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122nd Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) Meeting, October 18, 2000


                             UNITED STATES
                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                  ***
                  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE
                                  ***
                          122nd ACNW MEETING
                                  ***
                              Room T2-B3

                              Two White Flint North
                              11545 Rockville Pike
                              Rockville, Maryland

                              Wednesday, October 18, 2000
               The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:30
     a.m..     MEMBERS PRESENT:
     B. John Garrick, Chairman
     George W. Hornberger, Vice Chairman
     Raymond G. Wymer, ACNW Member
     Milton N. Levenson, ACNW Member

     ALSO PRESENT:
     Amarjit Singh, ACRS/ACNW Staff
     Howard J. Larson, ACRS/ACNW Staff
     Lynn Deering, ACNW Staff
     Richard K. Major, ACNW Staff
     Martin J. Steindler, ACRS Consultant
     William J. Hinze, ACRS Consultant
     Paul G. Shewmon, ACRS Consultant
     Maury Morgenstein, Geoscience Management Institute, Inc.
     Don Shettel, Geoscience Management Institute, Inc.
     Robert W. Staehle, Adjunct Professor, University of
     Minnesota
     Aaron Barkatt, Professor, Catholic University
     April Pulvirenti, Catholic University
     Geoffrey A. Gorman, Dominion Engineering, Inc.
     Chuck Marks, Dominion Engineering, Inc.
     Gustauvo Cragnolino, Center for Nuclear Waste
     Stephanie Bush-Goddard, Office of Regulatory Analysis,
     Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, NRC
     Jim Lieberman, Office of General Counsel, NRC
     Paul Genoa, Nuclear Energy Institute
     Michael Webb, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and
     Safeguards, NRC
     Allen Howe, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and
     Safeguards, NRC
     Bret Leslie, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and
     Safeguards, NRC
     Tae Ahn, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards,
     NRC
     John T. Larkins, Executive Director, ACRS/ACNW
     Andrew C. Campbell, ACRS Staff [via speakerphone].                         P R O C E E D I N G S
                                                      [8:32 a.m.]
               DR. GARRICK:  Good morning.  Our meeting will now
     come to order.
               This is the second day of the 122nd meeting of the
     Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste.
               My name is John Garrick, Chairman of the ACNW.
     Other members of the committee include George Hornberger,
     Ray Wymer, and Milt Levenson.
               We also want to recognize our consultants today,
     Drs. Steindler, Hinze and Shewmon.
               This entire meeting will be open to the public.
               Today, the committee will discuss recent tests to
     explore the specific aspects of the corrosion resistance of
     alloy-22 material.  We're going to hear a presentation from
     the staff on its rulemaking plan addressing the entombment
     option for power reactors and hear comments from consultants
     and members on recent relevant activities and continue our
     discussion on planned activities, including the entombment
     option for decommissioning power reactors, and letter and
     report preparation.
               Amarjit Singh is the designated Federal official
     for the initial portion of today's meeting.  Andy Campbell
     was supposed to be in that capacity.  He is home recovering
     from a back problem.  I think we will be connected in with
     him by telephone.  I think that I have his number here
     somewhere, if somebody can do that.  He's standing by,
     expecting that.
               MR. SINGH:  They're on.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  He went to get a telephone.
               DR. GARRICK:  I see.  This meeting is being
     conducted, as usual, in accordance with the provisions of
     the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  We've received no
     written statements from members of the public regarding
     today's session.  However, should anyone wish to address the
     committee, you can do so by making your wishes known to one
     of the committee staff.
               As usual, it is requested that each speaker use
     one of the microphones, identify themselves, and speak with
     clarity and volume so that you can be heard.
               We have a lot of material to cover today.  This is
     a very important topic, as you all know.  We have a lead
     member on the committee that's been our cognizant person on
     this topic, and that's Ray Wymer.  I will ask him to take
     over and lead the discussions.
               DR. WYMER:  Thanks, John.  It finally has
     happened.  Chemistry has finally reared its ugly head.  As
     the few, the proud chemists among us knew, it had to happen
     sooner or later.
               DR. GARRICK:  This is your day.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Make the most of it.
               DR. WYMER:  It may never happen again.  But the
     importance that we attach to this topic, as indicated by the
     amount of time that's devoted to it, we're going to be on
     this until noon, which will give us ample opportunity for a
     lot of good discussion, I hope, from anybody and everybody
     who wants to comment on it.
               This morning we have some formal presentations by
     several consultants that were brought in specifically for
     this purpose.  As you all know, the issue of the corrosion
     resistance of the C22 alloy, which is the outer layer of the
     waste container for the bulk of the waste that will be in
     the Yucca Mountain repository, if we have one, is a central
     issue.
               And within that issue, one of the central issues
     is whether or not the conditions that have been studied so
     far that have shown rather severe corrosion attack on this
     alloy are realistic conditions within the repository
     environment itself, and I hope we'll hear something about
     that.
               We have Bill Hinze here, who will be able to give
     us a little insight into some of the geology that will have
     a bearing on this.
               So we'll start out by -- I'll introduce Maury
     Morgenstein, who will then introduce the subsequent speakers
     for the rest of the morning.  Take it from there, Maury.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Thank you.  My name is Maury
     Morgenstein.  I want to briefly go over who we are.
     Essentially, we're working for the State of Nevada.  It's a
     team approach.
               We have essentially three tasks that we're working
     on.  We're going to report to you today on one of those
     tasks, which is the C22 oversight assessment.
               I'm not going to go through reading everyone's
     name.
               Our preliminary scoping studies on C-22, as
     oversight, should not be confused with site characterization
     activities.  This is strictly oversight and I wanted to
     underline that, because there is a big difference between
     how one proceeds.
               We have three presentations today.  The first is
     on natural lead and mercury values at Yucca Mountain, the
     second on our scoping experiments, and the third on
     essentially the waste package environment and waste package
     concepts.
               We will start out with Don Shettel, who is sitting
     next to me here, with our first presentation.
               The main issue of this morning and the
     environmental assessment of lead and mercury, and I want to
     start out here and stress the fact that we are only talking
     about lead and mercury in this particular case.
               There is a host of transition metals, other trace
     elements that are important in our overall discussions
     concerning C-22 in the natural environment.  We are going to
     only concentrate on two of these at this point in time.
               We're going to present to you information on fault
     and fracture carbonates and silicates that form at the
     surface of the ground as evaporates, that form in fault
     zones, such as trench-14, and we're going to take a look at
     the hydro geochemistry data available for the Yucca Mountain
     area, and the data on hard rock, whole rock tufts in the
     area.
               So there are three different activities dealing
     with chem.
               For the first, this is a -- and I'm going to turn
     this in a minute so, actually, we can look at it
     stratographically -- a shot, a stratographic run for
     mercury, for core hole, 3D, from Nye County.  It's a Nye
     County core, Nye County early warning drilling project.  And
     I want to show you the distribution of mercury in the tufts
     and sediments from the core.
               At around 500 feet below surface, we have a
     uranium deposit in this particular core and that was the
     purpose behind our activity here.  These data were not
     developed for C-22 project.  We were looking at mercury.
               You will note that there is a marked peak, mercury
     peak associated with essentially the uranium peak and it's
     probably a uranium roll front hydrothermal oriented.  It's
     not a very strange thing.  We see these elsewhere in Yucca
     Mountain area and they're probably related to normal gold
     type mineralization that we see in Nevada, low yield.  In
     this case, we just don't have a lot of gold.
               The point is here, we do get some reasonably high
     mercury values.  That's running about 199 PPM.  And they are
     associated with unique deposits, but at the same time,
     there's a general background.
               In the same hole, we take a look at lead, and,
     again I'm going to go stratographic.  I'm sorry.  Turn that
     so we can look stratographically.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Where did that deposit occur in
     the section, in the stratographic section, the uranium?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  The uranium deposit?
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Yes.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  That's in the tuft.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  It is in the tuft.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  It's in the tuft, just above the
     sediment horizon.
               We have a discontinuous data section here on lead.
     I apologize, but, again, our purpose was not to look at lead
     in this case and we had already used up the samples for
     other purposes in the uranium area.
               But the point I would like to make here is that
     there's essentially no pattern on lead.  It's all over the
     place.  There's a large number of samples that are below
     detection limit, but at the same time, we have samples, for
     example, at the surface with eight PPM and at depths with
     six or seven.  So there's no pattern at all associated with
     lead.
               We do see, in this particular hole, when we look
     at the uranium section, we do see galena, which is a lead
     sulfide.  So there is some mineralization, lead
     mineralization coming along with the uranium and it doesn't
     show on this particular analysis.
               But at the same time, we don't think, from our
     other looks in the literature, we don't think that the
     sulfide type deposits have exorbitant lead concentrations in
     them.  We see, most of the time, just normal background.
               In fact, I will show you a little bit later the
     tufts not associated with sulfide enrichment seem to have
     higher values of lead than those associated with sulfide.
     I'd like to transfer our attention to the surficial
     sediments, the authogenics, those that are formed by
     essentially precipitation, and we have -- this shows
     minimum/maximum values, looking at carbonate, silicate
     veins, fracture fillings, on other words, looking at
     calcretes, which are soil horizon evaporates, and looking at
     rhizoliths, which are also up in the soil horizon.
               And the point I would like to make here is that we
     have fairly significant lead concentrations -- this is only
     lead that we're looking at right now -- running from a
     couple of PPM to about 150 PPM in some cases, and this shows
     around 64-65 PPM for trench-14A.
               This is broken down into silicate and carbonate
     fractions.  This work is done by the USGS.
               In the same paper, they looked at isotope ratios,
     lead isotope ratios, in an attempt to source the formation
     of the carbonates and silicates in the veins in trench-14 to
     address the question of whether or not we're looking at
     meteoric water, down-flow water, or something that was
     up-welling.
               And it was very clear from the isotope ratios that
     this is meteoric water origin deposits.  This is a down-flow
     situation, and at the same time, we have relatively high
     concentrations of lead and the origins of the lead was
     thought to be, for the most part, as a function of aerosol
     dust hitting the surface of the ground, rainwater dissolving
     it and moving it through the system and evaporating.
               If this is the case, and we believe that it is,
     since we see these low to moderate background values all
     over the place and certainly at the surface sediments, one
     can presume, I think very confidently, that down-flowing
     fracture water, especially in fracture zones and fault
     zones, contains a general background value of someplace --
     of lead.  I won't give you a concentration, because I don't
     know.
               But what I can say is if we had that water
     dripping on a canister and that water was to go to
     vaporation, the calcite, silicate, opaline product just
     prior to or at solidification, crystallization, would
     contain values very similar to the surface.  That would be
     somewhere between two and about 150 PPM, because it's
     essentially the same waters that we see depositing these
     deposits on the surface.
               Other analysts, other papers in our references
     have looked at, for example, trench-14 and here is that 150
     PPM.  So what we have done is we have not developed in this
     analysis any unique or specific analytical numbers
     ourselves.  These are all out of the Department of Energy
     literature existing today.
               Again, lead PPM values are all over the place.
     There's just a general background.  I can answer the
     question that's running through your mind of why are the
     values so different.  That's because essentially, when
     you're precipitating stuff, it depends upon how much you get
     in that particular -- how much water is going through that
     system at that point or how active that area is.
               We cannot get back to the water concentration
     values using this analysis.
               IF we ere to look at mercury values for veins,
     pyretic and non-pyretic tufts, trench-14, we see that
     there's a fairly distinctive variance, again.  Veins seem to
     be, of course, higher and these are probably associated, in
     this particular case or in these cases, with some
     hydrothermal activity, and that's why those numbers are
     higher.
               These are not necessarily the same as we just
     looked at for lead.
               I want to bring to your attention the basic
     background numbers that we're getting for a regional vadose
     water chemistry on lead as a product from that water
     vaporation as a function of the USGS analyses and work.
               We have a specific -- I have a little diagram
     here, where -- once again, the surface waters are running
     general meteoric and aerosol lead concentration, which is in
     low PPM values, drips down a fracture zone and if that were
     to contact the waste canister, the deposits formed that we
     see in trench-14, for example, or, I'm sure, if we analyzed
     some of the vein fillings at the Ghost Dance fault, we would
     see the same kind of numbers.
               We expect to see the same kinds of things
     precipitate in the near field and a general feel for that is
     anywhere around three to 150 PPM values.
               I would like to turn this over to Don at this
     point.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  If you had to put a pH value on
     that cartoon --
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Eight.
               DR. SHEWMON:  You have a water level table in
     here, wells, where, in those columns, would they be?  Below
     1,000 feet?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Yes.
               DR. WYMER:  Before we go on, are there any other
     questions on this presentation?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Okay, this part of it, the first
     half.
               DR. WYMER:  Any additional questions?
               DR. GARRICK:  You have given us some indication of
     distributions and concentrations.  What about time
     dependencies, time information?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Anywhere from the tertiary to
     present day.  I can tell you -- the only thing I can tell
     you about time is if we go into the uranium deposits,
     because we did run a uranium series run on the 3D uranium
     deposits, and those were 180,000, 182,000, and they're, of
     course, sitting in tertiary lava.  So that's kind of cute
     and it's of interest.
               But my sense is that we're looking across the
     board.  I don't think it matters what time.
               DR. GARRICK:  I guess the question is what are the
     dynamics over a three or 400,000 year timeframe of the
     distribution and concentrations.  What evidence do you have
     that might suggest what the dynamics might be?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Almost nothing.  We have a
     miniscule amount of data coming into us that we can find in
     the literature.  Remember, we're not out there analyzing
     anything ourselves.  We're in an oversight capacity.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  So looking at the distribution
     of these numbers through time, we don't see any patterns at
     this point in time.  But at the same time, there isn't
     enough material data, authogenics data, at least well dated,
     that we could feel confident in even reporting to you, if we
     had some numbers.
               Roger, did you have something to say?
               MR. STAEHLE:  Roger Staehle, I'm with the State of
     Nevada.  Just to possibly anticipate some of the questions
     I've been hearing here, the amount of lead it actually takes
     to crack this material, if you use the analogy of alloy-600,
     which is the only really super-available analogy, it's only
     about one to ten parts per million over the pH range from
     about three to 13.
               So we're not looking for a lot of lead here, just
     to get that framework straight.
               DR. STEINDLER:  I guess I'm confused.  We're
     talking here about the lead content in solids.  You've not
     addressed, I believe, in any of these data, the lead content
     in solution.
               MR. STAEHLE:  That is correct.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Thank you.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  The solids that we are talking
     about in the case of trench-14 type solids were solids that
     were deposited from vadose solutions as evaporates.  So in
     order to get where they are, they had to go through a
     solution.
               One of the unique problems at Yucca Mountain is
     that if we go to, and I'm sort of stealing some of Don's
     stuff here, but I'll let him get to it, if we go to looking
     at water analysis, that is, saturated zone water, vadose
     pore water and vadose fracture water for trace elements, we
     are going to -- we have an extremely hard time in the
     databank.  There is hardly anything of value there.  This is
     a problem of characterization.
               I'm going to go to Don and then if there are any
     questions that pertain to the whole, we'll go back over
     those.  Don Shettel.
               MR. SHETTEL:  I will try and use this microphone,
     although I think Maury just gave my talk.  It will be rather
     brief, which will become apparent.
               Starting out with the USGS database, put out by
     Perfect in 1995, this is a compilation up to 1994 of over
     3,000 water analyses in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain,
     three degrees of longitude by three degrees of latitude,
     which is about 100 kilometers in north-south-east-west
     direction, and this is a histogram of the data we get
     ranging from almost down to one parts per billion up to over
     a PPM, and these values actually are not necessarily
     natural.
               They're evaporative ponds sitting in buttes and
     fall-out hills.  So they've been evaporatively concentrated
     and the range for natural lead in water is more in this
     vicinity here.
               DR. SHEWMON:  That X axis is hard to see.
               MR. SHETTEL:  This axis is -- this is log --
               DR. SHEWMON:  Ten-to-the-minus-one?
               MR. SHETTEL:  This is log parts per billion.  If
     you look up here, I have it thousand parts per billion,
     hundred, ten and one part per billion.  This is log PPM lead
     down here.  Does that help?
               DR. SHEWMON:  Yes.
               MR. SHETTEL:  That's all the data that's available
     to date, other than some more recent data, which I'm going
     to show next.  In the vicinity of Yucca Mountain, this is
     most saturated zone water, spring deposits, and well water,
     and, like I said, there's some artificial pond water here
     that's been concentrated on the test site.
               Now, if we move in closer to Yucca Mountain and
     look at some individual data that we have, and most of this
     is from the Nye County early warning drilling program that I
     personally sampled.  The only data we had from the USGS is
     well J-13 and J-12 here.  This is dissolved lead up to 16
     parts per billion.
               These wells are arranged from west to east.  The
     Bond gold mining well is on the western side of the Amargosa
     Valley and the Funeral Mountain is on the boundary between
     Amargosa Valley and Death Valley.
               As we come across Amargosa Valley, to the first
     western-most site of the early warning drilling program, 1D
     site, we have this value.  As we come down Highway 95 a
     little more, we have the next well is 9SX.  Then we have a
     few values from here from Site 3.  These are sampled at
     different times and different depths during the drilling
     process.  There's at least two or three holes at this site.
               2D is directly south of Yucca Mountain, along 95,
     Highway 95, and then the wells on the test site, J-13 and
     J-12, are in 40 Mile Wash, directly east of Yucca Mountain.
     Finally, the well 5-S is southeast of Yucca Mountain, in
     Oasis Valley, and this is all the data that's in the
     immediate vicinity of Yucca Mountain.
               Now, what you should note from this is there is
     nothing vadose or these are all saturated zone samples.
     There's nothing in the vadose zone or saturated zone in the
     repository block.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Nothing, meaning no measurements,
     not no lead.
               MR. SHETTEL:  No measurements of lead.
               DR. HINZE:  Let me understand.  You're looking at
     mercury and lead because of their potential corrosive
     qualities and because you have some data.  Is that correct?
               MR. SHETTEL:  I'm concentrating a lot in mercury
     because that's what our consultants have done in the lab,
     experimenting with the alloy.
               DR. HINZE:  Do you have information on any other
     elements that are potentially corrosive or that might be --
               MR. SHETTEL:  I think there's -- the data that
     I've shown is going to be typical of what's available for
     anything else that you might want to consider, cadmium,
     arsenic, antimony.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  And there are other values that
     do exist for other things, and we're not presenting those
     today.
               MR. SHETTEL:  But the lead is typical.
               DR. HINZE:  Is that because you haven't put them
     together yet?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  We have not put them together
     yet.
               MR. SHETTEL:  We're just concentrating on lead and
     mercury today.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  As we maybe in the future
     present findings of significance for other trace element
     values in the laboratory, we will present their natural
     background concentrations.
               DR. HINZE:  So what you're getting to, if I -- let
     me make certain I understand -- is that there are a dearth
     of measurements and that you would like to see additional
     measurements.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Yes.
               DR. HINZE:  And can you tell us a little bit more
     about what you think should be made available to properly
     evaluate the corrosion properties of the vadose water, for
     example?
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.  I'll get into that.
               DR. HINZE:  Okay.  Sorry.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Now, when we come to mercury,
     there's even less data.  We have one value from the
     literature here, from Castor, which is half a part per
     billion.  Location unknown.  It's from some EPA database
     which we haven't traced down yet.  It may be NURE data,
     which would be the National Uranium Resource Evaluation
     data, it might be from there, we're not sure yet.
               In the Perfect database, which is the USGS
     compilation, there's almost 100 values, but they're all
     zero, which I don't know if that's analytical property or
     what.  But out of 3,500 analyses, less than 100 are listed
     as not missing, but they're all zero.  So you'd have to dig
     back.
               And then the one conclusion we can make from all
     this is that the site characterization of Yucca Mountain, in
     terms of trace elements in vadose and saturated zone water
     within the repository block is incomplete and essentially
     unfinished.
               And this may be a shortsightedness or an oversight
     on the part of DOE, not looking forward to what might come
     up, such as what you're going to see later this morning, and
     may be the result of their -- well, I don't know how to say
     this, but bias or preconceived notions about what's going to
     be important, the data that they need to collect during site
     characterization.
               DR. WYMER:  Would you go as far as to say that
     there's so little data available on dissolved mercury and
     dissolved lead that you can't really draw any conclusions
     about the corrosion that might take place in the repository?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  No.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Well, I think we have enough data in
     the area to say that it is certainly present in the system
     and if they had analyzed it in at least the saturated zone
     water, they would have found it.
               So I don't think there's any question that it's
     there or not.  They just haven't done the analyses for trace
     elements in the waters.
               DR. WYMER:  So you don't really know.
               MR. SHETTEL:  We don't really know, but judging
     from the data that's in the immediate vicinity of Yucca
     Mountain, it's there, so I don't think there's any doubt
     that they'll find it, if they analyze for it.
               DR. WYMER:  Okay.
               MR. SHETTEL:  I don't think that's a question at
     all.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Let me speak to that for a
     second.  What we don't have information on, from an aqueous
     geochemical point of view, is any reasonable set of
     analytical figures for Yucca Mountain and precisely Yucca
     Mountain and precisely the individual types of water that
     exist.
               It's not sufficient to talk about the hydrogeology
     of Yucca Mountain with respect to any of these trace
     elements, unless we distinguish if they are coming from the
     saturated zone, which is a really poor choice of target
     water to look for.
               DR. WYMER:  That's right.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  But seems to be the choice --
               MR. SHETTEL:  I'll get into that here.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  -- at hand.  We really are
     interested in vadose water.
               DR. WYMER:  Sure.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  And we're interested in fracture
     flow vadose water as opposed to just pore water, vadose pore
     water.  We need to know actually both.
               Those numbers aren't there.  We do have enough
     information to know that lead and mercury exist in the
     system in the aqueous phases and in the solid phases.  We
     don't have a way at this point in time to look at how much.
               DR. WYMER:  Okay.  Thanks.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Oh, good, you just finished my talk
     for me.
               MR. LESLIE:  Ray, this is Brent Leslie, from the
     staff.
               DR. WYMER:  Yes.
               MR. LESLIE:  Can I ask a question?
               DR. WYMER:  Yes.
               MR. LESLIE:  Don, what is the minimum value of
     water that you need to do these lead analysis, since you've
     been doing them for the Nye County wells?  This will help me
     understand whether that volume of water is available, for
     instance, in the thermal test.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Well, I use a leader, but that is --
     we use that for lead analysis, as well as lead isotopes,
     uranium isotopes and strontium isotopes, and those are all
     done at MIT.
               MR. LESLIE:  Thank you.
               DR. WYMER:  Marty, did you have a question?
               MR. STEINDLER:  Yes.  You indicated that, I guess,
     most of your lead data in solution comes from USGS.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Well, in that 100 kilometer region
     around Yucca Mountain, yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Right.  Is there any information
     on what else is in the water?
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.  They have a whole series of
     all the major analyses, cations and anions, as well as trace
     elements.  I've only shown you the lead and mercury.
               DR. STEINDLER:  So you know what the pH is.  What
     else?
               MR. SHETTEL:  If they've measured it, it should be
     in the database, yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  If they measured it.  I guess I'm
     asking is --
               MR. SHETTEL:  This is a compilation of literature
     data that the USGS put together.  Mostly, their data -- I
     haven't gone over the whole database to show everything
     that's in there.  I just pulled out the lead values.
               And, finally, a little digression on the use of
     J-13.  DOE has historically used it as reference water in
     all experiments.  However, as Maury pointed out, there
     really is no vadose zone water sample from within the
     repository block.
               In other words, collecting a sample of dripping
     water from a fracture.  They have pore water that they
     squeezed out of the rocks, again, the USGS has done this.
     This is not necessarily an appropriate water to use to
     represent water that's flowing in the fractures.
               It may be more appropriate, as Brett mentioned,
     from the thermal test, if it's determined that the canisters
     are going to leak early on during a thermal pulse, then the
     composition of the water that's been refluxed and circulated
     above the drifts will certainly have a different and evolved
     composition due to the refluxing and boiling and condensing.
               And to further complicate problems, the
     experiments that use -- they use synthetic J-13, they only
     use major cations and anions in the water and they leave out
     all the trace and minor elements, which you will see later
     on this morning that these may be important for the
     stability of the canisters.
               So I have some conclusions here about -- mainly in
     reference to water, vadose and saturated zone water within
     the repository block, that the site characterization is
     essentially incomplete, and that because of their
     shortsightedness or however you want to put it, they may
     have to go back and reanalyze samples or even re-collect
     samples.
               I pointed out above, experiments are missing
     important components, major -- not major, but minor and
     trace elements in the water, although they're starting to
     add some of the elements that we're concerned about into
     their alloy tests now, I believe.
               But the bottom line is they're not using a
     realistic aqueous environment in any of their experiments,
     especially as it refers to canister materials.
               DR. WYMER:  By environment, you're talking about
     concentrations of --
               MR. SHETTEL:  Talking about the -- yes, the --
               DR. WYMER:  Not temperature, pressure, anything
     like that, because you haven't discussed that yet.
               MR. SHETTEL:  No, I'm not going to discuss
     temperature.  I'm really just concerned about the
     concentrations of elements in the aqueous solutions.
               DR. SHEWMON:  It bothers me some --
               DR. GARRICK:  Paul, can you move your mic closer?
     Thank you.
               DR. SHEWMON:  To rephrase that last statement, I
     would prefer to say that it's unrealistic to talk about an
     aqueous environment for these casks, but then that's --
               MR. SHETTEL:  Why is that?
               DR. SHEWMON:  Because there's no -- you said the
     water level was down a thousand feet or more.  They aren't
     submerged in water, are they?
               MR. SHETTEL:  No, but there's water that flows
     through the fractures and can drip onto the canisters.  The
     unsaturated zone is almost 80 percent saturated by water.
               DR. SHEWMON:  That's not an aqueous environment.
     It's sort of running through in --
               MR. SHETTEL:  Once you heat up the rock and drive
     the water out of the rock, you could have water, more water
     dripping into the drifts.
               DR. SHEWMON:  It's dripping on.  It's not an
     aqueous environment.  Well, you can call an aqueous
     environment parts per million --
               MR. SHETTEL:  Well, it's certainly a human
     environment and with the water dripping -- no, you're right,
     it's not going to be necessarily submerged in water, but
     they can have water dripping on there, the water can
     evaporate and build --
               DR. SHEWMON:  If that's what you mean by an
     aqueous environment, that's fine.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Well, but in the lab, they do their
     tests in an aqueous environment.
