

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

PUBLIC MEETING
BETWEEN U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O350 PANEL
AND FIRST ENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY
OAK HARBOR, OHIO

Meeting held on Tuesday, August 12, 2003, at
2:00 p.m. at the Oak Harbor High School, Oak Harbor, Ohio,
taken by me, Marie B. Fresch, Registered Merit Reporter,
and Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.

PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT:

- U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- John "Jack" Grobe,
Senior Manager, Region III Office
& Chairman, MC 0350 Panel
- William Ruland, Senior Manager NRR
& Vice Chairman, MC 0350 Panel
- Christine Lipa, Projects Branch Chief
- Christopher Scott Thomas,
Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. NRC Office - Davis-Besse
- Jon Hopkins,
NRR Project Manager - Davis-Besse
- Jack Rutkowski, NRC Resident Inspector
- FIRST ENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY
- Lew Myers, FENOC Chief Operating Officer
- Robert W. Schrauder,
Director - Support Services
- James J. Powers, III
Director - Nuclear Engineering
- Mark Bezilla, Vice President/Plant Manager
- Steve Loehlein,
Manager - Nuclear Quality Assessment
- Rick Dame, Reliability Unit Supervisor

1 MS. LIPA: Good afternoon. I
2 would like to welcome FirstEnergy and members of the public
3 for coming to this meeting today. This is a public meeting
4 between the NRC's Davis-Besse Oversight Panel and
5 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company.

6 My name is Christine Lipa, and I'm the Branch Chief
7 in Region III, who is responsible for the NRC's inspection
8 program of Davis-Besse.

9 The next slide shows the purposes of this meeting.

10 So, we'll talk about NRC's Oversight Panel
11 activities since the last public meeting and going forward,
12 and then also we'll turn over later on in the presentation
13 to FirstEnergy and they'll discuss the status of activities
14 in their restart plan.

15 The next slide shows the agenda. We'll start off
16 with introductions and then we'll go through the rest of
17 these items. You can see down near the bottom, we'll take
18 a break before we have the public comment and question
19 period. And we'll have another break as appropriate after
20 about an hour and 15 minutes.

21 So, I would like to make some introductions here at
22 the NRC table. To my far left is Jon Hopkins. He's the
23 NRR Project Manager for the Davis-Besse facility.

24 Next to John is Bill Ruland. Bill is a Senior
25 Manager in NRR and he's also the Vice Chairman of the

1 Davis-Besse Oversight Panel.

2 On my left is Jack Grobe. He's a Senior Manager in
3 the Region III Office in Lisle, Illinois, and he's the
4 Chairman of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel.

5 On my right is Scott Thomas. He's the Senior
6 Resident Inspector at the Davis-Besse facility.

7 We also have Jack Rutkowski running the slides.
8 He's the Resident Inspector.

9 We also have Rolland Lickus. He's responsible for
10 state and government affairs. Nancy Keller was in the
11 foyer with the handouts and greeting everyone. And we have
12 Jan Strasma, he's our Public Affairs. There in the back.

13 So, Lew, would you like to introduce your staff.

14 MR. MYERS: Absolutely. Thank
15 you, Christine.

16 Today we have a couple people in the audience. Gary
17 Leidich is with us in the audience. Gary is the new
18 President of FENOC. I'm glad to have him here.

19 Also with him is Bill Cottle. Bill is the Chairman
20 of the Nuclear Committee Board with FirstEnergy. He's also
21 a FirstEnergy Board Member, and he's here with us today.
22 Bill is out there also.

23 Now, the team. We have at the table today, we have
24 Steve Loehlein down at the far end. Steve is the Manager
25 of our Nuclear Quality Assessment Group.

1 Bob Schrauder is next to him. I think everyone
2 knows Bob. He's Support Services Manager responsible for
3 high pressure injection project that we have going on.

4 Mark Bezilla is to the left of me. Mark is the Vice
5 President of the Davis-Besse plant.

6 Rick Dame next to him. Rick is sort of a new face.
7 He's from our Perry Plant. And he's the Nuclear
8 Engineering Supervisor at Perry Plant. He's here as
9 Restart Test Manager to help out with not only the restart
10 of the plant, but to lay the plans out for the upcoming
11 Mode 3 Temperature Pressure Test.

12 And then next to him is Jim Powers. Jim is the
13 Director of Nuclear Engineering.

14 MS. LIPA: Okay, thank you,
15 Lew.

16 Also, are there public officials or representatives
17 of public officials in the audience?

18 MR. PAPCUN: John Papcun,
19 Ottawa County Commissioner.

20 MR. WITT: Jere Witt, Ottawa
21 County Administrator.

22 MS. LIPA: Okay. Thank you.

23 I would like to point out, this meeting is open to
24 public observation, obviously, but this is a business
25 meeting between the NRC and FirstEnergy. At the conclusion

1 of the business portion of this meeting, but before we
2 adjourn the meeting, we will have a public questions and
3 comments period.

4 There are copies of the August edition of our
5 monthly newsletter in the foyer, and copies of the slides
6 that I'm using up here. Also the Utility has their slides,
7 and those would be all used for references for you today.

8 We also have a public meeting feedback form that you
9 can use to fill out and provide comments on how this
10 meeting goes and mail that back to us or hand it to us
11 today.

12 We're having this meeting transcribed today by
13 Marie Fresch to maintain a record of the meeting; and the
14 transcript will be available on our web page. It's usually
15 about 3 to 4 weeks. So, it's important that all speakers
16 use the microphone today, so the audience and the
17 transcriber can hear.

18 The next slide shows a summary of the July 9th
19 meeting. And during that meeting, the NRC provides a
20 status of items on our Restart Checklist and some of our
21 ongoing inspections. And then later in today's
22 presentation, we'll provide an update on recently completed
23 and ongoing NRC activities.

24 FirstEnergy last month also provided an update on
25 the efforts that they have made towards restart. They

1 provided an update of several projects in topical areas,
2 such as containment activities, the high pressure injection
3 pump issues and their plans to resolve them, and then some
4 performance in the area of Operations, Engineering and
5 Maintenance. And they also discussed several plant
6 improvements that have been made during the extended outage
7 and some scheduled items. And, the transcripts from that
8 meeting are available on our website.

9 The next slide shows some significant NRC activities
10 since the previous meeting.

11 Actually, these next two slides discuss some
12 important activities since last month's meeting. We held a
13 Resident Inspection Exit and issued that Resident Report.
14 The number is 03-15. That was issued on July 30.

15 And in that report, there were several findings
16 discussed. Most importantly, we issued a preliminary
17 yellow finding for the potential containment sump clogging
18 issue that was identified. And our goal is to have the
19 final significance issued for that issue within 90 days.
20 Also, in that same report was an unresolved item
21 associated with the high pressure injection pumps.

22 At each recent meeting we've been discussing the
23 Licensee's plan to resolve the high pressure injection
24 pumps going forward. Also, as part of the NRC's process,
25 we need to review the as-found condition and the risk

1 significance of that condition. So, we need to complete
2 our preliminary risk assessment associated with the high
3 pressure injection pumps and then issue that preliminary
4 determination.

5 That same inspection report also contained three
6 self-revealing noncited violations associated with human
7 performance during routine activities.

8 The next three items on the slide are some resent
9 decisions on the part of the 0350 Panel to close Restart
10 Checklist Items and that was based on recent inspection
11 results. Those include the Integrated Leakage Test on
12 Containment, which has a separate report. That report is
13 number 03-05. And then two programs; Boric Acid Corrosion
14 Management and Radiation Protection, which will be
15 documented in the next Resident Inspection Report.

16 And what we did in the monthly newsletter, is we
17 actually have the entire list of Restart Checklist Items,
18 so that you can follow along which ones are closed. They
19 have a check mark and they're in italics and they have the
20 report number reference of where that checklist was closed
21 and what the basis was.

22 Okay. The next slide has additional NRC
23 activities. We recently issued three inspection reports.
24 I already discussed two of those. That was the Resident
25 Report and the Containment Leak Rate.

1 The third report is the Phase 2 of the Management
2 and Human Performance. And based on the results of that
3 inspection, we have closed the Restart Checklist Items that
4 were associated with the root causes in the vessel head
5 degradation and the corrective actions for those root
6 causes.

7 We do still have a Phase 3 Inspection of the
8 Management/Human Performance, and that is ongoing and that
9 will continue and that evaluates the effectiveness of the
10 corrective actions.

11 We also recently revised or updated the confirmatory
12 action letter. This is a relatively minor revision which
13 was issued simply to change the location that we requested
14 the samples to be sent. Those are being sent to an NRC
15 contractor for future research.

16 The next slide on continuing NRC activities. System
17 Health is one of the inspections that continues on site
18 this week. Plans to exit within the next two weeks.

19 For Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work
20 Environment, I already discussed our plans for the Phase 3
21 of Management and Human Performance. We're also planning
22 on a public meeting on that topic. That date has not been
23 set. We're looking at September right now.

24 Also the Corrective Action Team Inspection. They
25 are back on site this week. We have three NRC Engineering

1 Inspectors and four contractors that are reviewing numerous
2 Condition Reports to determine whether those issues have
3 been appropriately resolved. That team will be on site for
4 two of the next three weeks and they plan to exit in early
5 September.

6 Then, of course, we have the two Resident Inspectors
7 on site with ongoing inspection, and routine activities.

8 The next slide shows some other upcoming NRC
9 activities. And I'll be covering most of these when I
10 discuss the open Restart Checklist items.

11 And the next slide shows more up coming activities.

12 What I want to point out is some of the Licensee
13 Event Reports have been, are being inspected by the
14 Corrective Action Team and some are being reviewed by the
15 Resident Inspectors. And in each case, what we do with the
16 Licensee Event Report is we review the past significance of
17 the issue as well as the Licensee's plans to resolve the
18 issue going forward.

19 We also plan a Confirmatory Action Letter Update,
20 again, once all the vessel head samples are received by our
21 contractor and inventoried, then we will update the
22 Confirmatory Action Letter to close two items, that Vessel
23 Head Quarantine and the Root Cause.

24 Next slide shows the Open Restart Checklist. I
25 think it's actually several slides. What I wanted to do is

1 walk through just the ones that are open and what our plans
2 are for each one.

3 So, the first one is 2.a. Well, let me just point
4 out to you that 15 of the 31 items on the Checklist remain
5 open; and that is the Restart Checklist Item, Restart
6 Checklist Revision.

7 So, for Item 2.a, which is the Reactor Pressure
8 Vessel Head Replacement. The NRC completed initial
9 inspection of this item and we found the replacement vessel
10 head to be acceptable. That's been documented, but this
11 item remains open pending the final testing. And the
12 Licensee will be taking the plant to Modes 3 and 4 and
13 doing what we're calling a Normal Operating Pressure Test,
14 a 7-day test to test the vessel and do some other testing.

15 For Item 2.c, for Structures, Systems and
16 Components inside Containment. We did Extent of Condition
17 Inspections, and we still have three unresolved items that
18 need to be reviewed by the Corrective Action Team and one
19 will be during the 7-day Normal Operating Pressure Test.

20 For Item 2.c.1, which is the sump. The sump
21 modification, Licensee did a rather extensive modification,
22 and most of that modification was reviewed and is
23 documented in a separate Inspection Report, 03-06, which
24 was issued in June. And that inspection concluded that the
25 new sump meets the design requirements, but there were a

1 couple of open items from that inspection and we still have
2 one that the residents are following up on. That will be
3 documented in a future report.

4 For Item 2.d, which is Extent of Condition of
5 Systems Outside Containment, several systems have already
6 been walked down by the Resident Inspectors and other
7 inspectors, and those have been documented in three
8 inspection reports. There has been no significant issues
9 to-date, but the Residents need to review the Licensee's
10 closure package before we can evaluate that item for
11 closure.

12 The next slide shows Item 2.e, which is the High
13 Pressure Injection Pump. The Licensee plans to modify the
14 pump. I know we're talking about that some more today and
15 we have plans to review that modification in detail.

16 For Item 3.a, this is on the Corrective Action
17 Program. And what we still have left to do is we have a
18 Corrective Action Team Inspection that's on site for two of
19 the next three weeks. And, we really want to see what kind
20 of results they have, and that will help the panel make
21 their decision on this checklist item.

22 Item 3.c is Quality Audits and Self-Assessments of
23 Programs. The NRC reviewed the Licensee's Root Cause
24 Evaluation of the Quality Assessments and reviewed the
25 Licensee's Assessments of its Programs. The results of

1 part of that have been completed and they're documented in
2 Inspection Reports 02-11 and 03-09. Those were both issued
3 in early July. Self-Assessments will be covered in a
4 future inspection.

5 For item 3.i, this is the Licensee's new Process
6 that they implemented for Ensuring Completeness and
7 Accuracy of Required Records and Submittals to the NRC.

8 The Licensee has an action plan. They selected a
9 sample of approximately 70 documents to review for
10 Completeness and Accuracy, including generic letters,
11 bulletins, Licensee Event Reports and amendment requests.
12 And the NRC is planning a separate inspection once the
13 Licensee has completed their action plan to review the
14 results in this area.

15 The next slide shows 4.b, Effectiveness of
16 Corrective Actions. I talked earlier about the Phase 3
17 Inspection we have planned for the Management and Human
18 Performance area. That has already started, but it still
19 continues. And that will be documented in Inspection
20 Report 03-12.

21 That inspection is evaluating the Licensee's Process
22 for tools for monitoring the improvement of Safety Culture
23 and Safety Conscious Work Environment and the Effectiveness
24 of the Employee Concerns Program. That's the status of
25 that one.

1 For 5.a, this a review of Licensee's Restart Action
2 Plan, which has been submitted on the docket. The NRC
3 plans review of that action plan and associated findings
4 and those will be evaluated by the Resident staff and the
5 Panel and assisted by Region and Headquarter Staff. And
6 the results of that review will be discussed in a Resident
7 Inspection Report.

8 For Item 5.b, Readiness for Restart, our inspectors
9 have been inspecting this area for quite awhile now.
10 Various reviews of the Licensee has been done to review
11 different systems and different topical areas. This
12 checklist item will remain open pending a completion of
13 inspection. That looks like it will be done in the next
14 one to two weeks.

15 5.c is Operation's Readiness for Restart. There is
16 actually several parts to this one. Management and Human
17 Performance Phase 3 Inspection has a part of it where they
18 evaluate the Licensee's recent Restart Readiness Assessment
19 Process that they're going through.

20 Other activities that are covered in this item are
21 the Resident Staff evaluating activities at each mode
22 change. And, we also plan a Restart Readiness Assessment
23 Team Inspection. That will be an NRC team of 4, 5
24 individuals. That will include some round-the-clock
25 observations of control room and content of operation.

1 That inspection is currently scheduled to begin near the
2 time the Licensee enters Mode 4 for the second time.

3 Okay. 5.d is Test Program Development and
4 Implementation. Licensee has several tests that are unique
5 and several other tests that need to be done as a result of
6 this outage. Specifically, an example is the 7-day Normal
7 Operating Pressure Test, some control rod drive tests that
8 are necessary, anyway -- and also especially necessary
9 because of the new vessel head. And also, they've done a
10 lot of maintenance and modifications that need to be
11 reviewed for a Post Maintenance and Post Modification
12 Testing.

13 So, the NRC's plans to close this item will be based
14 on completion of those inspections related to individual
15 tests and evaluation of acceptability of the Licensee's
16 Post Maintenance and Post Modification Testing; and that
17 will be done by Resident and Region III staff.

18 So, the next slide is the last slide on the
19 Checklist, and it covers Item 6.g, which is a License
20 Amendment Request that the Licensee has submitted in May.
21 NRC questions were sent to the Licensee and those have been
22 answered, and the submittal is being reviewed.

23 Item 7.a is the Confirmatory Action Letter and that
24 has several items on it. Each of those items needs to be
25 resolved before plans for a restart meeting. And right now

1 this item is open pending completion of each of the items,
2 and the Licensee plans a restart report and we plan on a
3 public meeting to discuss Licensee's Readiness for Restart
4 when we get to that point.

5 So, that provides a status of the NRC's Restart
6 Checklist. And, that's my last slide. Unless there are
7 further comments from the NRC table, I'll turn it over to
8 FirstEnergy.

9 Okay, go ahead.

10 MR. MYERS: Thank you,
11 Christine.

12 We have several desired outcomes today. First of
13 all, Jim Powers will provide you with an understanding of
14 solutions on the High Pressure Safety Injection Pump debris
15 issue and the safety margin improvements that are resulting
16 from the upgrades that have been made using the new
17 state-of-the-art Electrical Distribution System software
18 called ETAP.

19 Next, Mark Bezilla and Rick Dame will provide you
20 with an understanding of the Readiness for Mode 3 Pressure
21 and Temperature Test, and what I believe we will accomplish
22 during that test performance.

23 I will then provide you with our present status on
24 Safety Margin Culture Assessment that was performed in late
25 July. I will also provide you with an understanding of the

1 barriers that have been anchored in both the organization
2 and our people to ensure safety-related activities receive
3 the appropriate attention.

4 Finally, our Quality Assurance Manager, Steve
5 Loehlein, will provide you with some observations and
6 assessments of activities performed at the site since our
7 last meeting.

8 With that, I'll turn it over to Bob Schrauder.

9 MR. SCHRAUDER: Thank you, Lew.

10 As Lew said, I am Director of the Support Services
11 Department. And one of the functions that I have during
12 restart is to be the Senior Sponsor Project Manager for the
13 resolutions of the High Pressure Injection Pump.

14 Desired outcome that I have for today's interface
15 will provide you with an understanding of our solution
16 path, both for the High Pressure Injection Pump and to show
17 you that the solution assures that Davis-Besse High
18 Pressure Injection Pumps will be operable for all
19 conditions.

20 We are pleased with the progress that we've made on
21 the project since the last public meeting. I feel like I
22 can say with confidence that we have a design that will
23 assure that these pumps will perform as expected under all
24 necessary conditions.

25 Topics that I'm going to cover today are listed

1 here. And I'll start kind of in the middle and talk about
2 where we're at with the design, and what design we have,
3 our Defense-in-Depth Design. And then, I'm going to drop
4 back a little bit and talk about where we are currently
5 with the project and how we arrived at the designs we
6 currently have. And then, I'll talk about where the
7 project goes from here.

8 Next slide, please.

9 As I said, we are using a Defense-in-Depth Approach
10 to increase the safety margin for these pumps. This design
11 incorporates and improves the hydrostatic bearing design
12 which is qualified for use in the French PWR's by Pump
13 Guinard.

14 A part of that design locates bearing supply line,
15 the waterline to the hydrostatic bearing on the discharge
16 side of the impeller versus the suction side of the
17 impeller which is on ours currently. What that does is
18 reduces concentration and size of the debris that's able to
19 get to the hydrostatic bearing.

20 We will use either a 50 or 90 mil strainer as an
21 additional improvement to the French design, which will
22 further protect the hydrostatic bearing orifice.

23 Our design will incorporate what I'll call an escape
24 groove in the bearing, which allows debris to more readily
25 clear from the bearing pad itself.

1 And then, additionally, we are hardfacing all of the
2 critical wear surfaces with Stellite on this pump. That
3 includes the ~~wearings~~ wear rings , the bushings, the hydrostatic
4 bearing, the shaft sleeve itself, as well as the
5 hydrostatic bearings, as I said.

