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Westinghouse Electric Company (Hematite Facility)

1.0 Site Identification

2.0 Site Status Summary

The property consists of approximately 228 acres. The operating facility consists of two main plant buildings, an administration and several support buildings, and a parking area. Plant operations included low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication, processing and treating uranium compounds, including all forms of uranium from depleted to enriched uranium, and thorium fuel. Contamination at the site consists of uranium and thorium in the soil and groundwater.

The Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC (WEC) has provided phased-notification of cessation of operational activities. On September 11, 2001, WEC provided notification of cessation of all principal activities and submitted an application for license amendment to change the scope of authorized license activities to those associated with decommissioning activities. WEC has performed, within its permitted license activities, certain equipment decontamination and dismantlement and has shipped equipments and material to its South Carolina facility.

WEC submitted the Phase 1 DP in April 2004, and Decommissioning Funding Plan in September 2004. Staff required more information and requested that the licensee resubmit the Phase 1 DP by January 2005. The licensee submitted Rev.1 on January 28, 2005. OGC has determined that one EA is required to avoid segmentation under NEPA. Due to this OGC decision, the licensee agreed that NRC should perform one EA. In addition, the licensee agreed to one DP and therefore Phased-decommissioning is no longer being pursued by the licensee. Decommissioning is estimated to cost approximately $40.5 million.

Throughout its history, Hematite's primary function has been to manufacture uranium metal and uranium compounds from natural and enriched uranium for use as nuclear fuel. From its inception in 1956 through 1974, the facilty was used primarily in support of Government contracts that required production of highly enriched uranium products. From 1974 through the plant closure in 2001, the focus changed from government contracts to commercial fuel production plant. Over the lifetime of the facility there have been six owners. Mallinckrodt, United Nuclear and Gulf United Nuclear owned the plant for the government focused phase of operations. Combustion Engineering, ABB and Westinghouse owned the plant during the commercial phase of operations.

3.0 Major Technical or Regulatory Issues

WEC submitted its comprehensive DP on October 5, 2005. WEC requested the NRC to approve an alternate schedule. The NRC staff completed its 90 day extended acceptance review of the DP. The staff notified WEC that it would not accept the DP for a detailed technical review due to technical reasons. Subsequently a meeting was held at NRC Headquarters with the licensee to discuss the deficiencies in the DP. The licensee resubmitted the DP on June 19, 2006. On September 20, 2006, NRC accepted the DP for detailed technical review. However, NRC's letter noted that the staff's detailed technical review of the DP will not begin until WEC provides information that adequately addresses NRC's August 24, 2006, RAI (ML061630034).

On October 27, 2006 withdrew its license amendment request of 06082006 which was the basis for the RAI (ML063060011). At the October 17, 2006 meeting, Westinghouse indicated that a revised amendment request would be submitted. Originally, the submittal was to be made in January 2007. However, in December 2006 it was decided that the submittal should consist of two parts. The first part was submitted on February 5, 2007. `A public meeting was held on June 19, 2007 to discuss the forthcoming submittal. As a result of the public meeting Westinghouse decided to delay the second part of the submittal pending the identification of the remediation contractor and the incorporation of the contractor's approach into the DP and the amendment request. In addition, Westinghouse also determined that there were issues raised in past public meetings and correspondence which warranted a response.

On August 12, 2009 Westinghouse submitted a revised DP along with eight other items for staff review. A 90 day acceptance review was performed of the DP. On November 2, 2009, a letter was transmitted to Westinghouse indicating that the Hematite DP had been accepted for review. A notice will be published in the Federal Register probably in mid November indicating that the NRC is reviewing Westinghouse's request for an amendment to the Hematite license which would approve the Hematite DP and an offering an opportunity for interested parties to request a hearing. The opportunity to request a hearing typically expires 60 days following publication in the Federal Register unless an extension is granted. A public meeting at which the NRC would describe its amendment and DP review process and at which it would solicit comments from interested members of the public is tentatively scheduled for December 1 or December 2, 2009.

The NRC anticipates concluding the DP licensing action within 12 months following documentation that the DP has been accepted for review.

