



Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Drill Date - August 18, 2010

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



FEMA

Published September 17, 2010

Unclassified

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

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Contents

Executive Summary	3
Section 1: Exercise Overview	4
1.1 Exercise Details	4
1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership	4
1.3 Participating Organizations	5
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary	7
2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design	7
2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities	7
2.3 Scenario Summary	7
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities	8
3.1 Drill Evaluation and Results	8
3.2 Summary Results of Drill Evaluation	8
3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries	10
3.3.1 Support Jurisdictions	10
3.3.1.1 Cleburne Reception Center and Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station	10
Section 4: Conclusion	17
Appendix A: Improvement Plan	18
Appendix B: Drill Evaluators and Team Leaders	22
Appendix C: Acronyms and Abbreviations	23
Appendix D: Exercise Plan	24

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 18, 2010, an out-of-sequence Reception Center drill was conducted for the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), located near Glen Rose, Texas. Personnel from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA (DHS/FEMA) Region VI, evaluated all activities. The purpose of the drills was to assess the level of preparedness of local responders to react to a simulated radiological emergency at the CPNPP. The previous Reception Center drill conducted at this site was on November 17, 2004.

Personnel from the City of Cleburne Emergency Management Personnel, City of Cleburne Fire Department, City of Cleburne Police Department, City of Cleburne Environmental Health Department, City of Cleburne Independent School District, City of Cleburne Administration, City of Cleburne Engineering, Johnson County Emergency Management, Careflite Ground, American Red Cross, and CPNPP participated in the drill. Evaluation Areas demonstrated included: Emergency Operations Management, Protective Action Implementation, and Support Operations/Facilities. Cooperation and teamwork of all participants was evident during the drill, and DHS/FEMA Region VI wishes to acknowledge these efforts.

This report contains the final evaluation of the out-of-sequence drill. The participants demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies and one Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs), corrected during the drill. Eight Plan Issues were also identified as a result of the drill.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant

Type of Exercise

Drill

Exercise Date

August 18, 2010

Program

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type

Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

Lisa Hammond

RAC Chair

FEMA Region VI

Technological Hazards Branch Chief

800 North Loop 288

Denton, Texas, 76209

940-898-5199

lisa.hammond@dhs.gov

Linda Gee

Federal Planning Team Lead

FEMA Region VI

Technological Hazards Program Specialist

800 North Loop 288

Denton, Texas, 76209
940-898-5368
linda.gee@dhs.gov

Glenn Corbin
State/Health Planner
Texas Department of State Health Services
State Emergency Planner
Radiation Control Program, Environmental Monitoring
P. O. Box 149347
Austin, Texas, 78714
512-834-6770
glenn.corbin@dshs.state.tx.us

Wade Parks
State Planner
Texas Division of Emergency Management
Tech. Hazards Supervisor
P. O. Box 4087
Austin, Texas, 78773
512-424-5677
wade.parks@txdps.state.tx.us

James "Jim" Ogden
Utility Exercise Planner
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant
Offsite Emergency Planner
P. O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, Texas, 76042
254-897-6470
jogden2@luminant.com

1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant drill:

State Jurisdictions

Texas Department of State Health Services

Support Jurisdictions

City of Cleburne Emergency Management

City of Cleburne Fire Department

City of Cleburne Independent School District

City of Cleburne Administration Support

City of Cleburne Environmental Health Department

City of Cleburne Police Department

City of Cleburne Engineering

Johnson County Emergency Management

Careflite Ground

Private Organizations

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant

American Red Cross

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

The DHS/FEMA Region VI Office evaluated the drill on August 18, 2010 to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP). The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations during a simulated radiological emergency.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

Exercise objectives and identified Capabilities/REP Criteria selected to be exercised are discussed in the Exercise Plan (EXPLAN), Appendix D.

