Department of Homeland Security
Region IV
3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road
Atlanta, Georgia 30341

FEMA

July 11, 2012

Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
One Marquis Tower
245 Peachtree Center Avenue, Suite 1200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. McCree:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the March 21, 2012 partial participation plume exposure pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the States of Georgia and South Carolina and Burke County, Georgia as well as Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina. Parts of the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) are also within the 10-mile EPZ. DOE has responsibility for emergency response actions at the SRS. Although FEMA does not evaluate SRS participation, they regularly participate in these exercises in accordance with their memorandum of understanding with the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.

State and local organizations demonstrated the ability to implement their emergency response plans and procedures. The exercise highlighted the effective coordination between the States of Georgia and South Carolina. FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action during this exercise. This report was prepared by FEMA Region IV Technological Hazards Branch staff and copies of this report will be forwarded to the States of Georgia and South Carolina, as well as FEMA and NRC Headquarters.

Based on the results of the exercise and FEMA's review of Georgia and South Carolina's Annual Letters of Certification for 2011, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the States of Georgia and South Carolina and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the States of Georgia and South Carolina site-specific to Vogtle Electric Generating Plant granted for both States on June 9, 1987, will remain in effect.

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Should you have questions, please contact Conrad Burnside at the Atlanta Regional Office at 770/220-5486.

Sincerely,

Major P. May
Regional Administrator

Enclosure

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

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - March 21, 2012

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program

FEMA

Published July 10, 2012

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

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Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 21, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff evaluated a partial participation plume exposure pathway exercise for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP). VEGP is located in Burke County, approximately 34 miles southeast of Augusta Georgia and is operated by Southern Nuclear Operating Company. The VEGP Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is divided into 11 emergency response planning zones designated A through F in Georgia , and 2 zones in South Carolina designated G and H. The 10 mile EPZ encompasses parts of Burke County in Georgia and Allendale, Aiken, and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina. The VEGP EPZ also encompasses a portion of the U. S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS). DOE is responsible for the safety of the workers within SRS's portion of the VEGP EPZ. The current residential population of the EPZ is approximately 3,200.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company is in the process of constructing two additional reactors at the VEGP site.

FEMA's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at VEGP. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on May 19, 2010. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted April 30 and May 1, 1987.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development of corrective actions. FEMA's recommendations for improving State and local government capabilities were provided under seperate cover.

The objectives for the 2012 VEGP REP Exercise were as follows:

• Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency operations center (EOC) management including direction and control through the state and counties Emergency Operations Centers.

• Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

• Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

• Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.

• Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for joint (public and private sector) emergency information communications.

These objectives encompass the REP Program evaluation area criteria. These objectives were successfully demonstrated during the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Partial Participation Plume Phase Exercise in the States of Georgia and South Carolina and in the Counties of Burke, Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

Type of Exercise
Plume

Exercise Date
March 21, 2012

Program
Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type
Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

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1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant exercise:

- State Jurisdictions
  - State of Georgia
  - State of South Carolina
- Risk Jurisdictions
  - Burke County
  - Aiken County
  - Allendale County
  - Barnwell County
- Private Organizations
  - American Red Cross (ARC)
  - The Salvation Army
  - Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)
  - Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

DHS/FEMA administers the REP Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, State, tribal and local governments impacted by the EPZs established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, Tribal and local government RERPs and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises affected State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise together with review of the RERPs and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visit enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final AAR to the NRC that the affected State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) to FEMA by the States of Georgia and South Carolina occurred respectively on September 24, 1986, and September 26, 1986. Formal approval of each State's RERPs was granted on June 9, 1987, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was evaluated on March 21, 2012, and included evaluations of the out-of-sequence activities held during the week of March 7-8, 2012.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

The objectives for the 2012 VEGP REP Exercise encompass the REP criteria agreed upon for this exercise:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency operations center (EOC) management including direction and control through the state and counties Emergency Operations Centers.

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for joint (public and private sector) emergency information communications.

Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.

• Emergency Operations Center Management: Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, state, and federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and

maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

• Emergency Public Information and Warning: Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

• Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place: Is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.

• Emergency Public Safety and Security Response: Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement (LE), fire, and EMS.

• Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

• Mass Care: Is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident,

including special needs populations. Special needs populations include individuals with physical or mental disabilities who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid. Other special-needs populations include non-English speaking populations that may need to have information presented in other languages. The mass care capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGO), such as the ARC, or by local government-sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Special-needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.

Additionally, each objective is linked to one or more capabilities. Based upon the identified exercise objectives, the evaluated capabilities were:

Objective 1: Capability - EOC Management

Objective 2: Capability - EOC Management
Capability - Emergency Public Information and Warning

Objective 3: Capability - EOC Management
Capability - Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
Capability - Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place
Capability - Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
Capability - Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, Related Services)

Objective 4: Capability - Emergency Public Information and Warning

Objective 5: Capability - Emergency Public Information and Warning

2.3 Scenario Summary

The scenario initial conditions have Units 1 and 2 at 100% power with normal operating temperature and pressure. All control systems are in automatic. The Unit 1 RCS Gaseous Activity is 2.0 E-03 ?Ci/cc and Unit 2 is 3.2 E-03 ?Ci/cc. Unit 1 has been on line for 285 days and Unit 2 has been on line for 74 days.

The scenario creates conditions for an offsite release through the failure of all three fission product barriers. The sequence of events is initiated with a Digital Metal Impact Monitoring (DMIMS) event which damages the fuel cladding. The operating crew will trip the reactor because of the sustained multiple impacts that are detected. The on-shift plant staff will have indications of RSC coolant activity greater than 300 ?Ci/gm dose equivalent I-131 will report findings to the Shift Manager.

An ALERT emergency is declared due to "Any loss or any potential loss of either fuel clad or RCS." Upon declaration of the Alert Emergency, the Shift Manager will implement the emergency plan implementing procedures and assume the position of the Emergency Director (ED).

Offsite notifications will include the warning points for the States of Georgia and South Carolina and the Counties of Burke, Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell. The Savannah River Site (SRS) operation center will also receive notification. The plant staff will receive notification via the plant public address system. At this time the staff will initiate actions for an ALERT per emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs). Other activities that occur on-site at the onset of the ALERT include the activation of the NRC Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC). The Corporate emergency response organization in Birmingham will also have staff available to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and support plant operations to include generation of news releases.

Assembly and accountability are performed within 30 minutes of the plant emergency alarm sounding and the emergency recall system is activated to inform offsite responders. The ED in the simulator will perform a turnover with senior management and transfer the ED duties. The ED will perform a site dismissal with no monitoring which will simulate the movement of non-involved personnel from the owner controlled area.

Approximately fifty minutes after the ALERT declaration, the unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feed water pumps trips. The OSC will be requested to form and dispatch a repair team. At 0932 Unit 1 experiences a steam generator tube rupture on loop 2. The crew will initiate a safety injection and respond to the reactor coolant leak. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) is declared due to "Loss or potential loss of any two barriers.

While the simulator crew manages the SAE, the States, Counties and the NRC are notified of the event upgrade by the TSC. No off-site protective action recommendations are required at this time. The OSC will respond to another request for damage assessment when the unit 1B centrifugal charging pumps trips.

At approximately 1049, a release path (unmonitored release) to the environment begins because the unit 1PSV-3011 main steam code safety lifts and will not reset. Field monitoring teams are directed to monitor the environment and locate the plume. Damage control teams will be formed and dispatched to investigate the breach in containment.

By approximately 1104 the staff will determine the need to upgrade the emergency classification to a GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) based on NMP-EP-110-GL03 due to "Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of Third Barrier." Once declared the ERO will begin taking actions for a General Emergency while the simulator crew continues actions per EOPs. Within approximately 15 minutes, the Emergency Director will notify states, counties and SRS.

The initial GE notification recommendations to offsite agencies should be based on wind direction from 0° (N, >349 - 11), PAR 2, Evacuate Zones "A", "B5", "C5" and "SRS to 2 miles"; Advise remainder of EPZ to monitor local radio/TV stations/TARs for additional information; Consider use of KI in accordance with State Plans and policy.

About 1 hour after the General Emergency is declared the exercise lead controller will determine if the emergency response organization has had the opportunity to demonstrate all objectives. Once the objectives have been demonstrate the exercise is terminated.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the March 21, 2012 partial participation plume phase exercise and OOS activities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise)
- ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from previous exercises
- Deficiency assessed
- Plan Issues
- Not Demonstrated

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

See section 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries for the associated HSEEP Capability Summaries for each jurisdiction.

