Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE
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121ST ACNW MEETING
PUBLIC MEETING
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Ballroom B
Crowne Plaza Hotel
Las Vegas, Nevada
Tuesday, September 19, 2000
The Commission met in open session, pursuant to
notice, at 9:05 a.m., B. John Garrick, Chairman, presiding.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
DR. B. JOHN GARRICK, Chairman, ACNW
DR. RAYMOND G. WYMER, Vice Chairman, ACNW
MR. MILTON N. LEVENSON, ACNW Member
DR. GEORGE HORNBERGER, ACNW Member. STAFF AND PARTICIPANTS:
DR. JOHN T. LARKINS, Executive Director, ACRS/ACNW
MR. HOWARD LARSON, Acting Associated Director, ACRS/ACNW
MR. RICHARD K. MAJOR,, ACNW Staff
MS. LYNN DEERING, ACNW Staff
MR. AMARJIT SINGH, ACNW Staff
DR. ANDREW C. CAMPBELL, ACNW Staff
JAMES E. LYONS
NEIL COLEMAN, NMSS
WILLIAM REAMER, NMSS
DR. JOHN TRAPP, NMSS. P R O C E E D I N G S
[9:05 a.m.]
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Good morning. The meeting will
now come to order.
This is the first day of 121st Meeting of the
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste. My name is John
Garrick, Chairman of the ACNW. Other members of the
Committee include George Hornberger, Ray Wymer, and Milt
Levenson.
Today, the Committee will discuss activities
regarding planning and future agenda items, and we have, as
a matter of fact, already done that.
We will hold a special session, Key Technical
Issues. Bill Reamer of NMSS will discuss the considerations
involved with KTI closure.
We will discuss saturated and unsaturated flow
under isothermal conditions. Neil Coleman, NMSS, will
discuss the partial closer of this KTI, namely that having
to with unsaturated zone flow.
We're going to discuss igneous activity, Dr. John
Trapp, NMSS, will discuss the considerations associated with
closure of this particular KTI.
This afternoon, we're going to hear public
comments from stakeholders and members of the public, and
interested parties between 1:00 and 4:30 p.m., and we're
going to discuss potential technical committee issues for
the Calendar Year 2001.
Lynn Deering is the Designated Federal Official
for today's initial session. This meeting, as usual, is
being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.
We have received one request from Dr. Jacob
Powers, who has indicated a desire to make a few remarks. I
assume that's going to take place during the afternoon
session, unless I'm advised otherwise.
In connection with people who will be speaking, it
is requested that each speaker use one of the microphones,
identify himself or herself, and speak clearly and with a
volume that we can all hear.
Also, I should note that there were some
last-minute changes in our agenda, due to activities of the
Commission, and these changes were made, however, learned
that the revised Federal Register Notice on the meeting did
not get out until, as a matter of fact, today. So we
apologize for that inconvenience, especially to those of you
who were expecting to see an agenda item on the Yucca
Mountain Review Plan.
That was out of our control, and pretty much out
of the staff's control.
Before proceeding, I'd like to note a few items.
Jim Lyons, who is supposed to be sitting on my right here,
we welcome him as the Associate Director for Technical
Support, ACRS/ACNW, at this meeting.
We did discuss his activities and experience and
curriculum vitae at our July meeting, and we welcome him. I
understand he had some personal matters he had to take care
today, but he will be here for the rest of the meeting.
The Committee also welcomes Judith Goodwin to the
Technical Staff as secretary. She reported on August 28th.
Judith was with the High-Level Waste Branch, so,
fortunately, is familiar with a lot of the business that we
engage in.
Janet Schleuter who is Commissioner McGaffigan's
Technical Assistant, is on a rotational assignment to
High-Level Waste for a couple of months, serving as the
Acting Branch Chief.
An item of interest is that the Utah regulators,
subject to some public comment, have approved license
amendments to the EnviroCare license to allow construction
of a new disposal cell for Class-A, low-level radioactive
waste.
TLG Services, a company leader in the
decommissioning services business, has been purchased by
Entergy Nuclear. Entergy Nuclear is a nuclear power plant
generating company.
Some of us have been interested in following the
Maine Yankee activity. Maine Yankee has indicated that it
intends to remove all fuel from the spent storage pool by
April 2001, by unloading it to NAC Universal Multipurpose
Systems Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Cask System.
I think that's all the opening remarks, unless
there are some comments from members or staff or something
that I missed.
[No response.]
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Hoping that there have been
none, I think we will proceed with the agenda. The first
issue is going to be key technical issue closure business,
and Bill Reamer is going to cover that.
MR. REAMER: Thank you, Dr. Garrick. And we have
actually three presentations today, as you enumerated.
The three presentations today all give some kind
of introductory description of issue resolution, the
process, what the staff is trying to achieve, the issue
resolution, what does it mean; then we'll have two of the
technical presentations on saturated zone and igneous
activity to follow, where we will really show what we've
done to implement issue resolution in those two areas.
So, what I'll be talking about today are the
givens that drive -- some of the givens that drive issue
resolution.
I'll be talking about the context of issue
resolution, which is prelicensing consultation. Issue
resolution, as we're talking about it today, is a
prelicensing concept.
I'll define, as best I can, issue resolution, and
will be interested in any questions that you have to kind of
assure that we have shared understanding of what it is that
we mean when we say issue resolution.
I'll talk about the constraints on issue
resolution which are very important as well, and the revisit
the distinction between prelicensing and the licensing
context, and hopefully driving home some of the points that
I want to make on issue resolution.
I talked about the drivers of issue resolution,
and I just want to mention several items here:
One is the statutory requirement that the
Commission complete its license application review in three
years. That assumes, of course, that there is a license
application.
There are many steps in this project that need to
be completed before there can be a license application.
The Department of Energy needs to complete the
scientific studies at the site, and needs to prepare a site
recommendation.
That site recommendation needs to be approved by
the President. It needs to be approved by the Congress.
This is not a project that is a foregone conclusion; there
are many steps that still need to be taken.
But assuming that there is a license application,
one of the requirements in the statute is that the
Commission must complete its review and issue a decision on
whether or not to authorize construction within three years.
This puts the onus on the DOE to submit to the
Commission, a high-quality license application. By a
high-quality license application, what I'm talking about is
a license application that addresses all of the issues in
some way.
That puts the onus on the Department to identify
the issues early on, and to address them. The three-year
timeframe that we work under, once the license application
is filed, really doesn't permit very much time to be
addressing questions.
The premium is on the early identification of
issues, and it's DOE's responsibility to do that.
What do we mean when we talk about issues? We're
talking really very broadly here: Questions, comments,
concerns. They can come from the staff, they can come from
the state, they can come from the Department of Energy,
technical people.
They are broadly defined; they relate to the data,
the models, the codes that the Department proposes to rely
on in its argument in favor of the project. As I said, the
Department's responsibility is to address all of these
issues in some manner.
For the NRC staff's part, we, too, are
implementing a policy of early identification of issues.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act directs the Commission to
monitor and comment on the Department of Energy's site
characterization activities.
The staff takes that to mean that we should be
raising our questions now, not holding them. These, I would
emphasize, are questions at the staff level.
We're not speaking for the Commission, we're not
speaking for the Licensing Board, if there is a license
application. We're not speaking for other aspects of the
Agency.
The other point, of course, in prelicensing
consultation is that the staff has focused its review
activities on nine key technical issues. These are issues
that we have identified as what we think are most important
to performance.
We have done that identification based on our
iterative performance assessment activities, the insights
we've gained from that. And this is, in prelicensing, our
focus for issue resolution, the key technical issues.
What is issue resolution? To me, issue resolution
is an agreement by the Department of Energy that it will
address all of the questions, comments, and concerns, that
the staff raises at the staff level, before there is any
license application, and it will include that information in
the license application if there is a license application.
So that puts the onus on the Department of Energy
to provide to us, sufficient information so that the staff
can review the application and write a safety evaluation
report.
It puts the onus on the Department to provide a
complete record that we can review and reach a decision on
at the staff level.
Now, I say that issue resolution is achieved when
there is an agreement between the staff and the NRC, but
what I mean here is that there is an understanding on the
Department of Energy's part about our comments, and there is
an agreement on their part to respond, to provide the
information that the staff says is needed, that they have
heard our comment, that they have heard our question, and
that they have agreed to accept it and identify it.
Issues are, from the staff's standpoint,
considered closed when we have no further comments or
questions at a particular point in time about how the
Department of Energy is addressing something.
How is issue resolution achieved? In a very
general process description, we're using our TPA insights to
risk-inform our approach to issue resolution. We, the
staff, are focusing on those areas that we have identified
as areas of potential concern.
We're also identifying, at the staff level, what
additional information DOE needs to provide to address those
concerns, and I think the two following presentations on
unsaturated zone and igneous activity will really give you
concrete examples of how issue resolution in certain areas
has been achieved.
We have working definitions for issue resolution.
I haven't included them on the slide, because it looks like
the words are written by a lawyer.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: You wouldn't want to do that.
[Laughter.]
MR. REAMER: In any event, I'll just give them to
you orally: Issues that fit within the closed category,
we're saying that issues can be closed if the DOE approach
and available information acceptably address the staff
questions such that no information beyond what is currently
available will likely be required for regulatory
decisionmaking at the time of initial license application.
In other words, we're saying that the data that's
been presented is sufficient for us to conduct a review.
Issues are considered closed-pending, if the NRC staff has
confidence that the DOE proposed approach, together with the
DOE agreement to provide the NRC additional information
through specific testing or analyses, acceptably addresses
the staff's questions such that no information beyond that
provided or agreed to will likely be required at the time of
initial license application.
The key difference between a closed issue and a
closed-pending issue is that closed-pending issues are
relying on an agreement by the Department of Energy to
provide certain information in the future before there is
any license application.
