United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

2014 Reactor Actions

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FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1) EA-14-094

On June 30, 2014, a Confirmatory Order was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC's commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805.  FENOC had originally planned to submit its application on July 1, 2014.  The NRC reviewed FENOC's justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2015.

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2) EA-14-008

On June 23, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, and a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, involving the March 31, 2013, Unit 1 stator drop that affected safety-related equipment on both units.  Specifically, Entergy approved a design for the temporary hoisting assembly that was not supported by detailed drawings, specifications, evaluations, and/or certifications as required by Entergy Quality Procedure EN-MA-119, "Material Handling Program."  As a result, on March 31, 2013, while lifting and transferring the main generator stator, the temporary overhead crane collapsed causing the 525-ton Unit 1 stator to fall on and extensively damage portions of the plant, including safety-related equipment.

Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant) EA-14-005

On April 30, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as a result of the failure to maintain plant staffing levels in accordance with the radiological emergency plan at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.  This White finding, an issue with low to moderate significance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections, involved the failure of the licensee's process for maintaining minimum emergency response shift staffing to adequately maintain staffing of the Shift Technical Advisor and Incident Commander to ensure initial accident response in all key functional areas.

Additionally, NRC identified two examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50.9 based on the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information associated with emergency response on-shift staffing requirements and a violation of 10 CFR 50.90 for the failure to submit an application requesting an amendment to their operating license concerning on-shift staffing levels.  On May 1, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to TVA to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session.  The commitments were made by TVA as part of a settlement agreement between TVA and the NRC regarding the violation(s) of 50.9 and 50.90.  TVA agreed to a number of corrective actions, including correcting the Conduct of Operations procedure to reflect adequate staffing levels and comprehensive fleet-wide and plant-specific corrective actions.

Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC (R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant) EA-13-247

On April 17, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving CENG’s failure to assure prompt identification and correction of conditions adverse to quality.  Specifically, CENG failed to promptly correct two improperly sealed cable penetrations at Ginna between manhole 1 and battery room 'B'.  As a result, certain flooding scenarios could have resulted in flooding the battery rooms and the eventual loss of all alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) power with no capability for using installed plant equipment for decay heat removal.

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3) EA 13-233

On March 28, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Operations, Inc. for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, “Test Control,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Waterford personnel to establish an adequate test program to demonstrate that a safety-related component associated with the train B emergency diesel generator would perform satisfactorily in service.  Specifically, prior to May 26, 2013, Waterford personnel failed to identify and perform adequate testing on the train B emergency diesel generator exhaust fan to demonstrate that the exhaust fan would perform satisfactorily in service.  As a result, the train B emergency diesel generator was determined to be inoperable for a period of 25 days.

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (Jenkinsville, South Carolina) EA 12-140

On March 10, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on October 8, 2013. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between SCE&G and the NRC regarding the apparent violations of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants” and 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and accuracy of information.”  The first violation involved the willful actions of the licensee’s access authorization staff, which caused the licensee’s access authorization program to fail to provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, such that they do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety, as required by 10 CFR 73.56(c).  Specifically, the licensee’s access authorization reviewing officials reviewed, adjudicated, and granted an individual unescorted access authorization by relying unreasonably on a falsified PHQ and fabricated court record to determine their trustworthiness and reliability. The second violation involved the willful failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9(a) which, in part, state that “information required by statute or Commission regulations to be maintained shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.”  In part, 10 CFR 73.56(o)(2)(i) requires the licensee to retain records of information that must be collected under subparts (d) and (e) of 10 CFR 73.56 that result in the granting of unescorted access for at least 5 years after the licensee terminates, or denies, an individual’s unescorted access or unescorted access authorization.  As part of the ADR settlement agreement SCE&G agreed that the issues described above resulted in an individual inappropriately being granted unescorted access to Summer Nuclear Station (SNS), which was inconsistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56(c) and 10 CFR 50.9.  SCE&G did not agree that the two violations were committed willfully.  However, the NRC determined these violations to be willful.  In response to the incident, SCE&G completed a number corrective actions and enhancements, and agreed to complete additional corrective actions and enhancements, as fully discussed in the CO.  The NRC concluded that the corrective actions and enhancements discussed by SCE&G were prompt and comprehensive and addressed the causes.  In consideration of the commitments delineated in the CO, the NRC agreed to fully mitigate a civil penalty and issue a Notice of Violation.

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (Duane Arnold Energy Center) EA 13-223

On On February 11, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation of Technical Specification 3.5.3, “Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System”, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Duane Arnold personnel to perform an immediate operability determination in accordance with NextEra’s procedures.  Specifically, on June 21, 2013, Duane Arnold personnel failed to consider the degraded speed indication’s impact on RCIC operability.  As a result, the RCIC system was inoperable from June 21, 2013, to August 24, 2013.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, July 23, 2014