

James A. FitzPatrick

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - June 22 - 23, 2011 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



Published July 19, 2012

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James A. FitzPatrick

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UnclassifiedRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Executive Summary

The post plume portion of the exercise in the 50-mile Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (IPZ) around the FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant began on June 21, 2012 following the release termination. The exercise extended through June 22 and 23 and was evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent full-scale, federally-evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on September 22, 2009. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 15, 1981.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in New York State and the counties of: Oswego, Onondaga, Cayuga, Jefferson, Lewis, Madison, Oneida, Ontario, Seneca and Wayne who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies and One Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified as a result of the ingestion pathway exercise. In addition, one Planning Issue was identified. Corrective actions were demonstrated for the one prior ARCA.

II. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all

offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
- Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
- U.S. Department of Commerce,
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
- U.S. Department of Energy,
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
- U.S. Department of Transportation,
- U.S. Department of Agriculture,
- U.S. Department of the Interior, and

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plants (JAFNPP), which share the site and the Emergency Planning Zone to FEMA Region II by New York State occurred on July 15 1981. Formal approval of the RERPs was granted by FEMA on February 1, 1985, under 44 CFR 350.

A radiological emergency response exercise was held and evaluated on June 22, 2011 by FEMA Region II to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Administrator.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;
- "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2001, and revised April 25, 2002, and contained in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2003)

Section III of this report, "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the Ingestion Pathway Zone IPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains as applicable: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, and the recommended corrective actions, and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them. The Improvement Plan for outstanding issues is contained in Appendix A.

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW

This section includes data and basic information relevant to the ingestion phase of the exercise extending from the release termination on June 21, 2011 through June 22 & 23. The purpose of exercise is to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

A. Ingestion Pathway Zone Description

The ingestion pathway zone for the Nine Mile Point/James A. FitzPatrick site encompasses the counties of Cayuga, Jefferson, Lewis, Madison, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Oswego, Seneca, and Yates, Counties. The area is predominantly rural in nature with most of its total land acres consisting of woodland, wetlands, and inactive agricultural land. Although active agriculture land only accounts for a small percentage of the local land acres, agriculture is the major land use in most of the counties. The major agriculture activity in the counties is dairy, accounting for a large percent of the value of all farm products produced in the area. The major harvested crops are hay, alfalfa, and corn. The major livestock animals are cattle and hogs. The total population of the 10 ingestion pathway counties is 1,228,442 (2011 Population Estimates). The counties of Seneca, Yates, Onondaga and Ontario constitute the popular New York State Finger Lakes Region. The area extends southward from a 75-mile-long (120-kilometer-long) line reaching roughly from Syracuse in the east to Rochester in the west. The region is well known for its wineries, stunning scenery and important historic sites.

The public institutions, aside from the schools and churches, within the IPZ of the site are hospitals, colleges, and jails. There are also a number of special facilities located within the 50-mile IPZ. Continuing urban and industrial expansion of the area will increase both the population and the amount of land used for residential and commercial purposes.

Continuing urban and industrial expansion of the area will increase both the population and the amount of land used for residential and commercial purposes. It is anticipated that the population in the region will increase by about 30 percent in the next twenty years, with larger increases in the urban areas.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name

James A. FitzPatrick

Type of Exercise

Ingestion

Exercise Date

June 22, 2011

Program

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type

Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

Rebecca Thomson

Exercise Oversight

FEMA Region II

RAC Chair

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FEMA Region II

Technological Hazards Program Specialist

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1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the James A. FitzPatrick exercise:

State Jurisdictions

New York State Office of Emergency Management

New York State Department of Health

New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets

New York State Police

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation

New York State Department of Transportation

New York State Department of Labor

New York State Office of Aging

New York State Thruway Authority

New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation

New York State Department of Correctional Services

New York State Office of Mental Health

New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control

New York State Education Department

New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

New York State Public Service Commission

New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs

New York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Organization

New York State Assembly

New York State Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services

New York State Office of Interoperability and Emergency Communications

New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services

New York State Office of Children and Family Services

New York State Office of Temporary Disability Assistance

New York State Office of People with Developmental Disabilities

New York State Office of Counter Terrorism

New York State Advisory Team

New York State Office of General Services

State University of New York

Risk Jurisdictions

Oswego County

Cayuga County

Jefferson County

Lewis County

Madison County

Oneida County

Onondaga County

Ontraio County

Seneca County

Wayne County

Oswego County Sheriff's Department

Oswego County Department of Public Works

Oswego County Emergency Management

Oswego County Chairman of the Legislature

Oswego County Administrator

Oswego County Personnel Department

Oswego County Administrative Services

Oswego County Department of Social Services

Oswego County Highway Department

Oswego County Superintendent of Schools

Oswego County Department of Health

Oswego County Fire Coordinator

Oswego City School District

Oswego County Attorney

Oswego County Promotion and Tourism

Oswego County Probation Department

Oswego County Planning Department

Oswego County Opportunities Transportation

Oswego County Emergency Medical Services

Oswego County Communication Center 911

Support Jurisdictions

Town of Palermo Fire Department

Mexico Central School District

Fulton Police Department

Onondaga City Emergency Management Office

Private Organizations

American Red Cross

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service

Entergy - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

Constellation Energy Coperation - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station

WSYR Radio Station

Salvation Army

Boards of Cooperative Educationsl Services

Cornell Cooperative Educatonal Services

Rochester Institute of Technology

Federal Jurisdictions

Federal Radiological Monotoring and Assessment Center

United States Department of Agriculture

United States Environmental Protection Agency

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Federal Emergency Management Agency

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

The DHS/FEMA Region II Office evaluated the ingestion pathway portion of the exercise which began on June 21, 2011 following the release termination. The exercise extended through June 22 - 23, 2011 to assess the capabilities of the local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving James A. FitzPatick Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this report is to represent the results of the findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations during a simulated radiological emergency.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

The Offsite Exercise objectives and capabilities for the James A. FitzPatrick full participation plume and ingestion exercise are discussed in the Extent of Play Agreement, Rev. 8, June 2, 2011 in Appendix E of this report.

2.3 Scenario Summary

SCOPE

The scope of the 2011 James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Station (JAFNPS) Ingestion Pathway Federally Evaluated Exercise is focused on the activities of the State agencies responsible for determining and implementing post-radiological emergency measures during the post-plume phase of a simulated accident at the JAFNPS. The post-plume phase is the period beginning after releases of radioactive material have been brought under control and the period of deposition of radioactivity has ceased. This phase of a radiological emergency may take from weeks to many months to complete depending on the severity and extent of the release of radioactive material to the environment. Fully demonstrating this response is well beyond the scope of this exercise. However, the State of New York will demonstrate key response actions and objectives based on the simulated deposition of radioactive material resulting from the off-site release and assumed scenario 30 - day time jump postulated throughout the exercise sequence of events.

The major exercise events to be demonstrated will include protective action decision making and implementation of actions resulting in protection of the public from direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive material and ingestion of contaminated food and water. To allow the

demonstration of these activities, simulated scenario times, information and data will be provided to exercise participants for the demonstration of the exercise objectives. The season assumed for the purposes of the exercise is Spring with the date being Wednesday, June 22, 2011. The specific schedule of events and timing of exercise events is provided in the table presented below and the detailed sequence of events.

EXERCISE EVENT PLAN SUMMARY

T=Refers to the time when release to the environment has been terminated and deposition of radioactive material is completely dispersed within the 50-mile area.

Event 1

T+2 hrs

Transition from Plume exposure phase exercise and conduct FRMAC Advance Party Meeting. Establish initial conditions, assess plume data based on available map(s) to be conducted following the completion of the Plume Portion Exercise (Time is to be set aside for the DOE/FRMAP person to hold/walkthrough of the Advance Party Meeting.)

1500/1530

State EOC and JAFNPS EOF

Designated dose assessment staff/decision makers support agency staffs.

Event 2

(Out of sequence)

Post-Emergency environmental sample collection morning of day after plume portion of the exposure.

Event 3/

T+5 hrs

Establish an environmental sampling plan based on NARAC style formatted maps, models and measurements provided by the utility for the morning of day after plume portion of the exercise. (NARAC did not participate in the exercise. NARAC style maps were provided by the utility).

Event 4/

T+48 hrs

Radiological assessment of environmental data and PAD Formulation for Relocation/Re-Entry/Return and ingestion pathway morning of day after plume portion of the exercise.

Event No./Simulated Scenario Time

T+72 hrs

Table top decision making and implementation of Relocation/Re-Entry/Return afternoon of day after Plume Portion of the Exercise

State of New York EOC only State EOC Personnel EOC Controllers.

