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PUBLIC MEETING  
BETWEEN U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O350 PANEL  
AND FIRST ENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY  
OAK HARBOR, OHIO

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Meeting held on Tuesday, March 11, 2003, at  
2:00 p.m. at the Camp Perry Clubhouse, Oak Harbor, Ohio,  
taken by me, Marie B. Fresch, Registered Merit Reporter,  
and Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.

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PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT:

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John "Jack" Grobe, Chairman, MC 0350 Panel  
William Dean, Vice Chairman, MC 0350 Panel  
Christopher Scott Thomas,  
Senior Resident Inspector  
U.S. NRC Office - Davis-Besse  
Jon Hopkins, Project Manager Davis-Besse  
Anthony Mendiola,  
Section Chief PDIII-2, NRR  
David Passehl,  
Project Engineer Davis-Besse

FIRST ENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

Lew Myers, FENOC Chief Operating Officer  
Robert W. Schrauder,  
Director - Support Services  
James J. Powers, III  
Director - Nuclear Engineering  
L. William Pearce,  
Vice President FENOC Oversight  
Craig Hengge, Engineer - Plant Engineering  
Kathy Fehr,  
Owner-Management Observation Program  
Lynn Harder, Project Manager  
Containment Health Inspection  
Clark Price, Owner-Restart Action Plan  
Greg Dunn, Manager  
Outage Management & Work Control

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1           MR. PASSEHL:       Welcome  
2 everybody. Welcome to FirstEnergy and members of the  
3 public for coming to this meeting today. This is a public  
4 meeting between the NRC's Davis-Besse Oversight Panel and  
5 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company.

6           I am David Passehl, Project Engineer and Assistant  
7 to the Branch Chief, Christine Lipa, who is responsible for  
8 the NRC's Inspection Program at Davis-Besse. Christine  
9 cannot attend today's meeting due to other commitments.

10          The purposes of today's meeting are to inform the  
11 public of the NRC's Oversight Panel activities and to  
12 discuss the Licensee's progress on implementing their  
13 Return to Service Plan.

14          On today's agenda, we'll be doing introduction and  
15 opening remarks. We'll have a short summary of the  
16 February 11th public meetings, which was our last 0350  
17 public meeting. We'll discuss significant NRC activities  
18 since that February 11th public meeting. The Licensee will  
19 present the status of their Return to Service Plan. And  
20 then we'll adjourn the NRC meeting with FirstEnergy, take a  
21 break. And, then we'll come back for public comments and  
22 questions of the NRC; and then we'll adjourn the meeting.

23          This meeting is open to public observation. Please  
24 note that this is a meeting between the Nuclear Regulatory  
25 Commission and FirstEnergy. At the conclusion of the

1 business portion of this meeting, but before the meeting is  
2 adjourned, the NRC staff will be available to receive  
3 comments from members of the public and answer questions.

4 There are copies of the March edition of our monthly  
5 newsletter and copies of the slides for this meeting in the  
6 foyer. The newsletter provides background information and  
7 also discusses current plan in NRC activities.

8 We also have a public meeting feedback form, which  
9 is a good tool to allow us to get feedback from people who  
10 are here to let us know aspects of the meeting we can  
11 improve on.

12 We have been doing that since our public meetings  
13 started in May of 2002, and we've made some changes, and we  
14 think that, that we think have made this a better meeting.  
15 Copies of the feedback forms are also available in the  
16 foyer.

17 We're having this meeting transcribed today by Marie  
18 Fresch, to maintain a record of the meeting. The  
19 transcription will be available on our web page and we  
20 usually have that available on our website in about three  
21 to four weeks.

22 Before we get started, I want to make  
23 introductions. First on my far left is Jon Hopkins, who is  
24 the NRR Project Manager for Davis-Besse.

25 Next to him is Tony Mendiola. He is a Section Chief

1 in the Division of Reactor Projects in our headquarters  
2 offices.

3 Next to him is Bill Dean, Deputy Director for the  
4 Engineering Division in NRR located in our headquarters  
5 office in Rockville, Maryland. He is Vice President of the  
6 Davis-Besse Oversight Panel.

7 And, next to him and to my left is Jack Grobe,  
8 Senior Manager in the Region III office in Lisle, Illinois;  
9 and he's the Chairman of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel.

10 Next to me is the Senior Resident Inspector, Scott  
11 Thomas.

12 And, also with us in the audience, we have Nancy  
13 Keller, who is the site secretary at Davis-Besse; we have  
14 our Public Affairs Officer, Jan Strasma, in the audience;  
15 and we have our Region III State Liaison Officer in the  
16 audience as well.

17 We also have Jack ~~Raczowski~~ Rutkowski, who will be replacing  
18 Doug Simpkins as the Resident Inspector later this spring.

19 MR. GROBE: Stand up, Jack.  
20 Let me embarrass you a little bit. Turn around. We're  
21 very grateful to have Jack here. He and his wife are in  
22 the process of moving to the area. Jack will be full time  
23 with us here at Davis-Besse in the next couple of months.

24 Jack has, is a highly educated, highly experienced  
25 individual. He's got degrees from three different

1 universities. He was an officer with the nuclear Navy.  
2 And he's had about 25 years of experience working for a  
3 variety of utilities in the nuclear power industry. And,  
4 starting with us a few months ago and we're grateful to  
5 have him assigned out at Davis-Besse. So, you'll be seeing  
6 more of Jack over the next few months.

7 MR. PASSEHL: Lew, if you  
8 wanted to introduce FirstEnergy and return it back to me,  
9 please.

10 MR. MYERS: Okay, thank you.  
11 We're going to be changing some chairs around at the  
12 break. So, I'm going to introduce the people now at the  
13 table. To my left is Bill Pearce, the VP of Quality  
14 Assurance.

15 To my right is Kathy Fehr. She's in charge of the  
16 Management Observation Program, is going to status us on  
17 that today.

18 Craig Hengge is the Manager of our new Leak  
19 Detection System. We'll talk about that today also.

20 Greg Dunn, next to him, is the Outage Director and  
21 also the Manager of Work Management. And he's with us  
22 today to status us on upcoming activities. We're actually  
23 going to try to get around to that today. You can see our  
24 package is considerably thinner than it was the last time.

25 Bob Schrauder is next to him. Bob is our Project

1 Manager for the System Review and also Director of Support  
2 Services.

3 Then, Jim Powers at the end of the table and Jim is  
4 the Director of Engineering.

5 We have Lynn Harder who is with us today. He will  
6 be, he will status us on the Containment Health Project.

7 And finally, Clark Price is the Owner of the Restart  
8 Action Performance. He'll status on that today also.

9 MR. PASSEHL: Okay, thank you.

10 MR. MYERS: Thank you.

11 MR. PASSEHL: At this time, I  
12 would like any public officials or representatives of  
13 public officials to introduce yourselves, please.

14 MR. PAPCUN: John Papcun,  
15 Ottawa County Commissioner.

16 MR. ARNDT: Steve Arndt,  
17 Ottawa County Commissioner.

18 MR. KOEBEL: Carl Koebel,  
19 Ottawa County Commissioner.

20 MR. WITT: Jere Witt, County  
21 Administrator.

22 MR. FLIGOR: Dennis Fligor, for  
23 United States Senator George Voinovich.

24 MR. PASSEHL: Okay, thank you  
25 very much.

1 Next slide, please.

2 Okay, we'll discuss a summary of our last public  
3 meeting. During the meeting on February 11th, we discussed  
4 the status of ongoing plant and NRC activities.

5 The NRC staff discussed the status of Restart  
6 Checklist items. We described the inspections that we've  
7 done and those that are upcoming regarding the adequacy of  
8 safety significant structures, systems and components. We  
9 mentioned a Resident Inspection Report and a Special  
10 Inspection Report that we issued.

11 The Special Inspection Report concerned the adequacy  
12 of Root Causes and the Human Performance area. We  
13 discussed the status of ongoing System Health Review  
14 Inspections, which are particularly focused in the  
15 engineering areas.

16 We highlighted some inspection activities that  
17 remained, including the normal operating pressure tests,  
18 the containment vessel integrated leak rate test, the  
19 inspection of the emergency sump, inspections of various  
20 Licensee programs, and adequacy of organizational  
21 effectiveness in human performance.

22 Later in today's presentation we plan to provide an  
23 update on our recently completed and ongoing NRC  
24 activities.

25 The Licensee provided an update on efforts made

1 toward restart. They discussed activities related to fuel  
2 reload and the containment integrated leak rate test. The  
3 Licensee also covered from a system health standpoint,  
4 their Safety Function Validation Project and described the  
5 basis for increasing the scope of their system health  
6 reviews.

7 The Licensee recapped our January 30th public  
8 meeting, which was held to discuss Safety Culture and  
9 Safety Conscious Work Environment. And they discussed how  
10 they grade their own Safety Culture. The Quality Assurance  
11 Organization discussed some of their observations. And  
12 finally, the Licensee discussed their schedule and where  
13 they were at and where they were going in the next few  
14 months.

15 Next slide, please.

16 MR. GROBE: There has been a  
17 number of activities that have occurred on our side of the  
18 table over the last month, and we wanted to just update you  
19 on a few of those. Work level activities for the NRC has  
20 gone up significantly and will continue to go up over the  
21 next couple of months as this project wraps up.

22 The first thing I wanted to talk about just briefly  
23 is we issued a preliminary significance assessment of the  
24 performance deficiency of Davis-Besse. On February 24, we  
25 issued this letter. It contained what we call a



1 performance deficiency.

2 That performance deficiency at Davis-Besse was the  
3 failure to properly implement the Boric Acid Corrosion  
4 Management and Corrective Action Programs that allowed the  
5 reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage to occur  
6 undetected for a prolonged period of time, resulting in the  
7 reactor pressure vessel head degradation and  
8 circumferential ~~tracking~~ cracking of the control and drive mechanism  
9 penetration nozzles.

10 We carefully articulate that performance deficiency  
11 and then assess the risk significance of that. Under NRC's  
12 Reactor Oversight Program, we have four colors that we use  
13 to describe the relative significance of findings. The  
14 least significant is what we call green, and it ranges up  
15 white, yellow, and the most significant is red.

16 Our preliminary decision is that the performance  
17 deficiency that resulted in this extended outage was  
18 characterized as a red significance finding or a finding of  
19 high safety significance.

20 Before the NRC makes its final decision on the  
21 significance, we publish our significance letter and give  
22 FirstEnergy an opportunity to comment on the analysis that  
23 supported that determination, give us any additional  
24 information that would provide further insights that would  
25 be useful; and FirstEnergy is in the process of evaluating

1 our letter, and I understand they will be responding with a  
2 letter to us.

3 So, another option that FirstEnergy would have,  
4 would be what we call a Regulatory Conference. That would  
5 be a public meeting. And, I understand that FirstEnergy  
6 has opted not to do that, but send us a letter with some  
7 comments; and we'll receive that letter and make our final  
8 significance determination.

9 Thanks, Dave.

10 MR. PASSEHL: Okay, the next  
11 item there, on February 19th of this year, Region III  
12 issued the final significance determination letter for two  
13 white findings associated with radiological controls  
14 related to steam generator work back in February of 2002.

15 The findings involve failures by plant staff to  
16 conduct an adequate evaluation of the radiological hazards  
17 in order to characterize radiological work conditions, take  
18 timely and suitable measurements to adequately monitor the  
19 intake of radioactive materials by workers during and  
20 following installation of nozzle dams and steam  
21 generators.

22 A public meeting was held back on October 16th,  
23 2002, to discuss the findings and observations from our  
24 inspection of this issue. Inspection report was issued on  
25 January 7th, 2003. FirstEnergy agreed with the NRC's

1 characterization of the risk significance of the findings  
2 and declined the opportunity to provide additional  
3 information or discuss the issue in a regulatory  
4 conference.

5 After considering the information developed during  
6 the inspection, the NRC concluded that the inspection  
7 findings were appropriately characterized as white, which  
8 is an issue with low to moderate increase importance to  
9 safety.

10 The NRC is currently conducting inspections in the  
11 radiological protection area, which I will mention in the  
12 next slide.

13 MR. GROBE: We also had an  
14 opportunity to respond to your governor, Governor Taft.  
15 The governor requested a briefing on what's happening at  
16 Davis-Besse from the NRC's perspective.

17 On February 27, my boss, Jim Dyer, the Associate  
18 Director of our Headquarters Office responsible for Nuclear  
19 Reactor Safety, Brian Sherrod Sheron, and myself briefed the  
20 governor and about 15 of his staff on a variety of topics,  
21 including some historical information on control rod drive  
22 mechanism penetration cracking, boric acid corrosion, as  
23 well as specific information regarding what's going on here  
24 at Davis-Besse, including the significance assessment  
25 letter that I just discussed a moment ago.

1       The NRC's response to the reactor head situation at  
2 Davis-Besse characterized the FirstEnergy's activities that  
3 are ongoing, as well as discussed in a broader context the  
4 nuclear industry's response to what happened at Davis-Besse  
5 and actions that are occurring at other plants around the  
6 country.

7       We completed the briefing with a discussion of our  
8 Lessons Learned and the improvements that the NRC is making  
9 in its programs and processes to ensure that this kind of  
10 situation doesn't happen again in the future.

11           MR. PASSEHL:       On February 26th,  
12 2003, the NRC issued two Special Inspection Reports on  
13 review of activities as described in the Davis-Besse System  
14 Health Assurance Plan. That inspection examined the  
15 Licensee's actions relative to NRC Restart Checklist item  
16 Number 5B, which is associated with assuring the capability  
17 of safety significant structures, systems and components to  
18 support safe and reliable plant operation.

19       The Licensee's System Health Assurance Plan consists  
20 of three review programs; an Operational Readiness Review,  
21 a System Health Readiness Review and a Latent Issues  
22 Review. Our inspection included reviewing the plans and  
23 procedures for the three review programs, monitoring the  
24 work of the teams in progress, monitoring nuclear oversight  
25 activities, attending review board meetings, and reviewing

1 condition reports generated by the teams as reviews were  
2 conducted and discrepancies were identified.

3 The inspectors also monitored training of reviewers,  
4 conducted walkdowns of systems, examined emergent issues,  
5 reviewed independent self-assessments of systems and  
6 reviewed various reports. We also performed our own  
7 Independent Design Review.

8 The NRC concluded in the inspection reports that the  
9 System Health Assurance Plan was well designed, with  
10 acceptable procedures and oversight; however, because the  
11 majority of the System Health Assurance Plan reports were  
12 still under development at the time of our inspection, and  
13 because several unresolved questions remained involving  
14 calculations, analyses and testing, the NRC kept Restart  
15 Checklist Item 5B open pending the outcome of some more  
16 additional inspection.

17 Next slide, please.

18 Cover some continuing NRC activities. Under  
19 Organizational Effectiveness and Human Performance, our  
20 inspection in this area is reviewing the Licensee's  
21 Management and Human Performance Excellence Building Block,  
22 which is part of their Return to Service Plan and is an NRC  
23 Restart Checklist item.

24 This inspection is being performed in three phases.  
25 The first is an examination of Root Causes. The second is

1 an examination of Corrective Actions for the Root Causes to  
2 ensure that FirstEnergy has identified appropriate  
3 Corrective Actions to address the causes, and the third is  
4 an examination of those Corrective Actions once they are in  
5 place to assess the effectiveness prior to restart.

6 Phase one of the inspection is complete. Phase two  
7 is under way. The inspection is being conducted by three  
8 inspectors and should be completed within the next week or  
9 so. The third phase is expected to be conducted as  
10 Licensee activities are completed in the upcoming weeks.

11 NRC issued an inspection report Number 02-15 on  
12 February 6th, 2003 and provides an update, status update in  
13 this area.

14 Under System Health Design Reviews, this is an NRC  
15 inspection of the Licensee System Health Assurance Plan I  
16 discussed earlier. We continue to perform inspections of  
17 this area. The inspection is being conducted by two  
18 inspectors, and is scheduled to be completed in the  
19 upcoming weeks prior to restart.

20 Under Safety Significant Program Effectiveness, this  
21 is an NRC inspection that is reviewing the Licensee's  
22 implementation of their Program Effectiveness Building  
23 Block. Our reviews include assessing the effectiveness of  
24 the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, the In Service  
25 Inspection Program, Reactor Coolant Unidentified Leakage

1 Program, Plant Modifications, Quality Audits and Operating  
2 Experience.

3 The inspection will also evaluate the Licensee's  
4 program for assuring completeness and accuracy of required  
5 records and submittals to the NRC. Three inspectors are  
6 reviewing the area, and except for the reviews of  
7 completeness and accuracy of required records and  
8 submittals, the inspection should be complete by the end of  
9 next week.

10 There are two Resident Inspectors stationed  
11 permanently at the site, who inspect a broad spectrum of  
12 activities, and that is characteristic ~~as~~ of all our sites  
13 at the NRC. They primarily look at areas of operations,  
14 maintenance and testing on an ongoing basis, and they issue  
15 inspection reports every six weeks.

16 We're also performing an inspection of radiation  
17 protection and it's also a supplemental inspection.

18 I mentioned earlier the findings associated with the  
19 inadequate radiological controls during steam generator  
20 work in February of 2002. We are performing a follow-up  
21 inspection to ensure that the root and contributing causes  
22 are understood by the Licensee, that they independently  
23 assess the ~~extended~~ extent of condition, and ensure that their  
24 corrective actions are sufficient to address the root and  
25 contributing causes and prevent recurrence.

1       We're also reviewing the scope, depth and quality of  
2 the Licensee's Radiological Controls Program and associated  
3 corrective actions, and we are reviewing the readiness of  
4 the Radiation Protection Organization to support restart  
5 and normal operations. Four inspectors are reviewing this  
6 area and the inspection should be completed by the end of  
7 next week.

8       We're preparing for a couple of upcoming  
9 inspections. First of which is the Integrated Leak Rate  
10 Test Special Inspection. We are planning to perform a  
11 review of the plant's integrated leak rate test of  
12 containment. The test is intended to show the leak  
13 tightness of their containment vessel. Our inspection is  
14 scheduled to be conducted by two inspectors from March 17th  
15 through March 23, 2003.

16       We're also preparing for an Emergency Core Cooling  
17 System and Containment Spray System Sump Inspection. That  
18 inspection is intended to review the design and  
19 implementation of modification made to the emergency core  
20 cooling system and containment spray system sump. That  
21 inspection is scheduled to be conducted by one inspector  
22 from our headquarters office from March 24th to April 4th.

23       And, we're preparing for Corrective Action Team  
24 Inspection to review the corrective action process at  
25 Davis-Besse to ensure that it's being effectively



1 implemented and appropriate corrective action is taken to  
2 prevent recurrence of problems. The inspection will  
3 include a review of restart corrective action items to  
4 determine if items required to be accomplished prior to  
5 startup of the plant have been correctly characterized and  
6 actions have been completed in accordance with the  
7 Licensee's and our NRC requirements. This is an extensive  
8 inspection, which is scheduled to be conducted by 8  
9 inspectors from mid March to mid April.

10 This briefly summarizes the activities that NRC  
11 currently has ongoing. The inspections I covered address  
12 part of our Restart Checklist, which is, as I mentioned, a  
13 listing of the issues that need to be resolved prior to  
14 restart of the plant.