2.3 Scenario Summary

The drill scenario was developed to evaluate the response of drill participants to an incident requiring evacuation of the public from the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone surrounding Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. The drill scenario provided for the evaluation of the City of Cleburne's Reception Center's ability to conduct monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees. A separate walk-through of the congregate care facility was conducted to ensure that services and accommodations provided at the Conference Center were consistent with established American Red Cross guidelines.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Drill Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the August 18, 2010, drill evaluation to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of local governments in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone surrounding Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the April 25, 2002, Federal Register, Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Evaluation Methodology. Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the extent of play agreement used in this drill are found in Appendix D of this report.

3.2 Summary Results of Drill Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 3.1 on the following page, presents the status of all exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercise)

D - Deficiency assessed

A - ARCAs assessed or unresolved ARCAs from previous exercises

P - Plan Issue

N - Not Demonstrated

Table 3.1 - Summary of Drill Evaluation

DATE: 2010-08-18 SITE: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, TX M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Cleburne RC
Emergency Operations Management		
Mobilization	1a1	
Facilities	1b1	
Direction and Control	1c1	
Communications Equipment	1d1	
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1	P
Protective Action Decision Making		
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1	
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1	
Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs	2b2	
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1	
Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1	
Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1	
Protective Action Implementation		
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1	
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1	
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2	
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1	
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2	
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1	
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2	
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions.	3f1	
Field Measurement and Analysis		
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1	
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2	
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3	
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1	
Laboratory operations	4c1	
Emergency Notification and Public Info		
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1	
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2	
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3	
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1	
Support Operations/Facilities		
Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees	6a1	P
Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment	6b1	
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1	M
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1	

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 Cleburne Reception Center and Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-6a1-A-06

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: During the process of monitoring evacuees following decontamination, it was noted that the emergency worker had the survey equipment on the X10 scale and not the X1 scale (according to plans and procedures and instructions attached to the Thermo/Bicron Surveyor 50 survey meter the meter should be on the X1 scale when conducting surveys).

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The emergency worker did not check the survey meter settings prior to use.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 J.10.h, J.12, and K.5.a

EFFECT: The survey meter would not have detected lower levels of contamination that exceed the contamination action level identified in procedures while set on the X10 scale.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The EW was asked to re-demonstrate the use and knowledge of the survey equipment. The EW successfully re-demonstrated the use of the survey meter by accomplishing surveys using the proper scale.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.e.1, 6.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-1e1-P-01

CRITERION: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

CONDITION: The current plans and procedures make reference to the use of Form-5 for auto registration and Form-6 for tracking the issuance of survey meters. Copies of these forms, that are required for use by emergency workers, are not included in the plans.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The tracking form (Form-6) and auto registration form (Form-5) were not included in the latest revision of the reception center plan.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a

EFFECT: Emergency workers might not use the required form because they would not know to which form the plan is referring.

RECOMMENDATION: Include Form-5 and Form-6 in the plans and procedures.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-6a1-P-02

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: According to the guidance provided in the Interim Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, August 2002, the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) is required to demonstrate the ability to monitor 20% of the

population assigned to the facility in a 12 hour period. Using the current numbers provided in the plans, 20% of 14, 994 amounts to 2999 people expected at the reception center. It was noted that the scenario calculation only called for 1000 evacuees, which is not compliant with current plans and guidance. This reduction in number is due to inaccurate assumptions and misinterpretations of the guidance and should be corrected in future updates of the Cleburne reception center plan. It was also noted that the population number in the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Cleburne Reception Center Operation Plan and Procedures (revised July 2010) have not been updated to reflect the current evacuation time estimates (ETE) from 2008.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Offsite Response Organizations have misinterpreted the guidance in the Interim Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual. In addition, the plan has not been updated to reflect the most current evacuation time estimates (ETE) completed in 2008.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 J.10.h, J.12, and K.5.a

EFFECT: The assumptions made by the plan with regard to the populations expected at the reception center are not compliant with current guidance and are made using inaccurate population numbers. This underestimation of the amount of evacuees who may report to the reception center could result in a lack of preparedness to receive and process evacuees in timely manner.