               DR. SHEWMON:  I know.  I think that --
               MR. SHETTEL:  They submerge the sample.
               DR. SHEWMON:  -- makes them largely irrelevant,
     but it's the only place, the only light we can look under.
               MR. SHETTEL:  No, I don't think that I'd say that
     it's irrelevant.
               MR. GORMAN:  Can I make a comment, please?  Jeff
     Gorman, Dominion Engineering, with the State of Nevada team.
     You should remember that the most aggressive corrosion for
     carbon steel piping in PWRs occurs when you have dripping
     borated water dripping onto the carbon steel and staying a
     little bit wet, but being concentrated to a high
     concentration.
     You can chew through the carbon steel at an inch a year and
     that's widespread occurrences and we have to watch for that
     in plants, because of this dripping concentrating to near
     draw-out, but not drawing out, is a very aggressive
     condition and that seems like a possibility with these
     canisters.
               DR. WYMER:  Is that equally aggressive -- let me
     ask you a follow-on question.  Is it equally aggressive in a
     totally emerged environment of the same material?
               MR. GORMAN:  No.  If you're totally emerged --
     well, boric acid solutions are aggressive if it's also
     oxygenated.  And so if it's -- the boric acid inside the
     PWR, that solution is not aggressive against carbon steel
     because it's fully de-aerated with a hydrogen over-pressure.
               Many cases, when it leaks onto really hot pipe and
     it dries quickly and stays dry, you don't get corrosion.
     You get the worst case when you have enough dripping to keep
     it at about 200 to 250 Fahrenheit and moist and then you get
     very aggressive -- truly you chew big holes in pump flanges
     and in vessel walls and the like.
               DR. WYMER:  This line of reasoning suggests that
     tests in total immersed solutions are not necessarily
     appropriate.
               MR. GORMAN:  That's correct.  We'll be discussing
     that.  We'll talk about that, some improved ways of testing.
               DR. WYMER:  Okay.
               MR. AHN:  Ray, we have -- there are a couple of
     questions here.
               MR. CRAGNOLINO:  This is Gustauvo Cragnolino.  I
     only want to provide two pieces of information.  One is in
     response to the question of Dr. Steindler regarding the pH.
     Typically, the pH for the solution that he described within
     dissolved lead concentration going from one PPB to one PPM
     is ranging from 7.5 to, at the most, 8.5.  This is the range
     of pH for the solution that he was describing.
     The second one refers to the speciation of lead when you
     have borated water.  We tried to do some very simplistic and
     preliminary analysis by running the GWB code using, as a
     baseline, the concentration of anionic and cationic species
     that you have in J-13 water.
               But doping the water with the maximum value, both
     the lead concentration that he has in solution, is about 3.1
     milligram per kilogram of water, three PPM.
               When you remove the water by this process of
     evaporation in the code, you come out with the conclusion
     that mostly lead is either precipitated, a cerrusite, that
     is lead carbonate, and the remaining solution is the
     dissolved form of lead carbonate, with a concentration on
     the order of 1.2-ten-to-the-minus-three molar.
               There is an ion pair association between lead plus
     two and carbonate in the aqueous phase to this
     concentration, while free lead, two plus is the order of
     ten-to-the-minus-14 -- minus-12, I'm sorry.
               DR. WYMER:  Pretty insoluble.
               MR. CRAGNOLINO:  The concentration on the other
     side reaches the range of the order of 1.4 molar.  Then we
     are getting close to saturation to the concentration
     solution.
               But this is only to give you a framework.  It
     doesn't mean that these are experimental data, by any means.
     It's a simplistic calculation with a code in order to seek
     out the operation process to lead to the concentration of
     lead in the water.
               MR. AHN:  One more question here.  Tae Ahn, of NRC
     Headquarters.  Have you considered the current design of the
     EBS system including a drip shield, that blocks the water
     drip during the thermal pulse period?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Have we considered that?  We
     will be talking about that later, and, yes, it's been
     considered.
               DR. WYMER:  And along these lines of this general
     conversation, have you considered the effect of sulfide on
     reducing the --
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Yes.
               DR. WYMER:  -- free ion -- I mean, that really
     knocks it down.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Yes.
               DR. WYMER:  We'll hear about that?
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.  You'll hear about possible
     effects of sulfate.
               DR. WYMER:  Sulfate.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Being reduced on the canister
     surfaces.
               DR. WYMER:  Then being sulfide and then
     precipitating into the lead and the mercury.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Well, it has other effects, I
     believe, other than that.  Roger Staehle will talk about
     that.
               DR. WYMER:  Of course, effectively removing the
     lead and the mercury is another whole area of consideration.
     You're going to get into that.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Can I prolong this discussion just
     a little?
               DR. WYMER:  That's what we're here for, Marty.
               DR. STEINDLER:  The conclusion I guess I come to
     is that in solution, which is what you were talking about,
     the variability of the lead content of the various samples
     that you get are what you call all over the map.
               MR. SHETTEL:  In a sense, yes, but they are within
     a fairly restricted range.  I mean, they fall within the
     part per billion range, yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  In the aqueous phase.
               MR. SHETTEL:  In the aqueous phase, yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  There seems to be no systematics
     which would allow you to predict where you would find high
     or low concentrations, even in that part per billion range
     that you're talking about.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  That is correct.  What we can
     tell you is probably what the range is.  So we have bounding
     ranges.
               MR. SHETTEL:  You have bounding ranges.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  That could be used at this
     point.  But as you could tell, we're not feeling very
     comfortable.  We would like to have a lot more information.
               MR. SHETTEL:  You can also use a geochemical
     modeling program, such as EQ36, to evaluate the chemistries
     of the solutions, if things are in equilibrium or not.  I
     mean, we haven't gone that far yet.  That certainly could be
     done.
               DR. STEINDLER:  The level of uncertainties at
     those concentrations strikes me as being excessive in terms
     of being able to predict your concentrations, particularly
     the --
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  We have no argument with you.
     We totally concur.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.  You have to know something
     about the geology, as well.
               DR. STEINDLER:  The other point then is in the
     case of mercury, you're totally without information.  Is
     that right?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  From an aqueous phase, that's
     totally correct.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Don't have a clue.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Don't have a clue.
               MR. SHETTEL:  We know it has to be fairly low and
     probably lower than lead.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Yes.  We know it's there.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  I think you now it's there.
               MR. SHETTEL:  You know it's there as a solid
     phase.
               DR. STEINDLER:  I'm talking about solution.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  In the solution, we have not a
     clue.
               MR. SHETTEL:  That's right.  But if you're going
     to heat up the repository and reflux water in there, the
     increasing temperature is probably going to increase the
     lead concentration in the water.
               DR. STEINDLER:  I'm sorry.  I moved to mercury.
               MR. SHETTEL:  I mean mercury, yes.  We're still
     talking about the same thing.
               DR. STEINDLER:  But since you don't know whether
     there is any mercury in the solution, you can't --
               MR. SHETTEL:  We don't believe that that's
     important whether or not it's actually in the solution right
     now.
               DR. STEINDLER:  How would it get to the --
               MR. SHETTEL:  The important point is that --
               DR. STEINDLER:  -- if it isn't in solution?
               MR. SHETTEL:  If you heat up the repository and
     start circulating hot thermal water in there, you could be
     drawing the mercury out of the rock.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Do you have any evidence to
     substantiate that?
               MR. SHETTEL:  The hydrothermal deposits are
     mercury.  It happens in nature.
               DR. STEINDLER:  I'm talking about evidence that
     relates to Yucca Mountain.
               MR. SHETTEL:  I'm going to be measuring mercury in
     water.  Next week I'm going to be sampling.  So we will try
     to get some mercury data in water.  Not within a repository
     block, but along Highway 95, where the Nye County early
     warning drilling program is sampling next week.
               DR. STEINDLER:  What's your limit of detection in
     the case of mercury?
               MR. SHETTEL:  I think it's below a part per
     billion.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Below the part per billion.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Do you have any idea how far below
     the part per billion?
               MR. SHETTEL:  Not at the moment, no.
               DR. WYMER:  I don't want you to answer this
     question now, but to alert you to the question so you can
     talk about it later.
               Do you have any idea, with respect to the
     characterization that you're going to need, you need a lot
     more data from the mountain, so that you really can pin some
     of these things down.  You need more characterization
     information.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  We would not even consider that
     characterization has taken place yet.
               DR. WYMER:  That's what I was going to ask you
     later on and maybe you people can't answer the question,
     maybe DOE has to answer it.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.  We think DOE needs to
     characterize the mountain in a more thorough fashion.
               DR. WYMER:  What I was concerned about out was the
     time in which this characterization can take place and then
     when the characterization results will come out with respect
     to the licensing process.
               MR. SHETTEL:  That's a question for DOE.
               DR. WYMER:  That's a question for DOE, I realize
     that, but I thought you might want to kick it around a
     little bit later on.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  We obviously have the similar
     concern.
               DR. WYMER:  Okay.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Unless there are further
     questions --
               DR. WYMER:  We've got one.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Don, I can infer from your last
     slide the criticism that no dripping fractures have been
     sampled in the ASF and that that's part of the
     characterization that you're talking about.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Would you suggest that what has
     to be sampled is water from the seepage tests in the cross
     drift or water from the thermal test that's in progress?
               MR. SHETTEL:  I believe the thermal test does have
     some water analyses and I just got a copy of one of their
     reports.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  But my point is that you --
               MR. SHETTEL:  The seepage tests in the drifts --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  -- want to collect water from the
     fractures.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Yes.  That would be one -- we feel
     that that's one part of the characterization of the mountain
     that should have been performed.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Right.  But I guess I would
     probably argue that you are going to -- if you sit out there
     and wait for a naturally dripping fracture to give you a
     liter of water, you might be characterizing for a very long
     time.  That is, you don't see water dripping from those
     fractures.  It's not like the Stripa Mine and --
               MR. SHETTEL:  Not in the ventilated parts of the
     repository, you don't.  You'd have to sit in a part that's
     closed off to ventilation, yes.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  So, again, you're saying that
     what should be sampled is if they do get water, and that's
     not clear yet, in the sealed-off drift, number one; number
     two, in the thermal test, which is --
               MR. SHETTEL:  I believe the thermal tests have
     been sampled, yes.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Okay.  And then would you
     consider data from leaching from a seepage test useable?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Let me speak to that.  We're
     sitting with hardly anything now.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Yes, I know.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Everything at this point in time
     is useable.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Okay.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  A window of information is
     better than a closed door.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I'm just trying to put the
     criticism that we don't have vadose zone water dripping from
     fractures to characterize in perspective.
               MR. SHETTEL:  They do have UZ14, which is the
     perched water, which they sample.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Sure.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Although that's --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  So you would consider perched
     water to be --
               MR. SHETTEL:  -- not necessarily exactly the same
     as the fracture water.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Certainly.
               MR. SHETTEL:  But on a seepage test, you mean with
     artificial recharge?  Well, that's data.  It's not
     necessarily the natural system, but it is data.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  It would be better than what we
     have.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Better than nothing.
               DR. WYMER:  Better than nothing, yes.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Again, Brett asked you how much
     you wanted and you wanted a liter of water per sample.
               MR. SHETTEL:  Well, that's just what I collect,
     but that sample involves a lot of other things, as well.
     It's not the minimum amount necessarily.
               MR. LESLIE:  Brett Leslie, from the NRC staff.  I
     mean, one of the places where potentially DOE has 35,000
     liters of water is alcove-1, where they've forced
     infiltration and have collected that water, and I guess the
     question I would kind of toss back to you is the transit
     time is a couple days to a couple weeks, is that useful
     information.  That's water that's flowing down fractures and
     dripping and --
               MR. SHETTEL:  Did they use J-13 water for that,
     Brett?
               MR. LESLIE:  Yes, they did.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  One of the things that you have
     to recall is that the lead signal, the background lead
     signal is a surface expression and so that if you take J-13
     and inject it into the system, you may not be dealing with
     reality.
               But at the same time, you may be.  We'd have to
     keep that an open issue.  But, yet, any activity that would
     produce any numbers at this point in time would be welcome
     and the more, the better.
               MR. LESLIE:  Are you saying that bad data is
     better than no data?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  I wouldn't call it bad data.
               MR. LESLIE:  But that's in essence what you've
     said.  You said any data.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  Well, any reasonable decent
     data.
               DR. WYMER:  These are literalists.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  I apologize.  If there are no
     further questions, we'd like to go to our next presentation
     from Jeff Gorman and Ronnie Barkatt.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Ray, are we going to get copies of
     the viewgraphs?
               DR. WYMER:  Yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  It would be useful.
               DR. SHEWMON:  We have them, I think.  Some of us
     do.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, our designated Federal
     official got to supply it.
               DR. WYMER:  Would you introduce yourself, again,
     please?
               MR. BARKATT:  Dr. Morgenstein already introduced
     the team in general.  The consulting group that we are
     involved with consists of personnel from Catholic University
     here in Washington, D.C. and Dominion Engineering of McLean,
     Virginia.
               My name is Aaron Barkatt and we have several other
     members of the team, Dr. Pulvirenti is here in the audience,
     Dr. Chuck Marks from Dominion Engineering works with Dr.
     Geoffrey Gorman, and Dr. Geoffrey Gorman will give the other
     half of the presentation, and, again, there are several
     other people at Dominion working within this group.
               Catholic University has been working for several
     years with Dr. Morgenstein for the State of Nevada, mostly
     on glass issues, and the project that we started here on
     C-22 is evaluation to development, this whole effort only
     started in the spring, several months ago, and the results
     that we have got are necessarily just preliminary in nature.
               We should also reemphasize that we have -- we are
     making no effort here to compete with or to overlap the DOE
     efforts.  Our mission, as we see it, is to supply the State
     of Nevada with information as to whether, in our opinion,
     the DOE program adequately addresses all the significant
     issues related to the waste package alloys and,
     specifically, the C-22, or whether the other aspects, in our
     opinion, that we think ought to be considered further.
               In that context, the aspect that we started
     addressing at the beginning of the program was the effects
     of minor species and trace species which may have a
     significant effect on corrosion.
               This concern is the result of Dominion
     Engineering's experience, as well as own experience in the
     nuclear industry, but as Dr. Staehle will detail in his
     talk, this is not by far the only issue and may not even be
     the most important issue to address with respect to the
     C-22, where we think that further consideration, further
     study may be merited.
               Many others, the nature of the heated concentrated
     surface that we are dealing with, and he will speak to that
     point.  But I would think that one reason why we started
     with aggressive species is it's easy to do preliminary
     experiments and, of course, our purpose is to go into more
     systematic studies that allow us to judge better the
     relevance of our results to the expected repository
     conditions.
               So what we are doing here is exploring acid and
     caustic environments with and without, so far, lead and
     mercury.  We've just scratched the surface with respect to
     arsenic and sulfides.
               Most of the tests were done with U-bends mostly at
     the temperature of 250 degrees Centigrade, as well as disks,
     unstressed disks at 160 degrees Centigrade, but, of course,
     a much milder condition.
               The base medium which we were looking at is J-13,
     and, again, you heard at length the concerns about the fact
     that J-13 may be not the most appropriate water for testing
     relevant to repository conditions, and I think that's an
     understatement.
               This water is concentrated by a factor of a
     thousand and that, again, is a an arbitrary number.  We use
     it because for DOE or Lawsonberg and coworkers analyzed the
     one thousand concentration factor extensively.  That's not
     the maximum concentration that may occur.
     Again, we are planning to use geochemical codes and if I may
     add, in digression to an issue which was brought up in
     response to the previous presentation, things can really get
     complex -- excuse the bad pun -- with regard to lead
     solubility, because, for instance, we know that there are
     carbonates, we know the limitations on solubility in
     carbonate systems, but there, again, it has been published
     that in systems exposed to radiation, formation of organic
     acids, formic acid, acetic acid and so on is observed, so
     that situation may be very complex.
               So what we tried to do here essentially is to take
     a first cut at looking at wherever potentially aggressive
     species, such as lead and mercury, may have significant
     effects on C-22 corrosion.
               MR. GORMAN:  I'm Jeff Gorman, of Dominion
     Engineering.  We started the -- did this series of tests
     with U-bends, which we'll show a picture of in just a
     minute, and so you can see the size and shape.  This is of a
     flat sheet of C-22 and then was stressed with a nut-and-bolt
     kind of thing, squeezing it.
               We chuck the strain that we estimated was about 25
     percent on the OD surface.  So highly, highly stressed
     U-bend samples and put in static autoclaves and in a variety
     of environments.
               Let's see.  I think that I should use this.  Here
     is essentially all of the tests at 250, except one at room
     temperature, and with rather a range of pH, some very acidic
     at room temperature, not quite so acidic up at as calculated
     pH at the 250 C, and some of the samples had wells in them
     and some did not, and some we added samples of tuft material
     in them and those are marked "yes."     And then the
     accelerants is with sulfuric acid.  One test had applied
     potential of 200 millivolts and these were short duration
     tests, generally in the neighborhood of a month.
               And in some of these environments, we saw no
     results, nothing either visual or in terms of cracking or
     pitting and the like, no -- while others, we saw definite
     signs of chemical attack, ranging from tarnishing to slight
     pitting, to very severe pitting, and then one specimen, this
     one here, specimen number 12, cracks through wall.
               We'll show a picture and we can pass the pieces
     around.  In quite a short time.  We saw the crack in the
     first inspection after one week, and fully fell apart after
     two weeks.  So then this is at an elevated temperature, 250,
     but it's a very short time, and the question is, as you
     reduce temperature towards more realistic, how long does
     that time become.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Were these solutions de-aerated
     before you used them?
               MR. GORMAN:  Chuck, no, they were not.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Do you have any idea of what the
     oxygen content was?
               MR. GORMAN:  Well, it's starting in seven PPM
     range, but the acidic ones probably the oxygen was consumed
     very quickly, I would assume.
               DR. STEINDLER:  What was your free board volume on
     your autoclave?
               MR. GORMAN:  Chuck, what's the volume in the
     autoclave?  It's, I think, listed.
               MR. MARKS:  Chuck Marks, also at Dominion
     Engineering.  The liquid volume in the autoclave was about
     150 mils and the head space above that, which was air, was
     about 100 mils.
               DR. STEINDLER:  So it's about one-to-one.
               MR. MARKS:  Just about, yes.
               DR. SHEWMON:  One other question.  At 250 C in
     that, the pressure is 1,000 PSI?
               MR. GORMAN:  No.  Let's see.  A thousand PSI is
     288 C, so my guess is something in the 600 PSI, something
     like that.  There's further results are shown here and the
     main -- the main point on this -- these are the same test
     samples.  The main new information or the concentrations of
     the elements showing that a fair amount of dissolution of
     some of the elements took place in these environments,
     showing some chemical activity going on.
               Again, in the same ones, the same general ranking,
     with this number 12 being the most severe and then the very
     severe pitting one being the next most severe, one with lead
     and the other was mercury.
               DR. WYMER:  Why did you go to such high acidities?
     That seems very unrealistic.
               MR. GORMAN:  The reason was is we only had a very
     short time to do some tests and --
               DR. WYMER:  You wanted to see something.
               MR. GORMAN:  We wanted to see something and we
     realize that these are rather -- these are aggressive
     environments and the intent is then to, first, find out
     where things happen and then start working in a systematic
     way towards service conditions, allowing us to extrapolate
     to longer and longer times.
               Let's see.  I think this is the time to the now
     fractured pieces around.  I'm going to pass it in the
     envelope, so you can take it out and look at it.  These are
     this sample here.  We'd like these -- oh, if anybody wants
     to see a U-bend, we can pass that around, but it's not very
     exciting.
               DR. WYMER:  Do you think that the stress that you
     got there is anywhere close to what would be present in a
     container?
               MR. STAEHLE:  Yes.
               MR. GORMAN:  Roger will discuss that.  This was at
     a -- we didn't quantify the stress.  It would be up over the
     yield stress, whatever level cold work would occur getting
     to 25 percent strain.
               So it would be at a high stress, but you could get
     to such surface stresses at a damaged area on the surface of
     a canister, for example.
               More pictures of cracks, which I guess are not
     terribly --
               DR. GARRICK:  You're going to have to install the
     microphone on your --
               DR. STEINDLER:  While you're doing that, let me
     ask a question here.  You mentioned the pH at room
     temperature.  In some cases, you're up at 250.  Do you have
     any clue as to what your pH is at 250, especially in the
     acidic solution?
               MR. GORMAN:  We show the calculated pH there, if
     you look at the table, the next column over.  It's
     calculated room temperature -- I mean, calculated at
     temperature pH.
               DR. STEINDLER:  And that took into account that
     you've got an air over-pressure.
               MR. GORMAN:  No, I don't think it did.
               DR. STEINDLER:  I'm trying to figure out what that
     means.
               MR. GORMAN:  I don't think we -- we did not take
     into account the -- any effect of air.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Okay.
               MR. GORMAN:  I guess I'm going to flip through a
     lot of cracks.  You can see it, it's in the handouts.
               Now, we also see a fair amount of evidence of
     under the washer, which was isolating the nut-and-bolt from
     the U-bend.  We also see a fair amount of sort of crevice
     attack, pitting kind of crevice attack.
               DR. WYMER:  What was the washer made out of, same
     stuff?
               MR. GORMAN:  It was Teflon.  Oh, no, excuse me.
     Chuck will come up and --
               MR. MARKS:  The bolting mechanism was a similar
     alloy to C-22, but there were Teflon liners in between the
     bolts and the washers and the sample itself.
               So there was no metallic contact with the bolting
     mechanism.
               DR. WYMER:  What was the ionic strength of these
     solutions, roughly, do you have a feel for that?
               MR. GORMAN:  Chuck, the ionic strengths?  It's
     listed, I think, on the --
               MR. MARKS:  We have a listing of the specific ion
     parts per million.  We don't have a molarity or anything
     like that concentration.  The autoclaves were also
     Teflon-lined.  So there was -- so the samples were isolated
     completely, except for the solution contact.
               MR. GORMAN:  Just to show some more details of the
     cracking.  You can see sort of general pattern of
     intergranular attack occurring.  The sample -- the crack
     growth direction is in this direction.  This is the OD
     surface.  This is the ID, transgranular to about sort of
     approximate midpoint, and then intergranular thereafter.
               So transgranular in the higher stressed area, then
     the final propagation at lower stress in the intergranular
     mode, with lots of little intergranular starts along the
     surface at other locations.
               So the lead environment, the acidic lead
     environments are quite aggressive against this material.
               DR. WYMER:  Were there some cracks before you ever
     put it in the autoclave?
               MR. GORMAN:  Not as could be seen under visual
     examination.  We didn't do metallography beforehand.
               DR. WYMER:  Under the same condition that you saw
     those cracks, you did not see cracks before.
               MR. LEVENSON:  They didn't do that.
               MR. GORMAN:  Let's see.  In visual examinations
     like this and some visual examinations under a
     stereomicroscope, we don't see any cracks in the surfaces of
     any of the samples, except for this one after test.
               DR. WYMER:  Okay.
               MR. GORMAN:  The only cracks that we have seen.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Excuse me.  I'm slowly catching up
     to you.  Your sample 12, which was -- you don't need to go
     to it, but which was the lead --
               MR. GORMAN:  That was the lead acid.
               DR. STEINDLER:  The lead acid, had a significant
     amount of what looks like either deposits or whatever around
     where that Teflon --
               MR. GORMAN:  Washer was.
               DR. STEINDLER:  -- washer must have been.  Did you
     look at that to see why that was there and whether it
     indicated the thing that I think Ray was driving at, whether
     you had electrolytic reaction?
               MR. GORMAN:  I'm not sure.  I don't think I
     understand your question, but, Chuck, let's get up to the
     microphone?  Because he's the one who actually looked at
     these in greatest detail as he took them out.  So repeat
     your question again.
               DR. STEINDLER:  In that sample, in the lead acid
     sample, it looks like there's a fairly non-uniform reaction
     layer which surrounds what apparently was the location of
     your Teflon.
               MR. MARKS:  Yes.  Why don't you put up the slide
     of sample 12, showing the --
               MR. GORMAN:  Yes, just a second.
               MR. MARKS:  -- bolting location?
               MR. GORMAN:  Right.  Just a second.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Sorry about that.
               MR. GORMAN:  That's fine.  I don't think these are
     deposits.  I think that's pitting, isn't it?
               MR. MARKS:  Yes.  Basically, what you see is there
     is a smooth circular region around the hole where the bolt
     went through and then just beyond that, there is some severe
     pitting in the location that was essentially a crevice
     formed by the Teflon liner and the U-bend sample.
               So we're looking at some accelerated corrosion
     there in a crevice type region.  In this particular picture,
     you don't see any deposits.  They've been washed off.  There
     was, because the J-13 water concentrated by 1,00 times did
     have some precipitates in it, there were salts located on
     the sample immediately after the test, but in this
     particular picture, they have been washed off and what you
     see there is pitting.
               DR. STEINDLER:  I guess all I want to do is draw
     attention to the fact that there seems to be something going
     on in the area of that magic nut and bolt.
               MR. GORMAN:  We were attributing it to crevice
     effects, but I couldn't swear that it isn't due to something
     from the Teflon.
               MR. MARKS:  Most likely it's a crevice effect.
     The Teflon is supposed to be non-reactive in these
     conditions and the bolt was an alloy C-276, which is
     actually very similar to the C-22 and we would not expect
     any kind of chemical reaction to be accelerated to this
     extent by the differences between those.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Those of us that have had to do
     MCC-1 tests will tell you that Teflon is not inert and you
     can get a significant amount of fluoride out of it,
     especially at the temperatures and conditions that you were
     using.
               MR. MARKS:  Our conclusions about this particular
     sample and the pitting that you see there are also based on
     the fact that the same bolting assembly was tested in other
     environments and, specifically, the lead acid is associated
     with this phenomenon, as well as the mercury samples.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Did you do any of these experiments
     at pH .5 without the lead?
               MR. GORMAN:  Yes.
               DR. SHEWMON:  I don't see any in the tables.
               MR. GORMAN:  The other ones, like this one here.
               DR. SHEWMON:  That's got sulfur.
               MR. GORMAN:  It's got sulfur in it, but the -- go
     ahead, Chuck.
               MR. MARKS:  But at that pH, most of the sulfur
     that was originally put into the solution is volatilized
     during the pH adjustment.  So the amount of sulfur there is
     --
               DR. SHEWMON:  This is a closed autoclave, isn't
     it?
