



FEMA

AUG 22 2011

NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

To Whom It May Concern:

Enclosed is one copy of the Final After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the May 10, 2011, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The State of Ohio, Ottawa and Lucas Counties, and the Utility owner/operator, FirstEnergy Corporation, participated in this exercise.

No Deficiencies were identified during this exercise for the State of Ohio, Ottawa or Lucas Counties. No Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified during this exercise for the State of Ohio.

Two ARCAs were identified for Ottawa County and one ARCA was identified for Lucas County during this exercise.

No Planning Issues were identified for Ottawa or Lucas Counties during this exercise. One Planning Issue was identified for the State of Ohio.

The first ARCA identified for Ottawa County was against Criterion 3.b.1 - Implementation of KI Decision, whereby the KI tablets with an expired expiration date of May 2007 were not removed from the Ohio Department of Transportation Oak Harbor Office when the new KI, with a current expiration date of February 2014, was delivered. The second ARCA identified for Ottawa County was against Criterion 6.a.1 - Monitoring/Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees, whereby, the emergency workers did not understand how to interpret the Ludlum Model 3 Survey Meter readings based on the range selected. Both criteria were successfully re-demonstrated.

The ARCA identified for Lucas County was against Criterion 6.d.1 - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals, whereby the Emergency Medical Services crew failed to properly monitor a potentially contaminated patient and failed to control potentially contaminated equipment. This ARCA was successfully re-demonstrated.

AX45
NRC

Document Control Desk

Page #2

The Planning Issue for the State of Ohio was identified against Criterion 5.a.1 – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, whereby the initial message used for alerting and notifying boaters on Lake Erie within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone did not specify the governmental organization or official with authority for providing the message as is required by NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants.”

A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Section 3.3 of this report under Criteria Evaluation Summaries.

Based on the results of the May 10, 2011, exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Ohio and the affected local jurisdictions, site-specific to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

Therefore, the Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Ohio site-specific to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, granted on June 15, 1987, remains in effect.

Copies of this Report were transmitted to the DHS/FEMA National Office, NRC Region III and the State of Ohio.

If you should have any questions, please contact William E. King, Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee, DHS/FEMA Region V, at (312) 408-5575.

Sincerely,



Andrew Velasquez III
Regional Administrator

Enclosure (1)



Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - May 10, 2011

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



FEMA

Published August 10, 2011

This page is intentionally blank.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Published August 10, 2011

Contents

Executive Summary	6
Section 1: Exercise Overview	12
1.1 Exercise Details	12
1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership	12
1.3 Participating Organizations	14
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary	17
2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design	17
2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities	17
2.3 Scenario Summary	17
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities	19
3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results	19
3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation	20
3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries	28
3.3.1 Ohio Jurisdictions	28
3.3.1.1 State of Ohio - Initial Notification Point	28
3.3.1.2 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Executive Room	28
3.3.1.3 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Assessment Room	29
3.3.1.4 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Joint Information Center	30
3.3.1.5 State of Ohio - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Joint Information Center	31
3.3.1.6 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Facility	32
3.3.1.7 State of Ohio - Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center - State Analysis	32
3.3.1.8 State of Ohio - Department of Natural Resources - Route Alerting	33

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions	35
3.3.2.1 Ottawa County - Initial Notification Point	35
3.3.2.2 Ottawa County - Emergency Operations Center	35
3.3.2.3 Ottawa County - Joint Information Center - Liaison	36
3.3.2.4 Ottawa County - Ohio Department of Transportation - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	36
3.3.2.5 Ottawa County - Ohio Department of Transportation - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point	37
3.3.2.6 Ottawa County - Oak Harbor Police Department - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	39
3.3.2.7 Ottawa County - Oak Harbor Police Department - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point	40
3.3.2.8 Ottawa County - Port Clinton City School District - Evacuation School	40
3.3.2.9 Ottawa County - Danbury Local Schools - Evacuation School	41
3.3.2.10 Ottawa County - Edgewood Manor Nursing Center - Special Population	41
3.3.2.11 Ottawa County - Allen-Clay Joint Fire District - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	42
3.3.2.12 Ottawa County - Allen-Clay Joint Fire District - Route Alerting and Verification	42
3.3.2.13 Ottawa County - Erie Township Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	43
3.3.2.14 Ottawa County - Erie Township Fire Department - Backup Route Alerting	43
3.3.2.15 Ottawa County- Erie Twp Fire Department - Route Alerting and Verification	44
3.3.2.16 Ottawa County - Rocky Ridge Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	45
3.3.2.17 Ottawa County - Rocky Ridge Fire Department - Route Alerting and Verification	45
3.3.2.18 Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	46
3.3.2.19 Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination	46

3.3.2.20	Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination of Equipment and Vehicles	47
3.3.2.21	Ottawa County - Perkins High School - Congregate Care Center	47
3.3.2.22	Lucas County - Initial Notification Point	48
3.3.2.23	Lucas County - Emergency Operations Center	48
3.3.2.24	Lucas County - Joint Information Center - Liaison	49
3.3.2.25	Lucas County - Oregon District Transportation - Special Population	49
3.3.2.26	Lucas County - Sheriffs Road Patrol & Dosimetry Coordinator - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	50
3.3.2.27	Lucas County - Sheriffs Road Patrol & Dosimetry Coordinator - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point	50
3.3.2.28	Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Backup Route Alerting and Verification	51
3.3.2.29	Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Medical Service - Transportation	52
3.3.2.30	Lucas County - Mercy St. Charles Hospital - Medical Service - Facility	53
3.3.2.31	Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	54
3.3.3	Support Jurisdictions	55
3.3.3.1	Erie County - Sandusky High School - Reception Center	55
3.3.3.2	Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Monitoring	55
3.3.3.3	Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Decontamination	56
3.3.3.4	Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination of Vehicles and Equipment	56
3.3.3.5	Ottawa County - Briar Middle School - Congregate Care Center	58
	Section 4: Conclusion	59
	Appendix A: Improvement Plan	61
	Appendix B: Exercise Timeline	62

Appendix C: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders	65
Appendix D: Acronyms and Abbreviations	68
Appendix E: Exercise Plan	71
Appendix F: Onsite and Off Site Scenario	117

This page is intentionally blank.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 10, 2011, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise evaluation was conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). The purpose of this exercise was to assess the capabilities of the State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.

The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on May 12, 2009. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on March 31, 1987.

DHS/FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise. In the State of Ohio, the Counties of Ottawa and Lucas participated along with State Government.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork on the part of all participants was evident during this exercise.

This Final After Action Report contains the evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence interviews and activities:

State of Ohio:

- Emergency Notification and Public Information - Ohio Department of Natural Resources

Ottawa County:

- Route Verification/Supplemental Route Alerting and Backup Route Alerting - Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Station #1
- Route Verification/Supplemental Route Alerting and Backup Route Alerting - Rocky Ridge Fire Department
- Route Verification/Supplemental Route Alerting and Backup Route Alerting - Erie Township

Fire Department

- Monitoring/Decontamination of Evacuees and Evacuee Vehicles - Sandusky Fire Department
- Registration of Evacuees - Erie County Job and Family Services
- KI distribution to the Public - Erie County Department of Health
- Monitoring/Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Vehicles and Equipment - Port Clinton Fire Department
- Temporary Care of Evacuees - ARC - Perkins High School
- Temporary Care of Evacuees - ARC - Briar Middle School

Lucas County:

- Route Verification/Supplemental Route Alerting and Backup Route Alerting - Jerusalem Township Fire Department
- Medical MS-1 Services Drill - Transportation - Jerusalem Township Fire Department
- MS-1 Services Drill - Hospital - Mercy St. Charles Hospital

Except where noted in this report, the State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of and adequately implemented their emergency response plans and procedures.

No Deficiencies were identified during this exercise for the State of Ohio, Ottawa or Lucas Counties.

No ARCAs were identified during this exercise for the State of Ohio.

One Planning Issue was identified for the State of Ohio, and one Planning Issue from a previous exercise for the State of Ohio was resolved. No Planning Issues were identified for Ottawa or Lucas Counties.

Two ARCAs were identified for Ottawa County and one ARCA was identified for Lucas County during this exercise.

The first ARCA identified for Ottawa County was against Criterion 3.b.1 - Implementation of KI Decision, whereby the KI tablets with an expired expiration date of May 2007 were not removed from the ODOT Oak Harbor Office when the new KI, with a current expiration date of February 2014, was delivered. The second ARCA identified for Ottawa County was against Criterion 6.a.1 - Monitoring/Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of

Evacuees, whereby, the emergency workers did not understand how to interpret the Ludlum Model 3 Survey Meter readings based on the range selected. Both criteria were successfully re-demonstrated.

The ARCA identified for Lucas County was against Criterion 6.d.1 - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals, whereby the Emergency Medical Services crew failed to properly monitor a potentially contaminated patient and failed to control potentially contaminated equipment. This ARCA was successfully re-demonstrated.

The Planning Issue for the State of Ohio was identified against Criterion 5.a.1 – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, whereby the initial message used for alerting and notifying boaters on Lake Erie within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone did not specify the governmental organization or official with authority for providing the message, as is required by NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants.”

The Planning Issue from the 2010 Perry REP exercise was identified against Criterion 2.b.1 - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, whereby the coordination of functions and timely sharing of information by the Dose Assessment staff in the Lake County Assessment Room and the Field Monitoring Team Coordinators for the State and Lake County were not documented in procedures. This issue was resolved in Section 2.3.g. of the March 25, 2011, update to the Field Monitoring Team Coordinator Procedure Number 357 of the Ohio Emergency Operations Center Procedures.

INTRODUCTION - EXERCISE BASIS

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. DHS/FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350 "Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness", 351 "Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness" and 352 "Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: Emergency Preparedness Planning" (Commonly referred to as 44 CFR 350 through 352). These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for DHS/FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.

DHS/FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
- Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
 - U.S. Department of Agriculture;
 - U.S. Department of Commerce;
 - U.S. Department of Energy;
 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
 - U.S. Department of the Interior;
 - U.S. Department of Transportation;
 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;
 - U.S. Food and Drug Administration; and
 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the DHS/FEMA Region V Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by DHS/FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station to FEMA Region V by the State of Ohio and involved local jurisdictions occurred on May 24, 1989. Formal approval

of these RERPs was granted by FEMA on March 15, 1991, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted on May 10, 2011, and evaluated by DHS/FEMA to assess the capabilities of State and local offsite emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this After Action Report (AAR)/Improvement Plan (IP) is to present the exercise results and findings based on the performance of the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this AAR/IP are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the DHS/FEMA Region V RAC Chairperson, and approved by the DHS/FEMA Headquarters.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;
- FEMA-REP-14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual," September 1991; and
- FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice" as published in the Federal Register Notice, Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002.

Section 1 of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview", presents information pertaining to the team that planned and coordinated the exercise. This section also provides a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated.

Section 2 of this report, entitled "Exercise Design Summary", contains the purpose and design of the exercise, a description of the plume pathway EPZ and presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise scenario.

Section 3 of this report, entitled "Analysis of Capabilities," presents detailed information on the

demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs (if any) assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments schedule of corrective actions, if applicable, for each identified exercise issue; and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs efforts to resolve them.

Section 4 of this report, entitled "Conclusions" presents the DHS/FEMA summary of overall exercise conduct and results as evaluated against the requirements of 44 CFR 350.

EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EPZ) DESCRIPTION

The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) is located in Northwestern Ohio on the South Shore of Lake Erie, within Ottawa County, near Oak Harbor, which is approximately 25 miles east of Toledo. The facility is located on 954 acres on Lake Erie: 582 acres of the site, consisting of dike marsh areas which are leased to the U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, forming the Navarre unit of the Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge. The area encompassing the EPZ includes part, or all, of the following communities: City of Port Clinton, Carroll, Erie, Bay, Benton, Harris, and Salem Townships in Ottawa County and Jerusalem Township in Lucas County. The 2003 permanent population of the 10-mile EPZ was approximately 20,807. The lakeshore within the EPZ, with the exception of the plant site, is primarily devoted to recreational activities. The area is home to many marinas serving Lake Erie boaters and has significant amounts of land reserved for public use in the form of parks and wildlife refuges. Areas away from the lakefront are primarily agricultural in nature. Commercial centers exist in Oak Harbor and Port Clinton. Industrial activity can be found at the Erie Industrial Park in Erie Township, the Lakewinds Industrial Park in Salem Township, the City of Port Clinton as well as in some smaller facilities throughout the EPZ .

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Type of Exercise

Plume

Exercise Date

May 10, 2011

Program

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type

Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

William E. King

Regional Assistance Committee Chairman

DHS/FEMA

Technical Hazards Branch Chief

536 South Clark Street 6th Floor

Chicago, Illinois, 60605

312-408-5575

william.king@dhs.gov

Stephen Tulley

Exercise Director

DHS/FEMA

Supervisory Team Leader

536 So. Clark Street

Chicago, Illinois, 60605
312-408-4425
stephen.tulley@dhs.gov

Gary Naskrent
Exercise Officer
DHS/FEMA
Supervisory Team Leader
536 South Clark Street 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois, 60605
312-408-4214
gary.naskrent@dhs.gov

Carolyn L. Sturghill
Site Specialist
DHS/FEMA
Technical Hazards Program Specialist
536 South Clark Street 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois, 60605
312-408-5379
carolyn.sturghill@dhs.gov

Carol O'Claire
Duty Officer
Ohio Emergency Management Agency
Radiological Branch Chief
2855 West Dublin-Granville Road
Columbus, Ohio, 43235
614-799-3915
coclaire@dps.state.oh.us

Brian Martin
Radiological Analyst

Ohio Emergency Management Agency
State Resident Radiological Analyst
315 Madison Street
Port Clinton, Ohio, 43452
419-734-6903
bmartin@co.ottawa.oh.us

David Dewitz
Offsite Controller
FirstEnergy Corporation
Senior Nuclear Specialist
5501 N State Route 2
Oak Harbor, Ohio, 43449
419-344-5206
dcdewitz@firstenergycorp.com

Broce W. Cope
Lead Controller
FirstEnergy Corporation
Senior Nuclear Specialist
5501 N. State Route 2
Oak Harbor, Ohio, 43449
419-344-5200
bwcope@firstenergycorp.com

1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station exercise:

State Jurisdictions

Ohio Department of Health
Ohio Department of Natural Resources
Ohio Emergency Management Agency

Ohio Environmental Protection Agency

Ohio State Highway Patrol

Ohio Department of Transportation

Risk Jurisdictions

Ottawa County Radiological Group

Ottawa County Public Information

Ottawa County Jobs and Family Services

Ottawa County Health Department

Ottawa County Fire/EMS

Ottawa County Engineer

Ottawa County Detention Facility

Ottawa County Commissioners

Ottawa County Transportation Agency

Ottawa County Sheriff's Department

Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Station 1

Rocky Ridge Fire Department

Oak Harbor Police Department

Port Clinton Fire Department

Port Clinton School District

Perkins High School

Edgewood Manor Nursing Center

Ottawa County Emergency Management Agency

Erie Township Fire Department

Lucas County Emergency Management Agency

Lucas County Sheriff's Department

Lucas County Engineer

Jerusalem Township Fire Department

Oregon City School District

Oregon City School District Transportation Department

Mercy St. Charles Hospital

Support Jurisdictions

Sandusky Fire Department

Sandusky High School

Erie County Job and Family Services

Erie County Department of Health

Danbury Local School District

Private Organizations

American Red Cross

ARES

FirstEnergy Corporation

WRVF 101.5 FM Radio Station

FENOC

Federal Jurisdictions

United States Coast Guard

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

The DHS/FEMA Region V Office evaluated the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise conducted on May 10, 2011, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the DBNPS. The purpose of this Final After Action Report (AAR)/Improvement Plan (IP) is to present the results and findings on the performance of the Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

Exercise objectives and identified Capabilities/REP Criteria selected for demonstration during the exercise are provided in Appendix F "Exercise Plan". The Exercise Planning Team (EPT) selected objectives that focus on evaluating emergency response procedures, identifying areas for improvement, and fostering collaboration between the various Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and stakeholders. This exercise focused on the following objectives:

- ORO demonstration of effective Emergency Operations Management.
- ORO demonstration of effective Protective Action Decision Making.
- ORO demonstration of effective Protective Action Implementation.
- ORO demonstration of effective Field Measurement and Analysis.
- ORO demonstration of effective Emergency Notification and Public Information.
- ORO demonstration of effective Support Operations and Facilities.