6 So, if we move forward with how did we get to
7 there. I'll drop back to progress on this project. We
8 initially came up with a design concept and then went into
9 verification and testing on that design concept. The
10 verification testing provided us information; and some of
11 that information is different than what our expected
12 results would be. And that enabled us to finalize our
13 design and properly characterize the debris loading for our
14 upcoming qualification testing.

15 We're currently in the process of optimizing the
16 design it will use and finalizing qualification test
17 criteria. Now I'll discuss with you what those
18 optimizations are a little bit later in the presentation.

19 So, what were the findings that we found during our
20 verification testing? The going-in assumption that we had
21 was that whatever debris in the water that got through our
22 strainer, which at that time was a 90 mil strainer, that as
23 it got into the bearing pads on the hydrostatic bearing,
24 that the shaft of the high pressure injection pump
25 rotation, which rotates about 3600 RPMs, would expel any

1 small debris that got in there, and would not cause any
2 plugging in the bearing pad itself.

3 We had that assumption verified by several of the
4 pump experts that we were working with on this project.
5 And that assumption turned out not to be the case, not to
6 be demonstrated in our verification testing.

7 Verification showed debris that was larger than the
8 bearing clearance. Clearance between the pad itself and
9 the clearance to what I'll call the escape channel for
10 debris out of that, could become lodged in the bearing
11 pockets and that eventually led to plugging of those
12 pockets.

13 We also found that fibrous material in significant
14 quantities is problematic both for the strainer performance
15 and for the tight clearances in the pump and hydrostatic
16 bearing.

17 We found that an unrealistic LOCA debris
18 characterization combined with small break LOCA pump load
19 resulted in excessive debris loading.

20 The next two slides will discuss how we incorporated
21 these findings into our final design concept in our
22 preparations for qualification testing. I'm going to do
23 that mostly through the use of these pictures. Bring us
24 back here. This is a very good depiction of our current
25 hydrostatic bearing in our high pressure injection pumps.

1 This area is what we refer to as the bearing pad.

2 This is the orifice that feeds the water into hydrostatic
3 bearing. And these are what I refer to as the escape
4 grooves in the bearing. So, that is our original design.

5 Because this bearing pocket was plugging, initially
6 we began then to adjust the size of our strainer in getting
7 it down to a small enough size that any debris that
8 actually got through would clear this approximately 6 to 7
9 mil clearance between the shaft and that escape groove
10 there. And in the course of those verification tests, we
11 found that fibrous material in the debris characterization
12 as well as other particles were plugging those very fine --
13 they were in the range of 6 to 7 1/2 mil strainers.

14 So, we adjusted our strainers several times and
15 finally we stopped, stood back, and said, okay, look, what
16 are we trying to do here? We're trying to demonstrate we
17 can clear debris out of this hydrostatic bearing. So, we
18 stopped the project for several days. Reconvened. Went
19 through several, went through engineering review
20 committees, if you will, and got another set of figures on
21 the project that would result with what is going on, what's
22 plugging, how do we keep it from plugging, and where do we
23 go from here.

24 Next slide, please.

25 One of the things that we found, and part of it was

1 information we gleaned from France, were that these
2 pockets, the way they are curved up to this clearance,
3 actually contributes to the clearance plugging as it kind
4 of tapers it right down to that point. So, we believe and
5 the French have incorporated that squaring this design
6 pocket and make it a constant depth would avoid that
7 condition of kind of easing the debris into the, into the
8 slot.

9 We also came up with this approach of cutting a
10 groove across the bearing and into the escape hatch. That
11 groove is about a hundred mils by a hundred mil channel.
12 It goes over to there.

13 We believe that that would keep the bearing clear,
14 and that we could go back to a 90 degree, 90 mil strainer
15 in this event.

16 So, we incorporated that design. Our next set of
17 verification tests, we took those two assumptions and made
18 different combinations of them for verification. That is,
19 some of the pockets were left, the original design
20 curvature like that, just the channel cut into it. Others
21 of those pockets had this squared up design or constant
22 depth design that I talked about. We moved grooves into
23 these locations, top and bottom, center locations;
24 different locations on there, and combined them with the
25 different configurations.

1 What we found in that verification test was that
2 indeed this groove seemed to be instrumental in maintaining
3 the bearing pocket unplugged. All of the pockets that we
4 had that groove in remained clear in that verification test
5 with the 90 mil strainer.

6 We also had evaluated that groove, rotodynamics
7 model, we showed it would not impact the rotodynamics of
8 the pump; it would not rob the pump of its needed supply
9 flow. It had very little impact at all on that. And,
10 again, none of the pockets with that groove plugged.

11 We also were able to obtain the French design. And
12 they were going to manufacture a bearing for us with that
13 design. The duration was excessive as the French go on
14 holiday this time of year. What we did agree to was to
15 purchase that design from them.

16 Next slide, please.

17 What the French. This is not a real clear picture.
18 I have to be a little careful because this design is
19 proprietary for the French, so it's not drawn
20 interdimension to their specs, but that is the orifice
21 where it comes into the bearing. There is an H
22 configuration etched into that. The legs of the H coming
23 parallel with this plane. We have two legs here and
24 across, the groove across that, that formulate what we call
25 the H groove.

1 The escape grooves that I showed you before are
2 eliminated in this design. One of the things that this
3 design does is it increases metallic space in here and it
4 actually stiffens this bearing and maintains its ability
5 to, for the shaft to pump not to vibrate. So, you get a
6 stiffer bearing and still have the ability with this pump,
7 as a hydrostatic bearing.

8 We've taken this, that concept, because we have
9 shown those grooves that I showed you before to be
10 effective in clearing. Our next verification test will
11 again have the five, or what are now the H grooves in this
12 thing. And we will run that in different configurations
13 again with grooves cut in right at the edge here coming at
14 a 45-degree angle. We have pockets like that. We'll have
15 some with a groove on both sides of the H. All four of the
16 H's with a groove cut into it.

17 That's what I was talking about earlier about
18 optimizing this design to find where best to put the groove
19 and whether that groove makes any difference in this
20 design; and if so, which one of them is the most effective,
21 or is one groove the appropriate approach to take on that.

22 Next slide.

23 This is the location of the strainers on the
24 discharge side. What that does, what the discharge, by
25 putting it on the discharge side, we have a couple of

1 effects. The flow in this pump, if I look at it coming
2 across this picture, the flow would be going this way. The
3 flow to the bearing is actually bypass flow through the
4 ~~wearings~~ wear rings, and that flow comes in this direction.

5 So, it's going back towards its path of least
6 resistance for the ~~wearings~~ wear rings which is back to the side of
7 lower pressure. As you increase stages of this pump, you
8 increase the pressure, so that the leakage path moreover
9 wants to go back.

10 On the suction side location of the strainer, you
11 are further away from the shaft on this thing. Being
12 further away, you're not as able to take advantage of the
13 centrifugal forces that come out of the power itself as you
14 eject water into its normal pump flow path and also there
15 is a shorter route up to the inlet of the strainer itself.

16 Those two things combined. And also, one further
17 thing is on the discharge side of this impeller, the -- you
18 actually are able to use the tight wearing clearances that
19 act as a filter zone after about 10 to 12 mil clearance in
20 there, which is its preferred flow of water, so you get
21 some filtering capability out of those tight clearances
22 themselves. You're able again to get these closer to the
23 rotating shaft which maximizes the benefits of centrifugal
24 force of the water as it goes in.

25 So, the bottom line is, this design makes it more

1 difficult for debris to get through the strainer and thus to
2 the hydrostatic bearing.

3 You really need some good detail pictures to show
4 all those different flow paths.

5 MS. LIPA: So, Bob, do you
6 plug off the inlet side? That's where the tap-off was.
7 Do you plug that up?

8 MR. SCHRAUDER: Yes. That will,
9 will not be, the tap-off will be relocated to this side.
10 Actually, you move this up to the fifth stage from the
11 fourth stage for take-off.

12 These screens are also one of the enhancements I
13 talked about in the French design. They felt their design,
14 qualified their design without the screens intact. So,
15 this gets an added benefit of further straining filtering
16 the water source to the hydrostatic bearing.

17 Next slide.

18 With regard to our final qualification tests, one of
19 the things, again, I talked about the debris mode a little
20 bit. What we found was by taking the worst case debris
21 generation and combining it with the worst case pump flow
22 characteristic which is a small break LOCA, those two
23 things combined gave an unrealistic design source to the
24 strainer.

25 What we did is went back, looked at that, and came

1 up with still a conservative, but more realistic approach
2 which matches the pump operation requirements with the
3 debris generation conditions. And found that the limiting
4 case in that, is long term operation of the boron
5 precipitation control flow rate which is about 250 gallons
6 per minute, combined subsequent to a large break LOCA.
7 What that does is give you the largest amount of debris
8 generation, but the flow rate, with the small break LOCA,
9 you don't get the same amount of debris generation.

10 So, we take the large break LOCA debris generation,
11 combine that with the long term boron precipitation control
12 flow rate, and that is the limiting case for this
13 condition.

14 MR. HOPKINS: Bob, let me ask
15 you, approximately how many hours do you get to the
16 precipitation control flow rate? How many hours past the
17 accident?

18 MR. SCHRAUDER: Before you get to
19 it or how long do we assume it will run?

20 MR. HOPKINS: No, before you get
21 to it.

22 MR. SCHRAUDER: It's quite a ways
23 into it. I don't have the exact answer to your question,
24 Jon, but we will determine the long term mission time for
25 boron precipitation that shows that the pump can operate at

1 that flow for the expected duration time.

2 MR. HOPKINS: Okay.

3 MR. MYERS: I believe it's, I

4 looked at it. I believe it's like 2 to 8 hours, something

5 like that, EOP. Within the first 8 hours, that you want,

6 the boron precipitation on a large LOCA.

7 MR. HOPKINS: Okay.

8 MR. SCHRAUDER: I could get that

9 exact time for you.

10 Then we talked about fiber also. One of the things
11 that we saw was large amounts of fiber. Significant
12 quantities of fiber is a detrimental character in these
13 tests, and it impacted in several locations. The type of
14 clearances in the ~~wearings~~ wear rings, we saw fiber accumulation
15 there. We talked about those fiber mats in the past. We
16 saw fiber was an impact both in plugging our finer mesh
17 strainers that we had employed, and then it can collect
18 other grit in the fiber matting and that can cause
19 excessive wear on the parts you're trying to protect.

20 So, in response to that, we went into our
21 containment and have removed nearly all the fibrous
22 insulation in containment. We started this outage in the
23 range of 87 cubic feet of fibrous insulation in
24 containment. We were able to go back in and remove all but
25 about 9/10 of a cubic foot.

1 Of that 9/10's, it is all assumed to be subject to
2 LOCA forces and become potential for debris and the
3 transport analysis accounting for that has 50 percent of
4 that debris generation, the fiber available to the suction
5 of the hydrostatic pump out of the high pressure injection
6 pump.

7 There is also included in there an assumption of 3
8 cubic feet of fiber that was inadvertently left and/or we
9 didn't find everything, so there is a conservatism of 3
10 cubic feet. And, 3 cubic feet, we assume all that is
11 available for suction through the high pressure injection
12 pumps, which gives us a total debris loading now of 3 1/2
13 cubic feet of fibrous material available for suction
14 through the high pressure injection pump.

15 So, we took that, removed it from the containment,
16 and then were able to adjust the debris loading in our test
17 loop.

18 We also reassessed our debris transport analysis
19 which had not taken into account settling of concrete
20 rubble, if you will, that comes, that was subjected to the
21 LOCA force. And that combined sand particles and heavier
22 sand particles actually, we looked at the transport
23 analysis for that getting to the suction of the pump, which
24 again is different than the analysis that we do for loading
25 your sump screen on that.

1 We had those analyses relooked at by several
2 different engineering organizations, including the firm
3 that had done the original transport analysis and our DAB.
4 And everyone agrees that we have a more realistic, but
5 definitely a conservative debris loading for our
6 qualification test that's coming up.

7 MR. HOPKINS: Let me go over
8 that a little more, Bob. So, you're taking the transport
9 analysis another step, instead of just determining the
10 transport to the containment sump screen; you tried to take
11 it another step as to where would it settle out beyond
12 that?

13 MR. SCHRAUDER: Yes. The
14 transport analysis, not only to the sump screen. When you
15 load the sump screen, your basic conservative assumption is
16 everything that gets to it sticks on the sump screen
17 itself.

18 When you're trying to look at, okay, what is my pump
19 taking suction on, it's a different set of circumstances
20 that you look at. That is, not everything gets stopped on
21 the sump screen. Some of it passes through.

22 So, if you're loading it all, the original loading
23 it all did not find these larger pieces of concrete rubble
24 to be a problem in the strainer, so they were left in the
25 analysis as transporting through that.

1 When we transported it for what's available to the
2 pump suction, we found that there was not credit for the
3 settling of that debris. In fact, verification testing, we
4 couldn't keep it in solution. And our test tank was
5 agitated and kept stirring at a much higher velocity than
6 we expect to see in our containment.

7 So, the analysis simply allows the natural
8 occurrence of larger pieces of concrete rubble to settle
9 out, so it is not available for the suction of the pump.
10 It cannot cause excessive wear on internal parts.

11 MR. HOPKINS: I think you said
12 something I was kind of listening for, is that, it isn't
13 just analysis, you have some verification testing that the
14 concrete particles do settle out.

15 MR. SCHRAUDER: I want to say that
16 verification testing was a chance to demonstrate settling
17 of that heavy debris. It was just a fact in the
18 verification test. We couldn't keep it in solution. Even
19 in a very roughly agitated tank, it settles out. And it
20 settles out in piping and it does not, we had to
21 continuously add more and more debris to keep our mixture
22 in solution.

23 So, like I said, we've taken some of that unrealism
24 out of the analysis and we have had that double checked
25 with people who have done the original transport analysis,

1 as well as our own DAB, an independent engineering firm to
2 verify that we believe that debris loading to that high
3 pressure injection pump was definitely a concern of debris
4 loading; and we will be sharing that with the NRC inspector
5 following its design.

6 MR. HOPKINS: Okay, let's go
7 on.

8 MR. GROBE: Just one more
9 question. When you were advised of debris transfer
10 analysis to account for this concrete settling, what
11 portion of the concrete was eliminated from your mixture in
12 your sump? Was it now 5 percent reduction or 95 percent
13 reduction?

14 MR. SCHRAUDER: It was not 95
15 percent, it was closer to 90 percent and fiber.

16 MR. GROBE: So, when you do
17 these proof tests after you modify the pump, it will only
18 have ten percent of the concrete constituent --

19 MR. SCHRAUDER: Of the larger
20 concrete constituent, that's correct.

21 MR. GROBE: Okay, thank you.

22 MR. RULAND: Another question
23 on this limiting case, you're assuming for long term
24 operation for the pumps themselves? Can you elaborate a
25 little bit on exactly what that assumption is? Making an

1 assumption, maybe I shouldn't, that you're not assuming,
2 just doing the 50 gpm for some amount of time. Can you
3 elaborate a little bit on what that assumption is?

4 MR. SCHRAUDER: If I understand
5 your question correctly, you would like elaboration on why
6 is this the bounding case for long term operation?

7 MR. RULAND: Yes. Jon alluded
8 to the fact that initially there is going to be 8 hours
9 maybe during the initial post-accident phase that the pump
10 might be operating greater than 250 gpm. That's what I was
11 assuming from his question, so.

12 MR. SCHRAUDER: Very early on in
13 the accident, and initially obviously, you've taken suction
14 off of the borated water storage tank. In a large break
15 LOCA, you very quickly get to recirculation with the pump.

16 The impact on this pump -- and then you have to
17 transport, you have to generate the debris, you have to
18 transport to the pump.

19 The high flow rates on the pump, you're actually
20 able to keep the strainer clearer with the high flow rates
21 than lower flow rates on the thing.

22 So, the long term impact on the pump itself is the
23 long term duration at the 250 gpm performance measure
24 control. And it's really that phase when you're really
25 looking at the wear on your ~~wearings~~ wear rings.

1 Bob Coward is in the audience and he has been
2 working a lot in the analytical development of those
3 models, if you would like more detail on it. He would be
4 happy.

5 MR. RULAND: That's not
6 necessary right now. Thank you.

7 MR. MYERS: One thing that
8 we've done also is, during this outage, our primary method
9 and it still is for boron precipitation to the high head
10 safety injection pump is what we call a piggyback mode.
11 We've also installed a new backup, which is very robust,
12 not a licensed, but it is there. And what it does is --
13 (microphone problem)

14 MR. MYERS: During this
15 outage, we made it our licensing basis is the high head
16 safety injection, what we call piggyback mode. During the
17 outage we've installed a modification, what we think is a
18 robust modification. That's our backup method for boron
19 precipitation.

20 What we do there, is we don't use the high head
21 safety injection pump. We use the low head pump and take
22 suction from the sump to the low head, and drop those from
23 what we call the hot legs, which is pretty typical from
24 what I've seen in the industry.

25 So, the method we have now in our licensing basis is

1 take the high head pump up to the spray head, and we have
2 installed that modification. So, that either low head pump
3 right now could be used when we start back up as a method
4 of boron precipitation.

5 MR. SCHRAUDER: Okay, what are our
6 project completion plans?

7 First of all, we do plan on having, as requested,
8 additional meeting to focus solely on the final design of
9 debris characterization with the NRC; and that will occur
10 as we finalize the design and inspections are done.
11 Tentatively, that is scheduled for around the third week of
12 September right now.

13 We've also provided in the schedule for our testing
14 done at Wylie Labs, so the inspector can come down and
15 witness portions of that inspection that he needs to for
16 the NRC, be able to verify if this design will function.

17 The HPI pumps have been returned to the Davis-Besse
18 site unmodified. We have begun reassembly of those pumps
19 and we've done that so that we can perform the Normal
20 Operating Pressure Test.

21 The ordering of our hardface parts and the
22 manufacture of the hydrostatic bearing took us out far
23 enough in the schedule that we determined that it was more
24 appropriate to get that Normal Operating Pressure Test
25 done.

1 So, the NRC is reviewing a proposed license
2 amendment request that documents that the high pressure
3 injection pumps will not have to function off of the sump
4 mode during that test. So, we have returned them. They
5 are unmodified and they're being installed in the plant as
6 we speak.

7 Our test loops, as I discussed, are being modified
8 to incorporate the new flow rates for our upcoming
9 qualification tests.

10 The qualification debris characterization is being
11 finalized. And the hydrostatic bearing design is being
12 adapted and approved as we said for the Davis-Besse high
13 pressure injection pumps.

14 We're also getting, as I said, the new design
15 manufactured for the test loop of the H configuration and
16 we'll receive those shortly.

17 Our hardfaced replacement parts have been ordered,
18 as have our new hydrostatic bearings; the manufacturing of
19 those. We have not given the final etchings to be made for
20 the H and dimensions on that, but we are getting the body
21 of the hydrostatic bearing manufactured.

22 And then, we'll make our final pump modifications to
23 the HPI pumps following our Normal Operating Pressure
24 Test.

25 MR. HOPKINS: I have a question

1 here, Bob. Is there any difference between qualification
2 testing and proof testing?

