as their review of the linear no threshold theory.
                       The International Council for Radiation
           Protection, as well as the National Council, are
           looking at various projects related to LNT, as well as
           doses to workers and the public.
                       I attended a meeting last December at the
           National Academy of Science, the other NRC, the
           National Research Council, who is getting ready to
           propose some work on risk harmonization, and as well
           as some of the ISCORS (phonetic) work on risk
           harmonization as well.
                       Our case studies.  The purpose is to
           illustrate what has been done or what could be done to
           alter the regulatory approach and to establish a
           framework in test of draft screening criteria as I
           mentioned.
                       And these are the areas that we have
           selected for the very beginning:  gas chromatographs,
           fixed gauges, site decommissioning, uranium recovery,
           radioactive material transportation, the Part 76, the
           gaseous diffusion plant facilities, spent fuel interim
           storage, and the static eliminators.
                       Now, broadly, this may appear very broad
           in some areas, but however, what we're going to do is
           take a specific area into these approaches and take a
           look at them retrospectively to see what has been done
           or what we could have done to use risk information.
                       And one of the things that I would like to
           point out is that these are the initial case studies.
           There probably will be more later, but that has not
           been determined.
                       We also have a couple of prospective case
           studies that we're doing, and this is primarily
           involved in the assistance to the divisions.  One is
           on a irradiator petition, helping to address a
           petition from one of the ANSI committees on operator
           requirements, and another is on radiography and the
           use of associated equipment.
                       We recognize there are complicating
           factors in doing this.  One is how are we going to do
           the safety goals, is probably the first and biggest
           question, but also how does ALARA impact this.
                       We also realize that our target
           population, whether it's the public or some subset,
           whether it's the worker, accident versus nonaccident
           scenarios, property damage, environmental damage, all
           of these things that will have to sort of come into
           play here.
                       I might point out as well that there are
           certain areas that we are not going to tackle
           immediately.  A couple of them are Part 35.  Part 35,
           which is the medical; Part 63, which is the proposed
           Yucca Mountain standard, as well as the new Part 70
           which went effective, I guess, last September.
                       The ISA reviews that we're doing in Part
           70 pretty much will define the extent of what we do in
           Part 70 for the moment.
                       Another thing I'd like to point out, that
           we were a roll-out meeting.  We were asked to insure
           that we had stakeholder involvement early in the
           process.  So as a result, we're going to have
           stakeholder meetings for each of these case study
           areas, probably about two meetings, one at the
           beginning to get early and substantial stakeholder
           involvement, and then at the end when we have more
           conclusions that we would like to present to our
           stakeholders.
                       The first set of cases that we're going to
           review are the gas chromatographs, fixed gauges and
           static eliminators, and the first stakeholder meeting
           is scheduled for February 9th, and I invite anyone
           here who would like to attend that meeting to do so.
           It will be in the auditorium from nine to four on
           February 9th.
                       As we move through the case study areas,
           we will be presenting the results to the Commission.
           Just to summarize a bit, we rolled out our case study
           plan on September.  It was approved and issued based
           upon stakeholder comments on October 27th.  We're
           conducting the case studies throughout the fiscal year
           and probably well into next year as well, and we will
           present the results to the Commission.
                       And I might add that we're also working
           with research as well.  Most of our material has gone
           through the NMSS Steering Committee, which has
           provided input to us.  It has a representative from
           research as well.
                       I said that the purpose of the case study
           was twofold.  One was to try to tease out any safety
           goals that may be implicit in there, as well as to
           test some screening criteria to see if an area that we
           were interested in risk informing was amenable to risk
           informing.
                       If you look, the first four questions look
           very familiar to our performance goals in the
           strategic plan.  One is would it resolve a question
           with respect to maintaining or improving an activity's
           safety.  Would it improve the efficiency or
           effectiveness of an NRC regulatory approach?  Would it
           reduce unnecessary regulatory burden?  And would it
           help to effectively communicate a regulatory decision
           or situation?
                       It has to pass at least one of these tests
           before we would even consider moving into a risk
           informed approach.
                       The next one is:  do we have sufficient
           information and analytical models and are they of
           sufficient quality or could they be developed to
           support a risk informing regulatory activity?