RECOMMENDATION: Update plans to reflect current population numbers and remove assumptions on population estimation that are not compliant with current guidance.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-6a1-P-03

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: The responsibility for interior decontamination of vehicles was not captured in the Cleburne Reception Center plans.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The responsibility to decontaminate the interior of a vehicle is assumed by the offsite response organization to be the responsibility of Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. It may not have been included in offsite plans because it is presumed to be handled by onsite personnel.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 J.10.h, J.12, and K.5.a

EFFECT: Staff at the reception center would not be able to identify to the vehicles owner, who is responsible for completing the actions necessary to return their vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION: Update plans and procedures to reflect specifically who is responsible for completing the actions necessary to return the vehicle to its owner when the interior is contaminated. Also include how those actions will be accomplished to ensure the vehicle is returned to the owner in a timely manner.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-6a1-P-04

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: The initial monitoring staff did not have any formal method for documenting contamination when found on an evacuee.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Individuals responsible for the planning effort failed to recognize the need for documentation of contamination on evacuees.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 J.10.h, J.12, and K.5.a

EFFECT: The plans and procedures allow for decontamination of isolated areas rather than a full shower when the contamination is limited. Decontamination of isolated spots of contamination would be impossible to accomplish if the personnel decon team does not have anything documenting the location of contamination on the evacuee when they arrive at the personnel decon area.

RECOMMENDATION: Include a form for documenting areas of contamination found on evacuees during initial monitoring in plans and procedures. The form should accompany the evacuee from initial monitoring to the personnel decon area and should be provided to the personnel decon team for use during the decon process.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-6a1-P-05

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: In situations where an evacuee was determined to be contaminated, but their vehicle was clean, the procedures call for the evacuee to move the car to the impound area. Rather than allow a contaminated person to exit the monitoring area, evacuees that were found to be contaminated were asked to provide information about the location of their car. If it was determined that their car was not found to be contaminated and was moved to the clean lot, the Radiological Officer (RO) asked for the make, model, vehicle description and license plate number from the evacuee. The intent was to have these cars tagged and towed to the impound area with the other contaminated vehicles. It was noted that the information on the car was not recorded and no one was assigned to tag and tow the car.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Responders deviated from plans and procedures to reduce the potential spread of contamination that may occur when a contaminated individual was allowed to return to their car to move it to the impound lot.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 J.10.h, J.12, and K.5.a

EFFECT: The plans and procedures would have created a situation that caused spread of contamination, so the responders made a decision to deviate from the plan. The plan does not reflect the best practice demonstrated by the responders.

RECOMMENDATION: Update plan and procedures to reflect the activities demonstrated by responders during the drill in dealing with evacuee vehicles that belonged to contaminated individuals. Identify a team member who will be responsible for assuring the car is towed to the impound area. In addition, include a form that assists the responders in documenting the vehicle information so that it can be tagged and towed to the impound area.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-6a1-P-07

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: During the registration process, it was noted that the evacuees were provided a newer version of the registration form that is not currently in their plan.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Plans and procedures were not updated to reflect the use of the new form.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 J.10.h, J.12, and K.5.a

EFFECT: Documentation forms were used for registration that were not consistent with current plans and procedures.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Cleburne Reception Center Operations Plan and Procedures be updated with the newer version of the form used

during the evaluated drill and also implement a method to record the results of monitoring, and time of decontamination in these forms.

ISSUE NO.: 14-10-6a1-P-08

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: It was noted that emergency workers had beverages and were using chewing tobacco in the proximity of contaminated individuals and equipment.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The plans and procedures do not provide for the prohibition of eating, drinking, smoking or chewing in potentially contaminated areas.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 J.10.h, J.12, and K.5.a

EFFECT: Personnel could have received unsafe and unnecessary exposure.

RECOMMENDATION: Provisions for the prohibition of eating, drinking, smoking and chewing should be included in plans and procedures.

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the drill, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Texas and the affected local jurisdictions are deemed adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, 44 CFR Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Texas site-specific to Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant will remain in effect.