2.3 Scenario Summary

Appendix F "Scenario Details," contains a summary of the Exercise Scenario, a simulated sequence of events that was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway exercise on May 10, 2011.

Results of a technical review of the scenario, submitted by the State of Ohio and FirstEnergy

Corporation on March 12, 2011, indicated that the scenario was adequate to support demonstration of DHS/FEMA requirements, as well as criteria selected by the OROs provided in the State's January 28, 2011, extent-of-play submission. DHS/FEMA Region V accepted this exercise scenario on April 28, 2011.

During the exercise, in addition to information and data provided through the DBNPS onsite scenario, controllers from the State of Ohio provided "inject messages" containing scenario events and/or relevant data to those persons or locations who would normally receive notification of such events. These inject messages were the method used for invoking additional specific response actions by OROs.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the May 10, 2011, REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) surrounding the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on its demonstration of exercise criteria delineated in Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreements used in this exercise are found in Appendix E "Exercise Plan" of this report.

Presented below are definitions of the terms used in this report relative to the criteria demonstration status:

- M – Met: The status of a REP exercise Evaluation Area Criterion indicating that the participating Offsite Response Organization (ORO) demonstrated all demonstration criteria for the Evaluation Area Criterion to the level required in the extent-of-play agreement with no Deficiencies or ARCAs assessed in the current exercise and no unresolved prior ARCAs.
- D – Deficiency: An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.
- A – Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) – An observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety. Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which one or more ARCAs was/were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of any ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
- P – Plan Issue – An observed or identified inadequacy in the ORO's emergency plan or implementing procedures, rather than in the ORO's performance.

-
- N – Not Demonstrated – Exercise criteria that were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason(s) they were not demonstrated.
 - Prior ARCAs - Resolved – Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved and the corrective actions demonstrated, in this exercise.
 - Prior ARCAs - Unresolved – Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next exercise.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 3.1, on the following pages, presents the status of all exercise criteria from Federal Register Notice: Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. The criterion status box is blank if it was not scheduled for demonstration.

This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.

The DHS has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues. This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among DHS Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It also is used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number of Deficiencies, ARCAs, and Plan Issues includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

- Plant Site Identifier – A two-digit number, corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Code.
- Exercise Year – The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
- Criterion Number – An alpha and two-digit number corresponding to the criteria numbers in the six Exercise Evaluation Areas described in Federal Register Notice, Vol. 67, No. 80, dated April 25, 2002, which amends FEMA-REP 14, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual.
- Issue Classification Identifier – (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA, P = Plan Issue).
- Exercise Identification Number – A separate two or three-digit indexing number assigned to

each issue identified in the exercise.

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (4 pages)

DATE: 2011-05-10 SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		OH-INP---	OH-EOC-ER---	OH-EOC-AR---	OH-EOC-JIC---	OH-DBNPS-JIC--	OH-EOF---	OH-EOC OTT--SAnalysis-	OH--ODNR-Route Alert-	OTT-INP---	OTT-EOC---	OTT-JIC--Liaison-
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M						M	M	
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1		M	M		M					M	
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M			M	M	
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1		M	M		M					M	
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1		M	M				M			M	
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1		M	M				M				
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2		M	M							M	
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1		M	M							M	
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1											
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1						M				M	
Implementation of KI decision	3b1						M				M	
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1										M	
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2										M	
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1		M	M							M	
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2										M	
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1											
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2											
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1											
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2											
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3											
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1											
Laboratory operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1		M	M					P		M	
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2											
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3											
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1				M	M					M	M
Support Operations/Facilities												
Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1											
Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1											
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1											
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1											

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued, page 2/4)

DATE: 2011-05-10 SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		OTT-ODOT-TCP/ACP-DCO B	OTT-ODOT-TCP/ACP-	OTT--Oak Harbor PD-TCP/ACP-DCO B	OTT--Oak Harbor PD-TCP/ACP-	OTT-Port Clinton CSD--EV2-	OTT-Danbury LSD--EV2-	OTT-Edgewood Manor NC--SP-	OTT-Allen-Clay JFD-DCO B	OTT--Allen-Clay JFD-RA and Verif-	OTT--Erie Twp FD-DCO B	OTT--Erie Twp FD-BU Route Alerting
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1											
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1											
Communications Equipment	1d1		M		M					M		M
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1											
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1											
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2											
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1							M				
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1											
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1							M				
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2					M	M					
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1		M		M							
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2											
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1											
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2											
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1											
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2											
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3											
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1											
Laboratory operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1									M		
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2											
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3									M		M
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1											
Support Operations/Facilities												
Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1											

Unclassified
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1																			
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1																			
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1																			

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 3/4)

DATE: 2011-05-10 SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		OTT -- Erie Twp FD-RA and Verif.	OTT - Rocky Ridge FD-DCO B	OTT--Rocky Ridge FD-RA and Verif.	ERI-Sandusky HS--RC-	ERI-Sandusky HS--EvM-	ERI-Sandusky HS--EvD-	ERI-Sandusky HS--EvMDVEq-	OTT--Port Clinton FD-DCO B	OTT--Port Clinton FD-EWMD-	OTT--Port Clinton FD-EWMDEqV-	OTT-Perkins HS--CCC-
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1											
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1											
Communications Equipment	1d1		M	M	M	M	M		M			
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1	M	M	M				M		M		
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1											
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1											
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2											
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1											
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1											
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M			
Implementation of KI decision	3b1	M	M	M				M				
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1											
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2											
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1											
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2											
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1											
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2											
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1											
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2											
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3											
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1											
Laboratory operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1	M	M									
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2											
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3		M									
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1											
Support Operations/Facilities												
Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1			M	M	M	M		M			
Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1										M	

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 4/4)

DATE: 2011-05-10 SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		OTT--Briar MS--CCC-	LUC-INP---	LUC-EOC---	LUC-JIC--Liaison-	LUC--Oregon DT--Trans-SP	LUC--Shrif RP&DosiCord-TCP/ACP-DCO B	LUC--Shrif RP&DosiCord-TCP/ACP-	LUC--Jerusalem FD- BU RA and Verif-	LUC--Jerusalem FD-MSIT	LUC--Mercy Hospital-MSIF	LUC--Jerusalem FD- DCO B
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1		M	M								
Facilities	1b1											
Direction and Control	1c1			M								
Communications Equipment	1d1		M	M		M		M	M	M	M	
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1			M		M		M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1			M								
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1											
Decisions for the Plume Phase - PADs	2b2			M								
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1			M								
Rad Assessment and Decision making for Ingestion Pathway	2d1											
Rad Assess/Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1			M		M		M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1			M		M		M	M	M		M
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1			M		M						
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2			M								
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1			M				M				
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2			M								
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1											
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2											
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1											
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2											
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3											
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1											
Laboratory operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1			M					M			
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2											
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3								M			
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1			M	M							
Support Operations/Facilities												

Unclassified
 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Mon/Decon of evacuees and EWs and registration of evacuees	6a1													
Mon/Decon of EW worker equipment	6b1													
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1	M												
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1											M	M	

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Ohio Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 State of Ohio - Initial Notification Point

State of Ohio - Initial Notification Point

During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant (DBNPP) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday, March 1, 2011, the State of Ohio Initial Notification Point (INP) successfully demonstrated the Target Capability to use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. For the DPNPS, the State of Ohio INP is the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) District 6 Dispatch and Communications Center located in the Ohio Emergency Management Agency, a secured facility located in Columbus Ohio. The INP is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. A variety of primary and back-up communications systems were successfully demonstrated during the exercise.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.2 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Executive Room

During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant (DBNPP) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday, March 1, 2011, the Executive Group in the State Emergency Operations Center successfully demonstrated the Target Capability for key personnel with leadership roles to provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible, including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner, sufficient multi-agency coordination to respond to an incident at the DPNPS through timely activation, effective management of the EOC, and staffing to an operational level. The Emergency Management

Agency Executive Director provided effective management, direction and control throughout the exercise, coordinated decision-making with Ottawa and Lucas Counties and ensured that clear and consistent information was communicated to the public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.d.1, 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.3 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Assessment Room

During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday, May 10, 2011, the State of Ohio Emergency Operations Center Assessment Room staff implemented a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of Potassium Iodide (KI), was in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. The Dose Assessment Group Supervisor issued emergency worker dose limits and potassium iodide ingestion recommendations. The Dose Assessment Systems Operator used Controller-injected information from simulated Field Monitoring Team air samples to calculate a dose conversion factor, and the Dose Assessment Group Supervisor provided a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) to the State Executive Group recommending the lowering of Emergency Worker Exposure Limits, and the Radiological Assessment Branch Director issued a recommendation for Field Teams and Emergency Workers in designated Sub-Areas to take KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.d.1, 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 2.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 47-10-2b1-P-01

ISSUE: The Dose Assessment Staff in the State EOC Assessment Room and the Lake County EOC and, the field monitoring team coordinators for the State and Lake County EOC performed well during the Perry exercise exhibiting good teamwork, coordination of functions and timely sharing of information. However, the procedures and standard (suggested) operating guidelines used by these individuals are mostly silent on the coordination methods used during the exercise.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: To ensure continued adequate communication and coordination procedures for the Field Monitoring Team Coordinator and Radiological Systems Operator at Lake County EOC (dose assessment) will be revised to include provisions requiring communications with each other and county personnel. These revisions were completed on March 25, 2011.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.4 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Joint Information Center

During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday May 10, 2011, the State of Ohio Emergency Operations Center (EOC) successfully demonstrated the Target Capability to provide accurate information to the public and news media in a timely manner and with a sense of urgency via the Public Information Officer (PIO) located in the EOC in Columbus, Ohio. The State EOC JIC was primarily tasked with the coordination and preparation of State of Ohio news releases, which included all required information. News briefings were conducted at the offsite JIC rather than the State EOC. State Information Packets on the DBNPS were available and included contact information and information about responsibilities of the State of Ohio, the four ECLs, actions taken after a State of Emergency is declared by the Governor, siren activation and appropriate individual response, sheltering-in-place, evacuation, and the State of Ohio plan for distribution and use of potassium iodide (KI).

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.5 State of Ohio - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Joint Information Center

During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday May 10, 2011, the Joint Information Center (JIC) successfully demonstrated the Target Capability to provide accurate, timely, and useful information to the news media and public through the Joint Information Center (JIC) co-located with the First Energy Nuclear Operating Company corporate offices in Toledo, Ohio. The State of Ohio and Ottawa County and Lucas County Public Information Officers (PIOs) provided emergency public information to the public and media, used effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize personnel and activate the facility in a timely manner. Key personnel with leadership roles provided direction and control and ensured that emergency information and instructions were presented to the public and the news media in a timely manner. The Joint Information Center Media Briefing Team conducted pre-briefings to prepare for each media briefing. Several mock media representatives (Licensee employees) provided a realistic barrage of increasingly penetrating questions, all of which were appropriately handled and answered by the respective agency participants. Rumor control and media monitoring functions were conducted, and calls were logged, trends were identified, and the JIC Manager addressed them as appropriate in the media briefings. Media packets were available to the media in the Media Briefing Area.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.6 State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Facility

During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday May 10, 2011, the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) and the Ohio Emergency Management Agency (EMA) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Liaisons successfully demonstrated the Target Capability to issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with plans and procedures, and read and record dosimetry readings on a periodic basis. This demonstration was conducted at the Emergency Operations Facility located at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Oak Harbor, Ohio. The EOF Liaisons had sufficient potassium iodide (KI) and appropriate KI instructions, and demonstrated appropriate record keeping for the administrative of KI for emergency workers should a decision be made to ingest KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.7 State of Ohio - Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center - State Analysis

During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday, May 10, 2011, the State Radiological Analyst in the Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center successfully demonstrated the Target Capability to support the County's decision-making process for ensuring that relevant factors were considered and appropriate coordination between the State and County occurred, an exposure control system, including the use of potassium iodide (KI), was in place for emergency workers, and that provisions were in place to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. He also ensured that appropriate protective action recommendations were based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, licensee and offsite response organization dose projections, and knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.8 State of Ohio - Department of Natural Resources - Route Alerting

As part of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted on Tuesday May 10, 2011, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) demonstrated the Target Capability to alert and notify the public in a timely manner following the decision to notify the public of an emergency situation. This interview was conducted during an out-of-sequence activity on Wednesday May 11, 2011, at the office of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources in Sandusky, Ohio 44870. Boaters utilizing Lake Erie within the 10-mile EPZ would be alerted and notified at the Alert and subsequent emergency classification levels (ECLs) of an emergency situation at the DBNPS by the land based siren system and by the ODNR marine radio and watercraft.

The ODNR would either restrict or evacuate boat traffic in Lake Erie within the EPZ (Sub-Area 12) in accordance with the ECL or upon specific instructions. Boating Advisories issued by the ODNR would inform boaters that an emergency has been declared at the DBNPS, that the State of Ohio has order restriction or evacuation of boating traffic, that important information can be found at the marina and local telephone books, and to tune to local EAS radio and/or television stations for further information.

The initial message used for alerting and notifying boaters within Lake Erie and within the EPZ did not specify the governmental organization nor the official with authority for providing the message as required by FEMA. A recommendation was made to revise the pre-scripted message in the ODNR checklist to specify the governmental organization and the official with authority for providing the message, as required by FEMA.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

-
- a. MET: None
 - b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
 - c. DEFICIENCY: None
 - d. PLAN ISSUES: 5.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 18-11-5a1-P-03

CRITERION: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.1.,4.,5.,6.,7.)

CONDITION: The initial message used for alerting and notifying boaters within Lake Erie and within the EPZ does not specify the governmental organization nor the official with authority for providing the message as required by FEMA.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Lake Erie Restriction / Clearance Checklist contains pre-scripted messages. The pre-scripted messages do not specify the governmental organization nor the official with authority for providing the message as required by FEMA.

REFERENCE: Federal Register /Vol. 66, No. 177 /Wednesday, September 12, 2001 /Notices, REP Exercise Preparation Guide for Evaluators and Team Leaders, Criteria 5.a.1
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV, D, E.5, 6, 7

EFFECT: Boaters hearing the Boating Advisories would not know who is authorizing the prescribed actions and may not take the message as serious or not as serious which could possibly delay the protective actions.

RECOMMENDATION: Revise the pre-scripted message in the ODNR checklist to specify the governmental organization and the official with authority for providing the message as required by FEMA.