                       In the materials arena, this may be a
           particular stumbling block.  To be quite candid,
           there's a lot of areas within the materials arena
           that, to be quite honest, has primarily been hazard
           barrier analysis or has been very deterministic.  The
           data just doesn't exist or is not kept.
                       And consequently this may be one of our
           bigger problems that we have to face.  However the had
           been some studies recently that have or done NUREG
           6642, which was the byproduct material study, which
           was the first of its kind, and we're relying on that
           in trying to figure out ways to improve upon the
           results of that.
                       The next one is can start-up costs -- are
           they going to be reasonable?  And we're looking at a
           benefit to either the NRC and its approach, the
           applicant or licensee or the public.  Will there be a
           net benefit?
                       Hopefully the answer is yes, and we'll
           move on to the last one.  This came out of the
           discussions with research as we're developing the risk
           informed regulation implementation plan.
                       And as a result of those discussions, the
           NMSS Risk Steering Committee brought this up to us as
           well, and this was added to our criteria.  Primarily,
           do other factors exist -- they could be legislative,
           judicial, or adverse stakeholder reaction -- which
           would preclude changing the approach and, therefore,
           limiting the utility of implementing the risk informed
           approach?
                       If the answer is no, we still may make a
           risk informed approach.  We may implement it still.
           If the answer is yes, we may have to give it
           additional considerations or just count it screened
           out.
                       This one is sort of catch-all.  We
           recognize that, but we think that in this area, there
           is enough sensitivity in the public domain that we
           have to be careful to try to capture some of these
           more miscellaneous and amorphous features.
                       I think someone said that, you know, your
           risk from radiation from exposure may be very low, and
           the dose that you get may be very low.  However, in
           the public perception it's still an "it," you know.
           The radiation itself is what people are frightened of.
                       And they don't tend, to be quite honest,
           to distinguish between the medical exposures that they
           get versus what they might be getting in other areas.
                       The second major activity that we have
           going on is training.  We are working with the
           Technical Training Center in Chattanooga to develop
           classes to train staff in risk assessment activities.
                       We held a pilot program in September, and
           we implemented the first class of risk assessment in
           NMSS last December, and the next class is scheduled
           for February.  It will be offered about six times this
           year.
                       This is primarily a course that will get
           everybody sort of speaking along the same lines.
           Everyone will get exposed to the policy and some of
           the procedures and applications of risk assessment in
           the various divisions within NMSS.
                       This will not make people risk
           specialists.  As a result, we are doing a needs
           assessment now to try to identify those courses in
           requisite knowledge and skills that we will train
           people to identify risk specialists in each of the
           divisions as well as the regional activities.
                       Also, I should mention that we are
           providing a similar course for managers and
           supervisors, and we are also thinking about developing
           a mini course for some of our administrative support
           staff as well as our lawyers.
                       The final thing that I'd like to mention
           is some of the assistance of the divisions that we're
           doing right now.  One is we have reviewed and
           commented on the Yucca Mountain review plan last
           summer.  I think I mentioned the petition on the
           irradiators, PRN 36-1.
                       We also were actively involved as a team
           member on the Mallinekrodt lessons learned task force.
           This was an event of overexposures that the NRC
           investigated, as well as looking at NUREG 66-42 to try
           to eliminate some of the uncertainties associated with
           the radiopharmaceuticals.
                       We're assisting fuel cycle and the review
           of the ISA summaries.  Although it says monitoring,
           we've actually reviewed and approved or not reviewed
           and approved, but reviewed some of the documentation
           related to the rulemaking allowing the use of a
           probabilistic seismic hazards analysis in the Part 72
           rulemaking related to the seismic criteria for
           independent spent fuel storage installations.
                       We are monitoring the research and SFPO
           dry cast storage PRA.  We are also assisting in
           monitoring the fuel cycle oversight program
           development.  We did a review of the in situ leaching
           report from the center, and we're assisting in a few
           other areas as well.
                       Dennis Damon mentioned that he was the
           chairman of the committee that was writing a PRA for
           non-reactor facilities overseas.  He was at the IIEA
           last November, and as other assistance is requested,
           we are assisting in that area.