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Issue Number: 14-10-1e1-P-01		Criterion: 1e1	
<p>ISSUE: The current plans and procedures make reference to the use of Form-5 for auto registration and Form-6 for tracking the issuance of survey meters. Copies of these forms, that are required for use by emergency workers, are not included in the plans.</p>			
<p>RECOMMENDATION: Include Form-5 and Form-6 in the plans and procedures.</p>			
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</p>			
CAPABILITY:		PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:	
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:		START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:		ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

Issue Number: 14-10-6a1-P-02		Criterion: 6a1	
<p>ISSUE: According to the guidance provided in the Interim Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, August 2002, the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) is required to demonstrate the ability to monitor 20% of the population assigned to the facility in a 12 hour period. Using the current numbers provided in the plans, 20% of 14, 994 amounts to 2999 people expected at the reception center. It was noted that the scenario calculation only called for 1000 evacuees, which is not compliant with current plans and guidance. This reduction in number is due to inaccurate assumptions and misinterpretations of the guidance and should be corrected in future updates of the Cleburne reception center plan. It was also noted that the population number in the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Cleburne Reception Center Operation Plan and Procedures (revised July 2010) have not been updated to reflect the current evacuation time estimates (ETE) from 2008.</p>			
<p>RECOMMENDATION: Update plans to reflect current population numbers and remove assumptions on population estimation that are not compliant with current guidance.</p>			
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</p>			
CAPABILITY:		PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:	
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:		START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:		ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

Issue Number: 14-10-6a1-P-03		Criterion: 6a1
<p>ISSUE: The responsibility for interior decontamination of vehicles was not captured in the Cleburne Reception Center plans.</p>		
<p>RECOMMENDATION: Update plans and procedures to reflect specifically who is responsible for completing the actions necessary to return the vehicle to its owner when the interior is contaminated. Also include how those actions will be accomplished to ensure the vehicle is returned to the owner in a timely manner.</p>		
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</p>		
CAPABILITY:	PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:	
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

Issue Number: 14-10-6a1-P-04		Criterion: 6a1
<p>ISSUE: The initial monitoring staff did not have any formal method for documenting contamination when found on an evacuee.</p>		
<p>RECOMMENDATION: Include a form for documenting areas of contamination found on evacuees during initial monitoring in plans and procedures. The form should accompany the evacuee from initial monitoring to the personnel decon area and should be provided to the personnel decon team for use during the decon process.</p>		
<p>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</p>		
CAPABILITY:	PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:	
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

Issue Number: 14-10-6a1-P-05	Criterion: 6a1
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ISSUE: In situations where an evacuee was determined to be contaminated, but their vehicle was clean, the procedures call for the evacuee to move the car to the impound area. Rather than allow a contaminated person to exit the monitoring area, evacuees that were found to be contaminated were asked to provide information about the location of their car. If it was determined that their car was not found to be contaminated and was moved to the clean lot, the Radiological Officer (RO) asked for the make, model, vehicle description and license plate number from the evacuee. The intent was to have these cars tagged and towed to the impound area with the other contaminated vehicles. It was noted that the information on the car was not recorded and no one was assigned to tag and tow the car.

RECOMMENDATION: Update plan and procedures to reflect the activities demonstrated by responders during the drill in dealing with evacuee vehicles that belonged to contaminated individuals. Identify a team member who will be responsible for assuring the car is towed to the impound area. In addition, include a form that assists the responders in documenting the vehicle information so that it can be tagged and towed to the impound area.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:

CAPABILITY:	PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:

Issue Number: 14-10-6a1-P-07	Criterion: 6a1
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ISSUE: During the registration process, it was noted that the evacuees were provided a newer version of the registration form that is not currently in their plan.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Cleburne Reception Center Operations Plan and Procedures be updated with the newer version of the form used during the evaluated drill and also implement a method to record the results of monitoring, and time of decontamination in these forms.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:

CAPABILITY:	PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:

Issue Number: 14-10-6a1-P-08		Criterion: 6a1	
ISSUE: It was noted that emergency workers had beverages and were using chewing tobacco in the proximity of contaminated individuals and equipment.			
RECOMMENDATION: Provisions for the prohibition of eating, drinking, smoking and chewing should be included in plans and procedures.			
CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:			
CAPABILITY:		PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:	
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:		START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:		ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

APPENDIX B: DRILL EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2010-08-18, SITE: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, TX

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
Cleburne Reception Center and Emergency Worker Monitoring/Decontamination Station	Nan Calhoun Brad DeKorte *Linda Gee Tim Pflieger	DHS/FEMA DHS/FEMA DHS/FEMA DHS/FEMA
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Meaning
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCA	Areas Requiring Corrective Action
CPNPP	Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOP	Extent of Play
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
EW	Emergency Worker
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
IC	Incident Commander
NCT	North Central Texas
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
PD	Personnel Decontamination
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RC	Reception Center
RO	Radiological Officer
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter

APPENDIX D: EXERCISE PLAN

CLEBURNE RECEPTION CENTER DRILL

August 18, 2010

Revision 4

1.0 Introduction

This drill will verify that the Cleburne Reception Center Personnel can effectively activate and operate the Reception Center in the event of an evacuation of the public from the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP).

2.0 FEMA Evaluation Criteria

1. e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k., 11, K.3.a.)
3. a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)
6. a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h.; K.5.b)
6. c.1 Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross current planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., 12.)

3.0 Guidelines

The following guidelines have been developed to instruct drill participants of the extent of play required to fulfill the drill evaluation criteria.

1. Drill lead controller is responsible for conducting the drill per the drill package.
2. Controllers will be assigned as needed to ensure the completion of drill evaluation

criteria.

3. This is a FEMA evaluated drill. Therefore, prompting is not permitted.
4. On-the-spot corrections are allowed in accordance with Recommended Initiative 1.5-Correct Issues Immediately (March 31, 2000)
5. The controllers should allow free-play. However, free-play will be stopped under the following conditions:
 - a. if the action taken would prevent a drill evaluation criterion from being met or is outside the scope of the drill.
 - b. if the actions are judged to be unsafe or leading to violations of the law.
 - c. if the actions would degrade systems or equipment, or degrade response to a real emergency.
6. If an actual emergency occurs, the drill will be terminated.
7. All radio and telephone communications will begin and end with **THIS IS A DRILL.**
8. All signs and postings should be marked either **FOR TRAINING USE ONLY** or **DRILL IN PROGRESS.**

4.0 Extent of Play

These guidelines define the extent of play required to meet an objective and identify planned simulations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k., 11, K.3.a.)

No exceptions are requested.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

For player safety and working conditions in the intense summer heat, access to anti-contamination clothing will be demonstrated; however it will not be worn during the exercise to prevent heat stress. The use of Personal Protective

Equipment (PPE) will be demonstrated in accordance with applicable procedures, upon request by a FEMA evaluator, in air conditioned space inside of the Reception Center (i.e. dress/undress). In addition, FEMA evaluations taking place outside in the heat will be completed as early as possible during the morning of the drill to prevent potential heat injuries to both players and evaluators.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h.; K.5.b)

All positions at the reception center will be staffed and rosters will be available to demonstrate personnel depth for subsequent shifts.

All evacuee and vehicle decontamination measures will be simulated.

All evacuee contamination levels will be via controller injects. Free play of these activities is not permitted.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with current American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., 12.)

American Red Cross personnel will demonstrate congregate care via sample shelter setup, equipment and supplies in a loaded trailer, rosters, interviews, and other resource documents.

5.0 Participants

This drill will require the participation of the following agencies:

- City of Cleburne Emergency Management Personnel
- City of Cleburne Administrative Support Staff as needed
- City of Cleburne Fire Department Personnel
- City of Cleburne Police Department
- City of Cleburne Parks and Recreation Personnel
- City of Cleburne Animal Control
- American Red Cross Personnel

6.0 Controller and Role Players

A minimum of five (5) controllers will be required for this drill.

A minimum of six (6) role players with automobiles will be required for this drill.