3 MR. SCHRAUDER: Well,
4 qualification testing is what I'm referring to as proof
5 testing; that this design will work. So, we go through
6 verification testing first that shows us that our design
7 concepts are expected to work. Then, we'll actually go
8 into a much more lengthy qualification run on those designs
9 that will incorporate the hardfacing, and that test will
10 run for several weeks to determine what type of wear you
11 can get on it and be able to take that to the respective
12 mission times of the pumps. We'll have long duration runs
13 on your bearing design and strainer design. What I'll
14 refer to in the qualification test, that is the test that
15 will demonstrate that this design works.

16 MR. HOPKINS: Okay, thank you.

17 MR. SCHRAUDER: Anything else?

18 MR. GROBE: Yeah, I have a
19 couple questions.

20 The first one has to do with the pump manufacturer.
21 The pump that you purchased, the high pressure injection
22 pump from the French manufacture; the original hydrostatic
23 bearing, has that been retrofitted in that same pump part
24 number in France or is this new hydrostatic bearing from a
25 more recently designed pump?

1 MR. SCHRAUDER: I don't know how
2 to answer that, Jack.

3 Bob, do you know? Could you identify --

4 MR. COWARD: That goes into all
5 their designs, it was retrofitted in their design.

6 MR. SCHRAUDER: Was it in fact
7 designed for that pump?

8 MR. COWARD: (Nodded.)

9 MR. GROBE: Did Guinard file
10 a part 21 on this?

11 MR. SCHRAUDER: Did what?

12 MR. GROBE: Did the pump
13 manufacturer file a part 21 and notify you that, that this
14 hydrostatic bearing was being retrofitted? You don't know
15 or do you?

16 MR. MYERS: No.

17 MR. SCHRAUDER: It's, it's in
18 France and they do not, have not issued a part 21. We're
19 the only ones that we know of in this country that have
20 this pump.

21 MR. GROBE: Do you get
22 service letters or, you know, vendor reports or updates on
23 that, on that pump? I'm just trying to figure out how the
24 French decided to retrofit all their pumps, but you didn't
25 hear about it.

1 MR. SCHRAUDER: I'm going to have
2 to look into it, Jack. I don't want to speculate on what
3 records we do currently get from them, but I'll look into
4 that and get back with you.

5 MR. GROBE: Okay.

6 Question regarding the bearing material, this new
7 bearing that they're using in the French pumps; is it the
8 same material that you're going to be using to manufacture,
9 since you're not having them manufacture the bearing
10 itself, are you using the same materials?

11 MR. SCHRAUDER: The materials are
12 basically the same. They're stainless steel pumps with the
13 hardfacing. I'm not sure if the French use the hardfacing
14 on theirs or not.

15 Bob, can you help me with that?

16 MR. COWARD: Our plan is to use
17 a hardface hydrostatic bearing, a hardface Stellite. And,
18 Pump Guinard, in their basic design, they use a slightly
19 different base material underneath the Stellite that we
20 plan to use. We plan to use ICONEL. We think that's a
21 better combination of, for fabrication reliability. We
22 think that Stellite and INCONEL is better. And we have
23 gone through that with the French and they agree that
24 that's acceptable.

25 And if I could help, since I'm standing here now,

1 Jack, your previous question.

2 Originally, there was the design developed by Pump
3 Guinard in the 70's. Pump Guinard sold the licensing
4 rights for the U. S. and North America to B and W Canada.
5 B and W Canada is actually the quote, provider, the vendor
6 of the pump to Davis-Besse.

7 After they supplied the pump to Davis-Besse, B and W
8 Canada then sold those design rights to Heyward Tyler, a
9 third party; and Heywood Tyler would be considered right
10 now the nominal pump vendor and they have basically no link
11 at all with Pump Guinard.

12 So, the fact that Pump Guinard identified this
13 condition, this concern basically around 1979, 1980. At
14 that point, since these other commercial transactions had
15 occurred, there was no direct link from Pump Guinard back
16 to Davis-Besse.

17 MR. GROBE: It's an
18 interesting family tree.

19 MR. COWARD: Yes.

20 MR. GROBE: But it creates an
21 interesting problem for you. The pumps are getting a heck
22 of a lot more service in France than they are in United
23 States. There is only one set of pumps, I guess, in the
24 United States, in nuclear application.

25 Wouldn't it make sense that you had some connection

1 with Pump Guinard to get information, like service
2 information letters or whatever they might call it with
3 respect to the pumps in France?

4 MR. SCHRAUDER: Yes. And we have
5 made contact directly with the Pump Guinard people. And
6 we're going to have to work that relationship out with the
7 French and how we get additional information that they
8 might have on those pumps.

9 MR. GROBE: It might also be
10 interesting to see what might have been generated in the
11 last 10 years or 15 years since you started using these
12 pumps in a safety-related capacity.

13 MR. MYERS: Jack, I've asked,
14 tried, as soon as we get them off vacation, we're trying to
15 offer to pay them a vacation over here to the United
16 States, but we're asking them to bring some of their pump
17 expertise over here so we can spend a week or two with them
18 doing exactly that, and setting up the relationships that
19 we need there. So, we're pursuing that already.

20 MR. GROBE: Okay.
21 A curiosity question for me. I'm not that familiar
22 with your emergency core cooling system design parameters.
23 What is the small break LOCA injection flow rate? Does
24 anybody have that?

25 MR. MYERS: Yes, it's a little

1 bit over, this was right on the high head, about 300
2 gallons a minute.

3 MR. GROBE: 300?

4 MR. MYERS: Yeah, it's a .25
5 square inch break.

6 MR. GROBE: Okay. One more
7 question. It appears that what you're doing is designed by
8 testing, which is fine. Normally, in your Quality
9 Assurance Program, you use well known engineering
10 principles to design something and we have independent
11 checks of those calculations and analyses that are
12 performed. Are you doing this qualification testing under
13 your QA Program?

14 MR. SCHRAUDER: It's being held
15 under a regular QA program, yes.

16 MR. GROBE: So, there will be
17 detailed written procedures with requisites and --

18 MR. SCHRAUDER: That's correct.

19 MR. GROBE: Good.

20 MR. SCHRAUDER: Now, we haven't --
21 I would say the verification testing has not been done
22 under QA Program. Qualification testing will definitely be
23 done under the QA Program.

24 MR. GROBE: Okay, good. When
25 will the test procedures be written? Do you have a

1 schedule for that?

2 MR. SCHRAUDER: The test
3 procedures will be written prior to running the test.

4 MR. GROBE: That's good.

5 MR. SCHRAUDER: The schedule will
6 be done to support that, and the qualification testing is
7 scheduled to commence around the third week of August. So,
8 around the end of August, we should expect to start the
9 qualification testing.

10 MR. GROBE: Okay.

11 MR. SCHRAUDER: The procedures are
12 under development now.

13 MR. GROBE: As soon as those
14 procedures are ready for review, I would suggest that you
15 get them to Gene Imbro and his staff at headquarters.

16 MR. SCHRAUDER: Okay, will do.

17 MR. GROBE: I also understand
18 we're planning a meeting, I think sometime in mid September
19 in headquarters to discuss this issue in detail with the
20 technical staff at headquarters?

21 MR. SCHRAUDER: That's correct.

22 MR. GROBE: That will be when
23 the final design is completed; is that correct?

24 MR. SCHRAUDER: That's correct.
25 We have kept in touch with them, I believe, and kept them

1 up to speed with where we're at in the testing, what's
2 going on with the design and the like.

3 MR. GROBE: Good. I have one
4 other question. On your slide 8, you talked about
5 unrealistic large break LOCA debris combined with the small
6 break LOCA flow. And then, on slide 13, you indicated that
7 the limiting case is actually large break LOCA debris with
8 what sounds like a slightly smaller flow rate.

9 MR. SCHRAUDER: It's actually a
10 higher flow rate.

11 MR. GROBE: A little higher?

12 MR. SCHRAUDER: It's actually
13 higher, yes.

14 MR. GROBE: So, in fact, the
15 debris characterization was unrealistic for small break
16 LOCA, but it's actually what the pump needs to be able to
17 handle in the boron precipitation level.

18 MR. SCHRAUDER: That's correct.

19 MR. GROBE: I just wanted to
20 make sure I understand. Thank you.

21 MR. SCHRAUDER: I think we can
22 clearly demonstrate the conservatism in the debris loading
23 that we have for this.

24 MR. GROBE: Okay.

25 MR. SCHRAUDER: With that, I'll

1 turn it over to Jim Powers.

2 MR. POWERS: Thank you, Bob.

3 I would like to talk this afternoon about the
4 progress we've been making in our Electrical Distribution
5 System at the plant. And as we reported out over the last
6 several meetings, we have been developing and finalizing
7 our Electrical Transient Analysis Program Results, which we
8 refer to as ETAP.

9 And we're using ETAP as a program we selected to
10 improve our analysis of the Electrical Distribution System
11 at the plant. Its current state-of-the-art software that
12 utilities are using in the nuclear industry.

13 And, we converted that from ELMS, Electrical Load
14 Management System Software, which had been replaced in
15 earlier years. The ETAP software allows us to model
16 transients and with much more fidelity the details of the
17 system. We're using it to add safety margin to the plant.

18 We got the initial results of those runs and we've
19 been evaluating them and looking to see what needs to be
20 done to support both the entry into the first Mode 4 for
21 our pressure test of the plant, as well as the long term
22 return to power operation of the plant.

23 And we're currently implementing design
24 modifications to improve the whole distribution system at
25 the plant. That's ongoing. Six modifications at the plant

1 to get ourselves prepared for the initial Mode 4 entry.

2 We're supporting the Mode 4 entry with an
3 operability evaluation and we're going to be using
4 administrative controls for technical specification voltage
5 relay set points. And these are protective relay set
6 points for the electrical process to be sure that all the
7 equipment gets the appropriate voltage and electrical power
8 supply it needs to perform its function.

9 We're also limiting the use of nonessential loads
10 during our pressure tests, initial Mode 4, to prevent
11 voltage degradation. And what we mean by that is some of
12 the larger motors that are not required to support Mode 3
13 operation for the pressure tests, loads such as circulating
14 water pumps and condensate pumps within the plant, which
15 can draw electrical current.

16 So, we won't be operating those. We'll give
17 Operations flexibility to maneuver and sequence some of
18 those modes, but they will have prescribed restrictions on
19 their use.

20 Also, we're going to give a clear definition of the
21 qualified off-site and on-site circuits to be operable,
22 requiring both of our circuits to be operable. That adds a
23 good bit of robust margin during the 7-day test.

24 And we've been in contact with our Transmission
25 Facilities Operator, what we refer to as ATSI, the grid

1 operator, on the voltage capabilities of the grid during
2 the 7-day test. And the grid voltage capability looks good
3 to support what we need during that time.

4 The projects status then. Once we've gone through
5 the --

6 MR. THOMAS: Jim, real quick.
7 Have you completed the opti-valve is it in line?

8 MR. POWERS: The opti-valve is
9 heading in the draft stage now, Scott. We believe the
10 visit that we made to the system operator yesterday by the
11 team was the final element that we needed to give us the
12 input on the system voltage, and now we have all the
13 factors.

14 We have checked calculation from ETAP. That
15 provides the basis. And we can factor all those with the
16 op valuations, expect to have a draft approximately, I was
17 targeting the end of this week for that, but we're also
18 supporting the team inspection and juggling a few balls
19 there, but that's the type of schedule we have. We'll give
20 it to you as soon as it's available.

21 Project status. Finalize our grid stat, that's an
22 ongoing discussion. Very active on our grid voltage
23 criteria to the plant and plant operations.

24 What this means is the voltage on the supply grid
25 that the plant needs to safely operate the half margin,

1 and we're working through that and the analysis.

2 And then, implementing modifications as required,
3 and is required to eliminate the restriction of
4 nonessential loads. So in other words, when we go to power
5 operation of the plant for our second Mode 4 and turn to,
6 turn to power, we want to be able and have to be able to
7 operate our circuit powers, condensate pumps. And so we
8 need to demonstrate the entire system will work
9 appropriately, and have robust margins for safety going
10 forward.

11 So, that's what we're working through now. And we
12 expect to have that detail prepared within the next several
13 weeks.

14 MR. HOPKINS: Let me ask you
15 here, Jim. You talk about going forward. Are you looking
16 at loading on the grid five years from now, ten years from
17 now? How far are you going?

18 MR. POWERS: We're looking at,
19 the grid operator does an operability assessment of the
20 grid capability, and largely it's predicated on the local
21 power plants that have been influenced to support grid
22 voltage. Those local plants are the Bayshore Units, also
23 the Fermi, Two Unit Nuclear Power Plants; that's our sister
24 plant to the west, as well as the Detroit grid, as well as
25 our own grid, with those of the more remote plants.

1 So, there is a contingency plan in place that they
2 use, and also they do that predictive-type future, looking
3 at what is a grid support capability of the plants that
4 currently exist to all plants that are expected to be
5 oncoming to changes in the grid configuration. So, they
6 are in control of that grid voltage analysis, Jon.

7 MR. HOPKINS: But, they may be
8 in control of it, but you stay aware of it, correct?

9 MR. POWERS: Correct.

10 MR. HOPKINS: Because you have
11 to be in control.

12 MR. POWERS: Absolutely, and we
13 have an agreement with them. One of the main reasons we're
14 going down and visiting this week was to talk about the
15 agreement and refresh both themselves and ourselves in how
16 the agreement works and the contact and reporting
17 relationship that we maintain.

18 For example, if they find down there that grid
19 conditions could be such that the needs of the Davis-Besse
20 plant are not supported, they notify our control room and
21 there is an agreement in place to do that.

22 So, our engineers went down to see how that's
23 working, what are the tools they have, and have that
24 dialogue on what the plant needs based on our current ETAP
25 analysis results. So that, that relationship is linked up

1 tight.

2 MR. MYERS: We also have,
3 we're putting indication in our control room to supervise
4 that also.

5 MR. HOPKINS: But you're also
6 looking at it for five years from now or they are, that
7 whole type?

8 MR. POWERS: I'll verify
9 they're doing that, Jon. I believe, but I need to go
10 verify that myself.

11 MR. HOPKINS: Yeah, because the
12 way voltages change and everything, it could always end up
13 with having to, you know, try and procure new transformers
14 or, you know, new transmission lines or something to take
15 care of what happens in the future.

16 MR. MYERS: Jon, we made a
17 trip over to MIT.

18 Do you want to talk about that?

19 MR. POWERS: Thank you, Lew.

20 MR. MYERS: You're welcome.

21 MR. POWERS: That was one of
22 the other proactive measures that the Electrical Analysis
23 Team took was to go to IEEE. That's the Institute of
24 Electrical Electronics Engineers. That was having a
25 symposium several weeks ago; and it was represented by 17

1 nuclear utility representatives, as well as I believe there
2 was a representative from the NRC in the electrical area
3 there.

4 So, our Project Manager and one of our lead
5 engineers went to present what the analysis results were,
6 what the configuration of the Davis-Besse plant is, what
7 the Electrical Distribution System, some of the results of
8 the analysis and the proposed changes we intended to make
9 to presafety margin in the Plant.

10 And got feedback from the benchmarking input to us.
11 We're factoring those into our resolution of this issue.
12 And that, so, that was pretty beneficial for us. We pretty
13 much got a checkmark that we're on the right track to get
14 this resolved effectively.

15 MR. HOPKINS: Okay, I don't
16 have any more questions.

17 MR. RULAND: Jim, at one point
18 you were talking maybe the second Mode 4, you might need a
19 license amendment in this area. Is that still being
20 considered?

21 MR. POWERS: Yes, it's still
22 being considered. We're looking at several options on the
23 final configuration of the system. One option involves the
24 additional protective relay. And we are currently engaged
25 in a design team dedicated to look at this option, and

1 we're going through the process now, looking at the
2 regulatory screening process to see if a license amendment
3 would be required.

4 We believe at the early stages that it would be
5 required for that approach, but that's, but that option is
6 not our only option. The design teams are also working
7 through the components in the plant as an option to simply
8 resolve what's in the plant at the base components and
9 that's going very well.

10 So, there is a strong possibility that no license
11 amendment will be required for the ultimate resolution.
12 We'll notify you of our intentions at the earliest time in
13 term of whether we will be submitting a license amendment.

14 MR. RULAND: Do you have a
15 ballpark idea of when you think you would be able to make
16 that decision?

17 MR. POWERS: I would say we
18 need to caucus on it with our reviewers and also up through
19 Lew on it, but I would say by the end of this week we could
20 state our intentions on whether we want to pursue that
21 avenue.

22 MR. RULAND: That helps, thank
23 you.

24 MR. MYERS: We actually have a
25 meeting on that at 1:30 today, but, you know, if we do have

1 to make a license amendment, it will be, you know, because
2 we're in this conditional relays to the bus, over and above
3 what we already have. So, I don't see it would be a very
4 difficult license amendment.

5 And I also have a question. I think you can submit
6 it as long as you have your operability review, you're
7 still okay. I don't know that we would need it back before
8 startup.

9 MR. GROBE: Jim, if you could
10 make sure that you include the status on the potential
11 licensing amendment in the Friday licensing call, it would
12 be great. I think I saw Kevin in the audience. He
13 probably heard that.

14 MR. POWERS: We'll give you an
15 update at that time, Jack.

16 MR. GROBE: Great. You talked
17 just a little bit about control room communication. It was
18 my understanding that the data that's in the control room
19 previously under grid voltage; is that correct; and how are
20 you gauging that?

21 MR. POWERS: Well, the
22 indication we're providing in control room now would be an
23 indication of the switch yard voltage, so we're giving the
24 operators the same indication that the system control
25 center will have of grid voltage. So, that's a

1 modification that we're making this outage to improve the
2 operator, the fidelity of the operator's view of grid
3 voltage, Jack.

4 MR. GROBE: Will that be a
5 specifically enunciated parameter?

6 MR. POWERS: I believe now it's
7 going into computer points, which computer points are
8 enunciated indications that are continuously monitored.
9 It's not a window enunciator.

10 MR. GROBE: Okay.

11 MR. MYERS: I'll review that
12 mod. What we're doing is fiber optics switch yard over to
13 our admin building. What that lets us do is tap into the
14 same picture that the dispatcher is seeing. So, we're
15 really robbing his signal back into our fiber optics
16 system.

17 MR. BEZILLA: What we're doing
18 is improving our fidelity on the indication the operators
19 can see. We have identification now, but it's pretty rough
20 indication of grid voltage, if you will.

21 MR. GROBE: Okay. Will there be an
22 alarm response procedure for that, just a computer point,
23 right?

24 MR. BEZILLA: I don't know that,
25 Jack, at this time. We'll have to look at the modification

1 to see what input it has to us, and if we can use that to
2 help our operators.

3 MR. GROBE: Where I'm going
4 with this, you're probably wondering where I was going with
5 this, right? Where I was going with this, you're going to
6 have an opti-valve that's going to have this parameter as a
7 limiting condition in your opti-valve.

8 I was wondering how the operators were going to be
9 monitoring that and what action it would take, whether that
10 would be prescribed by a procedure?

11 MR. BEZILLA: I can take this.

12 Yes, we have. Currently, we have the safety-related
13 busses, the 4160 volt busses. We have installed relay and
14 enunciation of low voltage on that bus. And that is really
15 what you're worried about.

16 You're worried about the implant 4160 volt bus
17 voltage, and this configuration off the, for this emergency
18 Mode 4/3 evolution will be on the startup transformers and
19 that bus voltage in the 4160 volt level will be indicative
20 of the grid voltage being supplied to the plant.

