



FEMA

October 7, 2010

NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Madam/Sir:

Enclosed find a final copy of the Braintree Host Community Reception Center Drill Report conducted on July 17, 2010.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and local emergency response organizations successfully demonstrated their capabilities to implement off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures based on the evaluation by the Regional Assistance Committee and a team of Federal evaluators. There were no deficiencies, three Areas Requiring Corrective Action, which were successfully re-demonstrated, and two Planning Issues.

State and local preparedness remains adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site in the event of a radiological emergency.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Steve Colman, Region I RAC Chairperson, at (617) 832-7584.

Sincerely,

Don R. Boyce
Regional Administrator

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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Drill Date - July 17, 2010

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



FEMA

Published October 05, 2010

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Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Published October 05, 2010

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Appendix A: Improvement Plan

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 17, 2010, a Host Community Reception Center Drill was conducted at the Braintree High School in Braintree, MA.

The purpose of this Drill was to assess the capability of the Braintree and Weymouth Emergency Management Personnel to respond to a radiological incident involving the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The drill was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, towns of Braintree and Weymouth, and the numerous volunteers who participated in this drill.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the Exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation results of the Braintree Reception Center Drill.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Type of Exercise

Drill

Exercise Date

July 17, 2010

Program

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type

Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

None

1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station drill:

State Jurisdictions

Public Health

Support Jurisdictions

Braintree/ Weymouth Emergency Management Agency (full-time and volunteer employees)

Mayor's Office

Police Department

School Department

Town Clerk

Private Organizations

American Red Cross

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service

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SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
- Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Department of Energy

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

U.S. Center for Disease Control

U.S. Department of Transportation

U.S. Department of Agriculture

U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station to FEMA Region I by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and involved local jurisdictions occurred in 1982. Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA in October 1984, under 44 CFR 350.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region I RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Administrator.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;
- 67 FR 20580, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," September 12, 2001 and amended April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions and the state and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue, and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

2.3 Scenario Summary

No separate scenario submitted for the Braintree Reception Center Graded Drill. This is an out of sequence demonstration in support of the Pilgrim Plume/Ingestion Exercise scheduled for November 16 & 17, 2010.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Drill Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation at each jurisdiction or functional entity that participated in the Braintree Reception Center Drill that was conducted on July 17, 2010.

The purpose of the drill was to assess the capabilities of the Braintree Reception Center staff to demonstrate the adequacy of the offsite emergency response plans and procedures, if there were a radiological incident involving the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

Each functional jurisdiction or entity was evaluated on its demonstration of criteria contained in the drill evaluation areas as outlined in the federal Register, Volume 67, No. 80 "FEMA - Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (April 25, 2002).

All activities were based on the plans and procedures and completed as they would have been in an actual emergency except as noted in the Extent of Play Agreement.

3.2 Summary Results of Drill Evaluation

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Local Emergency Response Organizations successfully demonstrated their capabilities to implement their off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures based on the evaluation of this drill by the Regional Assistance Committee and a team of Federal evaluators. There were no deficiencies. There were three Areas Requiring Corrective Action that were successfully re-demonstrated "on the spot" and two Planning Issues.

The matrix presented in the table on following pages presents the status of all drill evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during the drill at each participating jurisdiction and functional entity. Drill criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCA's assessed and no unresolved ARCA's from prior exercise)
A - ARCA's assessed or unresolved ARCA's from previous exercises
D - Deficiency assessed

N - Not Demonstrated

Table 3.1 - Summary of Drill Evaluation

DATE: 2010-07-17 SITE: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, MA M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Braintree RC Ops	Braintree RC Dosimetry	Braintree RC Port Sec Mon	Braintree RC Female Mon/Decon	Braintree RC Male Mon/Decon	Braintree RC KI Decision	Braintree RC Regn	Braintree RC Vehicle
Emergency Operations Management									
Mobilization	1a1	M							
Facilities	1b1								
Direction and Control	1c1	M							
Communications Equipment	1d1	M							
Equip & Supplies to support operations	1e1	M							
Protective Action Decision Making									
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1								
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1								
Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs	2b2								
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1								
Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1								
Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1								
Protective Action Implementation									
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1		M		M	M			
Implementation of KI decision	3b1						M		
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1								
Implementation of protective actions for Schools	3c2								
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1								M
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2								
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1								
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2								
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions.	3f1								
Field Measurement and Analysis									
Adequate Equipment for Plume Phase Field Measurements	4a1								
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2								
Field Teams Manage Sample Collection Appropriately	4a3								
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1								
Laboratory operations	4c1								
Emergency Notification and Public Info									
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1								
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2								
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception areas	5a3								
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1								
Support Operations/Facilities									
Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees	6a1		M	M	M	P		M	
Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment	6b1			M					M
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1								
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1								