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: 2012-03-21 SITE: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, GA M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		SNC EOF	VEGP JIC	GA SOC	GSOC	Burke County	SCSEOC	Aiken County	Allendale County	Barnwell County
Emergency Operations Management										
Alert and Mobilization	1a1		M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1		M							
Direction and Control	1c1				M	M	M	M	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1		M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1		M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making										
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1				M	M	M	M	M	M
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1	M								
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2				M	M	M	M	M	M
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1					M				
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1									
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1									
Protective Action Implementation										
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1					M		M	M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1					M		M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1					M				
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2					M				
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1					M		M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2					M		M	M	M
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1									
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2									
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1									
Field Measurement and Analysis										
RESERVED	4a1									
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2				M		M			
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3									
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1									
Laboratory Operations	4c1									
Emergency Notification and Public Info										
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1				M	M	M	M	M	M
RESERVED	5a2									
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3					M				
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4									
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1		M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Support Operations/Facilities										
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1							M	M	M
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1							M	M	M
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1							M	M	M
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1									

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Private Organizations

3.3.1.1 Southern Nuclear Company Emergency Operations Facility

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is located in the Southern Nuclear corporate offices in Birmingham, Alabama. The EOF provides sufficient space and amenities to support emergency response operations and the State Liaisons that deployed to the EOF. The Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA), South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD), and the SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) provided liaisons, who effectively and professionally performed their duties.

The effective integration between the state representatives and the EOF Emergency Director's staff supported the two independent assessments by the States of Georgia and South Carolina of the offsite health and safety considerations supported the protective action recommendation (PAR) and the subsequent protective action decision (PAD). The government officials, in conjunction with the utility operator's Emergency Director and his EOF staff effectively communicated, coordinated and functioned as a cohesive response and recovery unit.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 2.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.2 Vogtle Joint Information Center

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

Representatives from the States of Georgia and South Carolina and Burke County, Georgia, located at the VEGP Joint Information Center (JIC) successfully demonstrated the Emergency and Public Information and Warning capability by providing emergency information and instructions to the media and public. The State and local representatives performed their roles in accordance with their published plans and procedures. The PIO functions for Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell Counties were performed by the SCEMD PIOs. The VEGP JIC was a new facility and was sufficient to support operations.

Southern Nuclear activated the JIC following the declaration of Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL). In accordance with the EOPA, State and County Public Information Officers (PIOs) were pre-positioned in the area and responded to the JIC upon notification of its activation.

State and local JIC representatives confirmed that all news releases were prepared, coordinated and approved at their respective EOCs and then forwarded to the JIC for dissemination to the media and JIC staff. A total of 18 press releases were received and distributed in the JIC during the exercise. Two media briefings were conducted during the exercise. Prior to each briefing the spokespersons gathered to discuss and coordinate their message for the briefing. They discussed who would say what, and in which order the briefing would be conducted. The spokespersons answered all questions asked of them and were able to discuss what actions had been taken by their organizations.

The States of Georgia and South Carolina along with the Utility's rumor control functions were performed in the JIC. South Carolina counties managed public inquiry from their EOCs and Burke County's public inquiry was managed by the State of Georgia. The applicable citizen information numbers were provided to the public during each media briefing and on press releases. The Utility's Public Response Coordinator consolidated and tracked the public inquiries received. Rumors and identified trends were then provided to the spokespersons for correction during the subsequent Media Briefings.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2 Georgia Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Georgia

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

3.3.2.2 Georgia State Operations Center

Emergency Operations Center Management:

Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) and other State agency staff successfully demonstrated the emergency operations center management capability at the State Operations Center (SOC). The SOC was comprised of one large main room with several rooms connecting to it. Those rooms included the State Warning Point (SWP), a conference room, and several work rooms used by various Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The SWP was organized and efficient with several workstations where operators received and distributed information using several communication systems, and effectively performed their duties. The SOC was technologically current and had sufficient space and equipment to support emergency response efforts. Communications systems were redundant and worked throughout the exercise. Other State agencies were easily identified with signs and grouped functionally for conducting their duties. Maps and status boards were visible and made vital information readily available to the staff for reference.

The SOC staff was alerted, mobilized, activated and organized in a timely manner. The SOC staff, with the exception of those who traveled long distances, was not prepositioned, as specified in the Extent of Play Agreement (EOPA). The SOC Chief, Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) and Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Coordinator served as the Command team. The Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC) from the Department of

Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division (EPD), provided expert technical advice and PARs. Direction and Control was immediately established and executed throughout the exercise. Protective action decisions PADs were timely and coordinated through conference calls with Burke, County GA, South Carolina and its affected Counties. The SOC Chief was very effective and capitalized on every opportunity during numerous routine scheduled and impromptu briefings as conditions evolved, to explain procedures and events that kept all staff members abreast of changing conditions, the scope of activities and their roles in the response. Staff actions were defined and deliberate and aided in coordination with internal and external agencies. The SOC staff was well trained, proactive and performed their duties in accordance with plans and procedures. The State also used this event to train a planner to work with the Public Affairs Officer (PAO), who had advocated this concept. The result was to have a proactive resource who contributed to the success of the PAO mission.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

GEMA staff successfully demonstrated the capability to alert, warn and notify the public of a simulated emergency at VEGP. The alert and notification process included activation of sirens, Tone Alert Radios (TARs) and the Emergency Alert System (EAS). Public alert and notification was successfully completed with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.

The GEMA PAO generated, gained approval and disseminated five news releases from the SOC to the Joint Information Center (JIC) for distribution to the media, Georgia and South Carolina state agencies and the risk counties. Joint messages regarding incident events around VEGP, to include PADs and implementation procedures were coordinated in accordance with plans and procedures and the EOPA. GEMA staff coordinated with Burke County the State of South Carolina and its affected counties in efforts surrounding the development and dissemination of timely and accurate information to the public. The PAO explained the use of the Public Information Emergency Response System (PIERS) which is a web-based software program that provided decision-makers the ability to expedite message and news release approvals to the media, states, and counties at the press of a button. It can be used in the office or when they are working remotely. Georgia used this system during actual emergencies. The Public Inquiry Hotline was initialized by the PAO calling the JIC. Public Inquiry is managed at the JIC.

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:

The Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division (DNR-EPD) dose assessment personnel assigned to the State Operations Center (SOC), were effectively alerted, notified, and mobilized in a timely manner. The dose assessment personnel occupied adequate facilities, possessed equipment, maps, displays, and other supplies sufficient to support emergency operations, and successfully established, maintained, and managed primary and auxiliary communications capabilities between VEGP and dose assessment personnel. The Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC) demonstrated effective direction and control over the dose assessment group composed of an Assistant REC, Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC), and Southern Nuclear liaison to Georgia. The DAC developed protective action recommendations (PARs) for the general public considering VEGP dose projections, meteorological data, field team radiological data (controller injects), and independent DNR-EPD dose projections from the use of both RASCAL and MIDAS software programs. The DAC promptly provided accurate technical information to the REC so that PARs could be presented to the GAR to coordinate Protective Action Decisions (PADs) with the State of South Carolina and the affected counties. The REC provided timely PARs to the GAR and the Georgia Department of Agriculture representative. The REC used appropriate consideration of relevant factors and coordination to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, in making PARs to support coordinated PADs. Field teams were not demonstrated during this exercise, but the DAC and REC Assistant described the activation, exposure control, and field team management to effectively obtain sufficient information to characterize the release.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 4.a.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.3 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Burke County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Burke County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff successfully demonstrated the capability to activate and operate their facility for an incident at VEGP. Their ability to alert and mobilize emergency personnel was demonstrated through the use of up to date call down rosters. Appropriate staff were notified and mobilized to the EOC based on emergency classification levels. The EOC was staffed and fully operational following the Site Area Emergency. Communications capabilities were tested and operated without failure. Redundancies in communications were available if failures had occurred. Maps and informational displays were prevalent throughout the EOC. The maps proved to be a useful asset for EOC staff when they determined locations of traffic control points, population densities, and critical facilities. Event logs projected at the front of the EOC served their purpose of keeping all staff informed of ongoing events. Each workstation was equipped with all of the supplies needed to conduct operations as well as position specific procedures manuals. The manuals were used by staff throughout the event to ensure that all mission critical tasks had been accomplished.