               MR. MARKS:  Yes, but the pH adjustments are made
     before the autoclave is closed and before the sample is
     added.  So there are certain adjustments made to what we
     call the 1,000 X J-13 order.
               MR. GORMAN:  The answer is we didn't do any tests
     without any additives and only the acidic, which would be
     interesting to do.  We haven't done that, but our thought is
     that this one is pretty close to that condition.
               DR. SHEWMON:  We aren't sure whether it's the lead
     or the conditions yet.
               MR. GORMAN:  But we're pretty confident that it's
     the lead.
               MR. CRAGNOLINO:  This is Gustauvo Cragnolino, from
     the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis.  I was
     precisely going to ask the question that Dr. Shewmon asked,
     because I think that it is very important to have a blank
     test under the same conditions with the absence of lead.
               When we reviewed the literature on these subjects
     several years ago in handbook on the stress corrosion
     cracking, we found out data precisely produced at that time
     by Haynes and Judy Kolls, showing that the alloy-22 is
     susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, one weight percent
     hydrochloride, hydrochloric acid, the pH is about .5 at room
     temperature, when you test this at 232, using a U-bend
     sample without lead.
               I don't deny that it could be an important
     accelerated effect of lead, but it has to be clearly
     demonstrated here and I think that the way to sort out this
     situation will be to have a blank test in which you are
     completely sure that you don't have lead.
               MR. GORMAN:  And in the test program, we would
     expect to do so.  So this is suggestive, but not conclusive,
     is our position at this stage.
               If you go to that last sample we were just looking
     at, which did not -- let's see.  Had I -- let's see.  I
     wanted to -- I think I may have passed over that in response
     to a question.  This was the mercury acid, where no cracking
     occurred, but we still saw some pretty severe pitting and
     crevice kind of attack.
               Then the one with the sulfur, where we think most
     of the sulfur was removed, also saw some crevice attack.
               DR. WYMER:  What is chemically, sulfur acid, what
     does that mean?
               MR. GORMAN:  It's on the -- earlier in the table,
     it gives the environment.  Chuck, do you want to answer that
     in more detail?
               MR. MARKS:  Yes.  Specifically, what we did was to
     the 1,000 X J-13 water, we added sodium sulfide, NA2S, at
     3,200 PPM sulfur. But upon acidification, there was a high
     degree of volatilization of the sulfur, even through the
     hood.
               So the speculation is that sulfur levels in that
     particular sample were not necessarily higher than any
     others.
               MR. GORMAN:  This, we are now to disk tests.
     Ronnie, if you're going to stand up, you're going to want
     this on.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Will you have on your slide
     something, what the concentration is in C-22 before the
     test?  I don't carry that around with me somehow.
               MR. BARKATT:  The C-22 composition --
               MR. STAEHLE:  The average compositions are nickel
     56.5, chromium 21, this is all weight percent, molybdenum
     13.5, tungsten 3, iron 4, and cobalt 2.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Thank you.
               MR. BARKATT:  The tests that you heard described
     before were done, as you heard, under fairly severe
     conditions, because we wanted to start under accelerated
     test conditions and then start working backwards towards
     milder conditions.
               And the second series of tests which was done, it
     had significant distinction from the first one.  First,
     instead of using stressed U-bends, these tests were done
     with unstressed static disks of alloy C-22.
               Secondly, the temperature, instead of being 250
     degrees Centigrade, was about 160 degrees Centigrade.  And
     thirdly, when you look at environment, we used the J-13
     water concentrated by a factor of 1,000, without attempting
     to acidify it in the first eight rows of the table, and then
     we also did acidified tests, but we acidified only to pH .5,
     not all the way to .5.
               I should also note, in passing, that in these
     tests, we used the Teflon vessels, where very, very aged,
     had been used at elevated temperatures in water for a long,
     long time, and I would expect that based on previous
     experience, by that time, the fluoride extraction from the
     Teflon was not a significant factor.
               Anyhow, we'd like to take a look at the chemical
     analysis of the solutions after contact with the C-22 and at
     least at the high pH region, we have a case where we had no
     additives, so that can serve as a baseline, and this was
     really a preliminary scoping test and please remember that
     we are talking here about very preliminary work.
               So we threw in everything that we could think of,
     a lot of it, additives that have been suggested, as a result
     of the DOE program.  And I would like to direct your
     attention particularly to two lines, one of them is the
     lead, where we added, admittedly, a high concentration of
     lead, but you can see here that with respect to chromium and
     molybdenum, at the high pH, you have an enhancement by a
     factor of about -- oh, I'm standing right in front of the --
               DR. SHEWMON:  You said high pH and pointed at 2.5?
               MR. BARKATT:  No, no, no.  I was pointing to these
     top nine lines, the pH at room temperature is about 13 all
     the way down to here.
               DR. SHEWMON:  You said you singled out two of
     them.
               MR. BARKATT:  I singled out -- let me single out
     three.  No, which is a mark to one, no additives, which
     serves as our baseline.  The row marked lead, introduced as
     lead acetate, the second row, and you can see here an
     enhancement in the concentrations of chromium and
     molybdenum, which may or may not be significant.
               At this stage of the program, it's premature to
     ask about uncertainties and standard deviations and so on,
     but there may be some enhancement here by about a factor of
     two.
               But when you go to the ninth line, the last line
     of the pH results, with mercury, you have enhancement in the
     concentration of these two dissolved elements, the chromium
     and molybdenum, by about a factor of 30 and that is even
     more likely to be significant.
               With regard to the pH 2.5 experiments, here, of
     course, you see larger amounts of the solution, higher pH,
     you will notice, for instance, within the case of mercury,
     you have what appears to be a significant enhancement of the
     dissolution of molybdenum.
               Now, again, admittedly, we don't have a line here
     which says none, but we did do the test with no additives
     and, again, because of the preliminary nature of the test,
     we did not, in that case, analyze the concentrations, but we
     had the samples and we could examine them.
     DR. STEINDLER:  I'm sorry.  I don't think I've got the
     picture yet.  This is the concentration in the residual
     solution.
               MR. BARKATT:  This is the concentration in the
     residual solution.
               DR. STEINDLER:  So these are comparable because
     the sample size surface area and the volume of the liquid
     were the same --
               MR. BARKATT:  Were the same in all cases.  Let me
     start by discussing --
               DR. STEINDLER:  I'm just trying to make sure that
     what I'm comparing is apples and apples.
               MR. BARKATT:  Apples and apples.  All these disks
     came from the same lot.  I may have misunderstood the
     question.  Jeff, would you mind passing these along?  One
     comes from the blank test, the other comes from the
     lead-containing test. And the pictures that we have here are
     even worse than the ones -- the ones which you saw before
     were really good.  These ones were done, again, pretty
     hastily and with less than optimum equipment.
               But the one thing that we saw in the
     lead-containing sample was an obvious evidence, clear
     evidence of pitting, plus we saw a lot of the position of
     corrosion products.
               The case of mercury is peculiar.  The case of
     mercury, we have one sample that I think we didn't
     characterize too much, because the filter won't let us get
     it out, it's too much, with a reasonably deep pit, which
     shows layers of chromium oxide and what may be molybdenum,
     but this is -- these tests, again, need to be reproduced,
     continued and the conditions need to be specified to the
     extent that we can clearly distinguish why, in one case, we
     did get a deep pit in the presence of mercury and in other
     cases we got a multiplicity of shallow pits instead.
               So we are not -- we cannot talk about the mercury
     effects conclusively at this stage.
               When we look at the main findings --
               MR. GORMAN:  You might as well go ahead.  Why
     don't you go ahead on this one, Ronnie.
               MR. BARKATT:  When we look at the main findings on
     the U-bend tests that you saw before, what you can see here
     is that in an acidified solution without additives, and so
     to resolve the current contradiction, when you introduce
     sodium sulfide into a solution at room temperature that
     contains acid at the pH .5, practically all the sulfur is
     driven out as hydrogen sulfide, and that's why we can talk
     about that.
               Without additives, the corrosion is mild and
     involves shallow general corrosion and pitting, possibly
     with some deposition, and, specifically, in the stressed
     region along the apex of the U-bend, we see very, very
     little alteration.  I should say we don't see significant
     alteration of the sample at all.
               In the presence of mercury, we see general
     corrosion, pitting, and deposition of corrosion products.
     All these modes.
               Now, there is something peculiar about the
     mercury, which may have to do with our analytical
     techniques.  We tried to use EDX on these samples.  Again,
     that was preliminary, with obsolete equipment, and we have
     not observed mercury accumulating on the corroded surface.
               DR. WYMER:  Why did you go to 1,000 full
     concentration instead of, say, 100 or 10,000?
               MR. BARKATT:  Again, there is a recent paper by
     Lawsonberg, I think at Lawrence Livermore, which
     characterized at great length the 1,000 concentration factor
     and related it to EQ, for EQ6 modeling results and there is
     where we felt comfortable that we had a solution which is
     pretty well characterized.
               But, again, in all reality, there is no reason
     that the concentration would stop at the factor of 1,000.
               DR. WYMER:  Yes, that was my point.
               MR. BARKATT:  And we'll try to do something about
     that, which we'll talk about in a moment.
               Okay.  With acidified solution in the presence of
     lead, we see the cracking occurs at first in the
     transgranular mode.  It may even start as pitting, going
     transgranular, and then follows and intergranular mode as
     the stress is relieved as a result of the cracking.
               We see numerous secondary cracks, mostly
     intergranular.  The corrosion part of deposition is
     observed.  Pitting may proceed with transgranular cracking
     and a large amount of lead concentrates at the crack
     surface.
               EDX results show between six and 11 percent
     concentration of lead on the surface of the C-22.
               DR. WYMER:  Would you repeat that?  I'm sorry.
               MR. BARKATT:  The EDX measurements show that
     between six and 11 percent lead on the surface of the C-22
     after it's been removed and washed.
               DR. WYMER:  Percent with respect to?
               MR. BARKATT:  In EDX, you get the top few microns
     of the sample.
               DR. WYMER:  So it's that percent with respect to
     the alloy.
               MR. BARKATT:  With respect to the composition of
     the surface, that's the composition of the surface.
               MR. GORMAN:  It would be with respect to sort of
     the average penetration depth of the --
               MR. BARKATT:  Of the EDX, which is a few microns,
     five microns.  The top five microns of the surface, and
     somebody may want to correct me, to two microns.
               DR. WYMER:  Okay.
               DR. STEINDLER:  But it's uniform across that
     surface.
               MR. BARKATT:  Again, it's not uniform.  It varies
     between five or six percent and 11-12 percent, but it's high
     in all cases because we measured in a few spots, yes.  I
     think we had three or four independent measurements.
               DR. STEINDLER:  These samples were used as cut.
               MR. BARKATT:  These samples were used as cut,
     after washing, yes.  They were removed, thoroughly washed,
     and then cut.  Yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  And the cutting was done with a
     cutting fluid?
               MR. BARKATT:  The cutting -- no, no, no, no, no.
     That was the experiment -- I'm trying to recall.  I think --
               DR. SHEWMON:  If you look at the back of the
     sample, it looked like a hacksaw.  I mean, the fracture
     surface wasn't damaged, but it was made small enough to put
     in these EDX machines, with a saw.
               MR. GORMAN:  I seem to recall she talked about
     dry-cutting.  I don't know.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Keep going.
               MR. BARKATT:  Do you remember if she used cutting
     fluid or not?
               MS. PULVIRENTI:  April Pulvirenti, Catholic
     University.  Even if she used a hacksaw, she wouldn't be
     cutting on the surface that was cracked.  The cracked part
     was already open.  She wouldn't have cut that, and I thought
     the SEMs were on the crack surface, the inner surface of
     that.
               MR. GORMAN:  Yes, they were on the crack surface.
               MR. BARKATT:  Okay.  The disks.  In the case of
     these disks, what we saw in the case of the disks was strong
     pitting on the surface of the specimens that were exposed to
     lead.  We saw extensive deposition of corrosion products.
               A very large amount of lead concentrated on the
     pitted surface.  And now I think that I caught myself with a
     major boo-boo.  The 11 to 12 percent we observed on -- no.
     Okay.  Take it back, and I'm sorry about this.
               On the crack surfaces of the U-bends, what we saw
     was five to six percent of lead accumulation.  On the disks
     which were exposed at 160 degrees, we observed up to 11 or
     12 percent of lead, again, in the top few microns of the
     disk.  Again, in this case, no cutting at all was done, just
     washed them and we did run the analysis.
               And ongoing tests indicate that in the case of
     these disks, to mercury pitting, and, again, I would like to
     emphasize that in the case of these unstressed disks, we did
     run blanks.  The blanks did not show any evidence of
     corrosion at all under microscopic examination.
               DR. WYMER:  What was the lead chemical species on
     the surface?
               MR. BARKATT:  Acetate.  Yes, we introduced it as
     acetate.
               DR. SHEWMON:  When you do your EDX analysis,
     you're washing, as you phrase it, and it takes off the salts
     and what you're analyzing is lead deposited on the fracture
     surface.
               MR. BARKATT:  Yes.  All in the case of the disks,
     the surface of the disk.
               DR. STEINDLER:  How do you know it was acetate?
               MR. BARKATT:  What we added was acetate.  That's
     how we put it in.
               DR. WYMER:  That's what I was after.
               MR. BARKATT:  What was it after?  We don't know.
               DR. SHEWMON:  But on the surface, there was
     metallic lead.
               MR. GORMAN:  You get a lead signal from the EDX,
     but you don't know --
               MR. BARKATT:  The EDX cannot tell you which
     species it is.
               DR. WYMER:  That was my question.
               MR. BARKATT:  So the main findings on the
     unstressed disks, the acid pH, pH room temperature of 2.5,
     both lead and mercury caused extensive dissolution of the
     C-22 ingredients.
               In the pH 13 samples without acidification,
     mercury, and here I would have to modify, I shouldn't say
     but not lead, but I should say much more than lead, because
     lead, again, may have a moderate enhancement of corrosion,
     caused a moderately significant dissolution of chromium and
     molybdenum.
               IN general, the surface characterization and wet
     analysis both agreed with respect to specifically lead
     concentrating on the surface of the exposed surfaces.
               Now, we tried to follow up --
               DR. WYMER:  If lead was on there as lead acetate,
     it's hard to think of a mechanism that would cause
     preferential precipitation on the surface, which gets back
     to the significance of what actually was the lead species on
     the surface.
               It seems to me that's fairly important.
               MR. BARKATT:  Let me try to address it in the
     following --
               DR. WYMER:  Okay.  Please.
               MR. BARKATT:  So the question is really whether,
     if lead and mercury are present in the repository water,
     they could have, in fact, and all we are saying at this
     point is that that possibility needs to be explored.  But
     coming back to the specific question of what happens to the
     lead when C-22 is present, we are concerned that just
     looking at concentrations by themselves may not be
     sufficient, because if there is lead in solids surrounding
     the C-22 containers and water gets into the system, the
     concentration in this water may be very, very low, maybe
     very, very low, but this water still can communicate with
     other solids in the repository environment.
               In that case, our concern is whether it's only the
     concentration which is important or the total quantity of
     lead that is available, that is around, and may end up in
     full migration with the water acting as an intermediary,
     interacting with the C-22 surface.
               The question is whether C-22 actually absorbs,
     reactors, we are not sure of all of the mechanisms at this
     point of time, with lead and other aggressive species.
               Of course, we have indications, as you heard in
     the previous talk with Dr. Morgenstein, that lead is present
     in solids, in natural solids in the repository environment,
     and even more lead may be introduced as a result of human
     operations, construction and operation of the repository, as
     components of various metals that would be present during
     these operations.
               Now, if we are dealing with water that contains
     lead and the only important effect is concentration, it
     means that only the lead present very close to the surface
     will interact with the C-22 and the rest will remain in the
     solution and eventually find its way out without ever
     interacting with the C-22 surface.
               If, in the other hand, we have a mechanism that
     provides for adsorption or chemical reaction between that
     lead in the water and the C-22, causing the lead to be
     scavenged by the C-22, then we may need to consider a much
     broader availability of lead because as lead concentrated on
     the C-22 surface, it may be replenished from other available
     solid sources in the environment.
               And so what we tried to do in these experiments
     going on right now, these are experiments in progress,
     again, we are using those disks, again, the J-13 water at
     temperature of 160 degrees, we are looking at a variety of
     pH.  Again, we are limited -- our experiments so far have
     been limited to ten to 14 days.
               We are looking at various levels of lead
     introduced into the system and we are measuring the lead in
     the original solution and in the solution after contact with
     the C-22, to verify the fate of the lead.
               We are also starting to do acid etching on the
     C-22 surface of the disks after they have been removed from
     the solution and in one case, we have what looks like an
     initial rough materials balance with respect to the lead.
               Again, these results are very, very, very recent.
               DR. WYMER:  What acid?
               MR. BARKATT:  Dr. Pulvirenti?
               MS. PULVIRENTI:  This is April.  These were nitric
     acid.
               DR. WYMER:  Thank you.
               MS. PULVIRENTI:  At pH of 2.5.
               MR. BARKATT:  So we have a table here, we have one
     more data point which hasn't even found its way into the
     table yet, but I will give it to you orally.
               What you see here is that we start with lead
     concentrations ranging between 35 to 125 to 275 PPM before
     contact with the C-22, and after contact with the C-22, we
     end up with five or one or 14.  In other words, we have
     somewhere between about 87 and 95 percent removal of the
     lead from the solution onto these C-22 disks.
               Now, the extra data point, because lead
     concentrations may be very low, is at one and a half PPM, I
     think, to be exact, 1.4 PPM, initial lead, we ended up with
     0.03 PPM of lead in the solution after removal, so that's,
     again, about 98 percent removal.
               And in this case, we had an acid etch and the acid
     etch did account -- again, we had a rough materials balance,
     but it did look as if the lead coming off the surface of the
     C-22 in the acid etch accounted for most of the difference
     between the initial solution and the final solution.
               DR. WYMER:  Did you analyze the solution for any
     of the constituents of the alloy?
               MR. BARKATT:  The solution has been analyzed for
     constituents of the alloy, as well.
               DR. WYMER:  Did you look for a relationship
     between the amount of lead deposited and the amount of alloy
     dissolved?
               MR. BARKATT:  These are ongoing experiments.
               MS. PULVIRENTI:  Do you mean the initial and final
     of chromium and molybdenum?  We have that.  As yet, we don't
     have a materials balance.  We have numbers, but I don't
     believe that they're accurate, because in addition to these
     results, we also see some chromium oxide type deposits.
               So the numbers would be less than what we would
     expect if any of those alloys originally dissolved from the
     disk would be trapped within those deposits.
     DR. WYMER:  I was looking for sort of a stochimetric
     equivalence between the amount of lead deposited and the
     amount of alloy dissolved.
               MS. PULVIRENTI:  We didn't see it.  Now, we saw --
     in all cases, we did see quite a high -- yes, I would say
     quite a high concentration in inventory of dissolution of
     chromium, molybdenum and nickel, but we didn't quite see --
     we didn't see a nice linear increase as a function of
     initial lead concentration.
               DR. SHEWMON:  This was done at room temperature?
               MR. BARKATT:  No.
               MS. PULVIRENTI:  This was done at 160 degrees
     Celsius.
               MR. BARKATT:  All these experiments are at 160
     degrees.  Again, in response to a comment that was made
     earlier, we are not looking only at aqueous environments.
     We have an ongoing experiment with wet pate, as well, where
     we went to the concentration limit.
               MS. PULVIRENTI:  We have that.  Do you want to see
     it?  No.  Okay.
               MR. BARKATT:  Do you want to talk about that?  I
     mean, it's really preliminary.  These are experiments which
     have come out in the last two or three days and we really
     need more time.
               This is about time for a break.  So I think we'll
     go, while this is still fresh on our minds, I'll ask for
     questions, additional questions from anybody.
               MR. AHN:  Tae Ahn of NRC Staff.  In actual
     scenario analysis, they considered drinking water rather
     than static water.  That's my question, have you considered
     adsorption under the dripping water conditions?  That's one
     question.
               The second one, again, DOE, in the EDX design,
     included drip shield that preclude dripping water.  Can you
     comment on that?
               MR. BARKATT:  Again, we apologize for the
     preliminary nature of the experiments at this point.  These
     experiments under dynamic conditions are certainly being
     planned and Dr. Staehle may address that.
               But at the present time, again, we tried to answer
     a question more qualitatively.
               MR. CRAGNOLINO:  I have a general question.  My
     name is Gustauvo Cragnolino, Center for Nuclear Waste
     Regulatory Analysis.
               I notice that most of the tests tend to be done at
     low pH or at high pH.  Do you plan to do sensing in the pH
     in which, for instance, species like carbonate, many people
     agree completely with what was said before, that J-13 cannot
     be, by any means, representative of the water that comes
     into contact with the waste package.
               However, the main anions are there.  If you go
     very acidic pH, you're removing the C02 from the system.
     That means that you don't have this species that is very
     important in controlling the precipitating process.  And if
     you go to alkaline, you end up with species like this.
               I think my question is, do you have plans to do
     the study of these type of impurities in the intermediate pH
     range?
               MR. BARKATT:  Experiments in the intermediate pH
     range are going on right now, in progress, and we plan to do
     many more.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Gustauvo, the data for alloy-600,
     just as a possible paradigm here, shows that cracking occurs
     readily at about a PPM to ten in neutral solutions, just
     absolutely pure water, with lead oxide.  So the pH is a
     non-issue here, the first approximation.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Does that include carbonate
     species?
               MR. STAEHLE:  No.  This is just pure water with
     lead oxide.
               DR. SHEWMON:  As you know, the stress corrosion
     cracking of these nickel-based alloys has been aggravated by
     the chloride, and it just dawned on me, the only one of your
     tests that has a very high chloride concentration is the one
     where you found stress corrosion cracking, is that right?
               You added HCL to this stuff to get the pH down to
     .5.
               MR. GORMAN:  But there were a couple other tests
     with the same HCL, but other additives where we didn't get
     cracking.
               DR. SHEWMON:  But they weren't at .5?
               MR. GORMAN:  Yes, they were at .5.  I think there
     were three different tests at -- two tests at .5 and one --
     I guess it was the W15 did not crack, while 15 did crack.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Fine.  Thank you.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Just a comment.  If your lead
     absorption proposal holds water, then you should be able to
     soak up essentially all the lead in the solution if you dip
     some lead into it.  Does that make sense?
               MR. BARKATT:  What we know, and I think Dr. Gorman
     might be able to comment on this much better than I do, but
     if we take a look at industry experience, then concentration
     of lead on crack surfaces is a well known phenomenon.  It
     eventually should be able to remove all lead from the water
     phase.
               MR. GORMAN:  Just to cite an example, which I
     happen to have been working on recently for once-through
     steam generators.  The lead in the feedwater, it's very
     difficult to measure at low levels, but it's estimated with
     reasonable reliability at being ten PPT in the feedwater
     coming into the bottom of the steam generator.
               Up in the upper part of the steam generator, where
     it's boiled dry and the super-heated region, recent tests
     with sensitive XPS methods and with ATM methods have shown
     that lead in the percent levels of three, four, five percent
     is detected under the oxide layer on the tube surfaces and
     in crack faces.
               So this coming in at ten PPT, it's the Inconel-600
     in this case, is able to absorb and concentrate lead on
     surfaces and it appears to be having -- it's thought to have
     an effect on the cracking that's being experienced in this
     upper bundle region of these generators.
               So that's -- and fairly often, in other steam
     generators, recirculating steam generators, we find lead on
     crack surfaces, even though the lead in the feedwater is
     typically -- and in the blow-down water is thought to be in
     the ten to 30 PPT range.
               You find it in the percent range on fracture
     surfaces.
               DR. WYMER:  We do have one ACNW -- oh, I'm sorry.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  I just wanted to reiterate the
     fact that we believe that there is a general lead
     concentration in the vadose water coming from the
     dissolution of surface aerosol material and although we
     could not, at this point in time, give you what the
     concentrations are, we believe that you could get as much as
     between three and five PPM solid product from waters in the
     vadose.
               And if that is a general background number out
     there of some, say, one PPB or .1 PPB, and we do have a
     surface sorption characteristic for C-22, this is a fairly
     serious situation.
               DR. WYMER:  Well, we do have perhaps one ACNW
     staff member on the telephone.  He's home ailing with a
     strained back.  Andy, are you there?  Andy's laying down.
               MR. CAMPBELL:  Can you hear me?
               DR. WYMER:  Yes, we can hear you.  Do you have any
     questions, Andy, or anything you want to add?
               MR. CAMPBELL:  I guess that the real issue, in my
     mind, is I'd be surprised if any natural water or even
     static water of any sort did not have lead in it at some
     level.  What that level is, as was pointed out, an open
     question for things like the vadose zone water, and in the
     experiments that DOE and other people have done, it hasn't
     been measured, but there may be lead concentrations in those
     waters of some unknown amount and whether or not they're
     relevant, without those measurements, it's hard to say.
               But the other issue, in my mind, is the speciation
     of the lead under the various conditions and what is the
     important lead species that, if there is a relationship to
     this stress corrosion cracking, what is it.
               And then if you know what that speciation of lead
     is in the water, you do you get this cracking, then are you
     going to get some sort of intersection of conditions you
     might expect in the Yucca Mountain repository environment
     with the kinds of experiments done in systems where this has
     occurred, and anybody can answer that, if they want.
               DR. WYMER:  Or address it.
               MR. GORMAN:  Can I make one comment on it?  With
     regard to autoclave testing of lead and its effect on
     alloy-600, tests have been done with lead metal, lead
     sulfide, lead chloride and lead oxide, and all have been
     approximately as aggressive.
               It hasn't been -- the additive species to the
     autoclave has not had any significant effect on the results.
               So there's no particular speciation as far as for
     600 mil annealed.  Related to that, in pure ACD -- that's
     all volatile treatment water, which would -- at temperature,
     would be essentially near neutral, at 320 Centigrade, 4,000
     hour C-rings at 25 percent of stress, low stress, .1 PPM of
     lead can cause cracking of 600 mil anneal and one PPM, quite
     clearly, but down to about a tenth of the PPM in just pure
     water won't crack it.
               MR. CAMPBELL:  And, again, the question at had is
     depend -- I mean, you can add all kinds of different sources
     of lead, but the question is what is its speciation once
     it's come to some sort of equilibrium in the water where you
     are seeing the cracking, and then are you going to see that
     kind of speciation under various repository types of
     conditions.