15 So, with that, I'll turn it over to FirstEnergy.

16 MR. MYERS: Good afternoon.

17 I would like to make a statement concerning the Preliminary  
18 Significance Assessment finding of red. It is our  
19 intention to respond back and agree with that finding;  
20 we're in complete agreement.

21 We're also in the agreement with the scientific  
22 finding which related yellow. However, due to the breadth  
23 of the issue, we agree it was red, and it is our intention  
24 to discuss the strong actions that we've taken since the  
25 event of February of last year. So, that's our position.

1 With that, we have five Desired Outcomes today that  
2 we would like to accomplish. First, Craig, Kathy and I  
3 would like to provide you with a status of our milestones  
4 since the last meeting from a hardware perspective and a  
5 management perspective.

6 Second, Bill Pearce will provide you a status of our  
7 Safety Culture, Safety Conscious Work Environment  
8 activities; and then he'll provide you some perspective of  
9 some of the Quality Organization's observations since our  
10 last meeting.

11 Third, we'll provide you an update of several of the  
12 Building Blocks. Bob Schrauder will discuss System  
13 Health. Lynn Harder will discuss Containment Health.  
14 Clark Price will provide some views of our Restart Action  
15 Performance. That's on the graphs. And, Jim Powers will  
16 discuss the Program Compliance.

17 And fourth and finally, hopefully this time we'll  
18 get around to Greg Dunn. We're looking forward to that  
19 Return to Service Schedule. With that being said, I would  
20 like to talk about the Return to Service Plan progress  
21 since the last meeting.

22 Since last meeting, we have accomplished several  
23 milestones in returning the plant to service. I would like  
24 to take a few moments to summarize some of these  
25 accomplishments in our programs, and in our plant

1 activities.

2 First, we start our preparation for fuel load. As  
3 part of that activity, we performed a thorough inspection  
4 of our reactor vessel. We found a small amount of foreign  
5 material, including a small cap screw in the bottom.

6 We formed a Decision-Making Team using our Nuclear  
7 Decision-Making Operating Procedure. We made a decision to  
8 remove our core support assembly, so that we could perform  
9 a thorough cleaning of both the plenum and the reactor  
10 vessel itself prior to moving forward. This is an  
11 infrequently performed activity with significant potential  
12 at our station because of the high potential of radiation  
13 exposure; and also, the plenum weighs about 140 tons.

14 The core support assembly is a container that's used  
15 to support the reactor fuel itself and the alignment of the  
16 reactor core assemblies. It is a very activated, and took  
17 us about five days to remove that assembly and return it to  
18 service, but I think it demonstrates a proper safety  
19 culture at our plant.

20 After cleaning the reactor vessel, we began the core  
21 load, if you will, of 177 fuel assemblies on February the  
22 19th. As we told you in our last meeting, we had developed  
23 a core load pattern to reduce a known design issue of fuel  
24 grid, fuel grid interaction, and reduce the damage to those  
25 grid straps due to that interaction.

1       With only four fuel assemblies remaining to finish  
2 our core reload, we did have interaction of two  
3 assemblies. We stopped. We formed a decision-making team,  
4 using our Decision-Making Nuclear Operator Procedure and  
5 performed a detailed inspection of the assembly being  
6 loaded. Additionally, we removed the assembly with the  
7 interaction. We did find some minor damage to one of the  
8 grid straps. We spent three days bringing in Framatone to  
9 perform the repairs of the damage assembly. Once again,  
10 demonstrating good sensitivity to the safety related  
11 activity.

12       This slide shows our fully loaded reactor core. As  
13 you know, the fuel assemblies, fuel assembly is normally  
14 out of the, in the core for about three cycles or six  
15 years. The shiny fuel assemblies observed here are the new  
16 fuel assemblies and represents about one third of the core,  
17 core load. We completed our fuel load on February the  
18 26th, 2003, error free.

19       Our new reactor head is now sitting on the reactor  
20 vessel. We are ready for Mode 5, which means the nuclear  
21 reactor is intact. This week, we'll be installing the new  
22 manways on the steam generators. At that point, the  
23 reactor coolant system, as well as the reactor will be  
24 ready to be returned to service. Once again, there is much  
25 more to do before we do that.

1       Several months ago -- next slide. Several months  
2 ago we told you about a Flus Leak Monitoring System that  
3 FENOC was planning to install under the insulation of our  
4 reactor vessel. This option is unique to the industry.  
5 The Flus System demonstrates our commitment to improving  
6 the station's operational and safety margins. At this  
7 time, we have installed the system and we'll be testing it  
8 during our upcoming first heatup of the plant.

9       Craig Hengge, our Project Manager, will provide you  
10 a status of the system. As you know, in previous meetings,  
11 we were not sure we would be able to buy this equipment,  
12 much less get it installed. Once again, we think that's a  
13 positive approach.

14       We have completed many other activities this month.  
15 We have performed the Safety Features Actuation Test to  
16 prove that our safety related equipment would respond as  
17 designed.

18       We completed our Integrated Diesel Testing to assure  
19 that the diesel would start and load to all the emergency  
20 core cooling water system equipment. We instrumented the  
21 diesel to monitor both the voltage and frequency, and did  
22 find some voltage and frequency issues, drops in voltage  
23 and frequency that were not expected and were analyzed as  
24 we speak.

25       We improved and implemented our Improved Corrective

1 Action Program on March 1st, 2003. This program and the  
2 changes ensure that the proper classifications of condition  
3 reports are made and that their proper evaluations get  
4 completed. This procedure is critical to the restart of  
5 the plant and its implementation.

6 We implemented our new Decision-Making Nuclear  
7 Operating Procedure and Problem Solving Procedure this  
8 month also; and we'll talk about that later on in the  
9 meeting.

10 Next slide.

11 We have installed new containment air coolers with  
12 stainless steel coils. Each of the three cooling units has  
13 twelve new cooling coils. You can see them there.

14 We also installed a new stainless steel air plenum  
15 below that directs the air to the coolers. We are  
16 presently experiencing some problems where the service  
17 water trees that supply cooling water to the units. We  
18 will not be satisfied until we get the design so that it is  
19 both robust and maintainable.

20 We're completing our, an upgrade of the long term  
21 problem with the containment decay heat pit. We have lined  
22 this pit with stainless, as shown in the picture. It is  
23 now a decay heat tank. Once again, we believe the upgrade  
24 demonstrates Davis-Besse's commitment to ensuring safety  
25 related equipment receives the attention it deserves.

1       We spent six days performing a Mode 6 Restart  
2 Readiness Review to ensure that our engineers, our  
3 mechanics, and our managers all have a common understanding  
4 of our readiness for fuel load. We believe that effort,  
5 that our effort to continue to support the performance of  
6 our scheduled activities are necessary, but safety and  
7 doing the job correctly the first time is the gate that we  
8 must pass through to go forward.

9       Now, let me turn the meeting over to Craig Hengge  
10 who will perform our new Flus Leakage Monitoring System.  
11 Thank you.

12               MR. HENGGE:       Thanks, Lew.

13       Good afternoon. My name is Craig Hengge. I've been  
14 an engineer over at Davis-Besse since 1981; had a variety  
15 of responsibilities, a lot of which have been involved with  
16 project management.

17       One of my responsibilities this outage has been  
18 overseeing the activities associated with inspection and  
19 remediation of the lower portion of the reactor vessel.

20       As you'll recall when we did our initial inspections  
21 back in April, we identified some staining down the side of  
22 the vessel, which obscured the view of some of the incore  
23 nozzles on the bottom of the vessel.

24       I'm here this afternoon to update you on two of  
25 those activities. One, as Lew mentioned, we committed to

1 pursue installation of the Flus Leak Detection System.  
2 I'll give you an update on those installation activities,  
3 as well as a brief description of the system. As Lew  
4 mentioned, we're the first in the country to install this  
5 system and we're pretty excited about its potential.

6 First, I'm going to talk about some leak detection  
7 testing that we also committed to pursue down at  
8 Framatone. And the purpose of this testing, as you're  
9 aware, we committed to do a Mode 3 full temperature and  
10 pressure test as a way of confirming whether or not we  
11 actually have any leakage down at the bottom of the  
12 vessel.

13 As you recall, we had done some sampling and  
14 analysis of those samples, and the results of those were  
15 inconclusive. One of the things we wanted to determine  
16 was, given the annulus configuration on the in-cores, what  
17 type of leakage down there would we expect would result in  
18 visible deposits at the surface of the vessel which we can  
19 visually identify at the conclusion of our test.

20 We were also curious about what other types of  
21 chemical residue might result from the leakage from those  
22 nozzles. We were also curious to take those results to  
23 compare back to our samples and see if they would add any  
24 further clarification on the results we got from our  
25 earlier samples.



1 To accomplish this testing, we built a 4-2 1 tube mockup  
2 down at Framatone that would pressurize the full RCS  
3 temperature and pressure. The actual tube we used was  
4 actually a four-inch diameter tube, as opposed to the  
5 one-inch diameter that the tubes actually are. We did that  
6 to accommodate using capillary tubing to actually control  
7 the leak rate that we were simulating.

8 We feel the large diameter is conservative and that  
9 it gives the leakage residue more volume to accumulate in  
10 before it's forced to the surface where we can detect it  
11 during our post test inspection.

12 The leakage we detected, we simulate a leak in the  
13 tube as opposed to the leak in the weld. Again, we thought  
14 that was conservative, because a leak through the tube is  
15 going to impact the vessel surface, dissipate its energy;  
16 whereas a leak in weld, which we think is a more likely  
17 scenario given the material, the leakage there would tend  
18 to eject material up towards the surface which would  
19 enhance our ability to detect it.

20 We ran a number of tests, as indicated on this  
21 slide. We varied the Boron concentration, the leak rate  
22 and duration. The first four tests were eight hours in  
23 duration. Two principle Boron concentrations. The 2680  
24 was representative of the Boron concentration we expect to  
25 have during our Mode 3 test. We ran one test at 1134 ppm,

1 which is what we expect to have prior to our midcycle  
2 outage.

3 We picked those numbers to get a feeling as to, for  
4 different Boron concentrations, how we expect that to  
5 affect the residue that might be at the surface.

6 We also monitored several leak rates as indicated,  
7 .015 being the highest leak rate. We managed to get the  
8 leak rates down to .0004 gallons per minute, which equates  
9 to slightly over half a gallon per day.

10 To achieve that leak rate, we actually went back and  
11 flattened a portion of the capillary tubing that we had  
12 installed to get a leak rate that low.

13 For all four of those tests, at the conclusion of  
14 the eight hours, we were able to identify visual source of,  
15 visible residue on the surface, both on the tube and the  
16 vessel surface.

17 We committed to do one longer test. We had hoped to  
18 run the last test for 120 hours. Since we already had  
19 visual results from the first four indicating they would  
20 result in residue at the surface, we attempt to get a lower  
21 leak rate by actually running the capillary tube through a  
22 milling machine to flatten it out to try to get a lower  
23 leak rate.

24 And, we were successful in getting a lower leak rate  
25 during the cold testing, but when we put the capillary tube

1 into the system, our initial leak rate was actually a  
2 little higher, .0006 gpm, but it was very erratic during  
3 the test; and at 47 hours, the leak rate went to zero.

4 We terminated the test at 55 hours, and determined  
5 that the capillary tube we had built had actually clogged.  
6 That's what caused the termination of the leak rate. But  
7 again, at the conclusion of that, that test number 5, we  
8 did have visible residue again at the surface, both on the  
9 vessel surface and the tube surface.

10 The other significant result we got from all of  
11 these tests, one of the things we noticed as we were  
12 capturing the leak-off from the test, we noticed the Ph  
13 continued to decline of the liquid we were capturing during  
14 the duration of the test.

15 At the conclusion of test five, what we determined  
16 is that the lithium that was in the liquid was not coming  
17 clean with the leakage; it was actually staying at the  
18 vessel surface. At the conclusion of test five, we  
19 actually identified lithium concentrations at the tube and  
20 vessel surface of 17,000 parts per million.

21 That's important to us for two reasons. One is, one  
22 of our concerns was, if we were to get a leak late in life  
23 where we have very little Boron concentrations would there  
24 be some visible residue, some identifiable residue that we  
25 could trace back to that. The lithium now seems to

1 indicate that that would be a clear fingerprint that would  
2 be a conclusive indicator of a leak.

3 The other thing that will be helpful for us, when we  
4 go back and look at the samples that we took back in June,  
5 one of our inconclusive results was, due to lithium  
6 concentrations up to the 10,000 ppm range that we got in  
7 one of our tubes, but again that's far below what we saw  
8 even following this 55 hour test.

9 MR. HOPKINS: Craig, I have a  
10 question. Do you have any pictures of the visible residue  
11 from this test you did here that we could see?

12 MR. HENGGE: I didn't bring any  
13 with us, but we are looking at coming to Washington to  
14 present more detailed results of this test activity.

15 MR. HOPKINS: Okay, thank you.

16 MR. GROBE: Do you have a time  
17 frame for that?

18 MR. HENGGE: I think we're  
19 looking at later this month, somewhere around the March  
20 28th time frame.

21 MR. GROBE: Okay. The sooner  
22 the better.

23 MR. HENGGE: I understand.

24 Next slide.

25 I would like now to talk a little bit about the Flus

1 Monitoring System that we're going to be installing.

2 Again, as Lew mentioned, we're the first utility in the  
3 state to install this system. This is a state-of-the-art  
4 system.

5 MR. GROBE: Craig, One more  
6 question. I apologize. I'm not familiar with how you  
7 would measure lithium. How do you measure that? Do you  
8 take a wipe and then -- how do you get a lithium  
9 concentration, in a residue?

10 MR. HENGGE: We took wipe  
11 samples of the surface, surfaces that were outside the  
12 annulus at the conclusion of the test.

13 MR. GROBE: And what analysis  
14 technique is used for that?

15 MR. HENGGE: I believe they use  
16 ICP.

17 MS. FRESCH I'm sorry, I  
18 believe they use?

19 MR. HENGGE: ICP. I used to --  
20 if there is any chemists in the audience that can help me  
21 out, I don't remember what the acronym stands for. I'm not  
22 a chemist, sorry.

23 The Flus System as mentioned will be the first to be  
24 installed domestically. The system has been installed in  
25 twelve other facilities; ten over in Europe and two in

1 Canada. It's had a very successful life so far from a  
2 reliability and detection standpoint, in terms of being  
3 able to detect leaks in the vicinity of where it's been  
4 monitored.

5 Flus is an acronym. I'm not going to embarrass my  
6 German by trying to pronounce it. It stands for humidity  
7 leak detection system. A couple of the words are fairly  
8 close to our version, the other two are not.

9 Next slide.

10 Again, where we're installing the system is to  
11 monitor the under vessel portion of our reactor dealing  
12 with the in-core. It's a fairly simple system to install;  
13 three cabinets and conduits and tubing. The actual  
14 implementation is only going to take us about three weeks.  
15 The issue of concern for getting it installed was getting  
16 the equipment here and getting the design done, and we were  
17 successful in accomplishing both of those.

18 The element identified there is kind of the heart of  
19 the system. What this is, is a piece of the sensory  
20 tubing. The sensor element depicted there, what that  
21 actually allows -- it's more coil than actual sensor, but  
22 allows the dry air that is inside the tube to communicate  
23 with the ambient air around the area where you're trying to  
24 sense for a leak.

25 What it allows is humidity or moisture in the

1 ambient air to diffuse into, saturate the air that is  
2 inside the tube. And these ~~senator~~ sensor elements are located  
3 about every foot or two on the sensor tubing that you mount  
4 in the area you're trying to monitor.

5 And, where we're going to have these installed is  
6 two areas. They will be installed in a ring underneath the  
7 reactor vessel. They will also have a short section of  
8 sensor tubing mounted in the cavity area, to monitor  
9 ambient humidity in the cavity area. I'll spend a little  
10 more time about the principle of operation in a later  
11 slide.

12 The system itself has eight available channels of  
13 which we'll only be using one, which is one of the reasons  
14 we're kind of excited, because it does have the capability  
15 for future expansion. Once you have the cabinets  
16 installed, really to utilize additional channels is just a  
17 matter of running some additional tubing to the other areas  
18 you want to monitor.

19 The expected sensitivity of the system is between  
20 .004 to .02 gpm. And the principle difference between that  
21 is how tight your insulation is around the area that you're  
22 trying to monitor.

23 We are going to be doing an actual sensitivity test  
24 of the system when we do the commissioning test during our  
25 Mode 3 Test. What we're going to do is we're going to have

1 an extra tube actually mounted to allow us to inject a  
2 known quantity of moisture into the bottom of the vessel.  
3 We will begin that test actually at .002 gpm. We can step  
4 that up, so we can monitor how a system responds to a known  
5 leak rate. We'll use that to help set the system up when  
6 we return to operation.

7 The last slide I'm going to talk about is a  
8 schematic of how the system is laid out. As I mentioned,  
9 there is three cabinets, two of those will be mounted  
10 inside containment. Those cabinets are connected by tubing  
11 to the sensors that are mounted underneath the reactor  
12 vessel, as well to the sensory tube that is going to be  
13 mounted in the cavity area.

14 How the system works is periodically dry air is  
15 purged into the tubing, forcing out the air that's been in  
16 the tubing. As that air is forced out, it's forced through  
17 a humidity detector, which calculates and produces a  
18 humidity profile of the air as it returns.

19 At the beginning of the curve cycle, the system  
20 injects a known humidity spike, called a test spike.  
21 That's used for two reasons. One is it helps calibrate the  
22 system when it sees it on its return, it knows what that  
23 spike is. It also tells it when the first cycle is over.

24 What we'll be able to do with these humidity  
25 profiles, once we establish a known profile, what would



1 happen is, if you got a leak in the area that you're  
2 monitoring, obviously the humidity and moisture content is  
3 going to change, it's going to become much higher. That  
4 will be reflected by the humidity profile increasing with  
5 time.

6 One of the things we'll do with the information  
7 we'll get from our threshold test is calibrate how that  
8 humidity profile change, or given the leak rates we're  
9 going to simulate during our test, we use that information  
10 to set up alarm set points. So, if we were to get a leak  
11 in the area at a known leak rate and a known humidity  
12 threshold, we would get a LOCA alarm that we can take  
13 action on.

14 The other cabinet that will actually monitor and  
15 track and be able to trend the humidity profiles, we  
16 mounted outside of containment and they're only accessible  
17 to our personnel.

18 MR. GROBE: Does this give  
19 you the capability to identify which of these sensor  
20 elements, since it's purged over time and you have this  
21 spike; can you tell which sensor element is detecting the  
22 higher humidity?

23 MR. HENGGE: We're going to  
24 determine that. Dependent on how you set up the first  
25 times. If you have the first times fairly close together,

1 it does give you the accuracy where you can really pick up  
2 which individual sensors, but you lose some sensitivity by  
3 increasing that.

4 We're more interested from a sensitivity standpoint  
5 on going to the longer purge time to detect any leakage,  
6 much less than, more so than we are interested in which  
7 sensor is picking it up. But the difference, we would be  
8 able to sense a difference between what we're seeing  
9 underneath the vessel and what the RST, the Root Sensor  
10 Tube will be detecting. We built that in, because we put a  
11 delay coil between the two sensors.

