



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
REGION II  
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

May 10, 2023

Jamie Coleman  
Regulatory Affairs Director  
Southern Nuclear Operating Company  
7825 River Road, BIN 63031  
Waynesboro, GA 30830

**SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP), UNIT 3 – INTEGRATED  
INSPECTION REPORT 05200025/2023001**

Dear Jamie Coleman:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3. On April 25, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Glen Chick, VEGP Units 3 & 4 Executive Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at VEGP Unit 3.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at VEGP Unit 3.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Davis, Bradley  
on 05/10/23

Bradley J. Davis, Chief  
Construction Inspection Branch 2  
Division of Construction Oversight

Docket No. 05200025  
License No. NPF-91

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP), UNIT 3 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05200025/2023001 Dated May 10, 2023

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05200025

License Number: NPF-91

Report Number: 05200025/2023001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-001-0078

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3

Location: Waynesboro, GA

Inspection Dates: January 01, 2023, to March 31, 2023

Inspectors: B. Kemker, Senior Resident Inspector  
J. Eargle, Senior Resident Inspector  
B. Griman, Resident Inspector  
J. Parent, Resident Inspector  
R. Elliott, Resident Inspector  
J. England, Senior Construction Inspector  
C. Even, Senior Construction Inspector

Approved By: Bradley J. Davis, Chief  
Construction Inspection Branch 2  
Division of Construction Oversight

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee’s performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

### List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Procedure to Verify Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.9.2.1			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05200025/2023001-01 Open/Closed	[H.3] - Change Management	71153
A finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 (10 CFR 50), Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was self-revealed for the licensee’s failure to have a procedure of a type appropriate to the circumstances for TS SR 3.9.2.1, to verify one valve in each unborated water flow path was secured in the closed position. Specifically, the licensee made a procedure change that removed an isolation valve that resulted in an unborated water source flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS) with the unit in MODE 6.			

### Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
LER	05200025/2022-003-00	LER 2022-003-00 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3, Unborated Water Flowpath not Secured per Technical Specification 3.9.2 Due to Inadequate Procedure Change	71153	Closed
LER	05200025/2022-002-00	LER 2022-002-00 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3, Automatic Depressurization System Stage 4 Flow Paths Inoperable During Mode 6 with Upper Internals in Place Due to Inadequate Work Processes	71153	Closed

LER	05200025/22-002-01	LER 22-002-01 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3, Automatic Depressurization System Stage 4 Flow Paths Inoperable During Mode 6 with Upper Internals in Place Due to Inadequate Work Processes	71153	Closed
LER	05200025/2023-001-00	LER 2023-001-00 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Unit 3, Manual Actuation of Reactor Protection System During Mode 3 Due to an Inadequate Procedure Step	71153	Closed

## PLANT STATUS

At the start of this inspection period, Unit 3 was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at normal operating temperature and pressure with the licensee performing pre-critical testing in preparation for plant start up. On January 15, the licensee performed a plant cooldown and Unit 3 re-entered Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) for corrective maintenance to address high vibrations on the reactor coolant system (RCS) loop 2 automatic depressurization system (ADS) stage 4 piping. On January 16, while making repairs to the RCS loop 2 ADS stage 4 pipe supports, the licensee identified a leak from the downstream (RCS side) flange on in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) injection line A squib valve 3-PXS-V123A, which provides an injection path between the IRWST and the reactor vessel through the direct vessel injection line. On February 2, following corrective maintenance activities, the licensee performed a plant heat up and Unit 3 was returned to Mode 3 to complete additional pre-critical testing. On February 9, the licensee initiated a plant cooldown and Unit 3 re-entered Mode 5 on February 10 for corrective maintenance to repair the 3-PXS-V123A valve flange leak along with other corrective maintenance. On February 26, following corrective maintenance activities, the licensee commenced a plant heat up and Unit 3 was returned to Mode 3 on February 27 to complete pre-critical testing.

On March 2, the licensee notified the NRC of the successful completion of the pre-critical tests for Unit 3 as required by license condition 2.D.(3)(e). Upon this notification, the Unit 3 reactor was authorized to go critical and operate at steady-state core power levels up to 5% thermal power. On March 6, the licensee commenced a reactor startup and Unit 3 entered Mode 2 (Startup) at 1:11 p.m. The Unit 3 reactor achieved initial criticality on March 6 at 3:37 p.m. and the licensee began low power physics testing.