               MR. STAEHLE:  One possible answer to that, if
     you're looking, as Jeff pointed out, that whether it's lead
     or PVS or PVO, when those dissolve in water, you end up with
     PV-double-plus.  So essentially, from a speciation point of
     view, you're looking at lead-double-plus and also in that
     range of oxidizing potentials, that's always possible.
     So the options you have is either lead metal, the lead metal
     to lead oxide equilibrium is about the same place as the
     standard hydrogen equilibrium.
               So there is actually some mechanistic question
     about whether you've got lead metal or lead plus two, and
     that's a mechanistic issue that has yet to be resolved.
               So, anyway, I think that maybe partially answers
     the question.
               DR. WYMER:  I think it's a very important
     question.
               DR. STEINDLER:  But I think the chances of you
     ending up with lead-double-plus in the solution that's got a
     tenth of a percent chloride in it is very small.  This 1,000
     X J-13, in a sense, screws up the standard chemistry.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Sure.  But let's start with
     something simple.  This experiment is just one set of
     experiments and if you look at the broad set of data that
     are available for alloy-600, exposed to lead, and start with
     something simple, like PVO, forget the chloride, just PVO
     and water, that's a place to start and that is quite
     sufficient to produce all the cracking you would see here.
     So then if you then expand that -- one of the -- I think the
     implication of the question that you just asked, and I'm
     sorry, I forgot your name, but the implication of the point
     is that, in fact, in operating steam generators, you
     sometimes see a lot of lead in deposits and you don't see
     any cracking.
               Wait a minute.  Why is that?  Well, probably
     what's happening is, in fact, the lead is reacting to form
     some -- more in soluble compound.  You just lower the
     activity of the lead.
               So there is an issue here about equilibrium with
     other lead activity affecting systems, and I think that's
     certainly relevant to the point you made.
               MR. CAMPBELL:  That is basically the point I'm
     making, is that until you get a handle on the speciation,
     and I will say, at 320 degrees C, under some equilibrium
     vapor pressure, you may very well have -- in fact, you
     almost certainly have different speciation than you would at
     25 or 30 C under atmospheric pressure.
               And you'll get pressure/temperature changes with
     speciation.  So that seems to me to be the key here to
     getting the handle on this, is how is the lead speciation
     changing under these various conditions in terms of
     relevancy to corrosion, stress corrosion cracking in steam
     generators versus conditions in Yucca Mountain.
               Anyhow, yes, that is the point.
               MR. BARKATT:  If I may add one comment.  With
     regard to lead, again, at the present time, we don't have a
     handle on the speciation.  With regard to mercury, recent
     observations showed information of mercury metal, metallic
     mercury, in contact with the C-22 under these conditions.
               DR. WYMER:  I think we probably need to declare a
     break.  The break was scheduled for 15 minutes.  Let's get
     back no later than ten minutes till 11:00, if you will.
               [Recess.]
               DR. WYMER:  It's ten of 11:00.  Let's go ahead and
     get started.  We do have a cutoff time of noon.  So we're
     going to have to move along.
               Let's go ahead and get started, whoever is next
     here.
               MR. GORMAN:  I think I am.  The purpose of this
     next section was we were asked by the State of Nevada just
     to review the history of material selection and material
     problems in nuclear power plants to get some ideas as to
     what sort of problems we ought to stay alert to when looking
     at the engineered barrier system.
               And so I've not tried to be exhaustive.  I've
     picked some of the ones that are most significant to the
     industry and ones which I happen to have worked on, so knew
     the situation pretty thoroughly, without a great deal of
     work.
               And what they show is that despite good intentions
     having been involved in the selection of the materials,
     there have been lots of problems, which has made a nice
     living for me for 40 years, but nevertheless.
               DR. WYMER:  Not 40 certainly.
               MR. GORMAN:  Well, since '59.  So 41.
               DR. WYMER:  You're aging well.
               MR. GORMAN:  No.  Okay.  First example is BWR
     stainless steel cracking, with the -- in piping and
     internals.  Piping was the original one.  Currently, the
     main problem is with the internals, where the stresses are
     lower and the cracking growth rates are lower.
               But people are wrestling with it.  And the main
     causes -- the material was selected because of its good
     general corrosion resistance.
     What seems to have been ignored or not enough attention paid
     to was the effect of sensitization at wells, the effects of
     the oxidizing potentials caused by radialytically produced
     oxidants, and effect of residual stresses and cold work due
     to grinding on accelerating crack initiation.
               By the way, Roger is going to be talking about
     many of these subjects in some more depth in a little bit,
     and so I am going to whip through this so as to not steal
     his time, because we're getting limited on time.
               Inconel-600 or alloy-600 used for steam generator
     tubes has experienced very widespread cracking.  Many of the
     steam generators made with the 600 mil annealed material
     have had to be released, and lots of money and lots of plant
     downtime.
               The reason Inconel was selected was primarily
     because of its good general corrosion resistance and
     resistance to chlorides, because if you remember, back in
     the '50s, there were cases of cracking of the stainless
     steel tubes due to the chlorides and testing showed that the
     higher nickel alloys were resistant to that kind of chloride
     induced stress corrosion cracking.
               What that selection seems to have failed to
     consider was a very large range in susceptibility as a
     function of the processing history and minor compositional
     varies, at least a thousand times in some tests in pure
     water, in primary water environments.
               So very large range in susceptibility as a
     function of rather minor changes, seemingly minor changes in
     how the material was made and its composition differences,
     like trace levels of boron, for example, have a big effect
     on the resistance to caustics.
               The effects of low potentials, cold work and
     residual stresses on primary water stress corrosion
     cracking, on the other hand, the effects of oxidizing
     potentials and the concentration of impurities under boiling
     conditions, which can lead to high or low pH and to
     aggressive -- high conductivity solutions and can
     concentrate aggressive species, such as lead, to
     intergranular attack and secondary and stress corrosion
     cracking from the secondary side, which is the current main
     biggest problem in the still operating steam generators,
     with 600 mill anneal.
               And as I already mentioned, the effect of minor
     elements in the metal, particularly boron, its resistance to
     stress corrosion.
               Most of these high strength materials or at least
     some of the high strength materials, I think X750 and A286,
     both precipitation hardening austenitic alloys, this one
     being nickel-based, this one being steel -- iron-based, were
     selected primarily for their high strength and were from
     aerospace applications.
               There have been a lot of failures of those two
     and, also, 17-4 pH and martensitic stainless steels, with
     lots of bolting having been replaced, expensive repairs in
     reactor internals and the like.
               They were selected based on their general good --
     their good corrosion resistance in terms of general
     corrosion resistance, but sufficient attention wasn't paid
     to the possibility of stress corrosion cracking in long-term
     exposure in reactor environments for material that was
     actually in the actual heat-treated condition.
               Again, effects of local residual stresses in cold
     work were commonly not given enough attention and in the
     case of particularly 17-4, the effects of time at
     temperature on its embrittlement and susceptibility to SEC
     wasn't taken into account.
               It's now pretty well shown that at over 500 F, the
     17-4 in a long period of time, after several years, will
     start to degrade, and that wasn't recognized back in the
     early days.
               And then a big point on particularly the 17-4 and
     the martensitic stainless steels, you can meet specified
     mechanical properties, the kind of things you see on your
     mill cert, but have very poor stress corrosion cracking
     resistance as a result of thermal mechanical heat
     treatments, not following the prescribed sequence.
               So there was the need for much tighter quality
     control in the fabrication to make sure that the materials
     actually saw the times and temperatures specified.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Before you change that, was most of
     this in PWRs with the hydrogen over-pressure or was it also
     in BWRs?
               MR. GORMAN:  On the X750, it's more a -- well,
     it's both BWR and PWR.  Both, both.  I mean, like the BWR
     jet pump beams and in the core bolting at shoes, for
     example, of the PWR, so it's both.  The A286 is all PWR.
     The 17-4 pH is a mix of both and martensitic is a mix of
     both.  A286 was early identified as being a problem with the
     oxidizing environment in BWRs and wasn't much used.
     Ziracalloy cladding, chosen for its good corrosion
     resistance and its low neutron cross-section.  The main
     thing that wasn't identified was its susceptibility to
     stress corrosion due to fission products such as iodine and
     cesium and when stressed, after the clad creeps down and
     then you get pellet-clad interaction, leading to the stress
     corrosion.  So that's been a big problem over the last 20
     years or so with zircalloy clad fuel.
               Sort of trying to summarize, what lessons should
     we learn with regard to thinking about choice of alloys for
     difficult applications.  You got to have a full range of
     realistic crevice environments and with all of the
     parameters, the potential, the pH, and aggressive species.
               You have to have the full range of realistic
     material conditions and compositions, including things like
     welding and stress relief operations and local surface
     damage is often a big effect.
               So realistic range of total stresses, especially
     including residual stresses and from things like surface
     damage or from fabrication operations.
               You've got to test for long times in realistic
     environments, with accelerated methods, and then work
     towards ever more realistic, but longer term tests to try
     and predict to the total service conditions that you're
     trying to protect against, the long times at lower, less
     aggressive conditions.
               I had mentioned this, the aggravating effects of
     the fabrication details and surface damage, and I guess you
     can't over-emphasize that, because lots and lots of cracks.
     On steam generator tubes, for example, many times, the
     cracks are at surface scratches made during tube insertion.
               And long-term material aging has to be considered,
     because material properties can change with time.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Would you agree that the results
     that we've heard so far do not include attention to some of
     these parameters that you were talking about here?
               MR. GORMAN:  Yes.  That's the next slide.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Oh, sorry.  The main lesson is
     you've got to consider all of those factors.  You can't
     afford to neglect any of them, and some of them may not have
     been -- we're being very cautious.  I'd say clearly have not
     been, but for written things, we'll say may not have been
     suitably addressed.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Could you tell us where the C-22
     alloy has been tested out, where it was developed for what
     kind of service?
               MR. GORMAN:  I'll let Roger address that.  Roger,
     development of C-22, what kind of service?  I think it was
     for acid chemical service, primarily.  But I haven't studied
     that in great depth.  Go ahead.
               MR. MARKS:  Basically, when you look at the alloy
     chemistry, with the molybdenum and tungsten and chromium,
     it's basically an acid service alloy and it's basically not
     developed for neutral or alkaline environments.
               I'm going to talk about that in some detail in a
     minute.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Fine.
               DR. HINZE:  When you talk about long-term tests,
     give me an idea of what you're talking about.
               MR. GORMAN:  I think we can start getting a feel
     for it in tests within about two years.  But I think for a
     10,000 year application, getting to tests that can last five
     or ten years is not unreasonable to try and --
     fundamentally, what you do, let's take just temperature as
     the aggravating factor.
               Probably, you'd also use stress, too, but you do
     tests, first, up at a high temperature where you see some
     effect, and then you reduce the temperature, say, by 50
     degrees C and then see how long it takes, and then you go
     another step temperature lower and you then start getting
     results that you can extrapolate on a log-log plot,
     basically, developing an arrhenious activation energy.
               But since we haven't done the tests at the lower
     temperature, we're not sure how long we're going to have to
     go for any given temperature.
               DR. SHEWMON:  And you also have to bet that the
     mechanism doesn't change fundamentally when you change
     temperature, which this test won't show you.
               MR. GORMAN:  Right, you have to take an estimate
     on that.
               DR. HINZE:  Is there experience with C-22 in terms
     of these long-term tests?
               MR. GORMAN:  Not that I know of.  Talking about
     the status of testing of C-22, we've been through the
     literature to some extent and not as thoroughly as we intend
     to in the next few months, and it looks like they haven't
     addressed trace aggressive impurities, such as the lead
     arsenic, mercury and sulfides on SEC and other modes of
     corrosion, such as the crevice corrosion and pitting.
               They don't seem to have addressed the range of
     water chemistries and concentrations that occur,
     particularly under heated crevices and deposits.  You sort
     of envision -- you have this canister that's going to be at
     pretty high temperature, initially, I think, as high as 200
     C, but up over 120 C, at least, for significant periods of
     time.
               You have some deposit, either rust or tuft or some
     kind of material on it.  You have a drip on it that
     concentrates.  It can go -- it's like a steam generator
     crevice.  It can go from pH of two to pH of 12, depending on
     the mix of species.  So those kinds of conditions haven't
     been tested.
               I think they've started looking at some material
     composition variations, but I haven't seen any systematic
     work on trace deleterious species, such as boron and carbon
     and this sort of thing, and the various conditions that
     might occur as a result of the fabrication route that they
     use.
               So we are intending to start a more extensive and
     systematic test program.  We're going to try and identify
     the mechanisms that we got to pay attention to, pitting,
     crevice corrosion, intergranular attack and stress
     corrosion, and then determine the effect of crevices and
     deposits, the pH, aggressive species concentrations and
     potentials, and the resultant effect of these chemistry
     changes on the corrosion phenomena; in other words, a
     systematic set of tests.
               DR. WYMER:  Let me ask you.  Presumably, in order
     to get at this alloy C-22, you've got to go through the
     titanium drip shield.  Is there any reason to believe that
     you ought to be looking at either of the states of titanium
     on any of these tests?
               MR. GORMAN:  I haven't considered that at this
     stage.  I think Roger has got the task of trying to consider
     the overall thing, so I'll leave it to him to address when
     he gives his talk in just a minute here.
               Let's see.  My last slide is -- so our objective
     is to develop a scientifically based way to predict the
     long-term performance of C-22 using accelerated experiments
     with -- as time goes on -- progressively less accelerated
     conditions and looking at the ability of the C-22 to
     scavenge and concentrate aggressive species, such as the
     lead, as we were talking about, the mercury and others, and
     determine how do you determine -- how do you assess what
     level of aggressive species, is it the total quantity in the
     inventory in the world around the container or is it the
     concentration in the water, what is the important parameter.
               We really don't know the answer to that yet.
               So I know turn it over to Roger, unless there are
     questions for me.  No questions.
               DR. WYMER:  Well, now, let's not be too fast here.
               MR. GORMAN:  Roger, are you going to be standing?
     Then you will want this.
               DR. WYMER:  An awful lot of questions got shoved
     down to your end of the table, Roger.  We're going to see
     here.
               MR. MARKS:  You know what they say about what
     rolls downhill.  Some years ago, I think in 1992, I was on
     the same program with a friend of mine, Bob Way, who some of
     you know, at Lehigh, a very fine guy, and he at -- we were
     at the point where we were talking about predicting things
     and he was saying, well, you just absolutely can't make a
     prediction until you understand absolutely the atomistics of
     the problem.
               And later, after his talk, I said, Bob, not in
     your lifetime or your children's lifetime or their lifetime
     will you know the atomistics of the problem, and so you have
     to deal with kind of what's in front of you in the best you
     can do doing intelligent experiments.
               And we're kind of in that framework, where there's
     a lot of things we'd like to know, but maybe we have to use
     a lot of judgment here and a lot of analogies.
               Now, just to point out where we're all at here,
     this is not -- this is out of the DOE report, we're
     basically talking about this container wall here and the
     C-22 is on the outside surface, fuel is on the inside
     surface, the titanium drip shield is on the outside.
               So for those of you who need some refresher,
     that's essentially the framework that this discussion is in.
               Now, I have some number of slides and they're all
     in my pass-out and I'm not going to talk about all of them,
     because I know that, first of all, you all read very well
     and some of these things don't need to be said particularly,
     and I'm going to start with this idea about maybe we could
     learn something from history.
               For those of you who are unfamiliar with this
     technology, this is a steam generator in a pressurized water
     reactor.  The hot water comes in the bottom, in the bottom
     plenum, goes through a tube, exits through and goes back to
     the reactor to be heated.  The inlet temperature is around
     320 to 330 Centigrade, the outlet temperature is around 395
     or so.
               Steam exits here around 290 Centigrade.  Now, the
     reason this is a useful set of ideas for discussion is that
     we're going to be interested particularly in the crevices
     between this Inconel or alloy-600 tube and these tube
     supports.
               And we're a little bit more interested in this
     joint here, because the -- it's an analogy for concentrating
     surfaces.  It's also an analogy for a surface which is not
     otherwise stressed, except for fabricating stresses.  And
     there is an issue here about -- the question was raised,
     well, what's the stress and what's the relevance of a
     U-bend.
               What I want to point out is that the as-fabricated
     tubes, as I will show you shortly, cracked just fine as
     fabricated, as mill annealed.  So we don't really need to
     have an enormous set of stresses to make cracking occur.
     So this particular joint is relevant for two reasons.  One
     is the concentration that occurs under heat transfer
     conditions and the second is the fact that the tube is not
     seriously stressed, except for an internal pressure, which
     is about net 1,000 PSI, and there's a little bit of thermal
     stress, there's a drop of about ten degrees Centigrade
     across the wall.
               That's not as much as the drop across the waste
     package container, but anyway, so it's not a bad analogy and
     so we can learn something from this and I would like to lean
     a little bit on that as a basis for my discussion.
               Now, in the beginning, I mean, in the beginning
     was different times for all of us. My beginning was about
     1957, when I first joined the Naval Nuclear Program and I
     have been thinking about reactors ever since.
               Let me compare something.  I'm going to compare
     the steam generator with the waste package and, for example,
     there are four areas where there are interesting
     comparisons.
               One is the appearance of an adequate test
     environment.  In the early days of the steam generators, it
     was thought that a fossil water chemistry of in excess of
     100 parts per million was an okay water chemistry.  Today,
     just for sake of comparison, the EPRI standard is around ten
     parts per billion.
               It was thought that the alloy-600 was an immune
     alloy and for those of us who worked for Rickover many years
     ago, it was said that actually God himself created this
     alloy and God himself was, of course, Rickover.
               If you don't believe that, you should have worked
     for him.  Anyway, and here we have C-22, which is, again, to
     quote DOE, is a corrosion-resistant alloy.  And the third
     area of comparison is the heat through crevices,
     concentrating impurities, as I mentioned, and here is the
     heat through the surface, this surface also capable of
     concentrating impurities.
               In this case, the early design objective was a
     40-year life based on fatigue.  Here, it's a 10,000 year
     life based on what I'll tell you later is basically a BWR
     stress corrosion model.
               So that's a little bit of analogy about the reason
     there is a reasonable comparison here from which we can draw
     some understandings.
               Now, just to make the point here, this happens to
     be capacity loss in BWRs, capacity loss in PWRs, and the
     point is virtually all this capacity loss was due to
     corrosion.
               So despite the fact that there's some wonderful
     engineers working on this, the fact is that we still had
     lots of problems.
               Now, in terms of the idea, essentially the analogy
     for prediction, again, in the DOE prediction discussions,
     they're talking what essentially is about a predictive model
     that comes out of the BWR technology, where we're talking
     about oxygenated water exposed to weld, whereas in the PWR
     analogy, we're looking at the condition where we concentrate
     impurities and I have the residual stresses on this side,
     which is, I believe, are much more analogous and useful idea
     than the BWR example.
               Now, I'm going to use a framework for my
     discussion which I call the corrosion-based design approach.
     It's a general way of approaching a design problem from a
     corrosion point of view.
               I'm not going to belabor it, just except to say
     that I'm going to emphasize the discussion on environmental
     definition, material definition, mode definition,
     super-position.  I won't talk about the failure definition
     or statistical framework and a little bit about prediction.
               Now, when we think about designing environments
     that are relevant, the environment that's relevant here is
     the environment on the surface of the metal.  It's not the
     environment out someplace.  It's what actually ends up on
     the surface of the metal.
               So that's where our focus has to be.  The next
     point in defining environment is the heated surface produces
     a totally different environment than an isothermal surface.
               And the third point I want to make is -- this is
     for those of you who are geologically inclined -- it may be
     an overstatement, but the entire -- from the point of view
     of thinking about chemistry on surfaces, you've got to start
     with the bounding condition that the entire surface and the
     mountain is relevant to the heated surface.
               I realize that sounds like a stretch, but you have
     only to look at what I'm going to show you in a minute about
     what ends up in the crevices of steam generators.
               You think, well, this is really pure water.  I
     will show you in a minute what ends up in these crevices.
               It's like the thiosulfate in TMI-3.  How could
     this thiosulfate ever get into the steam generator and
     produce all those cracks?  Well, it did and it wasn't
     supposed to.  It's like the sea water leakage at Millstone.
     It wasn't supposed to get in, but it did.  It's like the
     sodium that cracked some of the LFBMR technology.  It was
     supposed not to get outside, but it did.
     So while this is clearly a hand-waving argument, I think we
     have to be sensitive to the idea that when something is an
     environment of some impurities, things do have a way of
     getting there somehow.  And so while it's logically a little
     bit hard to argue with, it is nonetheless something you've
     got to start with.
               Now, the other problem we have, of course, is no
     feedback control here on environmental contamination.
     There's no conductivity meters, there's no local chemical
     analysis.  So we have a problem that we don't have in other
     technologies.
               Then, of course, the thermal gradients in the
     Yucca Mountain site produce flows we hadn't expected and
     another aspect of the environment is that the highest
     concentrations, like chloride, which is the dominating idea
     in the DOE work, are not always the most aggressive
     conditions.
               I mean, it would seem like chloride is always the
     most aggressive thing.  Wrong.  Chloride is not always the
     most aggressive environment.
               And then we do have to think about environments in
     not only molecular chemistry, but the stress and
     temperature, I'll touch on that shortly, and then there is
     also a slightly heated surface on the drip shield.  It's not
     quite as severe.
               I have a picture showing something about
     thiosulfate I'm going to pass over, you can look at that,
     and let me now emphasize this or push this analogy a little
     bit.
               What my hypothesis is here, which I think is a
     reasonable hypothesis, is that the surface of the drip
     shield is, first of all, going to be hot.  We know something
     about the temperatures, we can calculate those.
               And furthermore, that on the surface of this drip
     shield, there's going to be dust, which will form
     eventually, it will build up, and this will interact with
     the chemistry that's around and eventually we will build a
     deposit on the surface and this deposit now will begin to
     change the nature of the thermal condition at the interface
     and will be -- will approach the analogy of this crevice.
               Now, to give you some idea about what happens to a
     concentrated crevice, just to give you some reality about
     what is actually observed in a steam generator, this is a
     pulled tube from Beaver Valley and it shows you something
     about the kinds, the extent of the cracking in a
     concentrating environment.
               Now, the detail what the chemistry, the causative
     chemistry has a range that I will discuss shortly, but there
     is a reality in the cracking that does occur that you should
     appreciate.
               Now, the next idea, again, I want to emphasize or
     take further is the idea that in the beginning, from the
     point of view of thinking about performance, you really do
     have to think about the available elements.
               And so far as I can tell, from Maury Morgenstein's
     work and others, including DOE's, that this is the set of
     species in some form that has to be considered, not just
     lead.  We're talking about a lot of other species.  And that
     this somehow can find its way to a heated surface.
               Again, I realize this is an argument, it's a
     hypothesis, but it's a bounding condition that we've got to
     start with.
               Now, to look at this in a little bit more detail,
     I think an approach to thinking about this surface is that
     first of all, we have dust deposits.  These deposits will
     probably harden under the reaction of chemicals.
               The surface is going to be hot.  This hot surface
     will become hotter because of the thermal resistance.
               These chemicals are maybe available, and then in
     this kind of a structure, we're going to also form sets of
     cells which will have alternately hydrolysis and
     alkalization effects, and how that will play out isn't
     actually all that clear to me.
               So that's sort of a place to start thinking about
     a structural mechanistic picture.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Roger, do you have any guess as
     to the time scale for the evolution of this dust layer?
               MR. STAEHLE:  Well, no, I don't.  I mean, I think
     that, again, we're not talking about a 40-year nuclear
     plant; we're talking about longer times.
               And I think the question of dust buildup deposits,
     I think once you've been to Chion and seen the dust that
     built up on the soldiers, these things happen, you know, and
     those of you who are in the rock business probably know that
     story better than I do.
               DR. SHEWMON:  But the heat does decay, and that's
     over decades to 100 years.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Yes, so, if we're looking, say, at a
     hundred years, we still have a big thermal resistance here.
               I mean, this is not going to go away quite that
     quickly.  If you look at the DOE -- the
     temperature-dependent concentration, they show a peak that's
     over 100 years from now.
               But I think the problem here is that what -- my
     sort of perspective for a model needs some quantification to
     it, and that's something that I'm not here to talk about,
     but I will eventually.
               But I'm portraying something which I think is a
     reasonable hypothesis for a model which has, I think --
     obviously needs some work on it, including Paul's thermal
     thought.
               Now, let me show you sort of the general panorama
     of a crevice in this heat transfer condition in the steam
     generator.  What you've got is a hot -- this is 320, 325
     Centigrade.  Out here it's about 290.
               This is the tube wall, this is the tube support.
     And what you've got in here is, you've got a two-phase water
     steam system; you've got capillarity effects; you've got
     deposits; you've got corrosion of this side occurring.
               And these species are all available, and then
     you've got gradients in the system.  You've got
     electrochemical potential gradients, temperature gradients,
     concentration gradients, fluid density gradients, that do
     things that are certainly analyzable, but a little bit
     complex.
               Now, this is a real crevice.  This is from a paper
     by Combrade, et al, in 1995.  This happens to be a -- this
     vertical is a thickness dimension.
               This is the location where the tube support is,
     and this is outside the tube support.  So this tells you the
     thickness of the deposit, 100 microns for the outside
     deposit.
               And simply having thought the water was a fairly
     pure water, having quite an array of compounds including
     calcium, silicon, or course, iron makes sense, molybdenum,
     aluminum, and then farther down inside, looking at arsenic,
     antimony, barium, believe it or not, and then some organic
     species that will form, presumably because of the carbon
     present and the temperature.  You may get organic species of
     various kinds, and also the hydrazine gives you some
     nitrogen.
               So, you know, in these heat transfer crevices, a
     lot goes on.  And this isn't to say it's perfectly
     analogous, but it is to say that this kind of complexity
     needs to be considered.
               Now, I won't cover the stress issue.  The stress
     issue, at least to me, is pretty self-evident; that in the
     mill-annealed surface of the tube in the steam generators,
     the cracking occurs just fine.
               That rate of cracks I showed were from something
     that was not a U-bend.  It was mill-annealed surfaces.
               So, to me, you really get -- and the stress,
     contrary to the DOE thought, is not just at the welds.  The
     stress is over the whole surface.  When you make a metal
     surface, you've got to grind it, you've got to bend it,
     you've got to do things to it.
               And that surface will be stressed unless you
     figure out a way to globally heat treat it, and when you
     globally heat treat it, you change the metallurgy and you
     make a bigger problem.
               Now, so I'm going to take the next step and talk
     about material deformation.  What I've just done is sort of
     painted a picture of what I call environmental deformation.