And the third category issues -- Yes?
DR. HORNBERGER: Just a clarification: Is it that
they agree to provide the information before or at the time
of?
MR. REAMER: Well, at the time of, but as a
practical matter, that means it's going to have to be done
before the license application is submitted. It's
information, typically, that will require potentially
additional data-gathering or additional analysis of
information that exists, or additional justification of some
aspect of the argument.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: I think also, Bill, that it's
important to comment, maybe with respect to closed issues
and the issue of uncertainty.
You're not saying that the elimination of
uncertainty is a requirement for closure, but you may be
saying that good knowledge of the uncertainties is a part of
that process.
MR. REAMER: Yes, what we're looking for is the
DOE story, and the evidence that supports that story. And
the threshold for issue resolution is not that all questions
have been resolved such that there is no uncertainty that
remains; it's understanding the way in which the DOE has
used the uncertainty in their argument.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Right.
MR. REAMER: And, finally, issues that are open,
are open if the NRC has identified questions regarding the
Department of Energy approach, and the DOE has not yet
acceptably addressed the questions or agreed to provide the
necessary additional information in the license application.
DR. LARKINS: Bill, could that potentially affect
the acceptability of a license application, if there are
several open issues?
MR. REAMER: Absolutely. A license application
with a major hole may not be docket-able. As you may be
aware, there is an initial review that the staff does to any
license application that it receives, which is to assure
that the license application is complete.
And it must meet that acceptance review in order
to be docketed and reviewed. If a license application has a
major hole, there's always the possibility, the risk, that
it's not going to be a docket-able license application.
MR. LEVENSON: Bill, also, the term, closed, here,
applies just pre-license application. Is that correct, that
these things will all get thoroughly reviewed?
MR. REAMER: Issue resolution is a pre-closure
concept; that's right. It relates to the sufficiency of
information to conduct a review. It is not a merits
determination on that issue, and that's a very important
point, and I appreciate your raising that question.
The constraints on issue resolution are also
important points, and I try to remind people of this every
time I have an opportunity.
Issue resolution, the results of pre-licensing
activities, are not binding, if there is a license
application. They're not binding on the staff, they are not
binding on any potential party.
They are not binding on the state; they're not
binding on the Commission; they're not binding on the
Licensing Board, if there is a Licensing Board hearing.
Issue resolution is a prelicensing concept that's
designed to assure that there is a complete license
application, a complete record, that will provide the basis
for the staff to do its review, and write a safety
evaluation report.
The other point is that issues that are closed can
be reopened. And I think that Neil in his presentation,
Neil Coleman, may note in the unsaturated zone area, just
such a circumstance.
New information can always lead to the
consideration of what impact does this new information have
on that closed issue? Is it significant, such that that
issue should be reopened?
And so in conclusion, as I have said, issue
resolution relates to the left-hand side. It is a
prelicensing phase concept.
Its focus is on assuring that there is sufficient
information in any potential license application for the NRC
to conduct a review.
At the license application stage, the right-hand
concept, compliance determinations will be made by the NRC.
The DOE has the obligation, the burden of proof, really, at
all stages in this project, but particularly in the license
application stage, to demonstrate safety against the
Commission's regulations.
And it will be DOE's obligation at the time of a
license application, if there is one, to demonstrate
compliance with NRC regulations.
And so the logical conclusion is, in the
prelicensing phase, there are no safety conclusions against
the Commission's regulation, and it would be inappropriate
to attribute to issue resolution, any such conclusion or
finding with respect to compliance with the Commission's
regulations.
Any other questions?
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: I failed to recognize my
colleague here, George Hornberger, who was going to lead our
discussion on these next few presentations. George?
DR. HORNBERGER: Any questions, John?
[Laughter.]
DR. HORNBERGER: Any questions from the members?
Staff?
[No response.]
MR. REAMER: Any questions on just broader aspects
of issue resolution that I haven't addressed? What I've
tried to talk about specifically, or is the meaning, the
definitions, the meanings, the constraints, the boundaries,
the limits?
DR. HORNBERGER: As Bill well knows, we have been
quite interested in the issue resolution process, and I
think this is a good introduction to make sure that
everybody is on the same page with regard to the issues.
I think that I, at least, am looking forward to
the two specific discussions to follow, because my point is
that I think that we're okay on the general nature of the
issues.
What we need to do is better understand how this
really works.
I think one comment, though, worth making, is that
this is an open -- it sounds like it's just between the
Department and the NRC, but it's really an open process for
public and other stakeholder participation.
MR. REAMER: Right, the technical exchanges that
are frequently the point where we discuss issue resolution
with the Department of Energy are all open meetings, and the
documents the staff issues to document its progress in issue
resolution, those are public documents as well.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: The only thing I would ask,
though, is from your perspective, you've had some experience
with this. I know we're going to get at the detailed level,
but from your perspective, has the issue resolution process
so far accomplished what staff had hoped it would
accomplish?
MR. REAMER: Yes, but I wouldn't want to give the
impression that we're done. I think we have a lot more to
do in the issue resolution area.
Remember that there are essentially nine key
technical issues that we are focused on. We've held
technical exchanges with the Department of Energy on three
of those. We're hopeful to be able to meet with the
Department and the other -- the remaining key technical
issues as well.
So there's a good deal of work to be done, but
what we've found is an understanding and a willingness on
the part of the Department of Energy to hear what we're
having to say, and to respond to those questions and
concerns.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Thank you.
DR. HORNBERGER: Thanks very much, Bill. We're
going to -- even though the schedule says -- we're going to
move on.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: We're going to move on.
DR. HORNBERGER: We're going to move on. And so
we're going to --
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: The speakers are here.
DR. HORNBERGER: We're going to hear about the
unsaturated flow under isothermal conditions at KTI, and
Neil Coleman is with us for that.
MR. COLEMAN: Hello everyone. It's nice to be
here today to talk to you about a meeting that we had a
month ago in Berkeley, California.
I know from your staff, Lynn Deering attended that
meeting. Also, David Diodato, with the TRB attended, and we
had some very good technical discussions.
This was the first of this group of meetings on
issues resolution, and under our KTI, the unsaturated and
saturated flow under isothermal conditions, we've divided it
into two meetings, because it's really a lot of material to
cover.
The first meeting covered the unsaturated zone
issues and matrix diffusion, and also, to the extent we
needed to go over it, the climate issues as well, shallow
the infiltration.
The saturated zone issues will be covered in a
meeting that starts October 31st, and that is a definite
date. It will be a three-day meeting in Albuquerque.
And my counterpart with the Center for Nuclear
Waste Regulatory Analyses, Jim Winterly, is here today. A
number of folks from the Center were at this meeting as
well, and a host of NRC management and staff.
Briefly, again, the basis of these meetings is to
review the basis to resolve open issues at the staff level,
and for this meeting, those involving unsaturated zone flow
at Yucca Mountain, and to look at paths forward, if you
will, for any of the remaining issues under the unsaturated
zone.
Bill went through this, so I won't go through it
again, other than to stress that new information at any time
could cause us to reopen an issue, whether it's closed or
closed-pending.
And as you will see, new information prompted us
to reopen an issue that was resolved for several years, and
that was the shallow infiltration subissue.
Now, there are six subissues altogether under this
KTI or Key Technical Issue. And climate change, there are
two issues related to climate change:
There is one on just the general nature of what
kinds of climate change could be expected over the next
10,000 years and longer. This is a principal factor in
reviewing performance assessments.
And one reason we did look at it again is because
DOE changed their climate approach. They no longer assume,
as was done in the viability assessment, that a full pluvial
climate will occur over the next 10,000 years.
That was an extremely conservative assumption in
the VA. They now assume that a monsoonal climate, which is
somewhat wetter and warmer than today, will begin as soon as
600 years into the future, and last about 14000 years, and
that a glacial transition, which would be transitioning to a
pluvial climate, would occur in the following 8,000 years.
The mean annual precipitation during the glacial
transition is about 70 percent greater than in the present
day. DOE' assumptions about climate change are based on
generalized paleoclimate trends, and are acceptable.
The basis for this was published in a report by
Forester et al, 1999. The title of that is Climatic and
Hydrologic History of Southern Nevada During the --
So that subissue was closed, remains closed, even
though there was a revised approach.
The second subissue on hydrologic effects of
climate change, there was no real change in the DOE
approach, but because the climate change assumptions were
altered, we looked at this.
And we found that the same assumption made in VA
was made in -- continues to be made now, and that is that a
water table rise of about 120 meters would occur for the
future climate scenarios of both the monsoonal and the
glacial transition climate.
And you'll find that documented in the unsaturated
zone PMR on page 172, that that continues to be an
assumption.
This is a very conservative assumption that
continues to be, because we know that the water table rise
was probably nowhere near that much, and that was one of the
discoveries of the Nye County Drilling Program under the
leadership of the late Nick Stellavato, that one of the
first bore holes they drilled, Nye County Number 1, which is
drilled at a diatomite deposit known to have been flowing in
the very latest Pleistocene, just before the Holocene, and
confirmed that the water table depth there today --
We know it was flowing somewhere around 12,000
years ago, at the surface. Today, the water table there is
about 30 meters deep.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Neil, are these assumptions
absolute or probabilistic?
MR. COLEMAN: It's not an assumption; it's a
direct observation.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: So they are absolute.
DR. HORNBERGER: I don't think he means the
flowing water.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: No.
DR. HORNBERGER: He means the 120-meter rise.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Yes, yes, rise in the water
table, for example.
MR. COLEMAN: It's not treated probabilistically.
As each of the future climate --
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: So it's an on/off thing?
Either it's this or it's that?
MR. COLEMAN: At 600 years in the future, suddenly
the water table is treated as being 120 meters higher, and
it stays that way thereafter. It's a very conservative
assumption.