On March 7, the licensee notified the NRC of the successful completion of the initial criticality and low power testing for Unit 3 in accordance with Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) subsections 14.2.10.2 and 14.2.10.3 as required by license condition 2.D.(4)(d). Upon this notification, the licensee was authorized to operate Unit 3 at reactor steady state core power levels up to 100% thermal power, but only for the purpose of performing power ascension testing. On March 9, Unit 3 entered Mode 1 (Power Operation) and the licensee continued with plant startup testing activities.

On March 15, with Unit 3 at about 18% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the loss of two reactor coolant pumps when their electrical buses failed to automatically transfer after a main generator excitation protective relay tripped during testing of the main generator automatic voltage regulator. Following the reactor trip, the licensee stabilized the unit in Mode 3.

On March 20, following corrective maintenance, Unit 3 entered Mode 2 and the licensee performed a reactor startup. On March 21, Unit 3 entered Mode 1 and the licensee resumed plant startup testing activities. At the end of this inspection period, the unit was at about 18% power and the licensee was performing corrective maintenance to allow synchronizing the main turbine generator to the electrical grid and continuation of plant startup testing activities.

## INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## **REACTOR SAFETY**

### 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

#### Partial Walkdown Sample [AP1000] (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a partial walkdown of the following system/train:

- (1) standby diesel generator B during the week of January 1, 2023

### 71111.05 - Fire Protection

#### Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample [AP1000] (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) normal residual heat removal system A & B pump and heat exchanger rooms during the week of January 8, 2023

#### Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample [AP1000] (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on March 24, 2023.

### 71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

#### Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the south auxiliary building and turbine building during the week of March 20, 2023.

### 71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

#### Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during performance of 3-GOP-303, "Plant Heatup Mode 5 to Normal Operating Temperature," on February 3, 2023, and 3-RCS-SOP-002, "Reactor Coolant System Solid Plant Operations", on February 17, 2023.



Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator training evolution on March 21, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness [AP1000] (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following system remained capable of performing its intended function:

- (1) evaluation and resolution of RCS loop 2 ADS stage 4 line vibration during the weeks of January 22, January 29, and February 12, 2023

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample [AP1000] (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activity to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) RCS drain to mid-loop condition for maintenance on February 14 and 15, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment [AP1000] (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determination:

- (1) LDCR-2023-005, "UFSAR Subsection 3.4.1.2.2.1 Update for Hatches in Containment"

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications [AP1000] (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary modification:

- (1) in-containment refueling water storage tank injection line A squib valve (3-PXS-V123A) leak repair freeze seal installations during the weeks of January 22 and February 5, 2023.

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated initial plant startup activities from February 25 to March 10, 2023. Inspection activities performed under this IP were performed to supplement IMC 2514, "AP1000 Reactor Inspection Program - Startup Testing Phase," initial plant startup testing activities, which were documented in NRC Inspection Report 05200025/2023010.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance activity to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) [AP1000] (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) in-containment refueling water storage tank injection line A squib valve (3-PXS-123A) flange leak repair during the weeks of February 12 and 26, 2023.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) emergency preparedness drill on February 14, 2023

**OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issue:

- (1) CAR 323954, "Gaps Regarding Proper Execution of Regulatory Requirements by Operations"

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Follow-up [AP1000] (IP section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the event and operator response for an unplanned trip of Unit 3 upon loss of power to the RCPs on March 15 and March 16, 2023.

Event Report [AP1000] (IP section 03.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) LER 05200025/2022-002-00 and 05200025/2022-002-01, “Automatic Depressurization System Stage 4 Flow Paths Inoperable During Mode 6 with Upper Internals in Place due to Inadequate Work Instructions,” (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML22353A593 and ML23034A235, respectively):

The licensee submitted LER 05200025/2022-002-00 on December 19, 2022, to report the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and also in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant’s TS.

The inspectors reviewed the LER and documented a licensee-identified NCV in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05200025/2022-007-00 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23044A390) for the licensee’s failure to satisfy the Limiting Condition for Operation of TS 3.4.13 while in Mode 6 with the upper internals in place. Additionally, during review of the LER, the inspectors identified the licensee did not report the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(D) as an event where a single cause or condition caused at least two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and documented a minor violation of the NRC’s reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), “Licensee Event Report System.”