Effective and competent direction and control was demonstrated by the Vice Chairman Burke County Board of Commissioners and the EMA Director. They conducted staff briefings to maintain situational awareness of all agencies in the EOC. They also effectively utilized the special skills of their staff to resolve issues and to protect the general population. The Chairman and Director made the PAD to evacuate functional needs population early in the process simple by implementing early setup of the Reception Center, allowing them additional time to evacuate and a safe area to evacuate to. PADs for the general population were made in a timely manner once PARs were received from the utility. Georgia DNREPD evaluated the levels of contamination in the areas recommended for evacuation, made a recommended to the Governor of Georgia or the Governor's Representative and Burke County concurred with the action of evacuation over shelter in place.

Staff in the EOC successfully demonstrated their ability to support and coordinate response activities such as emergency worker exposure control, implementation of protective actions regarding schools and functional needs individuals, and assisting with evacuation efforts through the establishment of traffic control points and the removal of impediments.

The Radiation Protection Officer (RPO) set up the dosimetry issuing location early in the exercise. All emergency workers entering the 10 mile EPZ were instructed to report to the EOC where they were provided dosimeters and potassium iodide. The RPO provided each emergency worker a refresher briefing regarding its use, radiological exposure control and record keeping. Additionally, the established requirements were further engrained by providing each worker with a printed radiation safety card that contained radiation control levels and Potassium Iodide precautions and instructions.

The ability to relocate the school and the citizens with functional needs located within the 10 mile EPZ was successfully demonstrated through simulation and discussion. Adequate transportation resources were available to complete this task and those responsible were familiar with their duties. A list of individuals with functional needs was maintained at the EOC. Those individuals were notified and relocated prior to an evacuation order as a precautionary measure. With assistance from the Georgia State Police and the Waynesboro Police Department, the Burke County Sheriff's Department identified critical areas along evacuation routes to set up traffic control points and barricades to assist in evacuation efforts.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

Burke County successfully demonstrated their capability to issue emergency warnings and provide information to the public through information exchange with the JIC, the activation of the sirens, broadcast of EAS messages, river warning and backup warning in the case of siren failure.

During the exercise Burke County staff simulated the activation of sirens and the broadcast of EAS messages. After they coordinated their activities with the States of Georgia and South Carolina, they simulated siren activation and demonstrated the procedures they would use to broadcast an EAS message from their EOC. They also coordinated their actions with the state's activation of the tone alert radio system. They were familiar with their roles and responsibilities in carrying out this mission.

In the event of siren failure, the Burke County Sherriff's department in conjunction with the EMA Director manages back up route alerting operations. Routes are selected based on siren failures and identified by utilizing maps produced for the siren's geographic coverage location.

During this exercise Fire Department personnel driving vehicles with a PA system (built in or portable) would be utilized to run routes through the coverage area for each failed siren, with additional resources, if needed, provided by County Sheriff's Department and the Georgia State Police. There were sufficient equipment, supplies, and communications systems to support operations. Dosimeter kits containing KI would be issued by the RPO followed by a briefing before running routes. Backup route alerting was not demonstrated during this exercise; however, exposure control was demonstrated for emergency workers conducting other public information and warning functions.

Although no press releases were created in Burke County, they successfully demonstrated their ability to monitor all releases for accuracy and consistency. All news releases from GEMA, Georgia Power, and South Carolina EMA were reviewed and concurred upon by the Burke County Emergency Management Agency Director and the County Chairman. A Public Information representative was present in both the EOC and the Emergency News Center. This allowed for smooth coordination between the facilities and provided timely and accurate information to be contributed to any press briefings.

Burke County EMA, Burke County Fire Department, and Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Law Enforcement Section personnel demonstrated the capability, through interview, to implement emergency public information and warning for boaters on the Savannah River lying within the VEGP EPZ. At the Alert ECL personnel from all three agencies were notified, activated, and deployed on standby to sites on the river as identified in their plans. The teams had sufficient communications equipment and watercraft to support operations. The Burke County EMA had sufficient supplies of dosimeters and KI for emergency workers working in the county. The EMA Radiological Protection Officer issued dosimeters kits which included KI and conducted a thorough briefing on their use before emergency workers entered the EPZ. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of exposure limits and reporting and turn back procedures. At the Site Area Emergency ECL the decision was made to close the river in the EPZ and Fire Department and DNR teams implemented their procedures to notify and clear the public from the EPZ portion of the Savannah River. By plan Georgia is responsible for clearing the river, if they need assistance from South Carolina additional coordination would be required.

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response (TCP):

The Burke County Sheriff's Department, with assistance from the Georgia State Police, the Waynesboro Police Department, and the Burke County Public Works/Roads Department demonstrated the capability, through interview, to implement traffic and access control, law enforcement, and identification and removal of impediments to evacuation. At the Alert ECL police and public works personnel were notified, activated, and deployed to the EOC or put on standby. There were sufficient traffic control and communication equipment to support operations. The Burke County EMA had sufficient supplies of dosimeters and KI for county emergency workers. The EMA Radiological Protection Officer issued dosimeters kits which included KI and conducted a thorough briefing on their use before emergency workers entered the EPZ. Emergency workers were knowledgeable of exposure limits and reporting and turn back procedures. At the General Emergency ECL, traffic control points were chosen and staffed by County Sheriff's and State Police officers, with assistance by County Public Works, to implement the PAD to evacuate three zones in the Burke County portion of the EPZ.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4 South Carolina Jurisdictions

3.3.4.1 South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center

Emergency Operations Center Management:

SCEMD personnel demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. The demonstration included: EOC activation, notification, staffing; management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at the local and State levels; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and

recovery activities.

The SCEMD State Warning Point (SWP) used effective means to alert, notify, and mobilize personnel and activated the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in a timely manner. The VEGP used the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) and WebEOC to make all Emergency Classification Level (ECL) notifications. The SEOC/SWP in turn used Reach SC (a computer based call out system) to record and transmits information to initially call in SEOC staff. The SWP supervisor thereafter hand delivered ECL changes to the SEOC Director and staff. The facility had sufficient communications and other equipment and supplies to support the response efforts.

The Operations Chief (OC) was responsible for direction and control of the SEOC and for coordinating actions with other States, SC counties, counties in other states, and federal agencies. The OC conducted timely SEOC staff briefings and lead the decision meetings. Although there were some unnecessary delays in acting on ECL changes, the overall process was improved from past performances. The OC worked closely with the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) to review PARs from the utility and to formulate PADs with the SC counties and Georgia agencies. Due to the wind direction, no PADs were necessary for any South Carolina locations other than in DOE's SRS. The OC coordinated with SRS on PADs that affected SRS, but also could require support from the State or counties.

Appropriate traffic control and access control was established during the exercise. The South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCHP) representative at the SEOC coordinated with SCHP staff at the County EOCs to provide support to the field personnel assigned to assure timely information was available to emergency personnel. Impediment removal, while mainly handled at the County level, was discussed with the South Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) representative. If requested from a County EOC, the DOT representative was available to locate requested resources.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

SCEMD demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public prior to an impending emergency and activate warning systems to notify those most at-risk in the event of an emergency. This

capability was demonstrated within the State of South Carolina (SC) through observations of actual events and through interviews at the SEOC.

The initial and primary focal point for emergency public information was centered in the SEOC and began with the initial notification that an Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL) had been declared at VEGP. The OC directed operations and the SC Public Information Officer (PIO) issued news releases that the SEOC and the JIC were activated. There were recurring conference and operational coordination calls initiated by the SEOC leadership with the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, the JIC, the three impacted County EOC as well as the Savannah River Site (SRS)EOC, to assure all were in agreement on public information and warning activities.

A Site Area Emergency (SAE) ECL was received and PADs were made and concurred by SCEMD and GEMA. The PIO then coordinated and arranged for the (simulated) siren activation and an EAS message transmission with Burke County EMA in Georgia and Barnwell County South Carolina. The activation of the simulated TARS broadcast was subsequently arranged by GEMA.

There were several interactions with the JIC to assure accurate and timely information was exchanged and the media was made aware of events occurring via both press releases and briefings. The second PAD was received, coordinated and processed after the General Emergency ECL was declared. All actions involved Georgia jurisdictions or SRS. Special emphasis was given to assure news releases contained telephone numbers where members of the public could call for additional information and a number provided so members of the media could solicit additional information and emergency response status. Because the majority of simulated emergency events occurred in Georgia, there were no other PADs or other significant actions affecting the South Carolina jurisdictions. The SEOC processed five press releases, one EAS message and one proclamation.