So this subissue remains closed. It was closed
and it remains closed. This is not closed-pending, this is
closed.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: This is called shoot yourself
in the foot, but go ahead.
MR. COLEMAN: Then present-day shallow
infiltration, which was previously closed, since the
viability assessment, DOE has revised downward, the mean and
the upper part of the range for shallow infiltration.
In TSPA-VA, a total system performance assessment
viability assessment, DOE used a value of about 8
millimeters per year for the mean annual infiltration over
the repository block.
The distribution now used in the UZPMR ranges from
about one to 12 millimeters per year, with a mean of about
five millimeters per year.
Now, the main reason for this change is further
incorporating the effects of vegetation and performance
assessment, which increases the transpiration, and also
runoff effects and how much water is assumed to run off
under different kinds of rainfall events.
However, we can perhaps buy off on the mean, the
lowered mean, but the upper end of the range, we feel should
be about 50 percent higher, should account for the many
uncertainties that exist in the system, some of which
include the true range of soil thicknesses and textures over
the Mountain, and the bedrock hydraulic properties which are
only known to some extent.
And then there are the effects of the plant
distributions, because on different slopes, with different
solar aspects, you actually get different types of local
populations of plants.
Uncertainties in the methods used to develop the
shallow infiltration model -- oh, I do have a slide on this,
too. Sorry about that.
I'm at this point down here, uncertainty in the
methods used to develop the shall infiltration model. And,
by the way, you might correct on your slides, at the end of
neutron probe, that semicolon should not be there.
But some of the main tools that DOE has used to
look at shallow infiltration include determining water
counts and profiles using neutron probes; chloride mass
balance method; and temperature profiles.
Now, the main DOE action on this is that they've
indicated they would like to respond further to the comments
we made, and by October, provide an action plan on where to
go from here.
DR. HORNBERGER: The 50-percent higher figure,
this is present day? Do you feel that perhaps it should be
as high as 18 millimeters per year?
MR. COLEMAN: Around there, yes. We couldn't come
up with an exact number, of course. It's a number that was
more comparable to what was used in VA, and that certainly
does a lot better job of accounting for the uncertainties
here.
DR. HORNBERGER: The uncertainties, for example,
in the chloride mass balances are uncertain to the extent
that it could be 18 millimeters per year?
MR. COLEMAN: Well, some of it has to do with the
distribution of where the bore holes were placed, that it
doesn't really give you a true sampling of the site. It's
probably more that than anything else.
DR. HORNBERGER: But I guess what I'm -- you're
doing this based on a technical assessment, and you look at
it and say, well, okay, the chloride mass balances, because
of the placement of bore holes, it looks to us as if 18
millimeters per year is the -- would be reasonably
consistent with the information available?
MR. COLEMAN: Well, not just chloride mass
balance, but also from temperature profiles, yes; that there
is certainly enough variability at the site, and over the
whole range of different environments at the site, from the
crest where you have very thin soil environment, and, in
fact, bedrock exposure in places, quite a few places. And
then locations of the washes where a lot of the bore holes
are concentrated where you have much thicker alluvium, and
we suspect that infiltration is very much dominated by the
thinner soil environments and including the Western Slope.
When you're at the crest of Yucca Mountain, you're
looking down the other side, there's a lot of bedrock
exposure there, a location where you can have a lot of
fairly rapid infiltration.
You will notice that there are no bore holes in
that side of the Mountain. None of these measurements were
taken on that side, because you physically couldn't get in
there to do it.
MR. WINTERLY: Could I add to that point? Jim
Winterly, Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis.
If I understand Dr. Hornberger's question --
VOICE: I'm sorry, is your mike on?
MR. WINTERLY: We're discussing the technical
basis for our requesting a higher number of infiltration
somewhere around 18 millimeters per year.
The DOE has an analysis model report, AMR as we
call them, on uncertainty in infiltration that considers all
the parameter uncertainties and the uncertainties and what
the climate states are, but the analysis was only done for a
future climate.
And the infiltration rates used in the PMR aren't
really based on that AMR. The results of that AMR sort of
go into a different model abstraction for PA.
But the result of that AMR shows a certain
distribution of uncertainty for what the infiltration would
be under future climate. So we sort of extrapolate from
that that if present-day climate uncertainty follows a
similar distribution, that would move the upper bound up
quite a bit from where they are currently saying it is.
MR. COLEMAN: I just wanted to mention, while
we're still on this slide, that deep percolation, which
we'll get into in a minute, that is closed-pending, that is
present-day and future deep percolation.
Ambient flow in the saturated zone un-dilution,
that is one of the topics that will be covered at the
October 31st meeting.
At this meeting in Berkeley, we dealt with matrix
diffusion, and it has two parts: Matrix diffusion in the
unsaturated zone, that is closed-pending, as we'll discuss;
Matrix diffusion in the saturated zone, which is a quite
different issue, remains open, and that will be addressed in
the November meeting, as well.
Now, the agreements that we came up with at this
meeting, just reviewing Subissues 1 and 2, these are closed,
no agreements were necessary. Subissue 3, present-day
shallow infiltration, which is now, again, an open issue.
The DOE folks are planning to respond to our
comments, provide an action plan for further work, and also,
if needed, we will have a third meeting under this key
technical issue, and that would be scheduled by March of
next year.
Now, it's also possible that if we have the
information available that DOE wants to provide to us, this
could be discussed as an item of old business, shall we say,
at the October/November meeting, if there is time.
And by the way, from our summary meeting minutes,
the proposed DOE actions on shallow infiltration -- let's
see if there is anything different here from what I
mentioned --
[Pause.]
No, that's it. The bottom line, again, on shallow
infiltration is that it's open because we feel the new upper
bound is simply too low, approximately 12 millimeters per
year, does not encompass the uncertainties that we see at
the site.
DR. LARKINS: Neil?
MR. COLEMAN: Yes.
DR. LARKINS: Do you go -- I assume that you're
going to go back and re-factor these into your TPA analysis
and see what results, how these impact the results of your
TPA analysis?
MR. COLEMAN: Oh, yes. I'm glad you mentioned
that, because something that came up in our meeting -- and I
suspect that it will come up in other meetings as well --
the extremely robust waste package that DOE has proposed
makes it very difficult to see the effects of varying
assumptions in the natural system, the effects of the
different components in the saturated zone, such as effects
of valley fill, retardation in the valley fill, the role of
the Calico Hills in slowing down or absorbing radionuclides.
It has become much more difficult to see just
truly what those effects are.
Now, we talked with the DOE folks about this, and
they are thinking about ways to make this more transparent.
We really do need to see that more clearly, since in a
number of cases, a path to resolution might be a sensitivity
study, showing the true effects, NPA, of, say, assumptions
about matrix diffusion.
It was easier in VA to see what the effects were
of changing matrix diffusion on the overall system. We
noticed that even significant changes in dripping scenarios,
the numbers of waste packages that received dripping of
water, did not have nearly as large an effect as seen
before.
You would expect that, given a very robust waste
package, but there needs to be a treatment to make it more
transparent, what these effects are. Whether it -- where an
analysis would not include all the robust components of the
waste package, just so we can clearly see how the changes in
the natural system play out.
Agreements related to deep percolation,
present-day and future deep percolation, in order to reach
closed-pending on this subissue, we know that the importance
of the ongoing and planned tests, really most of the
remaining program of data collection that DOE has going on,
is focused in some remaining work in the east-west drift, a
fair bit of work in the cross-drift or east-west drift --
what I meant was, in the ESF and in the cross-drift, and
then the other work is concentrated to the south in the
saturated zone, involved with the Nye County drilling
program.
But it is very important for the ongoing and
planned tests to proceed and to be completed. Two of the
key examples here are the isolated part of the east-west
drift, and perhaps its --
[Pause.]
This projector is not too good. The isolated part
of the east-west drift, you can see the beginning point
where it comes off the north ramp, and then right about
here, at Station 16+95 or 1695 meters into the tunnel, is
the -- I'm sorry, 1763. I'm reading the wrong one. -- this
is the first hydrologic bulkhead.
This then isolates the remaining part of the
tunnel from the ventilation effects, which all of the tunnel
from here back are highly ventilated for the safety of the
workers.
And this test -- an additional bulkhead had been
added back here. There are two additional bulkheads at the
end, and these are isolating the test zone from a number of
things: There's a transformer at the end, the tunnel boring
machine is still here at the end of the drift; there's a
transformer there that gives off a fair bit of heat.
And at one time, in order to read the instruments
that are in the tunnel, it was necessary to leave the lights
on. They were all connected together. That's been
corrected so it's not necessary to have the lights on.
And this additional bulkhead then helps isolate
the effects of the heat. This transformer apparently gave
off so much heat that it was detectable in the isolated part
of the tunnel.
The idea of this test is to bring this section of
the tunnel as closely back to natural conditions as
possible.
The reason for doing that is to see just what the
moisture conditions are like in the wall rock, and help
answer the key question, does dripping occur in the
underground at Yucca Mountain under natural conditions,
fully equilibrated conditions?
This is a key finding to be made. It does not
depend on model assumptions, it does not depend on trying to
understand output from a black box. It's a true test of the
performance of the Mountain.
And one of the most recent additions to this part
of the tunnel -- and it's mainly in the farther end -- is a
series of cloths which are impregnated with a pH-sensitive
reagent. They are drip cloths which are designed to detect
whether any dripping takes place today.
So that while this tunnel is isolated, they will
record, because if a drop falls on them, it produces a spot,
a chemical reaction, and is preserved on the cloth, whether
dripping is happening.
I would say the main reason that we were able to
agree with DOE that this is a closed-pending, is the
commitment to run this test, and until equilibration is
achieved. That's very important that that happen.
The other test I want to mention is here at the
point where the east-west drift crosses over the main
tunnel. Now, an alcove has been constructed off the
east-west drift called Alcove 8.