21 So, that would be our warning system to the
22 operators that voltage would be lowering on the bus and end
23 up possibly causing any issues or concerns.

24 MR. GROBE: I understand what
25 you said, I think, but I would have expected that the alarm

1 setpoint on that 4160 undervoltage alarm would not
2 necessarily be consistent with the 99.3 percent voltage on
3 the grid that you would be trying to monitor.

4 MR. POWERS: We need to work
5 out that relationship Jack, to make sure it is consistent.
6 Now the under voltage alarm we have on 4160 is set above
7 the relay setpoints we're going to be establishing during
8 the tests. So, it will be indicative to the operator that
9 they have an impending problem with voltage. But we need
10 to finalize our transmission grid voltage restrictions and
11 then look at that alarm to ensure that it's consistent.
12 So, I understand your point.

13 MR. GROBE: Okay. Then, so,
14 you will have an alarm response structure?

15 MR. POWERS: We will have
16 instructions to the operators what to do on the case of
17 receiving that alarm.

18 MR. MYERS: On the bus, there
19 is a D11, D11 alarms. We set those where we need to, so
20 that they have initial alarms off our board, so if they see
21 the busses are saying low voltage, the operators will
22 immediately have enunciated the response to respond.

23 MR. GROBE: I apologize for
24 thinking out loud here, but it would seem the alarm
25 response instruction would be a different one in this

1 situation than would be a normal alarm response instruction
2 for an undervoltage, because this would be an indication of
3 inoperability; whereas, normally that would be an
4 indication of something the operator might want to look
5 into.

6 MR. MYERS: You talking about
7 for the Mode 4 Test or later on?

8 MR. GROBE: I'm talking Mode
9 4 Test.

10 MR. MYERS: I think right now
11 if you look at the Mode 4 Test, since we're connected
12 directly to the grid on the transform, you're into the
13 direct correlation between volt on the grid and in the
14 plant.

15 MR. GROBE: What I was
16 talking about, the specific required steps in the alarm
17 response. It may not be consistent with what you want.

18 MR. MYERS: We may have to
19 change it.

20 MR. POWERS: That's right.

21 MR. MYERS: We're looking at
22 that.

23 MR. GROBE: What action would
24 you expect if the operator gets an undervoltage?

25 MR. BEZILLA: I'll take that.

1 Jack, it's been awhile since I looked at the alarm
2 response, like ten years, okay? But what I believe is, if
3 you're off the Aux transformer, it would tell you to
4 increase your generator voltage and increase your main
5 generator output which normally slash in-house loads.

6 In this first Mode 4/3 evolution, you'll be off the
7 startup transformers, if you would see the alarm come in,
8 or you would see lowering voltage, it would be time to
9 contact load dispatcher; say, hey, what's going on, we need
10 to increase voltage on the grid. Okay.

11 If the load dispatcher would for some reason be
12 unable to do that; at some point, the guy says to the
13 operators, I believe to put the diesels on and separate the
14 safety bus from the off-site power system.

15 That's what I remember.

16 Mike? I have Mike nodding out there.

17 So, that's what we would do. So, at some point,
18 just say, hey, the off-site system is not doing what we
19 need it to do and you would go to emergency diesel
20 generator to supply your off safety busses.

21 MR. GROBE: Okay. We would
22 probably be looking at the procedures and the setpoints for
23 those relays. Thank you.

24 MS. LIPA: One other thing
25 that you mentioned; I'm not sure if it was you, Jim or Lew,

1 but if you do have to submit the license amendment request,
2 I think, you know, we're not sure now whether that would be
3 required for restart or not. We have to caucus on that. I
4 know you said it might not be, but our silence doesn't mean
5 we agree.

6 MR. MYERS: I agree.

7 MS. LIPA: Then, I think we
8 were going to pause for a break after Jim Powers. So, I'll
9 let you finish, Jim.

10 MR. POWERS: And I think that
11 covers my presentation if there are no more questions.

12 MS. LIPA: Any questions for
13 Jim?

14 Okay, thank you. Ten minutes.

15 (Off the record.)

16 MS. LIPA: Okay. We're
17 ready to begin.

18 Go ahead, Mark.

19 MR. BEZILLA: Okay, thank you,
20 Christine.

21 My next slide, please.

22 The purpose of my presentation today is to first
23 provide a brief recap of our plant's readiness for Mode 4
24 and 3; and second introduce our Restart Test Plan Manager,
25 Rick Dame, who will be responsible for the startup plan.

1 Next slide, please.

2 As I have previously reported out, we are confident
3 in our Reactor Coolant System, and its associated support
4 systems and equipment. We have conducted both the 50 pound
5 and 250 pound pressure tests of the reactor coolant system.
6 We have now all four reactor coolant pumps and we have
7 exercised most of the other support systems again
8 associated with the primary plant.

9 We installed containment equipment hatch in June,
10 and conducted a turnover of ownership of Containment Health
11 in the Containment Health Project Manager to the Operations
12 Superintendent in July.

13 In regard to the secondary plant systems, we
14 established condenser vacuum and exercised various systems;
15 for example, circulating water system, condensate system,
16 feedwater system, and other secondary plant support
17 systems.

18 In regard to plant modifications, we have completed
19 or are working on a number of modifications that have
20 restored or improved our margins of plant safety. For
21 example, we've redesigned the containment sump strainer.
22 We've installed a reactor coolant system leakage monitoring
23 device known as the FLUS Monitoring Detector. This is a
24 device used extensively in France, but this is the first
25 utilization of this tool in the United States.

1 We're in the process of installing our boron
2 precipitation modification. We're in the process of
3 installing our high pressure injection recirculation line
4 modifications, and this is for when we're in the
5 containment recirculation mode.

6 In regard to the emergency diesel generator air
7 start system, we have replaced all the piping -- most of
8 the piping. Have upgraded a portion of the piping and
9 we've included air dryers to improve the reliability of the
10 air start system, which in turn will improve the
11 reliability of our emergency diesel generators.

12 We also have a number of electrical distribution
13 related mods in progress, and this is to ensure that our
14 electrical distribution system is reliable.

15 In regard to Human Performance, we have stressed the
16 importance of taking the time needed to do each job
17 correctly the first time. Our people use the STAR
18 Principle; Stop, Think, Act, and Review. And for technical
19 issues, we utilize our problem solving and decision-making
20 procedure/process. Rick is going to elaborate more on this
21 procedure/process in his presentation in a few minutes.

22 Our supervisors do observations and provide feedback
23 and coaching directed at improving performance. We have
24 made some errors. Each error is thoroughly investigated
25 and corrective actions taken to address not only people

1 issues, but also process and procedures and management and
2 supervision opportunities. We strive for excellence,
3 error-free performance on each and every task.

4 Preparations for our first Mode 4/3 Evolution. Part
5 of our preparation is to review and prepare to execute our
6 startup plan.

7 Next slide, please.

8 Lew and I have brought in an independent, not a
9 Davis-Besse employee, but a FENOC individual --

10 MR. THOMAS: Mark, can we back
11 up one, just real quick, before you introduce Rick?

12 MR. BEZILLA: Yes.

13 MR. THOMAS: Recently there has
14 been some potential leakage identified on two reactor
15 coolant pumps. Have you reached resolution on how you will
16 address that issue?

17 MR. BEZILLA: Yes, Scott asked
18 about our Reactor Coolant Pump 2-2 and some indication of
19 leakage between the pump hole and the top casing.

20 What we did, Scott, was put our Problem-Solving
21 Decision-Making Team together. They have formulated out
22 what the potential causes could be. And what we're going
23 to do is set up, I'll say, an observation plan for this
24 first normal operating pressure and near normal operating
25 temperature, our first Mode 4/3 Evolution.

1 And we'll determine if we have seal leakage between,
2 there is two seals, there is an inner seal and outer seal.
3 We'll determine if we have seal leakage from the inner seal
4 and/or the outer seal and upon completion of this first
5 pressure test, make a determination if we need to take
6 action prior to restart.

7 MR. THOMAS: So, you're
8 basically going to clean up the interface and watch it
9 during the NOP test.

10 MR. BEZILLA: That's correct.

11 MR. POWERS: I might comment
12 too. That's always been our plan as part of the Normal
13 Operating Pressure Test of System Engineering Walkdown of
14 pressure boundary reactor coolant systems; it was one of
15 the areas we specifically wanted to look at.

16 MR. THOMAS: That's driven by
17 procedure, right, that's the normal -- you check gasket
18 leakage as part of your startup procedure?

19 MR. POWERS: That's right.

20 MR. THOMAS: Normally.

21 MR. POWERS: Right.

22 MR. THOMAS: I guess what I was
23 asking, are you going to do anything differently for 2-1,
24 because it exhibited potential outer gasket leakage?

25 MR. MYERS: We'll be watching

1 it very closely.

2 MR. BEZILLA: Scott, I also
3 asked to put together a game plan. We have leakoff line
4 capability between the inner seal and the outer seal. I've
5 asked them to identify how we're going to sequence the
6 observation of that leakoff line for the 7-day pressure
7 test.

8 MR. THOMAS: Okay.

9 MR. BEZILLA: Okay. Back to
10 preparations for the first Mode 4/3 Evolution. Part of our
11 preparation is review and prepare to execute our startup
12 plan. Lew and I have brought in an independent, not a
13 Davis-Besse employee, but a FENOC individual to be our
14 Restart Test Plan Manager for this first Mode 4/3 Startup
15 Evolution.

16 The individual is Rick Dame, seated to my left. Let
17 me introduce Rick briefly. He's a graduate of Ohio State
18 University. Has a BS in Mechanical Engineer. He has over
19 18 years of experience in commercial nuclear power. He's
20 also a Senior Reactor Operator license holder for a number
21 of years.

22 He has extensive experience on plant startup
23 testing, system leakage testing, system engineering, and
24 ASME, American Society for Mechanical Engineering, Section
25 44 XI Test Programs.

1 Please let me introduce Rick, my Restart Test Plan
2 Manager for first Mode 4/3 Evolution, and Rick is going to
3 talk to you about our plan.

4 MR. DAME: Okay. Thank you,
5 Mark.

6 MR. GROBE: Rick, I apologize
7 for interrupting.

8 Before we go on, Mark, you talked a little about bit
9 Human Performance. And the Resident Exit is documented in
10 the July 30th report. There were several Human Performance
11 driven violations that were documented in that report.
12 What have you done since then and what experiences have you
13 had through the month of July and August at this point as
14 far as Human Performance errors?

15 MR. BEZILLA: Okay, from the
16 Human Performance standpoint through the month of July, I
17 believe for both Operations and Maintenance, we're pretty
18 clean.

19 I have Mike -- and Mike, right?

20 So, we're pretty clean from an error and execution
21 standpoint.

22 What we did, Jack, on some of those previous errors
23 and issues, is we investigated those. In a number of
24 cases, we found that there was, say, culpability on the
25 individual's point. There are some process and procedure

1 enhancements we can make, and then there is, I'll say,
2 improvements that we can make in supervision and
3 management.

4 So, what we do is, I'll say in general, all right,
5 because we had a few specifics. In general, we had an
6 error, what we do is make sure the person is safe; the
7 other individuals are safe; that the plant is safe. Get
8 them out of the area, all right, if it's an at moment
9 issue. All right.

10 We do fact finding. What are the facts surrounding
11 the event, error or issue. All right. Then, what we do is
12 make an assessment on, okay, is there individual
13 culpability; is there organizational culpability; is there
14 management supervision culpability. What I found in almost
15 all cases is yes.

16 Then, what we'll do is calibrate the individuals as
17 gently as possible. We'll make corrections to our process
18 and procedures. And then we'll do a calibration on
19 supervision and management as appropriate.

20 In those couple specific instances, we have or are
21 in process of doing that.

22 MR. GROBE: Okay. Thank you.

23 MR. BEZILLA: Scott?

24 MR. THOMAS: So, you

25 characterize the past, say, six weeks or so, as an

1 improvement in your performance as far as what, let's be
2 specific in the area of Maintenance as far as procedure
3 compliance, adherence to work procedures, those types of
4 errors?

5 MR. BEZILLA: Yes. Scott, to my
6 recollection, I think over at least the last month of July,
7 I think we're pretty clean. All right.

8 And, I can't, Mike, I can't remember any. Can you?

9 MR. STEVENS: Do you want me to
10 assist?

11 MR. BEZILLA: It was more of did
12 you, but if you have detail, yes.

13 MR. STEVENS: Mike Stevens. I'm
14 the Director of Maintenance at Davis-Besse.

15 There has been some incidents over the month of
16 July. None of the significance I would say that we saw in
17 June and discussed at that exit. And we're continuing to
18 focus on identification of the error likely situation;
19 stop it; getting assistance with our work support center;
20 and then proceed with certainty.

21 What we're finding is, there is, as we ready work,
22 we get into rule base, that's mostly how we work, by
23 procedure. When we run into an issue, we break off into
24 knowledge based errors. And I think we've improved in
25 identifying when we make that change and when we need to

1 stop and get help.

2 MR. BEZILLA: Mike Roder,
3 anything to add from an Operational perspective?

4 MR. RODER: Mike Roder,
5 Operations Manager. We had as we debriefed the NRC last,
6 Scott, we called it a configuration control issue. We've
7 had zero configuration control issues in the month of
8 July. We did institute additional measures, peer checks in
9 the field, and additional lineups to mitigate those events.
10 And we've been highly successful and we're very satisfied
11 with those results.

12 MR. BEZILLA: Scott, just one
13 other add on to what Mike said here about configuration
14 control. Mike came down and talked to the shop
15 specifically about configuration control, about what role
16 Maintenance could play in ensuring and maintaining
17 configuration control; and I think that was very positively
18 received by the Maintenance organization.

19 MR. THOMAS: Okay.

20 MR. BEZILLA: Anything else?

21 MR. GROBE: I think we're

22 ready for you, Rick.

23 MR. DAME: Okay.

24 Thanks, Mark, for the kind introduction.

25 Good afternoon everybody. We'll be discussing the

1 startup plan, which is certainly of interest to everyone in
2 this room. However, before I get started, I want to talk
3 about my specific role. It really breaks down into two
4 distinct roles, but I characterize it as such.

5 First is restart assistance for the Operations
6 Department. One of the things I bring to the Davis-Besse
7 team to help out with restart is a very unique background
8 with regards to not only having written a number of LOCA
9 integrated tests, but also served as Test Director
10 performing on both the Engineering and Operations side. A
11 lot of those tests are very similar to LOCA sequence as far
12 as startup at Davis-Besse.

13 Davis-Besse already had an existing Restart Test
14 Plan, and what I'm going to help do is detail out such that
15 there is ownership throughout the organization for the
16 entire Restart Test Plan.

17 I'll also serve as Director of Corporate Operations
18 Manager for Mike Roder, who is in the audience today. Mike
19 will be responsible for the review and approval and
20 ultimate implementation of plan that we detail out. So,
21 that's my first role, restart assistance.

22 Second role is an independent assessor for Mr. Lew
23 Myers with regards to organizational readiness of the
24 facility for startup. You might ask what are my
25 credentials for that. I served as a leading INPO host peer

1 for both Engineering, Operations and Organizational
2 Effectiveness. Again, I'm walking in from the Perry Plant
3 helping Lew out with gauging our organizational readiness.

4 Next slide, please.

5 Our Restart Test Plan is going to have three main
6 objectives. The number one objective is we're going to
7 start up this facility in a safe fashion and event-free.

8 Before we get into the startup sequence though,
9 there's been a lot of talk about a 7-day leakage test.

10 We'll go into some details about that, because that's the
11 first big milestone that we'll be getting into in assessing
12 the station's readiness for startup.

13 Second objective, we're going to successfully
14 perform required post maintenance testing and modification
15 testing. You heard Christine Lipa in the intro talk about
16 a lot of different work done at Davis-Besse. I can tell
17 you they have done a whole lot of work to improve safety
18 margins, operational margins, and also preliminary
19 liability. So, it's very important that we test all the
20 equipment properly and make sure it lives up to our
21 expectations.

22 Our third objective is that second role I talked
23 about, assessing organizational readiness to effectively
24 implement plant processes when challenged by any emergent
25 issues.

1 Again, I talked about some of the things in my
2 background that will help out with that. Additionally,
3 believe it or not, at our last refueling outage, I was one
4 of the Project Managers for a project called Emergent
5 Issues. So, I should be able to help out Lew with that
6 assessment there.

7 MS. LIPA: Rick, I know the
8 second one will be documented in work orders. What about
9 the third one; how will that be documented?

10 MR. DAME: We'll discuss that
11 as I go through the presentation.

12 MS. LIPA: Okay.

13 MR. DAME: I want to share
14 some initial observations again. I'm walking in from the
15 outside and have been an evaluator for the Institute of
16 Nuclear Power frequently as host at the Perry station. One
17 of the things you always want to do to find out the pulse
18 of the organization is conduct a number of interviews.
19 I've talked to shift managers. I've talked to the
20 Operations Manager. I've talked to in-field operators.

21 And then, not only talk to the people, you observe
22 them, because behaviors are the most important thing in
23 assessing our organization. I can tell you, based on my
24 assessment, that the Operations staff here is well
25 trained. They're experienced. They appear very

1 competent.

2 Initially, I talked to John, I believe his name is
3 House, who was over in the simulator training area for
4 Operations. I found out there's been a number of
5 innovative simulator training scenarios already conducted
6 to support plant heatup from Mode 4 to 3 and set up for
7 7-day leakage test.

8 Next observation is walking through the plant. The
9 plant is in very good condition from apparent standpoint.
10 In fact, it looks almost like a brand new facility in a
11 number of places, so I think that's a very good indication
12 of the amount of work that's been done here at the
13 facility. But looks are one thing. Another thing is the
14 performance of equipment.

15 I talked to a number of operators that have been
16 involved with the return to service or equipment to service
17 on the secondary side of the plant, and very encouraged to
18 report that that equipment has performed very, very well.

19 Again, we still have some additional testing that
20 we'll do. We haven't applied any steam obviously to the
21 secondary side, but indications are that the workmanship
22 that's been done is very good.

23 Next slide, please.

24 I want to walk through these bullets fairly quickly,
25 then I'm going to walk through in a fair amount of detail

1 the Restart Test Plan.

2 Talk about the number one objective, that's to start
3 the plant safely and event-free. The plan which I have
4 before me will take me a couple more weeks to detail this
5 out as I described, is actually going to take the plant
6 from initial Mode 4 up to the hold period for the 7-day
7 leakage test, the cooldown, and subsequent restart up to a
8 hundred percent power.

9 I'll focus here on what we're doing for Modes 4 to 3
10 in preparation for the 7-day test, but that will all be
11 covered in this detailed plan.

12 I'll talk about a concept called operator startup
13 task, and the expectations we have for those. I'll talk
14 about in a fair amount of detail the 7-day leakage test
15 we're performing on the reactor coolant system. That's
16 very, very important to all of us.

17 I'll talk about some of the key activities through
18 the startup sequence and how we're going to get ownership
19 to the entire organization for this restart plan. This
20 isn't just an Operations startup; this is startup of
21 Davis-Besse facility. We want everyone on site to engage
22 and support Operations in the startup.