The Public Inquiry function was performed at the JIC. The PIO at the SEOC confirmed their capability of performing this function prior to activation of the Center. There were no simulated calls received at the SEOC.

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:

DHEC staff successfully demonstrated the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a radiological release. They were capable of testing and identifying all likely radiological substances offsite and informing appropriate agencies of their findings. DHEC personnel mobilized to the SEOC in West Columbia, SC after receiving notification of an Alert at VEGP from the State Warning Point. Rosters were provided to demonstrate 24-hour coverage of essential functions. Plans and procedures were available for each function. The ERC was in charge of the DHEC group with the Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC) providing support for dose assessment. Both coordinators demonstrated effective leadership and delegated tasks appropriately. Although the two groups were located in different rooms, they worked together effectively. Communications capabilities, equipment, and supplies were sufficient for the exercise for both groups. Primary components included landline telephones, 800 MHz radios, and computers. Maps of the VEGP 10-mile EPZ were readily available.

The ERC and dose assessment staff performed dose projections and recommended protective actions based on VEGP data. The team effectively characterized the radiological plume. Protective actions and KI recommendations were commensurate with dose projections and meteorological data. Since the wind direction was not toward South Carolina, recommendations for evacuation only included personnel at the Savannah River Site within two miles of VEGP. There was no recommendation to ingest KI, but preparations were in place to ensure timely distribution. Dose assessment capabilities were demonstrated using the RASCAL program. The DAC completed timely dose assessment functions and compared results with utility dose projections and utility field team results. Field teams were not dispatched for this exercise in agreement with the extent of play agreement. The DAC was in contact with a simulated field team member via the Trimble YUMA computer to test the capability of remote data transmission. Transmissions of simulated field team data were received by the DAC.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 4.a.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.5.1 Aiken County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

Aiken County staff successfully demonstrated their ability to alert, activate and mobilize, coordinate response and provide direction and control of the EOC as well as respond to an incident involving VEGP. At the Alert ECL the deputy EMC activated the Code Red electronic reverse call system to recall essential personnel. The system completed the notification in a timely manner and used phone, cell, text and email to notify the staff. Redundant and interoperable communications included landline phones, county cell phones, local government radio, WebEOC, and county email options; all were in operation for this exercise and no failures were noted. Equipment, displays and supplies were sufficient to support the county's emergency operations.

There was limited scenario play involving Aiken County for this exercise. The EMC, deputy EMC and EOC staff demonstrated effective direction and control of the county's response through their use of the individual job books and checklists. Supporting ESFs maintained situational awareness through monitoring of WebEOC along with intra agency discussions of responses. EOC briefings were provided by the VEGP representatives and periodic updates were given by the EMC. Protective Action Decisions (PADs) were discussed with surrounding risk counties and the states of South Carolina and Georgia via the Administrative Decision Line as the situation dictated. For this exercise there were no PADs for Aiken County to implement or physically coordinate with the surrounding jurisdictions.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The primary method of issuing emergency warnings to the public in Aiken County, both resident and transient population, is by Tone Alert Radio (TAR); followed shortly afterwards by the broadcast of an EAS message through the designated broadcast media. Other organizations were responsible for the activation of the TARS and EAS broadcast. The county generated two public information press releases wherein the content of each was extracted from the State of South Carolina's news releases. These county releases were made to the local printed media outlets by simulated email and fax of each release.

In addition to the TARs, the Aiken County Sheriff's Office would dispatch marked patrol vehicles or fire apparatus to warn the transient population within the county's portion of the 10 mile EPZ. The county portion of the EPZ encompasses the Cowden Plantation; the plantation would be physically contacted via phone of PADs that would impact their safety. If required, the aforementioned vehicles will utilize the public address (PA) system to broadcast a pre-scripted warning message. The pre-scripted warning messages are provided to each deputy or fire fighter and are part of the county plan. The Cowden Plantation is privately owned and was closed during this demonstration; the current county 10 mile EPZ population was indicated to be zero, to include transients, therefore this additional method of notification was not needed.

The ability to monitor the media was accomplished through the use of television, radio and internet news services in both the EOC and 911 Center. Public inquiries were fielded in the county EOC. The PIO acknowledged receipt of two such calls and referred callers to the Aiken County Help Line 2-1-1. The Aiken County Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) has limited guidance on the management of public inquiries and rumor control other than instructions that the Public Information Officer (PIO) "Monitor media reports for accuracy (rumor control)." Conversely, the Aiken County Emergency Operations Plan, ESF-15 Public Information, tasks the PIO with developing rumor control procedures, but has no further discussion of this area. A representative of 2-1-1 was a member of the EOC staff and when questioned about the responses given to callers noted that no calls were received and would not expect to receive calls in the EOC since all 2-1-1 calls went to a call center. This call center would provide information based on what is available in the 2-1-1 data base, however no such information data base exists at this time. The 2-1-1 representative in the EOC pointed out that the data base would be populated with VEGP information and updated as an event is occurring.

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:

During an out of sequence interview on March 8, 2012, the SCHP successfully demonstrated their ability to reduce the impact and consequences of a radiological incident by securing the affected area and safely diverting the public from radiological hazards and providing security support to other response operations.

Deputies were very knowledgeable on shelter locations, primary and alternate evacuation routes and TCP set up, and maintained access to all necessary equipment and supplies. Deputies displayed knowledge of dosimeters, administrative reporting exposure limits, maximum

exposure limits and activities to prevent exceeding any maximum doses. Deputies were very familiar with procedures for ingestion of KI in addition to the possible side effects of consuming KI. They displayed thorough knowledge of actions to take to remove impediments from the road to prevent any restriction in traffic flow.

The officers were well trained, professional and well aware of their responsibilities to direct/redirect traffic and residents out of evacuated areas.

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:

The Aiken County RPO effectively demonstrated the counties' ability to manage and protect their emergency workers from radiological exposure by providing exposure briefings, implementing administrative exposure limits and control protocols. The state has established limiting dosimeter correction factors for emergency workers. Each worker was issued a Self Reading Dosimeter, Permanent Record Dosimeter and Potassium Iodide.

The Public Works Department set up the center for Emergency Worker vehicles and equipment. If personnel are found to be contaminated they would be decontaminated at the reception center. They exhibited outstanding team work, effective communications techniques, a broad knowledge of exposure control and demonstrated excellent monitoring and decontamination techniques for vehicles, equipment and personnel. All workers were familiar with the county SOG.

Limiting the spread of contamination was effectively accomplished by establishing and operating the RCCC at the South Aiken High School. Personnel were knowledgeable of contamination limits, understood their responsibilities, followed plans and successfully demonstrated their ability to monitor evacuees, emergency workers and vehicles. If an individual was found to be contaminated they followed appropriate procedures to decontaminate them. Appropriate records were maintained for evacuees and workers. Reception center personnel prepared the necessary paperwork for evacuees to be processed for congregate care. Exercise participants were well equipped, well organized, and displayed a positive attitude throughout the exercise.

Mass Care:

During an out-of-sequence activity, Aiken County successfully demonstrated this capability during a demonstration at the South Aiken High School Reception and Congregate Care Center.

Congregate care at this facility is the responsibility of County DSS and the Aiken ARC Chapter. The DSS staff and ARC volunteers were very proficient in the demonstration of reception and processing of evacuees who had been monitored and/or decontaminated following a simulated nuclear incident at the VEPG. The facility was well laid out and could reasonably accommodate the less than 100 evacuees expected to arrive. The DSS staff efficiently and expeditiously processed six simulated evacuees into the shelter. The shelter staff demonstrated the ability to provide shelter, basic first aid, mental health, and functional needs support for evacuees; enable them to enter their contact data in the nation-wide ARC website; and provided information in a bi-lingual manner. Currently there is no arrangement for sheltering of pets; however, this area is being addressed.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None.
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.2 Allendale County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Allendale County EMD and EOC staff successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. This capability included EOC activation, notification, staffing; management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, and State EOCs and Federal Agencies; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response activities.

The EMD exhibited good direction and control of the EOC, effectively delegated actions to the appropriate EOC agency and coordinated all actions with other counties. Frequent situational awareness briefings were held and the EMD instructed all agencies to review actions that they

had been working, to review plans and checklists for future actions, and to insure they were coordinating actions with other agencies. The EMD reviewed PARs from the utility and from the State to insure they were the best decisions for the county. The EMD effectively managed the activation of emergency workers to staff traffic control points, shelters and monitoring and decontamination stations. There are no special populations or schools in the Allendale County 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone. The dissemination of public instructions and information was conducted in a timely manner.

