2008 Individual Actions
On September 8, 2008, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Mr. Joseph S. Shepherd, a contractor for Source Production and Equipment Company (SPEC), confirming commitments reached as part of conjoined negotiations with the Department of Justice (DOJ). As a result of the plea negotiations with DOJ, Mr. Shepherd agreed to not contest the Order. The Order was issued based on Mr. Shepherd’s failure to comply with certain NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) requirements regarding a shipping package and his engagement in deliberate misconduct which caused SPEC to be in violation of 10 CFR 71.3. Specifically, SPEC, an NRC licensee pursuant to 10 CFR Part 110, shipped licensed radioactive material to Mexico on July 15, 2003, December 4, 2003, and May 20, 2004 while (1) the end caps were physically and dimensionally different from those approved in the CoC, and (2) the package was not inspected prior to shipment as required by the CoC. Mr. Shepherd agreed that he authorized modifications to the transportation package without prior NRC approval and that he concealed these package non-conformances from SPEC at the time of the shipments. Mr. Shepherd also agreed that he did not perform inspections of the shipping package as required by the CoC prior to the shipments to Mexico, but provided SPEC documentation which indicated that he performed the required inspections. As a result, SPEC, which relied on Mr. Shepherd’s representations that the shipping package complied with all regulatory requirements, shipped NRC licensed material without a license in violation of 10 CFR 71.3. The Order and DOJ agreement will prohibit Mr. Shepherd from participating in 10 CFR Part 71 licensed activities indefinitely. He also will (1) be subject to additional unannounced inspections for five years from the date of the Order, (2) notify and make available copies of the Order to customers, (3) attend additional regulatory safety training, and (4) prepare a presentation for an industry conference describing the circumstances of his violations.
On July 3, 2008, a Confirmatory Order was issued as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), to adjudicate a violation of 10 CFR 50.5, submission of materially inaccurate information, which caused the licensee to be in violation. The agreement resolves an apparent violation of the NRC’s deliberate misconduct rule, 10 CFR 50.5 which was identified during an Office of Investigations (OI) investigation. Specifically, on February 6, 2006, materially inaccurate information was deliberately provided to Hatch Nuclear Plant on a Personal History Questionnaire. As a result, Unescorted Access was gained to the Protected Area of the Hatch Nuclear Plant from February 16 through March 27, 2006. The failure to disclose a prior positive drug test was material because it precluded the licensee from taking the information from this disclosure into consideration when determining trustworthiness and reliability prior to granting access to Hatch Nuclear Plant. The Access Authorization program objectives, as stated in 10 CFR 73.56(b), provide the NRC with high assurance that individuals granted Unescorted Access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public.
On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a contract security Lieutenant with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on activities that occurred on or about August of 2005. Specifically, Mr. Brumer deliberately removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency response weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. As a result, Mr. Brumer caused FPL to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 73. Mr. Brumer’s actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1), which states that an employee of a licensee or contractor, who knowingly provides to any licensee, applicant, contractor, or subcontractor, any components, equipment, materials, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's activities in this part, may not engage in deliberate misconduct that causes or would have caused, if not detected, a licensee or applicant to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order. Additionally, on or about February 19, 2006, Mr. Brumer provided a transcribed statement to an NRC Office of Investigations (OI) agent regarding his involvement in the breaking of a firing pin that was later determined to be incomplete and inaccurate. Mr. Brumer’s actions in this regard were in violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2), which states, in part, that an employee of a licensee or contractor may not deliberately submit to the NRC, a licensee, or a licensee=s contractor, information that the person submitting the information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC.
On January 22, 2008, an Immediately Effective Order prohibiting an individual, a contract security officer with the Wackenhut Corporation, from involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of five years from the date the Order was issued. The Order was issued based on activities that occurred on or about April of 2004. Specifically, Mr. Aguilar deliberately removed firing pins from two contingency response weapons, rendering the weapons non-functional. As a result, Mr. Aguilar caused FPL to be in violation of NRC Order for Interim Compensatory Measures, dated February 25, 2002, Section B.4(f). Mr. Aguilar’s actions in this regard constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50.5.