12 MR. THOMAS: Did I understand  
13 you correctly when you said this system wouldn't be on line  
14 and calibrated during, for service during the NOP and NOT  
15 Test, that you're actually calibrating it during that time;  
16 is that correct?

17 MR. HENGGE: Correct.

18 MR. PASSEHL: At the time of  
19 plant restart, will you have the alarm functions working  
20 and the indications in the control room that you would  
21 normally expect to have, or once the system is up and  
22 running?

23 MR. HENGGE: We'll have  
24 procedures in place for the system, we'll have alarms set.  
25 We will not have an individual alarm in the control room.

1 Right now, we're looking at a computer alarm that would be  
2 available in the control room.

3 MR. PASSEHL: And will the  
4 profiles, will they be available like on the plant process  
5 computer or how eventually will you have that?

6 MR. HENGGE: Profiles will be  
7 locally generated on the computer in the process cabinet  
8 that we can retrieve locally at that computer. I'm not  
9 sure if the system is capable of generating that on our  
10 process computer. That's something we'll be looking at.

11 MR. PASSEHL: Thank you.

12 MR. HENGGE: Any other  
13 questions? Thank you.

14 MR. MYERS: Okay. I would  
15 like to take a few moments to discuss a new Nuclear  
16 Operating Procedure that we are using to provide a  
17 systematic approach to addressing our station issues.

18 This particular procedure has been effectively  
19 implemented at our other two plants. And, if we had had  
20 the system, this process in place here several years ago, I  
21 think our approach to asking questions, harder questions on  
22 the Boron that we found on the reactor head, we might not  
23 be here today.

24 The problem solving and decision-making procedure  
25 was already effectively implemented, once again, at our

1 Perry and Beaver Valley plants. And when we developed it,  
2 we used the best industry experience that we could find to  
3 develop this procedure.

4 Let's take a few moments to discuss the purpose.  
5 The purpose is to ensure the plant issues are addressed  
6 consistently and effectively without consequences to plant  
7 safety or reliability.

8 Now, what does that mean? We do a lot of  
9 troubleshooting on the plant while it's running. And  
10 understanding what we're doing in preventing errors is very  
11 important. That's what that's about.

12 We, the purpose is to evaluate the significance of  
13 the issue and the potential impact on nuclear safety. What  
14 you see is, we'll take each issue and categorize it, and  
15 finally to determine the level of management approval based  
16 on the significance of the issue.

17 Next slide.

18 As you remember, we defined Nuclear Safety Culture  
19 as characteristics and attitudes that ensure that the  
20 organization and the people provide the correct attention  
21 to safety-related activities. Pretty important, both the  
22 organization and the people.

23 In this procedure, we characterize issues as either  
24 low, medium or high significance. A low significance issue  
25 has the following attributes. No personnel or radiological

1 issue should be present. Not likely to cause damage to  
2 plant and components or systems while we're doing our  
3 troubleshooting or testing. Not likely to effect the  
4 operations of the plant or an increase in the probalistic  
5 safety assessment, risk assessment, if you will.

6 Medium significance, next slide.

7 Now we're going a little more towards the safety  
8 issues. There is a potential for personnel or radiological  
9 concerns here. Without controls, one could cause damage to  
10 plant equipment; without controls. That's not unusual for  
11 us to be troubleshooting what would cause a reactor trip or  
12 something like that. Controls required to prevent  
13 undesirable change of state of components -- no plant  
14 transients. When we're troubleshooting, out doing tests,  
15 we should prevent plant transients. Often put jumpers in,  
16 pumping water to different locations. So, that's a  
17 question we have to ask. And finally, reevaluation of the  
18 risk associated with the activity.

19 High significance activity is one that could cause  
20 damage to critical plant equipment, or could result in  
21 either personnel or radiological safety issues. Then  
22 finally, without proper controls, will not result in  
23 reactor changes, generation or runback, runbacks of power.  
24 So, you have to have those controls in place.

25 Next slide.

1       The pride of this process is that we form a team  
2 each and every time when issues arise with our best people  
3 to work through the six principles shown on this slide to  
4 make, and then finally to make recommendations to our  
5 managers or our senior managers, management team, if you  
6 will, based on the significance.

7       Now we recently used this several times. We have  
8 consistently used the process over the past several weeks  
9 in addressing the issues; for example, the high head safety  
10 injection pump or the leak that we had. We had a leak on  
11 one of the nuclear instrument tubes prior to flood up. And  
12 then finally that was an option; we formed a team when we  
13 removed the upper plenum that I talked about earlier.

14       So, once again, this is a new FENOC procedure that  
15 we have in place. It's a Nuclear Operating Procedure.  
16 It's important that we demonstrate that we take this, this  
17 approach as part of our Safety Culture. Each and every  
18 time we have plant issues, we use this procedure  
19 religiously. That's the reason I wanted to talk about it  
20 today. Thank you.

21               MR. GROBE:           It sometimes is  
22 hard for folks to understand the importance of something  
23 like this. I think your initial comments regarding Safety  
24 Culture were very appropriate.

25       Good people can make bad decisions because they

1 didn't carefully approach the process of making decisions.  
2 I haven't seen many procedures like this in the past, but I  
3 think it's very important that you put something like this  
4 in place and it just is a continual reminder of the  
5 importance of discipline in decision-making for a high risk  
6 activity like nuclear power plant operation.

7 MR. MYERS: Even on something  
8 like, you know, the Boron on the head, I think if we went  
9 through a thorough process of asking all the hard  
10 questions, we would have come up with a conclusion that may  
11 not have come from the managers. So, probably would have  
12 taken a different approach than what we did and may not be  
13 here today.

14 So, I agree with you, from a Safety Culture  
15 standpoint, demonstrating and using this approach  
16 consistently every time is an important step. Thank you.

17 MR. GROBE: Any other questions?

18 Craig, I thought of a question. I apologize for  
19 coming back to you while Lew was talking, not that I wasn't  
20 listening, Lew.

21 I don't recall a discussion of using chemical wipes  
22 after the NOP/NOT Test. Is it your plan now to use  
23 chemical wipes as well as visual inspection following that  
24 test?

25 MR. HENGGE: Yeah. Very good

1 point. One of the issues that I have approached with  
2 Framatone, one of the concerns I had was the amount of  
3 residue we expect to see could be very small, and we know  
4 when we were doing our vessel cleaning activities, pressure  
5 washing, that we probably managed to pack some of those old  
6 deposits up into the crevice area. And when we heat the  
7 plant up and have our Mode 3 test, go through thermal  
8 cycle, some vibration, we expect to see all those nozzles;  
9 some of that debris is going to come back out and end up on  
10 the tubes.

11 We want to be able to differentiate that stuff from  
12 something that might be indicative of a real active leak.  
13 What we're going to use is the results from these lithium  
14 concentrations to accomplish that.

15 Before we do the Mode 3 test, we're going to go down  
16 to a number of tubes and actually take some wipe samples  
17 from the surface of the vessel and the tube, use that as  
18 our baseline, and we'll repeat that on those same suspect  
19 tubes, as well as any others, and use those results to  
20 verify whether any deposits that we see are indeed old or  
21 new.

22 MR. GROBE: Okay, very good.

23 Thank you.

24 MS. FEHR: Good afternoon.

25 I'll start out by introducing myself. My name is Kathy



1 Fehr, and I've been out at Davis-Besse since 1986, and I'm  
2 the Observation Program Owner at Davis-Besse.

3 I have my Associate's Degree in Nuclear Power. I  
4 have a Bachelor's Degree in Business Management. And I'm  
5 currently working on my MBA.

6 I've had various positions at Davis-Besse since I've  
7 started out there. I have worked in Emergency  
8 Preparedness; I have worked in Engineering, Operations and  
9 Performance Improvement.

10 I've been working on the Observation Program for  
11 over two years at Davis-Besse. It's a FENOC program. And  
12 we have the program implemented at all three sites, all  
13 three FENOC sites. We implemented the program at  
14 Davis-Besse in September of 2002.

15 The purpose of the Observation Program is to provide  
16 management oversight on activities and influence desired  
17 behaviors.

18 What I wanted to do is go over some of the  
19 categories that we have on the Observation Program, some of  
20 the, or some of the answers when they are out observing.  
21 Some of them will have satisfactory -- we have  
22 satisfactory coached, unsatisfactory coached and  
23 satisfactory.

24 The satisfactory means the observer saw conditions  
25 that meets or exceeds expectations and no comments were

1 made by the observer.

2 The satisfactory coached means it meets or exceeds  
3 expectations, but comments were made by the observer; would  
4 probably be the positive feedback and interaction with the  
5 field.

6 Unsatisfactory coached is when we provide feedback  
7 for areas of improvement and we influence desired  
8 behaviors.

9 And what I'll do is I'll give you a couple of  
10 examples of some unsatisfactory coached, so you can see  
11 what we see.

12 One of them, an example of unsat coached would be if  
13 an observer was watching a prejob brief and the briefer  
14 started the brief without a checklist. We had an observer  
15 stop, have them use the checklist, and correct the  
16 situation right on the spot.

17 Another example would be, we had the Operating  
18 Experience Program Owner at the, at a prejob brief, and  
19 there was no operating experience provided in the work  
20 package. That resulted in an unsatisfactory observation.

21 Another example is when the observer saw a hard, a  
22 person working out in the field with his hard hat turned  
23 around and his brim was on the opposite side it should have  
24 been. The observer stopped him, told him that the FENOC  
25 safety manual had him to wear it the proper way. And they

1 did fix the situation right on the spot.

2 Another example is we've had an observation where  
3 the operator was using slang to identify a component.

4 We also have an unsat observation that was conducted  
5 by Bob Schrauder.

6 Bob, did you want to talk about CACs?

7 MR. SCHRAUDER: I had done an  
8 observation out in the field on the work in progress on  
9 containment air coolers. It was during that observation  
10 that we observed plant workers actually climbing on the  
11 equipment, which is not acceptable under any condition, but  
12 in this particular one, it was particularly troublesome,  
13 because the connections from service water to the  
14 containment air coolers is a bellows-type arrangement made  
15 out of stainless steel. That has very limited capability  
16 for flex. It's made to flex, so it can take up thermal  
17 expansion on the supply line to it. And it's only rated  
18 for about two hundred pounds of pressure on the thing.

19 The individual climbed and actually stepped right in  
20 the center of the bellows, which required a significant  
21 amount of preanalysis and in fact some change-out of some  
22 of the bellows on the containment air coolers.

23 In that instance, I was able to bring the gentlemen  
24 down off of the cooler. I did query him as to whether they  
25 had been sensitized, first of all discussed policy pretty

1 clear; you don't climb on plant equipment, we use ladders  
2 and the like.

3       Talked to him to see, to get a sense of the  
4 workforce as to whether supervision had in fact discussed  
5 with him the sensitivity of the equipment that they were  
6 installing. Did not gain a sense that they were  
7 knowledgeable enough in that area. So, we went forward and  
8 talked to the supervisor also, got Design Engineering  
9 involved in creating a better installation approach and  
10 workability constructability.

11       So, that's an example of inappropriate actions in  
12 the field that we were able to observe and correct.

13           MS. FEHR:           Next slide.

14           MR. GROBE:           Kathy, before you  
15 go on. I'm glad you asked Bob to speak, because I had a  
16 note that I wanted to ask about containment air cooler  
17 work.

18       So, this program applies to contract workers as well  
19 as plant staff; is that correct?

20           MS. FEHR:           They are not using  
21 it right now, the Observation Program.

22           MR. SCHRAUDER:       But we do  
23 observe --

24           MS. FEHR:           We observe  
25 contractors. We observe everybody.

1           MR. GROBE:       All right. The  
2 contract organizations are not required to use it, but you  
3 use it.

4           MS. FEHR:        Correct.

5           MR. GROBE:        You've had a  
6 number of challenges with the containment air cooler work  
7 over the last several weeks at least. I was wondering if  
8 maybe you could comment on that a little bit, and comment  
9 on the effectiveness of this program in that context.

10          MS. FEHR:        I have an  
11 observation that was conducted by the Human Performance  
12 Advocate too on the cast. And, I brought it with me.

13         And this happened on 2-4-03. And part of his  
14 observation, I won't go through the whole thing, but he  
15 said the copper fins on the new cooling coils have been  
16 dinged, and they appeared, or appeared over the last couple  
17 days.

18         So, what they did right away, immediately they roped  
19 off the situation, and that way it wouldn't, people  
20 couldn't get in there. Then they hung sound proofing  
21 blankets around all four walls of the CACs, so those are,  
22 that's an example of what they did with the CACs.

23          MR. GROBE:        What I was trying  
24 to get at was a little more comprehensive. There has been  
25 a continuing challenge with quality of work on the

1 containment air coolers, and I was wondering how the  
2 feedback process or the Management Observation Program  
3 feeds into a broader assessment that would get at this kind  
4 of an issue?

5 MR. MYERS: Yeah, we've seen  
6 several workmanship problems, problems with  
7 maintainability. I mentioned that on the, on the, what we  
8 call the Service Trees; the connections, waterline  
9 connections, which we're building in the field. And that's  
10 basically with our contract vendor.

11 What we've done since that time, we collected all  
12 those issues, sat down with Engineering already, looked at  
13 the Lessons Learned, for the next two we're installing.

14 Where there are some changes in the way we're going  
15 to build stuff in the field. There is also changes in the  
16 way we'll pressurize the system. We went out pressurizing  
17 the system after putting everything in place the last  
18 time. We're going to be pressurizing sections this time as  
19 we build it, to make sure it's leak free as we build it.

20 Also there is some questions about maintainability  
21 with the Service Tree Structure. What I say was, the  
22 Engineering Department really did a good job building it  
23 robustly, because it could never be moved, you know, the  
24 first one. So, it must be robust.

25 So, we probably don't want that, so they're going

1 back and looking at how to make a bolted change down below  
2 that allows you to move the structure out of place in case  
3 you ever want to go pull a cooler or something like that.

4 So, we have collected those issues. I've already  
5 had one meeting on how we go forward here on the next two,  
6 and we'll see if we can't improve the performance there.

7 Okay.

8 MR. DUNN: Jack, I can speak  
9 a little about that from the work implementation. Part of  
10 what we learned from the Lessons Learned, we also utilized  
11 the problem solving decision-making tool when we captured  
12 up those observations and Lessons Learned to collectively  
13 look at that. And, as Lew mentioned, we have some  
14 constructability items where the design is good to respond  
15 to the post accident conditions necessary, but how  
16 constructable is that and how maintainable is that were  
17 some of the challenges.

18 What we found was some improvement opportunities and  
19 the methodology in which we do the installation. So, we're  
20 changing our methodologies for installation. We also had  
21 and instituted stop work activity on the actual conduct of  
22 the containment air cooler service water pipe side, got the  
23 craftsman involved with that problem solving  
24 decision-making team. So, actual participation of the  
25 craftsmen, so that they could provide their input as to

1 what the corrective measures going forward are.

2 Many times we pull the engineers together and come  
3 up with a solution as to how the craftsmen can do work  
4 better, and failed to bring those folks into, bring the  
5 customer, if you will, into the participation role.

6 So, this instance, we definitely made sure we  
7 accomplished that and came up with a collective corrective  
8 measures which involve both how we want to do the  
9 installation in the field and how the design will be  
10 conducted, so that the workers have a more simpler  
11 installation technique.

12 MR. GROBE: Okay, thanks  
13 Greg.

14 MR. MYERS: I knew he would  
15 give better answers than I do.

16 MS. FEHR: Another thing we  
17 do for the Observation Program is we have focus areas and  
18 that's in scheduled observations, and I'll get to that in  
19 the next slide.

20 This slide represents the February results for the  
21 observation program, who is doing observations by title.  
22 You can see The VP/Director level did 7 percent of the  
23 observations. The Manager/Shift Manager did 18 percent of  
24 the observations. Superintendent was 11 percent of the  
25 observations. Supervisors, 49 percent of the



1 observations. And the Other is 15 percent of the  
2 observations.

3 The Other would be Project Managers, or visiting  
4 people from the other sites, or maybe the Human Performance  
5 Advocates and stuff like that.

6 Next slide.

7 The next slide talks just in general what the total  
8 observations we had this month was 350 observations.  
9 Scheduled observations for February was 90 percent  
10 average participation, and that's the same as what we had  
11 in January.

12 Some examples of the scheduled observations that we  
13 do. We do them on a weekly basis. We -- I'll call the  
14 Human Performance Advocate. I'll talk to people in the  
15 field, find out focus areas we need to concentrate on for  
16 the following week. I'll then schedule the observations  
17 and notify the people that they do have an observation for  
18 the next week.

19 Some of the activities that we have chosen have been  
20 the activities that are going out in the field, going on  
21 out in the field, relating to the schedule. I schedule Ops  
22 hanging and restoring clearances, Ops turnovers. We do  
23 containment walkdowns, check for FME. We sit at the  
24 entrance of the RRA entrance and make sure people know what  
25 they're doing when they go in there and they're sure of

1 themselves. Check for housekeeping, safety in PPE. We do  
2 scaffolding checks. We do about any kind of observation,  
3 what the focus area maybe for the next week.

4 We also have special activities that are scheduled  
5 by Project Managers, which we've done, and use the  
6 Observation Program; and three examples of that would be  
7 the deep drain valve work, we've scheduled critical path  
8 activities, and we've also scheduled observations for fuel  
9 movement.

10 The next slide talks about the Condition Reports  
11 that we have. This is a live data base, so the numbers do  
12 change a little bit, but 6.21 percent of the February  
13 observations generated Condition Reports. I believe that  
14 number is up just a little bit right now.

15 The number is up from the January observations.  
16 And, actually on a year-to-date total, we have, I think it  
17 was 92 observations created; they generated CRs from  
18 observations.

19 Okay. The next slide talks about the coaching, and  
20 that's what I described earlier with the definitions.  
21 February we had 12.2 percent coaching, 9.4 was satisfactory  
22 coached and 2.8 was unsatisfactory coached. And the  
23 numbers there are for January, so you can see the  
24 comparison. We had 10.9 percent overall coached in  
25 January.

1       What I wanted to talk about too was some strengths  
2 and weaknesses that we have in the program and I brought  
3 some observations along too, to read some of them to you.

4       The biggest weakness that I see right now in the  
5 observations is the housekeeping in containment. And I  
6 have a couple examples of some observations from people  
7 that went into containment. I was going to tell you what  
8 they found and what they did about it.

9       The first example I have is a shift manager went out  
10 and conducted a paired observation with a couple of other  
11 people in Ops. And they found that the conditions were  
12 unacceptable. And they added the containment sump and the  
13 565 level inspections back on to the Mode 6 restraint  
14 list.

15       Another example is a superintendent in Ops was out  
16 doing a safety and PPE usage in containment observation.  
17 He found debris, such as tie wraps, loops plastic, tape, et  
18 cetera, and they were removed from the 565 level. So, what  
19 he did about it was he contacted the project manager, and  
20 they drafted up a paper; it was a position paper; on what  
21 conditions are acceptable.

22       And he wrote this position paper and it describes,  
23 like I said, the acceptable conditions and it also has a  
24 handout to it. They gave this handout at turnover and they  
25 gave it to all the containment managers. So, this is a

1 sheet of paper that they are using. It's a summary of what  
2 is acceptable and what is not acceptable.

