Department of Homeland Security
Region IV
3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road
Atlanta, Georgia 30341

FEMA

July 24, 2012

Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
One Marquis Tower
245 Peachtree Center Avenue, Suite 1200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. McCree:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the May 9, 2012 plume exposure pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant. The report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the States of Alabama and Georgia and for Houston County, Alabama and Early County, Georgia.

State and local organizations demonstrated the ability to implement their emergency response plans and procedures. FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action during this exercise. This report was prepared by FEMA Region IV Technological Hazards Branch staff, and copies of this report will be forwarded to the States of Alabama and Georgia, as well as FEMA and NRC Headquarters.

Based on the results of the exercise and FEMA's review of Alabama and Georgia's Annual Letters of Certification for 2011, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the States of Alabama and Georgia and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant, granted on March 11, 1981 for the State of Alabama and on May 5, 1981 for the State of Georgia, will remain in effect.

IX49

Should you have questions, please contact Conrad Burnside at 770/220-5486.

Sincerely,



Major P. May,
Regional Administrator

Enclosure

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NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001



AFTER ACTION REPORT
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant
REP Program Exercise

[FINAL]

May 9, 2012
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP)

FEMA

Published July 24, 2012



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Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant
REP Program Exercise

[FINAL]

May 9, 2012
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP)

FEMA

Published July 24, 2012

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Administrative Handling Instructions

This After Action Report (AAR) for the 2012 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Full Participation Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone Exercise is considered a public document.

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Executive Summary

On May 9, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV, REP Program staff evaluated a plume exposure pathway exercise in the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant (FNP). FNP is located near Dothan, Alabama on a rural and wooded 1,850 acre site in Houston County. The FNP 10-mile EPZ encompasses portions of both Alabama and Georgia.

FEMA's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at FNP. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on December 8, 2010. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November 19 and 20, 1980.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement and support development of corrective actions.

Due to its location near the border of Houston County, Alabama and Early County, Georgia, any incident at FNP requires close communication and coordination between those counties as well as various response agencies in both States. This communication and coordination was evident throughout the exercise.

The objectives for the 2012 FNP REP Exercise were as follows:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center management including Direction and Control through the Counties' and State Emergency Operations Centers Multi-agency Coordination Center System (MACCS).

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for State and Counties' emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to perform Plume Phase field measurements and analysis utilizing State field teams through exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.

Objective 6: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for joint (public and private sectors) emergency information communications.

These objectives encompass the REP Program evaluation area criteria. All objectives were successfully demonstrated during this exercise. No Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) were identified. FEMA will provide input describing strengths and areas for improvement separately from this AAR for consideration by the States of Alabama and Georgia for inclusion in their respective Improvement Plans (IPs).

Section 1: Exercise Overview

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name
2012 FNP REP Program Evaluated Exercise

Type of Exercise
Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise

Exercise Out-of-Sequence Activities Dates
May 8, 2012

Exercise Dates
May 9, 2012

Program
FEMA REP Program

Mission
Response

Capabilities
- Emergency Operations Center Management
- Emergency Public Information and Warning
- Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place
- Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
- Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
- Mass Care

Scenario Type
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise

1.2 Participating Organizations

The following agencies, organizations and units of government participated in the 2012 FNP REP Exercise.

State of Alabama
Alabama Emergency Management Agency
Alabama Department of Public Health
Alabama Department of Human Resources
Alabama National Guard
Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
Alabama Department of Corrections
Alabama Department of Public Safety

State of Georgia
Georgia Emergency Management Agency
Georgia Department of Natural Resources
Georgia National Guard
Georgia Department of Public Safety
Georgia Department of Agriculture
Georgia Forestry Commission
State of Florida (non-evaluated)
Florida Division of Emergency Management
Florida Department of Health
Risk Jurisdictions
Houston County, Alabama
• Dothan/Houston County Emergency Management Agency • Henry County Emergency Management Agency • Houston County Sheriff's Office • Houston County Board of Education • Dothan Fire Department • Dothan Police Department • Houston County Road and Bridge Department • Houston County Community Corrections • Morgan County Emergency Management Agency • Butler County Emergency Management Agency
Early County, Georgia
• Blakely-Early County Emergency Management Agency • Early County Sheriff's Office • Blakely Police Department • Early County Health Department • Early County Emergency Medical Services • Early County Schools • Early County Public Works Department
Non-Governmental Organizations
Amateur Radio Emergency Service
American Red Cross
Ashford Academy
Columbia Baptist Association
Flowers Hospital
Georgia-Pacific
Salvation Army
Southern Company
Southeast Alabama Medical Center
Wiregrass Area Food Bank
Federal Organizations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Section 2: Exercise Design Summary

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

DHS/FEMA administers the REP Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies sixteen planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, and State, tribal, and local governments impacted by the EPZs established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, tribal, and local government RERPs and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, affected State, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise together with review of the RERPs and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visits enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final AAR to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that the affected State, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal submission of the RERPs for FNP to FEMA Region IV by the State of Alabama and Houston County occurred on November 10, 1980 and by the State of Georgia and Early County on June 9, 1980. In accordance with 44 CFR 350, formal approval of the RERPs for the State of Alabama and Houston County was granted on March 11, 1981 and approval for the State of Georgia and Early County on May 5, 1981.

A REP exercise was evaluated on May 9, 2012, and included evaluations of the out-of-sequence (OOS) activities held May 8, 2012.

2.2 Exercise Objectives and Capabilities

The following objectives for the 2012 FNP REP Exercise encompass the REP criteria and were agreed upon for this exercise:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center management including Direction and Control through the Counties' and State Emergency Operations Centers MACCS.

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for State and Counties' emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to perform Plume Phase field measurements and analysis utilizing State field teams through exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.

Objective 6: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the JIC for joint (public and private sectors) emergency information communications.

Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.

- **Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management:** Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, state, and federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

- **Emergency Public Information and Warning**: Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

- **Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place:** Is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.

- **Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:** Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination

among officials from law enforcement (LE), fire and emergency medical services (EMS).

- **Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:** Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials (HazMat) release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of HazMats, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and LE agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

- **Mass Care:** Is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident, including special needs populations. Special needs populations include individuals with physical or mental disabilities who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid. Other special-needs populations include non-English speaking populations that may need to have information presented in other languages. The mass care capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGO), such as the American Red Cross (ARC), or by local government-sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Special-needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.

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Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the May 9, 2012 plume exposure pathway exercise and OOS activities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise)
- ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from previous exercises
- Deficiency assessed
- Plan Issues
- Not Demonstrated

3.2 Evaluation Capability Summaries

3.2.1 State of Alabama

Emergency Operations Center Management:

This capability was successfully demonstrated by the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA). AEMA executed the policies and procedures to activate the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). The SEOC communicated internally and externally with Federal, State and local agencies, including AEMA liaisons in the Houston County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the State Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (SRMAC) in Dothan. The SEOC had sufficient equipment, supplies, and communications to support the emergency response.