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Ottawa County - Initial Notification Point

The Ottawa County Initial Notification Point (INP), located in the Ottawa County Sheriff's Dispatch Center, demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management. The Ottawa County INP used effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. Dispatchers were familiar with their nuclear incident notification procedures. There are redundant communication systems available at the Dispatch Center, and both primary and backup systems were used effectively during this exercise.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.2 Ottawa County - Emergency Operations Center

The Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management by activities including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The focus always remained on the primary objective, which is protecting the public health and safety of those who live and work in local communities. The Ottawa County Emergency Management Agency Director fully demonstrated the decision-making process involving appropriate factors and necessary coordination when making Protective Action Decisions. Direction and control for the overall response effort of the Ottawa County EOC was successfully demonstrated by the President of the Board of Commissioners and the EMA

Director.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.3 Ottawa County - Joint Information Center - Liaison

The Ottawa County Public Information Officer (PIO) demonstrated the Target Capability of Providing Emergency Public Information through the County Public Information Officers PIO at the Joint Information Center (JIC). Effective procedures were used to alert, notify, and mobilize personnel and activate the facility in a timely manner. Key personnel with leadership roles provided direction and control. Emergency information and instructions were presented to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.4 Ottawa County - Ohio Department of Transportation - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) - Oak Harbor Garage demonstrated the Target Capability of conducting Dosimetry Briefings and ensured equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies were sufficient to support management of

radiological exposure to emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.5 Ottawa County - Ohio Department of Transportation - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point

The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) - Oak Harbor Garage demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. During the interview, ODOT demonstrated knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of the appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communication equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals. This included the provision of dosimetry and the ability to manage emergency worker radiological exposure including the decision to implement KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 3.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 18-11-3b1-A-01

CRITERION: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the admin of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E.7., J.10.e.f.)

CONDITION: THE OHIO PLAN FOR RESPONSE TO RADIATION EMERGENCIES AT COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, Page II-O-177, Part J - Protective Response, Section 3 – Methods of Accomplishment, Sub-section 3.3.1-5 states that the KI for emergency workers, other than responding ONG units, shall be pre-distributed by the Resident Radiological Analyst as part of a dosimetry packet that is in place for each worker at each agency's main office or staging area. The ODH-BRP is responsible for ensuring the analyst is provided replacement KI prior to the expiration date.

During the Dosimetry Coordinator (DC) Briefing at the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) Oak Harbor Garage, the evaluator observed the DC distributing KI to the Emergency Worker (EW). The KI was presented in individually sealed foil containers (130mg each), and were kept in a zip-lock type plastic bag along with a KI information pamphlet. The KI was manufactured by IOSAT and displayed an expiration date of 5-2007. The evaluator asked the controller if there was a letter extending the shelf life. The controller investigated and found another group of KI tablets in the dosimetry box, displaying an expiration date of Feb-2014. The KI tablets were not intermixed, one group contained the older expiration date and a separate group contained the newer expiration date. The controller took control of the older KI tablets and stated that he would deliver them to the Ottawa County EOC for disposition. He handed the DC the newer batch of KI tablets and the interview continued.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The expired (exp. 5-2007) KI tablets were not removed from the ODOT Oak Harbor Office when the new (exp. Feb-2014) KI was delivered.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654

II. Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria

J. Protective Response

J.10 The organization's plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway shall include:

J.10.e Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly for emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the plume exposure EPZ whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult, including quantities,

storage, and means of distribution.

REP PROGRAM MANUAL (III.B.3.)

Section III. – REP Exercise Guidelines

Sub-section B. – Evaluation Areas

Sub-section 3. – Protective Action Implementation

Sub-element 3.b. – Implementation of KI Decision

EFFECT: In an actual event the DC could issue the expired KI to emergency workers. The emergency workers could ingest the expired KI, which may not adequately saturate their thyroid gland to protect the worker from radioactive iodine.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: KI inventory was reviewed and all outdated KI was removed. KI was redistributed to emergency workers, the new KI was dated 02-2014.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.6 Ottawa County - Oak Harbor Police Department - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point (TACP) Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing demonstrated the Target Capability to provide sufficient equipment, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies to support emergency operations. The Oak Harbor Police Department ensured the officers were issued appropriate dosimetry and adequately managed radiological exposure control in accordance with plans and procedures.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None

- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.7 Ottawa County - Oak Harbor Police Department - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point

Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point (TACP) demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. During the interview, the Oak Harbor Police Department demonstrated knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of the appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communication equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals. This included the provision of dosimetry and the ability to manage emergency worker radiological exposure including the decision to implement KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.8 Ottawa County - Port Clinton City School District - Evacuation School

Ottawa County demonstrated the Target Capability of Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place for school children. The Port Clinton City School District representative described plans and procedures to safely evacuate students from the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Planning Zone and reunite them with their families. The school district demonstrated sufficient personnel, current contact information, worker dosimetry, and communications capabilities to notify families and guardians regarding how to reunite with evacuated students.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.9 Ottawa County - Danbury Local Schools - Evacuation School

Ottawa County demonstrated the Target Capability of Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place for school children. The Danbury Local Schools, representative described plans and procedures to safely evacuate students from the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Planning Zone and reunite them with their families. Danbury Local Schools demonstrated sufficient personnel, current contact information, worker dosimetry, and communications capabilities to notify families and guardians regarding how to reunite with evacuated students.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.10 Ottawa County - Edgewood Manor Nursing Center - Special Population

Ottawa County demonstrated the Target Capability to implement appropriate protective actions for special populations. The Edgewood Manor Nursing Center demonstrated the capability to provide emergency information, instructions, and transportation assistance to individuals with special needs by utilizing their plans and procedures.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.11 Ottawa County - Allen-Clay Joint Fire District - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

Ottawa County demonstrated at the Allen-Clay Joint Fire District, the Target Capability of conducting Dosimetry Briefings and ensured equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies were sufficient to support management of radiological exposure to emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.12 Ottawa County - Allen-Clay Joint Fire District - Route Alerting and Verification

The Ottawa County Allen-Clay Joint Fire District demonstrated the Target Capability associated with ensuring all persons within the Erie Township locality were alerted and notified of the ongoing emergency at the utility. the Route Verification/Backup Route Alerting Team Leader was prepared with route verification assignments for three teams in Sub-Areas 6 and 7, sections 601, 701, 702. Following the briefings, three teams of two fire personnel each were given a Route Verification Notebook with the specific map for their Sub-Area section, a special needs list of known individuals in that section, hearing impaired cards with information in English and Spanish, green emergency message cards in English and Spanish, and a transportation needs worksheet to be completed by one of the team members for anyone requesting transportation

assistance.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.13 Ottawa County - Erie Township Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

Ottawa County demonstrated at the Erie Township Fire Department, the Target Capability of conducting Dosimetry Briefings and ensured equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies were sufficient to support management of radiological exposure to emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.14 Ottawa County - Erie Township Fire Department - Backup Route Alerting

The Ottawa County Erie Township Fire Department successfully demonstrated the Target Capability to provide alert and notification of the public should primary alert and notification systems fail. The activities associated with ensuring that all persons within the Erie Township Subarea 7, section 701 siren coverage areas were alerted and notified, in a timely manner of the emergency declared at DBNPS.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.15 Ottawa County- Erie Twp Fire Department - Route Alerting and Verification

The Ottawa County Erie Township Fire Department demonstrated the Target Capability associated with ensuring all persons within the Erie Township locality were alerted and notified of the ongoing emergency at the utility. The Route Verification/Backup Route Alerting Team Leader was prepared with route verification assignments for three teams in Sub-Areas 6 and 7, sections 601, 701, 702. Following the briefings, three teams of two fire personnel each were given a Route Verification Notebook with the specific map for their Sub-Area section, a special needs list of known individuals in that section, hearing impaired cards with information in English and Spanish, green emergency message cards in English and Spanish, and a transportation needs worksheet to be completed by one of the team members for anyone requesting transportation assistance.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.16 Ottawa County - Rocky Ridge Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

Ottawa County Traffic and Access Control Point (TACP) Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control Posts (TACPs) within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. During the interview, the Rocky Ridge Fire Department demonstrated knowledge of the provisions of the Emergency Operations Plan related to the establishment of TACPs in addition to the use of the appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communication equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals. This included the provision of dosimetry and the ability to manage emergency worker radiological exposure including the decision to implement KI.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.17 Ottawa County - Rocky Ridge Fire Department - Route Alerting and Verification

The Ottawa County Rocky Ridge Fire Department successfully demonstrated the Target Capability associated with ensuring all persons within the Rocky Ridge locality were alerted and notified of the ongoing emergency at the utility the procedures, knowledge, and ability to provide route verification for prompt alert and notification of the public to an emergency situation.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.18 Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

Ottawa County demonstrated at the Port Clinton Fire Department, the Target Capability of conducting Dosimetry Briefings and ensured equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies were sufficient to support management of radiological exposure to emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.19 Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination

Ottawa County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability for monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers. The Port Clinton Fire Department had the capability to establish adequate facilities, resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.20 Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination of Equipment and Vehicles

Ottawa County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability for Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination of Equipment and Vehicles. The Port Clinton Fire Department had adequate procedures and resources for accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 6.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.21 Ottawa County - Perkins High School - Congregate Care Center

Ottawa County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability of Congregate Care Center (CCC) at the Perkins High School. The Fireland Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC) successfully demonstrated that they had the resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines, and had procedures to assure that evacuees had been monitored for contamination, and had been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering the congregate care facility.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 6.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.22 Lucas County - Initial Notification Point

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management at the Initial Warning Point, located in the Lucas County Sheriff's Office, Dispatch Center. The dispatchers demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel in a timely manner. The dispatchers were familiar with the nuclear incident notification procedures, demonstrated the redundant communication systems available at the Dispatch Center, and used both primary and backup systems effectively during this exercise.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.23 Lucas County - Emergency Operations Center

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Operations Center Management including the use of effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. The Lucas County EOC demonstrated sufficient multi-agency coordination to respond to an incident at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station through timely activation and efficient operations throughout the exercise. The EOC was managed efficiently and effectively, completed a full notification and activation, and was staffed to an operational level. The Emergency Management Agency Director and County Administrator provided effective management, direction and control throughout the exercise. The Lucas County EOC coordinated decision-making with the State EOC, JIC and other jurisdictions and ensured that a clear and consistent message was communicated to the public.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

-
- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
 - b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
 - c. DEFICIENCY: None
 - d. PLAN ISSUES: None
 - e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
 - f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
 - g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.24 Lucas County - Joint Information Center - Liaison

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Providing Emergency Public Information through the County Public Information Officer (PIO) at the Joint Information Center (JIC). Lucas County PIO coordinated with counterparts in the JIC and County EOC to provide timely, accurate and useful information to the public. The Lucas County PIO produced and coordinated the release of nine separate news releases.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.25 Lucas County - Oregon District Transportation - Special Population

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place for school children at the Oregon City School Transportation Department. Oregon City School District and Transportation Department representatives described plans and procedures to safely evacuate students from the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone and reunite them with their families. The school district demonstrated sufficient personnel, current contact information, emergency worker dosimetry, and communications capabilities to notify families and guardians regarding how to reunite with evacuated students.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.26 Lucas County - Sheriffs Road Patrol & Dosimetry Coordinator - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution through the establishment of a Dosimetry Distribution Point at Lucas County Sheriff's Office Substation in Curtice, Ohio. The Dosimetry Coordinator demonstrated the proper use of direct-reading and thermoluminescent dosimeters, calibration equipment and communications systems. The Dosimetry Coordinator conducted a thorough briefing regarding the use of and record keeping requirements for personal dosimetry kits including the proper procedures and documentation of the use of potassium iodide.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.27 Lucas County - Sheriffs Road Patrol & Dosimetry Coordinator - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through interview which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to implement Traffic and Access Control

Points (TACPs) within the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. During the interview, the Deputy demonstrated thorough knowledge of the provisions of the Lucas County Radiological Emergency Response Plan related to the establishment of TCPs in addition to the use of appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communications equipment including portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.28 Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Backup Route Alerting and Verification

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Public Safety and Security Response through out-of-sequence activity which included the distribution of dosimetry, emergency worker radiological exposure management, and the capability to perform Backup Route Alerting and Verification within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone. Jerusalem Township Fire Department personnel demonstrated thorough knowledge of the provisions of the Lucas County Radiological Emergency Response Plan related to the execution of Backup Route Alerting and Verification in addition to the use of the appropriate dosimetry procedures, documentation and communication equipment including a vehicle mounted public address system, portable radios, cell phones and mobile data terminals.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.1, 5.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

**3.3.2.29 Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Medical Service -
Transportation**

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment through out-of-sequence event at the Jerusalem Township Fire Department. Demonstrated activities included communications systems, maps, monitoring instruments, dosimetry and potassium iodide sufficient to support emergency operations. The Jerusalem Township Fire Department personnel demonstrated proper use of personal dosimetry to monitor and control radiation exposure and knew to report to their supervisor if their dosimeters indicated reaching either the administrative and/or maximum exposure limits as prescribed in the Lucas County plans and procedures. Jerusalem Township Fire Department personnel demonstrated proper patient handling, care, and transportation of a potentially contaminated medical patient and medical care took priority over monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.d.1.

ISSUE NO.: 18-11-6d1-A-04

CRITERION: Facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2., H.10., K.5.a.b., L.1., 4)

CONDITION: Inadequate contamination control: Radiation monitoring of the patient was observed to be improperly performed. Proper frisking distances with the probe were not uniformly maintained, and frisking was performed too rapidly. While caring for the contaminated injured patient in the Hot Zone, the EMT improperly discarded a backboard by pushing the potentially contaminated backboard out of the Hot Zone and into a clean area.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Inadequate training and lack of familiarity with proper frisking

techniques. Inadequate explanation or misunderstanding of the exercise scenario, whereby the demonstration of Hot Zone and Cold Zone procedures was conducted in an area that the EMTs routinely train in as a Hot Zone only.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, II.O.4.d and II.O.5.

EFFECT: Inadequate frisking could miss areas of contamination on the patient's body resulting in the inaccurate detection of radioactive contamination. The potentially contaminated backboard that was pushed out of the Hot Zone could have spread contamination into a clean area.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The frisking was re-demonstrated utilizing proper frisking techniques. Proper Hot Zone and Cold Zone contamination control procedures were successfully redemonstrated.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.30 Lucas County - Mercy St. Charles Hospital - Medical Service - Facility

The Mercy St. Charles Hospital demonstrated the appropriate facilities, equipment, supplies and trained personnel to provide radiological monitoring, urgent medical care, and decontamination to contaminated individuals injured during an incident at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). Mercy St. Charles Hospital demonstrated redundant communications systems and effective patient management between the Emergency Department and ambulances. The Radiation Emergency Area (REA) was fully stocked with all appropriate personal protective equipment and dosimetry, radiological survey equipment and contamination control supplies. The Radiation Protection Technicians issued appropriate dosimetry and managed radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. The Emergency Department and REA staff demonstrated a thorough understanding of radiological contamination control procedures and that life-threatening emergencies always have priority over radioactive contamination concerns.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.d.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.31 Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing

Lucas County demonstrated the Target Capability of Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution through the establishment of a Dosimetry Distribution Point at the Jerusalem Township Fire Department. The Fire Department Radiological Coordinator demonstrated the proper use of direct-reading and thermoluminescent dosimeters, calibration equipment and communications systems. The Radiological Coordinator conducted a thorough briefing regarding the use of and record keeping requirements for personal dosimetry kits and the proper procedures and documentation related to the use of potassium iodide.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.3 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Erie County - Sandusky High School - Reception Center

Erie County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability of Reception Center at the Sandusky High School Reception Center: The Sandusky Fire Department (SFD) and the Erie County Department of Job and Family Services (ECJFS) demonstrated that the reception center/emergency worker facility had appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.3.2 Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Monitoring

Erie County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability for monitoring of evacuees. The Sandusky Fire Department successfully demonstrated reception center and worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring and registration of evacuees.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.3.3 Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Decontamination

Erie County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability for decontamination of evacuees. The Sandusky Fire Department successfully demonstrated reception center and worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring and registration of evacuees

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.3.4 Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination of Vehicles and Equipment

Ottawa County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability for monitoring of evacuees. The Sandusky Fire Department successfully demonstrated reception center and worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring and registration for evacuees.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 18-11-6a1-A-02

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: During the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS)

Radiological Preparedness Exercise out-of-sequence demonstration on May 11, 2011, Emergency Workers (EWs) at the Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination Center, located at Sandusky High School, incorrectly read their Ludlum-3 survey meters, which could result in contaminated vehicles being released without proper decontamination. The EWs incorrectly read the background readings on their Ludlum-3 survey meters during initial monitoring as 2,000 counts per minute (cpm) rather than 20 cpm as indicated on the survey meter. In addition, the Controller presented a photograph of a Ludlum-3 survey meter with a reading of 1,600 cpm during initial monitoring, but the EWs were unable to determine the proper reading.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The EWs did not understand how to interpret the Ludlum-3 survey meter dial readings based on the range setting. This may be due to inadequate training or orientation during the DCO briefing. The DCO briefing included instructions to set the range switch to 0.1x, but did not include detailed instructions on how to interpret the meter dial readings based on the range setting.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, K.5.b

EFFECT: The incorrect reading of the survey meter had the potential to allow contaminated vehicles to be declared clean and be released, spreading contamination to persons in contact with the vehicle after its release. The incorrect high background reading of 2,000 cpm would allow the EWs to release vehicles that have greater than 300 cpm above the actual background of 20 cpm to be released. Vehicles with contamination between 320 cpm and 2,020 cpm would be cleared for release instead of being sent to decontamination.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The Controller provided instructions to the EWs on the Ludlum-3 survey meter settings and the proper way to interpret the readings. The Controller showed them a photograph of a Ludlum-3 survey meter and the EWs successfully determined the scale and correctly determined the reading that was being presented.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None

-
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
 - f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
 - g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.3.5 Ottawa County - Briar Middle School - Congregate Care Center

Ottawa County successfully demonstrated the Target Capability of Congregate Care Center (CCC) at the Briar Middle School. The Fireland Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC) successfully demonstrated that they had the resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines, and had procedures to assure that evacuees had been monitored for contamination, and had been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering the congregate care facility.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 6.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

No Deficiencies were identified during this exercise for the State of Ohio, Ottawa or Lucas Counties.