7.0 Initial Conditions

An event at the CPNPP near Glen Rose, Texas began approximately 4 hours ago. A radioactive release in a Southeasterly direction from CPNPP has prompted the evacuation of approximately 1,000 residents and visitors from the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

8.0 Narrative Summary

The Reception Center staff has been alerted to mobilize and prepare for evacuees by the Somervell County Judge. Set-up and activation has been completed according to the current Cleburne Reception Center Operations Plan and Procedures and the staff is ready for evacuees.

Evacuees begin to arrive at the Reception Center shortly after completion of the activation.

9.0 Time Line

0930 Drill begins. Notification to City of Cleburne received from the Somervell County EOC

1000 Evacuees begin to arrive

1115 Drill terminates

1130 Critique

1215 Activities Concluded

10.0 Facility Address

Cleburne Senior Citizens Center
1212 Glenwood Drive
Cleburne, TX

EVACUEE INFORMATION FOR CONTROLLERS

EVACUEE NO.	CONTAMINATION STATUS	VEHICLE STATUS
1 (Male)	Contaminated	Contaminated Exterior
2	Clean	Clean
3	Clean	Clean
4 (Female)	Contaminated	Clean
5 (Male)	Contaminated	Contaminated Exterior & Interior
6 (Female)	Contaminated	Clean


NOTE TO CONTROLLERS IN DECONTAMINATION FACILITIES: Contaminated persons after completion of shower will be clean. The attendant will do a whole body frisk following the shower and will also frisk valuables in a bag. Once the personnel decon has been accomplished, no readings over background are necessary. The objective here is to evaluate the process not trip up the decon attendants.

CONTAMINATION LEVELS: When a portal monitor is used to determine evacuee contamination levels the individual will be asked to step back and be re-surveyed by the portal monitor. Reception Center staff should then, at a minimum, survey hands and feet to locate/isolate contamination on the individual with a hand-held survey meter. (NOTE: The sex of the evacuee may vary due to the volunteer Role Players available on the date of the exercise)


The following levels apply to individual Role Players: (Note: All radiation levels are above background)

EVACUEE #	Location of Contamination and Level(s)	Remarks
#1	Left Hand – 450 cpm, Right Hand – 300 cpm,	Will be clean after shower
#4	Left Hand and Forearm – 400 cpm	Will be clean after shower
#5	Right Hand – 650 cpm, Seat of Pants – 400, and both shoes 600 cpm	Will be clean after shower
#6	Top of right shoe – 500 cpm, Right Hand – 350 cpm	Will be clean after shower

VEHICLE CONTAMINATION DETAILS FOR CONTROLLERS



CONTAMINATION INFORMATION FOR VEHICLE #1



CONTAMINATION INFORMATION FOR VEHICLE #5

NOTE: Vehicles depicted may differ from actual vehicles driven during this event.

Cleburne Reception Center Drill August 18, 2010

MESSAGE 1

TIME: 0930

FROM: Somervell County Judge

TO: City Manager's Office 817/645-0901

TEXT:

THIS IS A DRILL!

THIS IS THE SOMERVELL COUNTY JUDGE AT THE SOMERVELL COUNTY EOC. AN EVACUATION OF THE SOUTHEASTERN AREA OF SOMERVELL COUNTY HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED DUE TO A RELEASE OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL AT THE COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. WE REQUEST THAT THE CLEBURNE RECEPTION CENTER BE ACTIVATED FOR THE RECEIPT OF EVACUEES.

WE ANTICIPATE THAT APPROXIMATELY 1,000 PERSONS ARE AFFECTED BY THIS EVACUATION.

THE EVACUATION INFORMATION HAS JUST BEEN BROADCASTED TO THE PUBLIC OVER THE EAS STATION. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE FIRST EVACUEES WILL BE ARRIVING IN CLEBURNE WITHIN AN HOUR.

MY CALL BACK NUMBER IS 682-936-9100.

PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR NAME FOR THE LOG.

THANK YOU.

THIS IS A DRILL.

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