The SEOC provided a centralized place from which support and resources were coordinated by the State of Alabama. The SEOC Operations Chief (OC) provided overall direction and control of the Emergency Management Coordinators, Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and State agencies' representatives present for the exercise. The State Warning Point received initial notifications from FNP and notified SEOC personnel promptly. SEOC staff effectively used communications and computer systems to maintain situational awareness and track resource requests throughout the exercise.

AEMA liaisons to the Houston County EOC and SRMAC-Dothan participated in discussions of protective actions and enhanced the situational awareness of the SEOC.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The Public Information Officer (PIO) in the AEMA SEOC ensured emergency

information and instructions were provided to the public. The SEOC PIO stayed in constant contact with the Emergency News Center (ENC) and reviewed all draft news releases for accuracy. After review, the PIO received and documented approval from the OC. The approved release was then sent to the ENC for dissemination. The SEOC PIO maintained awareness of the changing operations throughout the exercise and ensured new releases to the media were accurate and up to date.

For this capability, the following REP criterion was met: 5.b.1

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:

This capability was successfully demonstrated at the SRMAC in Montgomery, at the SRMAC in Dothan, and by two radiological field monitoring teams (FMTs).

Alabama Department of Public Health (ADPH), Office of Radiation Control (ORC) staff initially coordinated the State's technical response to the emergency at FNP by activating SRMAC-Montgomery and by contacting and deploying personnel to staff SRMAC-Dothan and two FMTs. SRMAC-Montgomery is a well-equipped facility capable of supporting emergency operations. SRMAC-Montgomery staff provided a detailed safety briefing to the FMTs, monitored events at FNP, and kept ORC leadership informed.

SRMAC-Dothan staff were pre-positioned near the facility in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement (EOPA) and arrived promptly after being notified by SRMAC-Montgomery. SRMAC-Dothan had sufficient equipment, communications, and supplies to support the emergency operation, and staff worked efficiently to prepare to take over responsibilities from SRMAC-Montgomery. This occurred while FNP was at the Alert emergency classification level (ECL).

The SRMAC-Dothan Team Leader provided direction and control to the staff, all of whom were technically proficient and effective in carrying out the duties of their positions. The Team Leader frequently discussed the status of the emergency with the SRMAC Agency Director, who, under the authority of the State Health Officer, could issue Emergency Health Orders. SRMAC-Dothan staff frequently interacted with staff from other agencies (including those from Georgia and Florida) to obtain or provide information on emergency conditions. SRMAC-Dothan also produced three news releases which were sent to the Emergency News Center for dissemination.

The SRMAC-Dothan staff made well-reasoned recommendations and decisions based on plant conditions, radiological release data, dose projections, and FMT monitoring and sampling data. Following the FNP declaration of Site Area Emergency (SAE), the SRMAC Agency Director issued two Emergency Health Orders – Public Warning and Restricted Access. Following the declaration of General Emergency and the start of the radiological release, an Emergency Health Order was issued for evacuation of selected downwind zones.

SRMAC-Dothan staff effectively directed the activities of the FMTs, initially deploying them to traverse areas nearby and downwind from FNP. SRMAC required FMTs to report their dosimeter readings at least every thirty minutes. After the radiological release began, the Team Leader and Agency Director reviewed release data and dose projections and ordered the FMT members to ingest potassium iodide (KI).

Two FMTs were dispatched from the Houston County Health Department in Dothan, Alabama. Equipment, supplies, and dosimetry were sufficient to support radiological monitoring operations. Communications systems were tested and verified operational before leaving the dispatch area. Survey equipment was both operationally checked and source checked properly before deployment into the field.

The FMTs were given a radiological briefing by SRMAC-Montgomery prior to deployment. The field teams performed radiological surveys by traversing downwind locations as instructed by SRMAC-Dothan. Airborne radioactivity was sampled using air samplers with particulate filters and sample cartridges. Personnel exposure was recorded, tracked, and transmitted to SRMAC-Dothan. Field team members were knowledgeable of their exposure limits and the use of KI. Field team members demonstrated the ability to obtain measurements and samples in order to properly track and assess the plume.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2, 4.a.3, 5.b.1

3.2.2 State of Georgia

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) successfully demonstrated the ability to manage the State Operations Center (SOC) in response to an emergency at FNP. The SOC was a modern, well-organized, and spacious area equipped with redundant communications capabilities, administrative equipment, and supplies to support State emergency response operations. The State Operations Chief (OC) provided leadership and control of the SOC during the exercise. He demonstrated a keen knowledge of the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan and the Georgia Radiological Base Emergency Response Plan and was aware of the availability of State and Federal assets to support the event. Key members of the SOC staff were alerted initially for the event and all responded to the recall in a timely manner.

The OC ensured SOC staff maintained situational awareness through frequent staff briefings. All staff members were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and duties. The Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Environmental Protection Division (EPD) staff was proactive in providing the Blakely-Early County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) with technical assistance and information relating to the emergency situation at FNP. The OC maintained continuous communications with Blakely-Early County EMA during their coordination with Dothan/Houston County EMA relating to Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages, prompt notification system

(PNS) activation, and protective action decision (PAD) discussions. The Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) approved all PADs in accordance with current plans and procedures. The SOC kept surrounding States apprised of response activities in Georgia.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The State of Georgia Public Affairs staff successfully demonstrated this capability by developing, coordinating, and disseminating emergency public information in support of the response to the incident at FNP. Established protocols were followed when preparing, coordinating and disseminating news releases. The GEMA Public Affairs function in the SOC is organized under ESF 15 – External Affairs. The lead Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and two assistants formulated and processed all news releases for the State and Early County. The news releases were pre-scripted and were modified by the lead PAO to fit the current event. SOC staff also stayed informed of PNS/EAS activations which were performed by Houston County following coordination with Early County.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.b.1

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:

This capability was successfully demonstrated by dose assessment staff at the SOC, the FMT Coordinator at the Early County EOC, and two FMTs. The DNR staff at the SOC included the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC), the Assistant REC/ Dose Assessment, and a third member who assisted with dose assessment and WebEOC updates. The DNR staff routinely monitored and evaluated plant, radiological, and meteorological data. Adequate equipment, supplies and communications capabilities were available for all required tasks. Dose projections were performed to determine worst case scenarios based on plant conditions and radiological data, and projections made during the release were consistent with the results from the FNP Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The REC provided direction and control of the DNR staff, worked effectively with the SOC personnel, FNP, the State of Alabama, and others to evaluate and assess plant and off-site radiological conditions in order to provide input into PADs for the safety and health of emergency workers and the public. By interview, the REC described the following procedures and protocols: alert, notification and activation of DNR staff; emergency worker (EW) dose limits and administrative dose levels; KI for EWs; Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) correction factor; and dose extension approval for EWs. All procedures described by the REC were consistent with applicable plans and DNR Standard Operating Guides (SOGs).