     It clearly has some argument to it, but that's a picture.
               Now, let's talk about defining the material.  Paul
     asked a little bit about this during the previous
     discussion.  I'm going to hopefully answer some of those
     questions, maybe.
               But the essence of C-22 is that it's prone to be
     less stable and neutral to alkaline environments.  The
     alloying additions are basically additions that are used for
     acid resistance.
               The second point is that for lack of data, C-22 is
     a lot like 600 or a cross between Alloy-600 and 690.  I
     think these data are applicable to a first order, not
     perfectly, but I think that what's available in 600 needs to
     be considered.
               Third is that there is a very broad range of
     effects of metallurgical structure on Alloy-600.  We're not
     talking about a metallurgical monolith in terms of
     composition.
               This has all the variability that occurs and
     structure property relationships.  I'll illustrate those a
     little bit.
               If we move to global stress relief, we're going to
     change the structure and the proneness to corrosion.  We
     need to pay a lot more attention to grain boundary
     composition.  I won't say much about that at the moment, but
     I think it's pretty obvious.
               As far as I know, there is no prototype that's
     been fabricated that even tells us what this animal looks
     like.  And so to some extent, we are kind of talking about
     something that hasn't been done yet.
               Now, let me give you some metallurgical
     perspective, or a an alloy perspective.  This is the Ternary
     diagram for iron, chromium, nickel.  This is iron, nickel,
     chromium; this is a 400 C isotherm.
               And these are the classic stainless steels, the
     410, the 430, the Type 304 stainless, and at least the
     stable alpha-gamma region; the Alloy-800, 825.
               Now, the alloy we're specifically interested in
     comparing with Alloy-600 has been for years, the standard of
     steam generators, and now the Alloy 690 is the standard of
     steam generators.
               The C-22 Alloy fits about right in here, from the
     point of view of iron, chromium, and nickel, but in
     addition, there is 13 percent molybdenum, some tungsten, and
     cobalt, so that, you know, stretches a little bit the
     comparison, but this is a place to start.
               Now, the molybdenum, tungsten, and cobalt,
     metallurgically will affect the precipitation of carbides in
     the boundaries, and probably minimize the so-called
     sensitization effects that sucks the chromium out of the
     grain boundary area.  Chemically, I'll talk about that in
     just a second.
               So I think there's some argument to be made that
     the large amount of data that are available on Alloy-600 is
     relevant, although may be somewhat imperfect, but it
     certainly is a good place to start.
               Now, here I'm showing the potential pH diagrams
     for the main alloying species in C-22.  The main alloy
     element is nickel, and what I have in these diagrams, this
     lower line is the standard hydrogen equilibrium; this is the
     standard oxygen equilibrium; these are all at room
     temperature.
               And this is the -- this hatching in each case is a
     pure metal.  The other hatching here is the sequence of
     various oxides, depending on the oxidizing potential.
               And you can see that, of course, the big advantage
     of nickel is not so much the fact that you've got passive
     films; it's the high solution potential which slows down the
     reactivity.
               Now, there is some film here.  The film that
     actually shows up on these alloys is not so much a nickel
     oxide but a nickel-chromium oxide, which as a slightly
     broader stability that I'm showing here.
               With 21-percent chromium, the CR-203 stability has
     this range; it gets it acid benefit from the fact that
     phenomenalogically you can extrapolate this CR plus three to
     CR 203 line in this direction, and it seems to preserve a
     metastable stability and gives you acid protection.
               Molybdenum is a largely misunderstood material
     from the point of view of corrosion resistance.  It's sort
     of like, wow, I have molybdenum, therefore, I'm somehow
     great.
               The fact is that molybdenum is absolutely soluble
     in water.  And molybdenum is only useful in the relatively
     acidic environments and in the very acid environments where
     you have a MO3 stability.
               And so molybdenum is not a great addition,
     especially for neutral to alkaline environments.
               Tungsten has a passive range below about pH 3, and
     above that range, tungsten is soluble in water.  And then
     this is the well-known iron diagram which has a fairly broad
     alkaline stability, but unfortunately there's no much of it,
     and chromium or cobalt looks very much like nickel, and
     there's not much of that, either.
               So that's kind of the picture, but the sort of
     thing you come away with the in C-22 Alloy is the material
     is basically a lot like Alloy-600, possibly a little bit
     like 690, with chromium and tungsten, but the chromium and
     tungsten don't help you in neutral solutions.
               So, it's not -- there is some question about it,
     okay.
               Now, we had this -- I had several questions about
     metallurgy.  Let me show you two things quickly:  This plot
     is percent of affected tubes versus heats.
               Now, let me tell you what was done here:  This
     work from Peter Scott at Framatome.  The French,
     fortunately, know for every steam generator, the heat of
     material used in ever tube.
               Now imagine the possibility then of taking each
     tube that's plugged or cracked and relating it to a heat and
     being able to say what fraction of that heat cracked.  So
     you've got 35 tubes made out of heat one, and, you know, 20
     of them crack, then you know that you've got about 65
     percent tubes cracked from that heat.
               So this is now 40 percent up here, so one heat
     cracks a lot, fractionally.  There are 25 or 30 heats here
     in one steam generator.  There are 4,000 tubes in the steam
     generator, so it's reasonable there should be several heats.
               Several other heats crack at the ten, or
     five-percent level, but over half of these heats hardly
     crack at all.
               This tells us something about thinking about alloy
     development; that we need to think about in developing an
     engineering framework, about something about the
     structure/property relationships and the effect on the
     corrosion processes.
               This is the induction time or initiation time for
     cracking in pure water environments, essentially pure water
     environments as a function of grain boundary carbides within
     the specified carbon in the alloy.
               So, for essentially the same carbon, same nominal
     heat treatments, depending on the carbide distribution at
     the boundaries and away from the boundaries, there's an
     enormous difference in the proneness to cracking.
               So this is not to make an argument in too much
     detail, but simply to point out that the structure, as those
     of us who have been in metallurgy a long time know, is a big
     issue.
               Let me say just a word about the Grade 7.  Grade 7
     titanium, for those of you who are unfamiliar with it,
     basically has about two to three-tenths palladium in it.
     Now, why palladium?
               What palladium does, kinetically, is that it
     accelerates the reduction of the water, that is, the water
     at the hydrogen reduction.  That's the so-called exchange
     current electrochemistry, and by doing that, it raises the
     open circuit potential on the surface and keeps it away from
     the low potential range for hydrogen or where titanium has
     its greatest vulnerability.
               But in terms of our interests here, it actually
     hasn't been very well characterized, and I make a couple
     points there.
               Now, let me tell you a little bit about the
     material selection for Alloy-600 as maybe a
     history-repeats-itself kind of story here.
               Alloy-600 was initially selected, based on its
     great nominal corrosion resistance to chlorides, based on a
     boiling magnesium chloride test.  That was the total basis
     for the choice of that material.
               This work was first presented in 1957 by Copson,
     later presented again in 1959 by Copson, and that's the
     total basis for the choice of this material.
               Now, it turns out, as I will show you in a minute,
     that the failures that have occurred have had nothing to do
     with chloride, and not only that, but the basis for using
     chloride as a criterion is just wrong, because this alloy
     cracks just fine in chlorides; it's just never been studied
     very well.
               Now, the Alloy-690, the higher-chromium alloy, was
     again basically selected based on a 1972 work by Flint of
     INCO in the UK, where he showed that this kind of
     composition was nominally resistant to cracking in lead, and
     also was resistant to cracking in oxidizing crevices.  The
     detail is not so important here, but I'll show you how in
     both case those criteria were fallacious.
               These are Copson's data.  This is breaking time
     versus nickel for a 20-percent chromium composition.  The
     point is, above about 50-percent nickel, the cracking stops.
               Now, 42 percent boiling magnesium chloride is a
     fairly aggressive environment.  Anyway, so this is not a --
     but there is something of a fallacy in using some aggressive
     environments, and I think you all know that very well, but
     this is a good example.
               So these were his data which stood some test of
     time for awhile.  In 1981, two EDF people, Berge and Donati,
     published a paper showing, in fact, that Alloy-600 cracks
     just fine at about the same pH with small amounts of
     chloride in a boric acid solution with the same
     transgranular cracking, and later then published about three
     years ago, the full set of data.
               But the fact is that what that shows you is this
     assumption, presumption, is just wrong, and, second, that
     the alloy in service wasn't a chloride problem in the first
     place; it was a problem with alkaline cracking, acidic
     cracking, lead cracking, low potential cracking, and some
     copper problems and so on.
               So, the test that was done to qualify the material
     was largely irrelevant.  With respect to the lead issue in
     qualifying Alloy-690, this is chromium concentration versus
     iron.
               These were exposed to high purity water with a
     lead oxide in the environment.  And this shows a region of
     cracking.
               Alloy-600 is about -- this is 18 percent.
     Alloy-600 is about right in here.  Alloy-690 is up here at
     30 percent of chromium, about 10 percent -- this should be
     over a little bit, incidentally -- and nominally it was in
     the region where lead did not cause cracking.
               However, again, I have a photomicrograph here
     which some of you metallurgically inclined people might
     enjoy.  This shows the effect of an aqueous lead
     environment, the specimen was exposed in the steam phase
     above an environment containing lead oxide in an alkaline
     solution of one molar sodium hydroxide solution.
               And I don't know about you, but this is the worst
     cracking I've ever seen.  And this is purely a lead oxide
     kind of environment.
               The point is that the early work, again, by
     International Nickel on this subject, produced an alloy for
     which it was just an incomplete evaluation of the
     properties.
               So, the qualification of some of these materials,
     even with extensive testing, is something that maybe needs a
     little -- leaves something to be desired.
               Now, the third step in making predictions,
     corrosion-based predictions, is to figure out what the
     framework is for where certain kinds of corrosion occur with
     respect to some reasonable variables.
               And the variable I'm going to use here for this
     discussion, the main framework variables I'm going to use
     are pH and potential.
               Now, rather than going through this, I think I'm
     going to show you the pictures .  You can read this.  One of
     the first very useful frameworks that was developed was
     published from the work of Parkinson and Congleton at the
     University of New Castle.
               This is a potential pH diagram for iron.  This is
     work that was done in a variety of aqueous environments,
     including phosphates and carbonates and nitrates, showing
     that there was a range of cracking, essentially along the
     axis of the FE-304, FE-203 line; that the minimum in
     cracking occurred at the minimum insolubility for the iron
     oxide.
               And then as you moved to more alkaline, you get
     alkaline cracking.
               This line shows that below this line, the alloy
     cracks again in hydrogen environments, and so what you end
     up with is a framework for low alloy steel, which looks
     schematically like this.
               This is the hydrogen line, the oxygen line, and
     these other lines are the main phase ranges for iron
     compounds.  You have a hydrogen region below this value, you
     have an anodic, mildly acidic region here that cracks,
     alkaline region here that cracks.
               Now, this framework that I'm showing you here, the
     results from Parkinson and Congleton's work, actually
     applies in the broad range of iron -nickel-chromium alloys
     with variations which are more or less slight, and I'll show
     you that in a minute.
               So it's possible to dope out the framework.  I
     mean, this is not necessarily magic.  It can be doped out.
               And let me show you now, something that we
     published in 1989 for the occurrence of cracking of
     Alloy-600.  This is, again, the potential pH framework.
     This is a diagram at 300 Centigrade. or calculated at 300
     Centigrade.
               These are the iron lines; these are the nickel,
     plus two, nickel oxide, lines.  Now, what I've shown here by
     the crosshatching are four regions where cracking occurs, no
     unlike what we just saw for the iron.
               You have alkaline cracking, and I'm going to show
     you in a minute, how well defined this actually is.  There
     is acidic cracking, cracking of low potential regions.  This
     used to be called PWSCC, but that meant that it had to be
     occurring in the primary system, which doesn't make any
     sense, and so I've relabeled this as low potential cracking,
     which it really is.
               Then there's a high potential cracking range which
     occurs in BWRs, and this is the thing that has caused the
     cracking in the BWR technology until it was fixed by
     changing the alloys.
               So, this is essentially what the data tells you.
     This is based on real data, where I have actually taken all
     the world data and plotted it and come up with these regions
     where cracking has actually been observed to occur in this
     particular alloy.
               Now, to show you that this is, in fact, based on
     some pretty solid data, let's take, for example, this
     transition here from the cracking region to no cracking
     here.
               We look at these data from Smialowska, and this is
     amount of cracking versus potential, and the change from a
     lot of cracking to no cracking occurs about over 100
     millivolts, just right about the standard hydrogen line
     which also happens to lie at the same place.  This should be
     NOI right here, how that happened.
               Anyway, so, this change from no cracking to
     cracking has been very well defined by a lot of people,
     which is this situation here.
               These boundaries can be defined.  The alkaline
     region, which is this region here, has also been very well
     defined by many investigators.  This happens to be
     Mitsubishi work for Alloy-690 and 600, showing that the
     potential dependence of that region of cracking covers about
     300 millivolts and starts essentially at the D-area of open
     circuit potential.
               So, it is possible then to dope-out the regions of
     a given material where cracking does occur.  And it doesn't
     necessarily have to be all that obscure.
               Now, an interesting test, set of tests was done.
     I mean, can we do this today on some material?  The answer
     is yes.
               This was a set of experiments that was done by
     Mitsubishi and reported in 1994.  Again, this is
     electrochemical potential versus pH.  Actually the reference
     here is a horizontal reference.
               What the did is, they did a bunch of experiments
     and then checked out these regions and so this was a
     coherent set of experiments.
               You get the same result that I got from patching
     together everybody's data.
               Now, what I've show here are what I call the major
     submodes of cracking.  The reasons I call them submodes is
     that the principal mode here is a stress corrosion cracking
     mode, but a submode really is an occurrence which as
     different pH potential, temperature-dependencies.  So each
     of these has different dependencies.  They're still all
     stress corrosion cracking.
               Now, let me show you then some minor submodes
     which are maybe pertinent to this discussion, and I'm going
     to show you a region of this diagram here and look at some
     minority points.
               This is what I call the set of minor submodes
     which occur in Alloy-600 and 690.  Our discussion of lead,
     for example, the data on lead show that cracking due to lead
     mainly is lead oxide added to these environments.
               And, incidentally, there's this question about
     chlorides that's interesting because a lot of this work has
     been done down around the pH-3 range, with chlorides and
     lead.  It cracks just fine.
               So the range of cracking of the lead is a little
     bit difficult to see, because I've got a lot of stuff on top
     of each other.  But lead produces cracking that has been
     verified over a full range of pH.
               In addition, when the sulfur is in some lower
     valence form -- don't ask me in detail what it does,
     although I published a big paper on this last year -- but
     when sulfur somehow gets into a lower valence, a plus-2, a
     minus-2 valence, it causes all these alloys to crack fairly
     rapidly.
               Unfortunately, this work hasn't been extended
     beyond the basic region, but it I am sure is an issue over
     this whole pH range, of course depending on the stability of
     the pH dependence of the stability.
               Now there are some other species here that are
     important in the presence of alluminates and silicates.  the
     alkaline cracking occurs at the lower values of pH and the
     acid rains, the presence of copper in the environment
     accelerates the occurrence of cracking.  Chloride produces
     cracking we know now in the pH 3 range.  This has not been
     studied at higher pHs, and so there is an array of sort of
     miscellaneous things that people have done that are in
     frankly not very great shape but nonetheless are out there.
               Just to illustrate one of these, these are data
     and it's a little bit complex and I won't bore you with it
     too much.  This is Alloy 600, Alloy 690.  These are in
     solutions of varying -- and I have the solution basis
     here -- medium acidic environments.
               Now the difference here is that one set of alloys
     was exposed in autoclaves without copper oxides in the
     autoclave and the other with.  What does cooper oxide do?
     For those of you who know the thermal on this it gives you a
     potential that is the thermodynamic potential is about 500
     millivolts above the standard hydrogen potential but the
     mixed potential won't be that high.
               Now they have also added with hydrogen, without
     hydrogen.  What does hydrogen do?  Hydrogen lowers the
     potential and so what that means is that without the
     hydrogen leaving the potential probably a couple hundred
     millivolts above the standard hydrogen electrode it cracks
     both Alloy 600 and 690 very rapidly.
               Now that is just one of the multiple submodes and
     this is due to an acid copper system which we could discuss
     later if you wish.
               Now the point then I want to make relative to our
     discussion, that having laid out what is a fairly extensive
     definition of Alloy 600 right here, the question is, okay,
     what about Alloy C-22, and Alloy C-22 has no definition at
     all.
               That is the alloy we are talking about engineering
     with.  We are talking about engineering with an alloy for
     which there really is no panoramic definition.  It's not
     that there are not some very nice experiments that have been
     done.  Incidently, some very nice electrochemical work has
     been done by Gustavo over here, Dr. Cragnolino, but the
     point is that in this alloy that we are talking about
     engineering with there is no basis for making judgments
     about turning left or right.  We don't know where to
     engineer with this system.
               Now a similar situation occurs in the Grade 7.  I
     won't discuss that.  I have a few notes about the titanium
     system, which I won't bore you with since it is not as
     important here and let me move on now to some prediction
     processes.
               If you read the DOE analysis of how they predict
     stress corrosion cracking, they essentially use the approach
     that has been developed at the GERND, mainly by Andreson &
     Ford.  They have done a lot of very nice work on this, but
     essentially what they come up with is that the crack
     velocity relates to the crack tip strain rate and some
     environmental exponent.
               Then they convert this crack tip strain rate into
     a stress intensity to the fourth power so you can substitute
     stress intensity in here to approximately the fourth power.
               Now the problem is this doesn't predict anything.
     It doesn't tell you anything about the environments.  It
     doesn't tell you about mode diagrams.  It just simply is a
     way of plotting data and so this is not a basis really for
     any kind of prediction nor is it a basis for if you take the
     data -- this is work from Eason & Shusto in 1983, this is
     their statistical analysis of weld failures in BWRs for
     smaller pipes and larger pipes.
               The discrimination actually isn't so important
     probably and this is one percent failure, tenth of a
     percent, hundredth of a percent.  There were a lot of welds
     in a lot of plants.
               This is a Weibull plot.  The slope here is a
     little bit more than one, which means this is very
     dispersed, very dependent on heat to heat variation of the
     welds.  Something has happening here -- so this formulation
     doesn't predict this either, so we need something that is
     just a little bit better than saying this is proportional to
     something, to a power.
               One of the points that's made in the DOE report is
     the minimum stress intensity for cracking they find is
     around 30 ksi root inches or greater.  In fact, in alkaline
     cracking the minimum S1 SCC is around 10.  It's actually
     lower than that, so that assumption I think is somewhat
     questionable.
               Now the next step, having gotten some sense of
     environmental definition and again this was sort of an
     argument about what the environment should look like on the
     surface when you have a heated deposition.  You define the
     environment and you define the metals.  We have discussed
     it.
               The next step, a little bit slanted here, is what
     I call super position, and what is super position?  The idea
     is what you do very schematically is you are interested then
     in comparing the mode definition -- this is where the cracks
     occur, as we show in our mode diagrams -- with the
     environment that you have, and I have shown these in
     potential pH coordinates.  This could be in any
     coordinates -- and you find out where the overlap is.
               Now the problem here is it means that you have got
     to have some definition of mode.  Where do these occur?  For
     C-22 you have absolution no definition of where cracking
     occurs despite the fact it's pretty clear that it cracks.
     We just don't know where.
               With respect to the environment, the idea of
     engineering in terms of a aqueous environment from J-13 when
     you are thinking primarily about a concentrating surface, it
     just frankly is irrelevant, and so the capacity then to make
     a judgment about the inner section of modes and environments
     I think is maybe somewhat difficult.
               Now the next point I wanted to make -- I am almost
     done but not quite -- is that the reality, the making
     predictions has to be based not on just one set of
     experiments that one guy or one lady ran in the lab, but in
     fact is the result of work by a lot of people over some
     length of time and even though if you don't like the data
     and you would rather sensor it and just include your data,
     the reality is you have got to deal with a set of data by
     respectable people and this -- these are crack growth rate
     data versus stress intensity.
               This is from a collection by Jansson & Morin, but
     the point is the crack velocity versus stress intensity, one
     gets down to about 10 KSI root inches.  The megapasal root
     meter is virtually the same set as KSI root inches, not
     quite.
               This is what?  Five, six orders of magnitude of
     crack velocities.  Some of this is pretty crappy data.
     That's not a technical term, but --
               [Laughter.]
               MR. STAEHLE:  -- but it is, and the same problem
     with smooth surface data.  I showed these the last time I
     was here.  They haven't changed very much.
               This is time to failure versus 1 over T for
     stainless steels and magnesium chloride.  These are data
     from about 20 different investigators which we have put
     together.
               I know every one of these investigators
     personally.  Unfortunately about half of them are dead now,
     but what this shows again is that this is the reality of
     data for a set which is done by people of some repute, and
     so in making predictions we need to recognize that you don't
     have the sort of monolithic single value kind of capability
     but rather a somewhat more complex circumstances that you
     need to pay attention to.
               What I would like to do now is just conclude and
     say just a few things here that -- this actually is in the
     beginning of my notes -- that my first conclusion in looking
     into this problem is that there's substantially inadequate
     knowledge about the conditions under which C-22 or Grade 7
     sustains cracks, i.e., there is no capacity to know whether
     we go left or right with respect to an environmental
     definition.
               Second, I don't think there is any corrosion
     testing of a real environment -- that is, the concentrating
     surfaces.  This just simply doesn't exist.
               It is doubtful in my opinion that any of the work
     that has been done under isothermal conditions is
     substantially useful or substantively useful.  There's a lot
     of good work that has been done.  It's not bad work it is
     just irrelevant.
               The residual stress issue on broad services is
     quite adequate to produce cracking.  The application of
     global heat treatments to reduce surface stresses may
     accelerate other problems.  So far there is no evaluation of
     the condition of manufactured prototypes.  We don't know
     what the prototype does in terms of surface stresses.
               There is no prototype system for judging real
     environments.  Nobody has made -- for example, for those of
     you who know this, recall in the early years the BWR people
     made a quarter size BWR to evaluate certain heat transfer
     and fluid flow things -- a wonderful system they had
     built -- and the PWR people did equivalent things.  There is
     nothing like that here.  There is no prototype facility that
     you can go to.
               Again, some of you historically may remember the
     A1W and the S1W and D1W things and the whole tradition of
     this industry was to build prototypes.  There is no
     prototype here for the environmental problem.
               The next point -- this is the point Jeff made --
     that I think there's a lot that can be learned in the
     historical sense from looking at some of these analogies and
     paradigms from the nuclear development and I am also
     somewhat concerned that the same people that said there was
     no water present or going to be present are the people that
     are now making other predictions.
               So maybe with that -- oh, one more thing I wanted
     to mention here quickly -- the things that I think are
     needed.
               First, I think we need to develop a plan or
     program or system for realistically testing heated surfaces
     and I would be the last one to tell you, as I am sure Jeff
     and Ronnie would be, that these experiments in autoclaves
     are the perfect experiment.  They are not.  They just happen
     to be a good place to start -- say do you have a problem,
     are you worried or not worried, is this a perfect material,
     what, and ideally these experiments should be done on heated
     surfaces with grips or with something that is a better
     approach to reality.
               Second, I think we need to investigate this
     question about just how much of the Yucca Mountain chemistry
     is really relevant.  Now I made this sort of bounding
     statement that from the beginning you have got to start off
     and say what's there, and it will get there.  Now that is an
     overstatement.
               Then you have got to back off and say, well, now
     how much of it can get there and how, and let's do some
     prototypes and figure out just what really happens and take
     some intelligence from the steam generator examples.
               There is no mode diagram story for the C-22 or the
     Grade 7.  You simply don't know how these materials perform.
               We need to assess stresses over whole surfaces for
     manufacturing prototypes and we need to assess stresses over
     whole surfaces for manufacturing prototypes, and we need to
     get some kind of a prototype where we can deal with these
     large-scale environmental problems.  Okay?
               DR. WYMER:  Thank you very much.  That's a lot.
               Let me ask you a unscientific question and it is
     just a matter of your judgment.
               What is the likelihood of getting the essential
     information to qualify C-22 in about six years?
               MR. STAEHLE:  That's why I showed this data from
     Mitsubishi -- one chart showing this -- because that was
     actually done in a couple of years.
               Actually the guy that did most of that works,
     former Ohio State guy, which Paul and I both expect --
               [Laughter.]
               MR. STAEHLE:  The work that was done by Parkins
     Congleton on their work was done by about four graduate
     students over a period of five years, but in fact with an
     organized effort I think the things that I think need to be
     done here in that kind of time I think is reasonable.
               Admittedly there is a problem of acceleration and
     predicting, even if we had started the experiment today and
     it went six years, there is always the question of just how
     relevant is this but of course if it fails in six years then
     you have got a big problem with 10,000.
               I think that clearly we are not going to get to my
     friend Bob Way's aspiration --
               DR. WYMER:  No.
               MR. STAEHLE:  -- of defining all the atomistics,
     where I think we can get a lot smarter, there's a lot of
     thermal around we can deal with.  I mean there's a lot of
     analysis we can do that I think is pretty intelligent and so
     I think that a person could conceive of a reasonable program
     in that kind of time to get a reasonable set of data.
               I was afraid when we started talking you were
     going to ask me about a year --
               DR. WYMER:  Oh, no.
               MR. STAEHLE:  -- and I thought, well, I've got a
     problem with that, but a six year program done by good
     people who have good leadership I think can do a good job on
     this.
               DR. WYMER:  Thank you.
               We need to take other questions, even though it is
     Noon.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Sorry.
               DR. SHEWMON:  Let me make a couple comments.
               One didn't come up in the discussion but I am sure
     this C-22 was given us by Mike Stryker, who came out of
     Dupont and did corrosion work for them for years, which
     would fit in and he, when I last was involved in this 10
     years ago, was on his horse to save the program by getting
     rid of the stainless steel that they were talking about
     then, probably a 316 or something and going across to this,
     which just didn't stress corrosion cracking or much of
     anything else.
               I am not sure whether Mike is still with us or
     not.
               MR. STAEHLE:  No, Mike is still around, and Mike
     was one of the great people in the field.
               His experience I think was basically in acid
     corrosion.  I mean that is where Dupont had a lot of their
     problems.