3 MR. THOMAS: Kathy, you're  
4 discussing housekeeping issues and lower level of  
5 containment. Maybe someone could describe why that's  
6 important, based on your present plant conditions. I don't  
7 know if that's clear why those are important issues.

8 MR. POWERS: Housekeeping is  
9 important down there, Scott, because we've got our  
10 containment emergency sump construction complete to the  
11 point where the upper portions of the sump is available to  
12 the systems, and we utilize that sump as part of our  
13 defense in depth for shutdown risk.

14 It's a piece of the equipment of the plant that we  
15 want to make sure is available to us, should we need it  
16 from a shutdown risk perspective. So, we keep the areas  
17 clean, so that the sump remains available and wouldn't be  
18 clogged by any potential construction debris.

19 MR. THOMAS: Thank you.

20 MS. FEHR: Another one of the  
21 observations that I brought along was, a manager was out in  
22 containment and they were surprised that the lack of  
23 supervision around the RRA area. So, what I did was  
24 scheduled observations and I had people sit out there for,  
25 I think it was, I think I scheduled five observations that

1 week for that.

2 And one of the people did an observation. He went  
3 out there for six days and sat at the entrance of the RRA.  
4 And he sent in an observation with his statistics on what  
5 he found.

6 He said he saw 34 people entering the RRA and 53  
7 exit. And the bottom line was, two persons were turned  
8 back to their supervisors due to inadequate understanding  
9 of work scope.

10 So, the weaknesses are being found out in the plant  
11 and there is on the spot correction of the problems.

12 Some of the strengths that I found is a lot of  
13 teamwork going on. This is, this is what I see of the  
14 observers writing about the observees. They see a lot of  
15 teamwork going on in the plant. I have a few observations  
16 here to give you examples of when they were, I think this  
17 was maintenance, they were lifting some barriers, and they  
18 wrote in their observation; they stopped and they went to  
19 get engineering assistance, so they could ask what size  
20 pipe to use.

21 I have an example of another person who was told  
22 that they needed to get engineering involved in the  
23 walkdown, along with RP, so they all agreed on how the  
24 situation would be done to begin with, at the beginning of  
25 the, at the beginning of the project.

1 I have another observation, and the activity was  
2 unplugged drain lines in the collection box. This observer  
3 mentioned notifying chemistry, RP was notified to take  
4 readings, and they stopped and they contacted Ops to make  
5 sure the flow was reestablished. And the strengths that  
6 this person did identify was teamwork and support from  
7 other groups. So, the groups are working together out  
8 there. We're seeing that in the observations.

9 Another example of teamwork was a core support  
10 assembly, when it was moved from the deep end of the  
11 refueling canal to the reactor vessel, this observer  
12 noticed great teamwork by FTI, and, which is Framatone and  
13 RP.

14 The other strength that I find in this program is, I  
15 can see a lot of what the observers, which is what  
16 management is doing out there within the field, and how  
17 they're reacting to what they're finding. The things I  
18 find is they're doing follow-up observations with what  
19 they're finding. They're going out there correcting on the  
20 spot. They're writing CRs. And, I have a couple of them  
21 just from this past month where they would go out a couple  
22 days later and they would find out if the situation was  
23 still occurring.

24 I have that, some examples of a superintendent of  
25 Ops that did that. He was out watching fuel handling in

1 containment in the spent fuel pool. He noticed the  
2 self-checking for the containment side operator of the  
3 transfer mechanism; they didn't stop; they didn't pause  
4 before their peer check.

5       So, this observer went out and he went over and he  
6 checked both sides of the spent fuel pool and the other  
7 operators out there to see if this was common; if they all  
8 knew this was just a problem. He found out it was just a  
9 problem with the one operator. What he did was he  
10 discussed it, discussed it from becoming complaisant and  
11 standards for self-check. That's what he discussed with  
12 them.

13       Then I noticed a couple days -- it was the following  
14 day, he went out and did an observation on self-checks just  
15 to make sure it was satisfactory.

16       So, I have some more examples of the follow-up that  
17 the managers are doing. Here's one from a person. I love  
18 these.

19       He was doing an observation of a prejob brief. And,  
20 what he did was -- I'll read it to you. The prejob brief  
21 form was completed and the work order package. The prejob  
22 brief form was not signed by both technicians on the job;  
23 however, both technicians stated that they attended the  
24 prejob brief. So, this observer questioned the technicians  
25 to determine if they were properly briefed; and he

1 determined that they were, but he questioned them for  
2 follow-up.

3       So, in conclusion, I think the Management  
4 Observation Program has had some positive, positive effects  
5 on what we're finding in the people at Davis-Besse. I do  
6 believe there is room for improvement with the situation  
7 with housekeeping in containment. That's why we do the  
8 scheduled observations.

9       Did you want to add anything to it, Lew?

10           MR. MYERS:        I think, I just  
11 think it's, in September at these meetings you kept asking  
12 us, you know, what are you seeing; what are you getting out  
13 of the program. It was new and we had a little trouble,  
14 difficulty answering that. But I think today our data base  
15 is much improved, and we can tell you what we're finding,  
16 and I think we demonstrated that. So, that was the intent  
17 here.

18           MR. GROBE:        Okay. Questions?

19           MR. DEAN:         I have a couple  
20 questions. One is, you know, in your slide where you have  
21 the observation percentage by title. You have varying  
22 levels within the organization that are out there doing  
23 observations.

24       How do you assure that there is some consistency in  
25 the way these managers look at what it is they're looking



1 at in the field? Is there something to find that they can  
2 refer to for expectations in particular, work activity that  
3 they're looking at, or are they just out there kind of  
4 winging it in terms of...

5 MS. FEHR: We have set  
6 questions on the cards in which they answer. They all read  
7 the field observation card or the Ops observation card or  
8 the training observation card.

9 MR. DEAN: So, you've got  
10 several categories, so that gives you kind of a checklist  
11 approach.

12 MS. FEHR: Correct. We go  
13 from prejob -- there is probably two hundred questions on  
14 each one of the cards, and they go from prejob briefs to  
15 housekeeping to safety to FME. There is a lot of questions  
16 on those.

17 MR. DEAN: Second question I  
18 have is, obviously, a program like this sets itself up for  
19 collecting all sorts of data, you talk about percentages of  
20 this, coached, uncoached, so on and so forth.

21 Have you set some goals or expectations of the  
22 program itself that you would consider to be valuable  
23 measures? Like, for example, you talked about 90 percent  
24 were done as scheduled. I mean, do you have some goals  
25 that you have for yourself in terms of things like that?

1 MS. FEHR: We do have goals  
2 for the scheduled observations, which is 90 percent or  
3 better. We also have a goal for coaching within FENOC; and  
4 we go with ten percent or better is what we're looking for  
5 with coaching. And that's all interaction with the field.

6 MR. DEAN: And then the last  
7 question is really one maybe more for Bill, is obviously,  
8 you talk about generating CRs out of this, which is good.  
9 You want to see these types of things, feed them to the  
10 Corrective Action System.

11 Bill, in the observations of your organization, do  
12 you see some sort of congruence here in the types of  
13 observations that you have had from your people in terms of  
14 in-field observations and the types of things that are  
15 coming out of this program?

16 MR. PEARCE: Yes, we do and  
17 I'll go through some of these in just a moment when I  
18 talk.

19 MR. DEAN: Good, thank you.

20 MR. SCHRAUDER: I think the  
21 challenge for us going forward, we are doing observations.  
22 We are doing better, but a lot of us aren't as trained.  
23 That's not been our forte of doing focused observations.  
24 Organizations like ~~MP~~ INPO, the NRC, their inspectors or their  
25 observers seem to have their skills honed much better than

1 we do. So, we're looking at methods to hone our skills in  
2 the art, if you will, of observation.

3 Some of the things will jump out at you. Like a guy  
4 standing on a CAC, it's not too difficult to figure out  
5 that's probably not the right thing to do, but there are  
6 some other subtle types of things that can come out of  
7 field observations and stuff; and that's where we have to  
8 hone our skills a little bit better.

9 MR. GROBE: Feed them raw  
10 meat. (laughter)

11 A couple of questions, you sort of by percentage  
12 have who is doing the observations. Do you also have the  
13 capability to sort by departments or functions or work  
14 groups?

15 MS. FEHR: Yeah, we have  
16 that, that's a candid report. Some of the reports that are  
17 in the program right now are available by anybody who uses  
18 this program. And they can just, any time, at any time and  
19 place, they can get these reports of the departments.

20 MR. GROBE: And can you do  
21 that both on the who is doing the observing as well as what  
22 the outcomes are?

23 MS. FEHR: Correct, we can  
24 check the observee and we can have the departments check on  
25 what people are finding about their departments.

1           MR. GROBE:           Do you produce a  
2 a periodic report of some nature that you provide?

3           MS. FEHR:           I don't currently  
4 right now. What I do, is the managers go over it weekly or  
5 monthly with their people and their departments, and they  
6 discuss their findings. I know maintenance and I know  
7 operations go over weekly and they go over them.

8           MR. GROBE:           If you could just  
9 pull together a set of the various standard reports that  
10 you have, pages, I would like to see those at some time.

11          MS. FEHR:           Okay.

12          MR. GROBE:           Thanks.

13          I think it's one of the observations that you  
14 highlighted, the individual used the word complacency, and  
15 I think that's real important. I hope folks aren't taking  
16 these numbers and trying to say, you know, 2.8  
17 unsatisfactory coached is not good, and 2.7 is good,  
18 because I think that's, that's kind of silly. As soon as  
19 you stop looking to improve, that's when you start  
20 declining in performance. And it's very important to have  
21 coaching in the field.

22          So, we've just got to be a little careful with some  
23 of these numbers, I want to make sure we don't  
24 inappropriately use them.

25          Any other questions?

1           MR. THOMAS:        I have one more  
2 question. The discussion about the CACs, I was looking  
3 through the program and I didn't see a better place to ask  
4 it, so I'm going to ask it here.

5           Specifically, with the service water tree  
6 installation, and with a lot of your other projects that  
7 are ongoing, you've used the at risk change process,  
8 significantly, ~~due~~ to a large extent. You used it  
9 liberally, I guess. Specifically, with the CAC service  
10 water tree installation work, and you can expand to other  
11 projects if you like in your answer, have you seen that  
12 that's, the use of that process has caused any challenges?

13          MR. POWERS:        I would say, what  
14 we're talking about, what Scott is alluding to on the at  
15 risk change; it's an engineering work release to the field  
16 that is, it's like a preliminary engineering design. We  
17 haven't completed all the details of the full package yet,  
18 but it's been worked enough that we feel comfortable that  
19 we can release work and begin working in the field, and if  
20 we find any changes that need to be made as we finish up  
21 the formal package, then we have to suffer the cost of  
22 rework, but there is no nuclear safety or industrial safety  
23 risks associated with it. If there is a risk, commercial  
24 risk is what we're talking about.

25          But, yes, the CAC service water distribution trees

1 have been the most significant issue that we've had with  
2 our process for work release to the field. The expedited  
3 process under the at risk has not had the level of  
4 interaction with the installers, the field craft and  
5 supervision, as well as what we found recently in  
6 evaluating this, the plant engineers and operators or  
7 others that we need to engage in this process.

8 And so, we found some good lessons learned with that  
9 process with the CAC trees, but we haven't seen that level  
10 of issue in many other projects that we've had. This one  
11 has given us an opportunity to improve in those areas.

12 MR. MYERS: Let me answer  
13 that question too. The answer is yes.

14 MR. GROBE: That's a very  
15 interesting question. I appreciate that, Scott. Let me  
16 take it a little further, if I could.

17 You had a number of observations in the containment  
18 air cooler design issues that might have to do with  
19 interface between design and system engineering, interface  
20 between design and maintenance, interface between design  
21 and operations. Was that process less effective because  
22 you were using the at risk modification approach, or did  
23 those reviews occur before the installation began?

24 MR. POWERS: In the case of the  
25 CAC trees, the process was less effective with the at risk

1 change. So, the answer again is yes, there was some issues  
2 there that needed process.

3 MR. GROBE: I need a little  
4 more of an answer there. When you do an at risk mod,  
5 you're doing at risk because you don't have all the design  
6 work done, but has op -- are you doing that modification  
7 before you've integrated the insights from Operations,  
8 Maintenance and Plant Engineering?

9 MR. POWERS: In some cases,  
10 yes, Jack.

11 MR. GROBE: So, you really  
12 have some substantial financial commitment before Ops,  
13 Maintenance and Plant Engineering get involved.

14 MR. POWERS: That's right. And  
15 in cases such as the emergency sump or the decay valve  
16 tank, now that we've lined, it's a static structural  
17 component and there is not a lot of input in terms of  
18 Operations and Plant Engineering and such.

19 For the CAC tree, it was a rather special case in  
20 terms of the long term inspectability in taking those CAC  
21 trees off. And what we found was, it was really found in  
22 the field once the craft began working with the ~~fellows~~ bellows  
23 trying to maintain alignment and control the welding  
24 distortion, welding up the stainless steel work piping  
25 connections. That began to become apparent that

1 disassembling that and controlling that alignment would be,  
2 would have some difficulty. So, that's what arose on that  
3 particular issue.

4 MR. MYERS: If you go back and  
5 you look at the entire outage, you know, typically, outage  
6 you would build your modifications months and months and  
7 months before you come down, order all your parts, do your  
8 feasibility reviews up front, all your walkdowns and  
9 everything else. We're doing a lot of discovery and we're  
10 building the ice while we're here. So, that's driving some  
11 of the at risk changes.

12 But, even early on, if you think back, you know,  
13 we're cutting the containment. We had some issues with  
14 some modifications. We had some issues, installation of  
15 the head. Had the crane issues, you know. That was an at  
16 risk mod. You know, it is not a, this is not a typical  
17 outage. This is not a situation that I think is the best  
18 way to do modifications. That's where we're at.

19 MR. GROBE: Sure. It's  
20 important to understand that. That this outage is not a  
21 normal outage, and these modification approaches are not  
22 what you would normally expect to occur, but it's, you  
23 still have quite a few modifications out there, that you're  
24 installing under this at risk program. Have you gone back  
25 to look at those, as to whether or not there might have



1 been some, there might be some additional benefit with  
2 respect to Operations and Maintenance in particular, Plant  
3 Engineering?

4 MR. POWERS: We'll be doing  
5 that. The issue on the CAC has really come up over the  
6 past several weeks, I would characterize it. This  
7 interface has become evident we need to do it. So, yes,  
8 there is cases we need to go and look and see if there is  
9 better interface needs to occur up front.

10 MR. GROBE: Okay, good.  
11 Thank you.

12 MR. PASSEHL: Okay. I think  
13 we'll, if it's okay, have one more presenter, Bill Pearce,  
14 and then we'll take a short break. So, go ahead, Bill.

15 MR. PEARCE: Okay. I want to  
16 talk about three subjects today. First one I want to talk  
17 about is Safety Culture Survey. And, as you remember, this  
18 is an independent assessment that's being coordinated by  
19 Fred Giese out of our Human Resources Organization in  
20 Akron. So, what I'm going to read is his statement where  
21 we are on this assessment.

22 Doctor Sonja Haber and her team have completed the  
23 on-site portion of the Davis-Besse Culture Assessment. And  
24 the activities that are completed are they interviewed  
25 approximately 90 FENOC employees. These included Senior

1 Management Team, FirstEnergy corporate executives, all  
2 Davis-Besse site managers, and representatives from various  
3 job titles and organizational elements throughout the  
4 plant.

5 The second part of that was they observed, her team  
6 observed a number of normal plant activities, including  
7 morning and evening meetings, control room turnovers,  
8 manager meetings, prejob briefs, planning meetings and  
9 restart readiness meeting.

10 In addition, they conducted a pencil and paper  
11 survey, which included approximately 80 percent of the site  
12 employees, the permanent employees. That's approximately  
13 661 of 830 employees that actually filled out the survey.

14 Doctor Haber and her team are currently analyzing  
15 the information they gathered in those activities. And, as  
16 you remember, they do a process they call Convergent  
17 Validity. That's where they bring all those elements  
18 together and come to conclusions how they may relate to the  
19 culture, the safety culture aspects of the plant.

20 So, that's what they're in the process of now doing;  
21 and we expect that we'll get some initial results in the  
22 next several weeks. And, that's really the status of just  
23 to give you, because I know everyone has a lot of interest,  
24 as we do, to get that back.

25 The next subject --

1           MR. GROBE:           Bill, before you  
2 go on, just a couple of questions in that area.  
3       Lew, I know that this assessment that's being done  
4 by Doctor Haber is very important, but it's important to  
5 keep it in context. And, prior to entering Mode 6, you  
6 folks did your own assessment of where you were, using your  
7 model, and I think that was the first time you tried to use  
8 it. And, you presented that last month, I believe.

9           MR. MYERS:           Correct.

10          MR. GROBE:           Lew, I know that  
11 you sent out the first formal procedure for going through  
12 that process, and you're going to use it again next week.  
13 Then, I think, I understand that after that, you're going  
14 to revise the procedure appropriately after running it  
15 through its paces and then submit it on the docket; is that  
16 correct?

17          MR. MYERS:           That's correct.

18          MR. GROBE:           Okay, good.

19       And Doctor Haber's work is somewhat of an  
20 independent check, not, it's important to make sure that  
21 folks understand, it's not a go-no go. It's not a light  
22 switch, yes or no. That it's going to provide insights and  
23 inputs to further enhance the broader assessment tool that  
24 you're going to be using on a regular basis going forward.

25       That being said, it's also very important though

1 that Doctor Haber's work be completely independent so that  
2 her observations have validity and haven't been influenced  
3 by your processes and activities.

4 Could you talk a little about the process and how  
5 she's going to, how there is going to be independence  
6 maintained through the process. I don't know if that's a  
7 fair question for you, Bill?

8 MR. MYERS: I can't talk about  
9 it, because I don't know.

10 MR. PEARCE: We can say some  
11 things about it. I think what you may be referring to, is  
12 when we do get the initial report back, the NRC and site  
13 management will view that report simultaneously, even the  
14 initial report. The first time we see it, the NRC will be  
15 involved. We've made that agreement, so that we make sure  
16 that it is done independently, and it doesn't get, we don't  
17 have undue influence on it. I think that's probably what  
18 you're asking for.

19 MR. GROBE: Yeah, that's  
20 good. I appreciate that, Bill.

21 MR. MYERS: Let me add. We  
22 went out and developed our process. We think it's a good  
23 model. We shared that with you. It gives some framework.  
24 But the last thing, from my perspective, you know, the  
25 reason we put it up for the human employee development

1 organization, was because from a leadership in action  
2 standpoint, that's how we use our training program, to  
3 develop our managers, supervisors, that's where it's owned  
4 at; they're doing the core sponsors for that.

5 So, the last thing from my perspective anyway,  
6 sitting here, I can tell you I've been interviewed. Other  
7 than that, I have had no contact with Doctor Haber since  
8 she left the site. Other than being interviewed and taking  
9 the, looking at the survey that we did, that's, it's  
10 completely independent. And, it will stay that way.