Two FMTs consisting of personnel from DNR and the Georgia National Guard 4th Civil Support Team were pre-positioned at the Early County EOC. The FMT equipment and

supplies were adequate to support radiological monitoring and emergency worker functions. Two communications systems were tested and verified operational before deployment.

After a thorough radiological briefing by the Blakely-Early County Radiation Protection Officer, the FMT Coordinator provided a briefing on the current plant and meteorological conditions as well as initial travel routes and monitoring activities for each FMT. The FMT Coordinator kept the teams informed of changing plant conditions and changes in meteorological conditions including wind direction and speed. The FMT Coordinator frequently consulted the dose assessment staff at the SOC regarding FMT assignments and promptly reported monitoring and sampling results.

FMT instruments had current calibrations and were source checked for proper operation. FMT instrumentation was sufficient to perform airborne particulate and radioiodine sampling. Ambient direct radiation field measurements were also adequately performed. The FMTs performed hazard assessment by identifying the edges of the plume as directed by the FMT Coordinator and by identifying and quantifying the simulated release. FMTs demonstrated appropriate surveying, sampling, and counting techniques in order to track the plume. Airborne radioactivity was assessed using an air sampler equipped with a particulate filter and a silver zeolite cartridge (simulated). FMTs were knowledgeable regarding the purpose, proper use, and limitations of KI. They had sufficient supplies of KI, instruction sheets, and documentation. Emergency worker exposure control was satisfactorily demonstrated with appropriate dosimetry use and documentation.

For training and testing only, FMTs and dose assessment personnel demonstrated the use of an application for digitally recording, transmitting, and storing monitoring and sampling data using mobile devices. While the application is still in the debugging stage, it offers promise as a reliable, accurate, secure, and timely way of handling field data.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2, 4.a.3

3.2.3 Joint Operations

3.2.3.1 Emergency News Center

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

Representatives from the States of Alabama and Georgia, Houston County and Blakely-Early County located at the ENC successfully demonstrated this capability by providing emergency information and instructions to the media and public. The State and local representatives performed their roles in accordance with their published plans and procedures. Some PIO functions for Blakely-Early County were performed by the Georgia PIO.

The ENC served as the focal point for the distribution of news releases and presentation of media briefings by the utility and jurisdictions. Alabama Power/Southern Nuclear activated the ENC during the Alert ECL. In accordance with the EOPA, State and county PIOs were pre-positioned in the area and responded to the ENC upon notification of its activation. The utility's Public Information Director had the overall responsibility for the management of the ENC.

State and local ENC representatives confirmed that all news releases were prepared, coordinated, and approved according to respective procedures. All releases conformed to protective action decisions and precautionary measures instituted by the jurisdictions. A total of 25 news releases were received and distributed in the ENC during the exercise. Four media briefings were also conducted. Prior to each briefing, the spokespersons gathered to discuss and coordinate their message for the briefing. They discussed who would say what, and in which order the briefing would be conducted. The spokespersons answered all questions asked of them and were able to discuss what actions had been taken by their organizations.

The ENC has a robust communications capability with 38 dedicated commercial telephones supplemented by individual cell phones and several laptop computers. Communications is enhanced through electronic displays of information received over WebEOC and the utility's Share Point system.

Public inquiry and rumor control (PI/RC) is a jointly staffed activity that occurs in the ENC as well as other locations. Over 132 calls were fielded by the call center, and seven rumors were quelled during media briefs. Although positions were available for each county and both states, only the states provided personnel (one each) to perform PI/RC functions. Media monitoring is a corollary PI/RC function performed in the ENC by the utility. Utility staff monitored four televisions that could be set to national and local media outlets to ensure that accurate information is being disseminated. These televisions were linked to video recorders so transmissions could be recorded if necessary.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1

3.2.4 Risk Jurisdictions

3.2.4.1 Houston County, Alabama

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Dothan/Houston County EMA successfully demonstrated this capability during the exercise. The EOC facility was well equipped to support emergency operations. The activation of the EOC was methodical and timely. The three members of the EMA staff making notifications constantly coordinated with each other to ensure all EOC staff member were contacted.

The Operations Officer had command of the response operation for the county under the general direction of the EMA Director. EOC staff members were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and effectively performed their duties. EOC staff took prompt and appropriate actions to implement Emergency Health Orders and the decision to relocate school children. EOC briefings were conducted frequently, providing details of current conditions and actions taken.

The Houston County Health Department Director and Nurse Manager successfully demonstrated their knowledge of Houston County emergency response procedures through interview. Each was well versed on procedures for responding to a potential health order directing the issue and ingestion of KI for EWs or the public.

The Special Medical Needs Coordinator described selection and contact procedures as well as the Special Needs Population listing. His coordination with the EMA Director and Mass Care staff was detailed and thorough, ensuring the requirements of all special needs individuals were met.

The Houston County Sheriff's Office demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain traffic control points (TCP) through to demobilization. The sheriff's captain described the location of TCPs, reception, and shelter facilities; and how to remove traffic impediments.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The Houston County EOC staff effectively demonstrated the ability to complete primary alert and notifications of the public in a timely manner following a decision to notify the public of an emergency. The PNS, consisting of sirens and tone alert radios (TARs), was activated in a timely manner following each PAD. Houston County was responsible for activating PNS throughout the entire EPZ and therefore coordinated the activation with Early County. Dothan/Houston County EMA had detailed procedures for activating the PNS and for backup route alerting should the system fail. EOC staff members were very familiar with those procedures.

Use of the recently-installed EMnet EAS system allowed for transmitting EAS messages directly from the EOC in a timely manner. The operator described the operation of the system as well as the process for verifying receipt of the message in accordance with plans and procedures. Copies of EAS messages were sent to the PIO located at the ENC. In the event of an EMnet system failure, printed copies of potential EAS messages were available which would be faxed to the local primary EAS radio station.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.b.1

Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place:

The Principal of Ashford Academy successfully demonstrated through interview the ability to relocate school students from Ashford Academy to the Houston County Farm Center out of sequence on May 8, 2012. The Principal was very knowledgeable on all aspects of the relocation process including student and staff complement, incident notification procedures, communication capabilities, convoy preparation/transit/arrival procedures, and parent notification procedures. The measures discussed were consistent with the Emergency Operation Guidelines for Ashford Academy.