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Massachusetts Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 Braintree Reception Center KI Decision

- a. MET: 3.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Braintree Reception Center Operations

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.2 Braintree Reception Center Dosimetry

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.3 Braintree Reception Center Port & Secondary Monitoring

- a. MET: 6.a.1, 6.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.4 Braintree Reception Center Female Monitoring & Decontamination

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.5 Braintree Reception Center Male Monitoring & Decontamination

- a. MET: 3.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 6.a.1,

ISSUE NO.: 48-10-6a1-P-

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: PLANNING ISSUE: Braintree Reception Center SOP, BTR-22.

Initial Personnel Monitor Section, page 15 of 47, task d.(2), Perform operational check using the posted sign. The posted sign is referenced on page 2 of 47 in BTR-22 titled: "CDV-700 operational check." This sign is considered a form and contains the procedure necessary to place a CDV-700 survey meter into correct operation. In

In addition the full text of this form - sign/procedure is not correct in placing the CDV-700 in correct operation:

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The operational check procedure on the posted sign was not posted into the BTR-22 procedure, and it was also incomplete.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654; A.2.a; BTR-22

EFFECT: The effect of not having the full CDV-700 operational check/procedure posted onto the BTR-22 SOP could potentially create improper operationally CDV-700 survey meters as the required procedure could be done incorrectly or not identify an improperly operating survey meter.

RECOMMENDATION: a. Have the CDV-700 operational test procedure posted into the BTR-22 SOP.

b. The part of the procedure that needs to be added is. (1) After turning on meter wait 30 seconds.

(2) Place the center of the survey probe on the center of the side of the meter that has a radioactive check source, have the selector on X-10, listen to the influx of clicks and read the reading on the bottom CPM of the meter scale. Refer to the Range of Reading card usually on the left side of the of the meter box. If needle reads anywhere between of the range of reading card the meter is then considered operational. If needle does not fall within the range or reading card consider the meter non-operational obtain another meter.

ISSUE NO.: 48-10-6a1-P-

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b.)

CONDITION: PLANNING ISSUE: BTR-22, SOP Initial Personnel Monitoring, Page 15 of 47, Rev 9, 10/09, GENERAL EMERGENCY; Guidance 4a "Take

background readings every thirty minutes and post on Monitor Guide. The SOP requires frequent background readings however there is no specific procedure on how to determine a background reading, using the appropriate survey meter. The SOP does not specify how to determine a background reading in the immediate work area. There was no reference to a form or sign in the SOP.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Procedure not added to the BTR- 22 SOP

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654; A.2.a; BTR-22, Page 15 of 47, Rev 9, 10/09

EFFECT: Not having a specific procedure could cause errors in background readings at work stations. Cannot have a requirement to do a semi technical procedure unless there is a published step by step procedure in the SOP.

RECOMMENDATION: Add to BTR-22 in the appropriate place a detailed procedure that defines the exact steps for determining how to determine background reading in the immediate work area(s). Specify the type meter and probe to be used to determine background. Ensure that all areas in the SOP that specify use of survey meter have the suggested procedure changes published in the appropriate places.

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.6 Braintree Reception Center Registration

- a. MET: 6.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.a.1.a.01-81

ISSUE NO.: 48-10-6a1-A-

CRITERION: Reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., K.5.b)

CONDITION: The Registration clerk's IP calls for each person going to a shelter

receive a map. Map count is used to determine shelter spaces and there are the same amount of maps for each facility as there are shelter spaces in that facility. The registration clerks were not giving maps to each person going to a shelter.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Lack of training.

REFERENCE: Town of Braintree Monitoring and Decontamination SOP BTR-22 ,
Registration Coordinator and Clerks IP 7 & 8.; NUREG J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a

EFFECT: Without maps given to each individual going to a shelter, Reception Center officials and Braintree EOC don't know when a shelter is nearing capacity and when to open a new shelter, causing delay and confusion in sheltering the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Evaluator informed controller and Registration Coordinator ensured each person going to a shelter got a map.