The EOC staff was well trained, knowledgeable and performed their duties in accordance with local plans and procedures and the extent of play.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

Allendale County successfully demonstrated the capability of notifying and warning the residents of their county by coordinating information with the local Emergency Alert System radio station WDOG FM 93.5, AM 1460 and the local news media. Due to real events the county Public Information Officer (PIO) was excused from the exercise and the EMD took over the function of PIO. The Allendale County Administrator delegate's authority to the EMD to write and release press releases during the emergency, a total two press releases were transmitted during the exercise. The activation of the Alert and Notification System (ANS) was coordinated over a conference call with SC SEOC, GEMA, Aiken, Barnwell and Burke Counties. During the exercise Allendale County coordinated secondary alert and notification for the residents of Creek Plantation with Barnwell County. Seven public inquiry calls were received and correctly resolved by the EMD.

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:

During an out of sequence interview conducted on March 8, 2012, a SCHP State trooper successfully demonstrated the ability to reduce the impact and consequences of a radiological incident by securing the affected area safely diverting the public from hazards and providing security support to other response operations. The officer was very knowledgeable on shelter locations, primary and alternate evacuation routes and TCP set up, and maintained access to all necessary equipment and supplies. He displayed a basic knowledge of dosimeters, administrative reporting exposure limits, maximum exposure limits and activities to prevent exceeding any maximum doses. He was very familiar with procedures for ingestion and recording the use of KI,

in addition to the possible side effects of consuming KI. He displayed thorough knowledge of actions to take to remove impediments from the road to prevent any restriction in traffic flow. The officer was well trained, professional and well aware of his responsibility to direct/redirect traffic and residents out of evacuated areas.

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:

The Allendale-Fairfax High School Congregate Care Center and Emergency Worker Decontamination center was supported by the Allendale County Fire Department, Allendale County Sheriff's Office, Allendale County EMS, Allendale County DSS, ARC and DHEC. This EW team demonstrated the capability to monitor, decontaminate and provide congregate care for evacuees and emergency workers and their equipment. All though, initially, the monitoring staff had to be reminded by DHEC personnel of the proper monitoring techniques, the team performed their duties adequately. They demonstrated good team work and assisted each other in the performance of all their duties. They also demonstrated awareness of their responsibilities in controlling their own exposure and contamination control measures.

Mass Care:

During an out-of-sequence activity, Allendale County ARC and DSS staff successfully demonstrated this capability during a demonstration at the Allendale-Fairfax High School Reception and Congregate Care Center. Congregate care at this facility was the responsibility of County DSS and the ARC Columbia Region Chapter. The DSS staff and ARC volunteers were very proficient in the demonstration of reception and processing of evacuees who had been monitored and/or decontaminated following a simulated nuclear incident at the VEGP. The facility was well laid out and could reasonably accommodate the less than 100 evacuees expected to arrive. The DSS staff efficiently and expeditiously processed six simulated evacuees into the shelter. The shelter staff demonstrated the ability to provide shelter, basic first aid, mental health, and functional needs support for evacuees. Evacuees are provided the opportunity to enter their contact information into the ARC 'Safe and Well' website. All information is also provided in a bilingual manner. Currently there is no arrangement for sheltering of pets; however, this area is being addressed.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.3 Barnwell County

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Barnwell County Emergency Management Agency successfully demonstrated the capability to alert, notify and mobilize key staff in response to an incident at VEGP in accordance with County plans and the Extent of Play Agreement .The County Warning Point, received and appropriately communicated the initial notification, and relinquished control of alert and notification in accordance with procedures.

The temporary EOC had sufficient space and equipment to support emergency response efforts. Each agency had an easily identifiable and functional area for conducting it's duties within the EOC. Maps and status boards with vital information were visible and available to the staff for reference and situational awareness. The temporary EOC has multiple means of interoperable communication systems, all of which are operational. Each agency location had computers and telephones. EOC staff members also communicated using personal and agency cell phones, facsimile, and over the internet. Communications systems were redundant and functional with no observed failures.

The Radiological Officer (RO) demonstrated an excellent capability to make decisions and support emergency workers regarding radiation exposure limits. The RO administers the radiological program in coordination with the DHEC. The issuance of KI and appropriate dosimeters and the management of radiological exposure to emergency workers were in accordance with the EOPA.

The EMD was experienced and decisive. The best interest and safety of the community was always reflected in his decisions regarding REP resources. He managed time, resources and

personnel appropriately ensuring all tasks are completed in a timely manner and properly recorded within WebEOC. Situational awareness was above reproach as each open event was continually tracked to resolution. PADs were direct and timely, with the primary focus of preserving the county's resources for REP related situations. The Barnwell County RERP was adhered to as was the VEGP EOP with a positive outcome being successful accomplishment of exercise objectives. The EMD and Assistant maintained constant situational awareness and kept the EOC staff abreast of the state of affairs as the ECLs escalated. The EOC staff was very knowledgeable of their respective duties and professional in carrying out the actions to resolve the situations.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The Barnwell County Public Information Office (PIO) and EMD successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate and disseminate emergency information to the public and assure that timely warnings were issued to notify residents of emergency events within the Barnwell County EPZ. The PIO drafted and reviewed numerous news releases after conferring with the EMD for concurrence, and the information was received at the Joint Information Center (JIC)/ South Carolina Public Information office for release to the public. The PIO consistently provided documentation to the EMD for review and approval prior to release to the JIC. The PIO also fielded numerous telephone inquiries to answer public concerns. The PIO accomplished her duties competently and proactively by following the plans and procedures and staying abreast of the ongoing situation.

Barnwell County successfully demonstrated emergency public information and warning. Alert and notification of the public was accomplished with two successful siren activations with the Barnwell County Communication Center warning point where the capability to activate the Alert and Notification System resides. The EMD was very familiar with the Alert and Notification System processes for sector H-10 of Barnwell County. He is well versed and practiced in the process regardless of the physical separation from the Barnwell Dispatch Center.

During the exercise, the siren sounding was simulated at SAE and GE with no failure of the siren for either activation. The Barnwell County Sheriff Deputy through interview explained the process of how they would inform the public and the routes they would use and the message that would be broadcast over the vehicle PA system in the event of a siren failure. He also indicated there were enough vehicles, public address equipment and personnel to adequately cover the

individual route within the allotted 45 minutes. They were familiar with the turn-back - 1R, to protect property - 2 R, and life saving – 5 R limit and they were aware of the significance of the limits. They also understood the use of potassium iodide (KI). Sheriff Deputy's knew how to use dosimeters, when to take readings, and reporting procedures. When the notification was complete, the EW would provide feedback to the EOC, notifying them that the backup route alerting was completed and the EW was reporting to the EWD station at the Barnwell County Fire Station. Back up route alerting would be completed within the 45 minutes in accordance with the Barnwell County Emergency Operations Plan, Appendix F-Q2, Vogtle Radiological Emergency Response Plan, II.F.1 (pg. App.F-Q2-56).

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:

The Safety and Radiological Briefing was well conducted and thorough in covering the various areas of the OOS drill. Distribution of equipment was timely and properly recorded on established forms. Administrative limits, action level and protective measures were clearly covered and EW's were reminded to refer to the Radiological Emergency Worker Job Performance Aide as frequently as needed.

Operational checks were successfully accomplished by the team leader and background was appropriately established by the EW's within the areas of EWD operations. Monitoring and dosimeter equipment was utilized and worn correctly; within calibration dates; and in good repair.

Two EW's and one vehicle were monitored during the OOS activity. The personnel monitoring team consistently performed the survey in accordance with plans and procedures. Had there been actual contamination, it would have been detected using such a methodical survey technique. The personnel monitoring team paid close attention to areas normally touched by the hands as well as covering the SOG recommended areas. The personnel monitoring team continuously communicated and ensured the intended information was passed back and forth between the monitor and recorder. The recorder read off the process from the SOG and the monitor followed his directions precisely. The personnel decontamination process was simple, rapid, very effective and in the best interest of the individual without the typical undressing of a contaminated person. The vehicle monitoring team also demonstrated great monitoring practices. They utilized completed forms to identify the contaminated areas and also spoke with the personnel monitoring team for confirmation of the correct affected area. The process was similar to the

personnel monitoring team as the recorder read the directions and the monitor followed. The monitor was also the vehicle washer; he was very cautious when washing and scrubbing (decontaminating) the affected areas not to create over spray or unnecessarily splash potentially contaminated water onto clean vehicle surfaces. Both teams were fully dressed in PPE and prepared to perform EW duties.