11 MR. GROBE: Okay, good.

12 Bill, you mentioned something that's important.  
13 Doctor Haber is going to provide you a written draft. And  
14 myself and Christine and probably ~~Jeff~~ Geoff Wright, our team  
15 leader for that inspection will be there to hear her  
16 presentation.

17 Do you know if, have you considered whether that  
18 written draft report will be an attachment to the final  
19 report, so that if there is any changes in the  
20 interpretation or conclusions that that can be clearly  
21 understood?

22 MR. PEARCE: Jack, we don't  
23 know. We haven't seen it. We need to see it and  
24 understand, when we've got it, we can talk about that at  
25 the time.

1           MR. GROBE:        Maybe you can  
2 mention that to Fred and he can give me a call.

3           MR. PEARCE:       Okay.

4           MR. GROBE:        Credibility on  
5 this is very important.

6           MR. PEARCE:        Absolutely, we  
7 agree with that.

8           MR. GROBE:        You folks lost  
9 some credibility over the last few years and so has the  
10 NRC.

11          MR. PEARCE:        Yeah, and you  
12 know, one of the things that's really important to us, I  
13 think, is the congruence between what she comes up with and  
14 how we've evaluated ourselves. We really are anxious to  
15 see that, to see where that congruence is; not so much to  
16 try to change it, but to understand are we looking at  
17 ourselves properly in using the tool that we're using.  
18 That's what we want to try to validate. That's what's  
19 really important, I think.

20          MR. GROBE:        Yep, I agree. If  
21 you could mention that to Fred then.

22          MR. PEARCE:        I certainly will,  
23 I'll be glad to do that.

24          Okay, the next subject I would like to talk about is  
25 Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey. We've talked

1 about this on several occasions. I know, Jack, you had  
2 some interest in when we were going to do the next survey.  
3 As I told you in previous meetings, we intended to do the  
4 survey after we did the heat up and cool down. That's  
5 moved out some now, and it's gone further than we thought  
6 it was going to go a couple of months ago.

7 So, we've decided to go ahead and do one now,  
8 because we want to get one periodically and have the  
9 opportunity to do yet another maybe sometime near the time  
10 we restart.

11 So, you know, our Safety Conscious Work Environment  
12 Action Plan provides for periodic surveys and the next one,  
13 as I said, is going to be on March 24th. The survey will  
14 consist of 30 questions. The majority of the questions  
15 will be the same as the August of 2002, and the January  
16 2000, and November of 1999 surveys.

17 Another point about the survey we're going to do, is  
18 all the 21 questions that are in the standard industry  
19 document will be included in that survey. So, it will have  
20 all the standard questions. And, in addition, we're going  
21 to add some questions, nine more questions to that survey,  
22 surround, that surround some specific issues that we seem  
23 to try to get some more insight into the Safety Conscious  
24 Work Environment.

25 The rating scale will be the same as the previous

1 survey. And it's to be a pen and pencil, or pencil and  
2 paper method. The same as the survey that was just done on  
3 the Safety Culture. In fact, we're going to use a similar  
4 methodology, because we got a lot of good participation in  
5 the Safety Culture survey. So, we would like to use that  
6 same methodology, how to set up people that they can take  
7 it, that kind of thing, is what we're going to do on the  
8 24th.

9 Of course, it will be anonymous. It's voluntary,  
10 but we do encourage all, all our site employees to  
11 participate.

12 You got any questions about that? We're going out  
13 of that subject now.

14 MR. GROBE: No. Great.

15 MR. PEARCE: Okay. The next  
16 thing I want to talk about is Quality Assurance. And, as  
17 you know, we committed to do a Quality Assurance Program  
18 Review, I think it was last October. And so, we started  
19 doing that review, and it started on November 1st of 2002.  
20 And, we brought a team of people, expert in this area, and  
21 we wanted to look at our program, and determine, you know,  
22 what are the, make sure we had everything in it that the  
23 best programs in the country have.

24 So, we found some improvements we could make in the  
25 area of implementation of commitments, audit checklists,



1 use of operating experience and auditing, training,  
2 qualification of auditors, escalation of inadequate actions  
3 to audit findings, and interference interface issues with  
4 American Society of Mechanical Engineers QA Program were  
5 areas that we found we could do some improvement with.

6 It was initially completed and went before the  
7 Program Review Board on February 10. When we got it before  
8 the Program Review Board, they thought we, that we hadn't  
9 focused enough on the ASME, or the American Society of  
10 Mechanical Engineers QA Audit Program. We didn't have  
11 enough focus in that issue.

12 We went back and revisited that area again. We  
13 completed that re-review. And it went to the board again  
14 yesterday. And of course, I haven't got the update in  
15 here, but I'll tell you the update. The update is, it went  
16 successfully through the board yesterday. Not saying it  
17 didn't have any comments. It did have some comments to  
18 it. And Thursday, it is expected that we'll get the final  
19 review of that Thursday morning. That's the status of  
20 that.

21 Lastly, I would like to talk about a few things that  
22 Quality Assurance has seen, what we've looked at. We've  
23 done oversight of the new reactor head. And you asked  
24 about the, in fact, you led in quite nicely with the At  
25 Risk Program. Of course, it all has to come together at

1 the end with a modification package, so it doesn't miss any  
2 of the steps.

3 We've been reviewing that with the new reactor  
4 head. What we found as the package was put back together,  
5 there were some, we did have some issues of process. They  
6 were, they were fairly minor in my opinion. I looked at  
7 them.

8 There is a small amount of work remaining, which is  
9 installing the seismic plates on the top of the drive for  
10 the control rods, and post insulation testing, which is  
11 part of the pressure tests of the reactor vessel that we'll  
12 be doing later on. So, that remains to be done.

13 Restart Station Review Board Oversight. We believe  
14 that conservative decisions are being made during that  
15 board, and good safety culture discussions are being done  
16 in our observations. No major issues. We do see a few  
17 minor things, which we gave feedback on or wrote CRs as  
18 appropriate.

19 Another area I would like to talk about is fuel  
20 handling. Lew talked earlier about a, about the fuel  
21 handling that was being done. And, in fact, we loaded the  
22 core. And I would like to talk about that a minute.

23 As you know, we had a stop work on fuel handling,  
24 and it was about what Lew talked about, about some of the  
25 design issues and we'd done some minor damage to some of

1 the fuel in the past. And we lifted that. And we lifted  
2 that stop work before we loaded fuel.

3 What we lifted it on was these four issues. We  
4 reindexed the spent fuel racks to have more precise  
5 indexing to make sure that we didn't have any interaction  
6 between the fuel grids and these fuel racks.

7 Fuel assemblies were required to be moved in slow  
8 speed in the refueling equipment throughout. That was a  
9 change to the process.

10 The core reload sequence was designed to maximize  
11 open water moves and minimize potential for unnecessary  
12 fuel assembly interaction. So, consciously, we're trying  
13 to make sure we didn't have those interactions that we did  
14 have one of.

15 And most fuel assemblies would be loaded with a,  
16 into the core with what's called an open water move, but we  
17 have a device where we can actually move it around, and  
18 make sure that it moves exactly in the right spot and is  
19 not subject to interaction between the grid.

20 So, those were the corrective actions that were put  
21 in place, as a result of our stop work. And we lifted the  
22 stop work. And then I think we had a fairly successful  
23 core load.

24 One of the things I would like to say on the  
25 positive side, is Lew talked about the fact that the core

1 support assembly was removed from the reactor. We oversaw  
2 that activity, trying to clean, make sure that the reactor  
3 vessel, the entire internal of the reactor vessel were  
4 clean.

5 The station spent a lot of effort trying to clean  
6 with a core support assembly in place, and, in fact, they  
7 did remove a lot of minor material from the reactor. And,  
8 I really believe that they could have evaluated the  
9 condition that it was in to be okay, and justified that it  
10 was all right to go on. That's what I want to give. I  
11 give a lot of negative, I want to give a positive. They  
12 actually stopped and took a five day hit in the schedule in  
13 order to make sure that the, that the reactor internals and  
14 the reactor itself was absolutely clean before we went  
15 forward.

16 So, I saw that as a good thing. I'll go down  
17 through a few more issues. The In-Service Inspection, see  
18 some implementation issues and Condition Reports we've  
19 issued in that area.

20 And the Quality Control area. We previously rated  
21 the Quality Control Department as marginal for the previous  
22 quarter, and the issue was lack of use of Corrective Action  
23 Program. That just wasn't enough activity, we didn't  
24 believe, to, for where it should have been for the type of  
25 things we're seeing in the plant. And, since that time, we

1 saw a marked improvement.

2 Contractor Control. We still saw issues with  
3 Contractor Control. We'll talk about that more in a  
4 minute. I think that's been an issue we've had ongoing,  
5 and we continue to have, and we're trying to provide a lot  
6 of oversight in that area.

7 We did a, an assessment of Safety Culture, an  
8 independent assessment that we did ourselves in QA. And,  
9 we didn't -- and I think we talked about it, I don't  
10 remember if we talked about it at the last meeting or the  
11 last public meeting, but we assessed about ten percent of  
12 the site population, and we looked at Safety Conscious Work  
13 Environment and Safety Culture. And we believe from the  
14 assessments we've done previously to this one, that we're  
15 seeing an improving trend in what we're getting.

16 These were all face-to-face interviews and a  
17 specific set of questions that were asked, and we think  
18 that we're seeing an improving trend in that area.

19 Corrective Action Program implementation, we're  
20 still noting problems with clear and concise corrective  
21 actions, and incorporating appropriate level of detail.  
22 Traceability, you can look at the condition report always,  
23 and we're seeing a lot of them, and there is a few of these  
24 that, where we'll see the condition report and the issue  
25 identified as the corrective action. Actually go back and

1 fix the problem clearly without having to find out a lot  
2 more story besides what's written down. That's one of the  
3 major issues.

4 Last summer, you may be familiar with, we identified  
5 a compliance issue in the fabrication code for the  
6 feedwater flow modification that needed to be  
7 radiographed. Well, the radiograph was performed and  
8 identified that three welds needed to be repaired, and  
9 that's ongoing as we speak.

10 And the last thing I wanted to talk about, and this  
11 is probably one of the most significant things that I'm  
12 concerned with; is we're concerned with the quality of work  
13 being performed on mechanical equipment. You said  
14 something about several instances of that. What we  
15 witnessed is inconsistent results on equipment. And  
16 sometimes it comes out pretty good, and other times it  
17 doesn't.

18 We have an issue with that; talked to Lew in depth  
19 about that. One of the options we're considering, I'm just  
20 telling you we're considering it; one of the things about  
21 moving the Quality Control Department back under the  
22 Quality Assessment, so we can get more field observation  
23 time. We're a limited size group, and to combine those two  
24 we get more time in the field in not only the Management  
25 Observation Program, but in addition, the Independent

1 Program to see if we can see what we need to do to improve  
2 the quality in that area.

3 And that's my comments, unless you have any  
4 questions.

5 MR. HOPKINS: I have a quick  
6 question. You mentioned the feedwater flow modification.  
7 Is that connected to a power upgrade request at all, Jim?

8 MR. POWERS: That is the  
9 caldon, excuse me, Jon, that is the caldon, the install  
10 power upgrade request, it's related to that. And these  
11 were field weld installations and the MBE interpretation on  
12 whether radiography was required on those.

13 MR. HOPKINS: So, radiography  
14 was done on that?

15 MR. POWERS: Yes.

16 MR. PEARCE: And the weld that  
17 remained, trying to get the radiography rescheduled now  
18 after the repair.

19 MR. HOPKINS: Just, just so you  
20 know, we essentially have suspended review of power upgrade  
21 at this time. I mean that's coming later, if it happens.

22 MR. POWERS: Very good. As  
23 well with us, that's not our first order of affairs  
24 either. So, we'll be in contact when we want to reactivate  
25 that.

1 MR. HOPKINS: Okay.

2 MR. GROBE: Other questions?

3 MR. PASSEHL: Okay, let's take

4 a --

5 MR. GROBE: I was asking for  
6 questions from you guys. I have a couple other questions.

7 MR. PASSEHL: Oh, okay.

8 MR. GROBE: Bill, on the  
9 Quality Audit Program Review, was that a review of both the  
10 program and the implementation of the program?

11 MR. PEARCE: Just a review of  
12 the program. It puts the program together in place. Now,  
13 we're putting all the actions that came out of that in  
14 place is what we're doing now.

15 MR. GROBE: Okay. Good.  
16 I was looking through a little booklet that you  
17 folks have for your Operations Organization. I can't  
18 remember what it's called. It's got a yellow cover on it.  
19 It has all the procedures and standards and expectations in  
20 it. In the org chart in there, I notice that Mike Ross'  
21 name was in the Ops Organization. Is he back in the Ops  
22 Organization now? I ~~now~~ know that you took him out for awhile.

23 MR. MYERS: No, he's not back  
24 in yet.

25 MR. GROBE: Okay.



1           MR. MYERS:        But Jack, he's  
2 still providing coaching.

3           MR. GROBE:        That really gets  
4 to my question. There is a couple of areas that I would  
5 appreciate some independent observation from your folks on,  
6 thoughts on how you're doing, maybe at our next meeting.  
7 One is the area of operations ownership and leadership,  
8 and the second is operability evaluations.

9        And, I thought if Mike was back in Ops, maybe he  
10 could provide some input. And Bill, I would put that to  
11 you to provide some input, but those are areas where I  
12 don't have a good read on how things are going and there  
13 has been some issues coming up, and I would like to get a  
14 better, we'll be focusing a little bit more in that area,  
15 and I would like to get a better sense from you folks in  
16 what you think.

17       MR. PEARCE:        We'll try to give  
18 you some insight on the next meeting, Jack.

19       MR. GROBE:        Okay, thanks.  
20 Thank you, Dave.

21       MR. PASSEHL:       Let's take  
22 about -- everyone be back by 4. Thank you.

23 (Off the record.)

24       MR. MYERS:        We have a couple  
25 new players here. Lynn Harder is here to talk about

1 Containment, and Clark Price will go through our  
2 performance indicators later on, so we've done some  
3 rotation of people.

4 MR. PASSEHL: Bob, are you going  
5 to talk System Health progress?

6 MR. SCHRAUDER: Yes.

7 MR. PASSEHL: Okay. Go ahead.

8 MR. SCHRAUDER: Thank you.

9 System Health Progress. We continue to make good  
10 progress on answering the questions, the Condition Reports  
11 that were generated during the System Health Readiness  
12 Reviews, the Latent Issue Reviews, the NRC Inspections and  
13 the Safety Function Validation Project.

14 A lot of the analysis for the operability and  
15 functionality of those systems are starting to come back,  
16 and looks like we're going to be able to demonstrate for  
17 the most part that the systems will and could have  
18 performed their intended function.

19 Not all of the analysis is back and not all of the  
20 systems are as far along as others. One notable one that  
21 we're, I would say behind schedule on is the Electrical  
22 Distribution System, and the calculations for that; they're  
23 similar to the water flow calculations with the flow  
24 electrons. And so, we're behind on the electrical  
25 distribution, but we have some corrective actions in place.

1 We'll try to get that more organized and completed.

2 We have scheduled a meeting, I think the meeting is  
3 scheduled now. I'm not sure of the date, but I know we're  
4 working on scheduling a meeting to go over in more detail  
5 all of the design issues that we've identified. But  
6 today's meeting topic I want to concentrate on are the  
7 topical issue reviews we've done. I would say in adjunct  
8 to the Safety Validation Project.

9 There were five of those topical issues that we had  
10 identified. Four of them are through the review process  
11 and are ready for Lew's signature. In fact, I believe he  
12 signed one of them. The final one, Appendix R - Safe  
13 Shutdown Analysis is in what I'm calling the final stages  
14 of review, and I expect that will be ready here very soon  
15 also.

16 Just real briefly again, the Collective Significant  
17 Reviews, how they came about, we had done the System Health  
18 Assurance Plan Reviews and they had identified some  
19 potential cross-cutting issues. The initial Collective  
20 Significance Review identified five topical areas that  
21 warranted further evaluations. They were Seismic  
22 Qualification, Station Flooding, High Energy Line Break,  
23 Environmental Qualification and Appendix R Safe Shutdown  
24 Analysis.

25 I went over this last meeting very briefly, but we

1 did institute a NOP, Nuclear Operating Business Practice,  
2 for collective significance reviews and had the process we  
3 used to evaluate these topical areas. The process was to  
4 look at all the Condition Reports, that had been  
5 identified, ~~been~~ "bin" in common areas; evaluate each and  
6 determine its significance to the program, and then conduct  
7 ~~extended~~ extent of condition evaluations where warranted.

8 We didn't just look at the Condition Reports that  
9 were generated as a result of those System Health Readiness  
10 Reviews and Latent Issue Reviews, each of the program  
11 owners actually went into the ~~GRS~~ CREST Database and searched  
12 that database and pulled out and identified Condition  
13 Reports that went back to, I believe it was, January of  
14 2001 is what's the ~~GRS~~ CREST Database. So, we went back an  
15 additional year and pulled those issues out, and also  
16 reviewed those in the Collective Significance Process.

17 I forgot to ~~mentioned~~ mention as we finished those, I don't  
18 know if we forwarded them yet, but we had told Marty Farber  
19 that we would send those reports to him as part of his  
20 inspection plan on the System Health Building Block.

21 I'll go through each of these five topical areas.  
22 And, again, I want to remind you that when I talk about  
23 Appendix R, that that will be preliminary information, but  
24 I don't expect it to change significantly in the review  
25 process.

1       What I have done is broken down each one of these  
2 categories into actions that we found that we need to take  
3 to support restart, and then what I call enhancement items  
4 to go forward. I'll talk about how we get out to those  
5 actions, what we found, and why that's an action.

6       So, under the first program or topical area I talked  
7 about is the Seismic. Reactions to support that, I would  
8 say, evaluate impact of Cooling Tower Makeup Pump not in  
9 accordance with the USAR. We found some seismic category  
10 one issues on that, where that, the documentation, if you  
11 will, the USAR and PID identified that that ~~typing~~ piping, which  
12 is in the proximity of the service water pumps, it was  
13 supposed to be seismic category one. The Condition Reports  
14 said it wasn't; it wasn't installed seismic category one.

15       So, we did, first of all, we evaluated that  
16 Condition Report, applied SQUG methodology and found it  
17 would withstand the appropriate response spec for the  
18 earthquake.

19       We did find some improvements that there was a  
20 higher than expected stress at the mounting bolts in that  
21 pump; that we'll be changing the bolting configuration on  
22 that. But as a result of that issue, we did an ~~extended~~ extent of  
23 condition review ~~seeing~~ screening, looking at other potential impacts  
24 of ~~double~~ two over one criteria, particularly impacting multiple  
25 trains or multiple systems. We did that review and found

1 no additional problems in that area.

2 The next one is ~~revolving~~ resolving boundary conflicts between  
3 Seismic and Quality classification. That came as a result  
4 of a couple Condition Reports that identified what I'll  
5 call conflicts that was introduced into the database system  
6 where a Q boundary ends, quality boundary ends, but seismic  
7 category needs to extend down stream further to an  
8 instrument.

9 We looked at that once before and addressed it  
10 pretty well for pressure gauge, but hadn't addressed it  
11 I'll say thoroughly enough for other interests. It also  
12 may need to perform a pressure retention for seismic  
13 readings.