Below it, off of the ESF, is a niche called Niche
3, and what are planned are infiltration tests to percolate
water down from the overlying tunnel to the underlying
niche.
This will be done at a series of different rates,
and approximately three weeks will be used for each of the
tests. There will also be a series of tracer tests to look
at matrix diffusion phenomena in there.
One of the agreements from DOE was to provide test
plans for Alcove 8 and Niche 3, and, in fact, they had done
that a few weeks ago. We have reviewed it, and provided
those comments -- in fact, I hand-carried the letter for
that today to give to one of the DOE folks.
Another commitment is for Alcove 8 and Niche 3 to
try to get a better mass balance of the water use in the
testing, and we talk about that in the comments that we
made.
And for all of the continuing tests in the
underground at Yucca Mountain, for DOE to carefully monitor
evaporation during these tests and to see what the effects
are. One of the things we understand is that a similar type
of infiltration test was done involving Alcove 1.
So where you first enter the Mountain at the north
portal, if you look up on top of the ridge, you'll see kind
of a disturbed area, and this is a place where water was
ponded on the surface, directly above the first alcove known
as Alcove 1, and a very considerable amount of water was
percolated there.
And it was noted -- the reason I bring this up --
if the bulkhead door was opened during the process of the
test, there is a dramatic decrease in the water that was
entering the tunnel.
Correct me if I'm wrong, Jim, but I think it was
about 50 percent, roughly. This is a dramatic effect,
showing how very quickly the infiltration -- or, I should
say, percolation in this case is affected by the dryout of
the tunnel ventilation.
And a couple of other agreements to enable us to
get to closed-pending, to let -- well, to get DOE to
closed-pending -- that they should include the effect of
film flow in evaluating the seepage fraction and seepage
flow in the underground, affecting waste packages, or
justify that this is not needed, that there is no need to do
this.
In seepage studies, DOE should consider smaller
scale irregularities in simulating collapse of a drift.
Because what happens is, if a block of rock were to fall
from the overhead, you will get considerably more
irregularities, perhaps on smaller scale, which can enhance
dripping.
And we have a commitment to do just that, or show
that it's not needed.
And we are looking for additional documentation on
the effectiveness of the Paint Brush Tuft non-welded unit to
dampen episodic flow.
This unit is above the repository, and a key part
of this is reconciling the differences in the Chlorine-36
studies that we all recently became aware of.
It is very important for the DOE conceptual models
of the site, and the resulting mathematical models, that
they get to the bottom of these differences in Chlorine-36.
I was at the TRB meeting where this first was
presented. And TRB, of course, is also quite concerned
about this.
The differences that were found between the
Lawrence Livermore studies and the Los Alamos work, the
longstanding Los Alamos work, are really quite large, and
this must be resolved.
And then finally, we need to see more of an
analysis of the geochemical data that are used to constrain
the flow field below the repository, involving the Calico
Hills and the potential for a fraction of flow to bypass the
vitric and zeolitic units there.
DR. HORNBERGER: Now, before we leave this issue,
I know that one of the comments that DOE had made was that
in this issue, the NRC staff says the DOE drift scale
process level seepage model has not been shown to be of
reasonably conservative upper bounding values. And it goes
on then to the status and path of the resolution and says
that therefore conservative assumptions are needed.
DOE took exception to that, noting that there
isn't anything in risk-informed regulations that would
suggest that upper bound conservative estimates are
required. Have you made any progress on resolving this
interpretation?
MR. COLEMAN: Well, we're not saying, to make
unreasonable -- bounding analyses, as long as they are
reasonable, are okay. That does not get away from
performance-based, risk-informed. This is a seepage issue.
This is one of the number one factors identified
by DOE and in our own performance assessments. And it
relates, in a way, the same question that you asked, that
applies to shallow infiltration.
And I don't think I mentioned under it -- and I'll
mention the same thing about seepage -- we're not
necessarily looking for, in the case of shallow
infiltration, a lot of new data collection. The easier way
is to increase the upper bound and to account for the
uncertainties in that way.
If they choose, they could collect a lot of
additional information. That's another way to go.
But I realize there is a line that --
DR. HORNBERGER: But, you see, I ask the question
I asked on the infiltration for specifically that purpose.
Now, Jim gave me an answer that would suggest that
there is a technical basis for suggesting a 50-percent
increase. And to me, that's different than saying that this
is important, we better make it reasonably conservative, and
therefore raise that upper bound. They are two different
approaches.
Do you agree with that?
MR. COLEMAN: I do, but I think they're related.
DR. HORNBERGER: Okay.
MR. COLEMAN: Because percolation and infiltration
--
DR. HORNBERGER: No, no, the percolation and
infiltration are related. That wasn't my point. But I'm
just interested in how you resolve this, because DOE
obviously, when you say -- and these are NRC words,
evidently -- the DOE drift scale process level seepage model
has not been shown to yield reasonably conservative upper
bounding values. That sounds pretty conservative. It
sounds like that's what you want them to do, rather than
take into account, the uncertainty in a reasonable way.
MR. COLEMAN: Well, you notice that closed-pending
was achieved here.
DR. HORNBERGER: Yes.
MR. COLEMAN: The reason is -- and I stress the
importance of these tests -- where there's no professional
judgment involved if there is dripping going on in the
Mountain. And the thing we would expect, and the reason we
can get to a closed-pending and make statements like the one
you read, is if they proceed with these tests, let them run
the full course, and then calibrate their models based on
the results from east-west drift, Alcove 8, Niche-3 testing.
So the closed-pending is not based on here's what
we think the seepage rate is, but it's based on an
affirmation that DOE will make their models consistent with
the observations of these tests to be completed. Does that
help?
DR. HORNBERGER: Yes.
MR. WINTERLY: Could I add a sentence to that,
Neil? This is Jim Winterly again.
I think DOE does raise a good point there, that
there is really no regulatory requirement that they be
conservative, and that's Revision 2 of the IRSR for this key
technical issue that is quoted there.
And in the current working draft of Revision 3
that's not out yet, the language has been changed more along
the lines of they need to adequately bound the uncertainty
MR. COLEMAN: Thank you. Subissue 5, as I
mentioned earlier, this will be -- this is open, involves
the saturated zone issues, dilution, and also matrix
diffusion in the saturated zone. That will be covered at
the meeting that starts October 31st in Albuquerque.
Matrix diffusion for the unsaturated zone was
dealt with in this meeting at Berkeley, and for those who
are not familiar with matrix diffusion, this refers to the
migration of radionuclides from flow-in portions of a
fracture into the unfractured matrix of rock.
And once it happens, then minerals like the
zeolite minerals that are present in there can absorb
radionuclides. And that's the importance of matrix
diffusion; it's the mechanism by which radionuclides might
get into the solid part of the rock.
From work that we've done over the years, it
appears that DOE should not take a great deal of credit for
matrix diffusion in the unsaturated zone. The saturated
zone is very different, and we would expect that much more
credit could be taken for that.
In fact, matrix diffusion is usually talked about
as just a fractured rock phenomenon. That's not true.
In the valley fill materials, it's probably one of
the most important things that could happen, because of
diffusion into the rock class which range from gravel size
up to boulder size that are entrained in the valley field
materials, so it's a very effective mechanism there as well.
We'll talk about that at the Sat Zone Meeting.
But to achieve closed-pending, although DOE pointed out that
they feel they don't take a huge amount of credit for matrix
diffusion in the unsaturated zone, we wanted to see an
update of this in the TSPA SR, showing just how much credit
was taken.
We pointed out an example -- let me see if I can
read the page number on this -- from the viability
assessment, Volume 3, page 5-36.
There are a series of diagrams that show the
relative effects of matrix diffusion, so we want to see
documentation similar to that, and I'm sorry that I don't
have a slide of that.
Also, for DOE to provide the final testing plan
for Alcove 8, which I mentioned already that we have
reviewed and provided comments on that. And it will also
address matrix diffusion for the unsaturated zone.
And that DOE take into consideration, these
comments that we've made.
Okay, it's taking me a moment to get to future
milestones, where we go from here. We will review the DOE
action plan on shallow infiltration which I mentioned should
be available in October.
We have the upcoming meeting, October 31st to
November 2nd. We also plan to release Revision 3 of our
issue resolution status report in the coming months. We
hope to have that out by January, if not earlier.
And there will be a followup meeting on shallow
infiltration that will be held by March of 2001, if that's
needed.
So that's for the KTI, unsaturated and saturated
flow under isothermal conditions; that's where we are today.
I'm ready for any additional questions.
DR. HORNBERGER: Great, thanks very much, Neil.
Questions from the Committee? Ray?
DR. WYMER: No.
DR. HORNBERGER: Very well.
MR. LEVENSON: I have sort of a philosophical
question: As you go through this procedure, you're
collecting more and more information. In fact, you had one
closed issue which when subsequent information becomes
available, you reopened.
As more and more information is collected, do you
or do you intend to back away a little bit from the required
over-estimates, the word you call conservative, which I
don't agree with, because over-estimating quite often is not
conservative. It forces you to do something else.
But using your definition of the word, it's to
cover uncertainties. As more and more information becomes
available, do you have a mechanism for backing that down?
MR. COLEMAN: Are you referring to infiltration,
in particular?
MR. LEVENSON: Just generically, as you go into
the technical issues. This applies to almost all of them.
Since you use over-estimates to cover uncertainties, as more
and more information becomes available, do you back down
your over-estimates? And if not, why not?
MR. COLEMAN: Well, for deep percolation, really
in the hydrology area, the amount of water that could
contact an engineered barrier, drip shields, waste package,
here's where DOE doesn't have to become overly conservative.
We don't have to require things that may be perceived as
overly conservative.
The results of those two tests that I mentioned --
and we don't have the results of them yet -- that there's
very little professional judgment that has to be made in
interpreting them. They will be really some of the best
understanding that there will be until and if a construction
authorization would be made.