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.7 Braintree Reception Center Vehicle Mon/Decontamination

a. MET: 3.d.1, 6.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 48-10-6b1-A

CRITERION: Facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG_0654, K.5.b)

CONDITION: Personal protective equipment (PPE) in the form of disposable anti-contamination suits listed as required in inventory list of work box #5 and Vehicle Monitoring IP was not present at the vehicle monitoring position.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Suits were possibly removed for training and not returned.

REFERENCE: Town of Braintree Monitoring and Decontamination SOP BTR-22.
NUREG K.5.b

EFFECT: Without these suits the Vehicle monitoring crew could have become contaminated by touching contaminated vehicles as they monitored vehicles.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: When the vehicle monitoring crew returned to the Reception Center to get their dosimetry, they showed the evaluator the suit storage location, which did have sufficient resources to accomplish their mission.

ISSUE NO.: 48-10-6b1-A-

CRITERION: Facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG_0654, K.5.b)

CONDITION: The Vehicle Monitoring IP their called for the staff to re-check background radiation every 30 minutes. They did first calculation at 0952. At 1100 when directed by the RC Manager to begin Vehicle Monitoring they had not done another background check until the evaluator informed the Controller.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: New personnel were on the team that day and require additional training

REFERENCE: Town of Braintree Monitoring and Decontamination SOP BTR-22
Vehicle Monitoring Part 2, 4.a
NUREG J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a

EFFECT: Without frequent background checks, vehicle monitoring readings would be inaccurate possibly causing contaminated vehicles to pass as clean or clean

vehicles to be deemed contaminated

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Evaluator informed controller and a background check was conducted before vehicle monitoring began.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Issue Number: 48-10-6a1-P-		Criterion: 6a1
ISSUE: PLANNING ISSUE: Braintree Reception Center SOP, BTR-22. Initial Personnel Monitor Section, page 15 of 47, task d.(2), Perform operational check using the posted sign. The posted sign is referenced on page 2 of 47 in BTR-22 titled: "CDV-700 operational check." This sign is considered a form and contains the procedure necessary to place a CDV-700 survey meter into correct operation. In addition the full text of this form - sign/procedure is not correct in placing the CDV-700 in correct operation.		
RECOMMENDATION: a. Have the CDV-700 operational test procedure posted into the BTR-22 SOP. b. The part of the procedure that needs to be added is. (1) After turning on meter wait 30 seconds. (2) Place the center of the survey probe on the center of the side of the meter that has a radioactive check source, have the selector on X-10, listen to the influx of clicks and read the reading on the bottom CPM of the meter scale. Refer to the Range of Reading card usually on the left side of the of the meter box. If needle reads anywhere between of the range of reading card the meter is then considered operational. If needle does not fall within the range or reading card consider the meter non-operational obtain another meter.		
CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:		
CAPABILITY:		PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

Issue Number: 48-10-6a1-P-		Criterion: 6a1
ISSUE: PLANNING ISSUE: BTR-22, SOP Initial Personnel Monitoring , Page 15 of 47, Rev 9, 10/09, GENERAL EMERGENCY; Guidance 4a "Take background readings every thirty minutes and post on Monitor Guide. The SOP requires frequent background readings however there is no specific procedure on how to determine a background reading, using the appropriate survey meter. The SOP does not specify how to determine a background reading in the immediate work area. There was no reference to a form or sign in the SOP.		
RECOMMENDATION: Add to BTR-22 in the appropriate place a detailed procedure that defines the exact steps for determining how to determine background reading in the immediate work area(s). Specify the type meter and probe to be used to determine background. Ensure that all areas in the SOP that specify use of survey meter have the suggested procedure changes published in the appropriate places.		
CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:		
CAPABILITY:		PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:
CAPABILITY ELEMENT:	START DATE:	
AGENCY POC:	ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:	

APPENDIX B: BEST PRACTICES

1. Shelter Capacity Tracking System

Summary: The Braintree Reception Center had a unique way of tracking shelter capacity by the number of maps distributed to evacuees.

Description: Each shelter has a map specific to that shelter. There was one map available at the Registration Clerk desk for each space in the shelter. (i.e. If the shelter had 100 beds, there was a stack of 100 maps specific to that shelter. As evacuees going to that shelter came in, every member of the household, including children, were given a map. By tracking the number of maps distributed, the Registration area manager could determine the remaining capacity of that shelter. If a stack of maps was getting low, the registration manager could direct another shelter to staff up and be prepared for evacuees. In this way there was no delay in getting evacuees situated in temporary shelter.