No ARCAs were identified during this exercise for the State of Ohio.

One Planning Issue was identified for the State of Ohio, and one Planning Issue from a previous exercise for the State of Ohio was resolved. No Planning Issues were identified for Ottawa or Lucas Counties.

Two ARCAs were identified for Ottawa County and one ARCA was identified for Lucas County during this exercise.

The first ARCA identified for Ottawa County was against Criterion 3.b.1 - Implementation of KI Decision, whereby the KI tablets with an expired expiration date of May 2007 were not removed from the ODOT Oak Harbor Office when the new KI, with a current expiration date of February 2014, was delivered. The second ARCA identified for Ottawa County was against Criterion 6.a.1 - Monitoring/Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees, whereby, the emergency workers did not understand how to interpret the Ludlum Model 3 Survey Meter readings based on the range selected. Both criteria were successfully re-demonstrated.

The ARCA identified for Lucas County was against Criterion 6.d.1 - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals, whereby the Emergency Medical Services crew failed to properly monitor a potentially contaminated patient and failed to control potentially contaminated equipment. This ARCA was successfully re-demonstrated.

The Planning Issue for the State of Ohio was identified against Criterion 5.a.1 – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, whereby the initial message used for alerting and notifying boaters on Lake Erie within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone did not specify the governmental organization or official with authority for providing the message, as is required by NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants.”

The Planning Issue from the 2010 Perry REP exercise was identified against Criterion 2.b.1 - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, whereby the coordination of functions and timely sharing of information by the Dose Assessment staff in the Lake County Assessment Room and the Field Monitoring Team Coordinators for the State and Lake County were not documented in procedures. This issue was resolved in Section 2.3.g. of the March 25, 2011, update to the Field Monitoring Team Coordinator Procedure Number 357 of the Ohio Emergency Operations Center Procedures.

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Issue Number: 18-11-5a1-P-03		Criterion: 5a1
<p>ISSUE: The initial message used for alerting and notifying boaters within Lake Erie and within the EPZ does not specify the governmental organization nor the official with authority for providing the message as required by FEMA.</p>		
<p>RECOMMENDATION: Revise the pre-scripted message in the ODNR checklist to specify the governmental organization and the official with authority for providing the message as required by FEMA.</p>		
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION: The responsible agency and official have been identified and the messages and plan will be revised as needed to reflect this change before the 2012 Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station.</p>		
<p>CAPABILITY: Emergency Public Information and Warning</p>	<p>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: Ohio Emergency Management Agency</p>	
<p>CAPABILITY ELEMENT: Planning</p>	<p>START DATE: 2011-05-11</p>	
<p>AGENCY POC: Nancy Dragani 614-889-7150</p>	<p>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE: 2012-06-19</p>	

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise held on May 10, 2011. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2011-05-10, SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	OH-EOC-ER---	OH-EOC-AR---	OH-DBNPS-JIC--	OTT-EOC---	LUC-EOC---
Unusual Event	NA	NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	0819	NA	0829	0934	0829	0829
Site Area Emergency	1002	1020	1015	1038	1015	1015
General Emergency	1147	1207	1202	1229	1202	1202
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1147	1207	1202	1229	1202	1202
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	1437	NA	1440	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		0930	0933	0926	0902	0915
Declaration of State and Local Emergency		1050	N/A	1050	1041	1021
Exercise Terminated		1440	1440	1447	1438	1438
Early Precautionary AR: Relocate School Children		N/A	1016	1037	1016	1016
Early Precautionary AR: Restrict Boating Traffic		N/A	0945	1037	1031	1016
Early Precautionary AR: Restrict Air Traffic		N/A	1022	1037	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary AR: Restrict Rail Traffic		N/A	1021	1037	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary AR: Close Parks		N/A	0945	1037	1031	1016
Early Precautionary AR: Livestock Advisory		N/A	1016	1055	1032	1032
General Informational Message		1026	N/A	1037	1031	1031
1st Siren Activation (for GI Message)		N/A	N/A	N/A	1038	1038
1st EAS Message (for GI Message)		N/A	N/A	1041	1041	1041
1st Protective Action Recommendation: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 10, 12. EW Turn-back Values: Remain the same inside 10-mile EPZ; Remain at 5R outside 10-mile EPZ.		1210	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1st Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 10, 12. EW Turn-back Values: Remain the same inside 10-mile EPZ; Remain at 5R outside 10-mile EPZ.		1215	N/A	1230	1215	1215
2nd Siren Activation (for 1st PAD)		N/A	N/A	N/A	1220	1220
2nd EAS Message (for 1st PAD)		N/A	N/A	1230	1223	1223
2nd Protective Action Recommendation: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 10, 12. EW Turn-back Values: 5R to 3R; 2R to 1R; 1R to 1R.		1257	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2nd Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 10, 12. EW Turn-back Values: 5R to 3R; 2R to 1R; 1R to 1R.		1309	N/A	N/A	1309	1309
Siren Activation (Not Applicable for EWs)		NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
EAS Message (Not Applicable for EWs)		NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd Protective Action Recommendation: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12. EW Turn-back Values: 5R to 3R; 2R to 1R; 1R to 1R.		1334	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3rd Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Sub-Areas 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12. EW Turn-back Values: 5R to 3R; 2R to 1R; 1R to 1R.		1339	N/A	N/A	1339	1339
3rd Siren Activation (for 3rd PAD)		N/A	N/A	N/A	1345	1345

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline

DATE: 2011-05-10, SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	OH-EOC-ER--	OH-EOC-AR---	OH-DBNPS-JIC--	OTT-EOC----	LUC-EOC----
3rd EAS Message (for 3rd PAD)		N/A	N/A	1357	1348	1348
1st KI Administration Recommendation (EWs, Institutionalized Persons & General Public): Sub-Areas 1, 2, 10, 12.		1210	1205	1216	1215	1215
2nd KI Administration Recommendation (EWs, Institutionalized Persons, & General public): Sub-Areas 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12.		1334	1329	1239	1340	1339

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is a list of the personnel that evaluated the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station REP Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise on May 10, 2011. The list includes the evaluation team leadership and all evaluators. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

DHS/FEMA Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency

ICF ICF International Consulting

Name	Title	Organization
Radiological Assistance Committee, Chairman	William E. King	DHS/FEMA
Exercise Director	Stephen Tulley	DHS/FEMA
Senior Specialist	Gary Naskrent	DHS/FEMA
Site Specialist	Carolyn Sturghill	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - State of Ohio	Carl Bebrich	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - Ottawa County	Ed Diaz	DHS/FEMA
Team Leader - Lucas County	Karl Rabenhorst	DHS/FEMA

DATE: 2011-05-10, SITE: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, OH

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
State of Ohio - Initial Notification Point	Debra Schneck	ICFI
State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Executive Room	Debra Schneck Bruce Swiren	ICFI ICFI
State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Assessment Room	Michael Howe Debra Schneck	FEMA - HQ ICFI
State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Center - Joint Information Center	Debra Schneck	ICFI
State of Ohio - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Joint Information Center	Paul Nied John Simpson	ICFI FEMA R5
State of Ohio - Emergency Operations Facility	Richard Grundstrom	ICFI
State of Ohio - Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center - State Analysis	Carolyn Sturghill	DHS/FEMA
State of Ohio - Department of Natural Resources - Route Alerting	Richard Grundstrom	ICFI
Ottawa County - Initial Notification Point	James King	FEMA R5
Ottawa County - Emergency Operations Center	Kerris Bates James King Roy Smith Carolyn Sturghill	DHS/FEMA FEMA R5 ICFI DHS/FEMA
Ottawa County - Joint Information Center - Liaison	John Simpson	FEMA R5
Ottawa County - Ohio Department of Transportation - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	James Groves	ICF
Ottawa County - Ohio Department of Transportation - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point	James Groves	ICF
Ottawa County - Oak Harbor Police Department - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Kaori Flores	FEMA - HQ
Ottawa County - Oak Harbor Police Department - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point	Kaori Flores	FEMA - HQ
Ottawa County - Port Clinton City School District - Evacuation School	Henry Christiansen	ICFI
Ottawa County - Danbury Local Schools - Evacuation School	Richard McPeak	ICFI
Ottawa County - Edgewood Manor Nursing Center - Special Population	Christopher Bellone	FEMA R5
Ottawa County - Allen-Clay Joint Fire District - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Kerris Bates	DHS/FEMA
Ottawa County - Allen-Clay Joint Fire District - Route Alerting and Verification	Kerris Bates Paul Nied	DHS/FEMA ICFI
Ottawa County - Erie Township Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Meg Swearingen	ICFI
Ottawa County - Erie Township Fire Department - Backup Route Alerting	Christopher Bellone	FEMA R5
Ottawa County - Erie Twp Fire Department - Route Alerting and Verification	Meg Swearingen	ICFI
Ottawa County - Rocky Ridge Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Todd Gemskie	FEMA
Ottawa County - Rocky Ridge Fire Department - Route Alerting and Verification	Todd Gemskie John Simpson	FEMA FEMA R5
Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Henry Christiansen	ICFI
Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination	Henry Christiansen	ICFI

Unclassified
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Ottawa County - Port Clinton Fire Department - Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination of Equipment and Vehicles	Deborah Fulk	FEMA Region 5
Ottawa County - Perkins High School - Congregate Care Center	James Groves	ICF
Lucas County - Initial Notification Point	Deborah Fulk	FEMA Region 5
Lucas County - Emergency Operations Center	Clinton Crackel Deborah Fulk Todd Gemskie William Vocke	FEMA Region 5 FEMA Region 5 FEMA ICFI
Lucas County - Joint Information Center - Liaison	John Simpson	FEMA R5
Lucas County - Oregon District Transportation - Special Population	Meg Swearingen	ICFI
Lucas County - Sheriffs Road Patrol & Dosimetry Coordinator - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Delwyn Kinsley	FEMA
Lucas County - Sheriffs Road Patrol & Dosimetry Coordinator - Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point	Kara Scott	FEMA R5
Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Backup Route Alerting and Verification	James King Kara Scott	FEMA R5 FEMA R5
Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Medical Service - Transportation	Clinton Crackel	FEMA Region 5
Lucas County - Mercy St. Charles Hospital - Medical Service - Facility	Delwyn Kinsley	FEMA
Lucas County - Jerusalem Township Fire Department - Dosimetry Control Officer Briefing	Kara Scott	FEMA R5
Erie County - Sandusky High School - Reception Center	Richard McPeak	ICFI
Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Monitoring	Roy Smith	ICFI
Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Decontamination	Delwyn Kinsley	FEMA
Erie County - Sandusky High School - Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination of Vehicles and Equipment	William Vocke	ICFI
Ottawa County - Briar Middle School - Congregate Care Center	James Groves	ICF
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Meaning
ANI	American Nuclear Insurers
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCA	Area Requiring Corrective Actions
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Services
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch
CCC	Congregate Care Center
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
DBNPS	Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
DC	Dosimetry Coordinator
DCO	Dosimetry Control Officer
DRD	Direct Reading Dosimeter
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECHD	Erie County Health Department
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
ED	Executive Director
EDL	Executive Decision Line
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
EMD	Emergency Management Director
EMR	Equipment Monitoring Record
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ER	Emergency Room
ERDS	Emergency Response Data System
EW	Emergency Workers
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FENOC	First Energy Nuclear Operating Company
FFD	Freemont Fire Department
GE	General Emergency
GIS	Global Information System
HP	Health Physicist
IWP	Initial Warning Point

JFD	Jerusalem Fire Department
JIC	Joint Information Center
JTE	Jerusalem Township Elementary
JTFD	Jerusalem Township Fire Department
LCD	Lucas County Dosimetry
LEADS	Law Enforcement Agencies Data System
MARCS	Multi Agency Radio Communication System
MDT	Mobile Data Terminal
NDS	Nuclear Data System
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRP	National Response Plan
OCHD	Ottawa County Health Department
OCTA	Ottawa County Transit Authority
OEMA	Ohio Emergency Management Agency
OFD	Oregon Fire Department
OHPD	Oak Harbor Police Department
ORO	Offsite Response Organizations
OSHP	Ohio State Highway Patrol
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAG	Protective Action Guides
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PCFD	Port Clinton Fire Department
PIL	Public Information Liaison
PIO	Public Information Officers
PNS	Prompt Notification System
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RA	Resident Analyst
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
REA	Radiological Emergency Area
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
RO	Radiological Officer
RPT	Radiation Protection Technician
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SEG	State Executive Group
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SFD	Sandusky Fire Department
SOG	Standard Operating Guidelines
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SR	State Route

TCP	Traffic Control Posts
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VHF	Very High Frequency

APPENDIX E: EXERCISE PLAN

This Appendix lists the exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise on May 10, 2011, and the offsite extent-of-play agreement accepted by DHS/FEMA Region V on April 28, 2011. The exercise criteria, contained in FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice," as published in the Federal Register Notice/Vol. 67, dated April 25, 2002, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980. Because the exercise criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plants sites, and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the State and accepted by DHS/FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the criteria.

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
PARTIAL PARTICIPATION EXERCISE

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

State of Ohio

MAY 10, 2011

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, at the decision of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 – EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Extent of Play

The Ohio Emergency Management Agency will receive the initial notification via the 24-hour number located in the Ohio State Highway Patrol Dispatch Center. The Ohio Emergency Management Agency will activate appropriate portions of the State Emergency Operations Center. Once the SEOC Assessment Room is activated all dedicated phone communications will be received there. The State will mobilize all the agencies that have responsibilities in the SEOC, primarily the Executive Room, Dose Assessment, State Joint Information Center (JIC); the county EOC's; and the DBNPS JIC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The state representatives assigned to the DBNPS JIC and EOF, and the county EOC's will be pre-positioned within approximately 20 minutes after the declaration of the Alert.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

Extent of Play

The baseline exercise for demonstration of this criterion was conducted in April 2002.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Extent of Play

Direction and control of state activities will be demonstrated at the SEOC. The Executive Director of Ohio EMA will be positioned in the SEOC Executive Room and will coordinate decisions on behalf of the Governor's office. The Ohio Department of Health is responsible for determining the State PAR in the SEOC Assessment Room and will provide periodic briefings to the SEOC Executive Room.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available and operate properly and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communication capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Extent of Play

The primary means of communications between the State EOC and the County EOCs, DBNPS JIC and EOF is by commercial and/or dedicated telephone. Backup communications (radio and/or cellular phones) will be demonstrated.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Extent of Play

The state will demonstrate the use of equipment, maps and displays to support emergency operations. The maps traditionally used in the EOC will be available and used for exercise evaluation purposes.