The licensee submitted LER 05200025/2022-002-01 on February 3, 2023, to address the 10 CFR 50.73 reporting discrepancy and to provide additional details. The inspectors determined the information provided in the revised LER did not raise any new issues or change the conclusion of the initial review.

- (2) LER 05200025/2023-001-00, “Manual Actuation of Reactor Protection System During Mode 3 Due to an Inadequate Procedure Step” (ADAMS Accession No. ML23073A380): The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in the Inspection Results section of this report.

- (3) LER 0500025/2022-003-00, "Unborated Water Flowpath Not Secured per Technical Specification 3.9.2 Due to Inadequate Procedure Change" (ADAMS Accession No. ML22353A609): The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in the Inspection Results section of this report, (NCV 05200025/2023001-01).

## INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Procedure to Verify TS SR 3.9.2.1			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05200025/2023001-01 Open/Closed	[H.3] - Change Management	71153
A finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” was self-revealed for the licensee’s failure to have a procedure of a type appropriate to the circumstances for TS SR 3.9.2.1, to verify that one valve in each unborated water flow path was secured in the closed			

position. Specifically, the licensee made a procedure change that removed an isolation valve that resulted in an unborated water source flow path to the RCS with the unit in Mode 6.

Description: During Mode 6 operation, all unborated water sources connected to the RCS must be isolated to prevent an unplanned dilution, with at least one isolation valve in each flow path secured in the closed position to prevent an inadvertent positive reactivity addition. Procedure 3-RCS-OTS-20-001, "Unborated Water Source Checklist," was used to meet TS SR 3.9.2.1, which required operators to verify one valve in each unborated water flow path was secured in the closed position when the unit was in Mode 6.

On September 11, 2020, CR 50062352 was written to delete valve 3-DWS-V244 as an isolation point from the unborated water source checklist. In March 2022, procedure 3-RCS-OTS-20-001 was issued to reflect the removal of valve 3-DWS-V244 from the checklist. On October 24, 2022, with Unit 3 in Mode 6, post fuel load, the operating crew confirmed an increase in the level in the RCS from an unborated water source. Operators entered Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.2 Condition A after declaring TS SR 3.9.2.1 was not met.

The licensee investigated the cause of the unborated water source into the RCS and determined the removal of the 3-DWS-V244 isolation valve was due to an improper determination that there was not a flow path connected to the RCS.

The licensee submitted LER 05200025/2022-003-00 to report the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an event or condition which was prohibited by the plant's TS.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this performance issue into its corrective action program for evaluation and to identify appropriate corrective actions. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee closed valves DWS-V244 and CVS-V041 to isolate the unborated water source flow path into the RCS and restore compliance with TS. The licensee also measured RCS boron concentration to verify it was within TS requirements. Additional corrective actions included performing an extent of condition evaluation and updating procedure 3-RCS-OT-20-001 to add valves DWS-V244 and CVS-V041 into the unborated water source checklist.

Corrective Action References: CR 10917725

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to have a procedure of a type appropriate to the circumstances for TS SR 3.9.2.1, to verify one valve in each unborated water flow path was secured in the closed position, was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of more than minor significance because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, RCS, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the procedure failed to ensure one valve in each unborated water flowpath was secured in the closed position.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Safety SDP [Significance Determination Process]." The affected cornerstone was Barrier Integrity, as determined by IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial

Characterization of Findings.” The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SDP review of this finding using the guidance provided in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,” and determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on “No” answers to all of the Exhibit 4 – Barrier Integrity Screening Questions.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.3 - Change Management: Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority. The licensee’s technical evaluation process failed to identify that the removal of DWS-V244 from procedure 3-RCS-OTS-20-001 was inappropriate.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” requires, in part, that, “activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.”