APPENDIX C: DRILL EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2010-07-17, SITE: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, MA

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
Braintree Reception Center KI Decision	Barbara Thomas	FEMA - RI
Braintree Reception Center Operations	*Taneeka Hollins	FEMA - RI
Braintree Reception Center Dosimetry	Helen Laforge	FEMA - RI
Braintree Reception Center Port & Secondary Monitoring	John Rice	FEMA - RI
Braintree Reception Center Female Monitoring & Decontamination	Helen Laforge	FEMA - RI
Braintree Reception Center Male Monitoring & Decontamination	Robert Swartz	FEMA - RI
Braintree Reception Center Registration	Don Carlton	FEMA - RI
Braintree Reception Center Vehicle Mon/Decontamination	Don Carlton	FEMA - RI
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX D: EXERCISE PLAN

This section contains the Extent of Play (EOP) agreement between FEMA and Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. The EOP highlights the specific actions to be demonstrated by the Reception Center staff in accordance with the NUREG-0654 Criteria. It also lists the criteria that FEMA has approved for "on the spot" redemonstration.

COMPLIANCE	ACTIVITY	LOCATION
1. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
2. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
3. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
4. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
5. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
6. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
7. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
8. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
9. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center
10. FEMA	Reception Center	Reception Center

BRAINTREE RECEPTION CENTER DRILL

JULY 17, 2010

SUMMARY OF EXTENT OF PLAY

This extent of play describes the demonstration of objectives that will occur on July 17, 2010. Participants in this demonstration will be limited to Reception Center staff, the Staging Area Manager and a RACES Operator at the Transportation Staging Area, and the Braintree Emergency Management Director and a RACES operator at the Braintree Emergency Operations Center. Braintree Reception Center staff will prestage at the beginning of the drill. Evacuee and vehicle monitoring staff will set up and demonstrate those areas of the facility.

Primary and backup communication links to the Braintree EOC will be demonstrated once; thereafter, all communication with the EOC will be simulated. Controller messages will provide direction and information normally issued from Braintree EOC. This will include information about the emergency, such as emergency classification levels, protective action directives, etc. Calls will not be made to non-participating locations; phone lists will be ready for use in simulation.

One vehicle monitoring lane will be demonstrated. Three cars will be monitored for contamination. One car will be found to be contaminated and decontamination procedures will be demonstrated. A roster will be shown to the FEMA Evaluator for all three lines.

Three portal monitors will be demonstrated and monitoring staff will use CDV-700 survey meters with pancake probes. Of the seven (7) evacuees, one male and one female will be found to be contaminated. Decontamination will be simulated through a discussion of techniques and procedures. One secondary evacuee monitoring team member and one male and female evacuee decontamination team member will dress out.

The five (5) remaining simulated evacuees will provide fictitious information to elicit response from the reception center staff. Three (3) will require mass care shelter, one (1) will require transportation to shelter and one (1) will seek information about other family members who also evacuated.

***Criterion 6.a.1:** The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

***Criterion 6.b.1:** The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles

The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) plans and procedures.

***Note:** If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

STAFFING

Braintree Reception Center - Call down of staff to confirm their availability and ETA will be demonstrated in sequence on November 16, 2010. The following Reception Center staff will be pre-staged on July 17, 2010, at the facility at the time the demonstration is scheduled to begin:

Reception Center Manager

Registration Coordinator

Registration Clerks

American Red Cross

RACES

Animal Control Officer

Medical Evaluator

Reunification Clerk

Monitoring and Decontamination Station (MDS) Team Leader

Dosimetry Coordinator

Personnel Group Leader

Portal Monitor Operators

Initial Personnel Monitors

Personnel Recorders

Personnel Decontamination Assistants

Secondary Personnel Monitors

Vehicle Group Leader

Vehicle Monitors

Vehicle Recorders

Vehicle Decontamination Assistants

Runner(s)

MDPH Reception Center Liaison

Set up Crew

Maintenance Supervisor

Braintree Transportation Staging Area (TSA) and Braintree EOC - Will be pre-staged with limited staff to support operations at the Reception Center. Participants will be limited to:

Staging Area Manager at the TSA

RACES Operator at the TSA

RACES Operator at the Braintree EOC

Staff will show call down/computerized lists to the FEMA evaluator.

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