The HAZMAT Response and Decontamination Capability was excellently demonstrated by well trained monitoring and decontamination team members.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

Overall, the exercise was a success. Officials and representatives from the States of Georgia South Carolina; the risk Counties of Burke in Georgia and Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell in South Carolina; Southern Nuclear Operating Company as well as numerous volunteers participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

During the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Partial Participation Plume Phase Exercise there were no areas requiring corrective action or deficiencies identified.

APPENDIX A: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2012-03-21, SITE: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, GA

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	VEGP JIC	GA SOC	Burke County	SCSEOC	Aiken County	Allendale County
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	8:11	N/A	0820	8:23	8:21	8:23	8:30
Site Area Emergency	9:41	9:54	0952	9:51	9:59	9:48	10:00
General Emergency	10:56	11:13	1109	11:09	11:12	11:02	11:15
Simulated Rad. Release Started	9:41	9:54	1020	9:51	9:59	9:48	10:00
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		9:17	0900	10:12	9:05	10:10	9:20
Declaration of State of Emergency		N/A	1015	9:55	10:30	10:50	N/A
Exercise Terminated		12:32	1250	12:41	12:52	12:50	12:55
Early Precautionary Actions:		N/A	N/A	N/A	10:10	N/A	9:20
1st Protective Action Decision:		N/A	1028	10:28	10:29	10:29	10:29
1st Siren Activation		N/A	1102	N/A	10:35	N/A	10:35
1st EAS or EBS Message		11:18	1045	10:45	10:45	10:45	10:45
2nd Protective Action Decision:		N/A	1131	11:31	11:31	11:33	11:33
2nd Siren Activation		N/A	1140	11:40	11:40	11:40	11:40
2nd EAS or EBS Message		N/A	1145	11:45	11:45	11:45	11:45

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2012-03-21, SITE: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, GA

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Barnwell County
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A
Alert	8:11	8:35
Site Area Emergency	9:41	9:51
General Emergency	10:56	11:08
Simulated Rad. Release Started	9:41	9:51
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		8:40
Declaration of State of Emergency		N/A
Exercise Terminated		12:51
Early Precautionary Actions:		N/A
1st Protective Action Decision:		10:29
1st Siren Activation		10:35
1st EAS or EBS Message		10:45
2nd Protective Action Decision:		11:33
2nd Siren Activation		11:40
2nd EAS or EBS Message		11:45

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2012-03-21, SITE: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, GA

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
Georgia		
Georgia State Operations Center	John Fill Lisa Rink *Odis Spencer John Wills	FEMA RIV FEMA R4 FEMA-NP-TH-REP ICFI
South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center	Gary Bolender *Joe Harworth Jill Leatherman David White	ICFI FEMA-NP-TH-REP ICFI ICFI
Burke County	Matthew Bradley *Walt Cushman Bruce Swiren	FEMA-NP-TH-REP FEMA-NP-TH-REP ICFI
Aiken County	*John Ackermann Walt Cushman Willis Larrabee Lorenzo Lewis	FEMA-NP-TH-REP FEMA-NP-TH-REP ICFI FEMA-NP-TH-REP
Allendale County	Walt Cushman Alex Sera *Ronald Shaw	FEMA-NP-TH-REP FEMA-NP-TH-REP FEMA-NP-TH REP
Barnwell County	Walt Cushman *Gerald Mclemore Robert Nash	FEMA-NP-TH-REP FEMA RIV FEMA-NP-TH-REP
Southern Nuclear Company Emergency Operations Facility	*Michael Dolder	FEMA-NP-TH-REP
Vogtle Joint Information Center	Henry Christiansen Thomas Hegele *Robert Spence	ICFI ICFI FEMA-NP-TH-REP
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Meaning
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Services
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOUO	For Official Use Only
IP	Improvement Plan
JIC	Joint Information Center
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
SRS	Savannah River Site
VEGP	Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

APPENDIX D: EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENTS

State of Georgia
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise
March 21, 2012

Other than the exceptions described in this Extent of Play Agreement, exercise activities demonstrated for evaluation will be based on the Georgia Radiological Emergency Base Plan, the respective site-specific plan (Annex D), local county plans, and appropriate Standard Operating Procedures.

It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be allowed correction immediately, at all player locations, if it is not disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator.

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-Element 1.a—Mobilization
Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Extent of Play
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Emergency response personnel will be assigned to the following locations;
  - State Operations Center (SOC), Atlanta , GA
  - Southern Company Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Birmingham, AL.
  - Joint Information Center (JIC), Waynesboro, GA;
  - Burke County Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Waynesboro, GA.

- State and local emergency response personnel will be notified of the emergency event, and requested to respond to their assigned duty location, using established notification procedures.

- Exercise participants, who would be required to travel to their assigned duty location may pre-position themselves in close proximity to their assigned duty station. However, exercise participants will not be allowed to enter their assigned duty location, or participate in exercise related activities, until they receive notification that an emergency event is taking place and they are requested to respond to their assigned emergency response duty location.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 1.b—Facilities
Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H.3)

Extent of Play
Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- New Joint Information Center Facility to be evaluated
  Joint Information Center (JIC)
  636 Woodland Road
  Waynesboro, GA

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 1.c—Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)

Extent of Play

Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State direction and control will occur from the SOC in Atlanta, GA. GEMA liaisons will be deployed to the Burke County EOC and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in Birmingham, AL. GEMA Public Information Officers will deploy to the Joint Information Center (JIC), located in Waynesboro, GA.

- The Burke County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) will provide direction and control from the Burke County EOC. A Burke County liaison will be deployed to the Joint Information Center (JIC), located in Waynesboro, GA.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 1.d—Communications Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play

OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- Burke County EMA in agreement.

Sub-Element 1.e—Equipment and Supplies to Support Operation

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent of Play

Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 4.a.1 for field team equipment; 4.c.1 for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment); reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment under 6.d.1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- All dosimeters and radiation detection instruments are commercially procured. Practice or simulated TLDs, self- reading dosimetry, and simulated KI will be furnished to State and county emergency workers as necessary. The participating county's Radiation Protection Officer will coordinate and oversee the issuing of equipment and instructions to Emergency Workers. The general public is not provided KI.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

1. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Sub-Element 2.a—Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10.e, f)

Extent of Play

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

If necessary, the state OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of preauthorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- Burke County EMA in agreement.

Sub-Element 2.b—Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

When release and meteorological data are provided by the licensee, the ORO also considers these data. The ORO should demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs should be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m)

Extent of Play

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff.

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. The decision makers should demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these projections.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans, then the ORO should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision should be based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision making process should involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should communicate and coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- Burke County EMA in agreement.

Sub-Element 2.c—Protective Action Decisions for Protection of Special Populations
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

Extent of Play
Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a high-risk environment where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors that should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be considered by the OROs. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be actual.

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision making process for protective actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the location of students at the time (for example, whether the students are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of available resources, for special population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This to be accomplished by interview with appropriate county officials.

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-Element 3.a—Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control
Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Extent of Play
OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures. Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated. During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn back values are reached.

The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be affected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.
All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability is to be demonstrated by interview only. The interview with the County Radiological Protection Officer (RPO) and Emergency Workers (EWs) will take place in close proximity to the Burke County Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

- The RPO will see that an instructional and procedural briefing is conducted while dosimetry kits are being issued to Emergency Workers (EWs)

- Emergency Workers will be available following the briefing to demonstrate, by interview, how to operate / use the equipment they are issued and understand the directions / guidance.

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.b—Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e)

Extent-of-play

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability is to be demonstrated by interview only. The interview with the county Emergency Workers (EWs) will take place in close proximity to the Burke County EOC.

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.c—Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations:
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

Extent-of-play
Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent-of-play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the extent-of-play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Implementation of protective actions for special populations will be demonstrated through interview with human service agencies represented in the Burke County EOC as identified below;

Burke County EMA Director within the Burke County EOC

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

Extent-of-play

Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action decisions for students. The demonstration shall be made as follows: At least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plan and/or procedures, should be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools. The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens and day care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans and procedures as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of-play agreement.