Contrary to the above, on October 17, 2022, the licensee failed to have a procedure of a type appropriate to the circumstances for TS SR 3.9.2.1, to verify one valve in each unborated water flow path was secured in the closed position. Specifically, the licensee made a procedure change that removed an isolation valve that resulted in an unborated water source flow path to the RCS with the unit in Mode 6.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Violation	71153
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Minor Violation: The inspectors determined that not providing adequate guidance in procedure 3-AOP-202, “Condensate System Malfunctions,” Version 2.0 was a performance deficiency. The licensee did not provide adequate procedural direction to check reactor trip breakers are not open prior to manually tripping the reactor when responding to main turbine gland steam pressure below the AOP's established limit while in Mode 3 with reactor trip breakers open, which led to operators manually inserting a reactor trip.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of minor significance. This determination was made because the answers to all the more than minor screening questions in Appendix B, "Issue Screening", of IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports", was "no".

Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC’s Enforcement Policy.

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was documented in this report.

- On April 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Glen Chick, VEGP Units 3 & 4 Executive Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.04	Procedures	3-ZOS-SOP-001	Onsite Standby Power System	2.1
71111.05	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10959280	Fire drill lessons learned	03/24/2023
71111.05	Fire Plans	B-PFP-ENG-001-F3120	Pre-Fire Plan-Auxiliary Building RCA EI 66'-6"	1.0
71111.05	Fire Plans	B-PFP-ENG-001-F3121	Pre-Fire Plan-Auxiliary Building RCA EI 82'-6"	2.0
71111.05	Fire Plans	B-PFP-ENG-001-F3122	Pre-Fire Plan- Auxiliary Building RCA EI 92'-6"	2.0
71111.05	Fire Plans	B-PFP-ENG-001-F3123	Pre-Fire Plan-Auxiliary Building RCA EI 100'-0"	1.0
71111.05	Fire Plans	B-PFP-ENG-001-F3124	Pre-Fire Plan-Auxiliary Building RCA EI 117'-6"	1.0
71111.05	Miscellaneous	NMP-TR-425-F14	Fire Drill Package	4.0
71111.06	Engineering Evaluations	APP-GW-GL-022	AP1000® Probabilistic Risk Assessment	8
71111.06	Engineering Evaluations	APP-PRA-GSC-358	AP1000® Plant At-Power Internal Events PRA, Fluid Systems Pipe Leak and Rupture Analysis Notebook	0
71111.11Q	Procedures	3-GOP-303	Plant Heatup Mode 5 to Normal Operating Temperature	T=0.19
71111.11Q	Procedures	3-RCS-SOP-002	Reactor Coolant System Solid Plant Operations	1.0
71111.11Q	Procedures	NMP-AD-002-F04	Troubleshooting Log	1.1
71111.12	Work Orders	WO # SNC1428658	Remove ADS-4 Temporary Supports installed under DCP TM SNC1426824	0
71111.13	Procedures	3-GOP-102	Draining the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)	I=0.8
71111.13	Procedures	3-GOP-205	Plant Cooldown Mode 3 to Mode 5	2.0
71111.13	Procedures	B-ADM-OPS-018	Protected Division and Protected Equipment Program	1.0
71111.15	Miscellaneous	LDCR-2023-005	UFSAR Subsection 3.4.1.2.2.1 Update for Hatches in Containment	1.0
71111.18	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10949295	3-PSX-V123A Pressure Test	02/18/2023
71111.18	Procedures	NMP-MA-021	Installation, Maintaining & Removal of Freeze Seals on Piping Systems Using Liquid Nitrogen (N2)	1.1

