United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

2013 Reactor Actions

This page includes links to files in non-HTML format. See Plugins, Viewers, and Other Tools for more information.

Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station) EA 13-083

On December 23, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding identified during an inspection of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3. This White finding, an issue of low to moderate safety significance, involves the failure of San Onofre personnel to verify the adequacy of the thermal-hydraulic and flow-induced vibration design of the Unit 3 replacement steam generators, which resulted in significant and unexpected steam generator tube wear and the loss of tube integrity on Unit 3 Steam Generator 3EO-88 after 11 months of operation.

NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (Duane Arnold Energy Center) EA-13-182

On December 18, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Duane Arnold personnel to prescribe a work instruction of a type appropriate to the circumstances for the re-assembly of the ‘A’ standby diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger. Specifically, on October 18, 2012, the licensee completed work order 40132858, which replaced the ‘A’ standby diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger tube bundle. The work order did not contain a specific and detailed sequence for re-assembly of the heat exchanger and connected piping system to achieve uniform and appropriate compression of the tube bundle-to-shell gasket. This contributed to the catastrophic failure of the tube bundle-to-shell gasket during a maintenance run of the engine on March 8, 2013, rendering the ‘A’ standby diesel generator unavailable.

Aerotest Operations, Inc. (Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor Facility) EA 13-108

On December 18, 2013, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of Violation to Aerotest Operations, Inc. involving the failure to implement Technical Specification 10.2. Specifically, for an indeterminate period of time beginning at a point after the last full fuel inspection in 2006 until October 15, 2010, when the facility ceased reactor operation, the licensee operated the reactor with significant defects in the fuel elements. During fuel inspections conducted following reactor shutdown, twenty two fuel elements were identified as having varying degrees of cracking in the aluminum cladding, representing a significant defect in the fuel elements and loss of the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3) EA 13-068

On October 28, 2013, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to Exelon Generating Company, LLC. (Exelon) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on September 18, 2013. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between Exelon and the NRC regarding the apparent violation of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants.” The agreement resolves the apparent violation which involved the failure of several Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden) individuals to immediately inform a reviewing official of the questionable behavior of a now former Dresden senior reactor operator (SRO). This individual, along with another former Dresden SRO, planned and attempted to recruit another former employee to commit a violent off-site crime. As part of the ADR settlement agreement, Exelon has completed or intends to complete a number of corrective actions. These actions include fleet wide procedure revisions and training, fleet wide briefings, a presentation at an appropriate industry forum and submittal of an operating experience summary to an industry wide organization. In consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation and to preclude consideration of this CO as enforcement history for the Dresden Station.

Carolina Power and Light (H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2) EA-13-129

On September 19, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Carolina Power and Light for a violation of 10 CFR 50.63(c)(2), Loss of all Alternating Current Power, Implementation – Alternating AC Source, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Robinson to have an alternate AC power source with acceptable capability to withstand station blackout for the required durations specified in its coping analysis.  Specifically, during surveillance testing of the Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator (DSDG) on October 2, 2012, the DSDG automatically shut down on high engine temperature due to a failure of the radiator drive belts. Based on the failure of the DSDG and necessary repair time, this degraded condition would have prohibited the DSDG from supplying power to shutdown equipment within one hour following a station blackout and could have rendered the plant unable to cope for eight hours after a postulated station blackout or to provide emergency power for certain selected Fire Safe Shutdown scenarios.

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (Berwick, PA) EA-12-216

On August 28, 2013, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to Pennsylvania Power and Light (PPL) Susquehanna, LLC for a Severity Level III problem for several issues with PPL's process for conducting biennial medical exams for licensed reactor operators (ROs) and reporting changes in RO medical conditions. Between August 2007 and June 2012, eight RO's performed licensed duties when they had permanent disabilities or illnesses that caused them to not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.33, “Disposition of an initial application.” PPL also provided information to the NRC that was not complete and accurate when they submitted an initial RO application and three NRC licensed operator renewal applications. This was a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and accuracy of information.”