23 Last, but not least, this plan is going to have a
24 lot of details involved with management oversight. We're
25 going to institute what's called Infrequently Performed

1 Test Evolution, which adds additional management checks and
2 balances to the startup sequence; and that will go 24/7
3 and, I know Mark has already put together a schedule with
4 the management team as far as performing that evolution.

5 Okay, at this point in time, I would like to talk a
6 little about this Restart Test Plan when I talk about level
7 of detail that we're going to start including. I think
8 everyone on the panel is familiar with what I would call
9 Revision Two of the Restart Test Plan. That's for, that
10 was in the, I think it was 5.d was the number for the
11 Restart Checklist.

12 What this Revision 3 of the Restart Checklist Plan
13 will do is summarize results of Rev 1 and Rev 2. What we
14 did there is we obviously replaced the reactor at
15 Davis-Besse. We conducted a 50 pound leakage test. We
16 went out identified issues and we fixed those issues.

17 Under the first two revisions of the plan, we also
18 performed a 250 pound test. Again, we did inspections and
19 we found some issues, a little bit less, but we fixed those
20 issues also.

21 Last, but not least, in order to install the new
22 reactor head, we had to move it through the containment
23 structure, so we performed an Integrated Containment
24 Leakage Test. So, we'll summarize the results of those
25 tests were all done successfully.

1 Talk about an organization or small organization
2 that I'm going to set up, an Augmented Outage Management
3 Team, and that's going to be the Restart Test Plan Team.
4 Again, I'm helping set the table here as far as the plan
5 going forward, but it's going to be up to Operations of
6 this facility to carry it out.

7 This Restart Test Team will have a night shift and
8 day shift owner. It will be SRO level qualified
9 individuals. It will be supported by a team of
10 individuals. They'll include a Post-Maintenance Test
11 Coordinator, Post-Modification Test Coordinator, and also
12 Test Directors and Contingency Plan.

13 I'm ready for the next slide, if you'd step back for
14 second.

15 Okay, an additional aspect of the Restart Test Plan
16 that we'll have. We'll have expectations for the entire
17 organization. One of the key things is communication and
18 execution of the organization. We're out in the plant, we
19 see something that's unusual; the expectation is the shift
20 manager will be contacted, shift manager will engage the
21 organization accordingly depending on the significance of
22 the issue. We'll get those expectations out to everybody
23 on site.

24 Talked about startup test or task assignments. What
25 those are, if anyone is not familiar with how I've done

1 shutdowns and startups in the past; and we've copied Perry,
2 Beaver Valley, and other places in the industry; is we go
3 through a large integrated test procedure and we pick out
4 the key aspects of it.

5 We have detailed down about 150 startup tasks, we'll
6 call them. Those tasks have prejob checklists already
7 filled out for the Operations staff. They'll be practiced
8 and assigned ahead of time before we get to performance of
9 those evolutions.

10 It's a great tool to utilize to improve Human
11 Performance. It allows your shift managers who are helping
12 drive the schedule and improve their performance also.
13 Talk about management oversight; it will all be detailed in
14 this plan.

15 Talk about engaging the organization. Here's how
16 we're going to do it at Davis-Besse. We've done a lot of
17 work. We have all these post-maintenance tests that are,
18 have to be executed. We're going to try to move as many of
19 those outside the Operations Organization, which will allow
20 Operations to focus on running the plant and starting up
21 equipment and get that in the hands of the Maintenance
22 Department, the Engineering Department, Quality, Rad
23 Protection.

24 What that does is it really helps build some
25 ownership of the whole startup sequence. If I'm a

1 maintenance individual that's rebuilt a valve, I would like
2 to validate the level of craftsmanship, because I take
3 pride in what I do. I'd like to be involved in the
4 walkdowns.

5 If I'm an engineering individual who helped pick out
6 the work scope for this particular outage, I would like to
7 make sure that what I picked out is appropriate, the
8 equipment's been working and running good. So, we're going
9 to have those people out assigned to a day shift and night
10 shift down to the individual who will be executing those
11 post-maintenance tests. We'll have a matrix that will be
12 utilized by the facility to help do that.

13 It will detail the whole startup sequence with
14 regards again to Mode 4 up to 7-day hold, back down, and
15 startup. That will all be contained in this plan.

16 Let's talk a little bit about the 7-day test,
17 because I think we're all very interested. Talked about
18 this 50-pound test we did on the reactor vessel, or
19 250-pound test.

20 Here's what's going to happen with our 7-day Normal
21 Operating Pressure Test. We're going to ~~heat-up~~ pressurize the
22 facility up to 2155 psig. That's normal operating pressure.
23 And what we're going to do is a series of walkdowns. In
24 fact, I've talked to the people in Engineering with the
25 Boric Acid Program. We have over one thousand separate

1 components we're going to be inspecting during this
2 walkdown.

3 We've also set up teams in Maintenance, that the
4 whole goal was to go out and do inspections. We want to
5 develop a find and fixed mentality. So, as we find issues,
6 we want to fix them. So, Maintenance already has a plan
7 out there that if we find anything, how we're going to
8 address that. So, again, the find and fix mentality.

9 During this leakage test, which I performed at my
10 facility sort of a similar evolution three times, am very
11 familiar with the whole process with the ASME walkdowns, is
12 what we'll be holding during that test, and again, these
13 walkdowns will occur, but we're also going to test some
14 very innovative modifications we put in, specifically one
15 that's been designed to help sense leakage in very small
16 amounts.

17 I think the whole industry is actually waiting for
18 the results in that, because we're a leader in that respect
19 of that modification we put in. So, we'll be exercising
20 that.

21 And, as Christine mentioned, again, confirm our
22 testing, and as a past engineer on a similar system on
23 a boiler water reactor, I should be able to help provide
24 some assistance in that area.

25 Last, but not least with regards to this plan, any

1 good plan should always have a post-job critique. When
2 everything is said and done, we'll come back and we'll take
3 a look at results and incorporate lessons learned and the
4 whole test approach what we're doing with this evolution
5 will apply going forward. So, it will allow you to learn
6 and improve going forward.

7 Next slide, please.

8 Talk about post-maintenance tests. Second main
9 objective is to make sure that we do these right. I've
10 already talked about a number of the bullets up on the
11 slide here. Again, real important, the ownership of the
12 post-maintenance test, getting that out to the
13 organizations can really help out Operations.

14 Talk about some additional things as we're bringing
15 back equipment. I'm in charge of equipment reliability in
16 my facility. One of the most important things when you're
17 bringing back equipment is watch its performance in
18 monitoring any trends that may be exhibited. If something
19 isn't going well, you want to have contingency plans in
20 place to address those.

21 Davis-Besse has done a very good thing; they brought
22 in a lot of their senior managers, both previous and past,
23 to talk about things that have happened on startups; stuff
24 that was unexpected. And they've already put together this
25 list. We're going to have a list of contingency plans to

1 address all of those things historically that happened in
2 the past.

3 We're also going to have night shift and day shift
4 owners for those too. We hope we don't have to use them,
5 but it's always better to be prepared; better safe than
6 sorry. We have a whole list of those that will be
7 incorporated in this plan.

8 Last point with regards to startup equipment and
9 bringing it back. One of the things we're going to be
10 about as an organization, not only at Davis-Besse, but
11 FirstEnergy Nuclear, we're going to exercise effective
12 operational decision-making principles if unexpected
13 results are encountered.

14 Now, that's a lot of words up there. What's that
15 really mean? What that means is, if we see something
16 unexpected, we're going to step back, use one of the
17 principles Mark talked about, STAR; Stop, Think, Act and
18 Review.

19 We're going to utilize a document that the Institute
20 of Nuclear Power Operations put together. This is December
21 2001, that contains six principles that we're going to
22 apply to problems going forward. Davis-Besse is already
23 using it. We use it at Perry. It's been very successful.

24 And we've also incorporated that into a document;
25 that's one of the variants to help us improve Human

1 Performance. It's called Problem Solving Decision Making.
2 Those six principles are mandatory to be utilized when
3 management calls for a problem-solving plan. And those are
4 all couched within this procedure.

5 I just wanted to touch on a couple of them. There's
6 six of them. One in particular I wanted to, actually two
7 that I would like to talk about.

8 One of the principles we will be looking at if we
9 find something unexpected that we'll apply is -- one of the
10 main principles is any conditions that potentially
11 challenge the safe and reliable operation are recognized
12 and promptly reported for resolution. That's very, very
13 paramount with regards to how to maintain your plant in a
14 safe and reliable condition.

15 And, again, there is six principles here. I just
16 wanted to touch on a couple. Again, they're all important,
17 but the ones I thought were most applicable to this whole
18 startup.

19 Decision-making or decisions are based on full
20 understanding of the short and long term risks and
21 aggregate impact conditions associated with various
22 options. Again, that principle is real important because
23 you can make a decision for today that may not be the right
24 one three years from now, or as Jon was talking about with
25 the ETAP that Jim Powers talked about, five years down the

1 line. You want to assess and take a look at your
2 solutions, how they're going to play out in the course of
3 time.

4 There is four other principles. Again, these are
5 all about making the right decision. If you apply this
6 document properly, it will always point you to make the
7 right decision, even if it means shut down the facility,
8 fixing whatever you need to, and bring it up.

9 Next slide, please.

10 I want to talk about this second role in a little
11 bit of detail with regards to what Lew Myers has brought me
12 in to do an independent assessment for; and that's
13 organizational readiness to effectively implement plant
14 processes when faced with an emergent issue.

15 I mentioned I've been a Project Manager for emergent
16 issues for my facility. I'm real used to using this
17 process, personally because I was co-author of it, believe
18 it or not. So, I do know a little about emergent issues
19 and how to handle problems.

20 What we're going to do is put together a series of
21 exercises that will help exercise these. One of the main
22 objectives we would like to accomplish is we'd like to
23 utilize techniques, actually own techniques is probably a
24 better term because they are being used here at
25 Davis-Besse.

1 Techniques that will improve operational focus and
2 also Operations leadership. And, again, we talked about
3 utilizing the problem-solving plan. We talked about
4 communicating with your shift managers who will engage your
5 organization.

6 One of the ways we've engaged the organization at
7 Perry, which we copied from Beaver Valley, who probably
8 copied from other leading performers, is the technique of
9 utilizing a conference call whenever an emergent issue
10 comes up.

11 Here's how this would work. Okay. Let's say I'm
12 out in the plant. I see something that doesn't look
13 right. I'll call the shift manager. The shift manager
14 would then engage the organization through a conference
15 call. The conference call would include your management
16 team, both your senior leadership team and also your line
17 management, and also typically the issue owner.

18 What would happen is everybody gets on that
19 conference call. You talk about the issue. Assess the
20 significance of it. Determine how your going to deal with
21 it going forward.

22 Additionally, if you're lucky enough to be the issue
23 owner, who I happen to end up being quite a bit, they ask
24 what I need to be successful. So, we're going to employ
25 those techniques here and hone those up. We'll be doing

1 that during our 7-day Reactor Coolant System Leakage Test.

2 We should have time to exercise that; and the second
3 bullet demonstrates some of the different things we'll be
4 looking at. And we'll get to put these together,
5 Christine, again, in some sort of -- in the thought
6 process, but what we would like to look at is things like
7 emergent procedure issues; how do we handle that; how do we
8 respond as an organization. Equipment issues; how do we
9 set up for a significant root cause if one happens to come
10 our way.

11 Utilization of this problem-solving issue process.
12 Again, we already utilize it, but want to hone those skills
13 because we're planning on transitioning from a shutdown
14 facility to an online facility and we need to be able to
15 find and fix things promptly and effectively. And I'll be,
16 again, providing that input to Lew Myers with regard to
17 what I see through those exercises.

18 So, with that any questions or comments?

19 MS. LIPA: Sure. So, as far
20 as documentation of that assessment, is it just going to be
21 feedback from you to Lew Myers; is that the plan?

22 MR. DAME: I think it's going
23 to be more than that, Christine. Again, a lot of this is
24 break down the thought process, and we'll be working, you
25 know, quality will help me with some of the exercises. We

1 do have a self-assessment process here at FirstEnergy. I

2 think that might be a good way to package that.

3 Lew, you can correct me if I'm wrong there.

4 MR. MYERS: No.

5 MS. LIPA: Thank you.

6 MR. GROBE: Just a question or

7 two. What's the relationship, Rick, between you and Greg

8 Dunn as far as work management?

9 MR. DAME: My relationship

10 right now with Rick Dunn, I'm reporting to, actually Mike

11 Roder. Okay. Outside of utilizing Greg as someone that

12 can help facilitate activities, right now my reporting

13 scheme is to Mike Roder.

14 MR. GROBE: Okay. I'm not

15 sure I fully understand all that, but I'll get used to it

16 over the next couple of weeks, I'm sure.

17 MR. THOMAS: Can I?

18 MR. GROBE: Sure.

19 MR. THOMAS: How, you said,

20 this team will have 100 or 150 activities. Did I

21 misunderstand?

22 MR. DAME: Actually the

23 number of activities I was talking about is your startup

24 sequence. What's happened or what we've done is we've

25 taken a look at our integrated procedures. Specifically,

1 Scott Wise the Operations Superintendent with Tony
2 Stallard, who is another Senior Reactor Operator; and we've
3 picked out the tasks that we feel require a prejob brief
4 and also practicing to be successful.

5 MR. THOMAS: Are these
6 activities put into a schedule? Are they actually
7 scheduled activities, or are these just the activities that
8 need to occur during startup?

9 MR. DAME: Majority are
10 scheduled activities. Again, we'll be detailing that out.
11 I'm used to seeing every one of those in a schedule, so I
12 know where they're at. But I'll be working with Mike, Mike
13 Roder and Tony Stallard and Scott Wise to get those in the
14 schedule to a level of detail we're looking for.

15 MR. THOMAS: I guess, I think
16 that's what Jack was asking. We're trying to understand
17 how you interact with your, the outage manager -- how your
18 team functions in relation to the others.

19 MR. DAME: I'll give you an
20 example of how startup tasks work. Let's say we're doing a
21 scheduled activity; we're going to be conducting the
22 heatup. That's one, called one big activity.

23 You'll have a night shift and day shift crew that
24 would be trained and practiced in that particular activity.
25 That activity would also be reflected in the schedule. The

1 whole team would know when that activity is coming up. And
2 I've also detailed historically down to who is the night
3 shift and who is the day shift owner of that activity in
4 the Operations Organization.

5 So, that would be part of our whole startup
6 sequence, but it's a piece of what Operations is doing to
7 move the facility.

8 MR. THOMAS: Okay, but you also
9 had some discussion about dealing with emergent activities
10 and outside these 100, 150 tasks. So, that would require
11 direct --

12 MR. DAME: Mark can tell
13 you.

14 MR. BEZILLA: Let me try and
15 help. Rick will be working with Mike Roder and his team to
16 orchestrate the heatup, the sustaining and the cooldown on
17 this first Mode 4/3 Evolution. The activities that Rick is
18 talking about are things like bringing on condensate pump,
19 bringing on feed pump, start reactor coolant pump, et
20 cetera. Okay?

21 Now, once Rick's got that all orchestrated out,
22 that's Mike Roder and Scott and Tony and the shift managers
23 and operators; those guys will execute that. Then, Rick
24 will switch into a different mode where he's working for
25 Lew and I. All right?

1 Then, what he'll do is this oversight team that we
2 have established, management oversight, if we're not
3 already presented by things like an emergent procedure
4 change, an emergent equipment issue, we're going to run
5 some drills on the staff to see how they would handle a
6 emergent procedure change.

7 Can I get a procedure change done in a couple of
8 hours? I have an emergent equipment issue. If I don't
9 have an emergent equipment issue, we'll simulate an
10 emergent equipment issue. Like Rick said, talking about
11 getting the team on, say it's 2:00 in the morning issue.
12 Get the management team to respond and how would we handle
13 that issue.

14 What we want to do is try to simulate some of the
15 things that we know we'll encounter once we're restarted.
16 We want to make sure we have the capability to deal with
17 those types issues.

18 So, Rick's got two roles. First is help us
19 orchestrate out this restart plan, if you will. Then,
20 secondly, is to go in and run some drills and watch our
21 behaviors on those drills.

22 Does that help clarify?

23 MR. THOMAS: Yeah, I think. I
24 know I would like to talk more about these drills that you
25 plan during the NOP test. I don't know that we have to do

1 it here. I would like to know more about that.

2 MR. DAME: Any additional
3 questions?

4 MR. GROBE: Couple more.
5 These drills or exercises, are these being conducted with
6 the offgoing shift or are these going to be conducted on
7 shift?

8 MR. BEZILLA: Jack, these would
9 be, we get up and we're at normal operating pressure,
10 normal operating temperature. We're at Mode 3, stable
11 there, doing our walkdowns and stuff. If we have them
12 occur, then they can watch to see how we deal with
13 procedure changes and equipment issues.

14 If they don't occur, we'll have some drills in our
15 pocket at 2 in the morning that say, okay, we would like to
16 run this drill. This just broke, you just got this report
17 from the operator in the field. What are you going to do?
18 How are you going to handle that? Okay?

19 MR. GROBE: Will these be
20 occurring in the control room?

21 MR. BEZILLA: Could be in the
22 control room, could be in the field, could be in the shop,
23 in NRP.

24 MR. GROBE: Let me --

25 MR. BEZILLA: Okay. So, this

1 would not be unusual to like running a fire brigade drill
2 while you were running on shift. It would be similar to
3 that type of thing, I think, trying to help.

4 MR. GROBE: It depends how
5 many operators in the control room are engaged in the
6 drill.

7 MR. DAME: I'll chime in
8 here. Having been an operator with startups, I can
9 appreciate limiting distractions to the crew. Really, what
10 we'd like to do is see how the organization responds to
11 support operations. So, the shift manager might make, he
12 might initiate the drill, and from there on out, we'll
13 really look at the organizational response to support
14 operations.

15 So, really, that's how these drills or exercises
16 would be put together. Minimal distractions that control
17 the staff. We want to watch organizational response.

18 MR. MYERS: For example, you
19 know, something when I first got my job as Chief Operating
20 Officer, I made some calls, and at all three of our
21 plants. And duty team on the weekends were expected to be
22 at the plant. I called two of the plants and the duty
23 managers were there, knew what was going on. I called the
24 Davis-Besse plant, I found out that duty manager got an
25 early morning phone call and didn't come into the plant,

1 you know. This didn't meet expectations.

2 So, we're going to make sure we have some clear
3 understanding on some of those kinds of processes we expect
4 to see in place and how would we change procedure. Do we
5 have qualified people. We have an independent review
6 process.

7 We have the organization in effect to routine
8 operations without, without depending on the, the massive
9 structure we have in place now. With the routine
10 operations, would we be able to make a routine procedure
11 change easily? Do we have the right qualification? That
12 process has changed during the year we have been shut
13 down.

14 It's a changed process. Corrective action process.
15 You know, ownership, how is that expected to work for
16 routine operation now. How does the shift supervisor,
17 shift turnover process, how does that look now? So, we
18 need to assess how we feel. I wouldn't use the word
19 drills, as much as assess, how we feel about some of our
20 routine processes and how we see them work.

21 For example, let's talk about, he was talking about
22 the turnover process. In our other two plants, we have
23 some meetings in a particular area, especially over at
24 Beaver Valley. Oncoming shift does a sitdown, and not just
25 the Operations Group, but the Chemistry guys, the HP guys,

1 Health Physics, I said that, Security, Maintenance, and we
2 talk about all of the goals for that shift. I haven't seen
3 that work here. I don't know how that will work. I'll
4 know more after this.