For this capability, the following REP criterion was met: 3.c.2

Mass Care:

The Department of Human Resources and the South Alabama District of the American Red Cross (ARC) successfully demonstrated through interview the ability to provide services and accommodations for evacuees at the Walton Park and Wiregrass Park shelters out of sequence on May 8, 2012. Only individuals processed through the Houston County reception center would be allowed in the shelter. Meals and health services would be provided at the shelter, as well as the opportunity for evacuees to register on the ARC Safe and Well web site.

For this capability, the following REP criterion was met: 6.c.1

3.2.4.2 Early County, Georgia

Emergency Operations Center Management:

The Blakely-Early County EMA successfully demonstrated this capability during the exercise. Alert, notification, and activation were performed in accordance with plans and in a timely manner. The facility was suitable and appropriately equipped with supplies and duplicative communications equipment to successfully perform emergency response activities. Procedures and organizational design were unambiguous.

The Emergency Management Director (EMD) exhibited skillful and progressive direction and control of the county EOC and through routine, consistent briefings and updates of the developing situation at FNP, especially upon ECL changes, enabled the EOC staff to conduct coordinated operations with internal and external agencies, including the State of Georgia and Houston County, Alabama. The EMD focused activities and capitalized on opportunities as teaching points, augmenting and training the EMD of an ingestion-pathway county as part of his staff. The staff was perceptive and savvy and adeptly carried out their responsibilities.

Emergency responders displayed a thorough knowledge of their responsibilities, including the use of KI, managing TCPs, and other activities and procedures in response to incidents at FNP. All support functions were readily identified with position plates/boards at staff desks. Position binders that served as quick reference job aids were

available at each work station and provided sufficient reference materials that supplemented electronic references. Activities were documented, registered and archived for recounting. Projection and other visual aids, wall displays, maps and status boards were available, provided pertinent information to the staff and aided in situational awareness.

This capability was augmented with video teleconference, linked to the SOC in Atlanta, Georgia and allowed more direct, deliberative, timely coordination and decision making. The Early County EOC staff demonstrated a high level of competence in the ability to protect the health and safety of the public and emergency workers in the event of an incident at FNP and all activities were performed in accordance with plans and procedures.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The Blakely-Early County EMA successfully demonstrated the ability to provide accurate emergency information and instructions to its residents in the event of an incident at FNP. Press releases and EAS messages were effectively coordinated and implemented by the EMD and PIO. Public information and instructions were accurate, consistent, timely, and easy to understand. All information was reviewed, approved, and coordinated by the proper authorities, prior to dissemination.

The primary alert and notification system in the county is the TAR. Activation of TARs was coordinated and simulated through the Houston County, Alabama EOC. The Blakely-Early County EMA also has automated alert and notification systems such as EMNet and Code Red which can quickly notify and instruct residents in the event of a TAR failure. The county maintains a listing of all residents who have refused TARs and would contact them via Code Red. In addition, residents without telephones would be contacted via a door-to-door knock procedure managed through the 911 center. There were no system failures during this exercise; therefore there was no need to demonstrate the capability to conduct back up route alerting. However, EMA staff discussed the resources and procedures in place to complete that task in a timely manner. Procedures described by interview were consistent with plans and procedures.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, and 5.b.1

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:

Officers from the Early County Sheriff's Office, Georgia State Patrol, and DNR successfully demonstrated this capability by interview in the Early County EOC.

The officers understood their roles and responsibilities for establishing and managing TCP operations in support of evacuations related to incidents at FNP and were aware of

the fourteen TCP locations in the county REP Plan. They were aware of the necessity to manage orderly flow of traffic and control access to restricted areas as well as procedures for removal of impediments to ensure a timely evacuation. They were also familiar with radiation exposure limits, the use of dosimetry and KI, and reporting procedures.

For this capability, the following REP criteria were met: 3.d.1, 3.d.2

Section 4: Conclusion

Overall, the exercise was a success. Officials and representatives from the State of Alabama; the State of Georgia; the risk counties of Houston, Alabama and Early, Georgia; Southern Company; as well as numerous volunteers participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

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Appendix A: Exercise Timeline

All times are in Central Daylight Time.

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken							
		SEOC	SRMAC Montgomery	SRMAC Dothan	GA SOC	GA Dose	ENC	Houston County	Early County
Unusual Event	0752	0801	0801	----	0801	0805	----	0801	0801
Alert	0826	0839	0839	----	0839	0839	----	0839	0839
Site Area Emergency	0934	0944	----	0944	0944	0944	0944	0944	0944
General Emergency	1045	1053	----	1053	1053	1053	1108	1053	1053
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1041	1128	----	1053	1053	1041	1108	1053	1053
Simulated Rad. Release Ended	Ongoing	Ongoing	----	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		0908	0801	0915	0830	0830	0930	0918	0821
Exercise Terminated		1221	0920	1240	1216	1216	1218	1208	1216
Declaration of State of Emergency Local		----	----	----	0956	1059	0942	0942	0945
State		1012	----	----	0954	1055	1054 GA 1055 AL	----	1002
Early Precautionary Actions: Georgia Agricultural Advisory		----	----	----	1016	1016	1100	----	1016
1st Protective Action Decision: Alabama Health Orders1 and 2		1002	----	0952	0952	0956	0952	0952	0952
1st PNS Activation		----	----	----	1006	1006	----	1006	1006
1st EAS Message		----	----	----	1008	1008	----	1008	1008
2nd Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Zones: Alabama A, E-5, F-5; Georgia A, I-5		1100	----	1058	1102	1102	1058	1058	1102
2nd PNS Activation		----	----	----	1112	1112	1112	1112	1112
2nd EAS Message		----	----	----	1114	1114	1114	1114	1114

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Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Assignments

Location	Evaluation Team	Capabilities
Joint Operations		
ENC	J. Ackermann W. Larrabee	Emergency Public Information & Warning
State of Alabama		
SEOC	A. Sera M. Dolder	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning
SRMAC-Montgomery	A. Bevan	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
SRMAC-Dothan	J. Fill	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
FMTs	J. Harworth J. Leatherman	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
State of Georgia		
SOC	W. Cushman R. Spence M. Bradley	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning
Dose Assessment	J. Hickey	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
FMTs	M. Henry M. Herndon	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
FMT Coordination	K. Keyes	HAZMAT Response & Decontamination
Houston County		
EOC	L. Rink G. McLemore Q. Ivy	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning
Schools *(OOS)*	G. McLemore	Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place
Congregate Care *(OOS)*	J. Fill	Mass Care
Early County		
EOC	O. Spencer R. Shaw L. Lewis	EOC Management Emergency Public Information & Warning Public Safety and Security Response

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Appendix C: Extent of Play Agreements

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, OFFICE OF RADIATION CONTROL