Northern States Power Company, Minnesota (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant) EA-13-096

On August 28, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Northern States Power Company, Minnesota for a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Monticello personnel to maintain a flood plan to protect the site against external flooding events.  Specifically, from February 29, 2012, to February 15, 2013, the site failed to maintain flood Procedure A.6, “Acts of Nature,” such that it could support the timely implementation of flood protection features within the 12-day timeframe credited in the design basis, as stated in the updated safety analysis report.

Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2) EA-13-118

On August 23, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Tennessee Valley Authority for a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Browns Ferry personnel to properly implement a procedure recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978.  Specifically, on December 22, 2012, the licensee failed to properly implement the procedure for Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of the Reactor Protection System, 2-OI-99, Reactor Protection System, step 5.1[3], when an operator incorrectly opened the RPS motor generator set tie to battery board 2 Breaker on the A RPS bus motor generator set while attempting to start the B RPS bus motor generator set. The failure to properly implement 2-OI-99 caused a Unit 2 reactor SCRAM and MSIV closure.

NextEra Energy, Point Beach, LLC (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) EA-13-125

On August 9, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy, Point Beach, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Point Beach personnel to have a procedure appropriate to the circumstances to address flooding as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).  Specifically, from January 19, 1996, to March 13, 2013, procedure PC 80 Part 7, “Lake Water Determination,” as implemented, would not protect safety-related equipment in the turbine building or pump house because the procedure: (1) did not appropriately prescribe the installation of barriers such that gaps between the barriers were eliminated to prevent water intrusion, (2) did not protect equipment by requiring barriers to be placed in front of the doors, from 1996 to 2008, as described in the FSAR, and (3) did not require the barriers to protect the plant to an elevation of at least 9 feet as described in the FSAR.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3) EA-13-079

On July 31, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Dresden personnel to establish a written procedure to address the effect of an external flooding scenario on the plant.  Specifically, prior to November 21, 2012, procedure DOA 0010-04, Floods, did not account for reactor vessel inventory make-up during an external flooding scenario up to and including the probable maximum flood event which could result in reactor vessel water level lowering below the top of active fuel.

Aerotest Operations, Inc. (Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor) EA-13-097

On July 19, 2013, the NRC issued a letter to Aerotest Operations, Inc. denying an application for license renewal of the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor license because Aerotest is owned by a foreign corporation.  The staff also denied an application for transfer of the license.  As a result, on July 24, 2013, NRC issued an order prohibiting Aerotest from operating the reactor and placing the facility and its licensed material in a possession-only condition.  The order also requires submission of an updated decommissioning plan and updated decommission funding.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) EA-11-260

On July 17, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) for a Severity Level III problem involving two violations of NRC requirements associated with licensed reactor operator medical examinations and reporting at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The first violation involved Entergy's failure to ensure licensed operators at PNPS meet medical prerequisites for performing NRC-licensed operator activities and Entergy's failure to obtain prior NRC approval, as required by 10 CFR 55.3, 10 CFR 55.31 and 10 CFR 55.23. Specifically, on various dates, licensed reactor operators performed duties without meeting medical prerequisites (blood pressure limits and stamina tests) and without prior NRC approval. The second violation involved Entergy's failure to provide the NRC with information that is complete and accurate in all material respects, as required by 10 CFR 50.9. Specifically, Entergy submitted NRC Form-396s for renewal of two reactor operator licenses that certified that the operators met the medical requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.4-1983, when, in fact, the facility licensee had not verified, via conducting a stamina test, that the operators had met the requirements.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Oconee Nuclear Station) EA-13-010

On July 1, 2013, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) and a Notice of Violation (NOV) for a Severity Level III violation to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke). These actions are based on Duke's failure to comply with a license condition associated with the amendment to complete their transition to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 for its Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. Duke received the NOV for not incorporating the protected service water (PSW) modification into its fire protection program site documents and confirming the risk reduction from the modification prior to January 1, 2013, as called for in its transition license condition. A CO was issued to provide a heightened regulatory accountability for the completion of the PSW system, and interim milestones associated with this modification.

Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2) EA-13-019

On June 18, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and proposed civil penalty in the amount of $70,000 to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a Severity Level III problem involving three violations of NRC requirements relating to the commercial grade dedication (CGD) program at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (WB2). Specifically TVA failed to: (1) verify the proper critical characteristics for certain safety-related items procured for the WB2 project starting with the resumption of construction activities in 2008 as a result of a breakdown in its 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B quality assurance (QA) program; (2) report the breakdown in its QA program to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4) and (e)(5); and (3) follow plant procedures and identify a significant condition adverse to quality and, thus, reevaluate corrective action categorization when the QA program breakdown was found to be more significant than originally reported.

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One) EA-12-275

On June 10, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) for a Severity Level III violation of NRC Regulations.  Between December 14, 2010 and January 11, 2012, the licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commission's regulations as complete and accurate in all material respects.  Specifically, a senior emergency planner formerly employed by Arkansas Nuclear One, deliberately falsified documents regarding the performance of Emergency Preparedness drills and communication surveillances.  The senior emergency planner documented that the drills and surveillances were completed when they had not actually been performed. These actions caused Arkansas Nuclear One to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a), which requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by the licensee, or information required by the Commission's regulations to be maintained by a licensee, shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.

Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1) EA-13-018

On June 4, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding, a White SDP finding, and a Severity Level III violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).   The Yellow finding, a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, Procedures, was issued for the failure of Watts Bar personnel to maintain an adequate procedure to implement its flood mitigation strategy within 27 hours as described in Watts Bar's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) from initial licensing to July 2012.  The White finding, a violation of TS 5.7.1, Procedures, was issued for the failure of Watts Bar personnel to establish and maintain an adequate procedure to implement its flood mitigation strategy prior to September 30, 2009, such that earthen dams located upstream of the facility could potentially overtop, causing a subsequent breach and resulting in onsite flooding and the submergence of critical equipment.  The Severity Level III violation involved the failure of Watts Bar personnel to implement 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) on December 30, 2009, when Watts Bar personnel failed to notify the NRC within eight hours upon confirmation that a postulated Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) level would exceed the current licensing basis and the design basis PMF flooding event would result in overtopping of critical earthen dam structures upstream of the Watts Bar facility.

Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) EA-13-045

On June 4, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Tennessee Valley Authority for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Sequoyah personnel to translate the design basis related to onsite flooding into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.  Specifically, prior to December 15, 2012, Sequoyah's design documentation for the essential raw cooling water (ERCW) pumping station did not contain information to identify design basis flood barriers to prevent water from flooding the building during a design basis flood.  As a result, the ERCW pump station would not remain functional when subjected to the maximum flood level, the ERCW intake station would not remain dry during flood mode, and portions of the ERCW walls and penetrations would not withstand all static and dynamic forces imposed by the design basis flood.

Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) EA-13-023

On June 4, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) associated with a White Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding and a Severity Level III violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).   The White finding, a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, involved the failure of Sequoyah personnel to establish an adequate Abnormal Condition Procedure to implement its flood mitigation strategy.  Specifically, prior to September 30, 2009, AOP-N.03, “External Flooding,” was inadequate to mitigate the effects of a Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) event, in that earthen dams located upstream of the facility could potentially overtop, causing a subsequent breach and resulting in onsite flooding and the submergence of critical equipment.  The Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) involved the failure of Sequoyah personnel to report within eight hours an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.  Specifically, on December 30, 2009, Sequoyah personnel failed to notify the NRC upon confirmation that a postulated Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) level would exceed the current licensing basis and the design basis PMF flooding event would result in overtopping of critical earthen dam structures upstream of the Sequoyah facility.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Farley Nuclear Plant) EA-12-145

On May 6, 2013, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on March 15, 2013.  The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between SNC and the NRC regarding apparent violations of NRC requirements. The agreement resolves the apparent deliberate violations involving falsification of radiation worker training exams by security officers at Farley Nuclear Plant.  The proctors and security officers self-proctoring the radiation worker exams were not ensuring that the exams were not compromised either by someone providing answers, hinting to the answers, or using material such as study guides during the exams.  As such, the security officers did not complete their radiation worker training requalification exams in accordance with SNC procedures in order to maintain unescorted access to Protected/Vital Areas or Radiation Controlled Areas; yet they continued to have unescorted access to those areas.  SNC agreed to a number of corrective actions, issuing fleet-wide messages that will clearly articulate that willful misconduct is incompatible with safe nuclear construction and operation, conducting fleet-wide stand-downs with all employees and contractors to address trustworthiness and integrity, and modifying guidance involving investigations based on allegations to include an initial evaluation of potential nuclear safety implications and to identify any appropriate immediate mitigating measures to be taken while the investigation is ongoing.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Three Mile Island Unit 1) EA-13-046