EVALUATION AREA 2 – PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

Extent of Play

The SEOC Assessment Room staff will consider PAGs and Administrative Limits to develop recommendations, including KI, based on their technical evaluation of the available data. Recommendations will be forwarded to the SEOC Executive group and subsequently to the Ottawa and Lucas County EOC's. County EOC's will disseminate recommendations to their emergency workers. Field monitoring data will be provided to the SEOC Assessment Room via controller injects.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

Extent of Play

The SEOC Assessment Room will evaluate the licensee information and complete independent dose projections based on that information and controller injected (simulated) field-monitoring data. Assessment Room staff will evaluate the data and forward protective action recommendations to the SEOC Executive Room. Approved recommendations will then be forwarded to the Ottawa and Lucas County EOCs via a dedicated conference line established in the Assessment Room.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

Extent of Play

The Governor or his designee will demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations based on technical information from the SEOC Assessment Room. Recommendations concerning the use of KI for the general public and emergency workers and institutionalized are the responsibility of the Ohio Department of Health. They are made in the SEOC Assessment Room in compliance with the ODH KI policy and will accompany the protective action recommendation.

Coordination will take place in the SEOC Executive Room with Ottawa and Lucas Counties to ensure consideration of local needs. After the decision is made, counties will disseminate protective actions to the general public.

At least two (2) Protective Action Decisions will be demonstrated.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

Extent of Play

The recommendation to take KI is developed by the Ohio Department of Health in the SEOC Assessment Room and accompanies the PAR. Upon approval in the SEOC Executive Room, it is then forwarded to Ottawa and Lucas Counties for implementation. **See Ottawa and Lucas counties extent-of-play agreements.**

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

Extent of Play

The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Extent of Play

The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3 – PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Extent of Play

The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the October 2012 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise. Implementation will be demonstrated by county responders.

Implementation will be demonstrated for State personnel responding to the EOF.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained.

Extent of Play

The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the October 2012 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise. Implementation will be demonstrated by county responders.

Implementation will be demonstrated for State personnel responding to the EOF.
No KI will be ingested.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special population groups within areas subject to protective actions.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/school officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Extent of Play

The SEOC Dose Assessment Room in coordination with the SEOC Executive group will procedurally demonstrate restricting air, water and rail traffic within the Emergency Planning Zone. The actual restriction of air, water and rail will be simulated.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

Extent of Play

The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural production.

Extent of Play

The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

Extent of Play

The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4 – FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

Extent of Play

The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the April 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the October 2012 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

Extent of Play

The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the April, 2010 Beaver Valley Exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the October 2012 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise.

Note: The State received a Deficiency for this criterion that was successfully redemonstrated on July 22, 2010.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

Extent of Play

The State Field Monitoring Teams (FMT's), and Sample Screening Point will not be demonstrated this exercise. The State demonstrated this criterion at the April, 2010 Beaver Valley Power Station exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the October 2012 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise.

Note: the State received an ARCA for this criterion that was successfully redemonstrated on July 22, 2010.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

Extent of Play

The State demonstrated this criterion at the June 2006 BVPS exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

Extent of Play

The State demonstrated this criterion at the October 2006 PNPP exercise. It will be demonstrated again at the June 2012 PNPP exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 5 – EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include:

1. Identification of the state or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message
2. Identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant
3. Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency
4. A closing statement asking the affected and potentially affected population to stay tuned for additional information.

Extent of Play

The State will consult with the county EOCs in the Executive Room to determine the best immediate protective action for the populace. Once a decision is reached that requires the activation of the alert and notification system, Ottawa County will simulate the activation of the sirens. EAS messages will be prepared by Ottawa County EMA who will provide them to the EAS Station. (See the Ottawa County Extent of Play Agreement for further details.)

The State also notifies the public on Lake Erie (within the 10-mile EPZ) through the US Coast Guard as supported by Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). The demonstration will be conducted by interview only with ODNR at 1:00 pm on Wednesday, May 11 at the ODNR Division of Watercraft offices in Sandusky, Ohio.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Extent of Play

The State PIO and a representative from the Ohio Department of Health will be present at the DBNPS JIC to address protective actions being implemented and the activities taking place at the State and county level. Public information representatives from Ohio EMA will be present in the SEOC JIC to communicate with the DBNPS JIC.

A Public Inquiry telephone will be established and demonstrated at the SEOC JIC and driven by controller injects. Public Inquiry will address at least 3 calls per hour once Site Area Emergency is declared for two (2) hours. Trends in rumors will be identified and responded to as needed.

EVALUATION AREA 6 – SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

Extent of Play

N/A - This is a county function.

OTTAWA COUNTY 2011 RADIOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, by a decision of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 – EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-Element 1.a - Mobilization

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

All agencies identified in the Ottawa County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) will be alerted as per established procedures. The primary means of notification from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a dedicated line; therefore, a verification call will not be performed. If a back-up means of communication (commercial phone or 800 MHz radio) is necessary, a verification call will be made. Appropriate personnel shall be mobilized in accordance with the RERP to staff emergency facilities. The Sheriff's Dispatcher and Ottawa County EMA personnel will notify the emergency response agencies/individuals. Individuals/agencies to be notified will vary according to the level of emergency. Agencies/individuals will be contacted by radio, pager or telephone and will verify the accurate receipt of the notification message by either reading it back or calling the Sheriff's Dispatch Center (or EOC, if activated) depending upon how the individual was notified. Following verification, the designated individual will notify appropriate personnel within the agency by using normal internal notification guidelines. Personnel will be informed of the Plant's status so that each agency with response roles at specific levels in the emergency can take appropriate actions as specified in the plan. Individual agencies rely on telephone and/or radio to contact their personnel according to a predetermined priority call list.

The County EMA Director shall be responsible for EOC activation and operation. The EOC will not normally be activated for an UNUSUAL EVENT. It may be activated for an ALERT at the discretion of the EMA Director. The EOC staff will be fully mobilized at a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY.

The following field activities/facilities will be driven by controller injects and demonstrated out of sequence:

Route Verification/ Supplemental Route Alerting

- Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Station 1

Monday, May 9, 2011 – 1830 hours

- Rocky Ridge Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours
- Erie Township Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours

Backup Route Alerting

- Allen-Clay Joint Fire District Station 1
Monday, May 9, 2011 – 1830 hours
- Rocky Ridge Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours
- Erie Township Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours

Traffic/Access Control

- Ohio Department of Transportation
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 0800 hours
- Oak Harbor Police Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1000 hours

Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination

- Port Clinton Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours

Schools

- Port Clinton City School District
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 0830 hours
- Danbury Local School District
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1100 hours

Reception Center

- Sandusky High School
Wednesday, May 11, 2011 – 1830 hours

Care Center

- Perkins High School
Wednesday, May 11, 2011 – 1830 hours

Institutionalized/Special Populations

- Edgewood Manor Nursing Center
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1400 hours

Sub-Element 1.b - Facilities

Criterion 1.b.1 Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

Extent of Play:

N/A. Baseline established in 2005.

Sub-Element 1.c - Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Extent of Play:

Direction and Control will be demonstrated by appropriate participating agencies in accordance with RERP and SOGs.

Sub-Element 1.d – Communications Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Extent of Play:

All communications equipment at the locations listed in Criterion 1.a.1 will be demonstrated. Commercial telephone is used as the primary means of communications between the Utility, Local, County, State and Federal agencies. The initial notification call informing County officials of an emergency at DBNPS is made on a 4-Way dedicated telephone line that connects Davis-Besse, State of Ohio, Ottawa County and Lucas County. Upon activation of the County EOC, the 4-way dedicated (conference style) telephone hook-up will connect the Davis-Besse Emergency Operating Facility (EOF), the Ottawa County EOC, Lucas County EOC and the Ohio EOC. A facsimile machine will support verbal communications, as well as plant status and radiological dose assessment updates. This system may remain open and operational until the incident is terminated by the appropriate authority.

In addition, a 3-way conference line will connect Ottawa and Lucas County Commissioners and the Governor's Representative and will be used to coordinate protective action recommendations and activation of the siren system and EAS.

Once notification has been made and communication links are established, a telephone/radio network will be used to expedite agency communications.

Radio/backup communication will be available for demonstration by the following entities at the EOC:

- ◆ Amateur Radio Emergency Service
- ◆ Fire/EMS Liaison
- ◆ Ohio Emergency Management Agency
- ◆ Ohio State Highway Patrol
- ◆ United States Coast Guard
- ◆ Ottawa County Schools' Liaison
- ◆ Ottawa County Sheriff's Dispatch

Sub-Element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Extent of Play:

All equipment, displays, supplies, etc. at the locations listed in Criterion 1.a.1 will be demonstrated.

Sufficient quantities of direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers are available for issuance to emergency workers. Dosimetry and KI have been pre-distributed to ORO's (see 3.a.1 and 3.b.1). Available supplies of KI will be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs.

Monitoring kits and Dosimetry are exchanged annually; the documentation is included in the 2011 Annual Letter of Certification.

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) (through local health departments) makes KI available to the general public by pre-distribution and distribution at reception centers. EOC Liaisons for the Ohio Department of Transportation, Ottawa County Engineer and Ottawa County Sheriff will discuss equipment and supplies to support Traffic and Access Control.

EVALUATION AREA 2 – PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Sub-Element 2.a – Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

Extent of Play:

The Ottawa County Radiological Officer (RO) will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to monitor exposure of county emergency workers. Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices* at all times when performing personnel or equipment contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual is in the EPZ during a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY. Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Should the scenario dictate a revised exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Controller inject will initiate the discussions about the process for exceeding exposure limits.

Provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs will be discussed. Discussion will be driven by controller inject.

Advisories from the EOC to field personnel will be simulated due to out of sequence play.

The Ohio Department of Health recommends the use of KI. Dosimetry packets have been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations.

- Area dosimetry will be utilized (in lieu of individual dosimetry) at the Edgewood Manor Nursing Center and the Ottawa County EOC.

Sub-Element 2.b – Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County does not demonstrate this criterion; it relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

Extent of Play:

Protective action decisions (PADs) will be made in accordance with the RERP and SOGs. The Ottawa County Commissioners are responsible for the recommendation and implementation of protective measures for the affected public and emergency workers in Ottawa County. They will reach their decisions by weighing information, data and protective action recommendations from the State, Utility, Federal and local sources. When a protective action has been recommended by either the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) or the State of Ohio, the Ottawa County Commissioners will consult with the Ottawa County Executive Group and the Lucas County Commissioners to decide upon a coordinated protective action, the time when the sirens will be activated, an Emergency Alert System (EAS) message and Special News Broadcasts (SNBs).

The decision to advise the general public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

The county will demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of PADs with affected jurisdictions. The number of PADs will be dependent on the scenario, however, at least two (2) will be demonstrated.

Sub-Element 2.c – Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

Extent of Play:

A list of people with special needs (mobility impaired, hearing impaired, etc.) is maintained by the Ottawa County Health Department, in coordination with the Ottawa County EMA and local fire departments, for use in an emergency.

A special needs list shall be printed by the Health Department, however, due to confidentiality concerns, simulated lists will be provided to appropriate fire departments.

Appropriate protective actions for institutionalized/special needs shall be demonstrated at the Edgewood Manor Nursing Center at 1400 hours, Tuesday, May 10, 2011.

Sub-Element 2.d - Radiological Assessment and Decision Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

Extent of Play:

N/A – Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio.

Sub-Element 2.e – Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry and Return

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

Extent of Play:

Criterion not selected. Successfully demonstrated in May, 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 3 – PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-Element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Extent of Play:

The Ottawa County Radiological Officer will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to monitor exposure of county emergency workers. Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices at all times when performing personnel or equipment contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual is in the EPZ during a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY. Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a GENERAL EMERGENCY. Should the scenario dictate a revised exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Advisories from the EOC to field personnel will be simulated via controller inject due to out of sequence play.

Dosimetry packets have been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations.

Criterion 3.a.1 will be demonstrated by appropriate agencies/ personnel in conjunction with their RERP assignments.

- ◆ Allen-Clay Joint Fire District, Station #1
- ◆ Danbury Local School District
- ◆ Edgewood Manor Nursing Center
- ◆ Erie Township Fire Department
- ◆ Oak Harbor Police Department
- ◆ Ohio Department of Transportation
- ◆ Ottawa County Radiological Officer
- ◆ Port Clinton City Schools
- ◆ Port Clinton Fire Department
- ◆ Rocky Ridge Fire Department
- ◆ Sandusky Fire Department

Sub-Element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, potassium iodide (KI) is supplied by the Ohio Department of Health to the Ohio EMA for pre-distribution to offsite response organizations. The Ohio EMA provides a full dose complement of KI tablets for each dosimetry packet of emergency workers with potential to enter the EPZ, thus allowing emergency workers to begin use promptly and voluntarily upon recommendation from the Ohio Department of Health. Should the Ohio Department of Health recommend the taking of KI for emergency workers, the County Radiological Officer will coordinate with local agency dosimetry coordinators to implement such a recommendation. **KI WILL NOT BE INGESTED.** Issuance of KI to institutionalized individuals is based upon the recommendation of the Ohio Department of Health and implemented at the County and local level. The Special Needs Communicator will notify institutional facilities, as needed, and recommend that the appropriate designee for each applicable facility administer KI to institutionalized persons. Actual administration is under the direction of the attending physician. **KI WILL NOT BE INGESTED.**

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) (through local health departments) makes KI available to the general public by pre-distribution and by distribution at reception centers. The decision to advise the general public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

Agencies/Individuals will demonstrate Criterion 3.b.1 in conjunction with their RERP assignments. Those available for evaluator interviews will include:

- ◆ Allen-Clay Joint Fire District, Station #1
- ◆ Danbury Local School District
- ◆ Edgewood Manor Nursing Center
- ◆ Erie Township Fire Department
- ◆ Oak Harbor Police Department
- ◆ Ohio Department of Transportation
- ◆ Ottawa County Radiological Officer
- ◆ Port Clinton City Schools
- ◆ Rocky Ridge Fire Department

Sub-Element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations, other than schools, within areas subject to protective actions.

Extent of Play:

A list of people with special needs (mobility impaired, hearing impaired, etc.) is maintained by the Ottawa County Health Department, in coordination with the Ottawa County EMA and local fire departments, for use in an emergency.

A special needs list shall be printed by the Health Department, however, due to confidentiality concerns, simulated lists will be provided to appropriate fire departments.

Appropriate protective actions for institutionalized/special needs shall be demonstrated at the Edgewood Manor Nursing Center at 1400 hours, Tuesday, May 10, 2011.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, the Ottawa County Schools' Liaison will report to the EOC to:

- 1) Provide notification to local school districts.

- 2) Advise school district superintendents on plant status and recommended response actions.
- 3) Simulate the coordinating of protective actions for schools.
- 4) Simulate the coordinating with local school districts to provide buses and volunteer drivers for the evacuation of the mobility impaired, transportation dependent populations and health care facilities.

The Schools' Liaison communicates with the Superintendents' offices. They, in turn, notify district personnel and coordinate district resources. Communications between the Schools' Liaison and the Superintendents' offices will be documented.