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.18	Procedures	NMP-MA-021	Installation, Maintaining, and Removal of Freeze Seals on Piping systems using Liquid Nitrogen (N2)	1.1
71111.18	Work Orders	SNC1430155	3-PXS-L127A - Contingency Freeze Seal to Support Outlet Flange Leak of 3-PXS-V123A	0
71111.18	Work Orders	WO SNC1430008	3-PSX-V123A - Replace outlet flange gasket	01/29/2023
71111.18	Work Orders	WO SNC1431055	3-PSX-L127A- PXS to RCS DVI A Line	01/24/2023
71111.20	Procedures	3-GEN-ITPS-606	Post-Fuel Loading Precritical Test Sequence Startup Test Procedure	Version 2.0
71111.20	Procedures	3-GEN-ITPS-610	Initial Criticality and LPPT [Low Power Physics Testing] Sequence Startup Test Procedure	Version 2.0
71111.20	Procedures	3-GEN-ITPS-611	Initial Criticality and Low Power Physics Test Startup Test Procedure	Version 3.2
71111.20	Procedures	3-GEN-ITPS-618	Power Ascension Test Sequence Startup Test Procedure	Version 3.0
71111.20	Procedures	3-GOP-301	Mode Change Checklists	Version J=0.9
71111.20	Procedures	3-GOP-302	Reactor Startup Mode 3 to Mode 2	Version P=0.15
71111.20	Procedures	3-GOP-303	Plant Heatup Mode 5 to Normal Operating Temperature	Version Q=0.16
71111.20	Procedures	3-GOP-306	Plant Startup Mode 2 to 25% Power	Version M=0.12
71111.20	Procedures	B-GEN-RES-004	Low Power Physics Testing	Version 5.0
71111.24	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10943400	Cold spring of PXS piping 3-PXS-PLW-L123A	01/28/2023
71111.24	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10943621	Leak on 3-PXS-V123A	01/29/2023
71111.24	Miscellaneous	SVP_SVO_230033	Maximum Pressure Assessment for Leak Check Following 3-PXS-PL-L123A Repairs	02/10/2023
71111.24	NDE Reports	NMP-ES-024-202	Visual Examination (VT-2)	9.0
71111.24	Procedures	3-GEN-ITPS-629	Thermal Power Measurement and Statepoint Data Collection Startup Test Procedure	Version 5.0
71111.24	Procedures	3-PMS-OTS-16-007	Calorimetric Heat Balance Comparison to Nuclear and Delta T Power	Version F=0.5
71111.24	Procedures	3-RCS-ITPS-605	RCS [Reactor Coolant System] Flow Measurement at	Version 4.0



Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Power Startup Test Procedure	
71111.24	Work Orders	SNC1433782	Support PCI in the Repair of 3-PXS-V123A Downstream Flange	0
71111.24	Work Orders	SNC1437228	Perform System leak check on 3-PXS-V123A	0
71114.06	Miscellaneous		Vogtle 1-3 Facility Activation Drill	02/14/2023
71152A	Corrective Action Documents		Root Cause Evaluation - (CAR 323954) Gaps in the Execution of Operations Activities that Have Resulted in Regulatory Impacts	12/07/2022
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CAR 323048	Readings Not Taken on 3-GEN-OTS-17-003 "24 Hour TS Surveillance"	
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CAR 323606	LCO 3.4.13 Conditions B and F Entered with a LOSF	
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CAR 323624	Unexpected Rise in RCS Level with Purification in Service	
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CAR 323954	Trend in Operations Challenges with Regulatory Impacts	
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10918518	Trend in Operations Challenges with Regulatory Impacts	
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	CR 50158883	3-IDSBB-DD-1 (Division B 250 VDC Distribution Panel) Main Breaker Opened During System Lineup	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	10956698	Demin Water Transfer Pump Failed to Sequence on Loss of Power	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956663	U3 Rx Trip.	03/16/2023
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956663	U3 Rx trip	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956682	RTVO challenges Safeguards actuation with low decay heat	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956684	Secondary Component issues during E-0 & E-0.1 Performance	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956690	Unit 3 Main Control Room VES actuation	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956693	APS response post reactor trip	

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956699	CVS-RMCS (Reactor Makeup Control System) malfunction	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956706	ECS post Rx trip response	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956709	Main Feedwater Pump Trip indication	
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10956723	IDSB Battery Charger and Inverter faults due to plant transient	
71153	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 10940798	NRC Identified - Revision Needed to LER 2022-002-00	
71153	Miscellaneous	LER 2022-002-00	Automatic Depressurization System Stage 4 Flow Paths Inoperable During Mode 6 with Upper Internals in Place due to Inadequate Work Processes	12/19/2022
71153	Miscellaneous	LER 2022-002-01	Automatic Depressurization System Stage 4 Flow Paths Inoperable During Mode 6 with Upper Internals in Place due to Inadequate Work Processes	02/03/2023
71153	Miscellaneous	LER 2023-001-00	Manual Actuation of Reactor protection System During mode 3 Due to an inadequate Procedure Step	03/14/2023
71153	Miscellaneous	Report No. 3-23-001	Reactor Trip Report - Unit 3 Trip on 03/15/23 @ 2157.	03/15/2023
		3-AOP-202	Condensate System Malfunctions	Version 2.0