ELEMENT / Sub-Element	
1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT	
1.a.1. Mobilization	X
1.b.1. Facilities	B
1.c.1. Direction and Control	X
1.d.1. Communications Equipment	X
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations	X
2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING	
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control	X
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information	X
2.b.2. Decision Making (PADs) for the General Public	X
3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION	
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	X
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	X
4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS	
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment	X
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management	X
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures	X
5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION	
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	X

X – Will Demonstrate
O – Out of Sequence
C – Coordination
B – Not Scheduled for Demonstration

EVALUATION AREA: 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate facilities in a timely manner.(NUREG-0654, A.4,D.3,4,E.1,2,H.4)

EXTENT OF PLAY:
ORC (Alabama Office of Radiation Control): The Office of Radiation Control will simulate alerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency personnel. Personnel will be pre-positioned at the Montgomery Emergency Room, 201 Monroe Street, Montgomery, AL, Suite 700 and at the Dothan SRMAC room in the Houston County EMA Office, basement of the Houston County Courthouse, 114 N. Oats Street, Dothan, AL. Personnel will also be pre-positioned at the Emergency News Center (ENC) in Dothan, AL and the field teams will be pre-positioned at the Houston County Health Department parking lot, 1781 E. Cottonwood Road, Dothan, AL.

Radiation Control will demonstrate the ability to receive notification from the licensee and verify the notification. The facilities will demonstrate activation in a timely manner, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654,A.1.d.,2.a.,b.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Radiation Control will demonstrate direction and control from the Montgomery Emergency Room and the Dothan SRMAC Room of the Houston County Courthouse, Dothan, AL.

Sub-Element 1.d - Communications Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communications links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1.,2.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Radiation Control will demonstrate communication capabilities at the appropriate locations (the Montgomery Emergency Room, Dothan SRMAC and the ENC) and between governmental agencies.

Sub-element 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J., 10a.b.c.e.f.j.k.,11,K.3.a.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Radiation Control will have available equipment, maps, and displays that would be necessary to support emergency operations at the Montgomery Emergency Room, Dothan SRMAC and ENC, scenario dependent. Dosimetry and KI will be available for field teams, as needed.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654,K.4.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Radiation Control will demonstrate emergency worker exposure control decision-making, for the Radiological Field Monitoring Teams only.

Sub- element 2.b - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based On available information on plant conditions, field monitoring, data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8., 10., 11. and Supplement 3.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Radiation Control will demonstrate radiological assessment for the plume phase of the emergency.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9., 10.m)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Radiation Control will demonstrate the decision-making process to make protective action decisions for the general public. Coordination of protective action decisions, once made, with the State of Alabama EMA and Houston County will be demonstrated.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Radiation Control will demonstrate the implementation of emergency worker exposure control, for the Radiological Field Monitoring Teams only, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J.10.e.,f.)

EXTENT OF PLAY

ORC: Radiation Control will demonstrate the implementation of KI to the State Radiological Field Monitoring Teams only, scenario dependent.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10, I.8., 9., 11)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Two teams will be dispatched into the field on the day of the evaluated exercise, Wednesday, May 9, 2012. Both teams will be evaluated. Field teams will be pre-positioned at the Houston County Health Department parking lot, 1781 E. Cottonwood Road, Dothan, AL. Field teams will demonstrate taking an air sample prior to being deployed into the field. The air sample will be demonstrated in the parking lot of the Houston County Health Department parking lot. Field teams will use booties and gloves for contamination control for the air sampling demonstration only and simulate using them thereafter.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field measurement teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, I.8., 11., J.10.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Two teams will be dispatched into the field on the day of the evaluated exercise, Wednesday, May 9, 2012. Both teams will be evaluated. Field teams will only simulate using booties and gloves for contamination control. Field teams will have previously demonstrated using booties and gloves during the air sampling demonstration.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulates samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I.8., 9., 11.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: Two teams will be dispatched into the field on the day of the evaluated exercise, Wednesday, May 9, 2012. Both teams will be evaluated. Radioiodine sample procedures will be demonstrated in the parking lot of the Houston County Health Department before being deployed into the field. Due to the compression of the scenario, radioiodine sampling will be simulated in the field during the exercise. Field teams are instructed to complete the air sample calculation sheet in the field during the exercise, scenario dependent.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5., 7., G.3.a., G.4,a., b., c.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
ORC: The coordination process will be demonstrated. Actual message distribution to the public and media will be simulated.

ALABAMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

ELEMENT / Sub-Element	
1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT	
1.a.1. Mobilization	X
1.b.1. Facilities	B
1.c.1. Direction and Control	X
1.d.1. Communications Equipment	X
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations	X
2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING	
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control	N/A
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information	N/A
2.b.2. Decision Making (PADs) for the General Public	C
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations	N/A
2.d.1. Radiological Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Exposure	N/A
2.e.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry & Return	N/A
3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION	
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	N/A
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	N/A
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations	N/A
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools	N/A
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	N/A
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control	N/A
3.e.1. Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Information	N/A
3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategic/Instructional Materials	N/A
3.f.1. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions	N/A
5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION	
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification	N/A
5.a.2. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification 15 Minute (Fast Breaker)	N/A
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification	N/A
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	X
6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES	
6.a.1. monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees	N/A
6.b.1. monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment	N/A
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees	N/A
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	N/A

X - Will Demonstrate
O - Out of Sequence
C - Coordination
B - Not Scheduled for Demonstration

EVALUATION AREA: 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.a - Mobilization
Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4,D.3,4,E.1,2,H.4)

EXTENT OF PLAY:
AEMA (Alabama Emergency Management Agency) at 5898 Co. Rd. 41 Clanton, AL, will simulate alerting, notifying and mobilizing personnel. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will demonstrate activation in a timely manner in accordance with the Alabama REP plan, scenario dependent. . Messages will be entered into EMITS deploying personnel and task action updates will be made when JIC, and Liaisons are operational. Pre-positioning is necessary due to the compression of the scenario and the distances involved in traveling to the various locations. Personnel will be pre-positioned at the State Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (SMRAC), Houston County EOC 114 North Oates Street Dothan, AL, Joint Information Center (JIC) 179 North Foster Street Dothan, AL, and the SNC Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 41 Inverness Drive Birmingham, AL. AEMA will demonstrate ability to receive notification from the licensee and verify the notification.

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654,A.1.d.,2.a.,b.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
In accordance with the Alabama Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plan and the Farley Standard Operating Guide (SOG), direction and control will be demonstrated by AEMA, scenario dependent. The SEOC will be activated. All requirements and activities to support the plans will be performed; actions required by the EMCs will be coordinated through the SEOC Branch Directors.