Certainly the best way to learn about the Mountain
is if it looks okay now, to excavate it and see what's truly
there, what we call performance confirmation.
But before that can ever happen, it has to be
shown that a good safety case has bee made on what is known
today. But these tests -- and this relates to the
present-day percolation, because DOE has very little chance
of reasonably estimating future conditions under future
climates without establishing the present-day case.
So, I think whatever they come up with in these
tests, they could use in performance assessments, because
they would have the best data they're going to have.
There would still be some bounding in the case
because there will be variability. There may be no dripping
at all in the East-West Drift, but no one has to make that
estimate. You simply wait and see.
MR. LEVENSON: I understand that for the unusual
case, in a way, where you have an experiment that can answer
the question.
But I was asking it more generically. In a lot of
the technical issues, you can't have a simple test that says
when we do this test, we can forget the modeling and the
analysis that's the fact.
There aren't very many like that, so I'm asking
the generic question about as you get more information, do
you have a mechanism to reduce your over-estimates as you
reduce uncertainty?
MR. COLEMAN: I think the way I'd answer that is
that the whole story has to hang together. So, it could be
that the information that's been learned about the
stratigraphy of the site, the geochemistry of the site, the
hydrology parameters, everything has to hang together or it
will hang separately.
[Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: That sounds like the answer is
yes, that you do have a mechanism for changing assumptions.
MR. COLEMAN: Quite frankly, it's not something
we've talked a great deal about, because DOE is moving in
the right direction, we think.
Now, you did see a case where new information
reopened an issue, but this issue was resolved. It would
not have been reopened, if DOE had not cut the numbers in
half, which is really a dramatic change to make this late in
the program. That's why we really scrutinized this
question.
DR. TRAPP: Let me try and answer that. One of
the things that -- this is John Trapp from the NRC.
One of the things that we do have is what we call
the Iterative Performance Assessment, in which each time we
do get the new information, this is factored right into the
performance assessment model to get us a better estimate of
where things stand.
So, yes is the answer to your question, that the
iterative performance assessment is basically the way we
work through it.
DR. HORNBERGER: Thank you. John?
DR. LARKINS: I don't think so. Thank you.
DR. HORNBERGER: Okay, thanks very much, Neil, and
thank you, Jim, for piping in.
[Pause.]
We're going to move right along and move to the
KTI on igneous activity, and John Trapp is going to give us
a presentation on what's been happening in this arena.
DR. TRAPP: I have asked Dr. Hill to assist me in
doing this, actually for two reasons: It makes it a little
easier on me, and also if I don't know the answer to the
question, Rick does.
The presentation today is going to be focused on
the results of the technical exchange we held two weeks ago
on igneous activity. This is actually the second in a
two-seek series of exchanges we had with DOE.
The first was basically an observation audit which
was dealing with the total disruptive process and events
area which covered week one.
The objective of the exchange is basically to
resolve the open issues related to igneous activity, and by
resolve, I'm going to say it again, is resolve as was
explained by Bill Reamer.
We were trying to discuss a basis to resolve these
issues, determine which ones we could resolve at present,
and if we couldn't resolve them at the meeting, come up with
some mechanism by which we had a path forward to reach
resolution.
Now, going into the meeting, we had the two
issues, probability and consequence, and they were in the
open state. Next slide, please.
On these next two slides, there are what I listed
as NRC technical concerns, and I'd like to discuss these
just a little bit.
First off, how did we get to these things? If you
take a look at the IRSR, and go through the IRSR and take a
look at the sensitivity analysis, we basically made a run
through this thing and said, okay, which points have to be
resolved, have to have the information to get to licensing?
We then, like I said, used the sensitivity
analysis, so we used the risk information that we could get
out this to rack these out and see, are the ones that we
have left important?
So this is basically what we call technical
concerns. These are the things that are necessary to be
addressed, to be resolved, so that we've got sufficient
information to get to a licensing application, to docketing.
Or, another way to describe this is, how much is
enough? If DOE can resolve these and the ones that are on
the next slide, we basically have enough information that we
can get to licensing.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Are these approximately
importance-ranked?
DR. TRAPP: No, these are not important ranked.
The only two that don't quite fit into this thing -- and
I'll get to them later -- are these two at the end, and
those are there to make sure that we know our mechanisms for
doing the modeling.
Go to the next slide, would you? I'd also like to
just talk a little bit about these three points:
If you take a look at the IRSR, we did have at
that time, expert elicitation, quality assurance, in there.
We knew they really didn't belong in there, per se, but we
didn't have a mechanism to hang them on at that time.
If you take a look -- well, you can't take a look
-- if you could take a look at the Yucca Mountain Review
Plan, you would see that there are specific sections dealing
with expert elicitation, the mechanism of quality assurance,
the mechanism.
And so these parts of the issues that we had in
the IRSR will be taken out of the IRSR and moved on over to
those areas.
Features, events, and processes is a means of
trying to make sure that we have all the different
mechanisms that could possibly be related to igneous
activity, all the features and events considered in the
analysis.
The previous week, during the review, the quality
assurance out -- the FEPS PMR was one of the main parts of
the audit. Very simply, what we came out with at that time
was that we really didn't have any disagreements with what
was being presented, but the basis, the justification for
what was in there was, we felt, not quite up to speed.
However, we also had a chance to take a look at
some of the stuff that was going into the next revision.
And my only statement I can make right now is that if you
take a look at what appears to be going into the next
revision, a lot of this concern about justification should
be taken care of when we get to that point.
Okay, where do we sit? Like I said, probability,
that one was open, and on the ACNW meeting following the
April technical exchange, there were some questions raised
about this.
One of the agreements that came out of this
meeting is that DOE would put together their licensing case,
and they would use what they considered the best value that
they could justify.
At present, it looks like this is going to be
something like about 1.2 to 1.6 times ten to the minus
eighth. However, in addition to this value, what they're
going to put in the license application -- and it doesn't
have to be right there; it can be in a reference document,
anyplace -- is an analysis which is also done at one times
ten to the minus seventh.
I feel quite comfortable with this. Both parties
agree that these values do fall somewhere in the range. The
big difference is how we would put the adjectives on them.
DOE would say that ten to the minus eighth is
their main value, and ten to the minus seventh is something
at the extremes.
We would say that ten to the minus eighth is a low
value, and the value should lay somewhere between ten to the
minus eighth and ten to the minus seventh, so we feel that
by doing this, we've got stuff available for us and for the
Licensing Board to make a decision as to the site.
In addition, there was another agreement raised on
this. And we do necessarily expect at any time new
information does come in, that DOE would take a look at it
and factor it into their analysis.
This, however, was kind of a specific case. It's
new aeromagnetic data, which basically was funded by Nye,
Clarke, and Inyo County. I believe those are the right
three ones, and then was run and put into an open file
report by the USGS.
Because this information just became available, I
think, the week before the meeting, we wanted DOE to agree
to take a look at this, see if it made any changes in the
number of buried features that they could find, and they
have agreed to do this.
We don't know the actual survey specifications, so
we're not sure that they can actually accomplish much by
doing this. They are first going to take a look at the
survey specifications, find out if it's worthwhile, report
back to us if it is, give us the plan on how this is going
to be analyzed.
Therefore, the probability is one we call
closed-pending. We've got this stuff coming in, but we feel
quite comfortable.
DR. HORNBERGER: John, I take it that if the
aeromagnetic specs aren't up to snuff, it's not required
that DOE redo the survey?
DR. TRAPP: That's correct. We're not asking for
a redo of the survey; we're just asking for an analysis of
the data, if the data is sufficient to analyze, yes.
Just to give you the bottom line on where we're
situated, if you take consequences, the issue is described
as open, but the reason that it's open is that if you go
through the various acceptance criteria and divide them into
intrusive and extrusive and take a look at them, everything
is closed-pending, except for one point.
So, we in this meeting, I think, made tremendous
progress, and we'll talk about where we're sitting on that
right now.
Yes, that is important. This does come from
Revision 2 of the IRSR, the acceptance criteria. The
acceptance criteria in Revision 3 will actually change.
I have said that so many times, I'm not sure I
need to. And the way they will change is, they will
basically be reflective of the ISIS that you'll see in the
Yucca Mountain Review Plan, so, for instance, most of this
will end up going into volcanic disruption, and airborne
transport.
Most of the material right through here, will end
up going into mechanical disruption of the waste package, so
you'll see slightly different acceptance criteria in
Revision 3, however, the basic thought is still there. We
are not trying to ratchet anything; we're trying to make
sure that we've got things up to date as the license will be
handled.
If we take a look at Acceptance Criteria 1,
basically it states that models are consistent with the
geologic record of basaltic igneous activity in the Yucca
Mountain region.
For records, you can track it right back to the
technical points we were talking about. This is Technical
Point Number 12.
Our concern, very simply, was that if you take a
look at the tougher volumes that are being used in the DOE
analysis, they were coming up with values which we felt were
too high.
The range was basically too large, and one of the
things we found in doing our sensitivity analysis is that
when we go to these higher ranges, we kind of get a dilution
of the material.
Therefore, we wanted DOE to document the real
range that we're using, come up with a better basis for this
range, and put it in the TSPA analysis.
Since they have agreed to do it, this is something
that we expect to see in June of 2001.
Acceptance Criteria 2: Models are verified
against analog igneous systems. This is really the model
for the airborne transport.
And the question is, can you show that ash plume,
as it's being used, can be run against some well-documented
volcano, and replicate the results?
This is one that DOE has readily agreed to. They
are using this 1995 Sierra Negro eruption, the same one that
we used to run through this. Very honestly, it's the one
that's got the best documentation that you can check the
model against and make sure that you have got an exact
repeat.
Again, this is a June 2001 date that we expect to
find this information.