Event 6/

T+72 hrs

Table top decision making and implementation of ingestion pathway actions Afternoon of Day after Plume Portion of the Exercise

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the June 22 - 23, 2011 ingestion pathway portion of the exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the EPZ surrounding the FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria contained in the September 12, 2001 Federal Register Notice (revised April 25, 2002) and in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15, 2002).

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 3.1, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those objectives is indicated by the use of the following letters:

- M Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises)
- D Deficiency assessed
- A ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
- N Not Demonstrated
- P Planning Issue

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Eval	uatioi	<u>. </u>							
DATE: 2011-06-22 SITE: James A. FitzPatrick, NY M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		NYSEOC	NYSAA	NYS STA	NYS STB	NYS STC	NYSDOH LAB	OSWC EOC	OSWC AA
Emergency Operations Management	† ·	广	-		Ι_	-	_	<u> </u>	Ť
Mobilization	lal	\vdash	_	ļ					
Facilities	161		-						<u> </u>
Direction and Control	101	M	├-				ļ	M	
		M	_					M	-
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	<u></u>		-			M	-
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	lel	M		-	-			├	
Protective Action Decision Making	+			<u> </u>	<u> </u>				
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1		<u> </u>		<u> </u>			 	-
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1	 	M				ļ	<u> </u>	M
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2	M		ļ <u>.</u>	<u> </u>			<u> </u>	<u></u>
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1	}		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	├ —	
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1	ļ	M				<u> </u>		M
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1	М	М					M	М
Protective Action Implementation		<u> </u>		L			ļ		
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1			M	M	M			
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals	3b1								İ
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1								
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2								
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1								
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2								
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1	М						М	
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2	М						М	
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1	М						М	
Field Measurement and Analysis									
RESERVED	4a1								
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2								
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3							Т	
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1	T		М	P	М		\vdash	
Laboratory Operations	4c1		_	1112	<u> </u>		M	\vdash	
Emergency Notification and Public Info	1	!					141		
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1						<u> </u>		
RESERVED	5a2	 			 			\vdash	
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3	\vdash		-	\vdash	\vdash		 	
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4	 	\vdash			 		\vdash	
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	A		\vdash	 		<u> </u>	一	
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1	A			-			\vdash	\vdash
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and		\vdash		 	-	<u> </u>	 	├	\vdash
Vehicles	6b1			<u> </u>			ļ 		
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1	<u> </u>	 	\vdash	ļ			<u> </u>	-
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	L			1_	<u>L</u>

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

James A. FitzPatrick

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 New York Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.e.1, 3.e.1, 3.e.2, 3.f.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 5.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 24-11-5b1-A-03

CRITERION: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner.

CONDITION: Public Information was inconsistent on the second day of exercise play. The talking points for the Director of the Department of Health for the press conference that was to take place at 1400 stated that ERPA 3 remained evacuated, and also that those in ERPA 3 can return to their homes.

Also, Press Release #1 (1600) stated that the general agricultural embargo area had been reduced from the original 50-mile radius, and food in this reduced area should not be harvested or eaten. In a subsequent paragraph, it stated that food should not be consumed within a 50-mile radius of the affected area. Both statements referred to an attached map, which only displayed the reduced embargo area.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Lack of a detailed review of the talking points and Press Release.

REFERENCE: NUREG654, E.5.7; G.3.a; G.4.a.b.c

EFFECT: The public would have been confused by the inconsistent information.

RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that a thorough review of public information is accomplished prior to its release.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: 3.e.1.

ISSUE NO.: 27-05-3e1-A-01

ISSUE: The Wayne County USDA representative sent a message [by e-mail at 1604, Day 2, to the State Agriculture and Marketing representative in the Emergency Coordination Center (ECC)], that the State Dairy Farm database was not up-to-date.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: For the ARCA from 2005 concerning updates to the State Dairy Farm database, an interview was conducted with representatives from Department of Agriculture and Marketing (Ag & Markets), USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA), Cornell Cooperative Extension (CCE), Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) Digital Imaging and Remote Sensing Lab, and NYSOEM.

Ag & Markets has just a central office, so the main source of information is through certified milk inspectors, employed by the cooperatives, who regularly inspect the milk at critical nodes before going to market. The inspectors report that information which is then entered into the State Dairy Farm database. Information regarding location goes to the NYSOEM GIS for enhanced mapping using high resolution photography and county parcel data.