Sub-Element 1.d - Communications Equipment
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communications links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1.,2.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
Communications systems will be demonstrated scenario dependent on May 9, 2012. WebEOC and ENN are the primary means of communication. Electronic notification of the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) will be through WebEOC and acknowledgement of receipt of this notification will be accomplished by responding to roll call on the ENN. Telephones, E-mails,

EMITS and faxes will serve as secondary communications. Southern Linc radios may also be used.

Sub-element 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J., 10a.b.c.e.f.j.k.,11,K.3.a.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
AEMA will have available equipment, maps, and displays that would be necessary to support emergency operations at the SEOC, and JIC, scenario dependent. Dosimetry and KI are not applicable.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9., 10.m)

EXTENT OF PLAY
AEMA is a coordinating agency only. The ORC is responsible for issuing the PADs. However after a PAD is issued, AEMA reserves the right to review and/or recommend the PAD be changed due to any mitigating circumstances (road conditions, weather conditions, etc.), scenario dependent.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5., 7., G.3.a., G.4,a., b., c.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
The coordination process will be demonstrated at the SEOC, SRMAC, and JIC. Actual message distribution to the public and media will simulated, scenario dependent.

DOTHAN/HOUSTON COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

ELELEMENT/Sub-element	
1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT	
1.a.1. Mobilization	X
1.c.1. Direction and Control	X
1.d.1. Communications Equipment	X
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations	X
2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING	
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control	X
2.b.2. Decision Making (PADs) for the General Public	C
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations	X
3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION	
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control (Discussion)	X
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions (Discussion)	X
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations (Discussion)	X
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools (Discussion)	X
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control (Discussion)	X
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control (D)	X
5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION	
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification	X
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification	X
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	X
6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES	
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees	B
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment	B
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees	O
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	B

X - Will Demonstrate
C - Coordination
O - Out of Sequence
B - Not Scheduled for Demonstration

EVALUATION AREA: 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization
Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4, D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

EXTENT OF PLAY:
On May 9, 2012, EMA Staff, consisting of the EMA Director, Operations Manager, Communications/Planning Officer, two Administrative personnel, will be on duty at 7:00 a.m. (normal duty hour) at the Houston County EOC, located at 114 N. Oates Street, Dothan, AL. Some of the EOC Support Staff will also be pre-positioned at 7:00 a.m. at the Houston County

EOC. Additional EOC staff will be alerted, notified and mobilized according to the Farley Nuclear Plant Notification Guide.

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d., 2.a., b.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
EMA will demonstrate direction and control in the EOC scenario dependent.

Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communications links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1., 2.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
Communications systems will be demonstrated, scenario dependent. The ENN is the primary means of communications. Telephones, fax machines, and 800 MHz radios will serve as secondary communications.

Sub-element 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J., 10a.b.c.e.f.j.k., 11, K.3.a.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
An adequate supply of thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and dosimetry will be available for the emergency workers. This will be discussed at the D/HCEOC on May 9, 2012.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control
Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
This will be discussed during the exercise, scenario dependent.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9., 10.m)

EXTENT OF PLAY
This will be discussed during the exercise, scenario dependent. ADPH/ORC is responsible for issuing the PADs. Houston County reserves the right to review/recommend changes, if needed, due to certain mitigating circumstances (road conditions, weather conditions etc.)

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for Special Population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9., 10.c.d.e.g)

EXTENT OF PLAY
This will be discussed during the exercise, scenario dependent.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
This criterion will be discussed, May 9, 2012, at the D/HCEOC, on the day of the exercise, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision
Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J.10.e., f.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
Distribution of KI will be discussed along with appropriate instructions by a Houston County Health Nurse, on May 9, 2012, at the D/HCEOC, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 3.c.1 - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for Special Populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J.9., 10.c.d.e.g.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
This criterion will be discussed on May 9, 2012, at D/HCEOC, implementing protective action for Special Population other than schools, scenario dependent.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide to implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c.d., g.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
This will be discussed by interview at Ashford Academy, out of sequence, with the principal or their selected representatives on May 8, 2012, at 1:30pm.

Sub-element 3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG- 0654, J.10.g, j., k.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
The Houston County Sheriff's Office will discuss traffic and access control, during the exercise, scenario dependent.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10., k.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
The Houston County Sheriff's Office will discuss impediments to evacuation during the exercise, scenario dependent.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a.1 - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System
Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message must include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.1., 4., 5., 6., 7.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
Sirens will be simulated during the exercise for all PNS activations, scenario dependent.
EAS message distribution will be simulated to the local EAS stations, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 5.a.3 - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Backup Alert and Notification

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E.6., Appendix 3.b.2.c)

EXTENT OF PLAY
This criterion will be discussed May 9, 2012, at the D/HCEOC, during the exercise, scenario dependent.

Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5., 7., G.3.a.,G.4,a., b., c.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
Actual message will be developed, however distribution to the public and media will be simulated, scenario dependent.

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATIONS/ FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees
Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparation Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., 12.)

EXTENT OF PLAY
Congregate Care facilities will be demonstrated, out of sequence, with Red Cross on May 8, 2012 @ 1000. Those facilities are: Walton Park, 122 Walton Park Drive, Dothan, AL 36303 and Wiregrass Park, 620 6th Avenue, Dothan, AL 36301. A walk thru and interview with Red Cross, using a detail floor plan, no equipment will be set-up.

STATE OF GEORGIA

Other than the exceptions described in this Extent of Play Agreement, exercise activities demonstrated for evaluation will be based on the Georgia Radiological Emergency Base Plan, the respective site-specific plan (Annex A), local county plans, and appropriate Standard Operating Procedures.

It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be allowed correction immediately, at all player locations, if it is not disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator.

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-Element 1.a—Mobilization
Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Extent of Play
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia response personnel will be assigned to the following locations;
  - State Operations Center (SOC), Atlanta , GA
  - Southern Company Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Birmingham, AL.
  - Joint Information Center (JIC), Dothan, AL.
  - Early County Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Blakely, GA.

- State and local emergency response personnel will be notified of the emergency event, and requested to respond to their assigned duty location, using established notification procedures.

- Exercise participants, who would be required to travel to their assigned duty location may pre-position themselves in close proximity to that location prior to the start of the exercise. However, exercise participants will not be allowed to enter their duty location, or participate in exercise related activities, until they receive notification that an emergency event is taking place and they are requested to respond to their assigned emergency response duty location.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 1.c—Direction and Control
Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)

Extent of Play
Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State direction and control will be provided from the SOC in Atlanta, GA. GEMA liaisons will be deployed to the Early County EOC and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in Birmingham, AL for coordination purposes. In addition, a GEMA and GA DNR Public Information Officer will deploy to the Joint Information Center (JIC), located in Dothan, AL.