On May 21, 2009, Westinghouse submitted a request for an amendment to the Hematite license to allow alternate disposal of low-activity radioactive materials containing source, byproduct and special nuclear material in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2002. Westinghouse proposed disposing of this material at a U. S. Ecology facility in Grand View, ID. This facility is neither an NRC nor an NRC agreement state licensee. Since it is not, disposal at this site would require the NRC to grant exemptions from 10 CFR 30.3 and 10 CFR 70.3. On July 21, 2009 a NRC Category 1 technical meeting was held at the NRC offices in Rockville, MD. At that meeting Westinghouse provided an overview of the proposed action. On July 28, 2009, a NRC Category 3 public meeting was held in the vicinity of the Grand View, ID facility. At the public meeting the NRC described its amendment process and solicited comments from interested members of the public. On July 6, 2009 a Federal Register Notice was published which provided interested members of the public guidance on how it might request a hearing with regards to Westinghouse's proposed alternate disposal amendment request. Later, on September 4, 2009, another Federal Register Notice was published which granted a 30 day extension for individuals to file a request for hearing on the alternate disposal. A hearing request was received from Citizens for a Clean Idaho, Inc. Both the NRC and Westinghouse responded to that request by October 26, 2009. As of November 5, 2009, Citizens for a Clean Idaho has not replied to either the NRC's or Westinghouse's response.

On May 22, 2009, Westinghouse submitted an amendment request which proposes revisions to the Hematite License and revisions to Chapters 1-6 of the application incorporated into the Hematite License by Condition No. 16.A. With this submittal, Westinghouse withdrew its February 15, 2008 as corrected on July 9, 2008 amendment request. When the NRC issued Amendment 54 to the Hematite license certain aspects of the May 22, 2009 amendment request were implemented as License Condition 15A. The remaining items will be addressed in future NRC actions.

On September 11-13, 2007, an inspection was conducted of the Hematite site. The inspection resulted in the issuance of three Level IV violations. The violations involved failures to: conduct licensed activities due to a lack of management focus; maintain the license consistent with changing site conditions and activities: and failure to properly label containers containing radioactive materials. On December 18, 2007, Westinghouse responded to the Notice of Violation. They contested Example a of Violation 2. Westinghouse believes that they took proactive actions to maintain the license to reflect the removal of the exhaust and conversion offgas stacks.

In letters dated February 4, 2008, February 11, 2008, February 21, 2008 and March 5, 2008 Westinghouse reported four instances of concentrations of radioactive material exceeding limits in unrestricted areas.

On April 18, 2008 Hematite made a special report to the NRC's Operation Center indicating the loss of a special nuclear material source which was utilized in a nuclear criticality detector. A 30 day report was also made with respect to having material which exceeds the 10 times concentration limits of Appendix B to Part 20 in an unrestricted area.

During August 2008, Westinghouse performed visual inspections and radiological surveys of the process buildings. They were performed to confirm the type and number of items remaining in the buildings; to confirm the effectiveness of the fixative to contain surface contamination during subsequent building demolition; and to identify any items that displayed elevated radiation levels suggesting the presence of residual contamination on internal surfaces. During the inspection, several UO2 fuel pellets were identified within a conveyor system. As a result of this finding, Westinghouse performed additional surveys in the process buildings. These surveys identified elevated radiation levels in piping and system ductwork. On November 20, 2008, Westinghouse issued a stop-work order for all activities associated with the process buildings. The stop work order was issued due to the fact that Westinghouse had concluded that the amount of U-235 in the process buildings was greater than the 700 gram limitation of 10CFR70.24. This amount was also greater than the amount specified in the supporting documentation presented by Westinghouse for Amendment 52.

As a result of questions raised by the staff in a conference call to discuss the identification of fuel pellets underneath conveyor rollers in the process building, Westinghouse performed some additional sampling for U-235 in the process building.

A November 14, 2008 email from Westinghouse indicated that their contractor had identified amounts of U-235 ranging from approximately 418 - 2541 g of U-235 in piping and other components in the process building. This value did not include the 250 g indicated as being present in the supporting information to Amendment 52 to the Hematite license.

As a result of this situation the NRC conducted a number of inspections between November 17, 2008, and June 24, 2009, at the Hematite facility. The purpose of the inspections was to determine whether decommissioning activities were being conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspections focused on management organization and controls, radiation protection, quality assurance, corrective action, effluent control, and environmental protection. The results of the inspection were documented in Inspection Report 070-00036/2008002, dated July 23, 2009. On September 2, 2009, a Predecisional Enforcement Conference was conducted in the NRC Region III office. The purpose of the Conference was to discuss the apparent violations, their significance, their root causes, and Hematite s corrective actions. Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information provided by Westinghouse during and following the Conference, the NRC determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations were cited in a Notice of Violation issued October 23, 2009.