5 Then, what we got to do is assess that, make the
6 necessary adjustments we need to make prior to startup;
7 right? So, that's what we're looking to do.

8 MR. GROBE: Okay.

9 MR. MYERS: I have a list of
10 things.

11 MR. GROBE: I think I
12 understand. And, let me just say what I think I
13 understand, make sure it's correct.

14 As far as interface with work management, what
15 you're talking about is activities going on in the control
16 room. And work management would normally be scheduling
17 those or task listing those, with Greg Dunn and his
18 people.

19 But this is a separate kind of work management
20 system for work going on inside the control room being
21 conducted by the control room operators and the off-site
22 operators; is that right?

23 MR. MYERS: I think that's
24 pretty accurate. I mean, one of the things, we've been in
25 this outage for quite awhile now. It's not that we've been

1 planning and scheduling all at the same time. We need to
2 lay out a schedule, a group of scheduled activities during
3 that time frame, and see how effectively we can implement
4 those now. What would the normal scheduling process look
5 like? How effective would we implement that at
6 Davis-Besse? We'll make an assessment of that while we're
7 up there.

8 Is it the same we would see at our other plants? I
9 don't know the answer. The differences, I just don't know
10 about. I would like to know those answers.

11 MR. GROBE: I understand
12 that, and I think the exercise and drills you're talking
13 about, all of those are going to be conducted consistent
14 with process sequence as far as control room, core room,
15 and discipline.

16 MR. MYERS: Absolutely. One
17 thing we'll probably assess is the control room. What I
18 call conduct of operations. What do you do for conduct of
19 operations? You have shift turnover. You monitor the
20 plant, right? You have operator rounds. How effectively
21 are those things working for us? You need to understand
22 that. Okay?

23 MR. RULAND: Rick, as you
24 stated, you have some unique experience that you can bring
25 to bear for this position. Your initial, your initial

1 observations in your slide are positive ones. I would
2 think that given your experience, that you would have some
3 areas that you thought Davis-Besse could improve on in
4 addition to that.

5 Can you describe what those things you think, where
6 Davis-Besse would improve in this area, given your
7 experience?

8 MR. DAME: I can tell you
9 right now, post-maintenance retest coordination and bring a
10 heavy engineering side to that. That's one of the things I
11 have a little bit of concern about. It's one of the
12 reasons I'm here to help make sure that all goes well.
13 Okay. So, that's something.

14 The other thing is just the interface between
15 Operations and Engineering. I'm used to a little bit
16 closer relationship between Engineering and Operations than
17 I'm seeing right now. I'm going to help make that a little
18 better.

19 Again, it's funny, if you go to my facility, go to
20 the Engineering building, I'm a Resident Operator. When
21 you go to Operations, I'm a Resident Engineer. I want to
22 create that close knit relationship that really helps you
23 out with regards to teamwork and going after emergent
24 issues when the chips are down.

25 So, I'll try to help with regards to teamwork also

1 in that area, but that's something that I think could be
2 improved on a little bit. So, those were two areas.

3 MR. RULAND: Good, thank you.

4 MR. DAME: Any additional
5 questions?

6 MR. GROBE: I don't think so.
7 Thank you.

8 MR. DAME: Thank you.

9 MR. BEZILLA: Next slide.

10 Okay. What I would like to do now is I'll briefly
11 cover our Restart Milestones and then update you on some
12 recent activities associated with those milestones.

13 Next slide.

14 One of the requirements in the confirmatory action
15 letter was to take nozzle samples from the old reactor
16 vessel head and ship those off to Pacific Northwest
17 National Laboratory. We have done that. I believe we're
18 in the process of confirming that the nozzles got there and
19 you all have everything that you wanted, so we can get back
20 to our confirmatory action letter. Just wanted to let you
21 know that's being done.

22 Next slide, please.

23 Just briefly, these are some near term milestones.

24 Transition from the Return to Service Plan to normal
25 processes. All right, as we say get near the end of this

1 outage, what we would like to do is get into our normal
2 outage processes; and as an example, we recommence the 0800
3 Management Team Open Communication Meeting. Part of that
4 meeting is to review Condition Reports and make sure the
5 appropriate ownership is there and that the classifications
6 are correct.

7 Another item that we've done is turned the scope
8 control back to the shift outage directors. So, those are
9 the types of things we're talking about on this
10 transition.

11 Installation of high pressure injection pumps. Bob
12 talked about that. We're installing the as-was high
13 pressure injection pumps for this first Mode 4/3 Evolution.
14 We have to finish the remaining work to be able to go to
15 the first Mode 4/3 Evolution. We probably have three to
16 four weeks of work to be able to do that evolution.

17 Once we get there, we'll do the 7-day full pressure
18 test. And what that will do is, as Rick said, it allows us
19 to check out our systems, check out our processes, and
20 check out our people. And we'll also execute the Restart
21 Test Plan. There is a number of inspections and activities
22 that we have to complete as part of that Restart Test
23 Plan.

24 Then, upon completion of that 7-day test, we'll
25 return the unit to Mode 5, and then we'll go ahead and

1 assess our performance; again, how did the plant do, how
2 did our processes do, and how did our people do.

3 Next slide, please.

4 This is just a list of what we have accomplished so
5 far in this outage. 62 Modifications have been completed,
6 over 7,000 Work Orders, over 6,000 Condition Report
7 Evaluations, and over 6,000 Corrective Actions. That's
8 just, we've got a lot of stuff done since we've been in
9 this outage.

10 Next slide.

11 Christine, you went into a lot of detail on your
12 opening remarks. This is just a summary. Of the 31 items,
13 16 are done, 5 are completed and you all are in the process
14 of checking those out, 3 need to have the Normal Operating
15 Pressure Test conducted to be ready for review, your
16 review, 6 we're working on, and then the last one is the
17 confirmatory action letter. And, as I started out with,
18 we're working to try to complete those items and make sure
19 that's ready for closure also.

20 Any questions?

21 MS. LIPA: Mark, in reference
22 to Slide 32, your last bullet was return to Mode 5 and
23 assessing the results. What's your plan for criteria for
24 assessing the results, procedure, and what's your plan for
25 documenting that assessment?

1 MR. BEZILLA: As an example,
2 from a plant standpoint, as Rick said, we've got over a
3 thousand components in the Reactor Coolant System as well
4 as secondary plant walkdowns, so we'll use that 7-day
5 period to go find any leaks or equipment problems that
6 we'll need remediated.

7 From a process standpoint, as we said, we'll be
8 conducting assessments on how we utilize some of the
9 processes that we may have not used over the last year and
10 a half or that have changed while we have been in the
11 outage.

12 And, then from a people standpoint, we'll monitor
13 the behaviors, our procedure use, our ability to stop when
14 we have questions or doubt. And, so we'll be doing a
15 number of management observations. We have round-the-clock
16 senior management coverage for this period, in our Quality
17 Organization, as well as Rick assisting, we'll take a look
18 at, I'll say, our behaviors and he will provide an
19 independent assessment of how we did during that 7-day
20 test.

21 So, what we'll do is roll all that up, and then in
22 our restart readiness for startup, we'll go through that
23 process review of our people, our plant and processes prior
24 to hopefully the second Mode 4.

25 MS. LIPA: Okay. So, that's

1 really what I was looking for. You plan to roll this all
2 up and this would be part of your proceduralized restart
3 readiness concept?

4 MR. BEZILLA: Correct.

5 If nothing else, I would like to turn it over to
6 Lew.

7 MR. MYERS: Thank you.

8 The industry definition of Safety Culture is that
9 assembly of characteristics and attitudes in the
10 organizations and individuals which establishes an
11 overriding priority toward nuclear safety, and finally
12 ensures that these issues receive the attention warranted
13 by their significance.

14 First, I would like to take a few moments to status
15 you and the public on the Safety Culture Assessment we
16 performed in July. That assessment was in preparation for
17 the upcoming Mode 3 temperature and pressure test.

18 Next, I would also like to brief you on our multiple
19 barriers to safety. These barriers are now anchored in the
20 organization at our Davis-Besse station.

21 The definition for Safety Culture contains several
22 important words, like characteristics and attitude.
23 Characteristics and attitudes have significantly been
24 strengthened in both policies and procedures. These
25 characteristics and attitudes are now measured and assessed

1 in the organization; both in our managers and our people.

2 The activities that we perform today receive
3 management oversight by our Management Observation Program
4 and independent oversight by our full assurance
5 organization and safety review boards is truly independent.

6 Today when we have issues, our Corrective Action
7 Program and Decision-Making Process ensures the proper
8 classification and then resolves those issues.

9 Next slide.

10 Our process establishes both ownership and
11 accountability by the site management team, as well as
12 convergence through independent reviews. Peer reviews,
13 contractor assessments and quality oversight, independent
14 assessment of safety culture ensures these convergences.

15 Contractor assessment is provided by several
16 industry experts. For example, Lawrence Martin, an
17 experienced executive, also participated in our meeting.
18 He is a proven experienced executive of TVA, a South Texas
19 Project during extended outages.

20 Mike Ross is an experienced executive from Three
21 Mile Island. He has held many successful positions, is
22 well known in the industry.

23 Additionally, the Institute of Nuclear Power
24 Operations provides us with industry peers from top
25 performing plants, in both Operations and the Maintenance

1 area.

2 Quality Assessment performs their own assessment for
3 Safety Culture prior to our meetings. They participate as
4 an independent part of the management segment to assure
5 convergence.

6 Each Safety Culture attribute is assessed
7 internally, and then a two-day meeting was held by the
8 entire management team to review the results of these
9 assessments by the peers. Some criteria, such as open
10 positions, are presented by the Human Resources Group and
11 assessed as the, by the peer team of managers.

12 Our employees also play a significant part in these
13 assessments through survey performance as part of the 4-C's
14 Meetings as well as Town Hall Meetings.

15 We believe that our process is strong, and has an
16 industry base, because our methods of convergence combined
17 with peer reviews that finally result in the management
18 ownership in the alignment of our issues.

19 Next slide.

20 As you recall, the industry accepted model consists
21 of three commitment areas. They consist of Policy Area
22 Commitment, Plant Management Commitment and Individual
23 Commitment Areas. Each of the commitment areas has
24 specific attributes that are established to monitor.

25 For example, the Policy Level Commitment Area has

1 five attributes consisting of a statement of policy,
2 management value structure, resources, self-assessment and
3 independent oversight.

4 Next specific criteria establishes in our process
5 to monitor these attributes. In fact, the criteria feeding
6 each attribute consists of approximately 40 pages of
7 questions. Sometimes the same or similar questions are
8 used and are appropriate to be used for more than one
9 attribute.

10 We have four labeled attributes and criteria of our
11 process to that of the independent assessment that was
12 performed by Doctor Sonja Haber. We now believe our
13 process is much more objective using our specific
14 criteria.

15 We also established convergence using multiple
16 measures to monitor our conclusions. Once again, the two
17 assessment methods are very well aligned.

18 The first Policy Commitment Area has to do with
19 messages, attitudes, and environment that the executive
20 leadership team, the quality oversight groups and plant
21 leadership should be established within the organization.

22 Next, the Management Commitment Area has to do with
23 methods used to perform the day-to-day activities. We
24 establish and then anchor the work requirements within the
25 organization and individuals through training programs, our

1 programs, our processes and our procedures.

2 Third is the Individual Commitment Area. This
3 commitment is very objective, and that the training
4 effectiveness, activity monitoring and assessment all have
5 received the criterias used to monitor plant activities.

6 For example, the Corrective Action Program is the
7 key trending, is the key to trending plant equipment and
8 personnel performance issues and how effective that we are
9 in addressing our problems.

10 As you recall, the last assessment rated all three
11 commitment areas as yellow. This would indicate that
12 management actions were needed or ongoing action plans need
13 to be in place. Many actions are now complete. I will
14 show many of our complete actions later, yet much is yet to
15 be done using the action plans that we showed you in the
16 early meetings.

17 We do believe we have made good improvement. Both
18 the Policy Commitment Area and the Individual Commitment
19 Area are now rated white. Once again, they were yellow
20 before.

21 Next slide.

22 I have prepared the next slide to demonstrate the
23 Barriers to Safety -- the Barriers to a Safety Event. No
24 one area, no one attribute, nor no one criteria fell would
25 result in an event taking place. The barrier process is

1 the reason for developing criteria for management actions
2 needing to be taken prior to moving forward. We would not
3 move forward with any of the commitment areas rated as
4 red.

5 First, we take strong actions to resolve commitment
6 area of concern. Note that red rating in one of the
7 attributes which require a Condition Report and strong
8 senior leadership review prior to moving forward.
9 Additionally, we captured each and every groups rating a
10 specific criteria and performed a senior leadership team
11 review of the actions that we need to take from a
12 collective significant standpoint.

13 Our Safety Culture Assessment is only part of our
14 Restart Readiness Process. For example, it is not, it does
15 not measure plant material readiness. We do sit down just
16 prior to changing modes with each and every manager and
17 review why he or she is ready to move forward. We review
18 our System Health, our temporary modifications, our
19 operator workarounds. We involve several of our craft
20 employees, our operators, and our systems engineers in this
21 review to ensure alignment of the entire team.

22 Next slide.

23 This slide provides the first Barrier to
24 safety. Independent Oversight consists of the Executive
25 Leadership Team, Corporate Program, the Plant Program

1 Owners, the Plant Senior Leadership Team and the Quality
2 Oversight Groups.

3 Many actions have already taken place to strengthen
4 the independent oversight barrier. We have combined our
5 Quality Oversight Group and Quality Control Group
6 organizations. We now have a VP of Oversight that is
7 independent, and reports directly to the President of
8 FENOC, and also reports to the Nuclear Committee of the
9 Board.

10 The Combined Nuclear Safety Review Board has many
11 new members that are proven industry leaders. The charge
12 has been strengthened to focus on safety. This group is now
13 more involved with station activities and even the County
14 Business Administrator is an active participant.

15 Bill Cottle, a proven industry leader, is now
16 Chairman of the Nuclear Committee. He is also a member of
17 the FirstEnergy Board of Directors. Bill is an active
18 participant in Policy Commitment Area.

19 Our Safety Conscious Work Environment Program is
20 more proactive. We now have independent issue reviewers to
21 help improve our employees concerns of confidentiality.

22 The state is no longer in isolationism. The
23 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations is providing peer
24 reviews in Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics and
25 Engineering. I am very proud of the accomplishments that

1 we made in our Health Physics Organization. You can see
2 the changes in rigor during daily activities. Our
3 employees in that group in my mind now have great morale.

4 The next slide focuses on the changes that have been
5 anchored in the Management Commitment Area. I am pleased
6 with the new management team. All of the managers are
7 proven leaders. They all have good technical education.
8 They have Senior Reactor Operator's License or
9 Certifications. Most importantly though, they helped
10 aligned themselves as a Management Team.

11 During the middle of all the work pressures that we
12 faced, they have taken several days and weekends to come
13 together and align themselves with the Senior Leadership
14 Team. We have met several times on the weekends to ensure
15 consistent standards.

16 The Operations Group Ownership Plan is assuring
17 alignment between the management and our operators.
18 Operations is now involved with most station activities.
19 We are turning the plant systems back to them in good
20 condition.

21 Our Management Observation Program is showing the
22 delta between the management observations and supervisor
23 observations are closing.

24 The Engineering Assessment Board ensures quality
25 engineering products. This was not a temporary fix. We

1 have anchored this board in our process.

2 We now have elevated the Project Review Committee to
3 ensure good line ownership. The Director of Operations now
4 chairs the PRC at all FENOC plants to ensure line ownership
5 of station projects. We also have a corporate PRC
6 providing an additional layer of review to major projects.
7 Either the Executive VP of Engineering or Chief Operating
8 Officer, myself, would chair these meetings.

9 Our Supervisor Training Programs and Managers,
10 Managers and Supervisors Evaluation Program has, now has
11 two new processes. Both Nuclear Professionalism and
12 Nuclear Safety are anchored in this process.

13 Next slide.

14 The next barrier is part of the Management
15 Commitment Area and Individual Commitment Area in our
16 programs. This area focuses on the changes that have been
17 made and have been anchored in the methods we use to
18 accomplish plant activities and ensure these activities
19 receive the attention warranted by their significance.

20 Sound familiar as Safety Culture?

21 Our Operating Experience Program and Corrective
22 Action Program has been strengthened. We can all see many
23 material and program improvements that have been made
24 during this outage to improve safety margins. We
25 demonstrated several today.

1 The Boric Acid Control Program and Training Program,
2 and our training of that program is now industry standard.
3 The integrated RCS Leakage Program, Reactor Coolant System
4 Leakage Program is now the first of a kind. The Radiation
5 Protection Program is greatly improved. We now have 65
6 engineering programs that are routinely monitored and
7 assessed for their effectiveness. We believe this sets a
8 new industry method of assessment.

9 Our System Health Reviews that we brought from our
10 Beaver Valley Station are noted for improving plant
11 performance. Our Problem Solving Nuclear Operating
12 Standard is a systematic approach to ensure station issues
13 receive the attention warranted by management.

14 I believe that if we had had this standard in place,
15 we may not be sitting here today discussing reactor vessel
16 head.

17 The final barrier is focused -- next slide.

18 The final barrier is focused on our individuals, our
19 employees. How do we expect -- how do we set our
20 expectations for behaviors? Technically driven employees
21 with the correct environment are the best barriers for
22 nuclear safety.

23 I have taken many actions that are not listed to
24 ensure that the correct people, correct -- the
25 qualifications are good, and the environment to do the job

1 correct the first time is in place.

2 We have had 50.9 Training, Safety Conscious Work
3 Environment Training, Operability Evaluation Training, our
4 Corrective Action Program Training, Root Cause Training,
5 Ownership for Excellence Programs, which we started one
6 today; and our SRO Training Program, Case Study Training,
7 Standards and Expectations Training, and Plant Access
8 Training.

9 MR. THOMAS: Lew, what's the
10 status of the 50.9 Training? Has all the staff attended
11 that or is it --

12 MR. MYERS: Excuse me?

13 MR. THOMAS: Is it planned for
14 the whole staff?

15 MR. MYERS: Yes, it is. There
16 may be some stragglers, but I believe everyone's had it
17 already.

18 MR. LOEHLEIN: Most of the
19 organization is done, but I don't have the latest number.

20 MR. MYERS: I can look up the
21 number, I think there is --

22 MR. THOMAS: Have you seen
23 any, I guess, fruit from that training?

24 MR. MYERS: Absolutely, you
25 see fruit from the training, I believe Maintenance

1 especially. And I know I've seen some fruit from that
2 training, I think, in some of the licensing issues and
3 documents we were looking at, probably harder than we used
4 to, so I see quite a bit of fruit from the training,
5 definitely. It definitely revitalizes your attention on
6 what your seeing.

7 Next slide.

8 In conclusion, with a strong Safety Culture
9 consisting of strong solid barriers that resolve challenges
10 to events, we will effectively implement a new FENOC
11 Vision. The new vision which we're just getting ready to
12 roll out is, "People with a strong safety focus delivering
13 top fleet operating performance."

14 Thank you.

15 MR. GROBE: Just one

16 question, Lew.