- The Early County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) will provide direction and control from the Early County EOC. An Early County Public Affairs Liaison will be deployed to the Joint Information Center (JIC), located in Dothan, AL.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 1.d—Communications Equipment
Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play
OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and

ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- Early County EMA in agreement.

Sub-Element 1.e—Equipment and Supplies to Support Operation
Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent of Play
Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 4.a.1 for field team equipment; 4.c.1 for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment); reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment under 6.d.1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- All dosimeters and radiation detection instruments are commercially procured. Practice or simulated TLDs, self- reading dosimetry, and simulated KI will be furnished to State and County emergency workers as necessary. The Early County Radiation Protection Officer will coordinate and oversee the issuing of equipment and instructions to Emergency Workers. The general public is not provided KI.

- Evaluation of equipment and supplies will be completed during a Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) prior to the exercise.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Sub-Element 2.a—Emergency Worker Exposure Control
Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10.e, f)

Extent of Play
OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures. If necessary, the state OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of preauthorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI

as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- Early County EMA in agreement.

Sub-Element 2.b—Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play
During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

When release and meteorological data are provided by the licensee, the ORO also considers these data. The ORO should demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs should be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m)

Extent of Play
Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff.

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. The decision makers should demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these projections.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans, then the ORO should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision should be based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision making process should involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should communicate and coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.
- Early County EMA in agreement.

Sub-Element 2.c—Protective Action Decisions for Protection of Special Populations
Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

Extent of Play
Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a high-risk environment where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors that should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the

administration of KI should be considered by the OROs. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be actual.

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision making process for protective actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the location of students at the time (for example, whether the students are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of available resources, for special population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Demonstration of procedures for Special Populations is to be accomplished by interview with representatives of the following organizations within the Early County EOC:
    - Early County Emergency Management Agency (Director)
    - Early County Public Health Department
- Early County does not have a school located within the 10-mile EPZ.
- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-Element 3.a—Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control
Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Extent of Play
OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures. Each emergency worker should have the basic

knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated. During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn back values are reached.

The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be affected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability is to be demonstrated by the Early County Radiological Protection Officer (RPO) providing an instructional and procedural briefing to emergency workers (field team personnel) while dosimetry kits are being issued prior to their deployment.
- This briefing will take place in close proximity to the Early County Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
- Emergency Workers will be available following the briefing to demonstrate, by interview, how to operate / use the equipment they are issued and understand the directions / guidance.
- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.b—Implementation of KI Decision
Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e)

Extent-of-play
Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- This capability is to be demonstrated by interview with Emergency Workers following a briefing provided by the Early County RPO.
- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.c—Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations:
Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

Extent-of-play
Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent-of-play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the extent-of-play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Implementation of protective actions for special populations will be demonstrated through interview with the Early County EMA Director within the Early County EOC.

- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 3.d—Implementation of Traffic and Access Control
Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

Extent of Play
OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air) they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Demonstration regarding Traffic Control Points and River Clearance will be demonstrated by interview within the Early County EOC by representatives of the agencies identified below.

  Traffic Control Points
  Early County Sheriff's Department and Georgia State Patrol personnel in the Early County EOC

  River Clearance
  GA DNR personnel in the Early County EOC

- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

Extent of Play
OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- The Early County 911 Director will be available in the Early County 911 Center, located adjacent to the EOC, to demonstrate, through interview, actions that could be taken to resolve any impediments to evacuation.

- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

4. Field Measurement and Analysis

Sub-Element 4.a—Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses
Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)

Extent of Play
Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans and procedures.

An appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper operational response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 R/hr.) and for high range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high range instrument can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of-play agreement.

- Field Team coordination will occur from the SOC and Early County EOC.

The GA DNR-EPD Field Team Coordinator will coordinate Field Team activities from the Early County EOC.

The GA DNR-EPD Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC), located in the GA State Operations Center, will manage Field Team activities though the GA DNR-EPD Field Team Coordinator located in the Early County EOC.

- Two (2) field teams will be dispatched into the field. Field teams will be comprised of one (1) Georgia EPD Radioactive Materials Program staff member and one (1) Georgia National Guard 4th Civil Support Team (4th CST) member.

- FEMA HQ is sponsoring / funding several efforts that leverage the FRMAC Radiological Assessment and Monitoring System (RAMS) database and facilitate communications to it.

- These two efforts are:

  Distributed Digital Field Monitoring (D-DFM), designed for use primarily by state-level radiological personnel; and

  RAMS as a Service (RaaS), designed for use primarily by first responders, but robust enough for use by state-level radiological personnel

Since Georgia EPD is involved in development and testing of both D-DFM and RaaS, it is the desire of the State of Georgia to DEMONSTRATE the use of D-DFM and/or RaaS as part of the Plant Farley 2012 Evaluated Exercise.

Recognizing that both systems are currently in development the following conditions are agreed to by the state of Georgia and FEMA:

1. Georgia EPD will demonstrate D-DFM and/or RaaS, depending on the current state of development.

2. Any "issues" involving the D-DFM and/or RaaS system will not adversely affect field team evaluation.

3. FMTs will demonstrate, for evaluation, the current verbal field measurement reporting procedure for the first 3 direct radiation (gamma) measurements, and for all data related to air sample collection and field analysis. Field teams will also report these direct radiation measurements, and the direct radiation measurements associated with air sample collection, via D-DFM and/or RaaS. After evaluation of verbal reporting of field team data, teams will exclusively report direct radiation (gamma) measurements using D-DFM or RaaS unless a system failure occurs.

4. This capability is for demonstration purposes only and will not be evaluated by FEMA evaluators, however, FEMA evaluators can provide feedback regarding the utility of D-DFM and RaaS for this function.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play
Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions.

Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts. If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume; it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume.

The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated. OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of-play agreement.

- Field Team coordination will occur from the SOC and Early County EOC.

  The GA DNR-EPD Field Team Coordinator will coordinate Field Team activities from the Early County EOC.

  The GA DNR-EPD Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC), located in the GA State Operations Center, will manage Field Team activities though the GA DNR-EPD Field Team Coordinator located in the Early County EOC.

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I. 9)

Extent of Play
Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples.

OROs should share data in a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of custody form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- State of Georgia in agreement.

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-Element 5.a—Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System
Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play
Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner

(will not be subject to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages *is not* required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- GEMA and Early County will coordinate PNS activation with Houston County, Alabama. (State and County)
- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5–10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

The 45-minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Backup route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement if the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- Successful activation of the tone alert radios is verified through witnessing activation of the radio in the EMA office.
- If there is an actual failure of the Tone Alert Radio (TAR) system, then backup alert and notification plans and procedures will be discussed by the evaluator, the Early County EMA Director, and if necessary local law enforcement officers.
- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.
- Early County EMA in agreement with clarifications above.