- Implementation of protective actions for schools will be demonstrated through interview with the following agency represented in each county EOC;

Burke County EMA / Burke County School System personnel located in the EOC

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.d—Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

Extent of Play

OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.

In instances where ORO's lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Demonstration regarding Traffic Control Points and River Clearance will be demonstrated by interview within the Burke County EOC by representatives of the agencies identified below:

  Traffic Control Points
  Burke County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Burke County EOC

  River Clearance
  GA DNR personnel in the Burke County EOC

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

Extent of Play

OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Designated traffic control personnel will be available in the Burke County EOC to demonstrate, through interview, actions that could be taken to resolve any impediments to evacuation.
  Burke County Sheriff's Department personnel in the Burke County EOC
- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

3. Field Measurement and Analysis

Sub-Element 4.a—Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions.

Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts. If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume; it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume.

The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated. OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of-play agreement.

- Understanding there are no field teams deployed, the analysis and management will happen off of injects provided.
- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

4. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-Element 5.a—Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System
Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play
Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages *is not* required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- Burke County EMA in agreement.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5–10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

The 45-minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Back-up route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability to be demonstrated by interview within EOC representatives of the agency identified below:

  Burke County EMA / Burke County Sheriff's Department personnel located in the EOC

- Burke County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 5.b—Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c)

Extent of Play

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable instructions (for example, evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and special populations, public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them.

The ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (for example,

Emergency Alert System [EAS] messages and media releases) and media information kits should be available for dissemination to the media. OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases. All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- The State will pre-deploy a GEMA Public Information Officer, a GA DNR Public Information Officer, and a Public Affairs staff member to the Joint Information Center (JIC) in Waynesboro, GA.

- Two GEMA Public Affairs representatives will participate in the State Operations Center to coordinate State and local joint press releases which are then provided to the Public Information Officer at the JIC

- Burke County will provide one Public Affairs liaison to the Joint Information Center (JIC) in Waynesboro, GA.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Burke County in agreement with clarifications above.

State of South Carolina
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
PARTIAL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE
March 21, 2012

All selected activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans. The Extent of Play agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans and standard operating guides or procedures. It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be allowed correction immediately, at all player locations, if it isn't disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the SCEMD controller and the FEMA evaluator.

CAPABILITY: Emergency Operations Management (State and County EOCs)

Definition: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes: EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities. Similar entities may include the National (or Regional) Response Coordination Center (NRCC or RRCC), Joint Field Offices (JFO), National Operating Center (NOC), Joint Operations Center (JOC), Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), Initial Operating Facility (IOF), etc.

Activity 1: Activate EOC (Definition: In response to activation, perform incident notifications, recall essential personnel and stand-up EOC systems to provide a fully staffed and operational EOC.)

1.1 ORO's use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

All participating state and local government personnel will be pre-positioned in the area and will respond as the scenario dictates. The alert, notification and mobilization process will be initiated per the exercise scenario. EOC activation will begin after the alerted staff arrives at the EOC. Alert recall rosters will be provided to FEMA evaluators.

1.2 Facilities are sufficient to support emergency response. (Sub-element 1.b, Facilities, **Criterion 1.b.1**: NUREG-0654, H.3)

The Plant Vogtle Joint Information Center (JIC) and the Barnwell County Emergency Operation Center (EOC) will be evaluated on March 21, 2012 to establish a baseline for this exercise evaluation criterion. The Plant Vogtle JIC is a new facility and is located at 636 Woodland Dr, Waynesboro, GA. The Barnwell County EOC is located in the Barnwell County Public Health Department and at 11015 Ellenton St, Barnwell, SC.

1.3 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)

The official onsite to offsite notification method is via the Emergency Notification Network (ENN) and facsimile of the Emergency Notification Form (ENF). Backups to this notification method include commercial telephone lines and Southern LINC phone system. WebEOC will also be used as an emergency information management tool by the state and participating counties.

1.4 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) were conducted in:

Allendale County on September 20, 2011, at 9:30 am
Barnwell County on September 20, 2011, at 11:00 am
Aiken County on September 20, 2011 at 2:00 pm

Quantities of KI for Emergency Workers were confirmed at the local EOC (ESF-8) and/or the local Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) office by documentation of the current inventory during the SAVs.

All state/county radiation detection equipment will be inspected and operationally checked during the OOS activities. Quantities of equipment, their calibration/testing were verified during the SAVs.

Activity 2: Direct EOC Operations (Definition: Following activation of the EOC system, staff and organize the EOC in accordance with the comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) and the requisite policies, procedures, and directives.)

2.1 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control,

Criterion 1.c.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)

Direction and Control will be at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). County Direction and Control will take place at the Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC). *All telephone calls to non-participating agencies will be made by calling the simulation cell (simcell).* FEMA evaluator will be given access to the simcell as needed.

2.2 OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.4.)

Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell County EOCs will discuss the use of KI during the March 21st exercise.

Dose limits for emergency workers are pre-determined. In accordance with state and local procedures, emergency workers may voluntarily exceed dose limits only after obtaining approval from state ESF 8 and 10, and being briefed on the effects of radiation and possible consequences of excessive exposure by their supervisor. The staff at county EOCs and the SEOC will discuss the processes with evaluators during in-sequence and/or OOS activities.

2.3 A decision-making process involved consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.2: NUREG, J.9, 10.M.)

The Governor or her designee will demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions (PADs) based on recommendations from SCEMD, DHEC, and Risk Counties. PADs that require sheltering or evacuation of residents or transients in the 10-mile EPZ will be coordinated with *GEMA and SCEMD*.

2.4 Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (Sub-element 2.c., Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations, Criterion 2.c.1: NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.c.d.e.g).

There are no identified special populations in the EPZ.

Activity 3: Support and Coordinate Response (Definition: Once requested, provide resource, technical, and policy support to the Incident Command by coordinating the actions of off-site agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions, implementing MAAs, and requesting higher-level assistance.)

3.1 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).

This criterion will be demonstrated by the counties during OOS activities.

3.2 KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained. (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).

KI is distributed to Emergency Workers prior to being dispatched. Emergency Workers DO NOT ingest KI until advised to do so by the SCDHEC Commissioner or designee. The Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell County Health Department representative discussed record keeping for KI during the SAVs.

3.3 Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions (Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J.9., 10.c. d.e.g,)

There are no special populations within the EPZ.

3.4 OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools. (Schools include: all public schools, licensed day care centers, and participating private schools) (Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.2: NUREG-0654, J.10.d. g.)

There are no schools or licensed day care facilities within the EPZ.

3.5 Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.)

Command and control of TCP operations will be discussed by ESF-16 at the SEOC, and by the Sheriff's Department in the counties. Barnwell County has no TCP's.

3.6 Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (Sub-element 3.d., Criterion 3.d.2: Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

County/Local Law Enforcement personnel will discuss actions to identify and remove impediments to evacuation at the county EOC's.

CAPABILITY: Emergency Public Information and Warning (State and County EOCs and JICs)

Definition: Develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public prior to an impending emergency and activate warning systems to notify those most at-risk in the event of an emergency. By refining its ability to disseminate accurate, consistent, timely, and easy-to understand information about emergency response and recovery processes, a jurisdiction can contribute to the well-being of the community during and after an emergency.

Activity 1: (JICs Only) Public Information, Alert/Warning and Notification Plans (Definition: Activate key personnel, facilities and procedures.)

1.1 RO's use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

All participating state and local government personnel will be pre-positioned in the area and will respond as the scenario dictates. The alert, notification and mobilization process will be initiated per the exercise scenario.

1.2 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)

This will be demonstrated in accordance with plans.

1.3 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

The equipment and displays relevant to JIC operations will be demonstrated according to plans.

Activity 2: (JIC only) Establish Joint Information System (JIS) (Definition: Upon assigning PIO, activate and implement the JIS/JIC and disseminate information to public.)

2.1 Ensure OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, **Criterion 5.b.1**: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)

The State, Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell counties will demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the news media.

Activity 3: (JIC Only) Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings (Definition: In response to need for public notification, provide overall management and coordination of Emergency Public Information and Warning capability.)

3.1 **Provide periodic updates and conduct regularly scheduled media conferences.** (Sub-element 5.b. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, **Criterion 5.b.1**: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)

Activity 4: Issue Emergency Warnings (Definition: Upon receiving Protective Action Decisions, issue emergency public warnings through established warning systems.)

4.1 Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by FEMA REP guidance. (Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.1: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.1., 4., 5., 6., 7.)