AC-3, models account for magma/repository
interaction. This right here, we are dealing with the
extrusive component, and one of the things in the change of
the repository layout -- what happens when you change the
repository layout and start figuring out the most likely
angle for dikes?
You start getting a spot where the dikes and the
repository layouts coincide. When they coincide, you have a
very large probability that the conduits will not be in a
circular nature, but will be elongated, and if they are
elongated, you could end up with a larger number of waste
packages being intercepted.
In reality, this will probably not be that big an
effect, because if you take a look at the range and possible
dike orientations, and the range -- not the range, but the
present layout -- the angles at which they can intercept is
relatively a small range.
However, DOE is going to take a look at this
concern, find out how it does affect their whole analysis,
and, again, this will be documented in the Revision 1 of the
TSPA of June of 2001.
AC-4, models account for interactions within magma
and engineered barriers and waste form, this takes care of
Points 2 and 3. Another concern, as they took the ash flow
cone which was developed by the Center, they modified it for
their own use, and we're not totally sure, exactly some of
the modifications they've done.
In reality the dates and the repository layouts
coincide. When they coincide you have a very large
probability that the conduits will not be in the circular
nature. It will be elongated, and if they are elongated you
could end up with a larger number of waste packages being
intercepted.
In reality, this will probably be that big an
effect, because if you take a look at the range and possible
dike orientations in the present layout, the angles at which
they can intercept is relatively a small range. However,
DOE is going to take a look at this concern, find out how it
does affect their whole analysis and again this will be
documented in the revision, one of the TSPA of June, 2001.
AC-4, models account for interactions between the
magma and engineered barriers and waste form. This takes
care of points 2 and 3.
One of the concerns as they took the ASHPLUME code
which was developed by the Center they modified it for their
own use and we're not totally sure exactly some of the
modifications they have done.
The question we've got is in doing so and
incorporating the waste into the ash, have they correctly
accounted for the density variations in two of the
materials.
At the meeting nobody could lay their hands on
enough documentation to determine if it had been or not,
therefore they are going to be taking a look at this to make
sure they have handled it correctly if they haven't handled
it correctly make the modifications that are necessary and
we'll have this in January of 2001.
Document the results of sensitivity studies for
particle size consistent with the above -- if you take a
look at the interactions between the magma and the waste
form itself, you really end up with extreme thermal and
physical load. The information that DOE has been using is
according to our waste package people, first off the best
basic information we've got on fragmentation of magma and
fragmentation of waste forms, but from that there are
basically three different slots you can choose.
DOE happened to take one slot and use this in the
range which is documented in the literature. However, the
question is, hey, why didn't you use the other two slots?
What's the basis?
DOE is going to take a look at these two
different, two other grain size distributions in the
sensitivity analysis, find out exactly how it does affect
the TSPAs and report back to us on that in June, 2001.
SPEAKER: Where did these come from, Joe? Brit?
MR. HILL: This is Britt Hill from the CNWRA.
There were a number of studies done even back to the '60s in
changes in waste grain size during mechanical disruption
from crush impact studies, for examples. DOE has now pulled
together a range of some of the literature for nonoxidized
spent fuel. They are coming up with an average grain size
of about 20 microns with about plus or minus one log unit
for the grain size distribution.
We have been using an order of magnitude approach
at about 10 microns. We have first to see that the waste is
being incorporated properly into the ash for the disruption
in the modeling and then see if that difference is
significant or not or other potential waste forms, other
spent fuel forms and glass, whether the grain sizes for
those would significantly affect how much was transported
downrange.
DR. TRAPP: Also in going through this whole thing
one of the difference that has happened is there's been a
jockeying back and forth trying to decide if we are going to
have backfilled repository or not.
The AMRs that we have received were based on a
backfilled repository and based on the backfilled repository
DOE had calculated that if a dike is going through the
repository that you should end up with about three waste
packages on either side of it. Basically it's completely
destroyed as far as any ability to protect the thing from
groundwater movement.
Going through a nonbackfilled repository what you
have got is a much greater potential zone of effect.
Instead of the magma coming in basically being stopped by
the backfill, the magma will go in, hit the initial waste
packages, continue on down the drift. However, if you
logically look at this, as the magma is going down the drift
there should be some dissipation of energy but for some
places along this line it's not really reasonable to assume
complete disruption. There should be something else that
happens.
According to the DOE's analysis and it agrees with
what we have done, the temperature alone when you get down
to that point would be enough to cause cracking of the
endcaps but not complete disruption of the waste package, so
what we really need, and this is the one point where we have
got the open issue, is to really understand how this
mechanism is being modeled by DOE, how the energy
dissipation is being taken into effect, what the effects of
thermal flow are and then actually how they are modeling the
whole groundwater flow out of this thing to take care of it.
Next slide, please -- the groundwater flow post intrusion.
What DOE will do is basically go through analysis,
show which one of these and how these waste packages are
affected. There are a number of packages that are hit on
this thing in Zone 1 or Zone 2 total disruption or partial
disruption. We expect to get that by 2001.
They will also show what the relative contribution
to the whole TSPA is from these two different zones. This
also would be coming but that would not be until June, 2001.
To better understand how the thermal effects are
being modeled, they basically provide an evaluation of these
thermal effects in Zone 1 and Zone 2. Again this is in
January, 2001.
As I said, this is the one point that was left
open. It was felt that we couldn't have the degree of
confidence with the amount of analysis that had to be done
to close this one at this time.
SPEAKER: But the good news is that it seems to me
that you have an agreement on what needs to be done.
DR. TRAPP: We definitely have a path forward and
very honestly if we'd had a few more waste package and waste
form people at the meeting we might have gotten farther
along with this. Because of the change from the backfilled
to nonbackfilled we really have not, neither site had enough
people in that area to cover it, so, yes, it's open, and it
will take some analysis.
Acceptance Criteria 5, parameters are constrained
by data from Yucca Mountain, et cetera, we have four areas
that really fell into this -- wind characteristics, airborne
particle concentrations, deposit remobilization, and
inhalation effects.
Up to this point neither DOE nor NRC have had wind
data that really covered the range of the plumes that we
needed to deal with.
Now basically you have up to about three and a
half, four kilometers above ground level. The levels that
you would have to be dealing with for a plume would be
somewhere between two to six, seven kilometers.
During the QA audit we did some talking to people
and I am not sure who actually found it but somebody did
find some additional data that carries the information on up
to the elevations of concern. Because of this, DOE is going
to take a look at this data, put an analysis together, be
able to give us a composite wind speed and altitude and use
this really in a stratified way because there is a
tremendous amount of difference between what you have at
ground level versus what you have at height, and then use
this in the analysis.
This will be available in June, 2001.
One of the things that we want to make sure is
when they are doing the dose conversion, et cetera, this
type of thing, that the mass loading parameters are really
correct for the type of deposit that they are dealing with
and the type of activity that the people are working with.
Taking a look at some of the information we were a
little concerned that some of the measurements may have been
static measurements instead of the dynamic measurements you
would expect with people walking out in the fields, this
type of thing.
We are concerned that some of the information may
be dealing with mass loading parameters that are from
deposits that really are not reflective of ash deposits.
DOE basically during the meeting, I had a fairly
good feeling that they probably do have the right
information. They just don't have it at the present time,
but in January, 2001 they will document exactly what mass
loading parameters, et cetera, and the basis for these
parameters.
This last one on this page is a very complex one
and it really wouldn't be there if we were dealing with a
rule slightly different than it was.
In going from a rule that -- well, the previous
rule where we were primarily dealing with peak dose and the
one which is totally risk informed and this type of thing,
we had to take a look at the overall changes in the area of
the critical groups or time.
If you assume that you have got in eruption at the
Yucca Mountain area the majority of the ash, et cetera, is
going to be going into the 40 mile wash drainage basin. As
it goes in 40 mile wash drainage basis erosion is going to
start and materials is going to be moved on down the slope,
and just about Highway 95 is where you go from primarily an
erosional transport situation to an area where you are going
to primary deposition.
As such, what you have got is an area which will
have material constantly being brought in, but in addition
to the material being in, there will be some subsequent
erosion of material coming out, so you have got a tremendous
problem on mass balance of this material.
You also have a problem in trying to figure out
during the erosion what is the amount of dilution that you
have got going on. You have got to deal with the changes in
particle size in the ash and this type of thing.
This is going to be, I believe, the second hardest
of the whole bunch to resolve and I rather suspect that DOE
is going to be using kind of a bounding analysis to come
through this. That seemed to be the results of the meeting
and I just saw Eric Smithstead come in here and he's just
kind of shaking his head, so it looks like I am correct on
that, so they will probably be using the bounding analysis
to try to resolve this concern.
Originally the analysis in the VA was only talking
about doses and was only using the 1 to 10 micron range in
calculating these. However, with a lot of the isotopes that
you are dealing with, the 10 to 100 micron range can provide
a significant dose impact even though it doesn't get down to
the lungs, it will lodge in the nasal and pharynx region and
this type of thing.
DOE basically had realized this was a problem.
They proposed to treat this as an additional soil ingestion
and have it calculated that way. They are going to review
how they are considering these things and make sure that
this is the right way to handle it or if they don't do it
that way use ICRP 30 analysis methods.
Again, we will see this in January, 2001 so this
should be taken care of without any problem.
Miscellaneous -- if you go back to the VA, one of
the things that was assumed during an eruption is that there
really wouldn't be a dose because people would be running
out of there.
If you take a look at what happens in areas where
you have got these type of eruptions, people do not leave.
They stay in that area and so really it's been resolved
totally because they are no longer assuming the
self-evacuation during an eruption.
These two were kind of miscellaneous concerns.
Remember, I mentioned them before, because they don't fit
into the risk deal, but one of the things that we were
noticing is that there was quite a bit of difference between
what DOE was getting in their intrusive scenario from what
we were getting, and we are trying to understand the
difference.
