2014 Individual Actions
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On September 15, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Joseph S. Shepherd, owner of Foss Therapy Services, for a Severity Level IV violation. The violation involved a failure to adhere to a condition set forth in NRC Order IA-13-038. Specifically, on March 14, 2014, Mr. Shepherd conducted licensed activities in NRC jurisdiction at Pontifical Catholic University, Puerto Rico, without notifying them that the NRC had issued Order IA 13-038 and Order IA-08-014 to him, which is a condition of these Orders.
On July 24, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Trey Brattin for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(1) involving deliberate misconduct that caused his employer, Techchorr USA, LLC, to be in violation of the 10 CFR 34.47(a) requirement for dosimetry to be worn by an individual while performing radiographic operations. Specifically, at various times between July 2010 and January 2011, Mr. Brattin deliberately failed to wear, on the trunk of his body, a direct reading dosimeter, an operating alarm ratemeter, and a personnel dosimeter while conducting radiographic operations in Wyoming.
On July 17, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level II NOV and an Order prohibiting Mr. George Geisser, III, President of Geisser Engineering Corporation (GEC), from involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 3 years. Mr. Geisser engaged in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(1) by deliberately conducting and directing employees of GEC to use portable gauges in NRC jurisdiction without filing for reciprocity with the NRC causing GEC to violate the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 150.20. In addition, for a period of 1 year after the 3 year prohibition has expired, the Order requires Mr. Geisser, III, to notify the NRC within 20 days following acceptance of his first employment offer involving NRC licensed activities.
On July 11, 2014, the NRC issued a prohibition order (ML14190A256) to Mr. James Chaisson for failure to comply with a Confirmatory Order issued September 10, 2012 (ML12256B002), which memorialized the agreements and conditions established with him during an NRC Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session. In 2012, the NRC concluded that Mr. Chaisson engaged in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 30.10(a)(1) and issued him an Order on May 15, 2012 (ML12137A311) that prohibited him from working in NRC jurisdiction for 3 years. The May 15, 2012 Order, in turn, became the basis of the ADR mediation and was superseded by the September 10, 2012 Confirmatory Order. As of March 10, 2014, Mr. Chaisson had failed to complete both the formal training and a written article required by the 2012 Confirmatory Order. The July 11, 2014 Order superseded the 2012 Confirmatory Order and prohibited Mr. Chaisson from engaging in NRC-licensed activities for a minimum period of 3 years. The prohibition would continue thereafter and until he provides reasonable assurance to the NRC that he can safely use radioactive materials in accordance with NRC requirements, including his completion of formal training and verbally attesting his corrective actions to prevent deliberate misconduct. Additionally, under the Order, for a period of two years subsequent to the NRC written determination of reasonable assurance, Mr. Chaisson must notify the NRC of his involvement in NRC-licensed activities, refrain from working for any NRC licensee in specified supervisory roles, and provide a copy of his order to his employers (a state licensee performing work in NRC jurisdiction or an NRC licensee). On August 4 2014, Mr. Chaisson formally requested a hearing on the July 11, 2014 Order. The staff and Mr. Chaisson entered settlement negotiations and signed a settlement agreement on June 30, 2015. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board approved the settlement agreement and terminated the proceeding on July 2, 2015.
On May 14, 2014, the NRC issued Armando N. Clavero, Co-owner and President of University Nuclear and Diagnostics (UND), LLC, an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of three years. Specifically, Mr. Clavero deliberately did not perform a survey meter calibration, provided a falsified record of the survey meter calibration, and provided inaccurate information about performing the survey meter calibration both during the NRC investigation and during the predecisional enforcement conference. He also deliberately did not perform a sealed source survey in October or November 2011 and provided falsified records of a sealed source survey on a date when there was no survey meter. Mr. Clavero also did not ensure that the doctor's office had a working survey meter during the nearly 8 week period when a UND nuclear medicine technologist had sent the doctor's survey meter to UND for calibration and did not ensure that records provided to the doctor's office were complete and accurate in all material respects.
On May 14, 2014, the NRC issued Richard B. Smith, a former senior reactor operator at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (Grand Gulf), an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years. Specifically, on July 18, 2013, Mr. Smith tested positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty (FFD) test, a violation of 10 CFR Part 55.53(d) and (j). Grand Gulf planned to reinstate Mr. Smith and allow him to perform licensed duties contingent on his successful completion of a substance abuse treatment program and the passing of additional medical evaluations. However, after receiving unescorted access by the licensee and prior to allowing him to perform licensed activities, Mr. Smith tested positive on a second FFD test resulting in a second violation of 10 CFR 55.53(d) and (j). On December 11, 2013, the NRC terminated Mr. Smith's license.
On March 10, 2014, the NRC issued Mr. Michael P. Cooley an Order prohibiting involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 5 years. While employed at Summer Nuclear Station, Mr. Cooley submitted a signed Personal History Questionnaire (PHQ) to the licensee access authorization staff as part of his application for Unescorted Access Authorization. Mr. Cooley deliberately failed to report an arrest for arson in the PHQ criminal history information section which was necessary for the access authorization staff to consider in making determinations regarding his trustworthiness and reliability. In addition, he deliberately submitted information to the licensee that he knew to be incomplete or inaccurate, in violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). Specifically, in response to a request by access authorization staff for documentation to support his assertion that arson charges against him had been dismissed, he submitted a forged document that purported to reflect the dismissal of those charges by a Mississippi county court. At the time he submitted this document, the arson charges against him were pending.
On January 13, 2014, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of Violation to Mr. John Amburgey, formerly employed as a security officer at the Surry Power Station (SPS), for deliberate misconduct that caused SPS to be in violation of 10 CFR 73.55(i)(5)(ii), which states, in part, that licensees provide continuous surveillance, observation, and monitoring of the owner controlled area as described in their physical security plan. Specifically, co-workers detected the odor of alcohol on his breath and immediately reported this observation to site security supervision. In response, he was promptly for-cause tested for alcohol, and test results confirmed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level of 0.139 percent. Because his BAC exceeded the 10 CFR 26.103 limit of 0.04 percent, SPS declared the test result for alcohol as a confirmed positive test and relieved him of duty. Based on the confirmed positive test, and the fact that he had been on duty approximately 5 hours into his shift as an armed security officer, SPS declared him unfit for duty and unable to effectively perform his assigned security duties.