- ◆ Port Clinton City School District participants available for interview beginning at 0830 hours, Tuesday, May 10 2011, include:

Port Clinton Superintendent, Transportation Supervisory/Dosimetry Coordinator, Port Clinton High School Principal, and one bus driver.

- ◆ Danbury Local School District (non-EPZ) participants available for interview beginning at 1100 hours, Tuesday, May 10, 2011, include:

Danbury Superintendent, Transportation Supervisor/Dosimetry Coordinator and one bus driver.

Sub-Element 3.d – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criteria 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, major traffic intersections are controlled by the Ottawa County Sheriff's Office with support from the Ohio State Highway Patrol, local police departments and the Ohio National Guard.

The County Engineer – Highway Garage and ODOT also assist in traffic control efforts by delivering traffic control equipment and assigning personnel to predetermined control points.

If assistance is required to perform traffic control, clearing roads or removing stalled vehicles, it is requested from the State through Ohio EMA.

Two Traffic/Access Control Points shall be demonstrated:

5-2: SR 19 and SR 163
Oak Harbor Police Department

5-6: CR 42 (Harris-Salem Rd.) and
CR 6 (Elmore-Eastern Rd.)
Ohio Department of Transportation

Those pre-designated access control points necessary to control access to an affected area will be activated (SIMULATED). Personnel from the Ottawa County Sheriff's Office, Ohio State Highway Patrol, local police departments, Ohio National Guard and ODNR supported by access control equipment from the County Engineer – Highway Garage and Ohio Department of Transportation ensure that unauthorized vehicles do not enter the evacuated areas.

Remaining Traffic Control and Access Control Points shall be demonstrated procedurally at the Ottawa County EOC by:

- ◆ Ottawa County Sheriff Liaison
 - ◆ Ottawa County Engineer Liaison
 - ◆ Ohio Department of Transportation Liaison
 - ◆ Ohio State Highway Patrol Liaison
- Ohio Department of Transportation personnel available for interview beginning at 0800 hours, Tuesday, May 10, 2011
ODOT Superintendent, Dosimetry Coordinator and one Worker
 - Oak Harbor Police personnel available for interview beginning at 1000 hours, Tuesday, May 10, 2011 include:
Police Chief, Dosimetry Coordinator and one Officer

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

Extent of Play:

Ottawa County Sheriff's Office, Ottawa County Engineer's Office, Ohio State Highway Patrol and Ohio Department of Transportation Liaisons located in the Ottawa County EOC will demonstrate the capability to:

- ◆ Identify impediments to evacuation
- ◆ Implement appropriate actions to remove or otherwise deal with impediments.

Controller injects will identify impediment(s) that will impact an evacuation route and necessitate re-routing traffic and drive further discussion at GE. Actual resources will not be utilized.

Sub-Element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

Extent of Play:

N/A – Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production.

Extent of Play:

N/A – Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio.

Sub-Element 3.f – Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

Extent of Play:

N/S - Criterion not selected. Successfully demonstrated in May, 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 4 – FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-Element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

Extent of Play:

N/A – Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

Extent of Play:

N/A – Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

Extent of Play:

N/A – Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Sub-Element 4.b – Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (for example, food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio

Sub-Element 4.c – Laboratory Operations

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

Extent of Play:

N/A - Ottawa County relies on the State of Ohio

EVALUATION AREA 5 – EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-Element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

1. Identification of the state or local government organization and the official with the authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message
2. Identification of the commercial nuclear power plant and a statement that an emergency situation exists at the plant.
3. Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures and information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency
4. A closing statement asking the affected and potentially affected population to stay tuned for additional information.

Extent of Play:

Siren activation will be simulated at Site Area Emergency, General Emergency and prior to the announcement of PADs.

Route Verification/Supplemental Route Alerting will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. PA systems will be demonstrated with a test message at an agreed upon location.

- ◆ Allen-Clay Joint Fire District, Station #1
Monday, May 9, 2011 – 1830 hours
- ◆ Erie Township Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours
- ◆ Rocky Ridge Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours

NOAA will be contacted. NOAA will not broadcast an emergency message.

◆ National Weather Service (Cleveland)

EAS messages will be prepared and provided to the LP 1. EAS Messages are transmitted electronically from the Ottawa County EOC to the LP-1 station via telephone lines utilizing the SAGE ENDEC. The Ottawa County ENDEC provides a printout verifying that the message was sent. The LP-1 ENDEC provides a printout verifying receipt of the message. EAS messages will be recorded but not broadcast.

◆ WRVF 101.5 FM Radio
Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Text telephones (TTY/TDD) are available for demonstration by the Ottawa County Sheriff's Dispatch and by Public Inquiry.

Criterion 5.a.2: (RESERVED)

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Extent of Play:

Sirens 301 (Allen-Clay Joint Fire District, Station #1), 313 (Rocky Ridge Fire Department) and 701 (Erie Township Fire Department) will be identified as failing at the General Emergency (during the out of sequence demonstration of this criterion).

Backup Route Alerting will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. PA systems will be demonstrated with a test message at an agreed upon location.

- ◆ Allen-Clay Joint Fire District, Station #1
Monday, May 9, 2011 – 1830 hours
- ◆ Erie Township Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours
- ◆ Rocky Ridge Fire Department
Tuesday, May 10, 2011 – 1830 hours

Sub-Element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

EAS messages will be prepared and provided to the LP 1. EAS messages will be recorded but not broadcast.

◆ **WRVF 101.5 FM Radio**

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, the JIC will be activated and staffed by PIOs from Ottawa County, Lucas County, the State, Federal Agencies and the Utility upon declaration of an ALERT. News Releases will be coordinated with all participating PIOs prior to release to the news media with briefings held jointly, as appropriate.

The Ottawa County PIO will maintain contact with the Public Information Assistant in the Ottawa County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) who will serve as the primary contact point for all public information related matters within the Ottawa County EOC. Ottawa County will not conduct a news briefing at the Ottawa County EOC.

Information from participating local or County agencies in the EOC will be coordinated with the Public Information Assistant. The Public

Information Assistant will provide information to the PIO for development of a joint news statement with Lucas County and the State, if appropriate.

The Public Information Assistant will ensure that the Commissioners are aware of information being disseminated to the news media. The PIO will coordinate with the Public Information Assistant to receive Commissioner approval on news statements affecting Ottawa County prior to dissemination to the news media.

A Public Inquiry telephone will be operational and demonstrated.

EVALUATION AREA 6 – SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-Element 6.a – Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOGs, if evacuation is the recommended protective action, residents are instructed to leave the affected area along designated routes and go to specific reception centers located in adjacent/host counties. *No reception centers are located in Ottawa County.* At reception centers, the evacuees are checked for contamination, provided KI (if appropriate), registered and assigned to a care center (if necessary).

The evacuee portion of this criterion shall be demonstrated at the Sandusky High School Reception Center, Sandusky, Ohio, out of sequence on Wednesday, May 11, 2011, at 1830 hours.

In accordance with applicable guidance, monitoring will be demonstrated and decontamination will be discussed by Sandusky Fire Department. The Dosimetry Coordinator will be pre-positioned at Sandusky High School and will distribute dosimetry from that location.

The ORO will provide six individuals to be simulated evacuees. They will be monitored for contamination and will be processed through the facility.

Initial monitoring utilizing a Bicon Portal Monitor will identify one evacuee to be referred to secondary monitoring. One locker room will be fully set up and demonstrated.

Decisions on the need for decontamination will be made based on Controller injected radiation levels. Decontamination will be simulated. The proper sequence for washing and for decontamination efforts, and the decisions to refer individuals who cannot be decontaminated to medical facilities will be discussed.

Contamination control and record-keeping procedures will be demonstrated at the initial and secondary monitoring points.

Brown Kraft paper will be used for floor covering.

Registration of six evacuees will be demonstrated by Erie County Job & Family Services. Transportation of evacuees from the reception center to care centers will not be demonstrated. Participating organizations:

- ◆ Sandusky Fire Department
- ◆ Erie County Job & Family Services
- ◆ Erie County Department of Health

Should the Ohio Department of Health recommend potassium iodide for the general public, KI will be distributed to evacuees by Erie County Department of Health after initial monitoring.

Evacuee vehicle monitoring will be demonstrated and decontamination will be discussed by members of the Sandusky Fire Department and the Sandusky High School. The vehicle monitoring and decontamination area will be set up as per guideline. One vehicle will be monitored and decontamination will be discussed. A firefighter will be available to answer questions regarding monitoring and decontamination guidelines, contamination control and record keeping.

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination will be demonstrated at the Port Clinton Fire Station out-of-sequence on Tuesday, May 10, 2011, beginning at 1830 hours, by the Port Clinton Fire Department.

The ORO will provide individuals to be simulated Emergency Workers returning from a field assignment. One Emergency Worker will be identified as contaminated and will be processed through the facility. Decisions on the need for decontamination will be made based on Controller injected radiation levels. Decontamination will be simulated. The proper sequence for washing and for decontamination efforts, and the decisions to refer individuals who cannot be decontaminated to medical facilities will be discussed.

Sub-Element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

Extent of Play:

Emergency worker vehicle monitoring and decontamination will be demonstrated by members of the Port Clinton Fire Department at the Port Clinton Fire Station out-of-sequence on Tuesday, May 10, 2011, beginning at 1830 hours. The vehicle monitoring and decontamination area will be set up as per guideline. One vehicle will be monitored but not decontaminated. A firefighter will be available to answer questions regarding monitoring and decontamination guidelines, contamination control and record-keeping.

Sub-Element 6.c – Temporary Care of Evacuees

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE – Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities.

Extent of Play:

Perkins High School congregate care facility will be demonstrated via interview out of sequence on Wednesday, May 11, 2011, at 1830 hours.

Care Center capabilities to provide food, bedding and other necessities will be demonstrated via documentation from the American Red Cross.

Briar Middle School (located adjacent to the campus of Perkins High School) is the alternate/overflow care center for Perkins High School. The Erie County EMA has coordinated a walkthrough of the facility and an interview with the center manager between 1900 and 2000 hours on Wednesday, May 11, 2011 following the Perkins High School Care Center demonstration. Briar Middle School will not be set up to receive evacuees.

American Red Cross staff positions participating at Perkins High School will include one care center manager, one registration worker, one nurse, and one family worker.

Participating organizations:

- ◆ American Red Cross
- ◆ ARES/RACES

Sub-Element 6.d – Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

Extent of Play:

Not demonstrating this exercise.

LUCAS COUNTY 2011 RADIOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

Criteria that can be re-demonstrated immediately for credit, by a decision of the evaluator, include the following: 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1 and 6.d.1. Criteria that may be re-demonstrated, as approved on a case-by-case basis by the Chairperson of the Regional Assistance Committee, include the following: 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.a.1 and 5.b.1.

EVALUATION AREA 1 – EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-Element 1.a - Mobilization

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

All agencies identified in the Lucas County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) will be alerted as per established procedures. The primary means of notification from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is a dedicated line; therefore, a verification call will not be performed. If a back-up means of communication (commercial phone) is necessary, a verification call will be made. Appropriate personnel shall be mobilized in accordance with the RERP to staff emergency facilities. The Sheriff's Dispatcher will notify the emergency response agencies/individuals. Agencies/individuals to be notified will vary according to the level of emergency. Agencies/individuals will be contacted by radio, pager or telephone and will verify the accurate receipt of the notification message by either reading it back or calling the Sheriff's Dispatch Center (or EOC, if activated) depending upon how the individual was notified. Following verification, the designated individual will notify appropriate personnel within the agency by using normal internal notification procedures. Personnel will be informed of the Plant's status so that each agency with response roles at specific levels in the emergency can take appropriate actions as specified in the plan. The individual/agency representative receiving initial notification will notify appropriate personnel within the agency using normal internal notification procedures. Individual agencies rely on telephone and/or radio to contact their personnel according to a predetermined priority call list. The County EMA Director shall be responsible for EOC activation and operation.

The EOC will not normally be activated for an UNUSUAL EVENT. It may be activated for an ALERT at the discretion of the EMA Director. The EOC staff will be fully mobilized at a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY.

The following field activities/facilities will be demonstrated out of sequence:

Traffic/Access Control

- Lucas County Sheriff's Office Road Patrol
TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 at 1300 hours

Backup Route Alerting

- Jerusalem Township Fire Department
MONDAY, MAY 9, 2011 at 1830 hours

Route Verification

- Jerusalem Township Fire Department
MONDAY, MAY 9, 2011 at 1830 hours

Protective Action Implementation

- Oregon City School District Transportation Department
TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 @ 1000 hours

Contaminated Injured

- Jerusalem Township Fire Department
MONDAY, MAY 9, 2011 at 1930
- Mercy St. Charles Hospital
TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 at 0830

Sub-Element 1.b – Facilities

Criterion 1.b.1 Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

Extent of Play:

Not selected. The Lucas County Emergency Operations Center was successfully demonstrated in 2007. There have not been any significant physical or other alterations to this facility since the 2007 evaluation.

Sub-Element 1.c - Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

Extent of Play:

Direction and Control will be demonstrated by appropriate participating agencies in accordance with RERP and SOPs.

Sub-Element 1.d – Communications Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

Extent of Play:

Commercial telephone is used as the primary means of communications between the Utility, Local, County, State and Federal agencies. The initial notification call informing County officials of an emergency at DBNPS may come through the Sheriff's Dispatch Center on the 4-Way dedicated telephone line. Upon activation of the County EOC, a 4-way dedicated (conference style) telephone hook-up will connect the Utility, Ottawa County EOC, Lucas County EOC and the Ohio EOC. A fax machine will support verbal communications, as well as plant status and radiological dose assessment updates. This system may remain open and operational until the incident is terminated by the appropriate authority.

In addition, a 3-way conference line will connect Ottawa and Lucas County Commissioners and the Governor's Representative and will be used to coordinate protective action recommendations and activation of the siren system and EAS.

Once notification has been made and communication links are established, a telephone/radio network will be used to expedite agency communications.

Radio/backup communication will be available for:

- Amateur Radio Emergency Service
- Ohio Emergency Management Agency
- Oregon City School Bus Garage
- Lucas County Sheriff's Dispatch

Sub-Element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

Extent of Play:

All equipment, displays, supplies, etc. at the locations listed in Criterion 1.a.1 will be demonstrated.

Sufficient quantities of direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers are available for issuance to emergency workers. Dosimetry and KI have been pre-distributed to ORO's (see 3.a.1 and 3.b.1). Available supplies of KI will be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs.

The letter identifying completion of the periodic requirements (identifying equipment calibration dates and KI expiration dates) will be provided at the evaluators pre-exercise meeting.

Monitoring kits and Dosimetry are exchanged annually; the documentation is included in the 2011 Annual Letter of Certification.

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) (through local health departments) makes KI available to the general public by pre-distribution and distribution at reception centers. KI distribution to the general public at reception centers will not be demonstrated in 2011.

EVALUATION AREA 2 – PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING

Sub-Element 2.a – Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

Extent of Play:

The Lucas County Radiological Officer will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to monitor exposure of county emergency workers. Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices at all times when performing personnel or equipment contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual is in the EPZ during a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY. Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Should the scenario dictate a revised exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Advisories from the EOC to field personnel will be simulated due to out of sequence play.

The Ohio Department of Health will recommend the use of KI.

Dosimetry packets have been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations.

Controller inject will initiate the discussions about the process for exceeding exposure limits.

Sub-Element 2.b – Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

Extent of Play:

Not Applicable - Lucas County does not demonstrate this criterion; it relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

Extent of Play:

Protective Action Decisions (PADs) will be made in accordance with the RERP and SOPs. The Lucas County Commissioners are responsible for the recommendation and implementation of protective measures for the affected public and emergency workers in Lucas County. They will reach their decisions by weighing information, data and protective action recommendations from the State, Utility, Federal and local sources. When a protective action has been recommended by either the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) or the State of Ohio, the Lucas County Commissioners will consult with the Lucas County Executive Group and the Ottawa County Commissioners to decide upon a coordinated protective action, the time when the sirens will be activated, an Emergency Alert System (EAS) message and Special News Broadcasts (SNBs).