14 We went through that, looked at ~~extended~~ extent of condition  
15 on that one also, identified where those Q boundaries were  
16 and what down stream instruments might need to be  
17 assessed. We have about two hundred instruments that we  
18 have to go back and look at to make sure that the seismic  
19 properties and the pressure retained properties of those  
20 instruments are appropriate. That activity is in progress.

21 The next one that was another example we did. HFA  
22 relays, that's an issue where very early in the life of the  
23 plant, General Electric had sent out a service information  
24 letter on these relays identifying that they need to be  
25 calibrated.

1       We didn't get the information from the vendors  
2 because we had purchase ours through a third party. That  
3 third party did not forward the information to us. We're  
4 looking at the process to make sure we plugged that gap, so  
5 we get all that information.

6       We did an ~~extended~~ extent of condition on those HFA relays.  
7 Identified there were in fact six of them that we had to  
8 calibrate to make sure, these were chattering in the  
9 relays, and whether it could prohibit actuation of a safety  
10 function that the relay needed to do. We hadn't had any  
11 problems with those, but some of those did need calibration  
12 that were identified in that service information.

13       Then, the other ~~extended~~ extent of condition, which is  
14 actually part of the Containment Health Walkdown was impact  
15 of boric acid on the side supports. We did that and found  
16 that was not a problem for us. Each of those had some  
17 activity in the containment to work on.

18       Other improvements we're going to make in seismic  
19 going forward is, we'll fix this confusion on the database,  
20 Q boundary, and seismic boundary.

21       Procedural requirements of control of temporary  
22 equipment, we found this begin is two of one type of issue;  
23 work in progress, we weren't being as diligent as we should  
24 have been retaining that two over one criteria. So, we're  
25 beefing up procedures in that area, and also for storage of

1 breakers and the like and their impact on seismic  
2 qualification equipment.

3 And then we're going to pull together all the  
4 seismic information programs, procedure to get through that  
5 information. And we'll be looking at using the SQUG  
6 methodology for new and replacement equipment. So, that's  
7 kind of what we found in the seismic area.

8 There is a lot more details and stuff in the  
9 report. We'll give that to you, go over that, and assess  
10 the impact of that.

11 Next area, I have is station flooding. I put that  
12 one next, because it really is very closely related to the  
13 seismic issue. In fact, you see the very first issue is  
14 the same issue I talked about on the Cooling Tower Makeup  
15 Pump, which is because the impact is, if that breaks, then  
16 you flood the service water, so the same issue becomes a  
17 flooding issue also. So, I've already talked about that.  
18 I won't go over that again.

19 There was another Condition Report that questioned  
20 the flooding in the service water tunnel. Now, user  
21 identified service water tunnel under certain conditions  
22 floods. And equipment was evaluated in there. This,  
23 originator of this Condition Report questioned two specific  
24 valves that were, let's see, I forget what valves they are,  
25 but isolation valves for other buildings.



1 We had to go out and evaluate those specific valves  
2 and make sure that they were adequately assessed and that  
3 they could perform their function prior to any flooding  
4 occurred. And no problems were found in that or any of the  
5 other equipment in the service water tunnel that we've  
6 already identified that that condition can occur.

7 And the final thing in there, we did an ~~extended~~ extent of  
8 condition on functionality of critical floor drains. We  
9 had an issue that came up, identified by a condition  
10 report, that specifically addressed the diesel generator  
11 and the day tank drains in the room, as to whether a  
12 flooding issue occurs, whether the room will drain or not.

13 We looked at those, and in fact the diesel generator  
14 drains were plugged. They needed to be unplugged. Now,  
15 the day tank was fine, but we did additional ~~extended~~ extent of  
16 condition review ~~or condition~~ on that, particularly concentrating on  
17 essential rooms and the cooling water room was one we had  
18 to look at; ~~pane~~ mechanical penetration rooms were another.

19 We found no additional problems. We did water tests  
20 on those, and did not find any additional drains plugged.  
21 But in the improvements in that one, on the next one, we  
22 will implement, we are implementing improving the  
23 requirements throughout and will periodically check those  
24 floor drains in the process also.

25 MR. GROBE: That will be part

1 of your maintenance program?

2 MR. SCHRAUDER: Yes. That's what  
3 I would equate it to. I don't know if it would actually be  
4 with pm, but I expect it will be. But maybe some  
5 programmatic tie to go out and periodically check for  
6 those.

7 Other improvements; installing these flood seals and  
8 conduit penetrations. That issue involved, identifies  
9 there were certain conduits penetrating below the station's  
10 flood plan. And when they installed the work on the  
11 junction box and the like, rubber gasket and seals and  
12 stuff, they were found to be acceptable to maintain the  
13 water tight enclosure; however, once again, there were no  
14 pm's, I'll say, to go out and periodically check that  
15 barrier, if you will, which is a flood barrier. And, also  
16 that rubber starts aging, you could start getting some  
17 leakage.

18 So, what we decided to do, is to go in and install  
19 some flood seals in the conduit itself where you can  
20 actually seal where it comes in and not rely on the rubber  
21 gasket seal any longer.

22 Then, one of the other things that came up, we  
23 looked at was the, we have a formal inspection program for  
24 barriers in the fire protection program. You know,  
25 something everybody has you go out and you have a routine

1 inspection of your barriers. We don't have that formal  
2 program aspect of inspecting other barrier like flood  
3 barriers and the like. So, we're going to incorporate that  
4 as part of our barrier inspection program; where it will be  
5 the same type of inspection we do on our independent  
6 inspections.

7 Do you have a question?

8 MR. GROBE: Yeah, I was just  
9 thinking about what you were talking about, in the context  
10 of the reactor pressure vessel head. You were probably  
11 wondering what kind of activity there is here.

12 All of the things that you've talked about that  
13 you're putting preventative maintenance activities in  
14 place, are passive components; floor drains, seals,  
15 barriers. And one of the reasons we didn't focus on the  
16 reactor head as part of our inspection program is that you  
17 focused more on active components that have real  
18 significance.

19 Is there some learning here that there might be  
20 other important but passive components that aren't part of  
21 your preventative maintenance program? Kind of a wide  
22 open question. I don't expect an answer.

23 MR. SCHRAUDER: I haven't thought  
24 of any.

25 MR. GROBE: I was wondering

1 if that was something that may be we should take a look at?

2 MR. SCHRAUDER: Yeah.

3 MR. GROBE: Okay.

4 MR. SCHRAUDER: Again, most of

5 these, as we talk about it, are not in the containment

6 building itself, most of these are really in the other

7 buildings; and most of these, there are seismic concerns,

8 obviously, contained in other, these particular ones are

9 not in the containment building itself.

10 The High Energy Line Break is another one in the  
11 Actions to Support Restart. Complete reanalysis of turbine  
12 building breaks. And this was, we had already started this  
13 in response to Information Notice 2000, 2000 Information  
14 Notice Number 1. And so, we need to complete that  
15 analysis, and in fact, determinability of analysis will  
16 demonstrate a crack or break in a location that we have to  
17 further analyze the impact on the feedwater pumps. So,  
18 we're looking at that.

19 The issue there, we have a high energy line, impacts  
20 on the environmental qualification of the equipment,  
21 whether it can take that. We'll complete that, and any  
22 impact on the environmental qualification or any new  
23 postulated crack or break in the building as a result of  
24 that. We'll get that done and complete prior to restart.  
25 Again, I consider that to be an ~~extended~~ extent of condition type of

1 evaluation.

2 The next issue on revise calculations effecting line  
3 breaks and cracks. We had an issue that came up that  
4 identified that we had misapplied a stress factor, revised  
5 stress factor. We applied a new stress factor to an old  
6 equation, and impacted the calculations. We did an  
7 ~~extended~~ extent of condition on that, where we had applied that  
8 stress factor. It did impact some calculations. Most of  
9 the calculations, it didn't change anything. I mean, it  
10 was wrong in the calculation, but it didn't change the  
11 outcome, because the old equation still postulated a break  
12 or crack in the same location. So, this would still have  
13 identified a crack.

14 But one calculation did show, when we applied the  
15 proper stress factor, that we could have a crack in an area  
16 that was not previously postulated for it. And it was in  
17 an area that we didn't, didn't feel like we, there was too  
18 much equipment in there to allow that to happen. The  
19 amount of qualification impact would have been pretty  
20 significant.

21 So, we moved where that stress would occur in the  
22 system, basically to soften the system a bit and move the  
23 stressers out into another location. And that required to  
24 replace some rigid supports with snubbers and also to move  
25 some other supports to move that stress into a more

1 palatable location.

2 Then the other one is in building free space, we  
3 found a high energy line barrier, happened to be an  
4 elevator door credited as a high energy line break barrier,  
5 and the analysis challenged that. We found it -- I forget  
6 what we found, whether it was acceptable or not. I believe  
7 it was not. It was not acceptable.

8 We did an ~~extended~~ extent of condition for the rest of the  
9 auxiliary building on that; found no other unacceptable  
10 barriers in that; but that did lead to another assessment  
11 of all the free space volumes and openings in the auxiliary  
12 building.

13 I was told before I did come up here, I did have one  
14 lifeline to go out to the audience for additional  
15 information. I almost had to use it there.

16 So, that's, that was what we did in response to  
17 high energy line break.

18 MR. THOMAS: Bob, before we  
19 move on, you addressed the Aux feed water pump room. I  
20 believe there is also issues of the component cooling water  
21 pump room. Are those, has that been resolved or will that  
22 be resolved prior to restart?

23 MR. SCHRAUDER: There is issues in  
24 the component cooling water room. I forget whether they  
25 were due to high energy line break or there was some --

1           MR. THOMAS:        There were high  
2 energy line break issues.

3           MR. GROBE:         The steam line  
4 break right outside the doors there. There is a block wall  
5 right behind.

6           MR. SCHRAUDER:    We had high energy  
7 line breaks --

8           MR. BYRD:         It was due to a  
9 pipe width in the steam line break outside the wall and it  
10 was resolved.

11          MR. GROBE:         It was resolved?

12          MR. BYRD:         Yes, was  
13 resolved.

14          MR. GROBE:         Through analysis?

15          MR. BYRD:         Through analysis,  
16 that's correct.

17          MR. SCHRAUDER:    I remember that  
18 now. It was a pipe width judgment and it was found to be  
19 acceptable.

20          MR. GROBE:         That's it. That  
21 was your lifeline.

22          MR. MYERS:         That's your  
23 lifeline.

24          MR. SCHRAUDER:    Future improvement  
25 for high energy line break. When we did that review of the

1 auxiliary building, we did find our model could be updated  
2 and made more user friendly in the auxiliary building.  
3 We're going to do that.

4 We are going to revise those calculations. I told  
5 you we reviewed the calculations and found certain of the  
6 calcs didn't impact a crack or break location, but they are  
7 in fact incorrect. We'll revise those calculations.

8 We had some USAR design criteria manual changes to  
9 make that need to be updated in there.

10 And, then one other issue that came out was a time  
11 critical operator actions and bases. There were eight  
12 condition reports that initiated, that were questioned or  
13 challenged whether we could get the operator action done or  
14 not. We ran those on the simulator and determined that we  
15 could in fact achieve those, net per time critical operator  
16 actions.

17 We're going to get the whole list of time critical  
18 operator actions to Operations to make sure they can  
19 periodically use those in their simulator training  
20 scenarios, and make sure that we're in good shape there.

21 We don't believe that there is any problems in  
22 meeting those times, but it's good to have a compiled list  
23 of all of them and the basis for those times for the  
24 operators, so they have better access to the information.

25 Environmental qualification is the next issue.



1 Again, this one is related to the high energy line break.  
2 Any time you do a reanalysis of where your high energy line  
3 breaks are, that can have an impact on your qualification  
4 of equipment. So, as we complete those analysis, we'll  
5 feed that information to the environmental qualification  
6 people to update their files and make sure we haven't  
7 impacted any of the environmental qualification for the  
8 equipment there.

9 Vendors license with EQ Splices on the Containment  
10 Limatorque Actuators. One of the things we did as part of  
11 the ~~extended~~ extent of conditions, we did a dedicated environmental  
12 qualification ~~extended~~ extent of condition in the containment  
13 building as a result of the boric acid dispersion in  
14 containment.

15 We opened up virtually all of the op, limatorque  
16 operators in the containment. One of the things we found  
17 in that ~~extended~~ extent of condition review was certain of these  
18 limatorque actuators, limatorque supplies when they're dual  
19 voltage actuators, they can not provide a qualified splice  
20 in there. And it's up to the user to upgrade that or to  
21 supply a qualified splice. We found I believe six  
22 limatorques that that splicing had not occurred in. We  
23 needed to replace those vendor splices or qualified  
24 splices.

25 This is probably a good time to mention, we haven't

1 completed this review though. Any of these actions or any  
2 of these issues I talked about where we found something not  
3 up to snuff with the, like EQ equations or equipment, or  
4 the high energy line break, we are reviewing those for past  
5 operability reportability concerns for those also.

6 MR. HOPKINS: Let me ask, Bob,  
7 in that regard. Are you going to be reviewing your IPEE ~~run~~  
8 ~~Triple-E~~ at all to see as to, if that's still correct or  
9 not?

10 MR. SCHRAUDER: Ken Byrd, of  
11 the individual plant external examination; how does that  
12 relate to that?

13 MR. BYRD: Yeah, actually,  
14 we're going to be, we have been doing quite a bit of work  
15 on that, both on our seismic and the fire part of it; in  
16 fact, we're putting those in the PRA. That should be  
17 complete rather shortly, so that is actually ongoing right  
18 now.

19 MR. HOPKINS: So, your PRA is  
20 then like a living document?

21 MR. BYRD: That is correct.  
22 And we'll include fire and seismic. We already have  
23 seismic completed. Fire should be completed by the end of  
24 year. That was already ongoing at the time this occurred.

25 MR. HOPKINS: All right, thank

1 you.

2 MR. SCHRAUDER: Okay, we also  
3 found in our reviewing containment four Raychem splices  
4 where the bend radius exceeded the bend radius and we need  
5 to correct those prior to restart.

6 And then we found one, the containment purge inlet  
7 isolation solenoid valve had accelerated aging. What we  
8 did is we looked, we discovered this solenoid valve and it  
9 appeared to be, have thermal discoloration I'll, call it on  
10 the thing, which was strange, because the environment that  
11 was shown in the picture or in the documentation showed it  
12 should be a certain level, the temperature should be at  
13 about 113 degrees. It looked like it had been exposed to  
14 temperatures higher than that.

15 What we found was that it was actually at a  
16 different elevation in the containment, and it was actually  
17 exposed to temperatures in the range of 150 to 170 degrees  
18 and it had caused the discoloration. And, what that did  
19 was decreased the thermal aging life of the piece of  
20 equipment. It was intended to be 40 year life component,  
21 and this prematurely aged it, I would say thermally. It's  
22 still functioning, but we figure we've used up its thermal  
23 aging life. We're replacing that, and changing the pm  
24 frequency or the EQ frequency for changeout of that piece  
25 of equipment.

1 We did do an ~~extended~~ extent of condition review on that also  
2 to see if we had properly identified those components that  
3 have a thermal aging aspect to their qualification life.

4 Future things we're doing in the world of  
5 environmental qualification. Revised the documents for  
6 installation of limitorque actuators, make sure we're  
7 getting qualified splices put in when we get the  
8 limitorque.

9 Provide drainage configurations for containment  
10 conduit. This is an issue that came out some years ago,  
11 actually in NRC information notice or some generic  
12 correspondence, on potential for accumulating condensation  
13 in unsealed conduits or conduits that don't have weep holes  
14 and the like.

15 Our containment ~~extended~~ extent of condition evaluations  
16 opened up all of these. We found no current evidence of  
17 any precipitation condensation in any of the conduits with  
18 the exception of one that we found, some rust around it;  
19 could be indicative of that, but we actually believe that  
20 was due to a cable pulled through there, is a high liquid  
21 content in the material that you put on the cable pulls.

22 But we are going to in the future go back and put  
23 these drainage configuration weep holes in there. We want  
24 to be able to take the time to, it can be a tricky thing to  
25 put weep holes into conduits that have live wire in them.

1 Found no evidence of a current problem. We'll fix that as  
2 we go forward, after we have proper time to adequately  
3 engineer and make sure we know exactly what we're doing  
4 before we go poking into live conduits.

5 We have some update on the maintenance matrix, EQ  
6 files. Revise EQ Program for guidance on recognizing  
7 components that need raceway drainage, and improve the  
8 problematic direction in that regard.

9 We found that we need to conduct some refresher  
10 training in the world of environmental qualification, what  
11 you have to do to make sure that maintenance and  
12 modification out in the plant can impact the qualification  
13 of environmental impact on your equipment. We provide that  
14 training.

15 I think what we're going to do is go steal that  
16 training from Perry, because I know we developed it over  
17 there in the years past. And we'll import that and put  
18 that into our continuing training programs.

19 Do you have a question, Jack?

20 MR. GROBE: How could you  
21 tell? Your comments on conduits drainage holes didn't  
22 make, I'm not sure I completely understand them.

23 MR. SCHRAUDER: Okay.

24 MR. GROBE: First off, the  
25 issue of, the one issue where you discovered corrosion. It

1 doesn't make sense to me that the pull lubricant would  
2 cause corrosion in that location and not elsewhere. I'm  
3 not sure I understand how a lubricant could cause  
4 corrosion.

5 MR. SCHRAUDER: The lubricant  
6 does have a high water content. It can cause it if you  
7 don't get it cleaned off properly. The ~~old~~ old pull Condition  
8 Reports show you. I pulled the Condition Report and read  
9 it, that was the assessment of that, why that one had it  
10 and not others.

11 We only found this, this level of rust, I'll call  
12 it, on one. There was no indication of current water in  
13 that.

14 MR. GROBE: I'll talk to a  
15 couple of my folks. Doesn't make a lot of sense to me, but  
16 I'm not an expert in this area.

17 MR. SCHRAUDER: Okay. Me either.

18 MR. GROBE: The second  
19 question is, I'm not sure why this is a post restart  
20 issue. Do you have a design requirement to have these  
21 drainage holes in the conduits?

22 MR. SCHRAUDER: No, it's not  
23 a design requirement. It was information to say, hey, you  
24 ought to consider this, that you can get condensation in  
25 those things from moisture in the air, or humidity in the

1 air. We went and looked at all of them and found that we  
2 were not, you know, we weren't collecting water. The issue  
3 is, if you collect water in them, then you can have  
4 shorts.

5 MR. GROBE: Right.

6 MR. SCHRAUDER: There is no, we  
7 went in and opened an awful lot of them during this  
8 ~~extended~~ extent of condition review in containment and did not find  
9 any evidence of moisture intrusion into those. And that is  
10 the basis, it's not required for restart.

11 MR. GROBE: I understand.

12 Thank you.

13 MR. SCHRAUDER: Then, the final  
14 topical issues is the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis.  
15 We do have some actions there to complete. Framatone is  
16 doing a transient calculation upgrade for us. We want to  
17 get that completed prior to restart.