17 On Slide 38, you presented our recent Safety Culture
18 Assessment results. And I know that was done to, I think
19 it was revision five of that procedure. And you compared
20 this assessment to prior assessments. How similar are the
21 criteria and methodology in the various revisions, such
22 that in fact those are comparable?

23 MR. MYERS: You know, each one
24 of these evaluations, each time we go through the criteria,
25 we find improvements. You know, one of the things that I

1 showed you, I think I have here is -- do you have that
2 document?

3 Yes. Before we were not taking each and every
4 criteria and looking at it holistically. We are now doing
5 that. The procedure has been through five revisions. And,
6 we've added, actually added some new attributes, two new
7 attributes have been added. So, we're getting rid of,
8 doing Revision 6 now based on the last meeting we had.

9 One of the things we did, one of the areas, the
10 attributes was rated red, did not really grade out as red,
11 it was yellow. We made a decision as a management team
12 that we thought it ought to be red. So, our procedure
13 doesn't really spell out the management judgment we use.
14 So, we're going to clarify that. Okay?

15 So, Rev. 6 is getting ready to come out.

16 MR. GROBE: Okay. Thank
17 you.

18 Any other questions?

19 MR. RULAND: Lew, you stated
20 that your process was, I think it was quote, much more
21 objective than the process that the NRC uses. Could you
22 elaborate a little bit on that, why you think that was the
23 case?

24 MR. MYERS: No, I didn't say
25 the NRC, I said the Sonja Haber report.

1 MR. RULAND: I'm sorry. Okay.

2 Could you elaborate on that then?

3 MR. MYERS: Yeah. You know,
4 the way they did that is a group of people come in. They
5 come, attend the meetings, they watch the plant, they ask
6 you questions, they take some surveys. And they have
7 convergence of their processing because of the different
8 ways they approach the same issue.

9 We have that same kind of convergence in the way we
10 use our quality root to do their own independent
11 assessments in our meetings, the contractor we have on
12 that. So, we have a convergence with them.

13 What they didn't have, we have. After we did our
14 two-day meeting and people bring in their assessments with
15 all the peers; by the time we do our assessment, you have
16 very, very good management alignment on the actions that
17 you need to take place.

18 So, when we walked out of that meeting, I feel we
19 walked out with good alignment. Here is the things we need
20 to go get done. In my mind, that's -- I've even attended
21 the ACRS meeting recently. That alignment we have with our
22 managers and senior leadership is a strength.

23 So, not only do we have, and if you go look at our
24 criteria, we now have, what, 40 pages of criteria. I don't
25 think their process was quite as objective as ours. They

1 had some surveys that were objective, but we can go out and
2 measure new performance error rate, procedure error rates,
3 things like that. A number of temporary modifications that
4 they didn't really have. Backlog in their process that
5 it's much more objective, our measure for Safety Culture,
6 especially in the individual area.

7 MR. RULAND: I guess, maybe
8 it's a semantic issue, but they have, clearly your process
9 was more detailed. It clearly was more scrutable. You
10 had a lot more objective criteria, the criteria clearly was
11 more objective.

12 MR. MYERS: Right.

13 MR. RULAND: And kind of
14 balanced against that, is the Sonja Haber report was done
15 by people that were independent of your folks. And it's
16 not, your process, really you don't have necessarily that
17 independence.

18 MR. MYERS: You know, we have
19 our Quality Group. They performed their own
20 self-assessment independent of Safety Culture prior to
21 coming to our meeting. Additionally, we have two or three
22 contractors that we use, and we also use the feedback that
23 we get from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations,
24 where we brought peers in before as part of that process to
25 help us out in Operations.

1 You know, I spoke with peers going into this
2 process, like three, two or three other plants they had
3 been in. So, we do have quite of bit of independence
4 also.

5 MR. RULAND: I understand. I'm
6 not objecting to your process, I was trying to understand
7 what your words meant. Thank you.

8 MR. MYERS: Okay.

9 MR. RULAND: One more question,
10 sorry.

11 MR. MYERS: Sure.

12 MR. RULAND: You said something
13 about, when you were talking about slide, the recent Safety
14 Culture where you put up that diagram with the yellows and
15 the reds.

16 MR. MYERS: Right.

17 MR. RULAND: You talked about
18 Corrective Action Trending.

19 MR. MYERS: Right.

20 MR. RULAND: How are you doing
21 Corrective Action Trending on CRs these days? Are you
22 looking at that?

23 MR. MYERS: Oh, yeah. What we
24 have, our other two plants that we implement here, we have
25 a standard group of performance indicators that we look at

1 routinely on, from our Corrective Action Process, from a
2 trending standpoint; a number, the number of procedure
3 changes outstanding, training issues, trying to remember
4 all the things; individual error rates. Things like that
5 we trend, they come out of our Corrective Action Program.

6 Again, we have a Nuclear Operating Procedure that's
7 in place we're not implementing here at this time because
8 of the outage. It's a Collective Significance Review
9 Procedure, and it's a business practice. And what we do on
10 that; I think Christine has observed that; we collect all
11 the data we can from the Institute of Nuclear Power
12 Operations, industry issues, NRC findings, stuff coming out
13 of our Corrective Action Program; pull that together; try
14 to vent it, then we bring it into the Senior Management
15 Team and take approximately a half a day to figure out what
16 this tells us what we need to go do with that data.

17 MR. SCHRAUDER: Bill, we just
18 recently got Region III, had a meeting down there. We
19 discussed training, and did identify that the formal part
20 of the Condition Report Trending Process had been suspended
21 during this outage period, and we are just reinstating
22 that.

23 And the System Health Reports do a lot of trending
24 for equipment and then the Condition Reporting Trending
25 Process will show you other trends which you're

1 identifying, but that process is just now in the stage of
2 being restarted, I'll say, and we're going back to feed
3 data into the last couple quarters worth of data that we
4 have to bring that forward, so.

5 MR. RULAND: Thank you.

6 MR. MYERS: Steve.

7 MR. LOEHLEIN: Thank you, Lew.

8 In previous meetings with the NRC, I pretty often
9 listed some of the specific observations we made in Quality
10 Assessment. Today, rather than repeat that format, I would
11 like to update you on how QA is conducting its assessments
12 to ensure readiness for restart.

13 First, I would like to report on Quality
14 Assessment's approach in confirming completion of the item
15 necessary to ensure the station's readiness for restart,
16 which is both from an equipment standpoint and from an
17 organizational standpoint.

18 Next, I'll discuss what Quality Assessment has been
19 doing to ensure its own readiness for station restart.

20 And, finally, I would like to share with you some of
21 the assessment activities we have planned for the upcoming
22 plant activities that are associated with the Mode 4 and 3
23 Normal Operating Pressure Tests.

24 Overall, I'll say the theme of my presentation is
25 that the organization is entering a transition from its

1 recovery actions towards more normal conditions. And this
2 transition represents opportunities for QA to evaluate how
3 well the changes that have been made, how well they've been
4 internalized by the organization and we'll be able to
5 assess whether improvements are continuing.

6 Next slide, please.

7 In terms of the Readiness of Systems and Equipment,
8 up until this time, confidence that we've been gaining in
9 the plant's readiness for restart is being achieved largely
10 through the continuous oversight of the Return to Service
11 Plan.

12 We've reported here in prior months about things
13 that QA has found along the way, how we've been involved
14 with the start of the Return to Service Plan. Provided
15 input. You may recall that we independently reviewed
16 several systems to ensure that the System Health Review
17 Process was working.

18 We monitored and confirmed that there was proper
19 management decision-making that took place and determined
20 restart related activities both for equipment and for
21 processes. And, that the required restart actions were
22 identified to the proper mode. That's what we've been
23 doing up until now.

24 We've also been monitoring the management oversight,
25 the key equipment of problem resolutions. Most flagrantly

1 and most notably the operation of the plant support center,
2 which is carrying the major remaining issues there on the
3 status board. You can see management oversight.

4 And, recently the System Health Reviews that were
5 done during the Restart Readiness Review Process.

6 So, going forward now, we're going to continue to
7 monitor and assess the resolution of the key remaining
8 issues. For example, the high pressure injection pumps.
9 QA has twice now visited the testing facility and provided
10 for the line and what we see there and we'll be returning
11 there at the time the qualification testing is done. And
12 we'll continue to follow the others using the plans we have
13 in place, things that cross these modifications and so
14 forth that still remain.

15 What's going to be changing is, up until now, for
16 example, a new issue would be identified on a Condition
17 Report, went to the Restart Station Review Board for
18 scoring and pre versus post restart, and ultimately was an
19 important enough issue to track in plant support center.

20 As of this past Monday, the organization now is
21 returning to the more normal process of reviewing Condition
22 Reports at 8:00 in the morning meetings. So, we have an
23 opportunity now to begin to watch how the organization
24 identifies an issue. How well does the management team
25 respond to it for categorization, priority, and assessment,

1 as to whether it's part of this outage evolution or whether
2 it's an issue that can be dealt with in the future.

3 Next slide.

4 Because of its critical nature, the Corrective
5 Action Program has received a lot of attention, lot a
6 scrutiny by QA of late. This took the form of two key
7 actions. The first was a review of the extensive
8 population of corrective actions. The review was led by
9 QA, included many people from the line organization and
10 even some off-site people that we used from our other two
11 stations.

12 A couple of months ago, QA reported an issuance of
13 insights of this review to the NRC at another meeting like
14 this. And since that time, the review team has completed
15 that review. As a matter of fact, we finished and signed
16 off the transmittal report to Lew Myers just today, to the
17 management team.

18 What I've got up here is the overall summarized
19 results. This Corrective Action Review touched on nearly
20 7,000 Corrective Actions overall. Of those, 5402 of those
21 have gone all the way through the process and were reported
22 as complete. So, that's the number you see here, completed
23 Corrective Actions. Of course, the primary objective was
24 to see Corrective Actions were implemented as expected out
25 of the condition that was originally identified.

1 Of those 5402, the team determined that 92 percent
2 approximately of those, were found to acceptably address
3 the issue. 422 cases of what they looked at or 8 percent
4 were inconclusive or unacceptable.

5 I might mention too, I forgot to mention. Of the
6 5402, that included all of the restart related actions that
7 were completed at the time of the review, and several
8 thousand additional ones to increase the sample size.

9 Now, we pretty much saw an even split in the types
10 of errors that the team identified. The one type the team
11 called documentation errors. These were cases in which the
12 team's belief from their review and investigation into the
13 actions, appear to be proper actions, but the documentation
14 of exactly what took place is in some way less than
15 accurate.

16 The other type is the documentation linkage could
17 not be made as clearly, based on the documentation that was
18 available. Those cases, we just were not able to determine
19 whether or not a proper Corrective Action was done;
20 therefore, those are the cases that represent potentially
21 issues that require additional work. For all of these 422
22 cases, they're all represented on Condition Reports that
23 the team has written.

24 I might say that in all the thousands they looked
25 at, there were only a handful of cases, less than five, I

1 believe, in which an actual error was found. In each case,
2 they got their specific Condition Report written because of
3 it. And none of those conditions were significant. They
4 were lower level type of errors.

5 So, the overall conclusion of the team was pending
6 the outcome of the new Condition Reports which have several
7 questions associated with them, that in general issues,
8 none appear to have been lost, but the documentation of the
9 activities needs improvement.

10 MR. GROBE: Steve, I would
11 like to try to hold my questions to the end, but you've
12 covered several different topics, so I would like to ask a
13 question to you.

14 MR. LOEHLEIN: Okay.

15 MR. GROBE: I'd seen some of
16 this activity process, and the error rate originally
17 reported was a little bit higher than what I'm seeing
18 here. What, what happened as you were finding data to
19 result in these final error rates?

20 MR. LOEHLEIN: That's a good
21 question, Jack. What the team did, is the first time
22 through, they went through a simple vending process. Those
23 that clearly fell from the documentation place, seemed to
24 be no question that they were acceptable, they would have
25 been, I think at that time, that was on the order of 80

1 percent or so, were found to be that way.

2 Following that initial screening, those 20 percent
3 or so, were viewed as inconclusive, based on unknowns at
4 that time, potentially problems with them.

5 Most of the ones that were eliminated following that
6 initial review were all of the type in which the Corrective
7 Action implementation was dependent upon capturing of a
8 record. Usually it was capturing of a photograph, an
9 as-left condition of a component. Those Corrective Actions
10 were relying on a process that would capture those and see
11 that they got to the files.

12 The team at that point was still not comfortable
13 calling those okay, those processes in place, until they
14 were able to go back and pick quite a number of those at
15 random and confirm that the process was indeed capturing
16 those and they were indeed ending up in Condition Report
17 files.

18 So, once they were able to conclude that was
19 working, those all went from the inconclusive state to an
20 acceptable state; and that was the primary reason for the
21 drop in percentage.

22 MR. GROBE: Thank you.

23 MR. LOEHLEIN: Any other
24 questions on that?

25 We have provided, Corrective Action Team requested a

1 copy of that report; and we're doing that, we're providing
2 that to that team.

3 Next slide, please.

4 The other major activity associated with the
5 Corrective Action Program was focused assessment of the
6 program. And we conducted that as part of the second
7 quarter of continuous assessment activities. Really, this
8 was prompted by several different indicators; one was the
9 day we were getting on this review. We also, QA had rated
10 the Corrective Action Program marginally in the quarters
11 leading up to this, and the response to all that feedback
12 by the Performance Improvement Group was to generate some
13 process changes and some responsibility changes to make
14 improvements. So, QA was very interested in assessing the
15 initial impact of the program changes.

16 I might also add here that the data I just showed
17 you on the slide before this was primarily historical data
18 done prior to the process change which occurred in March.
19 So, what we needed was a good solid read on the Corrective
20 Action Program effectiveness as it exists right now.

21 Listed up here are some of the major things, some
22 of the way we approached this assessment. We interviewed
23 managers, Condition Report analysts and other personnel
24 involved in the process. We did oversight in Corrective
25 Action Review Board and the Management Review Board. We

1 sampled Condition Reports for quality work and compliance
2 with procedure and we also sampled rollovers to check they
3 had been performed correctly.

4 Next slide, please.

5 My conclusions that the Corrective Actions -- or
6 that this focus assessment came up with, is the Corrective
7 Action Program currently is satisfactory in identifying,
8 finding, and fixing problems, essentially.

9 What we found is the process improvements by this
10 time now, which began in the second quarter, in the June
11 timeframe; by that time, changes were beginning to have
12 impact on the organization, and we were seeing improvements
13 in performance in that regard; finding and fixing and
14 identifying problems.

15 We had referred about before, we talked about
16 trending. There is no data for us to evaluate the
17 effectiveness of trending, because it's suspended, our
18 extended outage, and that needs to be in place for the
19 future health of the program.

20 We also identified that the organization needs to
21 improve its use of performance indicators to help target
22 what it does.

23 The other major message is that the organization
24 needs to continue to emphasize improvement in
25 implementation, because although we've seen improvement,

1 vigilance is really necessary here. The organization is
2 going to be changing back to routine methods and needs to
3 demonstrate the Condition Reports are properly categorized,
4 that the potential for collective significance is
5 recognized, and that management properly prioritizes
6 issues.

7 So, I view this as one of the key things we need to
8 monitor as Rick Dame, all of his activities he has
9 planned. As he has said, when the plant has a return to
10 its processes that are more normal, it's really important
11 that these improvements continue to occur in these areas,
12 and QA will really be continuing to look at that.

13 MS. LIPA: Steve, the
14 question I have about this trending, we talked about it a
15 good bit today. Your first conclusion is that the program
16 was satisfactory in finding and fixing identified problems,
17 but I wondered how you factored in the fact that trending
18 had been suspended, because trending is a way to find
19 problems.

20 MR. LOEHLEIN: Right. We've
21 talked about that as for, for prepared issues conclusion to
22 management, the importance of that.

23 What we have now though, or had, didn't quite go
24 over that last number of months, is we had that done almost
25 in an ad hoc way. We haven't had a computerized process to

1 trend data, but we've had very involved management.

2 I sit in on a tremendous number of Senior Team
3 Meetings in which the issues are discussed with the System
4 Engineers and Engineering Management and Operations and
5 Maintenance and so forth. And between that and the actions
6 of the Corrective Action Review Board, Engineering
7 Assessment Board, other people involved, what we had is
8 lots of opportunities to recognize the significance of the
9 issues.

10 So, the challenge will be as the organization goes
11 back to using its more normal processes and relying on the
12 Work Support Center which normally controls scope
13 sufficient to an outage, and relying on the Management
14 Interface Meetings to recognize priority significance, the
15 key thing is for QA to observe that transition to occur.

16 So, our feeling on trending was, that the decision
17 was valid in terms of trending up to now, but go back to
18 the process, trending is going to end up, for the future,
19 is an important part of a tool for the team to use, more
20 importantly, expand where all the oversight that's occurred
21 in the last number of months.

22 Does that answer your question?

23 MS. LIPA: Yes, thank you.

24 MR. LOEHLEIN: Next slide,

25 please.

1 MR. GROBE: Sorry, Steve,
2 just one additional question.

3 MR. LOEHLEIN: Okay.

4 MR. GROBE: On your previous
5 Slide 49, you indicated a number of areas --

6 MR. LOEHLEIN: Sorry, Jack, I
7 can't hear you.

8 MR. GROBE: Sorry. In your
9 previous slide, on 49, you indicated a number of areas
10 where you've examined, and including the Corrective Action
11 Review Board, Management Review Board, and other areas. I
12 didn't hear you mention an assessment of Condition Reports
13 that had been downgraded from significant conditions to
14 conditions or an assessment of Condition Reports that have
15 been deferred from restart scope to post restart scope.
16 Have you looked at those areas?

17 MR. LOEHLEIN: We have done a
18 lot of monitoring of the Restart Station Review Board that
19 did, that made those decisions and calls. And what we've
20 been watching for, you're probably aware of this, Jack, is
21 that part of the process change was to redefine some of the
22 categories.

23 So, the old, the old what we call Charlie Alpha, the
24 condition adverse to quality level with an apparent cause
25 was a much weaker category in terms of what was expected

1 out of it, there was no expectation for extent of
2 condition. There was no need to write down any cost
3 analysis basis.

4 That shifting of categorizations caused a lot of
5 people to rethink when they were doing their work, whether
6 they now, whether the Condition Report had been written
7 prior, whether it was now proper to recategorize the new
8 process. And, we monitored that and found that the Restart
9 Station Review Board was categorizing correctly, and spoke
10 up when we didn't think they were.

11 There may have been a few cases, I believe there
12 were a couple cases in which Condition Reports we thought
13 the Board should not have or should have and we identified
14 those. By and large the process was working.

15 MR. GROBE: The second half
16 of my question had to do with deferrals from restart scope
17 of work to post-restart scope of work.

18 MR. LOEHLEIN: Those were all
19 captured in the same settings with the same management team
20 members that would do those at the same deferrals, as well
21 as if they were recategorizing them for classification or
22 whether they were being recategorized for pre versus post
23 restart.

24 MR. GROBE: What were your
25 observations regarding Operations engaged in the question

1 deferrals?

2 MR. LOEHLEIN: I couldn't hear

3 you.

4 MR. GROBE: Do you have any

5 observations regarding Operation's engagement in the

6 discussion of deferrals from restart scope to post-restart

7 scope?

8 MR. LOEHLEIN: Sorry, Jack, I

9 personally don't.