The decision to advise the general public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

The county will demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of PADs with affected jurisdictions. The number of PADs will be dependent on the scenario, however, at least two (2) will be demonstrated.

Sub-Element 2.c – Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

Extent of Play:

There are no special facilities within the Lucas County Portion of the EPZ. The ability to make a decision to evacuate the mobility impaired or transportation dependent will be demonstrated in the EOC by the Fire Coordinator by interview.

Sub-Element 2.d - Radiological Assessment and Decision Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO planning criteria.

Extent of Play:

Not Applicable – Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio.

Sub-Element 2.e – Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry and Return

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely re-location, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures.

Extent of Play:

Criterion Not Selected: This is a six year objective and was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 3 – PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-Element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

Extent of Play:

The Lucas County Radiological Officer will coordinate with dosimetry coordinators to monitor exposure of county emergency workers. Each emergency worker will wear assigned dosimetry devices at all times when performing personnel or equipment contamination monitoring and decontamination, when handling radioactive material, and whenever an individual is in the EPZ during a SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Individuals will be instructed to read their direct-reading dosimetry every thirty minutes or more frequently after the onset of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

Should the scenario dictate a revised exposure limit, the message will be disseminated to dosimetry coordinators by the RO.

Advisories from the EOC to field personnel will be simulated due to out of sequence play.

Dosimetry packets have been pre-distributed to emergency response organizations.

A dosimetry briefing will be demonstrated for emergency workers prior to beginning their mission.

Criterion 3.a.1 will be demonstrated by appropriate agencies/personnel in conjunction with their RERP assignments.

- Oregon City School District Transportation Department
- Jerusalem Township Fire Department (JFD)
- Lucas County Sheriff's Office Substation located behind JFD
- Mercy St. Charles Hospital

Sub-Element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1:

KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOPs, Potassium Iodide (KI) is supplied by the Ohio Department of Health to the Ohio EMA for pre-distribution to offsite response organizations. The Ohio EMA provides a full dose complement of KI tablets for each dosimetry packet of emergency workers with potential to enter the EPZ, thus allowing emergency workers to begin use promptly and voluntarily upon recommendation from the Ohio Department of Health.

Should the Ohio Department of Health recommend the taking of KI for emergency workers, the County Radiological Officer will coordinate with local agency dosimetry coordinators to implement such a recommendation.

A KI briefing for emergency workers will be demonstrated prior to beginning their mission.

- **KI WILL NOT BE INGESTED.**

Agencies/individuals will demonstrate Criterion 3.b.1 in conjunction with their RERP assignments. Those available for evaluator interviews will include:

- Oregon City School District Transportation Department
- Jerusalem Fire Department (JFD)
- Lucas County Sheriff's Office Substation located behind JFD

The Ohio Department of Health (ODH) (through local health departments) makes KI available to the general public by pre-distribution and by distribution at reception centers. The decision to advise the general public to take KI will be based upon the recommendation of ODH.

KI distribution to the general public at reception centers will not be demonstrated in 2011.

Sub-Element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations, other than schools, within areas subject to protective actions.

Extent of Play:

A list of people with special needs (mobility impaired, hearing impaired, etc.) is maintained by the Lucas County EMA, in coordination with the Fire Coordinator in the EOC and with the Jerusalem Township Fire Chief. This list will be presented to an evaluator upon request although it is considered a confidential list.

Coordination with the Oregon City School District to provide buses and volunteer drivers for the (simulated) evacuation of the mobility impaired/transportation dependent populations will be relayed by the Fire Coordinator in the EOC. Demonstration will be by interview with the Oregon City School District Transportation Director and a volunteer bus driver at the Bus Garage at Clay High School, TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 at 1000 hours. A bus will not be driven for this exercise.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

Extent of Play:

Lucas County has no schools within the 10-mile EPZ. However, an Oregon City School District Representative will be available for an interview in the Lucas County EOC to describe the process for identifying and holding 10-mile EPZ students for parental pickup.

Sub-Element 3.d – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criteria 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

Extent of Play:

Lucas County Sheriff's Office Road Patrol will demonstrate this at the Sheriff's Substation on Jerusalem Road (State Route 2) TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 at 1300 hours.

After the Road Patrol Deputy receives his dosimetry coordinator briefing, a controller inject will be communicated to the Dosimetry Coordinator to have a Deputy report to combined Traffic Control Point/Access Control Point 11-6, located at the intersection of Elliston and Veler Road.

The County Engineer also assists in traffic control efforts by delivering traffic control equipment and assigning personnel to predetermined control points.

Activation of the remaining traffic and access control points shall be demonstrated procedurally (simulated) at the Lucas County EOC by:

- Lucas County Law Enforcement Coordinator
- Lucas County Engineer
- Ohio State Highway Patrol

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

Extent of Play:

The Lucas County Sheriff's Office and the Lucas County Engineer's Office Liaison located in the EOC will demonstrate the capability to:

- Identify impediments to evacuation
- Implement appropriate actions to remove or otherwise deal with impediments.

A controller inject will identify an impediment that will impact an evacuation route and necessitate re-routing traffic and drive further discussion at GE. Actual resources will not be used.

Sub-Element 3.e. – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable – Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable – Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio

Sub-Element 3.f – Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

Extent of Play:

Not Selected: This Criteria was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

EVALUATION AREA 4 – FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-Element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable – Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear

Power Station.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable – Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio and on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Sub-Element 4.b – Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (for example, food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio

Sub-Element 4.c – Laboratory Operations

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions.

Extent of Play:

Not applicable - Lucas County relies on the State of Ohio

EVALUATION AREA 5 – EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-Element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Extent of Play:

Ottawa County is responsible for EAS and siren activation. Lucas County Executive Group will coordinate with Ottawa County for the time of siren sounding and the EAS message to be broadcast.

The Lucas County Executive Group will insure that all elements of the EOC are aware of all EAS messages issued to the public.

Route Verification/Supplemental Route Alerting will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. Public address (PA) systems will be demonstrated with a test message at an agreed upon location.

- Jerusalem Township Fire Department
Monday, May 9, 2011 – 1830 hours

Criterion 5.a.2: (RESERVED)

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

Extent of Play:

During the out-of-sequence demonstration of this criterion Siren #0004 in Jerusalem Township will be identified as failing at the General Emergency. There will be no siren failures during in-sequence play.

Backup Route Alerting will be demonstrated out-of-sequence. Public address (PA) systems will be demonstrated with a test message at an agreed upon location.

- Jerusalem Township Fire Department
Monday, May 9, 2011 – 1830 hours

Sub-Element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

Extent of Play:

In accordance with the RERP and SOP's, the JIC will be activated and staffed by Public Information Officers (PIOs) from Ottawa County, Lucas County, the State, Federal Agencies and the utility upon declaration of an ALERT. News statements will be coordinated with all participating PIOs with briefings held jointly, as appropriate.

Upon arrival at the JIC, the Lucas County PIO will establish and remain in contact with the Public Information Liaison in the Lucas County EOC who will serve as the primary contact point for all public information related matters within the Lucas County EOC.

The Public Information Liaison will ensure that the Commissioners are aware of information being disseminated to the news media. The PIO will coordinate with the Public Information Liaison to receive Commissioner approval on news statements affecting Lucas County prior to dissemination to the news media.

A public inquiry telephone will be used to allow public inquiry staff to demonstrate the capability to identify trends in rumors (e.g., frequently expressed false or misleading information). The public inquiry staff will demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, will be included as appropriate in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings and/or media releases.

A media briefing will not be demonstrated in the Lucas County EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 6 – SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-Element 6.a – Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

Extent of Play:

Not Selected. This criterion was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

Sub-Element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

Extent of Play:

Not Selected. This criterion was successfully demonstrated in 2009.

Sub-Element 6.c – Temporary Care of Evacuees

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE – Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities.

Extent of Play:

Not Selected. This criterion was successfully demonstrated in 2007.

Sub-Element 6.d – Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.

Extent of Play:

Jerusalem Township Fire Department (JFD) will demonstrate assessment and transport of a contaminated, injured individual at the JFD Complex, out-of-sequence, on Monday, May 9, 2011, beginning at 1930 hours.

The ORO will provide an individual who will simulate being an injured and contaminated member of a State Field Monitoring Team. JFD will assess the patient for injuries and contamination. Once stabilized, the patient will be prepared for transport to Mercy St. Charles Hospital. Communications with the Hospital will be simulated for demonstration purposes. After simulated communications with the hospital the transportation portion of the demonstration will end.

At 0830 Tuesday May 10, 2011 The treatment demonstration will resume at Mercy St. Charles Hospital beginning with the unloading of the contaminated victim from the ambulance.

Upon arrival at Mercy St. Charles Hospital the patient will be treated by the Radiation Emergency Area (REA) Response Team.

MS-1 DRILL - JERUSALEM TOWNSHIP FIRE DEPARTMENT/MERCY ST. CHARLES HOSPITAL

Narrative Summary

This out-of-sequence drill has been prepared in order to meet the MS-1 Medical Drill requirements for Lucas County.

Monday, May 9, 2011 @ 1930 Hours:

For purposes of this drill, it is assumed that radioactive particulates were carried offsite in a plume as a consequence of an accident at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. A GENERAL EMERGENCY classification level has already been declared and an evacuation recommendation was issued for Jerusalem Township residents in Subarea 11. Jerusalem Township Fire Department personnel have reported to the fire station to assist with the evacuation and have been issued dosimetry and KI.

Emergency Worker Vehicle monitoring and decontamination is simulated to be in progress, and personnel are at their assigned stations with monitoring instruments checked and available.

The Medical Services - Transportation demonstration begins at 1930 hours in Jerusalem Township when an emergency worker who had been assisting with vehicle decontamination trips and falls. He sustains an injury from contact with the outside of the vehicle (simulated).

Fire department personnel from the fire station will be dispatched to the accident scene. The patient is assessed for injuries and possible contamination. Once stabilized, the patient is prepared for transport and loaded into the transport vehicle. Jerusalem Township Fire Department personnel will demonstrate radio contact with Mercy St. Charles Hospital. Transport will not occur. This will end the MS-1 Transportation portion of the demonstration.

Tuesday, May 10, 2011 @ 0830 Hours:

Mercy St. Charles Hospital will demonstrate the Medical Services - Facilities criterion upon radio communication from Jerusalem Township Fire Department personnel to the Mercy St. Charles Hospital Emergency Department of the pending arrival of a contaminated/injured individual. This demonstration will be terminated upon successful demonstration of all criteria by the lead controller with concurrence from the FEMA evaluator.

Attached: 1 - Sequence of Events
 2 - Medical and Contamination Data

APPENDIX F: ONSITE AND OFF SITE SCENARIO

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	The on-shift Shift Manager is briefed and the Exercise Authorization Form is approved.	-01/15	0630	
	A Control Room Liaison (Member of the Controller Organization) is positioned in the real Control Room to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respond to questions from the Shift Manager. • Facilitate sounding of plant alarms. • Advise Lead Controller of changes in plant conditions that may impact the exercise. 			
1	Operator Shift personnel designated to participate in the exercise are briefed in Control Room Simulator	-00/45	0700	
	OSC craft personnel assemble in the OSC for their pre-drill safety briefing.	-00/15	0730	
2	Onshift Maintenance, Chemistry, Radiation Protection and OSC management are briefed in the OSC on simulated plant conditions	00/00	0745	

NOTE: The scenario will utilize the Control Room Simulator (CRS) to conduct Operator response instead of the Plant Control Room. An off-shift Operations Control Room crew will be pre-staged and briefed at the Control Room Simulator. The Equipment Operators will be pre-staged in the plant. Pre-designated Maintenance, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Personnel will assemble at the OSC once it is activated. Since players will not be able to use their normal

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	communications channels to contact the Control Room, an "Exercise Phone List" will be provided.			
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>CAUTION</u></p> <p><i>Entry into Protected Train room(s) requires permission from the on-shift Shift Manager PRIOR to room entry. If the on-shift Shift Manager is not available, any on-shift Senior Reactor Operator may grant permission. The total number of individuals entering, and the purpose of entry should be communicated. The PLAYER is responsible for obtaining permission PRIOR to room entry. (CA 03-04598-01)</i></p>			
3	<p>JIC Setup Instructions are provided to JIC Manager. Security will not be established in the Edison Plaza Lobby. Security will be established on the 8th floor for the restricted JIC areas.</p> <p><i>NOTE:</i> JIC personnel will be prestaged due to the distance from the station. Once the ERO pagers are activated a JIC Controller will allow small groups of JIC staff to respond to the JIC at random times to begin setup activities.</p>	00/00	0745	
4	<p>DBAB Security setup instructions for the ERFs in the DBAB. To allow non participating personnel to continue work a bypass around the TSC and EOF hallway will be established.</p> <p>Control Room Simulator operations shift takes control of Control Room Simulator with the following events in progress</p>	00/00	07/45	

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 100% power. • All systems in automatic • 380 EFPD • All plant chemistry parameters are stable and in specification • Motor Driven Feedwater Pump is out of service for bearing replacement work. Expected to be restored to service by 1400. • Containment Spray Pump #1 is out of service for mechanical seal replacement. Repairs should be complete at 18:00. • Two mobile cranes are in operation near the BWST, staging materials that will be used for the Reactor Closure Head Replacement Outage. 	00/00	07/45	
5	Control Cell Instructions for addressing multiple from the ERO on the same issue.	00/00	0745	
6X	Safety Briefing for individuals that did not attend the Player's Briefing or participate in one of the pre-job briefings.	00/00	0745	
	The Lead Controller at the Control Room Simulator will direct the following actions:			
7	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A Gai-Tronics announcement for the start of the scenario 2. Activation of the ERO pager drill code (969696), which advises all ERO pager carriers that the pages which follow are related to the scenario. 	00/00	0745	
8	The NRC Duty Officer will be notified by the Control Cell that Davis Besse will be conducting an Emergency Preparedness			

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	drill.			
9X	Contingency message to continue with the drill even if the Simulator Computer locks up.	00/15+	0800+	

INITIATING EVENT FOR THE ALERT

MS-3	A member of Site Management calls the Control Room Simulator, and reports that a mobile crane has backed into the side of the BWST. The BWST is dented, and leaking.	00/20	0805	
10X	Contingency message to be delivered to the Shift Manager/Unit Supervisor if the BWST is declared INOPERABLE. This contingency message will define the rate of unit power reduction, to ensure the unit is on line for the 0955 event.	00/20+	0805+	

ALERT

The Shift Manager and his staff evaluate the indications and classify the **ALERT** in accordance with Emergency Action Level (EAL) **HA3**, Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS:

6. Vehicle crash resulting in **EITHER** of the following:

- **VISIBLE DAMAGE** to **ANY** structures in **Table H-1** areas containing safety systems or components. (**BWST**).

(Refer to Section 6.3, EAL Declaration Table for details.)