                       A couple of minor things I'd like to
           mention is that because we came from many diverse
           backgrounds, we are trying to come up to speed amongst
           ourselves, not only the applications of risk
           assessment tools and methods, in other areas as well.
           So we are visiting the fuel cycle facilities.  We
           visited NIH and the radiopharmacy there, the Armed
           Forces Radiobiological Research Institute with an
           irradiator, and we intend to visit the GEPs and Yucca
           Mountain.
                       And you mentioned risk harmonization
           earlier.  Last December we had Dr. David Coker from
           Oak Ridge to come up and talk to us.  We spent the
           better part of a day with him talking about risk
           harmonization as well.
                       We are also interviewing as part of our
           case study action plan.  We met with Samuel Walker,
           and if you haven't read his book Permissible Dose, I
           encourage you to do so.  It's a real good primer on
           how radiation has been perceived in this country for
           the past 70, 80 years.
                       We've also talked with Charlie Meinhold at
           the National Council of Radiation Protection recently,
           just this week.  We've also talked to David Lockbaum
           with Union of Concerned Scientists, and we have some
           others that are planned.
                       With that in mind, I think I met my goal
           and yours, too.  Can I answer any questions here?
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  You did very well.
                       Well, maybe we've got a question or two.
           One of the things that keeps popping up whenever we
           talk about adopting a risk perspective on regulation
           is this matter of relieving of burden on the licensee,
           and I would guess that as far as the areas where we're
           the most advanced in the use of risk methods and move
           the furthest along on risk informed practices, you'd
           probably get a response from the licensee that just
           the opposite has been happening, namely, that the
           burden has increased.
                       And in a way that's understandable in a
           transition period because you don't want to give up
           anything until you have something that works better,
           and you don't know if it works better until you've
           tried it, and so you're in that no man's land of
           trying a new system, but not willing yet to give up
           anything about the old system.
                       And you have a lot of case studies here
           that you're applying some of the same criteria to.
           Are you optimistic about being able to make things --
           being able to do the job that the NRC has to do and as
           we transition into a more risk informed way of doing
           business, actually realizing some relief in terms of
           burden on the licensee?
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  Yes, sir.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  As well as the
           regulators?
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  Yes, sir, I do.  I couldn't
           stand here and tell you.  I wouldn't have taken the
           job if I didn't think that was possible.  I find it a
           very not only challenging job, but I think that we can
           accomplish it.
                       I agree to some point with Carl Paparello
           (phonetic).  He maintains that there has been risk
           information that was taken into account in the
           regulatory framework.  The unfortunate thing is it
           probably was never written down, and so what we're
           doing is we will be going back and putting the
           questions on the table and document it, and in some
           cases for the very first time.
                       Do I believe burden can be reduced long
           term?  Yes, I do.  There is another side of that,
           however, and it could be that we may find -- I'm not
           saying we will, but I said we may find -- that we have
           not put our resources in the most appropriate area,
           and that we may end up increasing burden in some
           fashion in some areas because that's where the risk
           is.
                       We're open to that.  I have no
           preconceived ideas where we will be on any of these
           programs.  What a safety goal is going to look like,
           I have no preconceived idea.  We're wide open, and if
           anything, I've tried to tell my staff and Marty
           Virgilio (phonetic) and Bill Kane have encouraged me,
           as well, to say everything is on the table.  We're
           going to look at it with a fresh set of eyes and see
           what comes out of it.  We hope that we will reduce
           burden, but we hope that we'll be applying our
           resources more effectively over the long haul.  We'll
           be putting our resources where there is the risk, and
           whether that risk is identified through an ISA or a
           PRA or a hazard barrier analysis.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Where do you think
           you're going to have your first successes?  Where do
           you expect to make the most progress in the shortest
           period of time?
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  You know, it's a toss-up.
           The two I am thinking of are in either the industrial
           medical and nuclear safety area or it will be in the
           fuel cycle area through the ISAs, and I'm not quite
           sure which is which.
                       We have done some work in answering that
           petition for the irradiators.  We hope to present that
           to the Commission as possible policy statement later
           this year, and that may give us an idea of where we
           will have an early success.