10 MR. GROBE: Okay, thank you.

11 MR. LOEHLEIN: I haven't

12 documented anything like that. I would check with my

13 assessors who regularly attend those, if you like. Get you

14 that data on how many times Operations has been the one to

15 seek help.

16 MR. GROBE: I would be

17 interested in feedback. You can just give me a call.

18 Thanks.

19 MR. POWERS: Jack, I would add

20 to that. Operations participates on the Restart Station

21 Review Board, typically either Mike Roder, the Operations

22 Manager or Mike Ross, one of our Senior Consultants,

23 Restart Director, participates on those boards. So, there

24 is an operational input to those decisions.

25 MR. LOEHLEIN: I might also add,

1 Jack, that we early on, attending these. Of course, we
2 wouldn't object as QA, but it was our belief that many more
3 items were being treated as prerestart than classification
4 criteria would have required. And there were very much
5 erring on the side of conservatism in our view. So, we
6 expect that there might be some time to come along where it
7 would be necessary to take another look at those.

8 MS. LIPA: Just to butt in
9 for a minute, Steve. Just for a time check. This is very
10 important information we're discussing, but we need to kind
11 of move forward quickly through the rest of this.

12 Go ahead.

13 MR. LOEHLEIN: As far as the
14 readiness of plant staff, this again we've been monitoring
15 the activities of Management/Human Performance Plan. As
16 mentioned, we conducted our own surveys of Safety Culture.
17 And, so many other things in the interest of time I'll try
18 to shorten this up.

19 What we're trying to continue to do is assess the
20 organization for performance as it completes its actions
21 toward restart. I talked about some of the things we
22 expect and observe the organization to do. Most notably
23 what we're looking for is how does the organization deal
24 with changing conditions.

25 Radiation protection for example, is going to start

1 getting challenged with change in plant conditions. That
2 will affect the radiation worker and so forth.

3 The entire organization is likely to see new
4 unexpected items occur. During the walkdowns, there could
5 be things observed. We'll be looking for the organization
6 to properly identify the issues, escalating them
7 appropriately, get them into the right people's hands to
8 get them resolved.

9 We talked some about what kind of weaknesses or what
10 kinds of things we're looking for. We know historically
11 one of the problems was the organization had a tendency to
12 go right from problem identification to problem solution.
13 In other words, we found something here and rushed to try
14 and fix it, or maybe some way deal with it.

15 Whereas, part of trying to internalize the last
16 couple of months is the need to recognize what the issue
17 could potentially mean, get the right people involved, and
18 make sure that safety is served. That's a little safety
19 culture thing that we're looking for.

20 So, there would be lots of opportunities really for
21 us to observe organizational response to changing
22 conditions. That's going to look different in the
23 different departments.

24 Operations is going to need to complete training for
25 its modifications. It's going to have to complete its many

1 restart activities in a safe manner.

2 I might note another one that we're watching closely
3 is the Maintenance area. Maintenance has a good plan, but
4 there is very little run time on many of the changes that
5 they've made. So, in our minds, they need to continue to
6 work those plans through.

7 I think they need to continue to reinforce Safety
8 Culture. I think convert to their regular safety process
9 and transition to a normal preventative maintenance
10 schedule as well. So, those are the kinds of things we're
11 watching.

12 So, overall, I'd say the thing we're really watching
13 more as an overall trending thing is Safety Culture, which
14 we get input from, through all kinds of interfaces we have
15 in the organization.

16 Next slide, please.

17 Now, some of what's on this slide has already been
18 talked about by Lew, as far as QA's Readiness for Restart.
19 This goes back some months, but QA had a Root Cause
20 Analysis done, and also we had extensive Program Review
21 done of our program. And I believe the results, that those
22 results are really bearing fruit for us.

23 Lew talked about the organization or structural
24 changes we made to make us structurally independent, and
25 reacquisition of quality control, and enhanced oversight by

1 the Company Nuclear Review Board, so I won't go over that
2 again.

3 We responded that some of the weaknesses or all of
4 the weaknesses that were pointed out to us by our Program
5 Review; some of the more important ones were, we were
6 advised by the need to increase our emphasis on field
7 observation activities; and we've done that both by process
8 and even within a database we use, which we made some
9 changes, so it's easy to indicate what settings you use to
10 assess a particular area and what percentage of that
11 represents field activities.

12 Also had the, in the development plans for my
13 supervisors, the need for them to go out on a regular basis
14 in the plant with their personnel. That's part of their
15 own development. So, we've taken actions to improve or
16 increase the field observation on what we do.

17 We've made process changes to improve the quality of
18 our source documents, attributes that we audit; and
19 especially the importance of operating experience that play
20 into the root cause of the whole event. So, we recognized
21 that and have been working on that. And we've improved the
22 qualification process for our assessors.

23 Some other notable things that have occurred, is we
24 built a strong relationship with the management at
25 Davis-Besse. I attend a lot of Senior Leadership Meetings,

1 and Mark Bezilla and I now meet on a regular basis to
2 exchange notes on what I'm seeing, what he's seeing. So,
3 there is a lot of feedback between the two of us, I think.

4 We have very positive response to the quality
5 assessments, of late. We're acting on the insights that
6 were provided in the exits that we provide.

7 The organization also has been very supportive of
8 our recognized need to remain independent. Historically,
9 and in some stations, it's not at all rare for Quality
10 Assessors to be loaned to the organization for production
11 activities for the outage. All of our Quality Assessors
12 are assigned, and are working to assess the organization.
13 So, that need for us, importance of that activity is
14 recognized by the station.

15 Next slide, please.

16 This is my final slide. It kind of lists some of
17 the more interesting things we're going to be doing coming
18 up here.

19 Just as a little reminder, we're always under
20 continuous assessment process. We're always able to adjust
21 our assessment activities based on organization activities
22 and plant conditions.

23 Our staff meets at 7:15 every morning to adjust our
24 activities for the day, get plant conditions. Seem to
25 warrant that, something going on in the plant that looks of

1 particular safety or quality interest for us, we'll adjust
2 our plans for that day.

3 For the Mode 4/3 Normal Operating Pressure Test,
4 some of the things we'll be doing is observing control room
5 activities. The field activities, maybe it's kind of a
6 broad category. That's going to include observing some of
7 the testing going on, equipment testing, but we'll also
8 have assessors walk three on the walkdown teams. We'll
9 pick which three.

10 And I already mentioned in response to our
11 conditions we'll be watching for.

12 We'll look for adjusted time training that's done as
13 we go out. And we will be doing a fair amount of oversight
14 of Restart Test Plan activities. Rick talked about a lot
15 of what they had planned, but we'll do the oversight of
16 that as well.

17 Questions?

18 MS. LIPA: Well, I appreciate
19 this, and I just want to point out that the last bullet you
20 have is some of the things we're doing too, some similar
21 things we'll be doing.

22 MR. LOEHLEIN: I thought about
23 the whole time I heard Rick Dame's presentation, because I
24 can't tell you what relief it is for QA Organization and
25 the Line Organization is trying to put a lot of barriers in

1 place.

2 So, as we look at this, that's very positive the
3 line organization is trying to provide the same kind of
4 oversight as we will. It gives us really two chances to
5 make sure safety is served.

6 MR. GROBE: I thought this
7 presentation was very insightful and helpful. When the
8 shutdown started awhile ago, there were some adjustments
9 that were made early on based on feedback that we were
10 providing and maybe internal feedback, and it got to the
11 point where you got pretty good at this. And we haven't
12 had a lot of significant findings recently.

13 You're now going through a transition. And, I think
14 we all know the transition is very difficult.

15 I would be interested in hearing on a monthly basis
16 feedback, Steve, from you and also, Rick, I would be
17 interested in your observations as things move
18 forward during each of these meetings.

19 MR. MYERS: In closing, today
20 we talked about our readiness for Mode 3, our material
21 improvements, our engineering improvements, and our Safety
22 Culture improvements.

23 I really believe that if you look at everything,
24 actions speak louder than words. So, I brought a tape with
25 me today that I wanted to show. It's very short. So, with

1 that, I would like to start my closing.

2 MR. GROBE: Lew, I have a
3 couple of comments. Did you want to show this first?

4 MR. MYERS: Yeah.

5 MR. GROBE: I'm sorry, go
6 ahead.

7 (TAPE PLAYED AS FOLLOWS:)

8 My name is David Baker. I'm the Reactor Head
9 Resolution Building Block Owner, and Project Manager for
10 head replacement.

11 The head was replaced with one from the abandoned
12 Midland Plant; one that was never used and is almost a
13 duplicate of the original Davis-Besse head.

14 Transporting the new head across two states took two
15 days due to its size and weight, but its arrival on site
16 was a significant milestone for the unit. Almost as much
17 as the swap of a two heads that occurred through the hole
18 in Containment Building that we had to make.

19 The Containment vessel has been restored and tested
20 as part of the Integrated Leak Rate Test. The reactor head
21 has been placed on the vessel and has been tested as part
22 of the 250 Pound Reactor Coolant System Test. All part of
23 our plan to prepare the unit for restart.

24 Hi, My name Steve Fox. I was the Project Manager on
25 the Containment Emergency Sump Project. The nuclear

1 industry has had a longstanding concern with respect to
2 maintaining core cooling following a Loss Of Coolant
3 Accident.

4 Our Containment Emergency Sump was one of the
5 smaller in the industry at only 50 square feet. We've
6 increased that strainer media square footage to over 1200
7 square feet or 20 times greater than what we had before.
8 What this relates to is a greater margin of nuclear safety
9 following a Loss Of Coolant Accident and ensuring that our
10 safety systems operate as they're designed.

11 Hello. My name is Les Bowyer. I was the Project
12 Manager for the decon and cleaning of the Containment
13 Building at the beginning of this outage. The building
14 presently is in the best condition that it's ever been in
15 since it was first built.

16 The floors, walls, everything you can touch is
17 clean. It's, you no longer need protective clothing or
18 will not need protective clothing at the end of this outage
19 as you tour that entire Containment Building.

20 The means that we used to clean this included
21 pressure washing, stream cleaning, hydrolasing and a
22 strippable coating product that we incorporated for the
23 some of the walls and beams and structures that we had to
24 clean.

25 All of the major components that had not been

1 replaced was in fact cleaned and in good housekeeping
2 condition.

3 Hi. My name is Brian Drouillard. I'm one of the
4 Containment Managers here at Davis-Besse, along with
5 Merrill Smith, Rex Rutledge and Jim Kalmbach. We're
6 responsible for correlating all the projects within the
7 Containment Building.

8 We've had a lot of successes during this outage.
9 One of major projects was to work on over 700 valves as
10 part of the corrective action process to ensure safe and
11 reliable operations during this restart process.

12 Hi. My name is Merrill Smith and I'm a Containment
13 Manager. One of the main projects we had during this
14 outage was painting of the Containment dome. That entailed
15 removing all of the paint over a 40,000 square foot area
16 and painting of over 200 gallons of paint.

17 One of the things that challenged us was use of the
18 polar crane while we were getting the painters up and down
19 from the dome, and coordination with other work activities,
20 such as replacing the reactor coolant pump motors which
21 required polar crane.

22 Hi. I'm Brad DeMaison. I'm the Containment Air
23 Cooler Project Manager, also representing Steve Roberts,
24 Project Manager. Our project entailed the replacement of
25 three Containment Air Cooler fan motors; two are brand new,

1 one was refurbished and replaced; the dropdown registers
2 and plenum and turning veins were also replaced under this
3 project.

4 We also redesigned and reinstalled the service water
5 trees, and this included all testing associated with the
6 motors and service water trees and duct work.

7 Another project that I worked on during this outage
8 was the fabrication of the decay heat valve tank. The
9 valve tank protects two essential valves in the Containment
10 Building, and ensures that in the event of a Loss Of
11 Coolant Accident these valves are protected.

12 In the process of fabrication, we welded more than a
13 quarter of a mile of stainless steel welds in order to
14 fabricate the tank. This ensures we have the greatest
15 margin of nuclear safety as Davis-Besse restarts.

16 Hello. My name is Mark Wymer. I am Project Manager
17 for the replacement of Reactor Coolant Pumps 1/1 and 1/2.
18 My project consisted of replacing both motors; one was a
19 new motor, one was a newly refurbished motor; also
20 consisted of replacing both rotating assemblies. We did
21 this project to ensure the quality and safety of the plant.

22 Hi. I'm Dave Imlay, the Electrical Distribution
23 System Project Manager. The status of the project is as
24 follows: The conversion of Davis-Besse's Electrical
25 Distribution System into the Electrical Transient Analysis

1 Program, known as ETAP software model, has been completed.
2 The change that's necessary to the Electrical Distribution
3 System to support Davis-Besse's Plant Restart have been
4 identified. Work on the design packages is continuing with
5 issuance of the design packages to the field expected
6 within the next two weeks.

7 (Dave Baker) Another project that I'm responsible
8 for is the Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start Project.
9 Emergency Diesel Generators provide electrical power for
10 the unit in the event that an emergency or an unusual
11 event, much like tornado that we had here several years
12 ago.

13 Periodic testing of the diesel generators had
14 indicated that their reliability was diminishing due to
15 particulate matter accumulating in the airstart system.
16 The replacement of the carbon steel piping for the
17 compressors with nonrustable stainless steel, the
18 installation of air dryers, and replacing the carbon steel
19 pipers from the receivers down to the airstart motors will
20 increase our margin of safety for those safety components
21 and prepare our unit for restart.

22 (END OF TAPE)

23 MR. MYERS: That's all I
24 have. Thank you.

25 MR. GROBE: Okay, thanks.

1 One of the things that is challenging to me is
2 challenging to the panel, and we've had many discussions
3 about it, is what gives us confidence that what happened
4 over the 90's and has happened previously at Davis-Besse
5 does not recur.

6 And I've seen the graphic of multiple brick walls
7 before, and that's really good graphic. And I think over
8 the period in the 90's, the mortar started cracking and
9 wasn't tuck pointed. It got to the point where it was four
10 walls of Swiss cheese, and as soon as those holes line up
11 you have a problem.

12 There is a couple issues that we have yet to talk
13 about. One is the Long Term Safety Culture Improvements
14 Initiatives Monitoring Plan we're meeting on in mid
15 September, I think. Another one that we're still wrestling
16 with is the Collective Significance Process and Corrective
17 Action Trending Process; how that contributes to assuring
18 long term health and not cyclic performance.

19 I think we haven't been able to answer that question
20 among ourselves yet. And what I think I would like to do
21 is have an agenda item next month and have you answer that
22 question, and kind of build that wall for us, and see if we
23 can develop some common understanding.

24 MR. MYERS: Okay.

25 MR. GROBE: I had no other

1 comments.

2 Does anybody have any questions or comments?

3 Okay. Thank you.

4 MS. LIPA: Okay. What we're
5 going to do now is take a five minute break and then we'll
6 resume for questions and comments from members of the
7 public. So, let's be back in five minutes. Thank you.

8 (Off the record.)

9 MS. LIPA: Okay, great.

10 What we would like to do is open up the microphone for
11 anybody who has a comment or question or the NRC folks
12 here, and then we'll be available after too, if you want to
13 come up to us personally.

14 What we would like to do is start with local member
15 of the public first. We have a signup sheet on the
16 podium. You can put your name and then state your name
17 clearly for the transcriber. And, we would like to limit
18 each person to five minutes and we would like to start with
19 local members of the public or public officials first and
20 then open it up to anybody. So, let's go ahead.

21 MR. ARNDT: My name is Steve Arndt,
22 Ottawa County Commissioner. Many, many months ago, I
23 addressed the NRC and indicated that as an elected official
24 my first and primary responsibility is the health, safety,
25 and welfare of the general public. And a part of this 0350

1 Process, while tiring, has been very rewarding.

2 The 0350 process, I totally believe that the NRC has
3 maintained the integrity in that system and in that
4 process. And I want to commend Jack Grobe and his staff,
5 Christine, and the group that you've assembled, you've done
6 and outstanding job of maintaining the integrity of that
7 0350 Process.

8 As far as the utility goes, I certainly have to say
9 there has been many changes and many policy consistent with
10 changes there as well. I wish I could call for restart
11 today, but I think that would be premature, but we have
12 made great progress; both the utility from the condition
13 side of the plant, as well as the safety culture change,
14 but I do believe we're getting close to the point where
15 we're able to see the light at the end of the tunnel.

16 As I mentioned, this has been a very long and tiring
17 process, but it's been a very rewarding process and very
18 fulfilling. That's from a local elected official
19 standpoint, making sure that health, safety and welfare is
20 permanent for the NRC and the Utility as well. I think
21 you've all proven that over the many months that that is
22 your focus, and I commend both the Utility as well as the
23 NRC for maintaining that focus.

24 I certainly know that through the length of this
25 time there has been a lot of distraction and comments and

1 you've maintained the focus, which is where it needs to be,
2 and I commend both the Utility as well as the NRC for
3 that.

4 In short, I hope that the systems that we've put in
5 place for the continuing oversight with both the Utility
6 and Corporate oversight structures serve as well. I
7 believe it will. I can certainly tell you as a County
8 Commissioner, one of our strong measure processes is make
9 sure those systems and policies are in place and to make
10 sure and ensure that those are carried out, and I believe
11 we're doing that here today through the O350 Process as
12 well.

13 And so, I just wanted to come up. And I know you
14 don't always hear positive comments, but as a local elected
15 official, I can tell you the community has recognized the
16 integrity of the NRC and their focus as well as the
17 Utility. We appreciate that. Thank you.

18 MS. LIPA: Thank you for
19 comments, Steve.

20 MR. GROBE: Steve, I really
21 appreciate your comments. Integrity is something that is
22 very important to us, and objectivity is maybe even a
23 better word.

24 And the Resident Inspectors are here every day.
25 They need to maintain their objectivity, make sure they're

1 providing effective independent oversight. I have
2 confidence they are. We also have become very closely
3 involved in, I would have to say, day-to-day assessments.

4 We have a team of about ten Resident Inspectors up
5 here. And it's very important to ensure that we maintain
6 and fulfill our responsibilities of objective and
7 independent oversight. So, I appreciate your
8 observations. Thank you very much.

9 MS. LIPA: Does somebody
10 else have a comment or question for us?

11 Okay, we'll expand it to not just local, but
12 anybody.

13 Okay, our next public meeting is September 10th. I
14 want to make sure I have the right date here. That's
15 right.

16 We'll be back again at 7 tonight.

17 Our next business meeting next month will be
18 Wednesday, September 10th, at 2 p.m. and 7 p.m. Going to
19 Wednesday that time for schedule reasons. And we also
20 talked about a couple of other special public meetings that
21 we'll be working on setting up in the meantime and those
22 will be published on our website.

23 Is there anybody else who has any comments or
24 questions for us?

25 Okay, we'll be back again at 7 tonight. If anyone

1 wants to return.

2 Thank you for coming. Good night.

3 (Off the record.)

4 ---

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 CERTIFICATE

2 I, Marie B. Fresch, Registered Merit Reporter and
3 Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio, duly
4 commissioned and qualified therein, do hereby certify that
5 the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the
6 proceedings as taken by me and that I was present during
7 all of said proceedings.

8 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
9 affixed my seal of office at Norwalk, Ohio, on this 22nd
10 day of August, 2003.

11

12

13

14

Marie B. Fresch, RMR

15

NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF OHIO
My Commission Expires 10-9-03.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25