The Control Room Simulator operators

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	takes the following actions in accordance with RA-EP-01700, Alert:			
11X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Station Alarm will be sounded. The ALERT Gai-Tronics announcement will be made at the Control Room Simulator. 			
	<p><i>NOTE:</i> Plant alarms will be sounded from the Plant Control Room since they are not accessible from the outside of the real Control Room.</p>			
12X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A modified Protected Area announcement will be made. Protected Area non-essential personnel assembly will be simulated. The Computerized Automated Notification System (CANS) will be activated to mobilize the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). Ottawa and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio are notified of the ALERT, utilizing the dedicated telephone system in accordance with RA-EP-02110, Emergency Notification procedure. The NRC will be notified in accordance with RA-EP-02110, Emergency Notification procedure. Notification to NRC will be simulated. The call will be made to the Utility Control Cell. 			<p>Ottawa and Lucas Counties Sheriff's Dispatchers and the State of Ohio Highway Patrol Dispatcher receive notification of the ALERT.</p> <p>State and County Dispatchers notify key offsite response agency representatives.</p>

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	Normal access to the Owner Controlled Area, DBAB ERFs and the Protected Area are restricted to authorized ERO personnel only in accordance with RA-EP-02510, Emergency Security Organization Activation and Response.			
13	Normal access to the Owner Controlled Area and Protected Area will be restored by the Controllers after approximately 30 minutes or when traffic backup becomes a safety issue for non participating personnel.	00/45+	0830+	
14	Security locks down the DBAB first floor ERF hallway. ERF (TSC/EOF) hallway access is restricted to authorized personnel only for the duration of the drill.	00/45+	0830+	
15	The Emergency Director directs the dismissal of training classes and sending non-essential contractors and visitors home. The Controller will direct these actions to be simulated.			State and Counties activate their EOCs and mobilize demonstrated elements of their staffs.
16X	Contingency input in the event an ALERT has not been declared by this time.	00/45	0830	
	Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff responds to the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and begin facility activation.			State of Ohio activates their Assessment Room (EMA, OEPA, ODH) in the State EOC to monitor the events at the Station. Selected Emergency Responders are alerted and placed on standby.
	Once the TSC and EOF are activated, the Emergency Director in the DBAB obtains a			County agencies are notified and key personnel respond to the

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	turnover from the Emergency Director in the Control Room Simulator in accordance with the RA-EP-02010, Emergency Management.			county Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
	<p><i>NOTE:</i> The Emergency Assistant Plant Manager on arrival in the Control Room Simulator should relieve the Emergency Director in the Control Room Simulator unless turnover to the TSC/EOF is imminent.</p>			County and pre-staged State personnel may be dispatched to the EOF and JIC.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ERDS data will be sent to an onsite terminal due to simulated NRC participation. 			Bus drivers are mobilized (simulated).
	The Company Public Affairs Duty Officer (PADO) provides news statements as required prior to activation of the Joint Information Center (JIC).			Emergency Alert System (EAS) brought to an "ALERT" status (simulated).
	Once the JIC is activated, news statements are prepared and media briefings held at the JIC.			In accordance with the Ottawa County plan, EMA considers closing parklands (Subarea 10) and restricting Lake Erie boating traffic to Subarea 12. (The actual closure of the parklands and restriction of boating will be simulated.)
	A small tear develops in the Main Condenser boot seal. Main Condenser vacuum starts to degrade.	02/08	0953	State and Counties issue news statements as required.
	The Main Condenser boot seal fails catastrophically. Condenser vacuum is lost, resulting in the following plant responses: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of Condenser Vacuum 	02/10	0955	

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps • Main Turbine trip on high exhaust pressure • Generation of a reactor trip signal • SFRCS actuation 	02/10	0955	
	The reactor trip signal fails to de-energize the Control Rod Assembly motors. The automatic reactor trip signal is unsuccessful in tripping the reactor.	02/10	0955	
MS-4	When the start signal is sent to #1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, the Steam Admission Valve fails closed, preventing the pump from starting or running.	02/10	0955	

INITIATING EVENT FOR THE SITE AREA EMERGENCY

The Control Room Simulator staff will recognize that the reactor has not tripped automatically, and will attempt to trip the reactor from the At The Controls area.

~02/12 ~0957

The Control Room Simulator Staff will recognize that their efforts to manually trip the reactor from the At The Controls area were not successful, and will dispatch an Equipment Operator to locally open the Reactor Trip Breakers. **NOTE: Simulator Controller must record the time that it is recognized that efforts to manually trip the reactor from the At The Controls area were not successful. Record Time: _____**

~02/14 ~0959

The Equipment Operator dispatched to

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	open the Reactor Trip Breakers locally is successful in manually tripping the reactor.	~02/14	~0959	
17X	Contingency Cue Card to be used in the event that the Shift Manager/Unit Supervisor decides to restart Reactor Coolant Pump(s), without consulting with the Technical Support Center.	02/15+	1000+	
18X	Contingency Cue Card to be used in the event that the Shift Manager/Unit Supervisor contacts the Technical Support Center, with the intention of restarting the Reactor Coolant Pump(s).	02/15+	1000+	
	The Emergency Response Organization evaluates the changing plant condition. The Emergency Director orders a review of EALs in accordance with RA-EP-01500, Emergency Classification.			

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

	The Emergency Director declares a SITE AREA EMERGENCY in accordance with EAL SS-3, "Automatic trip failed to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken within the Controls Area (CA) failed to shut down the reactor. (Refer to Section 6.3, EAL Declaration Table for details.)	~02/27	~1012	
	The following actions are taken in accordance with RA-EP-01800, Site Area Emergency:			
19X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station alarm will be sounded and SITE AREA EMERGENCY announcement made. 	~02/27	~1012	

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An ERO Group Page will be activated to notify the ERO of the upgrade. Ottawa and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio are notified of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY in accordance with RA-EP-02110, Emergency Notification. The NRC Incident Response Center notifications are simulated to the Control Cell. 			<p>Ottawa and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio receive notification of the SITE AREA EMERGENCY using the dedicated telephone system.</p> <p>State and County officials notify the ORO of the change in classification.</p>
	Containment radiation levels reach 15 R/hour (RE 4596 A & B).	~02/29	~1014	
MS-6	The #2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump trips on overspeed. During the overspeed trip, the Trip/Throttle Valve jams into its closed seat.	~02/30	~1015	
MS-5	When a start is attempted, #2 Makeup Pump fails to start.			
MS-7	When attempted to start, Containment Spray Pump #2 trips on instantaneous overcurrent.	02/30+	1015+	
MS-8	An Equipment Operator will be directed to place the Start Up Feedwater Pump into service. The Equipment Operator will be unable to rack in the supply breaker for the Start Up Feedwater Pump.			
	The Operators will have identified the loss of all feedwater and per DB-OP-02000 Specific Rule 4 will have attempted to start the standby			

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	Makeup Pump (#2) if not previously attempted. The #2 Makeup Pump will not start. The Crew routes to DB-OP-02000 Attachment 4 and implements MU/HPI PORV cooling.			
20X	Contingency input in the event a SITE AREA EMERGENCY has not been declared by this time. Evacuate non-essential personnel from Protected Area (PA) to the Training Center and assembly of the OCA is directed. (simulated)	~02/32	~1017	
<p><i>NOTE:</i> Evacuation of PA non-essential personnel will be simulated. However, the ERO should carry out their actions as if it were occurring. The Control Cell will perform the role of Assembly Area Coordinators and respond to the ERO directions for relocation of nonessential personnel.</p>				
21X	Security polls the security computer to determine the status of the evacuation of non-essential personnel from the Protected Area. The print-out is taken to the OSC in accordance with RA-EP-02520, Assembly and Accountability.	02/35+	1020+	
22X	For purposes of this exercise there will be no unaccounted for individuals. Security will conducted sweeps of the OCA. Because OCA assembly is simulated no announcements will be made.	02/50+	1035+	

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
23X	If requested by offsite, the EOF verifies the siren activation by polling the siren feedback system. All sirens will respond that they sounded for 3 minutes.			<p>Ottawa and Lucas Counties coordinate times for Siren EAS/NOAA activation. (Ottawa County is responsible for this activation.) The EAS message is made and sirens are activated (simulated).</p> <p>Following the simulated siren sounding, Ottawa County may request the Utility verify the siren status.</p>
24X	The Control Cell as the simulated Assembly Area Coordinators provide numbers for the assembly areas.	02/50+	1035+	<p>Closure of Parklands (Subarea 10) and restricting boating traffic (Subarea 12) (If not done at ALERT) (simulated).</p> <p>State of Ohio:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Makes a "State of Emergency" declaration. • Restricts rail traffic (simulated). • Requests FAA restrict airspace (simulated). • Informs federal agencies (simulated).
MS-9	Site Protection Officer Player contacts the Central Alarm Station, and reports a water leak in the Turbine Building.	03/36	1121	<p>Ottawa County relocates Carroll Elementary School (If not done at ALERT) (Simulated).</p> <p>Ottawa and Lucas Counties consider precautionary Protective Actions, including relocation of EPZ or Host School populations.</p>

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
				Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) recommends precautionary sheltering of livestock within a 10-mile radius. (simulated)
				Ottawa and Lucas Counties activate Reception Centers and Emergency Worker Decontamination/Monitoring Stations (simulated).
	News statements are prepared and media briefings held at the JIC.			State and counties issue news statements as required.
25	Security makes sweeps in the OCA making announcement over the portable Public Address System. (Simulated)	03/15+	1100+	The American Red Cross opens Care Centers (simulated).
				Counties initiate activation of traffic and access control (simulated).
	Containment radiation levels exceed 3,000 R/hour on RE 4596 A & B. This meets the Loss of Fuel Clad barrier criteria.	~03/20	~1105	

INITIATING EVENT FOR THE GENERAL EMERGENCY

Valve CV-343 fails catastrophically in MPR #4. Activity passes from the RCS into Containment, through Penetration #17, and is released to the environment through the Station Vent. This event constitutes the loss of the CONTAINMENT fission product barrier, but is not directly observable by the Operations Crew.	03/59	1144
High activity is indicated in the Plant Vent.	04/01	1146

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	<p>The Emergency Response Organization evaluates the changing plant condition. The Emergency Director orders a review of EALs in accordance with RA-EP-01500, Emergency Classification.</p>			

GENERAL EMERGENCY

	<p>The Emergency Director declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY in accordance with EAL RG-1, Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem Child Thyroid CDE at the site boundary OR EAL FG-1, Loss of any two barriers and loss or potential loss of the third barrier.</p> <p>(Refer to Section 6.3, EAL Declaration Table for details.)</p> <p>The following actions are taken in accordance with RA-EP-01900, General Emergency procedure:</p>			
26X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station Alarm is sounded and the GENERAL EMERGENCY announcement is made via a request from the Emergency Director in the Emergency Operations Facility. • Dose Assessment staff performs calculations (RA-EP-02240) and provides offsite protective action recommendations (RA-EP-02245) the default PARs 1, 2, 10, and 12. • An ERO Group Page will be activated 	04/16	1201	<p>Ottawa County confirms activation of Sandusky (simulated) and Erie County (simulated) Offsite Response Organizations.</p> <p>Fire Departments conduct route verification and notify mobile/hearing impaired (simulated).</p> <p>State of Ohio requests FAA</p>

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
27	<p>to notify the ERO of the upgrade.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ottawa and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio are notified of the GENERAL EMERGENCY classification and the Protective Action Guidelines. • The NRC Incident Response Center notifications (i.e., Red phone) are made to the Utility Control Cell. • Evacuation of non-essential Station personnel initiated. (simulated) <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p><i>NOTE:</i> Evacuation of non-essential personnel to an offsite assembly site will be simulated. However, the ERO should carry out their actions as if it were occurring.</p> </div> <p>If requested by offsite, the EOF verifies the siren activation by polling the siren feedback system. All sirens will indicate that they have sounded if polled.</p>			<p>restrict airspace (simulated).</p> <p>Ottawa and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio receive notification of the GENERAL EMERGENCY, using the dedicated telephone system.</p> <p>State and County officials notify Offsite Response Organizations of the change in classification.</p> <p>State and Counties monitor plant conditions.</p> <p>State of Ohio develops plume dose projections.</p> <p>State of Ohio coordinates with Ottawa and Lucas Counties in developing Protective Action Recommendations.</p> <p>Ottawa and Lucas Counties provide protective action decisions to the public.</p> <p>The EAS and siren systems are activated (simulated).</p> <p>Following the simulated siren sounding, Ottawa County may request the Utility verify the siren status.</p> <p>Ottawa County notifies special facilities of evacuation. Ottawa</p>

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
				County authorizes relocation of special facilities, as applicable (simulated).
				Ottawa and Lucas Counties assure monitoring of emergency worker exposure.
				Counties monitor evacuation routes (simulated).
	News statements are prepared and media briefings held at the Joint Information Center (JIC).			State and counties provide news statements and are represented at JIC media briefings.
				Ottawa and Lucas Counties implement KI decision, if requested, by ODH.
28X	Contingency input in the event a GENERAL EMERGENCY has not been declared by this time.	04/21	1206	Host counties staff reception and care centers, and emergency worker decontamination monitoring stations (simulated).
	The wind direction shifts from 79 degrees to 84 degrees.	05/30	1315	
	The Dose Assessment staff evaluates the change in wind direction and revises offsite protective action recommendations to evacuate Subareas 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, and 12.			
	Offsite agencies are notified of the change in PARs as per RA-EP-02110.	05/45	1330	Ottawa and Lucas Counties and the State of Ohio receive notification of the GENERAL EMERGENCY , using the dedicated telephone system.

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
				State of Ohio develops plume dose projections based on the change in metrological conditions.
				State of Ohio coordinates with Ottawa and Lucas Counties in developing a revised Protective Action Recommendations.
				Ottawa and Lucas Counties provide revised protective action decisions to the public.
				The EAS and siren systems are activated (simulated).
	The #1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is repaired and returned to service.	06/03	1348	Following the simulated siren sounding, Ottawa County may request the Utility verify the siren status.
	The #2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip/Throttle Valve is repaired, and the pump is returned to service.	06/12	1357	Ottawa County notifies special facilities of evacuation. Ottawa County authorizes relocation of special facilities, as applicable (simulated).
	The Station Vent monitor reading begins decreasing - the release has ended.	06/40	1425	
29	The management team begins classification downgrading and event termination discussions by evaluating plant conditions and formulating a plan to terminate the event. Requirements of RA-EP-01500,	06/45	1430	

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
	Emergency Classification, are reviewed.			
	The Recovery Advisor collects data for the recovery plan in accordance with RA-EP-02720, Recovery.			
	<p><i>NOTE:</i> Lead Controller shall contact all onsite and offsite Lead Facility Controllers to ensure objectives have been met prior to terminating the evaluated exercise.</p> <p>Some facility may be engaged in activities that continued beyond the end of the evaluated exercise such as a media briefing or data evaluation.</p>			
	The Evaluated Exercise is terminated.	07/00	1445	
30X	Termination announcement is made over the Gai-Tronics and in all ERFs.			State and Counties receive notification that the Evaluated Exercise is terminated.
	The following actions are taken by controllers:			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ERO pager "All Clear" code, "0000" is activated. This advises all ERO pager carriers that the Exercise is over. 			
31	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The NRC will be notified by the Control Cell that the Davis-Besse Exercise activities have ended. 			
32	A short break will be taken. Following the break, self-critiques will be held in each of the participating facilities.			A short break will be taken. Following the break, self-critiques will be held in each of the participating facilities.

6.4 SEQUENCE EVENTS (NON-UTILITY)

Cue Card #	Utility Action	Drill Time	Approx Time	Offsite Action
33	Players assigned to take part in the recovery discussions assemble in DBAB Room 209/210, following the facility critiques.		~1630	

This page is intentionally blank.

GIS Training Outline for August 30, 2011

1. FlexViewer Introduction
 - a. Edits
 - b. Sub Areas
 - c. Demonstration with Q&A

2. Flexviewer Demographic Analysis
 - a. Population in EPZ, County, Subareas
 - b. Block Grouping Census Measuring
 - c. Demonstration with Q&A

3. Database information (Jays information)
 - a. Critical infrastructure
 - b. Emergency Management Counties
 - c. Evacuee / Emergency Worker
 - d. Field Support Locations
 - e. Demonstration with Q&A

4. Google Earth and FlexViewer inter-relationships
 - a. Description of links to FlexViewer
 - b. Similarities and Differences
 - c. Accessing additional layers
 - d. Parcel Data
 - i. Information about residences
 - ii. Traffic
 - iii. Weather
 - iv. Street View
 - v. Data importing
 - e. Demonstration with Q&A