18 Complete flow model of component cooling water fire  
19 induced valve failure is a hot short issue, where the  
20 component cooling water could reach runout conditions.  
21 That analysis has actually been complete. We have not  
22 owner accepted it yet, but it was, contractor did the  
23 analysis for it, and preliminarily I would say, the  
24 analysis will support that you won't reach runout  
25 conditions on that issue.

1 Part of that is, the ~~extended~~ extent of condition goes back to  
2 that, the Framatone transient calculational analysis.  
3 They're going to be looking at other pumps in that process  
4 also, to make a pump, a high pressure injection pump, to  
5 make sure these issues can't cause those pumps to be  
6 Appendix R fire scenarios to reach the runout condition.

7 The next issue is a performance technical review of  
8 response to request for assistance. Two things to do on  
9 that. One is a restart required and one is a going forward  
10 issue. A request for assistance, you know, people will ask  
11 questions sometimes in the old process under what was  
12 called a request for assistance. And answers, technical  
13 responses were given to those that would have been more  
14 appropriately documented in calculation space.

15 So, first thing we've got to do is, we're going to  
16 go back and look at those RFAs, make sure they're  
17 technically correct, and then going forward we will convert  
18 them to formal calculations and put them in the calculation  
19 base, as opposed to a response to request for information.

20 Another action to support restart is, we're going to  
21 do a triennial audit, QA is going to do that. Prior to  
22 restart, we'll get that. And I know that you folks are  
23 coming in and doing an assessment of fire protection also  
24 to see whether triennial inspection is required prior to  
25 restart.



1 MR. GROBE: When you say  
2 triennial audit, is that with the safe shutdown, post fire  
3 safe shutdown --

4 MR. MYERS: Right.

5 MR. GROBE: -- or is that  
6 classical fire protection?

7 MR. SCHRAUDER: Whenever they're  
8 looking at safe shutdown, they're also looking at classical  
9 fire protection --

10 MR. PEARCE: The whole thing.

11 MR. SCHRAUDER: -- features in  
12 that.

13 MR. GROBE: Okay.

14 MR. SCHRAUDER: I talked about for  
15 future improvements, I talked about the, formalizing the  
16 calculations and requests for assistance. And we have an  
17 ongoing safe shutdown procedure upgrade project. And I  
18 believe that that is on the wrong slide, because I think we  
19 were also completing that prior to restart.

20 So, in conclusion, we looked collectively at the  
21 five areas. We've identified areas in virtually each of  
22 those that need correction prior to restart, and identified  
23 some additional enhancements that we want to make.

24 We didn't find any of the issues or any of these  
25 areas to be fundamentally unsound. The programs as set up

1 are fundamentally sound. We believe that the actions we've  
2 identified in those areas, we take those actions, that  
3 those topical areas will support the safe operation of the  
4 plant. And again, we'll be forwarding those to Marty for  
5 his review.

6 MR. GROBE: Okay.

7 MR. MYERS: Next area is  
8 Containment Health.

9 MR. SCHRAUDER: Next area is  
10 Containment Health and Lynn Harder will perform that for  
11 us.

12 MR. HARDER: Thank you, Bob.

13 My Name is Lynn Harder. I'm the Containment Health  
14 Inspection Project Manager. Since I'm a new face to the  
15 panel, I thought I would give you a little background on  
16 myself.

17 Personal note, I was born and raised, and lived in  
18 this area pretty much my whole life. Married my high  
19 school sweetheart, dream of my life. Two kids. Dream of a  
20 marriage, and two grandchildren. Dreams for everything.  
21 So, life is good in that perspective.

22 Professional note, I have an Associate Degree in  
23 Nuclear Power Technology. I have a Bachelor in Management  
24 Organizational Development. I've been involved in nuclear  
25 power, been a nuclear power professional for over 26 years;

1 the last 22 years at Davis-Besse.

2 While at Davis-Besse, I worked 15, 16 years in  
3 Health Physics, Radiation Protection in almost all aspects  
4 to include Radiation Superintendent. Five years in  
5 Security as a Fitness Duty Program Manager, Access  
6 Authorization Supervisor, Security Operations Supervisor.

7 And, last year, early in the spring, I moved to  
8 Human Performance, Human Performance Advocate and  
9 Performance Improvement Group. And, took Project Manager  
10 role over to Containment coating activities in Containment  
11 in June. Spent about the last eight months in Containment,  
12 looking at changes in the ~~extended~~ extent of condition in  
13 transformations that we take a lot of pride in. We're  
14 going to talk about today, Containment Health.

15 Last three or four weeks, got involved with  
16 Containment Health Inspection, so that's what I would like  
17 to talk about. Focus a little bit on the background of our  
18 Containment Health Program and what we're doing to go  
19 forward.

20 Next slide, please.

21 Really the purpose of our Containment Health Program  
22 is to ensure that our equipment is maintained to support  
23 safe, reliable plant operation.

24 If we go back and look in the spring of last year,  
25 we knew we didn't like the extent of the conditions of

1 things in containment as well as the rigor of our Boric  
2 Acid Corrosion Control Program.

3 We brought some specialists in, rewrote our  
4 procedures, improved our Boric Acid Control Procedure, and  
5 brought over 40 inspectors in, in August and walked  
6 containment down top to bottom by area in accordance with  
7 these procedures, looking for the ~~extended~~ extent of conditions in  
8 containment to do what we call as founds.

9 And those inspectors were diversified in electrical,  
10 structural, and mechanical areas. And were specifically  
11 looking at over five hundred inspection components and two  
12 hundred for Alloy 600.

13 And next slide, please.

14 They resulted in taking pictures and documenting  
15 more than 950 Condition Reports, which identified the  
16 ~~extended~~ extent of condition of what again we call the as-found  
17 condition. Those Condition Reports are given to an  
18 independent team of evaluators who looked at the extent and  
19 performed cause analysis on 950 Condition Reports and came  
20 up with over 6,400 corrective actions that would ensure the  
21 appropriate remediation for rework, replace, clean or  
22 refurbish done where necessary.

23 The last bullet there identifies those totals of  
24 corrective actions, involved more than twelve thousand  
25 assets, which is a part, pump, valve, component, conduit,

1 et cetera.

2 Next slide, please.

3 The problem side of it is, if you're looking at the  
4 transformation over the last six months really in some of  
5 the work activities, that these would be pictures of  
6 as-left conditions of the containment air coolers were  
7 completely refurbished, core flood tanks.

8 Next slide.

9 The plenum sensing line and the whole plenum itself  
10 was replaced with a stainless steel plenum. All the  
11 service water pipe was blasted and recoated with the piping  
12 supports. There is a picture of the containment air cooler  
13 plenum, and more of the service water pipes, and even  
14 conduits.

15 The big project there is the containment dome  
16 project was over 40,000 square foot of coatings being  
17 removed from the containment dome and repainted.

18 That shows a good picture of some of the supports  
19 and service water pipes that were recoated, and the bottom  
20 right pictures show a thermography shot of the hydrolasing  
21 we were doing internal to the pipe, even doing pipe  
22 internal cleaning to remove some of the scale.

23 Next slide.

24 So, where we got involved here, kind of at the end  
25 is, after the big projects were pretty much completing with

1 the as-found conditions, there is still about a thousand  
2 corrective actions out there, smaller activities, mostly  
3 related to cleaning and clean up, which we refer to as our  
4 final inspection and close-out areas. And even these  
5 as-left conditions need to be identified as we go through  
6 and close out the remaining corrective actions prior to  
7 restart.

8 So, we've developed teams, multidiscipline teams of  
9 painters, laborers, deconers, and each team is led by a  
10 Containment Health Inspector. They're in the field  
11 together. So the team can take care of business, so to  
12 speak, on the spot; make remediations as necessary, as  
13 directed by the corrective action.

14 So, then the final as-left inspection is documented  
15 in the inspection report. That final photograph that's  
16 taken of that asset is compared to the as-left by an  
17 independent verifier, so the Corrective Action Program then  
18 results in having the as-found versus the as-left condition  
19 of before and after pictures, and documentation associated  
20 with both, to reside all the evidence of the Boric Acid  
21 Corrosion Control Program.

22 So, this method provided for us a systematic method  
23 to document all of our findings and going forwards, and in  
24 essence, what we conclude will provide us a baseline for  
25 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program before restart.

1       The last bullet discusses our Restart Test Plan. As  
2 the Containment Health closes out all the boric acid  
3 corrosion inspection, we will still perform four more  
4 independent tests on the Reactor Coolant System boundaries  
5 to ensure we have an intact and tight RCS.

6       Any questions?

7           MR. GROBE:       Nope.

8           MR. HARDER:      No questions, I  
9 would like to turn it over to Clark Price.

10          MR. MYERS:        I have one. How  
11 many CAs did you say were still there, condition reports?

12          MR. HARDER:      Containment Health  
13 Inspection Team is working off about a thousand corrective  
14 actions.

15          MR. MYERS:        Which are minor in  
16 nature in general.

17          MR. HARDER:      Minor in nature,  
18 but still has to be closed out before we can restart,  
19 that's correct.

20          MR. MYERS:        The point is, the  
21 hard stuff in Containment, we have, before we close up the  
22 minor stuff, we had to get the hard stuff out of the way.

23          MR. HARDER:      Correct.

24          MR. MYERS:        So, a lot of this  
25 stuff is fairly easily closeable; is that correct?

1 MR. HARDER: That's correct.

2 MR. MYERS: Okay.

3 MR. PASSEHL: Sorry. I have a  
4 question. On page 56, what is the, looks like a large  
5 thermal gray there, that section of pipe. What are we  
6 looking at there?

7 MR. HARDER: That's service  
8 water pipe. We are hydrolasing the service water pipe.  
9 That depicted where our laser was at, so we knew the effect  
10 of where we were moving within the pipe as it was being  
11 cleaned.

12 MR. PASSEHL: I see. Thank  
13 you.

14 MR. SCHRAUDER: Before Clark gets  
15 started, I have to make a correction to a statement I  
16 made. The EQ Program, we did have more than one junction  
17 box that rust was identified. It was attributed to the  
18 cable pull slime.

19 MR. GROBE: Okay. Thanks.

20 MR. DEAN: That was his  
21 second lifeline.

22 MR. GROBE: No, actually it  
23 was his third. He's way over.

24 MR. SCHRAUDER: I didn't ask for  
25 that, I was just kidding. But it may get me in trouble.



1 (laughter)

2 MR. MYERS: Let's move on to  
3 Clark Price.

4 MR. PRICE: Okay. My name is  
5 Clark Price, and I'm the Owner of the Restart Action  
6 Process at Davis-Besse.

7 I would like to talk today about -- go on to the  
8 next slide -- two items; our 350 checklist item status and  
9 then our overall restart action progress, which I'll talk  
10 about in a little bit of detail.

11 Go on to the next slide.

12 This particular slide is the first set of three  
13 slides. And what it's looking at is our 350 progress, as  
14 we track it on site.

15 As we talked about in the past, our Restart Action  
16 Process is really in two major categories; a discovery  
17 phase and then an implementation phase. This chart here is  
18 showing the progress that we're making in those two  
19 phases.

20 This first chart identifies the checklist items  
21 number one and two, which primarily address the reactor  
22 head corrosion event and also the ~~extended~~ extent of condition in  
23 containment related to the boric acid.

24 And, as you can see in this area, we have one  
25 particular item in discovery that we're still working on,

1 that's the Collective Significance Review. That is being  
2 performed right now and there will be a management review  
3 of that next week and that should complete it.

4 On the righthand side in implementation area, we  
5 have some, a number of items that are still in progress. I  
6 failed to mention our green -- if the bar is green, we're  
7 complete with that activity. If it's blue, it's in  
8 progress. If it's gray, it's just not applicable.

9 But in that area, in the checklist item two category  
10 under the reactor vessel head and containment vessel, we  
11 are basically waiting plant conditions in order to finish  
12 out the required tests there with the full pressure test on  
13 the Reactor Coolant System and also the containment IRT.

14 We're also, as Lynn just talked about in the one  
15 area in Containment Health, which is the line called 2C,  
16 we're making good progress there. That's closing out.  
17 Hopefully, we'll be done with that area soon.

18 Containment emergency sump is another project that  
19 we're contending with and we'll have an inspection coming  
20 up on that, that we discussed earlier.

21 Then we have our boric acid systems outside of  
22 containment, which Lynn is also responsible for and he'll  
23 be focusing attention on those areas when we're doing the  
24 containment IRT. He'll move his teams outside to work on  
25 those. So, we'll make better progress once the, in that

1 area once they are IRT starts.

2 On the next slide is our program area, or Safety  
3 Significant Programs. We talked about those earlier. Dave  
4 talked about those in the earlier discussions.

5 We have one area that is still in discovery, and  
6 Bill Pearce talked about the Quality Audits Program Review  
7 that's currently going on and should complete this week.

8 We have a number of items that are completed in our  
9 programs area, and also some that are still in progress.  
10 And, we're pushing to get these completed this week and  
11 next, so that they're ready for inspection.

12 The one that is, currently the newest checklist  
13 item, which is the last item on the chart there, which is  
14 Completeness and Accuracy of Required Records and  
15 Submittals to NRC; we're just in the process of getting the  
16 implementation plan put together for that, make sure we  
17 have the full scope of that identified and covered.

18 If there is no questions, I'll move on to the last  
19 slide.

20 MR. GROBE: Clark, just an  
21 observation on that last slide. I believe that's, as far  
22 as the discovery and completion of the discovery phase,  
23 that's quite an improvement, having essentially by the end  
24 of this week possibly all of those done. Is that correct?

25 MR. PRICE: That is correct.

1           MR. GROBE:           Good. There was a  
2 number of questions regarding John ~~Jacobsen's~~ Jacobson's programs  
3 inspection where things weren't quite complete when we  
4 expected them to be, so that's all ready for inspection,  
5 that's good.

6           MR. PRICE:           Yes, this is one  
7 area we're pushing real hard on and making sure we've got  
8 all the implementation planned action items completed and  
9 there are just a couple close-out items on a couple of the  
10 reports to complete and we'll be ready.

11          Okay, the last sheet here is the last four remaining  
12 350 checklist items. The first one is the our  
13 Management/Human Performance Improvement Plan. We're  
14 continuing our activities there. Discussed that earlier,  
15 and we still have some items to complete to be able to  
16 finish up that inspection on that particular item.

17          In the, the one item that's in discovery is the item  
18 that Bob Schrauder just spoke to in the Design Issues  
19 Resolution area and we're making good progress there and  
20 should be closing that out from a discovery perspective  
21 within the next week.

22          We do have some other areas; the Test Program  
23 Development Implementation, that sits at 60 percent  
24 complete. That's primarily due to plant conditions. The  
25 plan and procedures are essentially ready. Now we're

1 waiting on plant conditions for the Integrated Leak Rate  
2 Test, which will be the first use of that test program, and  
3 then the full temperature and pressure test.

4 And, as you can see there too, we have identified  
5 our Restart Readiness Reviews, which are a critical process  
6 in our assurance that we're both from an operational  
7 perspective and our system readiness perspective that we're  
8 ready for restart. We've discussed those readiness review  
9 meetings and that's what's identified there.

10 Yes?

11 MR. DEAN: Clark, before you  
12 move on. Going back to the first item, 1 A. We do have a  
13 technical root cause in hand, but I note there is still  
14 some ongoing work looking at the liner that, testing along  
15 with that report.

16 MR. PRICE: Can you address  
17 that, or Jim?

18 MR. POWERS: I think there is  
19 continued work in terms of the data that was taken at the  
20 laboratory in Virginia on the as-found condition of the  
21 cladding liner; is that what you're referring to, Bill?

22 MR. DEAN: Correct.

23 MR. POWERS: So, that needs to  
24 be rolled up and reported out, and as well, we're going  
25 forward with extracting some additional samples from the

1 old head per your request, and that needs to continue as  
2 well. So, there is ongoing work.

3 MR. DEAN: Do you have a  
4 timeline for the analysis of the line?

5 MR. POWERS: No, I don't have  
6 that today. We'll have to get that information to you.

7 MR. DEAN: Thanks, Jim.

8 MR. PRICE: Okay, if that's  
9 all the questions, I'll move on to the next session, which  
10 is looking at our overall restart progress.

11 Each month, we display a set of charts that are  
12 actually on the audience's right over there. We use those  
13 to look at our major building block areas and major  
14 contributors to a lot of the work that came out of the  
15 discovery phase of our Restart Action Process.

16 I'm not going to go back and address each one of  
17 those curves today, but I do have a chart in here that will  
18 address them in kind of a higher level look. But what I  
19 also want to do is put this all in perspective.

20 When we look at the charts, they look rather ominous  
21 because of the scale we put them on, but when we look at  
22 what we have really completed to-date, this is the total  
23 Restart Condition Report that we have set our required for  
24 restart. And we have over 5,400 Condition Reports that we  
25 placed through the review of the Restart Station Review

1 Board, as requiring evaluation prior to restart.

2 As you can see there, we've got about actually  
3 around 89 percent of those Condition Reports have been  
4 evaluated, and Corrective Actions delivered out of those,  
5 with the remaining amount down there around 600 that are  
6 still to be completed.

7 So, it kind of puts it all a little in better  
8 perspective. We completed a tremendous amount of work  
9 already in this area that came out of our discovery phase.  
10 It's not only on the Building Blocks that these come, but  
11 normal day-to-day operations and the generation of  
12 Condition Reports, all those Condition Reports are reviewed  
13 by the Restart Station Review Board for potential restart  
14 requirements.

15 The other thing I would like to mention -- well,  
16 I'll wait until a later graph here.

17 The next graph is the Restart Corrective Actions now  
18 that have come out of those Condition Reports. As you can  
19 see here, we have over, to-date over 5,700 Condition  
20 Reports or Corrective Actions that have been identified out  
21 of those 5,400 Condition Reports.

22 Now, we talked months ago, we have around 3 to 4 on  
23 average Corrective Actions coming out of each Condition  
24 Report. And right around 30 percent of those Corrective  
25 Actions, when you look at it in total, are being classified

1 as restart by the board. So, that's why it almost ends up,  
2 looks like a one per one relationship with the Corrective  
3 Actions and the Condition Reports.

4 The Restart Station Review Board continues to meet.  
5 As we're now pushing to correct Condition Report  
6 Evaluations rather hard, the population of Corrective  
7 Actions coming into the board review, are streaming in  
8 quite rapidly, so until the board reviews them and  
9 classifies them, they don't get into this graph.

10 So, right now, I would expect that this graph will  
11 top out a little over 6,000 Corrective Actions when we,  
12 when we're done. But again, here, what this is showing, we  
13 have around almost 60 percent of the Corrective Actions  
14 that we've identified as required for restart completed  
15 to-date.

16 The last chart, what this is showing is another  
17 chart, simple chart that we put together, as we are looking  
18 at how we're progressing again. These are the major  
19 Building Blocks and the same ones that the charts are in  
20 the back.

21 A simple way to look at how we're progressing in our  
22 work-off rates. Essentially what the color coding means  
23 is, red means we're basically declining in our work-off  
24 rate; a green indicator says we're improving it, and white  
25 says basically from the prior week we remained about the



1 same.