On April 30, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Three Mile Island) for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving Three Mile Island’s failure to identify, during external flood barrier walk downs, that electrical cable conduit couplings in the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Air Intake Tunnel (AIT) were not sealed, as designed, to maintain the integrity of the external flood barrier system.  Specifically, Exelon staff, during visual inspections of the couplings and conduits in the AIT, did not identify that flood seals and material had not been installed, as designed.

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.(Kewaunee Power Station) EA-12-266

On April 30, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (licensee) for a Severity Level III problem with a proposed civil penalty of $70,000, and a White Significance Determination Process finding for an associated performance deficiency.  The violations were based on the licensee’s failure to follow License Condition 2.C.(3), “Fire Protection” and 10 CFR 50.9(a), “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.”   Specifically, from at least August 19, 2009 to December 20, 2011, a Kewaunee fire brigade trainer willfully failed to conduct announced fire drills in accordance with the Kewaunee license condition and implementing procedure and falsified fire drill evaluation/critique forms.

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.(Kewaunee Power Station) EA-12-272

On April 4, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Dominion Energy, Kewaunee, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54, “Conditions of Licenses,” and risk significant planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and (b)(8) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding, which involved the loss of the Auxiliary and Reactor Building system particulate iodine and noble gas (SPING) indication. Specifically, from February 28, 2011, to March 30, 2011, SPING indication on the plant process computer system (PPCS) and local server station was inoperable, which rendered emergency action levels ineffective. Kewaunee neither identified nor took timely corrective action to repair failed equipment necessary to support the emergency preparedness program.

Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant) EA-12-273

On March 26, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Northern States Power Company, Minnesota for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54, “Conditions of Licenses,” and risk significant planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and (b)(8) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. The finding involved the failure to recognize that the 1R-50 shield building high range vent gas radiation detector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (Prairie Island) was a single piece of equipment necessary for emergency preparedness action levels and failure to recognize its importance to the emergency preparedness program. Specifically, from July 24, 2011, to May 18, 2012, the 1R-50 high range detector was inoperable, which degraded Prairie Island’s ability on Unit 1 to classify and declare general emergencies or site area emergencies. Prairie Island did not take timely corrective actions to restore the monitor, which is a piece of equipment necessary to support the emergency preparedness program.

Entergy Operations, Inc. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1) EA 13-031

On March 20, 2013, a Confirmatory Order was issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), confirming Entergy’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. Entergy had originally planned to submit its application on August 31, 2012. The NRC reviewed Entergy’s justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of January 31, 2014.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) EA-12-240

On March 4, 2013, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for a Severity Level III problem for the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.48, “Fire Protection,” and (2) 10 CFR 50.9(a), “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” Between September and December 2011, four contract employees willfully failed to complete fire watch rounds required to ensure that Farley remained in compliance with 10 CFR 50.48. In addition, these same employees falsified fire watch logs by annotating that hourly fire watches were completed when in fact they had not been performed. These actions caused Farley to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50.9(a).

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2) EA-12-254

On February 20, 2013, a Confirmatory Order was issued to the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition its two units to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. FENOC had originally planned to submit its application on September 30, 2012. The NRC reviewed FENOC’s justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2013.

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1) EA-12-220

On January 2, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Point Beach personnel to prescribe maintenance on the safety-related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump, an activity affecting quality, by documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, Work Order 40101094 used to perform maintenance on the TDAFW pump specified a first time evolution of unbolting the steam exhaust piping to the turbine, aligning the turbine to the pump, and then re-bolting the steam piping to the turbine. The documented instructions were not appropriate to the circumstances in that they did not ensure the final turbine-to-pump alignment was performed after the bolting of the steam exhaust piping to the turbine flange. This led to the failure of the turbine-to-pump coupling on May 21, 2012.

To top of page

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 26, 2014