               DR. SHEWMON:  The other thing, you raise an
     interesting point that you can get lots of concentrations
     with high heat fluxes.  You talked earlier about getting a
     temperature variation.  Let me remind you of your original
     premise and said it is the heat flux, not the temperature,
     so the heat flux does dies down a lot in decades.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Well, Paul, you are right.  It is
     against though the framework that in any given day you could
     run a crack all the way through this wall in about four,
     five hours so we are not talking about -- if you get the
     right galactic intersections this is not a great big
     challenge to crack and so I think we need to sort of be
     conscious of that framework.
               The problem here is look, Roger, if you are so
     clever what is the answer to this sort of question which I
     think is an honest question to ask.  The way the problem was
     essentially solved in the nuclear technology was of course
     by a process of evolution and that Alloy 600 had lots of
     problems and eventually the 690 became a better material.
     They redesigned the tube supports, reorganized the water
     chemistry and so you have a system that behaves pretty well.
               In fact, I want to Kansi Electric Power and they
     wanted me to analyze the 690 future and I laid out to them
     some of the problems that were potential problems and the
     manager of the program said, well, you're right.  We agree
     with you that it has potential problems but in the field it
     hasn't failed yet and so we can't justify any work.
               Now the point I want to make here is that
     basically the solution to corrosion problems is a design
     materials interaction.  To say that you can solve this
     problem totally with one material is just a mistake.
               There is not a material that exists today that you
     can choose that is not going to crack in some framework of
     these environments.
               You have got to step back and say listen, we need
     to look at this not as a material but as a design material
     system so the solution is someplace like that.
               This on the other hand means that we have got to
     be intelligent about our understanding of C-22 because you
     can't design with something that you don't know left, up,
     right, or down, so you have still got to do that, but I
     think to think that a C-22 is going to resist even the
     reasonable environments that you can get there is just a
     mistake.
               If you go to some other material, well, if you are
     so clever, let's think of a better material, I think the
     answer is you have looked at some good ones.  The steam
     generator program has looked at some good ones by some very
     good people and you are kind of where you are at.
               So I think you have got to accept that reality and
     say, look, maybe we have got to kind of rethink how we do
     this.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, isn't the opportunity even
     greater for doing it systematically in the repository
     application than it was for nuclear power plants simply
     because most of the evolution you are talking about in the
     nuclear industry occurred in the first and second generation
     plants, rather than in prototypes.
               There was some of it in prototypes but most of the
     real problems with the BWR occurred after we had BWRs and
     they were in operation and during the inspection and
     surveillance.
               Now in the case of the repository we have anywhere
     from a 50 to 300 year operating period.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  Which is unique in engineering of
     systems, so maybe the opportunity exists to go much beyond
     the prototype here and actually have a performance
     confirmation program of an actual situation or an actual
     waste package under its actual environment and make
     measurements there and evolve in such a way that if things
     really go bad there is the option of relatively easy
     retrievability.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Well, that is kind of what I was --
     I agree with that.
               DR. GARRICK:  We are not here to design the thing.
     We are here to advise the Commissioners on how to reach a
     conclusion on its safety.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  But I am just picking up on the
     comment about the evolution.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Well, you know, in the nuclear
     program there were some interesting early things.
               For example, in Dresden, which was the earliest
     BWR, they actually saw cracking at room temperature in 1967.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               MR. STAEHLE:  And people thought, oh, well, that's
     a bad heat.  That's always the answer to first cracks -- bad
     heat.
               The problem of alkaline cracking was clearly
     evident in 1967 from Lindsay's calculations where he showed
     the concentration of alkalinity in these crevices and from
     the paradigms of the stainlesses, the cracking of Alloy 600
     was actually demonstrated in alkaline solutions in 1965 by
     Sedricks, so little things were out there but they say,
     well, that will blow away -- it's a bad heat, something, but
     in fact the things that were the beginnings of what
     eventually became very big were already known before major
     commitments were made.  That is one thought.
               The second thought is in fact what the nuclear
     industry really did was to use the reactors for the model
     boilers.
               DR. GARRICK:  Sure.
               MR. STAEHLE:  In a sense you can understand all
     that in framework of the hurry and the sales and the
     competition and all those things, but I think the argument
     here is that maybe we need a more stepwise, thoughtful
     approach to how to do this, and one of these has certainly
     got to be some kind of a prototype.  One is maybe a more
     design materials interaction that has some reality to it.
               There are some elements like that that we ought to
     evolve and rather than just saying we have got to have this
     tomorrow, we have got to pass a safety thing or an NRC thing
     tomorrow, you know, I just don't think that is consistent
     with the nature of this system.
               DR. GARRICK:  My point was that a lot of what we
     discovered in the nuclear plant systems came considerably
     later, such as the core spray nozzles on the BWRs.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Right, right.
               DR. GARRICK:  And I don't think we are in that bad
     a shape here in terms of being able to come up with a design
     and manufacturing strategy.
               That is to say, there is a lot more opportunity
     here for doing research than may be the first impression
     would suggest.
               MR. STAEHLE:  I think if we could think in those
     terms and a mature view of how things really are in
     approaching that, I think this is quite an imminently
     accessible, doable thing.
               Excuse me, Morrie?
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  I do have a concern relative to
     this.  If we are reading PMRs and AMRs that have start to
     failure times at 10,000 years from now for everything in the
     AMRs and PMRS no matter what the topic is and it is based on
     our C-22 canister.
               I am worried that the site as defined as a natural
     barrier may not be as rigorous as we originally envisioned
     and we are relying very heavily on C-22 as a containment
     barrier.
               We have pretty much agreed that there's some
     problems with C-22.  Are we willing to go for the next 300
     years and investigate C-22 while loading the repository or
     do we need some other kind of discussion?
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, I don't get the impression
     that we need 300 years.  I get the impression we can do it
     in a much shorter period of time, but I am saying this as an
     advantage that they have.  They have a lot more time to do
     more realistic in-place tests and prototype testing than we
     had in the power reactor field.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  I concur.  I would like to see
     that before we start loading and licensing.
               DR. GARRICK:  And we have done a pretty good job
     there.  That is my point.
               MR. MORGENSTEIN:  My point is that I would like to
     see us investigate C-22 before we agree on licensing or --
               DR. GARRICK:  I think that is correct, yes.
               DR. WYMER:  Any other comments?
               MR. CRAGNOLINO:  I have a comment and a question.
               My comment regards something that was mentioned in
     the past by Roger regarding the fact that we really look in
     the resistance to corrosion of Alloy 22 and one of the main
     reasons that was not mentioned for the large counting of
     molybdenum and tungsten -- they seemed significantly
     resistent to localized corrosion and in this sense this
     alloy has been used not only for service in the chemical
     industry acidic media but on a range of applications for
     seawater and the demanding conditions for geothermal
     application and a lot for replacement in the oil industry
     for perforation and the conditioning -- I mean there are a
     series of important aspects that have to be considered.
               Roger is however completely right in this concern
     about stress corrosion cracking that is one of the most
     insidious forms of failure.  It is a matter of important
     consideration.
               We have explored this in our work program, putting
     a lot of emphasis in certain aspects.  However, I think that
     even though the framework that Roger presents in thermal for
     pH is very important.
               There is one other body of it that should be
     included there, and this is my question -- temperature.
     What happened with temperature and what happened with a very
     large activation energy that this process has in particular
     in the pressing of lead for Alloy 600 where we are talking
     about 105, 125 kilogen or more.
               Roger, I'm sorry, but I would like to ask these
     types of questions.
               MR. STAEHLE:  No, no we are good friends.  The
     thing -- Gustavo has raised several important points here,
     but the actual problem with the answer is in fact that the
     data for the temperature dependence is not well established
     except over a narrow range.
               For example, alkaline cracking of infinel 600
     occurs as low as 100 centigrade.
               I showed you the data on the chloride cracking
     which occurs at 100 centigrade from EDF work.
               On the other hand, the cracking of the -- the pure
     water cracking and the so-called low potential cracking has
     a fairly steep activation energy and a long coefficient in a
     sense and probably does not practically occur below probably
     at least 200 centigrade and maybe more like 225 centigrade,
     so -- but in fact the interaction -- I mean one of the
     problems, for example, with this is a lot of the possible
     interactions just have not been explored.
               Potential dependence -- we had this discussion on
     lead dependence -- and I think you have to step back a
     little bit and say, you know, if it cracks here we better be
     careful of there.  It doesn't mean we can't do it.  It just
     means we have got to be careful to do the experiments and I
     think short of having the kind of atomistic things that we
     would all like to have, we have got to give things not a
     super-wide berth but a wide enough berth to say at least we
     do experiments that are intelligent -- I mean but that is a
     good point.
               DR. WYMER:  Bill?
               DR. HINZE:  Roger, just a very quick question
     based upon your experience.
               Do you have any comments about the relative
     advantages of lower high thermal loading of the repository?
               MR. STAEHLE:  Well, I think that is certainly --
     the model I was suggesting here is sensitive to thermal
     loading because it affects the heat flux and the
     concentration and the length of time and I think in general
     in the system --
               DR. HINZE:  And also the moisture.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Yes, and I think whatever you can do
     to cut down the concentration on these surfaces is a good
     idea.
               That affects both heat flux and temperature on the
     surfaces and length of time and those all sound like good
     ideas in one framework of thinking.
               There is a consequence in terms of how the water
     moves and the rocks and those things and I think it is not
     just sort of my reaction, it is kind of my reaction and your
     reaction together.
               DR. HINZE:  It is a real coupled process.
               MR. STAEHLE:  Yes, and I think that, I mean this
     is one of the wonderful interdisciplinary things where we
     both speak the same thermodynamic language.  We both speak
     the same framework, but there's a lot of differences in how
     we see things and understand things and there is certainly
     room for a lot of interaction here.
               DR. WYMER:  Anything else?
               [No response.]
               DR. WYMER:  Well, if not, this is has been a great
     session from my point of view.
               It's been very enlightening.  We have a lot yet to
     do but ostensibly we can do it, so with that I do thank you
     all very much.  We are adjourned.
               DR. GARRICK:  I want to indicate that we
     anticipated that this might overrun a little and so we are
     going to make arrangements to delay the start of the first
     session this afternoon on entombment.
               We are going to try to do that at 1:30 rather than
     1 o'clock as shown on the agenda.
               With that, we will adjourn for lunch.
               [Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the hearing was
     recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., this same day.].                           AFTERNOON SESSION
                                                      [1:34 p.m.]
               DR. GARRICK:  I'd like to call the meeting to
     order.  We're now going to get into the decommissioning
     business.
               This is Ray Wymer's big day because he's also the
     lead member on this, so, Ray, do you want to introduce the
     subject and speaker?
               DR. WYMER:  Yes, we're going to spend an hour till
     2:30, so you've got your full time, practically, on looking
     at entombment as an option for decommissioning reactors.
     Entombment is sort of, as I understand it, has been added
     formally to the SAFESTOR and license termination suite of
     means of getting out from this reactor responsibility.
               So, Stephanie Bush-Goddard is going to talk to us
     this morning about the rulemaking activities associated with
     entombment of power reactors.
               Stephanie.
               DR. GARRICK:  Except that it's afternoon already.
               DR. WYMER:  Time flies when you're having fun.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Good afternoon.  As he said, my
     name is Stephanie Bush-Goddard.  I am the Task Leader for
     the entombment rulemaking.
               I am here because the Commission has requested the
     staff to consult with the ACNW on this issue.  So my goals
     or my objectives today will be first to give a regulatory
     history.
               Entombment falls under -- is a decommissioning
     alternative, so I'll talk about the regulatory history of
     decommissioning, and then I will go into what actually is
     entombment, and some of the specific NRC activities related
     to the entombment issue.
               I'll go into the need for rulemaking and its
     scope, and I'll also give you a current status of where the
     rulemaking effort is, and then finally, I'll end up with
     some of the guidance I'm asking for from the members.
               As I said, entombment is a decommissioning
     alternative.  It falls under the decommissioning rule in 10
     CFR 50.82.  And basically this rule says that you have 60
     years from permanent cessation of operations to
     decommissioning.
               The NRC will approve beyond the 60 years, only
     because of public health and safety.  Now, this rule was
     written in 1988.  At that time, we only had an unrestricted
     release criteria.
               That criteria was 25 millirem a year.  Then in
     1997, we published what you call the radiological criteria
     for license termination.  This also gave a restricted dose
     criteria.
               You could -- the criteria was 25 millirem a year,
     and if institutional controls failed, you could go up to 100
     millirem a year, and if justified, up to even 500 millirem a
     year.
               However, if you go up to 500 millirem a year, you
     had to monitor the decommissioning site, and there had to be
     surveillance every five years.
               So, let's go into entombment.  Entombment is a
     decommissioning alternative, and basically it's where
     radioactive contaminants are encased in a structurally
     long-lived encasement such as long-lived materials such as
     concrete.
               The structure is maintained and surveillance is
     carried out until the radioactivity decays to levels -- I
     have permitting unrestricted release here because this rule
     was made in 1988 with the decommissioning rule, but now we
     also have the restricted release criteria, and that's
     something to keep in mind.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Stephanie, just a point of
     clarification.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes?
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Who does the surveillance?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  The licensee.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  So is the NRC involved
     afterwards, in a restricted release with surveillance or
     judging whether the surveillance is successful?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  In the license termination
     plan, I believe, the licensee has to prove that after the
     facility is terminated, that they will be able to maintain
     either the unrestricted or the restricted release criteria,
     and this is even before the final license is terminated.
               So, in 1997, when the license termination rule was
     being published, the NRC also told the Staff to see if
     entombment is viable, and if they determined that it was
     not, to see what could make it viable.
               So we published this information paper.  I'm going
     to talk a little bit about that.
               After the paper was published, we had public
     workshops, and actually we had a public workshop, and we
     submitted the workshop findings and Staff recommendations in
     a SECY paper.
               From that, the Commission told the Staff to
     proceed with rulemaking, and I'll go over each of those.
               The first was a PNNL report, the Pacific Northwest
     National Laboratory Report, and basically they first talked
     about some entombment experience in the U.S.  Currently, we
     have three DOE reactors that are entombed.
               They were entombed around the 1969-1970 timeframe,
     and they were entombed by regulations under the AEC.  These
     were small demonstration power reactors.
               The Hanford site is also going under some type of
     entombment.  They have eight former plutonium facilities,
     and as we stand now, they're doing partial dismantlement,
     and, subsequently, entombment.
               Now, the Hanford site is different from the DOE
     site in that they have characteristics similar to commercial
     power reactors, in that I think they're near a large body of
     water, they have low population density, and the residual
     activity is more like commercial power reactors.
               The PNNL report also did a study, not necessarily
     an isolation assessment, but what an isolation assessment
     would have to be done if a reactor would be entombed.
     Basically you have to look at the radioactive inventory.
               Now, they reference a pressurized water reactor
     that's about 350 megawatt thermal, and what they said is
     that you really have to have a great radionuclide inventory.
     If you're only going to leave in the Cobalt-60, which has a
     half life of about 5.27 years, then the radioactivity will
     last as long as the structure would be able to maintain it.
               If you have something like Cesium-137 at 30 years,
     and I think Nickel-63 at 100 years, you need something on
     the order of 130 to 300 years.  And then if you have your
     longer-lived radionuclides, I think, like Niobium, that's
     like 20,000 years, and then you couldn't necessarily verify
     that the containment would last.
               They also looked at the transport through the
     containment, and the long-term integrity, and they came up
     with the conclusion that concrete can last about on the
     average of about 500 years.
               Now, this report was taken in 1993, and they took
     data from the 80s, and they also looked at dispersal through
     the environment, in that once the radioactivity left the
     containment structure, what type of flow and what type of
     pathways would it have to go through?
               And they came up with conclusions.  First of all,
     there is no current isolation data, so you would have to do
     a study, and it would probably have to be site-specific on
     things like determining distribution coefficients and things
     like that.
               But the performance assessment could be similar to
     the low-level waste disposal -- a low-level waste disposal
     facility.  So you could take some Part 61 requirements and
     apply them to the performance assessment.
               Did you raise your hand, sir?  Okay.
               Also, there is a difference.  The performance
     assessment could be similar to low-level waste facilities,
     but there is a difference between entombment and low-level
     waste, in that the source term is very much different, and
     the site characteristics could be different.
               They also did two types of entombment scenarios.
     Say, if you had immediate entombment where you take out all
     of the stuff in the beginning and in about five years you
     seal and you monitor it until 130 years, and they're
     assuming that at 130 years, you meet the unrestricted
     release criteria.
               Now, this would have to take all the spent fuel,
     the GTCC out, basically everything except the Cobalt-60.
     And then they also did a deferred entombment where you place
     it in storage for 100-120 years, let things decay, and then
     entomb.
               And from that data, they came out with here I have
     radiation dose.  If you do immediate, delayed entombment and
     to other decommissioning alternatives which are DECON and
     SAFESTOR.
               Of course, with DECON you have the higher amount
     of person-rem, because you're decon'ing the material, the
     equipment, but you also have a large generation of low-level
     waste here in the red.
               Immediate entomb -- and both of the entombed
     produce the lowest person-rem here, and they are, each of
     them except DECON, had similar low-level waste being
     generated.
               Okay, so from that PNNL report, the NRC conducted
     a public workshop.  This was in December of last year.  We
     took the workshop findings and Staff recommendations to the
     Commission.
               And I'll go over the workshop findings.  In that
     workshop in December, the first thing that they found was
     that no attendees challenged the capability to construct a
     viable, technically-viable entombment.
               And we had seven states represented.  They viewed
     entombment favorably, but an issue that they had is that if
     the license is terminated, then the responsibility might
     fall back on them.  I'm sorry, if the license is terminated,
     and if there was entombment failure, that the cleanup and
     mitigation might fall on the states.
               There was agreement that the Low-Level Policy Act
     was not working, and entombment seemed viable from an
     economical standpoint.
               They preferred excluding, rather than Class C
     waste.  They felt that if this was going into rulemaking,
     the GTCC issue might hold up the entombment option.
               And they also called for a need for a study
     specific to NRC-licensed facilities.  As I mentioned before,
     the entombed reactors are basically DOE reactors, in that
     the source term is lower than some of our commercial power
     reactors.
               From those workshop findings, the Staff
     recommended that we do an Advance Notice of Proposed
     Rulemaking, an ANPR to solicit comments in a regulatory
     framework, you know, to get public comments, to get
     Agreement State comments and what have you.
               So in that Staff requirements memorandum, the
     Commission told us to do a couple of things:  First of all,
     they did not object to a rulemaking plan.  They told us to
     coordinate the rulemaking plan with the generic
     environmental impact statement, and to address the issue of
     greater than Class C waste.
               The workshop findings said we should not include
     that issue, but they wanted us to put it back in, and
     finally, why I am here today:  To ensure that you all are
     appropriately consulted.
               So, now we're at the rulemaking stage.  I have
     here, going from current requirements.  What we plan to do
     is put the current requirements in the rulemaking plan, try
     to provide different entombment option scenarios.  I'll go
     in that in a minute.
               And then specify what we feel is our preferred
     option.
               As I also said, we're issuing an Advanced Notice
     of Proposed Rulemaking, and here we just are telling the
     public about the issues, the background of entombment, and
     asking questions related to state issues, questions about
     the technically-viable issues, the greater than Class C
     waste, and what have you.
               So, we have a couple of options:  The first one is
     just to maintain the status quo.  We also have to put that
     in for NEPA analysis.
               A second option is to terminate the license,
     amending the 10 CFR 50.82.  You know, we have the six-year
     requirement, and maybe modifying that requirement to make it
     feasible for some power reactors.
               And then also we're thinking about retaining some
     type of license, maybe under Part 50, or under another
     existing Part.  You know, Part 50 is the utilization of
     power reactors, and the power reactor now will be
     decommissioned.
               Or we are thinking about some other option, maybe
     introducing a new Part under a new regulation, something
     maybe similar to the Low-Level Waste Part 61 license,
     similar in performance.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Stephanie, let me ask a question
     to try to overcome some of my ignorance here.  So,
     maintaining the status quo, just means that you would go on
     a case-by-case basis; that is, a licensee could apply for
     entombment and you would do the evaluation, and either
     approve or not approve?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes, but that's not viable for
     most entombment scenarios.  Most reactors have things in
     there that would let -- that you could not meet the license
     termination rule in the 60 years.
               Now, say, if they wanted an exemption, the
     Commission will only approve an exemption for public health
     and safety.  So if you wanted to extend it to, say, 100
     years based on economic reasons, as the rules are written
     now, you cannot do that.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I see.  Okay, and the second
     option, terminate the license, I'm not clear what that
     means.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Okay
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Terminate the license for a
     specific --
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Okay, the difference between 1
     and 2 is that you're terminating the license eventually, but
     in Option 2, terminate the license, we would amend that
     60-year requirement.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Oh, I see.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes.  Sorry about that.
               So, ending with the other, like I said, it might
     be under a new regulation.
               So, the current schedule, right now the rulemaking
     plan and the ANPR are in NRC Office Concurrence.
               Hopefully, by next Friday, we'll send them to the
     Agreement States for comment.
               That will take about 30 days.  We will get the
     comments back, analyze them, resolve the issues, send out
     another Office Concurrence, and hopefully by that time we'll
     also have our paper from you guys, and then we'll send it to
     the Commission.
               Now, there are some issues, particular issues that
     we would like to talk about, however, please feel free to
     write down anything you feel would be relevant.
               The first one is this issue of dose reduction
     credit.  Basically, there are some -- we're struggling.
     When I say "we," the Working Group is struggling with this
     issue of what dose reduction credit can be given for
     engineered barriers in an entombed structure.
               Basically, how long can we say the concrete will
     last?  Of if it's grouted and concreted, is there a specific
     lifetime we may say that the grout remained -- will remain
     effective to meet the dose criteria, which, again, is the 25
     millirem a year, the 100 millirem, or the 500 millirem a
     year.
               And then the second big question is, what should
     be the regulatory framework?  If we do decide to go with an
     entombment option, should it be still under Part 50 and just
     be a decommissioning Part 50?
               Should we develop a whole new Part and have the
     performance assessment similar to low-level waste, do some
     isolation assessments and things like that, and have that
     criteria in the rule?
               Or should it be under existing and existing Parts?
     So those are the two questions that we're wrestling with,
     we're struggling with.
               We would appreciate your comments, and any other
     comments that you will have.  And that's it.
               Are there any questions?
               DR. WYMER:  Thank you very much.  Are there other
     questions around the table?
               DR. GARRICK:  I was a little -- I was trying to
     figure out the real merit of deferred entombment, as you
     have described it, safe storage to 120 years.  Why the
     choice of that particular --
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  I guess, from an occupational
     exposure basis, that it probably has more merit than, say,
     immediate entombment.
               DR. GARRICK:  And it seems then to go to a sealed
     entombment for another ten years, that seems a lot of work
     for a short period of time.
               DR. WYMER:  There is a technical factor here,
     Stephanie, if I can jump in?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Go ahead.
               DR. WYMER:  To plot the radiation level inside the
     -- from the vessel, that is a function of time.  There is a
     sharp-kneed curve that's like a hockey stick and at about 70
     years, it breaks very sharply.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  And also this is some -- this
     is the PNNL report that they just made up two different
     scenarios.  I don't think in the rulemaking plan stage,
     we're actually looking at, you know, when will the license
     be terminated, and even actually look at the different
     scenarios of where it would be a delayed versus an
     entombment scenario, and even if we would be that specific
     in the regulations.
               DR. GARRICK:  How much has risk perspective been
     built into the entombment approach?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Well, we're looking at RCRA,
     the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act law.  They give
     some type of risk reduction credit to their institutional
     controls, so we're trying to look at their model to see if
     we can apply some of that to commercial power reactors.
               DR. GARRICK:  The other thing is, what are the
     specifications for entombment beyond radiation?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Specifications beyond
     radiation?
               DR. GARRICK:  Are there area limitations?  Are
     there structural integrity requirements?  What drives the
     qualification for entombment beyond radiation levels?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  We're looking into that right
     now, but I can say that in looking into that we are trying
     to model some of the low-level waste criteria.  I think
     we're maybe trying to, if these options -- once we get a
     preferred option, we're going to look at maybe putting
     requirements in that if you're below a certain water table,
     you can entomb your structure.
               DR. GARRICK:  Is there an area limitation?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  No, not yet.
               DR. GARRICK:  Or height limitation?  No spatial
     language?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  We haven't developed that yet,
     no.  We sure haven't.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay, thank you.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Stephanie, I have a couple of
     questions on the same study that John started on, and the
     immediate entombment versus delayed.
               And in their PNNL, it also had a SAFESTOR option.
     Does that mean safe storage in perpetuity?  Is that how the
     analysis was done?  I just thought it was odd to contrast
     SAFESTOR with decommissioning and entombment, which seemed
     to me to --
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, I was trying to relate it why
     on earth would you not SAFESTOR through the whole period,
     rather than --
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Well, actually, entombment, if
     you can look at it, it can kind of encompass the SAFESTOR
     issue.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  In SAFESTOR, I think the end
     point was to, after the dose has been reduced, to take that
     and put it into an existing low-level waste depository, so
     to move it away from the site.
               The difference between SAFESTOR and entombment is
     that in entombment you're having onsite disposal of that
     waste.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I see, okay, okay.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I missed that.  That's, again, an
     indication of my ignorance of how this works.
               So, again, Ray's point was that of course, if
     you're doing entomb immediately, the radiation, the
     occupational exposure is higher because you're doing work
     inside the containment.
               And yet the PNNL study, the difference is between
     800 person-rems and 300-plus-person-rems.  It doesn't look
     like a huge difference in exposure.
               DR. WYMER:  One of the things that came out of the
     conference we attended last week was the fact that the
     business of just waiting is one that's being seriously
     considered.  The British are saying, let's wait 75 to 135
     years or something like that, and the Canadians say you're a
     little bit out of your tree; we ought only wait about 50
     years.
               At any rate, they agree you ought to wait, maybe
     seven years till you come to the knee in the curve.
               So there are definite benefits to those, waiting.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I mean, that stands to reason
     because of the nuclides there.  Stephanie, I think I heard
     you say that the PNNL report suggested that concrete will
     last 500 years?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes, they reference another
     paper, and in the workshop, it was brought up that it could
     last much longer than that.  But I'm just --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  So going to the question, the
     first question that you posed that you'd like some feedback
     from us on is the life of, the potential life of engineered
     barriers.  You're just looking for us to again comment on
     that?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes, just comment.  You know,
     in the end, we will probably do an assessment of different
     types of concretes, and they will probably -- I'm not a
     geologist or a geological engineer, but go through all these
     criteria, and take data from that and decide.