Additionally, Ag & Markets coordinates with the CCE, which has a representative in almost every county in New York, to implement a program to connect the land-grant University's research to its community. The CCE does agriculture research and liaises between the farmers/producers in the county. CCE representatives work with farmers, growers, gardeners, etc., on a daily basis and keep data on crops, locations, and herds. CCE representatives typically serve as the Ag liaison in county emergency operation centers.

The USDA FSA office is usually co-located with the CCE in each county. FSA

provides loans, price support, and disaster assistance to farmers. They also have a database and aerial photography capabilities, which gives a comprehensive look at the whole agricultural community for that area. The USDA FSA and NYS Ag & Markets developed a memorandum of understanding allowing FSA to provide their information to Ag & Markets for validation and cross-check of the State Dairy Farm database.

Ag & Markets updated their procedures which now call for an annual check of the State Dairy Farm database with information from CCE and FSA. After database updates are made, Ag & Markets sends the information to every county office of emergency management.

The RIT Digital Imaging and Remote Sensing Lab is doing research on how it can rapidly identify and quantify agricultural impact of a radioactive plume from a nuclear power station through total acreage (by crop type) and identification of affected properties (via owner name/street address). They are working to develop a tool that can automatically and within hours, ingest satellite imagery, apply spectral processing, integrate available GIS data, compute acreage, highlight areas, identify affected land owners, and format map products for visualization. The RIT representative showed the maps they are capable of developing, and explained they will continue to work to improve the tool's capabilities.

All of the mentioned elements worked to assist Ag & Markets in assessing and disseminating information regarding crops and dairy embargoes throughout the exercise. The prior ARCA has been cleared.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.2 New York State Accident Assessment

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 2.b.1, 2.d.1, 2.e.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.3 New York State - Sampling Team A

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 4.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.4 New York State - Sampling Team B

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUE: 4.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 24-11-4b1-P-01

CRITERION: The field teams (two or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and collect samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

CONDITION: When asked what level decontamination would determine decontaminationactivities, members of the State Field Sampling Team B responded that all tools and equipment used would be decontaminated to less than twice background, or to as near background levels prior to reuse in the field, since sampling activities would generally be taken along the boundaries of the plume footprint with low levels of radiation. The Field Team Coordinator agreed with these levels. The New York

State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan, Procedure M – Ingestion Sampling Team Procedure does not state any level that would require decontamination activities.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Possible planning oversight.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, K.5.a, New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan, Procedure M

EFFECT: When additional state or federal personnel begin to integrate with State Field Sampling Teams, equipment may get released under different criteria if none is stated.

RECOMMENDATION: Modify the existing procedure to include a level at which decontamination of equipment is required for reuse in sampling activities.

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.5 New York State Department of Health Laboratory

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 4.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 New York State - Sampling Team C

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 4.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.2 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 2.e.1, 3.e.1, 3.e.2, 3.f.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 2.b.1, 2.d.1, 2.e.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of New York and the affected local jurisdictions are deemed adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore approval under 44 CFR Part 350 of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of New York, site-specific to James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant will remain in effect.

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Issue Number: 24-11-4b1-P-01 Criterion: 4b1 ISSUE: When asked at what level would determine decontamination activities, members of the State Field Sampling Team -B responded that all tools and equipment used would be decontaminated to less than twice background, or to as near background levels prior to reuse in the field, since sampling activities would generally be taken along the boundaries of the plume footprint with low levels of radiation. The Field Team Coordinator agreed with these levels. The New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan, Procedure M - Ingestion Sampling Team Procedure does not state any level that would require decontamination activities. RECOMMENDATION: Modify the existing procedure to include a level at which decontamination of equipment is required for reuse in sampling activities. CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION: **CAPABILITY:** PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: CAPABILITY ELEMENT: START DATE: **AGENCY POC:** ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE: Issue Number: 24-11-5b1-A-03 Criterion: 5b1 ISSUE: Public Information was inconsistent on the second day of exercise play. The talking points for the Director of the Department of Health for the press conference that was to take place at 1400 stated that ERPA 3 remained evacuated, and also that those in ERPA 3 can return to their homes. Also, Press Release #1 (1600) stated that the general agricultural embargo area had been reduced from the original 50-mile radius, and food in this reduced area should not be harvested or eaten. In a subsequent paragraph, it stated that food should not be consumed within a 50-mile radius of the affected area. Both statements refered to an attached map, which only displayed the reduced embargo area. RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that a thorough review of public information is accomplished prior to its release. CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION: CAPABILITY: PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: **CAPABILITY ELEMENT:** START DATE: AGENCY POC: **ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:**

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE

The State of New York and Oswego County demonstrated key response actions and objectives during the ingestion phase of the exercise on day 2 and 3, based on the simulated deposition of radioactive material resulting from the offsite release as shown in Table 1, Exercise Timeline.

