2013 Reactor Actions
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Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.(Kewaunee Power Station) EA-12-272
On April 4, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Dominion Energy, Kewaunee, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54, “Conditions of Licenses,” and risk significant planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and (b)(8) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding, which involved the loss of the Auxiliary and Reactor Building system particulate iodine and noble gas (SPING) indication. Specifically, from February 28, 2011, to March 30, 2011, SPING indication on the plant process computer system (PPCS) and local server station was inoperable, which rendered emergency action levels ineffective. Kewaunee neither identified nor took timely corrective action to repair failed equipment necessary to support the emergency preparedness program.
Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant) EA-12-273
On March 26, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Northern States Power Company, Minnesota for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54, “Conditions of Licenses,” and risk significant planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and (b)(8) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. The finding involved the failure to recognize that the 1R-50 shield building high range vent gas radiation detector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (Prairie Island) was a single piece of equipment necessary for emergency preparedness action levels and failure to recognize its importance to the emergency preparedness program. Specifically, from July 24, 2011, to May 18, 2012, the 1R-50 high range detector was inoperable, which degraded Prairie Island’s ability on Unit 1 to classify and declare general emergencies or site area emergencies. Prairie Island did not take timely corrective actions to restore the monitor, which is a piece of equipment necessary to support the emergency preparedness program.
Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1) EA 13-031
On March 20, 2013, a Confirmatory Order was issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), confirming Entergy’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. Entergy had originally planned to submit its application on August 31, 2012. The NRC reviewed Entergy’s justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of January 31, 2014.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) EA-12-240
On March 4, 2013, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for a Severity Level III problem for the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.48, “Fire Protection,” and (2) 10 CFR 50.9(a), “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” Between September and December 2011, four contract employees willfully failed to complete fire watch rounds required to ensure that Farley remained in compliance with 10 CFR 50.48. In addition, these same employees falsified fire watch logs by annotating that hourly fire watches were completed when in fact they had not been performed. These actions caused Farley to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50.9(a).
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2) EA-12-254
On February 20, 2013, a Confirmatory Order was issued to the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition its two units to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. FENOC had originally planned to submit its application on September 30, 2012. The NRC reviewed FENOC’s justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2013.
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1) EA-12-220
On January 2, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Point Beach personnel to prescribe maintenance on the safety-related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump, an activity affecting quality, by documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, Work Order 40101094 used to perform maintenance on the TDAFW pump specified a first time evolution of unbolting the steam exhaust piping to the turbine, aligning the turbine to the pump, and then re-bolting the steam piping to the turbine. The documented instructions were not appropriate to the circumstances in that they did not ensure the final turbine-to-pump alignment was performed after the bolting of the steam exhaust piping to the turbine flange. This led to the failure of the turbine-to-pump coupling on May 21, 2012.