               So, just a general feeling of if dose reduction
     credit should be taken.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Should be taken.  Finally, I just
     have two other things, again related back.  Part of what I'm
     trying to grapple with, not knowing too much about 10 CFR
     Part 20, Subpart E, but we heard a lot about West Valley
     yesterday, and, of course, they're grappling with the
     potential use of the license termination rule there, and the
     policy statement.
               And this issue of surveillance, let me come back
     to that.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Okay.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  You said under the regulations,
     surveillance would be carried out by the licensee; that's
     the licensee's responsibility.
               But I guess who looks over the shoulder of the
     licensee when they're doing their surveillance?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  The licensee has to have an
     approved plan before its terminated.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Right, so they come to you with
     an approved plan, and you say, yes, this looks good.  The
     end then?  We just trust them?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Well, no we don't.  I think
     that's when, say, for instance, if we have some type of
     failure, then maybe one of the federal agencies, probably
     the EPA, would have jurisdiction in that.
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  Stephanie, could I add something?
     I'm Jim Lieberman from Office of General Counsel.
               Under the license termination rule, when we're
     dealing with a restricted release, the Commission makes a
     determination based on the institutional controls that the
     cap, the dose cap, if institutional controls fail, is below
     either 100 or 500.
               They terminate the license when they're satisfied.
     If, after that point, something occurs, such that there is a
     greater dose, the Commission has said in the regulations,
     they will only get involved if they perceive significant
     threat to the public health and safety.
               They haven't defined in the regulations or the
     statements of consideration, what that threshold is of
     getting involved because they are seeking finality.  But
     they reserve the right to get reinvolved to deal with the
     situation.
               I presume somewhere in the 500 millirem --
     somewhere between 100 and 500 millirem, the Commission would
     probably get reinvolved.
               Absent that, under the decommissioning plan that's
     approved and the institutional controls, it provides for the
     monitoring, the maintenance, and the surveillance.
               And they have to have enforceable requirements but
     enforced outside of the Commission's activities.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Okay, so who looks at the
     surveillance data, and who then does the enforcement?  I
     guess that's my question.
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  Okay, it would not be the
     Commission, so that would be the state, whoever is the
     steward, maybe the state or the Federal Government.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  And the steward would be
     specified in the application for license termination?
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  Exactly.  We have to approve the
     steward.  We have to be satisfied that there is sufficient
     financial assurance, and that the relationship is
     sufficiently enforceable so that it will be a workable
     system.
               In most of these cases involving the large
     exposures, potential exposures, they have to have durable
     institutional controls which would be more likely the
     governmental entities.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Okay, so it gets specified, and
     that makes sense to me now.
               The other thing that I was interested in was that
     you mentioned that under the LTR, the exemptions beyond the
     60-year period can only be for reasons of public health and
     safety.
               And as far as you know, that could have a fairly
     broad interpretation, though, couldn't it?  I mean, I guess
     what I'm trying to grapple with is, in your case, suppose
     the analysis came back that deferred entombment which went
     beyond 60 years for reasons that Ray was saying,
     substantially would reduce both occupational and potentially
     dose to the public.
               Wouldn't that be a reason for public health and
     safety?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  I will -- since OGC interprets
     the rule, can you give us an answer to that also?
               [Laughter.]
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  That is a very good question.  In
     fact, we're looking at that question.
               The rule itself, I don't have the rule in front of
     me, but the rule says something like the Commission --
     approval of the Commission extended, based on a case-by-case
     basis, based on health and safety.  And then it has some
     examples.
               And I think one -- can you just read the rule,
     Stephanie?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes.
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  This is 50.82, .83.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Okay, factors that will be
     considered by the Commission in evaluating an alternative
     that provides for completion of decommissioning beyond 60
     years of permanent cessation of operations includes:
     Unavailability of waste disposal capacity and other
     site-specific factors affecting the licensee's capabilities
     to carry out decommissioning, including presence of other
     nuclear facilities at the site.
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  So we're still struggling with
     what those words actually mean.  So I really can't give you
     a more detailed answer.
               DR. GARRICK:  If you're struggling, what's that
     mean about the rest of us?
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HORNBERGER:  So you're not surprised then that
     we're struggling.
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  Exactly.
               MR. LEVENSON:  I have got sort of a followup
     question:  You said that the licensee is responsible for the
     monitoring, imposes the LTR.  But the draft policy statement
     on West Valley specifically states that the responsibility
     for the monitoring is not the licensee's, but will be a
     responsible government entity.
               Is that at variance with what's done in power
     reactors?
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  No.  During the period the license
     is in effect, it's the licensee.
               After the license is terminated, it's the function
     of the termination plan.  You have to have in the case of
     West Valley, because of the size of the source term, durable
     institutional controls, which the statement of consideration
     addresses as basic federal, state, or governmental agencies.
               This is a very complex rule, so let me try to
     explain it a little bit here.  You have to have
     institutional controls.
               You have to have an independent third party to
     provide the monitoring, provide the capability for
     monitoring and maintenance.
               The licensee can do it, but if the licensee fails,
     then the independent third party gets involved, which would
     be the institutional controls that would be the federal or
     state agency.
               So, one scenario is, the licensee does it from
     scratch, and that would continue until there is a failure
     and then the institutional controls kick in.
               Another situation might be the licensee gets out
     at the very beginning, and the institutional controls would
     begin early on.
               MR. LEVENSON:  Is the identification of the
     responsible government entity something that is done in
     advance then, when the -- I can't say when the license is
     terminated, because West Valley license is already
     terminated.
               MR. LIEBERMAN:  No, no.  The West Valley license
     is in suspension.  It's going to be reinstated once DOE is
     completed.
               But in a typical case, yes, it is agreed to in
     advance, because we want to make sure that the Government
     agency, whoever is going to do the institutional controls,
     will agree to do it.
               It has -- and satisfied the financial resources to
     achieve that, have been set aside in a trust or whatever.
     So that when we're closing the site and terminating the
     license, all these loose ends that we're talking about are
     resolved.
               And that may be easier said than done, and we
     haven't yet released a license under restricted release.
               But several licensees are getting into that
     situation now.
               DR. WYMER:  Thank you.  Is that all, George, that
     you had?
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Yes, thank you.
               DR. WYMER:  I have one question:  We may, in
     deciding to respond to this, to comment on something having
     to do with greater than Class C waste, Stephanie, and this
     whole issue of whether or not you address greater than Class
     C waste now or put it off into the future sometime, as has
     been suggested by some of the people who have made comments
     on it.
               That brings it up as an issue.  Can you say a
     little bit more about the implications of deferring the
     removal of greater than Class C waste and what this has to
     do with the regulation, how you respond to it?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  There is another
     interpretation, and I'm going to have to call you up here
     again, Jim.  It's the issue that if we include greater than
     Class C waste in the entombment structure, we can do what
     they call volume-averaging, and if we volume-average it,
     then we can classify it as less than greater than Class C
     waste, and we can put it in the entombment structure.
               If we cannot classify it as less than greater than
     Class C waste, then to put it in an entombed structure as
     greater than Class C waste would require modifying the
     Low-Level Waste Policy Act, I believe.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Don't go there.
               [Laughter.]
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Exactly.
               DR. HINZE:  It sounds like a good idea to me.
               MR. LARSON:  Remember, this was one of the
     considerations in the Trojan Pressure Vessel disposal.
               DR. WYMER:  And there is the -- 94 problem that
     you have, so that it never goes away.  It seems to me that's
     a pretty significant barrier to entombment, because it's
     forever a restricted release.
               DR. GARRICK:  Sort of as a followup to why we're
     where we are on this issue, where has the initiative for
     entombment come from?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Well, back in 1998 when the
     decommissioning rule was written, they gave basically three
     alternatives, DECON, SAFESTOR, and entombment.
               In the supplementary information, they did say
     that they favored both DECON and SAFESTOR.
               Now, since we have the license termination rule
     with restricted release, some licensees might say, well, we
     probably can entomb and meet the restricted release
     criteria, hence the new involvement in entombment.  That's
     kind of the basis why it's being renewed.
               DR. WYMER:  It's a cheaper option than taking it
     all offsite.
               DR. GARRICK:  I guess you got some feedback at the
     workshop as to the public's reaction to the entombment
     option?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes.  Like I said, there were
     seven states represented.  And they looked favorable,
     because one reason they realized that the Low-Level Waste
     Policy Act was not working, and they didn't know where they
     would put the low-level waste.
               But there was also a concern, like I said, that if
     the license terminated, who would assume cleanup and
     mitigation expenses and liability if there was a failure.
               Licensees would like to have entombment as another
     decommissioning alternative that will give them a little bit
     more flexibility in how they're decommissioning.
               DR. WYMER:  Can you give us a little feeling for
     -- do you know how many utilities are considering
     entombment?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  No, I don't.  In the workshop
     -- right now I know of only one.  I think that's Florida
     Power, but that's not to say that there aren't more.
               But I don't think I have that data, but I can get
     that to you, if you'd like.
               DR. WYMER:  It would be interesting.  It didn't
     sound like it was a groundswell of the utilities, does it,
     to go to entombment?
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, no.  But the utilities have
     been kind of frustrated on where to put the low level waste,
     so it solves that problem to a certain extent.
               DR. WYMER:  There's a representative from NEI that
     maybe would present the industry perspective on this, if
     you're interested.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, that would be good.
               MR. GENOA:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  My name is
     Paul Genoa.  I'm a Senior Project Manager at the Nuclear
     Energy Institute, and one of my issues -- all of my issues
     involve material disposition.
               And one of them is the entombment option.  The
     industry is interested in entombment as an option.
               At the workshop, we had members of our Task Force
     On License Termination.  Those members represented over 30
     reactors that all said at that meeting, that -- well, they
     showed up in December in D.C. for a meeting to show that
     they are interested in the option, but not that they're
     ready to move forward.
               I believe the Commission was motivated to pursue
     exploring the issue by a letter sent from the State of
     Florida.  It was a joint letter from the Department of
     Health Services, if that's the right term Florida, but the
     Agreement State agency, combined with the Public Utility
     Commission, both showing interest in the entombment option.
               But there are others as well, and clearly, as you
     point out, the concern over future availability of disposal
     -- we want to understand today, what it will take to safely
     disposition these reactors after their useful life is done,
     if we're forced to be in a situation where disposal is not
     available.
               As you know, spent fuel is facing that today.  And
     there is no regulatory structure in place to deal with that
     crisis -- Yucca Mountain.
               And so we don't want to be in the same situation
     with low-level waste.
               Further, there are economic and occupational
     safety issues.  Right now, in Connecticut Yankee, they are
     segmenting the reactor internals.  They're removing the
     greater than Class C material.
               It is a horrendous radiological exposure, about
     140 man-rem are being expended today to cut that material
     up, plus a lot of other industrial safety issues to involve
     in a task that great.
               I think you gentlemen have reviewed what happened
     in Trojan, and I think any real valid environmental
     assessment would find that the environmental impacts of
     taking this material out of a very robust container, perhaps
     have not been fully evaluated.
               Entombment seems to provide some options.
               DR. GARRICK:  Are we going to run into the same
     problems with entombment that we've run into with the states
     and the public that we have with the low-level waste
     Agreement State compacts?  Has the NEI done any surveys or
     public outreach projects to get a better assessment of how
     this option would be received by them?
               MR. GENOA:  We certainly have not done anything
     formal, but when we look to implement the Low-Level Waste
     Policy Act, or the High-Level Waste Policy Act, our
     opponents say leave it where it's stored.
               So we're looking for a regulatory approach at
     leaving it where it's stored.
               DR. GARRICK:  Near where the sites might be.
               MR. GENOA:  Generally not, actually.
               DR. GARRICK:  I guess we can't guarantee that we
     won't have the same problem with the entombment.
               MR. GENOA:  I think that's an accurate assessment.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right, right.
               DR. HINZE:  John, thinking back eight, ten years,
     the Committee spent a good deal of time discussing the
     longevity of concrete.
               And, in fact, I think we may even have a letter
     that discusses that.  You might want to go back and review
     those topics and what was said and some of the germane memos
     and so forth.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. HINZE:  There is a good deal of information
     residing on that point.
               DR. GARRICK:  Thank you, thank you for reminding
     me.
               DR. HINZE:  The author is here of that letter.
     He's not going to admit it.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. GARRICK:  We don't want to press that too far.
     Marty, yo had a question?
               DR. STEINDLER:  Let me just make a comment:  It
     seems to me that the long-lived activities essentially are
     all in the reactor vessel.  The rest of the stuff can be
     packaged, if you can get it out of there, and shipped to
     some low-level burial ground.  At the moment, a lot of this
     junk ends up in Utah.
               So the issue, it seems to me, is not a waste
     disposal issue, nearly as severely as one would believe.
               The expenditures, as I think you pointed out,
     George, the expenditure of over 150 or even 200 person-rems
     to cut up a reactor vessel is to the industry, probably a
     significant issue, as it should be.
               But I would expect that it's a lot more expensive
     than filling up a reactor vessel plus its surroundings with
     concrete and letting it sit there.  So there's an economic
     issue.
               I think the waste disposal issue is -- my sense is
     that it's not real in the sense that there are currently
     ways of alleviating that, albeit expensive.  If somebody in
     the East Coast wants to get rid of a reactor, they've got to
     move a lot of concrete debris to Utah, which can't be cheap.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Not only expensive in dollars,
     but if you talk about real risk, the trucks running concrete
     pieces to Utah run over people
               DR. STEINDLER:  Even if it's railroads.  And it's
     the regulatory nightmare that everybody has got to jump
     through.
               But I don't see how in the absence of addressing
     the greater than Class C issue, I don't see how you can make
     this work unless you operate on what I consider to be
     numerology, and that is averaging the total waste content
     from the fairly hot pressure vessel and piping over a very
     large concrete enclosure.  Something interesting, but not
     really the way it was designed.  Dilution is not really
     allowed, usually.
               But the --
               DR. WYMER:  It's not exactly dilution, Marty.
     That's sort of a fictitious dilution.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Well, yes, that's right.  But you
     do have to run some kind of a performance assessment to
     address the question of what happens?  Supposing your
     concrete last 1,000 years on a good day, but in the acid
     rain that the Chicago area occasionally comes through with,
     for example, 1,000 years is as optimistic as all get out.
               Then what do you do with a reactor vessel that's
     got a fair amount left of Niobium and nickel?  So some
     performance assessment has to address that issue.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. STEINDLER:  It seems to me that that should be
     the determinant.
               DR. HINZE:  You might also want to consider some
     site characterization, because talking about Florida, you
     have your potential for very fast pathways.  We saw that
     when we looked at the low-level waste siting in that state.
     DR. STEINDLER:  Yes.  The thing that troubles me about this
     particular approach is that this is almost setting aside of
     what I guess I would call the normal approach to risk
     assessment, the business of, the specialized business of
     getting rid of a reactor.
               I think the regulations have to be more coherent
     than that in the overall.
               DR. WYMER:  Can you address the Maine Yankee case
     in this context of their planning to leave something below
     grade there.  Aren't they?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Yes.  I think -- I'm not an
     expert in it, but I know that they are decommissioning, and,
     yes, they do not have a place yet for their spent fuel, or
     -- I'm sorry, you said they're planning on leaving something
     below greater than Class C?
               DR. WYMER:  I think I remember from the conference
     that they were going to go down to three foot below grade
     and leave everything lower than that there; is that right?
               MR. WEBB:  Yes, Stephanie, maybe I can help a
     little bit.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Please.
               MR. WEBB:  My name is Mike Webb, and I'm the NRR
     Project Manager for Maine Yankee.  And as you've said, what
     they have proposed is to remove all the radiological
     material above ground level, down to the three-foot level,
     to retain the foundations in place.  They will scabble
     and/or otherwise remove surface contamination, but then
     they'll backfill that space with clean soil.
               DR. WYMER:  That's not exactly entombment.
               MR. WEBB:  Correct.  They will have removed large
     portions of both concrete and all the other debris, the
     metals that would be associated with entombment.
               DR. GARRICK:  Marty?
               DR. STEINDLER:  Just one other thing:  This PNNL
     report by Smith and Short, there's a disclaimer by the NRC
     Staff in the front of it, which I thought was appropriate.
               Then I read in the front that this report dated
     May 11th, was revised by Carl Feldman of the U.S. Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission.
               Now, tell me what that's all about.  Since when is
     a contractor report revised by the NRC?  And does that --
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Would anyone like to help me
     with that?
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Well said, Stephanie.
               DR. STEINDLER:  That's the first time -- I have
     read a lot of NRC reports, and that's the first time I've
     seen one where the Commission Staff admitted to revising
     somebody's report.
               DR. WYMER:  I don't think you need to answer that.
               DR. GARRICK:  Howard, are you going to comment to
     us about what they're expecting to get from us?
               MR. LARSON:  Well, Stephanie had -- her questions
     that she asked for on concrete, and I guess the other thing
     is whether the Committee had any thoughts as to whether or
     not the ANVR should be issued, right?  But you're planning
     on doing it no matter what the Committee thinks.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  No.  In fact, we're taking it
     to the Commission for approval to publish it.
               And I'm sure that they will also look at what you
     all have to say about it.  If the Commission approves it to
     publish it, then we'll go ahead and publish it.
               DR. WYMER:  Okay, any other questions?
               MR. LEVENSON:  I have one.  You have suggested
     that there are several possible regulatory frameworks in
     which this might be issued.
               Basically, what's really the difference?  What are
     the advantages or disadvantages of issuing it, either under
     Part 50.82 or, say, maybe another existing regulation?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Well, I guess there are pros
     and cons of both.  Decommissioning of power reactors is kind
     of a gray area, because it's -- actually, decommissioning is
     under Part 50, which is the utilization and production of
     power reactors.  But actually you're not utilizing or it's
     not producing anything anymore, so it goes into this waste
     arena.
               Low-level waste is under Part 61, and other
     licensee-type Parts.  I think material source licenses are
     under Part 30 or whatever; I'm not sure.  So we're trying to
     write a clear regulation.  Should it be now in a specific
     race arena only, and say, for instance, leave 50.82 alone,
     and say if you want -- you know, leave it as it stands, and
     say, well, if you want to entomb, you have to go to this
     whole entire Part because we realize that it's not a
     production or utilization facility.
               Or should we leave it under 50.82, because that is
     where decommissioning of power reactors, you know, that's
     where the regulations are.
               So we're struggling with, you know, what, exactly,
     is this entombment issue?
               MR. LEVENSON:  Where, for instance, is SAFESTOR
     now?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  SAFESTOR is not exactly in the
     regulations, but the supplementary information to the --
     okay, let me start again.
               Yes, the supplementary information that talks
     about SAFESTOR and DECON are actually located in 50.82.  So,
     you would go to 50.82 for guidance with SAFESTOR and DECON.
               MR. LEVENSON:  Do you think there is any advantage
     in having it all in one place, rather than having to bounce
     around the regulations?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  I guess that's maybe an
     administrative type choice.
               MR. LEVENSON:  Well, not so much that as that most
     of the regulations have all kinds of supplemental stuff, and
     if you're moving back from in between regulations, you can
     have a lot of changes, whereas if they are all within one
     regulation --
               DR. GARRICK:  I guess one of those options -- and
     maybe that's what you were doing, talking about, because I
     have been looking at some other stuff while you were talking
     -- but one option would certainly be to remove the
     decommissioning material from Part 50 and combine it with
     the entombment and other things into a separate regulation.
               MR. LEVENSON:  My gut feeling, without thinking
     about it extensively, is that it's all being in one place is
     more important than where it is.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, yes.
               MR. LEVENSON:  You have a speaker from NRR that
     maybe would like to say something on that.
               MR. HOWE:  I'm Allen Howe with Industrial and
     Medical Nuclear Safety, actually Stephanie's Section Leader.
     I just wanted to provide a comment to you.  Where we are
     right now with the process, we're at the point of developing
     a rulemaking plan for this.
               Some of these questions that you're asking, we're
     also trying to work out ourselves.
               We are also in the process of developing an ANPR
     and some of these issues, we want to explore as a part of
     the ANPR.
               In terms of what is the best option, we have not
     concluded yet what is the best option for that part of we're
     headed in trying to make that determination.
               And part of what we're trying to do right now is
     to keep you informed as to where we are, what kind of
     options we're considering, and in terms of the pros and the
     cons of locating the requirements in one part or another, it
     certainly is an item of discussion.  If we left it located
     in Part 50, it would be subject to entombment of reactor
     facilities.
               If we looked at it for another part, it may be
     that the scope is still defined for reactor facilities; it
     may be that the scope would be broadened to other things.
     But that is the question right now that is in the very
     preliminary stages of consideration, and it is something
     that will be a part of the information that we provide to
     the Commission for their consideration.
               MR. LARSON:  To one of your questions, Milt, the
     Commission did recognize that the Part 50 was written for
     the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of
     reactors, but they never looked at the back end of the
     cycle.
               So they did direct the Staff to take a look at the
     regulations that might be associated with decommissioning,
     and to look at putting those into one section.
               I think they are also looking at the GIS.
               Now, in regards to the first one, they've said,
     well, we'll look at that, and the Staff did make a proposal,
     and they said, okay, we'll defer looking at that for awhile
     longer.
               But the intent is to try and pull the applicable
     regulations together, because as you say, right now, they're
     here, there, and everywhere, and, you know, even today we're
     talking Part 20, Part 50.82, and other facilities.
               DR. WYMER:  If I understand it, you just said that
     you think entombment is enough different or has enough
     different aspects to it that you might consider writing a
     more broadly based regulation that includes not only
     entombment but other things that might be similar but are
     not necessarily reactor --
               MR. HOWE:  Let me just answer that question.
               That is certainly an option that could be
     considered.  The charter that we currently have before us
     right now, from the direction of the Commission, and
     Stephanie, please assist me with this, is to look at the
     entombment option for reactors
               DR. WYMER:  Okay, so that would rule out what I
     just said.
               MR. LEVENSON:  No.
               MR. HOWE:  If we want to explore that, that would
     have to be something that we would have to go to the
     Commission to get their approval with.
               MR. LEVENSON:  But you have to go to the
     Commission anyway.
               MR. HOWE:  Right.  In terms of preliminary
     thinking, yes, it has been an item that we have discussed --
     what would be the applicability of this type of option to
     other applications, other type of facilities.
               DR. WYMER:  Thanks.  Could you hear that over
     there, recording this stuff?
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, he did.
               DR. WYMER:  Any other questions?  We have run over
     Stephanie's time here a little bit.
               DR. LARKINS:  Ray, I was just curious.  What is
     the Staff schedule for this ANPR and development of the
     options, because a lot sounds very preliminary right now.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Well, we have a preliminary
     package in office concurrence as we speak.
               We are trying to get those comments resolved by
     Friday of this week.
               DR. LARKINS:  When is your preliminary plan to go
     to the Commission?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  February, 2001.
               I think ACNW will be on distribution for the
     preliminary copies, even before they go to the Commission.
               DR. WYMER:  When do you need our input?
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  I would like to have it by next
     ACNW meeting.
               DR. WYMER:  That will be in San Antonio.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Okay.  I will fly there and get
     it.
               [Laughter.]
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  I don't know your schedule but
     I think in talking to Rich Tortel he said that you could
     possibly, if you decided to write something up I think
     you're going to also send it to the Commission.
               I was hoping to have something, you know if
     possible, maybe by Thanksgiving in case there were some
     comments that I wanted to incorporate into the plan before I
     send it to the Commission.
               DR. WYMER:  You are likely to get a turkey if it
     comes that soon.
               [Laughter.]
               MR. LARSON:  Our next meeting is after that.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Oh, is it?
               MR. LARSON:  Our next meeting is that Monday,
     Tuesday and Wednesday.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  Okay -- early December, I
     guess, if possible
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, we will talk about that later
     in our reports session.  Yes, thank you very much.
               MS. BUSH-GODDARD:  You're welcome.
               DR. GARRICK:  Thank you very much.  Okay.  We are
     to what our agenda says is 2 o'clock and we are now going to
     hear some reports from members and consultants.
               You have the honor of hearing from Bill Hinze
     first.
               DR. HINZE:  Well, prior to Stephanie's terrific
     presentation there I was going to use some overheads, but I
     have copies --
               THE REPORTER:  Do you want this as part of the
     record?
               [Discussion off the record.]
               DR. GARRICK:  I don't think we do.  Who is our
     designated Federal official?
               All right.  For this session he says yes.
               [Pause.]
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay, Bill, tell us what you are up
     to.
               DR. HINZE:  First of all I do want to thank you
     for directing me and allowing me to attend these two
     technical exchanges.  I found them very interesting.
               However, I want to say that I think that one of
     the momentous affairs of my life occurred this morning, I
     heard the first crack in the engineered barrier --
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  -- and so --
               DR. GARRICK:  Geology is back on the map.
               DR. HINZE:  -- this is a great day for the
     geoscientists.
               I think it is appropriate that I go immediately
     after entombment because --
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  -- there seems to be some kind of
     relationship there.
               Despite the many excellent attributes of the Yucca
     Mountain area, there are some negative aspects of the Yucca
     Mountain area and certainly those that have the disruptive
     events are very much a part of that.
               The Yucca Mountain region has been tectonicly and
     seismically and volcanically active for many millions of
     years and we as geoscientists have nothing to do but to
     assume that that is going to continue on for some period of
     time.
               In fact, within 20 kilometers of the Yucca
     Mountain facility, as you well know, we have a 80,000 year
     old volcano and we had a 5.6 magnitude earthquake which
     occurred in '92 which caused damage, I am not going to say
     how much damage, but damage to the FOC, the Field Operations
     Center at the NTS.  These are examples of the importance of
     giving the disruptive events a very sharp look.
               Disruptive events are not easy to predict in this
     environment, as they might be in some other environments
     because in terms of the volcanic activity it is sparse, it
     is low-volume.  There is little direct evidence and that
     also is true of the seismicity, which is widely dispersed,
     and generally low magnitude except for the occasional larger
     magnitude like the Little Skull Mountain earthquake.
               Incidentally, I couldn't help think about, as one
     thinks about the Little Skull Mountain earthquake, that
     shortly after that earthquake, if you will recall the ACNW
     had a walk-through of what was it? -- the Y-Tunnel.  I think
     that was the name of it, the Y-Tunnel, immediately above the
     epicenter of that earthquake, and it had recently been
     painted white.  The tunnel had recently been painted white
     and one of the things that I remember so vividly of that
     walkthrough is that we tried to find a chip of white paint
     that might have popped off from the wall and despite going
     through not with a hand lens but with pretty close scrutiny
     we were unable to find any evidence of even something, a
     little chip coming off the wall in an epicenter directly
     above it, above the epicenter of that earthquake.