The major exercise events demonstrated included protective action decision making and implementation of actions resulting in protection of the public from direct long term exposure to deposited radioactive material and ingestion of contaminated food and water. To allow the demonstration of these activities, simulated scenario times, information and data were provided to exercise participants. The New York State Office of Emergency Management conducted regularly scheduled conference calls with the ten ingestion pathway counties to coordinate these activities.

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2011-06-21, 22, 23 SITE: James A. FitzPatrick, NY

•			
Emergency@lassification/l/evelfor	Time Utility Declared	NWSEGG T	OSWE FOR
Unusual Event	0745	0752	0758
Alert	0818	0832	0835
Site Area Emergency	1019	1026	1031
General Emergency	1156	1206	1203
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1237	1255	1237
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	1430	1430	1430

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2011-06-22, SITE: James A. FitzPatrick, NY

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
New York State Emergency Operations Center	John Arszulowicz Richard Echavarria Rebecca Fontenot *Kevin Reed	FEMA HQ FEMA RIX FEMA HQ FEMA RII
New York State Accident Assessment	Jill Leatherman	ICFI
New York State - Sampling Team A	Michael DeBonis	USEPA
New York State - Sampling Team B	Katherine Nishihara	FEMA RIX
New York State Department of Health Laboratory	John Wills	ICFI
New York State - Sampling Team C	Ronald Biernacki	ICFI
Oswego County Emergency Operations Center	*William Cullen Laura Forrest Alberto Sifuentes	FEMA R II FEMA RII FEMA RIX
Oswego County Accident Assessment	Michael Howe	FEMA HQ
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Meaning
CRS	County Radiological Specialist
DCRS	Deputy County Radiation Specialist
DPC	Disaster Preparedness Commission
DRD	Direct Reading Dosimeter
EAL	Emergency Action List
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
ED	Emergency Director
EDAMS	Emergency Dose Assessment Modeling System
EMD	Emergency Management Director
ЕМО	Emergency Management Office
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERPA	Emergency Response Planning Area
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FTC	Field Team Coordinator
GE	General Emergency
ICS	Incident Command System
JAFNPP	James A Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant
ЛС	Joint Information Center
MAC	Multi Agency Coordination
NFO	Nuclear Facility Operator
NMP EAS WSYR	Nine Mile Point Emergency Alert System WSYR Radio
NMP/F EOF	Nine Mile Point / FitzPatrick Emergency Operation Facility
NMP/F JIC	Nine Mile Point / FitzPatrick Joint Information Center
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NWS	National Weather Service
NYS	New York State
NYSAA	New York State Accident Assessment

NYSEOC	New York State Emergency Operations Center
NYSPIO	New York State Public Information Officer
OC	Oswego County
<u>OCEMO</u>	Oswego County Emergency Management Office
OCEOC	Oswego County Emergency Operations Center
OCO	Ontario County Opportunities
<u>OCREPP</u>	Oswego County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan
<u>OCWP</u>	Oswego County Warning Point
OISWC MST OFDA	Oswego County Medical Services Transport Oswego Fire Department Ambulance
OSWC AA	Oswego County Accident Assessment
OSWC EOC	Oswego County Emergency Operations Center
OSWC FMT B	Oswego County Field Monitoring Team B
OSWC FMTA	Oswego County Field Monitoring Team A
OSWC HI	Oswego County Hearing Impaired
OSWC MI	Oswego County Mobility Impaired
OSWC MSH OH	Oswego County Medical Services Hospital - Oswego Hospital
OSWC SBC MAACS	Oswego County School Bus Company Mexico Academy and Central School
OSWC SI BOCES	Oswego County School Interview Board of Continuing Educational Services
OSWC SI CERES	Oswego County School Interview Charles E. Riley Elementary School
OSWC SI OMS	Oswego County School Interview Oswego Middle School
OSWC SPBC AE	Oswego County Special Population Bus Company A&E Transport
OSWC SPBC OT	Oswego County Special Population Bus Company Opportunities Transportation
OSWC TCP OCPD	Oswego County Traffic Control Point Oswego County Police Department
OSWC TCP OCS	Oswego County Traffic Control Point Oswego County Sheriff
OSWC WP	Oswego County Warning Point
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PI	Public Information
PIO	Public Information Officer
PMC	Personnel Monitoring Center
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
<u>RA</u> CES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service

UnclassifiedRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)


After Action Report/Improvement Plan

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REA	Radiation Emergency Area	
RECS _	Radiological Emergency Communications System	
REP _	Radiological Emergency Preparedness	
SAE	Site Area Emergency	
SEOC _	State Emergency Operations Center	
SGTS	Standby Gas Treatment System	
SRPD	Self Reading Pocket Dosimeters	
TACP	Traffic Access Control Point	
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent	

APPENDIX E: EXERCISE PLAN

OFFSITE EXTENT-OF-PLAY FOR THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE June 21-23, 2011



OFFSITE EXTENT-OF-PLAY FOR THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE June 21-23, 2011

OFFSITE EXTENT-OF-PLAY FOR THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE June 21-23, 2011

EXTENT-OF-PLAY GROUND RULES

- REAL LIFE EMERGENCIES TAKE PRIORITY OVER EXERCISE PLAY.
- The Scenario Development Team will develop the messages. All messages will
 be submitted to FEMA for review. The State Controller will inject the message to
 the County Emergency Management Director or designee for response actions
 based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual
 emergency.
- Messages for Public Inquiry at the JIC will be developed by the Scenario
 Development Team. Public Inquiry messages will be injected at the JIC by a
 control cell to enable the public inquiry function to identify trends and false
 rumors.
- The State Controller will inject radiological data for any radiological field activities.
- According to REP Program Strategic Review Initiative 1.5, "During tabletop exercises, drills and other demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence from an integrated exercise, if FEMA and the offsite response organizations (ORO) agree, the FEMA Evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate correction of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized only if it would not be disruptive and interrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation Areas." This initiative is not applicable to EOC/JIC/EOF demonstrations during the June 21, 2011 exercise.
- There will be no play beyond 50 miles.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.a - Mobilization

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

WARNING POINTS (NYS and Oswego County)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The latest revised call lists will be provided at the Federal/State evaluators briefing session the day before the exercise, if requested by FEMA. The lists will contain home and business telephone numbers and it is requested that these lists remain confidential.
- There will be no messages introduced at the Warning Points.

EOCs (NYS and Oswego County)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

 The State Liaison will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the County EOC no sooner than 30 minutes after the decision is made to mobilize. The Licensee Technical Liaison assigned to the State EOC will be pre-positioned and arrive at the State EOC no sooner than 30 minutes after the notification to mobilize.

EOF

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

• State liaisons will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the EOF no sooner than 30 minutes after the decision is made to mobilize.

<u>JIC</u>

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

• State JIC Staff will be pre-positioned and arrive at the JIC no sooner than 30 minutes after the decision is made to mobilize.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.b - Facilities

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H.3)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

• No Evaluation Needed

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a., b.)

- The State Controller will inject messages to the County Emergency Management Director or designee.
- All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

A State Controller will inject a message to the County Emergency
Management Director to initiate the demonstration of backup systems
at/or to communicate from Oswego County EOC to the EOF, and JIC.
The Dose Assessment Lead will receive the inject for Field Monitoring
Team back up communication demonstration.

Backup communications:

- RACES -- EOF to EOC
- RACES -- EOC to JIC
- County Multi Agency Radio EOC to Field Monitoring Teams
- UHF Frequency Radios EOC to Field Monitoring Teams

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

This will be demonstrated out of sequence (Day 1)

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.a – Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e, f; K.4)

- A State Controller will inject a message to the County Radiological Specialist and to each Field Monitoring Team to discuss what actions would be taken should a field dose rate exceed the turn-back value. This will be a discussion only activity.
- A State Controller will inject a message to the County Radiological Specialist and to each Field Monitoring Team to discuss what actions would be taken should a field team member reach an exposure that would require call back to the EOC. This will be a discussion only activity.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

 All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

 All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

Extent-of-Play Agreement for the following:

- TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION
- NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED
- NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS
- SCHOOLS
- SPECIAL FACILITIES
- All above activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.d. –Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.11).