2 Back during the week of the 16th of February, I  
3 believe it was, actually it was 23rd of February, earlier  
4 that week, we started a process on-site where we have  
5 morning meetings, 8:00 every morning, that are focused at  
6 Condition Report and Corrective Action progress. And we  
7 are reviewing those on a three-day look ahead basis,  
8 ensuring that we have everything in place in order to  
9 complete the Condition Report evaluations and close out the  
10 Corrective Actions.

11 And you can see that that focus attention now has  
12 turned a corner on our Condition Reports. We were having  
13 positive performance, as you can see from the charts in the  
14 back, however it wasn't at a rate that was satisfactory to  
15 support the restart scheduling that we wanted to get to.  
16 So, this focus effort here has definitely made some  
17 improvements in the work-off rates.

18 In addition, we have 2:00 meetings every day that  
19 are focused with the sections that are looking at the  
20 Corrective Actions and Condition Reports to ensure that  
21 each manager has a full grasp on the conditions that he's  
22 responsible for, what their status is. And also for the  
23 senior management team, because it's meeting with the  
24 senior management team to ensure we don't have any real  
25 hidden items out there.

1        That review has essentially been completed for all  
2 the sections. Now it's going to start a systematic review  
3 of those in the same 2:00 meeting; what we're going to be  
4 looking at are from a persistence perspective now versus  
5 the ownership of those Condition Reports and Corrective  
6 Actions from a department perspective.

7        So, that's to ensure that as we work those down,  
8 that we know the issues that we have out there. As I  
9 talked about before, we have around 600 Condition Reports  
10 out there that are still, still open. And out of those  
11 Condition Reports, at the rate we're working those off  
12 right now, that should take about two and a half weeks, two  
13 and a half to three weeks. We should have those Condition  
14 Report Evaluations completed.

15        Every day we still have incoming, but the incoming  
16 rate has significantly dropped. So, it would look like in  
17 about two and a half weeks, we should have our Condition  
18 Report backlog down. We know we've got some hard ones in  
19 there that we're working on that we'll manage those, but  
20 right now we want to get the major ones, the masses down,  
21 so we can really manage the real issues now that are out  
22 there.

23        And the same way goes with the Corrective Actions  
24 that were on the prior chart. We still have in the area  
25 of, I don't have my glasses on, I think around 320, 400

1 Corrective Actions. Like I said, that's going to grow a  
2 little bit. But the same thing, we're focusing on getting  
3 those numbers down, so the real hard ones we have  
4 identified what they are and we're pushing those into the  
5 schedule, the outer schedule, so that they're scheduled out  
6 and then worked on.

7 MR. MYERS: How many are late  
8 now?

9 MR. PRICE: How many are late  
10 now? We did what we were supposed to do, none of them are  
11 late now.

12 MR. MYERS: That's a good  
13 answer.

14 MR. PRICE: Part of our  
15 process in the 8:00 meeting is, we had a number of  
16 Condition Reports that went late, Corrective Actions. And  
17 through this process, we've gone through a -- management  
18 reviewed and agreed upon extension to those, placed those  
19 out in time in order to support the schedule. And so,  
20 that's been completed as part of this activity.

21 I think one last thing to say. One of the things we  
22 talked about here, we have to ensure that the quality of  
23 the product, quality of these Condition Report evaluations  
24 and Corrective Actions are maintained; that the  
25 documentation behind those is there. We continuously focus

1 on that. We've talked about that today. We know we have a  
2 major inspection coming in with a lot of focus in that  
3 area. So, we're working hard to get the numbers down, but  
4 we're also working hard to maintain the quality that we  
5 need to in all these Corrective Actions and Condition  
6 Reports.

7 MR. MYERS: Jack, I would like  
8 to move on to Greg Dunn. If we're going to skip anything  
9 this time, I think the program would be the one.

10 MR. GROBE: I appreciate  
11 that, thank you.

12 MR. MYERS: Okay.

13 MR. DUNN: Good afternoon.  
14 I'm Greg Dunn. I'm the Manager of the Outage Management  
15 Work Control. I recently joined the Davis-Besse team and  
16 my current capacity is Restart Director on day shift. That  
17 function is responsible for facilitating the physical  
18 implementation of field work and activities for the actual  
19 implementation of the corrective measures.

20 My desired outcome in this short discussion is to  
21 communicate our upcoming work activities that are necessary  
22 to support that testing and restart phase of our Return to  
23 Service Plan.

24 Just last evening -- next slide, please. Just last  
25 evening, as Lew mentioned earlier, we set our new reactor

1 head in place on the vessel flange. And our current work  
2 in progress includes lowering down the control rod lead  
3 screws and run in of the reactor head studs. And then,  
4 this evening, we plan to conduct a seating pass of those  
5 studs, and then transition into the tensioning, which will  
6 move us into Mode 5 Operating Condition of the facility.

7 That will establish the need to establish the  
8 technical specification of requirements for Mode 5, and  
9 will fully restore the reactor pressure vessel intact for  
10 the Davis-Besse station.

11 Placement of the reactor head on the vessel  
12 establishes also plant conditions necessary to support  
13 going to deep drain conditions. Deep drain is defined any  
14 time we go less than the flange level of the reactor  
15 vessel, and that's water level less than 80 inches.

16 That will allow the removal of the steam generator  
17 nozzle dams. Nozzle dams were put in place as a barrier  
18 between the reactor vessel and the steam generators and to  
19 allow for layup conditions of those steam generators during  
20 our extended shutdown conditions.

21 It is now time with the restoration of the reactor  
22 pressure vessel system to remove that isolation and restore  
23 normal Reactor Coolant System boundary conditions.

24 Also, during that drain period we'll be replacing  
25 all four reactor coolant pump seals. We elected to replace

1 those seals based upon industry operating experience,  
2 industry experience with an extended shutdown condition,  
3 potential for chemical attack on the surfaces of those  
4 seals; and as a result, utilize that experience and the  
5 need for replacement of all four of those seals also in  
6 preparation for restart.

7 Completion of all these activities will place the  
8 physical reactor system ready for fill to normal water  
9 level, and will establish Reactor Coolant System ready for  
10 return to service.

11 Fill of the Reactor Coolant System also supports the  
12 next testing activity, which is the Integrated Leak Rate  
13 Test. The water level and restoration Reactor Coolant  
14 System is necessary for proper monitoring from the control  
15 room during the conduct of the Integrated Leak Rate Test as  
16 we close up the containment structure and access to  
17 containment is limited during the conduct of that test.

18 The Integrated Leak Rate Test will verify or  
19 validate the leak tightness of the containment structure  
20 after we opened that up for access of our new head, and it  
21 will utilize as multiple industrial air compressors  
22 essentially and will pressurize the containment to  
23 approximately 40 pounds of pressure. And, it will be our  
24 first major milestone of the plant rate retest activities  
25 in preparation for restart.

1 In parallel with these activities, we have much  
2 remaining work in the field. As we know, we talked about  
3 much of that today in the Corrective Actions. Two of the  
4 important items in there inside containment are the  
5 completion of our new emergency sump, and specifically,  
6 that's the completion of the lower strainer assemblies  
7 installation, which is in progress.

8 That was prohibited earlier as we had the incore, we  
9 had the incores removed from the reactor vessel in support  
10 of fuel reload and that radiologically prohibited access to  
11 the under vessel area. Those incores are reinserted with  
12 the completion of the fuel reload, and allowed access in  
13 the new lower strainer assemblies installations in  
14 progress.

15 And, as we talked of the containment air cooler, we  
16 have lessons learned implementation necessary for restoring  
17 the service water supply in return to those containment air  
18 coolers.

19 And, Jack, as we talked about earlier the  
20 implementation of the field implementation lessons learned,  
21 as well as the modifications on how the design itself is  
22 installed.

23 All that should culminate with what we have called  
24 our restart readiness meetings. Define a little bit about  
25 what that is, it's a Collective Management Team Review of

1 the completion of implementation of Corrective Actions,  
2 that Clark talked about. Also our process in program  
3 improvements, our field work execution, as well as our  
4 performance matrix that we talked about earlier that's  
5 intended to monitor our progress on Safety Culture  
6 improvement and all of this is with the purpose to validate  
7 our preparation for plant restart.

8 That's the whole function of our restart readiness  
9 meetings proceeding forward. Upon successful completion of  
10 those readiness review meetings, and as Lew mentioned, it  
11 took us six days for Mode 6. I would anticipate some long  
12 hard days for Mode 4 as well.

13 This will be followed by pressurization of the  
14 Reactor Coolant System to normal operating pressure for  
15 seven days, which will be the demonstration of what I would  
16 term the fruits of our labor in establishing Reactor  
17 Coolant System integrity and supporting return to service.

18 Those are some major activities that we have  
19 upcoming in the near term to support the restart phase of  
20 our Return to Service Plan.

21 MR. GROBE: Lew.

22 MR. MYERS: Okay. In summary,  
23 our people are making good progress. We're working long  
24 hours. We're pushing toward closure of Corrective Actions,  
25 CRs, identifying -- in the CR area we're trying to find the



1 correct answer, corrective action area, we're trying to  
2 implement them, implement the needed actions.

3 If you'll look at our work-off rates, every week  
4 over there in each one of those categories, they're  
5 improving. The last two or three weeks have been the best  
6 weeks ever. So, we think we have a good opportunity to  
7 move forward to return the plant to service.

8 We continue to improve the material condition. I  
9 think we demonstrated that today. Many of the plant  
10 systems and components, a lot of hard work there ahead of  
11 us. There is a bunch of AOVs that we've got to go fix.

12 Price and work are going to come out of the  
13 electrical reviews and things we have to do, but there is a  
14 lot of work ahead of us. We're making a lot of progress in  
15 improving the material today.

16 We continue to make progress of the management area  
17 also. A few months ago, we couldn't even discuss what the  
18 Management Observation Program was telling us. Today, we  
19 have a good idea there, as we demonstrated.

20 Also the Safety Culture is an important part of our  
21 plant, our plant startup. We're doing our next assessment  
22 this week in Safety Culture. We're looking forward to the  
23 Sonja Haber review.

24 Additionally, from a plant standpoint, the  
25 decision-making Nuclear Operator Procedure, I really do

1 believe that carries us a long way, that consistent  
2 approach to addressing questions.

3 And then, finally, we're looking forward to our next  
4 meeting to see where we're at then. Hopefully, we'll be  
5 through the Integrated Leak Rate Test and looking forward  
6 to Mode 4.

7 With that, I thank you very much.

8 MR. GROBE: Thank you. Why  
9 don't we -- it's ten after 5, why don't we just go right  
10 into public questions and comments.

11 (Off the record.)

12 MR. GROBE: I appreciate you  
13 folks sticking with us through this meeting. These are  
14 long meetings. They're very productive for us. Some of  
15 the discussion I sure could be dry for you, but I do  
16 appreciate you all staying around.

17 What I would like to do is begin with questions from  
18 local officials or representatives; local officials, if  
19 they were here, if they're here; and then take any  
20 questions from local members of the public, and then move  
21 to other folks.

22 So, are there any local officials or representatives  
23 here that have a question or comment?

24 Okay. How about local members of the public? You  
25 guys going to be easy on me tonight?

1 Amy shook her head no.

2 Okay, anybody else?

3 MS. RYDER: Amy Ryder. My name is

4 Amy Ryder, and I represent Ohio Citizen Action.

5 I have a few questions today. My first question is

6 in reference to the Management Observation Program that was

7 discussed this afternoon. It seems that when it comes to

8 Safety Culture at Davis-Besse, a lot of the problems keep

9 bringing back to the decisions that are being made by

10 management, not necessarily the work force. And so, I

11 wanted to get your thoughts on what you would think about a

12 program, an observation program that would actually observe

13 management decisions as opposed to decisions or behavior of

14 the work force.

15 MR. GROBE: That's an

16 excellent question. I know one component of Doctor Haber's

17 work was observations of all sorts of different activities,

18 including meetings where managers were making decisions.

19 But that's really not a question for me. Where did Lew go?

20 I think that was a question for you, Lew. Let me

21 repeat the question, just in case you didn't hear it.

22 Amy's question was, whether or not the Management

23 Observation Program should not just be limited to observing

24 workers by supervisors, managers, directors and whatnot,

25 but maybe there should be some components of the Management

1 Observation Program, observing the managers doing their  
2 work in decision-making.

3 MR. MYERS: We actually do that.  
4 If you want to look at our Corrective Action Program. You  
5 know, we make decisions, if we find out like design mod  
6 made a poor decision on approach, we write a CR and capture  
7 those things in training and look for, like we just talked  
8 about awhile ago, at risk mods. Maybe right now we're not  
9 getting enough operation involved and stuff like that, so  
10 we really do that, Jack.

11 MR. SCHRAUDER: The  
12 observations that we talked about of infrequently performed  
13 tests and evolutions, prejob briefings, those are  
14 management decision-making activities. And we do observe  
15 those, enter those into the data base. We also do  
16 observations of things like the Senior Management Team  
17 Meetings where decisions are made. So, all of those  
18 activities are in fact incorporated into the program.

19 MS. RYDER: My question is  
20 actually specifically geared at one particular decision,  
21 which was the decision to fire Andrew Zamiska. Did  
22 somebody observe that decision and what was the key facts  
23 in that?

24 MR. GROBE: I don't think  
25 it's appropriate to discuss personnel actions in public.

1 That's not appropriate.

2 MS. RYDER: Well, it's safety  
3 culture. This was an individual who was raising safety  
4 concerns. He's claiming that he was fired for safety  
5 concerns. It absolutely has to do with safety culture.

6 MR. GROBE: I understand.

7 MR. MYERS: I would suggest  
8 you let that play out in court.

9 MR. GROBE: Yes, and that's  
10 actually, Andrew has pursued his avenues for adjudicating  
11 that issue and that's through the Department of Labor.

12 MS. RYDER: I understand.

13 MR. GROBE: And that's the way  
14 it will proceed.

15 MS. RYDER: It, all right,  
16 it's still related to safety culture.

17 MR. GROBE: Absolutely, I  
18 understand what you're saying.

19 MS. RYDER: My second question  
20 is not actually a question, more of a statement. This is  
21 in regards to whether or not, what was going to happen with  
22 the draft report, the bearer report that she's doing, and  
23 when she drafts her report I understand it's going to be  
24 given to FirstEnergy and to the NRC; is that correct?

25 MR. GROBE: Um-hmm. There is

1 a meeting next Thursday, when Doctor Haber will present her  
2 preliminary results to FirstEnergy, and we'll be observing  
3 that meeting.

4 MS. RYDER: Okay, one of the  
5 issues that you raised was this issue of credibility on  
6 behalf of both FirstEnergy and the NRC. And, I think it is  
7 important that members of the public actually are able to  
8 compare what the draft report said, in addition to what the  
9 final report said.

10 Last, let's see, in January, there was a report  
11 issued, it was commissioned by the State of New York, James  
12 Lee Witt, former Director of FEMA, was asked to look at the  
13 evacuation plan for Indian Point and Millstone. He  
14 actually posted his draft report on the Internet and  
15 allowed people to respond to that. And once the final  
16 draft is issued, you know, people will be able to compare.

17 So, I would like to make the suggestion that when  
18 that report is issued, that it's posted on line, either on  
19 FirstEnergy's Website or on the NRC's.

20 My final question, this was an issue that was  
21 discussed a little bit today and also last month. This is  
22 this issue about these, the thousands of tasks, whatever  
23 the number is, that has to be completed before restart, if  
24 that should ever happen, as well as the number of tasks  
25 that are being deferred until after restart.

1 I want to know whether or not the NRC has evaluated  
2 the criteria used by FirstEnergy to decide what gets done  
3 before restart and what gets done after restart?

4 MR. GROBE: Yes. That's  
5 actually contained in Clark Price's, the Owner for that  
6 program, is contained in a Building Block called the  
7 Restart Action Plan Building Block; and it includes  
8 criteria that are fairly obvious that a piece of equipment  
9 is not working properly, so it's then required by technical  
10 specifications, so that clearly would be a restart issue,  
11 specific issues to address over 50 checks list items.

12 And then there is more judgmental areas where an  
13 issue might affect reliability on equipment, but not  
14 directly affect safety. So, there is a variety of criteria  
15 in that test plan. And that's something that we review  
16 from a program perspective, we look at the criteria to make  
17 sure we're comfortable. On a regular basis, the resident  
18 specialist staff in particular, sample those types of  
19 issues to make sure that, two things; that the initial  
20 classifications are correct, and if an item is  
21 reclassified, that it is done correctly.

22 MS. RYDER: Okay, is there a  
23 specific inspection report that documents the scope and  
24 results of those?

25 MR. GROBE: I don't know. If

1 you could give Jan Strasma a call and maybe he can help  
2 you.

3 MS. RYDER: Okay. Thank you.

4 MR. GROBE: Thank you.

5 I wanted to make a, a comment regarding your earlier  
6 observation, Amy. I feel also strongly that it's important  
7 that the draft report be available. That's the way our  
8 internal assessments work in the NRC. But when my kids  
9 were in grade school and high school, I also let them open  
10 their report card, even though it was addressed to me. I  
11 let them open it first, and tell me about it. And now  
12 they're in college, I have to ask them if I can see their  
13 grades.

14 I think it's appropriate for FirstEnergy to have an  
15 opportunity to hear the results and then make any  
16 clarifications before the final report is issued, but I  
17 likewise think it's important, if there is any change  
18 between the draft report and the final report, that it be  
19 understood. So, I appreciate those comments.

20 Yes, sir.

21 MR. WITT: Jere Witt. County  
22 Administrator for Ottawa County and a member of the Restart  
23 Overview Panel. I would like to make one point for the  
24 benefit of the public; and that is in the question of  
25 management observation, I believe there are three areas



1 that I've observed, that management is out getting their  
2 observations done, and one of those would be the new  
3 structure with FENOC that provides a much better  
4 organization structure to oversee the decision made by  
5 management.

6 The second one is, that the Restart Overview Panel  
7 certainly reviews and comments and makes recommendations  
8 under decisions of that Restart Overview Panel. And I  
9 believe that the company Nuclear Review Board serves in  
10 that function in many regards.

11 So, I believe there is really three areas that the  
12 management team is being observed in. Thank you.

13 MR. GROBE: Thanks Jere.

14 And, in fact, there are others also; some aspects of  
15 quality assurance of the management decision-making and an  
16 independent assessment, as well as being a student of our  
17 operations, there is regular assessments at every nuclear  
18 plant in the United States.

19 Criteria they use are industry best practices, are  
20 not NRC requirements; and they look for any areas in  
21 management and organizational effectiveness that provide  
22 independent assessment also. But it was a very interesting  
23 question, within the context of the Management Observation  
24 Program. Thank you.

25 Any other questions or comments?

1       Okay, very good.

2       We have another meeting this evening at 7:00. If

3 you all haven't had enough, want to come back, that would

4 be great.

5       Thank you very much.

6 (Off the record.)

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1 CERTIFICATE

2 I, Marie B. Fresch, Registered Merit Reporter and  
3 Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio, duly  
4 commissioned and qualified therein, do hereby certify that  
5 the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the  
6 proceedings as taken by me and that I was present during  
7 all of said proceedings.

8 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and  
9 affixed my seal of office at Norwalk, Ohio, on this 21st  
10 day of March, 2003.

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Marie B. Fresch, RMR

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NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF OHIO  
My Commission Expires 10-9-03.

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