The State will coordinate Protective Action Decisions (PADs) with the impacted South Carolina county elected officials or designees and GEMA. South Carolina will coordinate with the impacted SC counties and GEMA during the simulated activation of the VEGP siren system in Barnwell County. The procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

4.2 Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.3: NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

In the event of a failure of the prompt notification system, Barnwell County will describe the back-up alerting system.

4.3 OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media. (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, **Criterion 5.b.1**: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)

The State, Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell counties will demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the news media.

Activity 5: Provide Public Inquiry Control (Definition: Upon activation of the JIS, track inquiries for rumors.)

5.1 OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media. (Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, Criterion 5.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)

Public inquiry for the State will be demonstrated at the JIC. Public inquiry for Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties will be demonstrated at the appropriate county EOC. Public inquiry personnel will provide a call log to the FEMA Evaluator.

CAPABILITY: Public Safety and Security Response (TCPs)

Definition: Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement (LE), fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).

Activity 1: Activate Public Safety/Security Response (Definition: Upon notification, mobilize and deploy to begin operations.) ORO's use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. **(Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization,** Criterion 1.a.1: **NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)**

State and/or county TCP Officers in Aiken and Allendale Counties will discuss procedures for alert notification during Out of Sequence activities.

1.1 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (Sub element 1.d, Communications, **Criterion 1.d.1**: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)

State and/or county TCP Officers in Aiken and Allendale Counties will discuss primary and secondary communications during Out of Sequence activities.

1.2 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

Distribution of potassium iodide (KI) State and/or county TCP Officers in Aiken and Allendale Counties will discuss procedures for distribution and ingestion of KI during OOS activities.

At locations where traffic control personnel are deployed, the availability of appropriate equipment (e.g. vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) will be discussed by law enforcement personnel.

Activity 2: Command/Control Public Safety/Security Response (Definition: In response to a notification for security assets, establish the management and coordination of the Public Safety and Security Response, from activation through to demobilization.)

2.1 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).

State and/or county TCP Officers, based on their assignment will use Self Reading Dosimeters (SRD) or electronic dosimeters and simulated Thermal Luminescent Dosimeters (TLD) to monitor and control their radiation exposure. State and/or county TCP Officers will be interviewed to determine their knowledge of radiation incident response procedures (i.e. exposure limits, protective clothing, dose record keeping, etc.) during OOS activities.

2.2 KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained. (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).

KI is distributed to Emergency Workers prior to being dispatched. Emergency Workers DO NOT ingest KI until advised to do so by the SCDHEC Commissioner or designee.

Activity 3: Control Traffic, Crowd and Scene (Definition: Direct/redirect traffic and pedestrians out of the affected area(s). Assess, coordinate, and establish force protection and perimeter zones, maintain a visible and effective security presence to deter criminal conduct and maintain law and order.)

3.1 Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.).

State TCPs to be evaluated are:

- S-2 (SC 57 and SC 63)
- S-3 (SC 125 and Millet Rd)

TCP S-2 in Aiken County will be evaluated on March 7th, 2012; at 9:00 a.m. TCP S-3 in Allendale County will be evaluated on March 8th, 2012 at 7:00 p.m.

Aiken County TCP to be evaluated is:

- AK-2 (SC 5 and Jackson Rd)

This TCP will be evaluated on location on March 7th, 2012, at 9:00 a.m.

Allendale County TCP to be evaluated is:

- AL-1 (SC 125 and SC 3) (un-manned barricaded location)

This TCP will be evaluated at Allendale-Fairfax High School on March 8th, 2012 at 7:00 p.m.

Equipment required by procedure will be described by the law enforcement officers.

3.2 Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.2: NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

Aiken and Allendale County/Local Law Enforcement personnel will discuss actions to identify and remove impediments to evacuation during OOS activities.

CAPABILITY: HAZMAT Decontamination and Response (Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Decontamination, Dose Assessment)

Definition: HAZMAT Response and Decontamination is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

Activity 1: Site Management and Control (Definition: In response to activation, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene and initiate response operations to manage and secure the physical layout of the incident.)

1.1 ORO's use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

All participating personnel will be pre-positioned at their respective Reception Center or EW Decon site for demonstration during OOS activities. Alert and notification procedures will be discussed with FEMA evaluators at this time. DHEC Dose Assessment personnel will describe their alert and notification procedures with the evaluator at the SEOC.

1.2 Equipment, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

Distribution of potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers will be demonstrated during OOS exercises at the counties. KI will be simulated by candy or other means.

All state/county radiation detection equipment will be inspected and operationally checked during the OOS activities.

1.3 (Dose Assessment only) OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.4.)

ESF-10 will discuss with the evaluator how exposure control decisions would be made for field monitoring teams.

1.4 (Dose Assessment only) Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information including: plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.1: NUREG-0654, I.8., 10, and Supplement 3.)

DHEC (ESF-10) will provide protective action recommendations.

1.5 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).

Emergency Workers or emergency worker teams, based on their assignment will use Self Reading Dosimeters (SRD), or electronic dosimeters and simulated Thermal Luminescent Dosimeters (TLD) to monitor and control their radiation exposure. Emergency workers in low exposure rate areas will use TLDs and may use SRDs or place them in centralized areas. Evaluators need to be present prior to the beginning of activities, so they can observe the briefing and KI distribution process. Emergency workers will be interviewed to determine their knowledge of *radiation incident response procedures (i.e. exposure limits, protective clothing, dose record keeping, etc.)*. Personal exposure forms will be completed by emergency workers during OOS activities and provided to FEMA evaluators upon conclusion.

1.6 (Dose Assessment only) KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained. (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).

DHEC to discuss with evaluator how KI would be distributed to Field Monitoring teams if necessary.

Activity 2: Hazard Assessment Risk Evaluation

2.1 (Dose Assessment only) Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.2: NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)

DHEC will discuss with the evaluator how field teams would be managed.

Activity 3: Decontamination and Cleanup/Recovery Operations

3.1 The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (Sub-element 6.a., Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees, Criterion 6.a.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.h: K.5.b.)

Reception Centers will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. At least six people will be monitored and registered. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-through and discussion. All necessary supplies will be on hand. Walkways will not be entirely covered with barrier material; however, some markings will be used to aid in directing evacuees. A monitoring productivity rate will be developed by the FEMA evaluator. Demonstration will include the necessary radiological monitoring equipment and monitoring teams required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. At least two vehicles will be monitored and one vehicle will be processed as contaminated. Vehicle decontamination will be discussed in accordance with local SOPs.

Reception Centers to be evaluated are:

Aiken County: South Aiken High School on March 7, 2012, at 2:30 p.m.

Allendale and Barnwell County: Allendale-Fairfax High School on March 8, 2012, at 7:00 p.m.

3.2 The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (Sub-element 6.b, Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment, Criterion 6.b.1: NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination will be demonstrated out of sequence. All necessary supplies will be displayed in accordance with local SOPs. Water will not be used in demonstrating personnel decontamination. Two emergency workers will be monitored. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-through and discussion. One emergency vehicle will be monitored and decontaminated in accordance with local SOPs. Water will be used when demonstrating decontamination of the emergency vehicle.
Note: Aiken County decontaminates emergency workers at the county's reception center.

Emergency Worker Decontamination Points to be evaluated are:

Aiken County: Redcliffe Elementary School, on March 7th, immediately upon completion of the TCP evaluations.

Allendale County: Allendale-Fairfax High School, on March 8th, 7:00 p.m.

Barnwell County: Barnwell Rural Fire Station, on March 8th, 10:00 a.m.

CAPABILITY: Mass Care

Definition: Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident, including special needs populations. Special needs populations include individuals with physical or mental disabilities who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid. Other special-needs populations include non-English speaking populations that may need to have information presented in other languages. The mass care capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, or by local government-sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Special-needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.

Activity 1: Establish Shelter Operations (Congregate Care)

Definition: Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident, including special needs populations. Special needs populations include individuals with physical or mental disabilities who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid. Other special-needs populations include non-English speaking populations that may need to have information presented in other languages. The mass care capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, or by local government-sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Special-needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.

1.1 Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have the resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (Sub-element 6.c., Temporary Care of Evacuees, Criterion 6.c.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.h, 12.).

County shelters will be demonstrated by walk through concurrent with Evaluation Area 6.a, above. Procedures that assure that only non-contaminated persons enter shelters will be demonstrated.

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