Sub-Element 5.b—Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media
Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c)

Extent of Play
Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable instructions (for example, evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and special populations, public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them.

The ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute

media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (for example, Emergency Alert System [EAS] messages and media releases) and media information kits should be available for dissemination to the media. OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

- The State will pre-deploy a GEMA Public Information Officer, a GA DNR Public Information Officer, and one Public Affairs staff member to the Joint Information Center (JIC) in Dothan, AL.

- Two GEMA Public Affairs representatives will participate in the State Operations Center to coordinate State and local joint press releases which are then provided to the Public Information Officer at the JIC

- Early County will provide one Public Affairs liaison to the Joint Information Center (JIC) in Dothan, AL

- State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

- Early County in agreement with clarifications above.

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Appendix D: Scenario

Scenario Summary

The following is an approximate scenario timeline for this exercise which was for evaluator reference only. All times are in Central Daylight Time.

TIME	ACTION EVENT
0630	Simulator Setup: Training System – MOL, 812 ppm, 923MWe, Rods 227 Setup per Event Stack and Command List items found on the SIMULATOR SETUP details sheets Type MET to start sending table data and after each INIT
0700	Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is the accident Unit 100% Power Bank D rods at 227 Boron concentration 812 ppm. A train is the on-service train / A train is the protected train Provide Crew turnover information per turnover sheet and allow board walk down
0730	Crew on station – Begin scenario Simulator to Run
0733	Multiple Alarms due to PT- 445 failing HI.
0738	DEH Trouble Alarm in
0740	Annunciator Failure alarm is in
0741	Loss of All MCB Annunciators
0755	Rover reports back to Control Room that CB-1 is closed and CB-2 is open in cabinet N1H25L040A-N
0756	A **NOUE** should be declared based on SU3-TV 1 due to a loss of most or all MCB annunciators for greater than 15 minutes
0803	SO involved in the Fuel Shuffle reports to the Control Room that a fuel assembly is latched to the SFP Bridge crane in the full up position and power to the crane has been lost
0816	The Assembly comes loose from the Bridge Crane and falls to the bottom of pool causing the following Rad Monitors to alarm: R-14, 22, 25A and 25B.
0817	Conditions are met for an **ALERT** based on RA2 TV1 a valid alarm on R-25A or 25B
0818	Control Room receives call from SO in SFP stating the assembly has fell to the bottom of the SFP and is lying on its side on top of the fuel racks. Bubbles came up and ventilation in the room tripped off.
0829+	"A" Train CREFs is placed O/S
0832	An **ALERT** should have been declared

TIME	ACTION EVENT
0832+	Plant Emergency Alarm activated – announcement to assemble and perform accountability
0851	1-2A DG trouble alarm is in with the air receiver air pressure light out
0902	An Under voltage Alarm is received on the EPB alarm Panel. The "1L" 4160V breaker (DG02) has tripped open. (Loss of "B" train SW)
0902+	Initial accountability (time requirement will be based on 30 minutes from PEA activation time)
0909+	Control Room team enters AOP-9
0911	SO investigating DG trouble alarm reports back that the "B" Air Receiver relief is stuck open and "B" Compressor running continuously
0918+	1B DG is placed in Mode 3 due to the loss of "B" Train SW and a T/O is requested from the TSC to caution tag the MODE Selector H/S
0928	Load rejection with a Turbine Trip, but no Rx Trip
0928	Criteria is met for a **SITE AREA EMERGENCY** based on SS2 due to the Rx not tripping automatically or via the MCB hand switches
0929	15% fuel failure occurs causing R-6 and R-50(GFFD) to come in alarm
0931	1B MDAFW Pump trips on start
0933	Rover reports back to the Control Room that the Rx trip and Bypass Breakers have been opened manually
0933	ED/Shift Manager should declare a **SITE AREA EMERGENCY**
0937	R-4 (Charging Pump Area) comes in alarm
0937+	Control room notices HV-2866C (Mini Purge damper will not close
0941	Control Room Team enters EEP-0
0943	ED/Shift Manager should have declared a **SITE AREA EMERGENCY**
0946	Control Room enters ESP-0.1
1015	400 GPM small break LOCA occurs and R-2, 7, 11 and 12 come into alarm
1018	Control Room Team Manually initiates an SI
1028	10000 GPM LOCA occurs
1030	Adverse numbers in CTMT (4#)
1030+	Phase B Isolation due to 27# in CTMT
1030+	The 1A CTMT Spray pump trips when starting
1030+	Crew enters EEP-1
1041	Rx Cavity H2 Dilution Fan trips on auto start and burns a hole in its electrical penetration. R-10,14 and 21 are in alarm
1041	Conditions are met for a **GENERAL EMERGENCY** (potential loss of 3 barriers)
1043	SO dispatched to close Recirculation Disconnects
1043+	Chemistry Contacted for Boron Concentration
1043+	Control Room Team Enters FRP-P-1
1056	ED should declare a **GENERAL EMERGENCY (PAR 2)**
1056+	Control Room Team Enters EEP-1

TIME	ACTION EVENT
1100+	Control Room Team Enters ESP-1.2
1110+	Wind Shift
1200	Drill Terminated

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Appendix E: Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AAR	After Action Report
AC	Area Coordinator
ADPH	Alabama Department of Public Health
AEMA	Alabama Emergency Management Agency
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCA	Area Requiring Corrective Action
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Service
CDT	Central Daylight Time
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CO	Chief of Operations
DHR	Department of Human Resources
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNR	Department of Natural Resources
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
EMD	Emergency Management Director
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
ENC	Emergency News Center
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EOPA	Extent of Play Agreement
ENC	Emergency News Center
EPD	Environmental Protection Division
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ESF	Emergency Support Function
EW	Emergency Worker
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMT	Field Monitoring Team
FNP	Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant
GAR	Governor's Authorized Representative
GEMA	Georgia Emergency Management Agency
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
IP	Improvement Plan
JIC	Joint Information Center
KI	Potassium Iodide
LE	Law Enforcement
MACCS	Multi-agency Coordination Center System

Acronym	Meaning
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOUE	Notification of Unusual Event
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NWS	National Weather Service
OC	Operations Chief
OOS	Out-of-Sequence
ORC	Office of Radiation Control
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAG	Protective Action Guide
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PID	Public Information Director
PIO	Public Information Officer
PI/RC	Public Inquiry/Rumor Control
PNS	Prompt Notification System
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SOC	State Operations Center
SOG	Standard Operating Guide
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRMAC	State Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
SWP	State Warning Point
TAR	Tone Alert Radio
TCL	Target Capabilities List
TCP	Traffic Control Point