               Well, in any event, disruptive events are very
     important.  They are hard to predict and as a result much of
     what has been heard at the technical exchanges from the DOE
     revolve around the evidence derived from the probabilistic
     volcanic hazard analysis and the probabilistic seismic
     hazard analysis plus its derivatives.
               These basically form the meat and potatoes of the
     response of the DOE to the NRC concerns.
               In the disruptive events there are these two KTIs
     that the NRC Staff has identified, the igneous activity and
     the SDS, the Structural Deformation and Seismicity.
               I was fortunate enough to attend both of those and
     the SDS was just last week.  I have prepared a trip report
     on each of those and your quiz on those will not be until I
     finish, but I hope that you will at least look them over.
               I do want to point out though that these are meant
     to supplement the NRC/DOE summaries that come out of these
     meetings because I really think these go hand-in-glove.  I
     have made no attempt to do every -- to say everything in the
     right words and the correct, exact verbatim of the
     agreements between the NRC and the DOE.
               On the next page I try to point out the objectives
     and the basic results of the technical exchanges.
               The NRC has identified in their KTI analyses
     several concerns regarding both igneous activity and the
     SDS.  For example, in igneous activity they have identified
     prior to the technical exchanges some 16 different concerns
     of various significance, but concerns, and these then were
     the subject of discussion in the presentations by DOE where
     they have presented additional data and analyses on these
     previously unresolved issues leading hopefully to the
     closing of these issues.
               This requires -- attendance at these requires a
     very close attention to what is going on.  Things go very
     rapidly and particularly if you have not been doing this
     every moment of your life.
               I was sitting there feeling sorry for myself that
     I couldn't daydream at all when I turned and looked at my
     neighbor at the last meeting, and it was Jim Curtis, who you
     will recall is a lawyer and a former Commissioner, and a
     good benefactor of this committee, and he was staying right
     with it, right with all of these things, so I figured if a
     lawyer could stay with it --
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  -- that we could stay with it as well.
               Another objective was to develop an action plan
     leading to the closure of the KTIs.  This has happened to
     some extent but it has often led to new concerns.
               This is not bringing me another rock, but further
     clarification, need for additional data that has been
     indicated by the NRC and its coworkers.
               The results were these intensive discussions by
     the DOE of the NRC concerns and I think that you will be
     pleased to know that all issues except one concern in
     igneous activity has moved to the closed or closed
     pending -- in other words, the NRC feels that they have
     enough information or that they see a proper path to obtain
     the information.
               That one issue relates to the intrusive scenario
     in the igneous activity and the number of casks that would
     be involved with that and what kind of disruption there
     would be to those casks.  That is the one remaining issue.
               Now in view of the fact that you wouldn't give me
     much time to do this discussion, I thought it would be best
     if I started with some general conclusions and not only
     about the technical aspects of it, but about the process
     itself because this is a process that may be new to you.
               So on the next page I have some bullets on general
     conclusions and the first is that this is an efficient
     process.  I think this eyeballing, this sitting down and
     actually looking at data together or maps together is a very
     efficient process which will lead to a much improved,
     enhanced site recommendation analysis and license
     application, if we reach that point.
               The discussions are very open and far-ranging, but
     they are very much focused on the technical issues.
               Both the DOE and the NRC Staffs are well prepared
     and bring a lot of ammunition in the form of backup
     expertise with various individuals that have discipline
     experience.
               The NRC, and here I am speaking about the NRC and
     the Center, has done a thorough job of identifying points of
     concern in the DOE's AMR, the FEPS, and the TSPA.  It is not
     immediately obvious that there are any holes in this.
               The NRC -- I know one of the things that this
     committee has been concerned about and rightly so is is the
     NRC overly conservative in their concerns.
               That would not be my feeling at all, at least on
     the basis of these two.  That goes even to igneous, the
     probability of an igneous event.
               I don't think they have been overly conservative.
     The fact of the matter is I think in some cases DOE has
     been, if you will, somewhat conservative, and frankly if I
     were in their shoes I would probably do the same thing,
     because they are covering themselves from the standpoint of
     uncertainties in data and inadequate knowledge of some of
     the events and so some of their assumptions are overly
     conservative and you can talk about that in many ways.
               For example, the number of casks that are damaged,
     the set-back distance and so forth -- these seems to be
     pretty conservative.
               There is a general concern that the NRC has about
     better documentation and I mention that as a general point
     because it is pervasive throughout the entire discussions
     and if you look at their summary reports you will see that,
     maybe not ad nauseam, but you will see that quite often.
               The DOE screens the basis of 63 and this is on the
     basis of the individual features, events and processes, the
     FEPs, for a 10,000 year period, but one of the questions
     that you have to ask, and this was brought up by the NRC at
     the technical exchanges, well, what is the impact of these
     FEPs in the period immediately following the time of
     compliance.
               You don't want in 10,001 for something
     catastrophic to happen and the fact of the matter is I think
     Congress has already stated their concerns about that.
               It isn't clear that even though their TSPAs, DOE's
     TSPAs are extended beyond 10,000 years that they are
     considering the FEPs that may have an effect after 12,000
     years.  An example of that might global change.
               I would suggest that this is something that this
     committee or some oversight committee needs to be on the
     alert for.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Change meanings going to pluvial?
               DR. HINZE:  A change in the infiltration, a change
     in the water table, you know, et cetera.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  We actually have included that in
     there, the TSPA --
               DR. GARRICK:  Certainly included it in their TSPA
     dose calculations.
               DR. HINZE:  You know, I think you are obviously
     right but you want to worry about things that are going to
     happen after that 10,000 year period of time after 10,001
     and whatever.
               The 63 gives them a very definite date on which to
     exclude by.  One part in 10,000 and 10,000 years, okay? --
     and so if something happens after 10,002 it may be of
     importance.
               It is not clear, and this goes back to your
     thoughts, Ray, that DOE is -- it is not clear, as I put it
     here, it is not clear that DOE is adequately considering the
     effect of coupling the events in the exclusion screening
     process -- this one part in 10,000 and 10,000 years.
               We also, as I mentioned yesterday, have to be
     worried about these events which cross over that may have an
     effect upon two different KTIs and get lost in the middle.
     There is -- you hear a lot of people saying, well, that will
     have to be taken up in engineering design, but somebody has
     to make certain that that really is taken up in engineering
     design and oftentimes these things are extremely critical.
               A couple of other items in general.  Staff of the
     Center I think have contributed greatly to the NRC's
     response to the DOE.  I think they have done a great job.
     There is also a need to maintain a continuing technical
     expertise as these things evolve and we are not through
     seeing the igneous activity, even though this committee
     might like to say that that is true.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  Well, I put myself in that category
     too.
               Something that I don't have listed down here but
     which is in the summary of my igneous activity trip report,
     and I don't know exactly how to say this but the
     documentation before -- let me start over again.
               I think it is very important that as this
     committee feels that stakeholders, public perception, be on
     the side of good science and good engineering at Yucca
     Mountain and part of that is taking part in these technical
     exchanges because you hear a lot and you do a lot.
               The problem is that except for the core group in
     NRC and the core group in DOE which have had numerous
     communications and which have access to all the reports and
     all that there is somewhat inadequate documentation both
     before and after the meeting for the stakeholder, for the
     advisory committees, et cetera, and I think that it would
     make life a lot easier.
               Let me just give you a case in point and this is
     not throwing rocks at anyone but I received through Len's
     good graces the PMR and the AMRs the day I was leaving for
     the technical exchange. You can understand that these just
     then became available.  It is essentially impossible to go
     into that meeting, sit in that meeting and be a
     knowledgeable observer -- all right, I've said enough.  I
     think you understand.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  You had enough time subsequently
     to digest the AMRs and PMR.
               DR. HINZE:  Merry Christmas -- and seriously, it
     is --
               DR. GARRICK:  He is our token earth scientist.
               DR. HINZE:  The fact of the matter is I don't even
     have a copy of the PSHA and my PVHA has been pulled apart
     and I think to attend these kinds of meetings that it is
     extremely important if you are going to get the most out of
     them that you have to have this kind of documentation not
     only in your hands but under your belt.
               John or George, I don't know how much you want me
     to go on with these --
               DR. GARRICK:  I figure we'll be here till 7:30 in
     the morning.
               Which conclusion are we on?
               DR. HINZE:  Well, we have gone through the general
     conclusions.
               Should I just hit a couple of high points?  Maybe
     I'll try to just hit a couple of high points.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Before you do that, you know, I
     just am interested in following up on what you just said,
     and I take your point that those of us who do this on a very
     part-time basis, it is extraordinarily hard to keep even a
     tenth of the relevant details in our minds and therefore to
     be nearly as well prepared as Staff.
               Now I would ask you though -- our hope is that
     nevertheless it was worth our while having you go there and
     write this report for us because you are technically capable
     enough to at least assess some of these general things,
     what's going on and whether the process itself is working,
     and be able to warn us if there are any red flags that
     should be raised.
               Are we wrong in assuming this?
               DR. HINZE:  I think that you get that from my trip
     reports.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               DR. HINZE:  That is what I carried forward.  There
     are general observations but there are also specific
     observations.  I mean we all have our technical expertises
     and our special interests and, yes, I think that standing
     back may be -- you know, sometimes too much knowledge gets
     you into the woods -- and you really need to get back there,
     and that is what this committee has always done, I think,
     and will continue to do, but it is helpful to be as prepared
     as possible and so that's my point.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Right.
               DR. HINZE:  One of the more contentious issues
     which has consumed a lot of this committee's time is -- that
     is between the DOE and the NRC, is the probability of future
     igneous activity.
               That contentious nature of that was not really
     subdued too much at the technical exchange.  It is still
     there.  It's clearly still there.
               The DOE has done the PVHA.  They have come up with
     basically 10 to the minus 8th per year based upon the ages,
     the distribution, and typography of the area.
               In contrast to that, as you will remember, the NRC
     Staff with the work of the Center have come up with 10 to
     the minus 7th to 10 to the minus 8th and they have included
     the tectonic controls much more than did the experts in the
     expert elicitation.
               Frankly, I think the NRC Staff is right on target
     here because there is ample evidence that there are some
     controls on particularly the more recent volcanic activity
     of the tectonism so I think that that has to be given a
     great deal of credibility.  I mentioned that in the report
     and so forth.
               I think the key thing is "so what" -- you know,
     what is the difference between 10 to the minus 7th and 10 to
     the minus 8th.  We were very interested to hear that the DOE
     indeed has done the TSPA going to 10 to the minus 7th as
     well as 10 to the minus 8th.  Basically they end up with
     about six times greater peak dose for the 10 to the minus
     7th over the 10 to the minus 8th, but this peak dose is
     really quite minimal.
               I think, if my notes are right, for the eruptive
     event the peak dose calculation shows .03 millirems per year
     and for the intrusive, 1.2 millirems per year and this is
     for 10 to the minus 7th.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  That's within the compliance
     period.
               DR. HINZE:  Yes, surely within the compliance.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  No, no, I mean that is for the
     compliance period.
               DR. HINZE:  Yes, that's right, excuse me.  That is
     for the compliance period.
               There is some difference here about whether
     intrusion, extrusion is important, earlier or later than the
     10,000.  I don't really think that is a real argumentive
     point, a problematic point, but the interesting thing is
     here that the DOE says okay, you know, now that they have
     run the TSPA as they follow through with their subsequent
     TSPAs they will provide 10 to the minus 7th plus their base
     case and that's great.  That is the kind of cooperation we
     want to see.
               The other --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  By the way, Bill, I totally agree
     with you and that is when John asked me the question
     yesterday about igneous activity.  He was, of course,
     chuckling, when he asked me the question but my response was
     at least partially serious, and that is that I really think
     that it is a great example of issue resolution because the
     Staff and DOE really came to an accommodation that seems to
     me to give satisfaction to both sides.
               DR. LARKINS:  I am glad to see that you were at
     least partially serious.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  We didn't reach agreement on numbers
     but we reached agreement on action.  That's the beautiful
     part about this.
               One of the things that enters into this also is
     this, is the buried igneous features and this gets into an
     old problem of events and the USGS has flown to new aeromags
     and I have given you copies or where to get that as an open
     file if you are interested in looking at it.  I don't
     suggest you do because it is kind of arcane but you can't
     get the figures off of the website -- at least I was unable
     to -- but you can get them from the USGS.
               The new survey has really not found any new
     events.  They found a new magnetic anomaly near Lathrup
     Wells.  It probably is a lava flow that is associated with
     Lathrup Wells.
               DR. STEINDLER:  You realize the implication of
     what Bill said?  Regulation by adjudication, you average.
               DR. HINZE:  That is not the case at all --
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  And to establish that --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  You tried to stuff those words
     right into us now.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. STEINDLER:  I have been trying for years.
               DR. HINZE:  I'd point out that you are --
               DR. STEINDLER:  Wrong as usual.
               DR. HINZE:  -- maybe this one time in error.
               I will ask you to direct yourself to the -- we are
     moving rapidly here -- to the second to the last page under
     Structural Deformation and Seismicity KTI agreement, the
     faulting.
               This was one of the more interesting -- the second
     bullet under Faulting.
               The second bullet under Faulting is perhaps one of
     the more interesting aspects of the technical exchange.
               That is that the DOE is using the median of the
     hazard as predicted by the probabilistic seismic hazard
     analysis.  There are further details in the material of the
     report plus this and this is the post-closure period.
               NRC says wait a second, you know, you should be
     using the mean like you are using in the pre-closure period,
     and DOE says no, we should be using the median as we do in
     the siting of nuclear power plants.  That is what I am
     getting to -- your average.
               This I think remains a very controversial point
     and it not only deals with the faulting subissue but it also
     deals with the seismicity and the ground motion, not only
     with the displacement but the ground motion associated with
     the seismic events.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  When you say it is a big issue,
     is it going to matter?  Is it going to matter in the bottom
     line?
               DR. HINZE:  We don't know that from the materials
     presented.
               I did not hear that but the problem, George, is
     that there were an expert or two that were way out on the
     tail, way out on the tail, and as a result the median falls
     beyond the 85th percentile, and so all of a sudden you're
     bumping way over here and DOE says what we are doing is just
     following the normal routine of the NRC and using the
     median.
               DR. GARRICK:  The mean.  The NRC uses a mean.
               DR. HINZE:  Well, as I understand it in the siting
     of nuclear power plants that they use the median and this is
     according to Carl Stepp, and I have not looked up the
     regulation but Carl, you know, lived with these things
     longer than I have.
               In any event, as I say here, they have agreed and
     I have abbreviated this, the longer expression of this is in
     your report, document technical justification for the use of
     the median or use of the mean or use of some other
     statistical measure that you justify -- but this is one that
     we should keep our eyes on very clearly because it may, it
     really may have an effect.
               Related to this, and I thought this may be of
     interest to the committee because of your long-term interest
     in expert elicitation, is that -- and it is the first bullet
     under Seismicity in this --
               DR. GARRICK:  Bell, before you get on to that, do
     you recall what they said the difference was between the
     mean and the median?
               DR. HINZE:  No, No, and I don't -- it's not that I
     don't recall.  It's the fact that it wasn't given.
               DR. GARRICK:  I see, because if they have a median
     they certainly have a mean.
               DR. HINZE:  There is a range of about 10 to the
     minus 5th to 10 to the minus 8th for the post-closure
     period.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, so if it is highly skewed then
     the mean may be anywhere from two to ten times the median.
               DR. HINZE:  Yes, exactly.
               DR. GARRICK:  And --
               DR. STEINDLER:  That's what Bill is saying.
               DR. HINZE:  That is what I am saying.  The median
     is way out there.
               DR. GARRICK:  Of course the other thing that often
     means, if that is as a direct result of an elicitation
     process, that there's some inconsistencies in the
     implementation of the elicitation activity.
               DR. HINZE:  Once again, you are right on target,
     sir.  That is the point that I was just bringing up here.
     That is, the NRC has asked the DOE to document the feedback
     to the subject matter experts following the elicitation of
     their respective judgments.
               This is to see what kind -- I have gone through
     the elicitation process with the Eastern Seismicity and I
     know once you give your results then all the calculations
     are made and they you are faced with comparing your results
     with what everyone else has done and why are you such an
     outlier and so the NRC has appropriately asked that they
     want feedback on what feedback was given to the subject
     matter experts.
               Now what DOE claims and I suspect correctly so is
     that they followed 1563, the Branch Technical Position.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               DR. HINZE:  And recalling from my own days of
     going through this with the same group, you know, there was
     a pretty fair discussion of that, but nonetheless that is
     something to be -- it is the first time we have seen even a
     question of a chink in the armor of the PSHA or the PVHA,
     and so this would be an interesting one to keep very close
     tabs on.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I am still curious about your
     assessment, because you started out talking about Little
     Skull Mountain and looking for white chips of paint, and not
     finding any, all right? -- and my question to you as an
     expert, post-closure is seismicity a big issue?
               DR. HINZE:  No.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Thank you.  I thought I was
     missing something.
               DR. HINZE:  No, but to me I don't think based upon
     what I know of the issue that it is going to be a major
     problem.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Okay.
               DR. HINZE:  But we have to follow the rules and
     standards.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  No, no, I agree, and I think that
     the NRC Staff is absolutely correct for asking for
     clarification and what-not, but I am just curious from our
     standpoint if we look at risk as the bottom line, yes, we
     should keep tabs on this but it is probably not going to be
     a big red flag for us.
               DR. LARKINS:  Just for your information, this is a
     reoccurring issue, even in the reactor side.  We are looking
     at the risk of spent fuel pool accidents, particularly spent
     fuel pool fires and those are dominated by the seismic
     events.
               In trying to reconcile it, the Staff was looking
     at the Livermore curves versus EPRI curves, which are about
     a factor of 10 difference, and what they ended up doing --
     they couldn't reconcile the difference -- was to do the
     analysis, the risk assessment using both sets of curves and
     in saying where they lay in terms of the safety goal, but
     the expert elicitation process, if you are familiar with it,
     was slightly skewed in one case versus another case.
               DR. HINZE:  I think there are some critical
     elements going on here in the igneous activity and the SDS
     and I think you ought to track them.  I think they are
     important.
               I think the word on the street now is that the
     most critical, from the standpoint of dose in the first
     10,000 years, is the igneous activity and that is even with
     the -- that is both with 10 to the minus 7 and 10 to the
     minus 8.  I think it is important to follow up.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  What is your assessment on the
     open issue, the open issue having to do with dispersal?
               DR. HINZE:  That is a good point, George.
               The DOE has assumed that the intrusion comes up,
     it hits a cask -- a cask, because generally the orifices are
     relatively small, a meteor -- and it hits a cask and then
     they have arbitrarily selected, and I say arbitrarily
     because I didn't hear any evidence -- that three casks on
     either side in that drift are destroyed and the lids are
     taken off from all of the so-called Zone 2, taken off all of
     the rest of the casks.
               It is rather -- it looked very arbitrary.  There
     needs to be a real documentation of the thermal, the nature
     of the thermal event, the mechanical and also the shock
     effect because if that magma comes up there's going to be a
     quite disastrous shock and so we have the mechanical effects
     of the magma on the shock wave as well as the thermal.
               The other aspect of that is that the NRC, and I
     think the NRC is right here again, is that the NRC states
     that any intrusion that reaches the drift will also have an
     explosion, an eruptive event, violent strombolian, okay?
               I think that is very reasonable because that will
     come up and the pressure differential will lift that
     thousand feet, you know -- it will work its way up.
               The DOE, in contrast to that, says no, that they
     have these two separate events.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Two separate events, right.
               DR. HINZE:  Right.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Actually I thought that the NRC
     Staff had agreed on separate analyses for the intrusion and
     for the exposure.
               DR. HINZE:  Yes, they do, but they think they are
     going to have both when they have an intrusion event.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I see.  You know, the only thing
     that bothered me in looking at it fairly recently is that
     the concern now, and I think it is a concern, is once you
     get the ash plume out there, and Staff is now pretty happy
     with the way DOE is doing the modeling of the ash plume
     because they are basically taking the lead from NRC, but the
     real question then is okay, this stuff gets out on the
     ground.
               Now a big issue is redistribution, post-eruption
     redistribution, and we don't know how the hell to do that.
               DR. HINZE:  You know, this is discussed in the
     report, my report, and --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  I know.  I read your report, by
     the way, and it was a good report.
               DR. HINZE:  It really worried me because, you
     know, one of the real features of the Amargosa Desert are
     the sand dunes.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  That is correct.
               DR. HINZE:  And that stuff is going to move, to
     say nothing of the working of the soil.  That is to enter
     into it as well.
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Whatever happens there.
               DR. HINZE:  And I really -- the modeling is all
     done with this ash plume, which is the Suzuki model, which
     is strictly an empirical model.
               I would feel much happier about it if we could go
     back to first principles, mechanics and thermal, and have a
     ash plume model that was based upon first principles rather
     than empirical fitting.
               It occurred to me that back in another world I
     used to be involved in, cratering, in fact out at NTS, and
     those days, which was long ago, we were working on models
     for cratering and they were pretty primitive --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  Yes, but you were using modeling
     clay, right?
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  The fact of the matter, I tested my
     models in the sandbox, but that is another story -- out at
     Fort Belvoir -- but it occurred to me that there probably
     should be some pretty good models out of the cratering
     people, and I know from the work that I was involved with
     back in those days that we went back to first principles.
               I mean we checked it but we really tried to do it
     on a first principle basis, and I think that it would be
     worthwhile for the -- for someone to look into that.
               I think I would have a much better feeling about
     it.
               You know, along that same line, we can talk a lot
     about this, but one of the concerns is the speed of the wind
     and the direction of the wind, because currently the DOE is
     cutting off their plume at 3.8 kilometers, which is low for
     a violent strombolian, which may be conservative but we
     should push that to a higher elevation, which means a higher
     velocity and if you go to a higher velocity in the Southern
     Nevada area you know what happens.  You know that from the
     radioactive spread from some of the vented nuclear weapon
     features.  It goes east.
               So there is more work to be done in looking at
     that whole biosphere issue including the remobilization.
               I was really proud of the NRC and its Staff in
     looking at these things.
               DR. LARKINS:  Bill, can I ask you a quick
     question?
               I notice on here you say "Address NRC concerns
     with the assumption that inhalation of 10 to 100 micron
     range particles is treated as additional" -- so ingestion --
               DR. HINZE:  The health physicist -- my
     recollection of that, John -- is the health physicist from
     the Center brought that issue up and felt that it could lead
     to underestimation of the dose, which therefore really has
     to be looked at.
               There are a number of things in the mass loading,
     in this --
               DR. LARKINS:  I was going to say there's a lot of
     information available on the inhalation of aerosols in the
     particle size range.
               DR. HINZE:  My guess is that it would be helpful
     if DOE had a better connect with NRC on this and I think
     that this agreement really spells that out.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Did you see any interest in the
     chemistry of resuspension?
               DR. HINZE:  Resuspension?
               DR. STEINDLER:  Yes -- junk gets down through the
     chemistry of transport to the water table, et cetera.
               You have a lot of stuff -- lay it down -- then
     what?  The issue is not entirely due to inhalation.
               DR. HINZE:  That's right and that is one of the
     things that the NRC asked for was there's concern about not
     only the inhalation but also drilling down and using the
     water that has gone down.  Yes.  That is part of it.
               I think you want me to shut up.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, no.  This has been very
     valuable.
               DR. HINZE:  But yes?
               [Laughter.]
               DR. GARRICK:  There's a lot of issues with this
     that I have struggled with, especially the igneous
     probabilities.
               The approach of separating the consequence from
     the likelihood was very foreign to me as a practitioner of
     risk assessment on the basis that the probability is very
     much dependent upon the end state and the end state is a
     variable and the end state is a consequence.
               The justification for that seems to be that if you
     get a partial intersection it is about the same as a total
     intersection and so the variability that usually exists in
     catastrophic events doesn't exist in this one, so that has
     been the simple explanation.
               DR. HINZE:  Good point.
               DR. GARRICK:  And also the issue you bring up
     about the median and the mean, that is a traditional one.  I
     thought it had been resolved.
               If you really believe in uncertainty and you want
     the central tendency parameter that best represents
     uncertainty it has to be the mean, and so I am surprised
     that there is a debate over that.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Well, isn't there always the
     question of skewed distribution?
               DR. GARRICK:  When you calculate a mean, you
     utilize the -- you calculate an expected value and that
     expected value calculation embraces all of the
     probabilities.
               DR. STEINDLER:  But for a skewed distribution --
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, yes -- but if the skewed
     distribution is in fact as a result of a consistent
     interpretation of the evidence.
               DR. STEINDLER:  Yes.  That is the issue, precisely
     the issue.
               DR. GARRICK:  And if it is not -- and that's where
     I don't think it is, and so I would agree with you if
     there's some high level of suspect on the distribution, but
     that is not something we are going to --
               DR. HINZE:  One of the real problems there is that
     the DOE is using the mean in the preclosure and the median
     in the postclosure.  You know, that smells like a day-old
     fish.
               I mean certainly the NRC's requests here --
               DR. HORNBERGER:  If they are doing it.  If that's
     correct then I would argue that at least they are doing it
     the right way, because the mean will be conservative and
     preclosure is when seismicity probably is important and you
     probably want to be conservative and postclosure is probably
     who cares.
               DR. HINZE:  Achh -- you can buy me a drink.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. GARRICK:  That's very good, Bill, and very
     helpful and your reports are comprehensive and enjoyable to
     read.  Okay.
               Let's see -- Ray, do you want to make a few brief
     comments about the decommissioning conference?
               DR. WYMER:  I can be very brief.
               DR. HINZE:  Excuse me.  There was a good old guy
     and he made copies of the attachments for this last report
     on the SDS.
               DR. GARRICK:  Oh, good.
               DR. HINZE:  So these are for you.  They are the
     attachments and your quiz will be --
               DR. GARRICK:  Oh, my --
               DR. HINZE:  Seriously, there's a lot of
     boilerplate in there but there's a lot of goodies too and
     flick through them, okay?
               MR. LARSON:  You are getting even with us for the
     PMRs.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HINZE:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay, Ray, and then we will take an
     overdue break again.
               [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the recorded portion of
     the meeting was recessed, to reconvene at 8:30 a.m.,
     Thursday, October 19, 2000.]

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