- All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
- The A-Team will participate on Day 2/3 of the Exercise

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, I.10; J.9; M.1)

- All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency
- The A-Team will participate on Day 2/3 of the Exercise

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

 All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10. e)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

• All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).

SPECIAL FACILITIES

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the special facilities (telephone call). Initial contacts will be actual and follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to special facilities, including simulated ones, will be logged at the County EOC.
- There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles to the special facilities.

EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION

- Bus companies will be interviewed in accordance with the offsite extent of play activities schedule.
- Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.
- During the June 21, 2011 exercise, there will be initial contact with the transportation providers (telephone call) by the Transportation Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to the transportation provider will be logged at the County EOC.
- There will be <u>no</u> actual dispatch of vehicles during the exercise.

NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- The hearing impaired list will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The list will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator. The procedures for notification will also be discussed at the County EOC.
- There will be <u>no</u> actual notification of hearing impaired individuals during the exercise.
- A State Controller will inject a message to the 911 (1) Center to initiate a test of the TDD system which will cause a test message to be sent to the 911 (2) Center (OCEOC).

EVACUATION OF NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

- The list of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The lists will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator.
- There will be <u>no</u> actual dispatch of vehicles for transport of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals.
- During the exercise, there will be <u>no</u> actual contact of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired individuals identified on the list; however, the discussion should include how the notification would be made.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).

EVACUATION OF SCHOOL POPULATIONS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- Bus companies will be interviewed in accordance with the offsite extentof-play activities schedule.
- Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 10% of that company's drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.
- During the June 21, 2011 exercise, there will be initial contact with the schools (telephone call) by the School Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and follow-up calls may be simulated. All calls to the Schools, including simulated ones, will be logged at the County EOC.
- There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles during the exercise.

SCHOOL INTERVIEWS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

 Schools will be interviewed as per the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (TCPs and ACPs)

- During the June 21, 2011 exercise, law enforcement officials will discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs at mutually agreed upon locations (Oswego County Sheriff at EOC and Oswego City P.D.).
- The TCPs/ACPs will be identified by a message provided by the State Controller to the County Emergency Management Director or designee. Actual travel to the TCP/ACP will not be demonstrated.
- Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one officer for interview.
- No equipment (Barriers, Traffic cones, Signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field.
- There will be interviews of two (2) different law enforcement agencies responsible for staffing the designated TCPs/ACPs (Oswego County Sheriff and Oswego City P.D.).
 - County Sherrif interview will occur at EOC
 - Oswego City PD interview will occur at the City Police Department

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k).

IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION

- The County will demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with at least two (2) impediments to evacuation on the day of the exercise.
- The State Controller in the County EOC will hand the messages to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action to test the procedures for the removal of traffic impediments.
- No equipment (Barriers, Traffic cones, Signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field.
- This demonstration will <u>not</u> involve the dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the scene of a simulated impediment on the day of the exercise. All calls concerning traffic impediments will be logged at the County EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

 All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).

- Distribution and communications with protective actions and protective measures with the agri-industries will be simulated, but the contact list will be available for review by the evaluator(s).
- Instructional or informational messages will be developed for news briefings; broadcast of actual message will be simulated. This activity will be coordinated between the impacted area and NYS (Day 2,3).

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.f. – Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

 All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)

- The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.
- Actual contamination control techniques will be demonstrated (with the exception of tyvek suits) and discussed for the first two (2) sample sites.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

• All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I.9).

FIELD MONITORING TEAMS

- The County will dispatch two (2) radiological monitoring teams. Each team will be provided with a State Controller and FEMA evaluator.
- Each team will take at least six (6) ambient radiation measurements and at least two (2) air samples. All teams must take the air samples as though they were in the presence of the plume (even teams that may not be impacted by the plume).
- The use of silver zeolite cartridges will be simulated and charcoal cartridges will be used. However, the silver zeolite cartridges are available in the kit.
- There will be <u>no</u> actual transport of samples to the laboratory. All arrangements up to transport will be demonstrated. EOC staff will be questioned <u>only</u> regarding means of transportation of air samples to a central point and the location of the laboratory. Field teams will demonstrate how to obtain air samples during the exercise and will be questioned <u>only</u> regarding the procedures for the pick-up point of air samples.
- The RO2A and E140N do not have installed check sources. Button sources for the E140N are available for inspection.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, I.8; J.11)