                       Since that's in IMNS, I suppose IMNS is
           where I'll probably make my first success.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes, yes.
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  Also, the case studies that
           we picked out, the three that we've picked out so far
           are in IMNS as well.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Right.
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  And we hope to have
           completed those by the summertime.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Yes.  Milt?
                       DR. LEVENSON:  I'd like to comment that
           I'm encouraged by the fact that you several times
           implied that the real objective is not risk informed
           really, but reduced risk, and I encourage you to keep
           that in front of you as an objective.
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  Thank you.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Well, I feel a little
           bit like the mystery that ends with the line, "And
           then there were none."
                       Our committee is rapidly diminishing, and
           we started the meeting with one member missing.  So I
           think we're going to have to figure out a way to close
           things here pretty soon.
                       I want to thank you for the presentation.
           We wanted an update on what was going on there, and
           we'll probably want to hear from you again in the not
           too distant future.  So we appreciate it very much.
                       MR. KOKAJKO:  I look forward to it.  Thank
           you.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Thank you.
                       One of the things that we need to ask
           about here is whether or not what we've heard today is
           cause for some sort of a report by the committee.  I
           don't know, Milt, if you have a comment on that.
                       I did talk to Tom a little bit before he
           left about that issue, and if not, when would be an
           appropriate time?
                       I think there is a real genuine interest
           in the ISA process.  I think the committee would like
           to see an application somewhere along the line, and
           that probably we are hesitant to make too much comment
           until we get more into the bowels or an actual
           analysis and keep any comments we'd make from being
           somewhat abstract and academic.
                       So my inclination is that --
                       DR. LEVENSON:  Wait and see.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Wait and see, and see
           if we can't somehow find an opportunity to have the
           committee or have the full benefit of a presentation
           on an ISA such as the MOX fuel facility.  So I think
           that's something we would want to follow pretty
           closely.
                       The other thing I think we're very
           interested in is this Chapter 3 of the review plan and
           what that's going to look like and better understand
           a few aspects of that that came up today.
                       And closely related to that would be the
           revised NUREG 1513.  So those are possible items to
           put on our future agenda list.
                       The fourth or fifth thing, wherever I'm
           at, sooner or later I think the Advisory Committee on
           Nuclear Waste needs to understand a little better the
           Navy spent fuel disposal activities and maybe a place
           to start on that subject would be with the Joint
           Subcommittee.
                       So those are a couple of issues, and I
           think what we'll do is before we actually close the
           door on whether we're going to write a report in ISA
           at this time or not, we'll discuss it with the full
           committees first before we make a final decision on
           that.
                       Mike, have you got any closing commentary?
                       MR. MARKLEY:  No.  I would just -- you
           know, you mentioned MOX fuel and the other one out
           there is the BWXT, which I'm not sure which comes
           first.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Right, right.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  However that fits best.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Any real application
           would be very interesting.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  Right.
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  Because I really don't
           think we are in a position to reach too many
           conclusions unless we see an application.
                       I think in general we're very pleased with
           the scope of the ISAs.  They certainly have a risk
           structure to them, and we're mainly debating some of
           the details.
                       I don't think anybody wants to get into a
           paper chasing routine here.  If there's not a clear
           benefit as far as the regulatory side of the business
           is concerned, from moving more to a probabilistic
           approach with respect to assessing the likelihood of
           these events, if there's no benefit from that, you
           know, we're not going to unduly push.
                       But there is an advantage in trying to get
           some degree of consistency throughout the agency in
           how we do safety analysis, and there's a real
           juggernaut rolling, pushed by the reactor business on
           the PRA, and we have to at least ask the question
           should it not, consistent with applications that make
           sense for things different than reactors, should it
           not pick up these other facilities.
                       That's a question we'll just have to
           continue to study.
                       So, John Larkins, do you have any comment
           or anybody from the rest of the staff or from the
           audience?
                       (No response.)
                       CHAIRMAN GARRICK:  All right.  With that,
           I think we will adjourn this meeting.
                       (Whereupon, at 2:56 p.m., the meeting in
           the above-entitled matter was concluded.)


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, January 27, 2014