I first off wanted to make sure it didn't have
anything to do with igneous activity so I don't have to
worry about it, and truthfully it doesn't. It's totally a
difference in the way the two model release and transport in
the saturated zone, or both saturated and unsaturated zone.
Integration of results from all pathways -- this
is basically making sure that with a change in the rule and
going to the expected dose that the calculational
methodology that DOE was using was correct. It appears to
be -- well, it is correct as far as Jim McCartin is
concerned and Jim is supposedly the guru on this stuff so I
am taking his word for it.
From where we sit, well, truthfully, while we have
got all these "closed pendings," there's an awful lot of
work left to be done.
The first thing we have got to do is issue
Revision 3 of the IRSR, which will have the modification
going to the Yucca Mountain Review Plan type criteria.
It's listed as 2001. Basically the Center's
component is supposed to be due in mid-November and the
exact date past then is how fast I work.
We've got a review of the TSPA-SR. We have got
the basic topics we've got and basically with some of the
things that came in from the biosphere we've got some
additional topics on surficial process that go into this
review that have to be factored in.
If you were looking at that list and listening to
me talk, I kept on saying January, 2001 and June, 2001.
There's a lot coming in those two dates. We are going to
commit ourselves to review these things, get the response
back to DOE in a quick timeframe.
In addition, however, we do have some research
going on still at the Center on magma-repository
interactions which would get into this whole waste package
type deal and the tephra deposit evolution which gets into
the remobilization, and we're talking a little more of a
look at wind speed and we will be taking a look at the new
data, looking at stratification until we exactly find out
how this all fits together.
In conclusion, I guess I would say I was extremely
satisfied with the technical exchange we had. We went
through an awful lot of material.
Like I said, Eric Smithstead just came in, Carol
Hanlon is sitting there. Those two I think really deserve a
lot of credit because they put an awful lot of time and
effort to making sure from DOE's side that it would get
done.
Questions?
DR. HORNBERGER: Thanks very much, John. Ray?
DR. WYMER: Yes, I have one general question.
DR. HORNBERGER: Want to use the microphone?
DR. WYMER: I have a general question. Presumably
whether or not the site is acceptable in the context of
volcanic activity at least is some sort of a product of
probabilities occurring and the consequences of the
occurrence. I heard the probability was 10 to the minus 7,
10 to the minus 8.
What do you look for as the product of the
probability and consequences? 25 MR per year? Is that your
criterion?
DR. TRAPP: Basically, yes. The criteria would be
a probability weighted consequence, which should have to be
at the present time assume less than 25 MR per year.
DR. WYMER: Okay, I didn't see that.
DR. LEVENSON: I have one question. Back on your
fourth slide you identify the elicitation of expert opinion.
My question is, is that a relatively important
part of this issue?
DR. TRAPP: It was a relatively important part
back on the probability because that is the basis of DOE's
probability. We had some concerns with how expert
elicitation was conducted. However, if you go back to I
believe it is a 1997 letter from Mike Bell to Steve Brocum,
we had basically talked about these concerns but decided
that even though there were some concerns that we would
accept the results of expert elicitation and give it its due
consideration, so, yes it was at that time.
As far as consequences, no, there is no expert
elicitation being planned on the consequences.
DR. LEVENSON: Okay -- because the expert
elicitations are a couple of nice-sounding words but there
is a huge range of application, and the reason I think I
have to raise the question is that in another activity in
which I am involved which has nothing to do with ACNW or
Yucca Mountain expert opinion was provided and it was a
group of very highly qualified technical people.
The question was what is the likelihood that this
new facility being considered could be licensed. The only
thing wrong with the group of experts -- not a single person
had ever worked in a licensed facility, ever worked for the
NRC, had ever applied for a license, and in fact there's
some relatively new literature on how valid are things like
probability projections made by technical experts in other
fields.
If expert elicitation is a significant factor
here, I think I'd suggest it really be looked at very
seriously.
DR. TRAPP: Well, like I said on probability,
DOE's an expert elicitation. Ours is not. There's a
difference in the mechanism that both of them were used,
therefore I think we have got a real good range in values.
Like I said, there's technical disagreement and
difference in adjectives but I feel quite comfortable with
the numbers.
DR. HORNBERGER: In fairness, I think I'll put in
that DOE expert elicitation of the probability of volcanic
activity, the experts were informed of all the data that
John mentioned, to the extent it was available at the time,
so it wasn't that they were just put in a room and asked.
Also, for the most part there is a NUREG giving
procedures for expert elicitation for NRC and that procedure
was basically followed. John?
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: John, I guess where we are now
is that preliminary analysis indicates that igneous
processes are the main contributor to the dose during the
10,000 year compliance period.
Is that kind of where we are?
DR. TRAPP: Very honestly, it was one of the
things I enjoyed because after getting hammered on this
thing for years and years and years, to have DOE actually
say the same thing, yes, that's where we came up.
Dose -- no, it would be expected dose, the risk.
It's the main contributor to risk.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Okay. I am still behind in
trying to understand this decoupling process of the
probabilities from the consequences because we know that
extrusive and intrusive igneous processes have a very big
range of values associated with them.
Can you give me a little bit of a discourse on how
the consequence thresholds are established to which a
specific probability is assigned?
DR. TRAPP: Really it is not assigned to a
specific probability. It is all stochastically sampled
throughout the end and by doing enough repetitions hopefully
you would have a stable product.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: But then you must surely get a
result that has a wide range of uncertainty associated in
terms of the consequences?
DR. TRAPP: Very definitely.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Because it seems -- go ahead.
MR. HILL: This is Britt Hill from the Center.
Compared to, say, earthquakes, where you would
assign an annual probability to a ground acceleration, with
earthquakes you would see a significant range in the event
manifestation.
The range of ground acceleration that you would
get greatly exceeds the range of volcanic eruption energy,
if you will, that you would get from a basaltic igneous
event.
While it seems at times that there is a lot of
uncertainty about that event, the volumes, the mass flow,
the temperatures, all of that is very narrow compared to the
range that you get from, say, an earthquake, so we are not
assigning a probability to a different event volume or mass
flow rate, we are saying the probability is the initiating
igneous event.
Now that event can have a range of column heights.
It can have a range of mass flow rates and durations, but
those ranges are much smaller than the range that you get
in, say, ground acceleration from an earthquake.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Okay, in a seismic analysis you
have something called a hazard curve.
MR. HILL: Right.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: And this gives you information
on the frequency of occurrence of earthquakes of different
magnitudes.
You are saying that you don't have a counterpart
to that necessarily for a igneous event and if you do have
it, the ranges are much, much more narrow?
MR. HILL: That's correct. There's really no
fragility curve, if you will --
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Right.
MR. HILL: -- for an engineered facility when a
volcano, basaltic volcano, comes up through it. There's
just a range in how many waste packages are damaged, but it
is difficult to say that you would have, for example, a
design threshold, which is a common application --
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: There are a number of waste
package thresholds.
MR. HILL: Or a waste package threshold -- at this
time there's no information to say that you would have a
certain resiliency for a waste package in the center of a
volcanic conduit while the volcano is erupting.
It is pretty much that there is no basis to say
that, well, "x" percent won't get in that conduit, "x"
percent won't get transported to the accessible environment,
so unlike with earthquake, you can say you have got .2g
ground acceleration and that there is a lot of robustness in
the system. Here even a small igneous event, the smallest
volume basaltic eruption, say about 10 to the 6 cubic
meters, is comparable in size to the entire volume of the
proposed repository layout, about again I think it is three
or four times 10 to the 6th cubic meters.
The minimal igneous event is comparable in scale
to the entire volume of the repository and then it goes up
to maybe 10 to 8th cubic meters, so even the smallest
initiating event, to try to use the right language, the
smallest initiating igneous event is capable of the same
level of localized damage of the largest igneous event.
There is just a change, the significant figure change, if
you will, between those two.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: So the issue is more a matter
of if you get an intersection than it is a matter of the
size of the volcanic eruption?
MR. HILL: That is correct.
Just for a final clarification, some of the
highest potential concentrations of waste a 20 kilometers
can come out from a relatively small volume event that has a
high wind speed because you have a more concentrated plume
and you can carry the material down in a very focused plume
towards the critical group location as proposed, as opposed
to something that is one of the larger ones with a more
dispersed plume to it, so that is where we look at -- of
course, we are considering the uncertainty in what that
event is going to be.
We are not predicting or trying to forecast the
exact event, but we are taking a more probabilisitc approach
of given these range of conditions in the magma system, what
is the range of eruption characteristics that we could
sample for a future igneous event.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Thank you.
DR. TRAPP: Just one thing to carry that a step
farther, Britt kind of hit on it, but remember we are only
dealing with a very small subset of the types of volcanoes
you could be dealing with. We are not dealing with the Mt.
St. Helens type eruption. We are not dealing with a
Maunaloa type eruption. We are dealing with a continental
basalis eruption.
DR. HORNBERGER: John, a lot of this, it strikes
me I would agree with you had I been at your meeting it
seems like it was very profitable indeed.
I would like to see Bill's writeup to find out if
he agreed.
DR. TRAPP: Yes, he did.
DR. HORNBERGER: Good.
DR. TRAPP: He did a good writeup.
DR. HORNBERGER: One of the things that you went
through I would be a bit concerned about right now is this
issue of remobilization and deposition, because as you
indicated, that is going to be a nightmare to sort out so
that some kind of bounding analysis is likely to be the only
way that you can get at it.
Do you have any gut level feeling that this is
going to be a feasible thing and that the bounding analysis
is not going to be so constrained as to produce something
that is ridiculous?
DR. TRAPP: I wish I could give you a much better
warm and fuzzy. Generally from what I have seen, I think
this would be a reasonable approach and I think they can get
to it.