- The State will dispatch 3 teams to collect two samples of each; water, milk, vegetables, leafy vegetation, soil, particulate and air samples. This activity will be out of sequence from the scenario.
- Teams will deliver samples to the NYS DOH mobile lab for screening.
 Mobile lab activities will not be evaluated.
- Sample transfer will demonstrated between one sample team and one NYS Police representative and the Chain of Custody forms should be completed by the collecting team. Discussions on all necessary transport activities will be conducted at the sample transfer location. Actual transport will be simulated.
- The teams will be integrated teams consisting of NYSDOH and NYS Ag + MKTS. Other federal and state agencies may participate as necessary on the teams.
- NYS sampling procedures will be utilized by the integrated teams for FEMA evaluations.
- Virtual teams may be used to supplement data via controller messages.
 This Sample data will be injected to the Lab and/or injected to the Field
 Team Coordinator.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11)

- The State lab performance may be demonstrated out of sequence and independent of other scenario activities (Day 2).
- The lab demonstration will begin with delivery of samples to the loading dock. The delivery will contain two samples of the following: water, milk, vegetables, leafy vegetation, soil, particulate filters and air sample cartridges. Samples must have appropriate paperwork including Chain of Custody forms.
- The NYS lab shall demonstrate communication of the sample results to the State EOC. Data will be provided for the simulated contaminated samples.
- No evaluation will occur concerning the NYS DOH mobile lab.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current DHS REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D & NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

- There will be no actual siren sounding, no actual tone alert radio activation, and no broadcasting of EAS messages. The NMP/JAF siren system testing is scheduled for November 18, 2011.
- Airing of EAS messages and Follow-on News Broadcasts, will be simulated with the radio station. The first message will be evaluated to the minimum elements required.
- Contact with the radio station for subsequent EAS messages will occur.
- Regular programming responsibilities of the radio station may preclude participation at the time of the issuance of the simulated EAS message.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.2: RESERVED

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c).

- There are no exception areas that require supplementary alert and notification.
- During the June 21, 2011 exercise, one (1) simulated siren failure will be discussed at the County EOC. The State Controller will inject a message regarding this siren failure to the County Emergency Management director or designee. The action to test the back-up alert and notification will be discussion only and will be based on the County's plans and procedures.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c).

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

- All activities will be based on the State/County's plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
- Conduct at least 2 actual briefings as selected by the Federal Evaluators. All briefings will be prepared/developed up to the point of performance of the actual briefing (Day 1 Only).
- Day 2/3 will be conducted from the NYS EOC and will include select NYS representatives.

PUBLIC INQUIRY

- The public inquiry function at the JIC will be staffed by at least three operators with one supervisor (2 licensee and 1 county).
- Inject messages will indicate false or misleading information to enable the public inquiry function to identify a minimum of 2 trends or false rumors (Day 1 Only).

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Not Demonstrated

• EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b).

Extent-of-Play Agreement

Not Demonstrated

• EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Not Demonstrated

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

- The transportation and facility component of this medical drill will be demonstrated in accordance with the offsite extent-of-play agreement schedule.
- The drill will involve the transport of a patient from the Nine Mile Point site to Oswego Hospital for treatment. This component was/will be evaluated on October 21, 2011.
- The use of flashing lights and sirens for exercise play is <u>not</u> required.

James A. FitzPatrick

OFFSITE EXTENT-OF-PLAY FOR THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE June 21-23, 2011

OFFSITE EXTENT-OF-PLAY ACTIVITIES SCHEDULE

RECEPTION CENTER	DATE	TIME

Completed

CONGREGATE CARE

Completed

EMERGENCY WORKER PMC

Completed

SPECIAL POPULATION BUS COMPANY INTERVIEWS

Oswego County Opportunities, Inc. Transportation Week of 5/2/11 A+ E Transport Week of 5/2/11

SCHOOL BUS COMPANY INTERVIEWS

Mexico School District Week of 5/2/11

SCHOOL INTERVIEWS

<u>District</u> <u>School</u>

1) Oswego Riley Elementary Week of 5/2/11 2) Oswego Oswego Middle School Week of 5/2/11 3) BOCES BOCES Week of 5/2/11

MEDICAL MS-1 DRILLS (Out of Sequence)

Transportation Component – Oswego City Fire 10/21/11 Facility Component – Oswego 10/21/11

FULL-SYSTEM SIREN AND EAS TESTS 11/18/11

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

James A. FitzPatrick

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