One violation involved the deactivation of the nuclear criticality accident monitoring system sometime between February 21 and March 22, 2006, prior to Hematite receiving NRC approval to deactivate the system. NRC approval was not given until June 2006. The second violation, involved the March 17, 2006 Westinghouse submittal in which inaccurate information about the amount of U-235 remaining in the process building was provided. The NRC used this information, in part, as the basis for granting License Amendment 52 on June 30, 2006. The NRC noted that on November 11, 2008, during routine surveys, Westinghouse had determined that the amount of U-235 remaining in the process building piping significantly exceeded the amounts provided in the March 17, 2006 letter.. The third violation involved the failure to provide adequate training to a health physics technician.

The first two violations were of particular concern to the NRC because they indicated a lack of sensitivity to the role that the NRC performs in ensuring public health and safety. The NRC determined that without nuclear criticality alarm capability, Westinghouse did not have the ability to detect and take mitigating actions in response to a nuclear criticality accident. This could have led to a significant overexposure, especially given the inadequate surveys that were used to determine the amount of U-235 remaining in the building. The NRC has concluded that the inaccurate information submitted to the NRC on March 17, 2006, was material to the NRC because the amount of U-235 remaining in the process building formed part of the basis for NRC granting the license amendment in June 2006. Therefore, the NRC categorized both violations, in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, at Severity Level III. The NRC determined that the likely root causes of these violations were: (1) inadequate radiation surveys in 2005 and 2006; (2) lack of rigor in defining what actions required prior NRC approval; and (3) inadequate review of information in submittals to ensure accuracy and completeness.

As a result of these violations, in accordance with its Enforcement Policy, the NRC assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $16,250.

Additional confirmatory surveys were conducted by Westinghouse following the lifting of the Stop Work Order. The results of these surveys show approximately 1750 grams of U-235 in piping, equipment and components and approximately 6900 grams of U-235 on the floors, walls, ceiling and roof of the process building.

In response to the issues identified in the November 2008 inspection, the NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (CAL 3-08-005) to Westinghouse/Hematite on December 15, 2008. The CAL noted that Hematite will take the following actions:

1. Maintain in effect a Stop Work Order on all activities associated with the Process Building by restricting entry to the Process Building and its roof. The Stop Work Order was initiated on November 20, 2008.
2. Develop an approach (methodology) to regain access to the Process Building that includes the following: a. Description of the appropriate safety precautions necessary to regain access. b. Description of the types of measurements needed to complete the assessment of the remaining mass of U235 within the structure.
3. Prior to termination of the Stop Work Order, discuss the methodology, including safety precautions, with the NRC.
4. Provide the approach (methodology), including major milestones, to the NRC by December 19, 2008.
5. Before any Process Building piping or equipment removal or demolition activities are conducted, discuss the methodology, including safety precautions with the NRC.

By letter dated July 9, 2009, the CAL was updated in response to the NRC's letter of June 22,2009 which granted Westinghouse an exemption from the criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a). The updated CAL approved the conduction of further characterization of the process buildings. As a result of the October 23, 2009 submittal transmitting the results of the process building characterization, the CAL will need to be updated again.

Hematite submitted an Action Plan to DNR. There will be a 30 day public comment period and a public meeting was held in July. Based upon the public comments, a record of decision was made. A public meeting was held on September 17, 2009 regarding that record of decision.

Although, only one EA and one DP will be produced, Westinghouse still has plans to address NRC regulatory requirements concurrent with those required under EPA's CERCLA process. This coordination of remedial investigation and remedial action under CERCLA versus NRC's License Termination Rule (LTR) decommissioning and site cleanup criteria could potentially be challenging.

There are active local, State, and Congressional interests in how the site will be decommissioned.

Westinghouse has sued previous owners and the US government for cost recovery for decommissioning. Westinghouse has entered into an agreement with the State of Missouri to give the State of Missouri specific authority in the decommissioning of the site. NRC submitted comments to the State of Missouri opposing the consent agreement because it does not recognize NRC authority over radioactive cleanup. The U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, ruled that the consent decree could not ratify the consent decree because the decree attempts to regulate the safety of a site containing nuclear contaminated, a field which is completely pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act.

4.0 Estimated Date For Closure

03/01/2012

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Tuesday, November 24, 2009