If you start taking a look at models of erosion,
et cetera, trying to put these all together, there are some
models that you can put there. There also are some ways
that -- for instance, like I said, it's a mass balance, so
instead of -- and I am not sure that this would work, but
you could try it -- is, say, just shutting off the removal
rates and only consider the rate of material coming in.
This might be a way of getting the material.
Now as you build up the section, you are starting
to get some shielding, so someplace along there you should
end up with something that is a reasonable value.
I am actually kind of glad that DOE has got the
problem of working with it and I also feel kind of good
about this one because of the people they have got organized
I have got quite a bit of confidence -- with Peter Swift,
who is basically going to be taking the major role in this.
DR. HORNBERGER: Has NRC Staff or anyone at the
Center done any analyses?
DR. TRAPP: Not that I know of.
MR. HILL: Again this is Britt Hill from the
Center. That's one of our tasks this year is to try to take
our own scoping calculations about the extent of
remobilization, not just from waterborne remobilization in
the 40 mile wash, but also having to consider the windblown
processes out there.
When you are driving up Amargosa Valley on your
next trip, you can take a look out to Big Dune or the sand
wraps up around Busted Butte to see that the wind can
remobilize a significant amount of finer grain material and
especially when we start to consider the critical group
itself being a farming community that is erecting fences,
buildings, growing crops that are all going to be serving as
particle traps.
We have to consider the potential influx of
material into the critical group location from wind and
water as well as the potential outflow of material also by
wind and water, so it's really turning into a challenging
flux problem, but it is a problem that is going to have to
be addressed because the whole expected annual dose is based
on the long-term behavior of the contaminated fall deposits
through time, so we have to be addressing these problems and
bounding them in a realistic, defensible way.
SPEAKER: You're going to apply your analysis to
mill tailings, right?
DR. HORNBERGER: I have got sort of a follow-on
question. Do your models for things like the windblown and
resuspension and all of these physical things have a nice
sophisticated term for gravity, since even the highly
oxidized uranium oxide fuel has a density of 10, which is a
factor of four heavier than anything else that is going to
be in there probably.
DR. TRAPP: This is one of the things if you took
a look at the questions that's basically making sure that
ASHPLUME is correctly considering these difference in
densities in the evaluation.
DR. HORNBERGER: Other questions? Andy?
DR. CAMPBELL: Do you guys have any analog
information on -- I mean it seems to me that one of the key
uncertainties on kind of the conceptual model end of things
is how magma intrusion disrupts and then disperses waste
into the magma, which then either gets extruded at the
surface or blown into a plume.
Is there any analog information on the
interactions of magmas and dikes and lava flows with
human-made objects to give you some way of bounding this?
DR. TRAPP: There really isn't. The only one that
I can think of is the one in Iceland several years ago where
they drilled into one of these active dikes by accident and
caused a miniature volcano through the drill pipe. Aside
from that, no.
DR. CAMPBELL: But in terms of the percentages of
material that starts out as a rather large steel and nickel
alloy container with stuff inside of it, there's really
nothing analogous to how that gets disruptive, so basically
you would just assume that "x" number of waste packages
based upon dimensional arguments get totally pulverized and
carried up into the plume?
DR. TRAPP: Basically, yes, any analysis that we
have done at least when you are dealing with the conduit
itself, we end up with the thing so totally disrupted that
we really can't go any farther than that.
I am not sure that it would really gain that much
in the analysis myself, but if you have some information I
would be glad to hear it. We don't have it.
DR. LEVENSON: One place there might be some
information from is quite a few years ago I took the cable
car up to the top of Mt. Vesuvius and I was a little
concerned about how it looked, so I went up and asked them
about the maintenance and they said, well, we don't maintain
this because this gets destroyed by the volcano about every
10 years or so, and it has to be replaced, so there might be
some interactive information available.
DR. HORNBERGER: John?
DR. LARKINS: Just a quick question for
information.
Aerosol transporting deposition is a function of
size, shape and density and what you assume for your load
distribution. How close are you between DOE analysis and
what you are assuming in your ASHPLUME models?
DR. TRAPP: Well, Britt is closer to that than I
am.
MR. HILL: We are very close. The differences at
this time don't appear to be significant in terms of the
particle densities, the constants that we are using for eddy
diffusivity, the dispersion. We are using the same
dispersional model.
The differences on the waste, we're evaluating
whether their mean value is significantly different from
ours, but we are in the same ballpark on just about
everything.
DR. LARKINS: Okay, chemical remobilization would
be impacted by the solubility and what you assume for your
chemical form for aerosol.
MR. HILL: We haven't made any assumptions about
chemical remobilization and surface leeching processes. We
are talking at this stage solely the physical transport of
particles by wind and water.
DR. HORNBERGER: Any other questions?
[No response.]
DR. HORNBERGER: Okay. Thanks very much, John.
That was an excellent presentation, lots of good technical
material.
We are glad to see progress.
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: This is an unusual event. We
are ahead of schedule, but it is fortunate because the
committee has been looking for some time to get access to
some computers and download some information that we need
for the balance of the meeting, so we are going to do that
now, and in that regard I think we will adjourn until 1:00
p.m.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the hearing was
recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.]. AFTERNOON SESSION
[1:00 p.m.]
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Could we get people to take
their seats, please, because we are going to conduct this
next phase partly by telecon and we have some timing issues
that we want to deal with, and I will be back online in just
a moment.
[Pause.]
CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Will the meeting come to order,
please.
For the benefit of the Honorable Shelley Berkley,
we want to get started, and I am John Garrick, Chairman of
the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, and I am supported
with the other members, George Hornberger, Ray Wymer, and
Milt Levenson.
This is the part of the meeting that is the
primary reason that we have it approximately once a year in
the Las Vegas area, and that is to establish direct contact
with stakeholders and the public in connection with the
Yucca Mountain Project.
We always consider this a highlight of our
activities and I can say with great confidence that it has
had a considerable influence on our communication and our
advice to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I think that in the last letter we wrote following
last year's meeting we stated it pretty clearly about this
sort of a session. We said, "Our objective in holding these
discussions is to enhance our own capability to communicate
technical issues and to develop ideas about how to improve
effective public participation in the NRC's regulatory
process. We also hope to strengthen our relationship with
Nevada stakeholders and clarify our role as an independent
technical oversight body to the NRC."
We have as a result of these meetings, and this is
our third one of this type, we have been specific in our
advice to the Commission about public participation. We
also have to acknowledge that the Commission has had a very
deliberate and determined effort to upgrade, if you wish,
its own activities in relationship to public involvement and
communication so we can't take all the credit but certainly
we have been a stimulant in that regard and I think we have
been pretty frank and direct in our advice on what should be
done.
Just as a minor example of that, in our last
letter following our meeting last time, we were very candid
in making some of the observations and I will just note a
couple of them, and we indicated that some representatives
of the state and counties and members of the public
perceived the following about the NRC:
One, NRC's attempt at risk communication is
disingenuous because of a lack of opportunities to influence
NRC's options and decisions -- all of this is in a letter
that we wrote that is in the public record.
Two, the NRC relaxed regulatory requirements to
ensure that the Yucca Mountain Repository can be licensed.
This was a comment made by state representatives.
Three, the NRC and the DOE have a strong
comraderie and a common language and have a common interest
in getting the repository license -- that is, the NRC will
not challenge the DOE, et cetera, et cetera.
And there are many more, and I just cite these to
indicate the frankness and candidness with which we
attempted to communicate what we were hearing from the
public about the project.
Now as far as actions beyond these letters are
concerned, there have been numerous.
One of course is that we annual prepare an action
plan for the committee that prioritizes its activities for
the coming year, and these meetings have had a direct
influence on establishing as first-year priorities such
things as risk communication and offering advice on
improving relationships with the public, et cetera.
In addition, we have noted several specific issues
such as transportation and have established a schedule for
dealing with these subjects as seems appropriate in the
context of the proceedings of the Yucca Mountain Project,
and we will say something about that a little later.
Now what I would like to do is give our guest, and
we are delighted that she is taking the time to do this, the
Honorable Shelley Berkley from the U.S. House of
Representatives and First District of the State of Nevada an
opportunity to address us for a few moments. Representative
Berkley?
CONGRESSWOMAN BERKLEY: [via telephone] Yes,
doctor, thank you very much. Good afternoon. I would like
to thank the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its Advisory
Committee on Nuclear Waste for the opportunity to offer my
testimony by telephone. Needless to say, I would much
rather be with you in person, but as you know, Congress is
still in session.
It is my understanding that the committee and the
NRC Staff will be discussing how to handle an application
from the Department of Energy to build and operate a high
level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. I am also
informed that tomorrow the committee will discuss the
so-called progress at the Yucca Mountain site, focusing on a
DOE site recommendation report and performance assessment,
and with all due respect to all concerned and I mean that, I
must say that the work of the Commission and the committee
should be directly in an entirely different direction.
Instead of continuing the Yucca Mountain Project,
I urge that you begin to consider shutting it down. The
dangers of Yucca Mountain as a nuclear repository are now so
well-known and so well documented that it is sheer folly to
continue the project and dump additional billions of dollars
literally in a hole in the ground.
Long ago the Yucca Mountain Project reached the
stage that the only way it could be kept alive was to
undermine the safety provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act. The calculated erosion of these provisions has kept
the project on life support for years. It is time to pull
the plug so that the nation may move on to consider safe and
effective strategies to solve the problem of nuclear waste
disposal.
On three separate occasions the state of Nevada
has demonstrated using DOE's own data that the site should
be disqualified under both the EPA standard and the DOE's
own internal site screening regulations and each time the
DOE or Congress has changed the regulations to ensure that
Yucca Mountain would not be disqualified regardless of the
health and safety consequences to Nevadans.
In fact, DOE has found the geology at Yucca
Mountain so poor that over 90 percent of the waste isolation
